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Russian Roulette
Dr. Nina Khrushcheva: History, Evolution, and a View from Inside Russia
00:43:45
Max and Maria sit down with Dr. Nina Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at the New School and one of the world’s leading experts on Russia, to discuss her new Russian‑language book Nikita Khrushchev: Vozhd vne sistemy (“Nikita Khrushchev: An Outlier of the System”) and her experience as one of the few scholars still traveling to and from Russia. As Nikita Khrushchev’s great‑granddaughter and adoptive granddaughter, she offers a rare, personal view of how Russian culture, politics, and society are evolving.
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- [00:07]
A
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.
- [00:12]
B
And I'm Maria Snigavaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia.
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A
And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies. Hello and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman here with my co host as always, Maria Snagovaya. And today we're joined by a very special guest, the great Nina Khrushcheva. Dr. Kristeva is a professor of international affairs at the New School up in New York. Nina is a globally renowned expert on Russia and Russian politics, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of numerous books and publications. She's also an editor and a regular contributor to Project Syndicate. Her most recent book was published in Russian in 2024 under the title, and I'll say it in English, Nikita Khrushchev, an outlier of the System. Nina was perfectly positioned to write a biography of the Soviet leader, as she is, of course, Khrushchev's great granddaughter and adopted granddaughter. She's author of numerous great pieces and books. She recently also had an Peace and Foreign affairs titled Russia's Descent into How Four Years of War have Remade Society. Nina, thanks so much for joining us today.
- [01:33]
C
Thank you. Thank you for inviting me.
- [01:35]
A
So maybe we'll actually start with your book about your great grandfather, Nikita Khrushchev. What prompted you to write this book and what were some of the lessons that you pulled out of his tenure as leading the Soviet Union in his response to Stalin and what were some of the lessons, I think for the present?
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C
Well, thank you. I was not going to write the book about Khrushchev. As I keep saying, I'm not a professional Khrushchev. And my Uncle Sergei, now late Uncle Sergei, he wrote numerous books and I just never planned to be in that ilk also because people expect you to sort of write about this and why would you if others do it? Happily, but it was commissioned. I was in Moscow. It was Covid. I actually went to Moscow to write another book that I wanted to write in English called Putin and Women. And then suddenly I got a call that would be great and so on. And I am at that time, I am the only living Khrushchev who remembered living Khrushchev. So I am, as Fiona Kiel calls me, the last Khrushchev in this sense. And so I just couldn't refuse. I really wanted to refuse I was writing it for three years, and three years I was hoping something would happen and I would not have to write it. I don't know, something. So that prompted me. But then it became interesting just because I'm not. I don't work in the archives that much. I was reading material that I thought I knew, but I didn't. I was actually holding in my hand all the materials from 1934, 1937, with Stalin's signature, Wicheslav Molotov signature, kill this, punish this Khrushchev signature. We agree with Stalin's decision to punish these people. And it was terrifying. It was actually still 2020, and Russia was still open. It was before the war. And the archives were in a wonderful street, which was at the time, like Via Candoti in Rome, parts of Fifth Avenue. And so I was looking at this documents with Stalin and Khrushchev and Molotov and all these other signatures. And I was looking down on Louis Vuitton and there was another Prada shop that I could see only parts. And it seemed complete kind of schizophrenia. But it was also part of that interesting experience because at the time when we began to write it, I was thinking how far we've come. And then, of course, by the time I finished the book and the. We didn't go anywhere. We just did full circle and came back to what it was to those, punish, destroy, make sure that these people don't live and their families cannot function and whatnot. And so in this sense, it was momentous thing for me, because I was writing this book at the time, from the end of the thaw, because I would consider sort of by 2020, by the time when Putin changed the constitution, basically it was a constitutional coup with him being in power now forever. So that was. I began writing a book when the era of the thaw was over, was officially over. And so in this sense, it was interesting. So I was also writing it. I mean, I wrote a lot before 22, but the 22 was already approaching. Although I do want to say, and I always say that until like on February 22nd, when this. Republics, not republics, whatever, these regions were declared independent by the Russians. I still didn't think the 24th would come because I just. It was because it went against any Russian or anything. And at the time, it still seemed like Putin was. He was a gambler, but he was a careful gambler. I mean, it was a clearly in Afghanistan, in. On steroids, on this proportion that cannot even be seen yet, although we already seen enough. We've Already seen five years of Afghanistan, so can imagine what will happen in the next five. And so when I was writing it, essentially, I was also writing it with today in mind. How do you become a Stalinist? Which we've seen. You know, all these idiotic pronouncements and announcements and everything. It was even before Dmitry Medvedev went nuts, obviously. But it was kind of. Khrushchev was that kind of nuts. I mean, when he was a young Stalinist from nowhere coming in was this the Stalin. So they were called the young Stalinists who were. There were people of. I mean, at the time it was called the Lenin cohort, the cohort of 24. And later when Lenin died. And so the announcement was, well, going to be a new Communist. It was great. All these young people who were. No, nobody suddenly would become somebody's. And Khrushchev was screaming hell. I mean, only. I think only the Pravda was talking about Stalin as the greatest Marxian of all. I mean, others were slightly more restrained. And so it was important to see how this person who was very carnivalesque, I would even say carnival Medvedev today carnivalesque and his approach into politics in a very loud and screaming matter. Would I have archives. It turned out that my. I mean, I knew that my mother had archives. I didn't know what amazing archives she had with all the photographs and letters, because she never sorted them out. She would always get upset. And so they would be boxing. And boxes of this under her bed with noted. With sort of. With notes saying, Papa. And so papa was Khrushchev father. And just amazing. Anyway, so there were pictures of Khrushchev at that time and being completely enamored with Stalin. There was a picture of 1936. I think they were in mausoleum. And Khrushchev is looking at Stalin as if it's just. That's the greatest thing that happened to humanity. And then notes from my grandmother Nina, who said that he. When he would come home from meeting Stalin in early days, he. The only thing he would talk about is how wonderful Stalin is and how wonderful and how. And how empathetic and how sympathetic and how caring and how this and that. And she was a much greater former Communist than he was. She was an earlier Communist than he was. And even she thought there was a little too much because she was much more restrained. Anyway, that's what I was looking for. Is that how you believe in Stalin? And then you play that game, because you already played that game. Because when Putin is gone, I'm interested In knowing how, when all of them are going to say, when did they got disappointed in Putin? I'm just really, really interested in that. And I was looking for the moment when Khrushchev got disappointed in studying was of course World War II, Great Patriotic War beginning in 41. And by 43 he was beyond disappointed. I mean, he was still serving, he was still enthusiastic to some degree, but the admiration, adoration was gone. And the next thing I was looking for is that when it happens and when dictator dies, what do you do? Where do you turn? Do you continue with that? Do you become like cruciate? Because he was unusual for them. Everybody else would have had China today. I mean, nobody would ever have denounced Stalin. Everybody would have said, well, you know, they cut the trees and then the pieces just fly around. And Khrushchev thought, no, we can't do that. We actually need to restore humanity. I mean, of course when I say that I can be accused that he was a Soviet despot. He was not restoring. Absolutely. He was a Soviet despot, there is no question about it. And he used despotic methods. But the fact that he did want to restore humanity and was going about it only the way Soviet despot could in a very inconsistent, in a very dramatic, in a very punishing, in many ways matter. So we are going to open the Soviet Union to some degree, but if you're going to take it badly, I mean, if you're going to take it as a sign of absolute freedom developing. No, no, no, you're going to go to prison for that. It's like, okay, is it freedom or is it we're going to go to prison for freedom. I mean, then Hungary 56 was exactly that kind of double headed eagle. And so for me, Khrushchev was this absolute Russian is that he would go, he would move from one extreme to another, would have total split personality. Dis Pasternak would be accused of not being Soviet enough. You're not going to have your noble literature prize, because this is bourgeois prize. And then the next thing Khrushchev would ask, is the poet being published? It should matter to you. I mean, you just destroyed his everything. But you care about the poet being published. So on one hand you go very far and then you don't want to go far enough or you don't want, you want to go, you don't want to go too far. Curious. And the kind of final thing is how the thaw begins. I mean, you know, when this is over, will there be another Thor? How the Thor begins. And so my main lesson after finishing the book, I hope, I still hope, maybe it's too hopeful that for every stallion there is a Khrushchev. And that was kind of the outcome that I got, that I got out of this book. Because if there is a cruise ship with all the horrible inconsistencies and woe, with all the own restrictions that of course, Khrushchev brought forward, there was still an idea that the Russians or Russian people are not those little screws and some higher machinery of higher machinery of power. So they actually should have, but also should have a voice. And that I was uplifted. When I finished the book. It was of course immediately banned and censored. In fact, it was not supposed to be published exactly for this reason. And then luckily, because Russia is interesting and we can talk about it as Russia is in a weird way still, even if changes quickly, but in a weird way, especially in 23, even in 24, 25, it started reducing was a very porous Orwell, as I call it, George Orwell, with a lot of holes in Orwell. So you can actually have books like that published, even if originally they would be censored, but you can get through certain holes.
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B
Thank you very much, Nina. This is a beautiful description and really comprehensive overview of the Russian Soviet dynamic. Before we deep dive a little bit more into Khrushchev's personality, that, as I think you really beautifully described, was different somehow from the rest of the Kremlin elites, would you mind maybe providing a little bit of the description who the Soviet elites, the nomenclature were? Were they distinct from the rest of the society? Maybe they were absolutely like nature, product of the Soviet society. And to what extent, of course, these legacies are reproduced within the Russian, today's Russian elites. I'm going to hire. I have my own selfish reasons for asking that questions, given that I'm working on related topics, but that will help also understand what made Khrushchev so distinct, maybe so unique as a Russian leader, Soviet leader?
- [13:43]
C
Well, I don't know why he was. I mean, I don't have an answer to this. We can, you know, people say different things. I mean, some say, which is going to be really upsetting for a lot of other people, but I think it matters to some degree to his personality. He spent a lot of time in Ukraine and so he was far away. He was on the edge of empire. But that is not a satisfactory explanation, I guess, why he was different. He was certainly very carnivalesque. And I do think that Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian Political culture is very carnivalesque. So we're seeing it today with Vladimir Zelensky. So there's certainly some kind of performance in this Vyshyvanke, the outfits that they wear. So there's a lot of showing in it. And so Khrushchev was not Ukrainian. I keep reminding people he always wanted to be Ukrainian. He always kind of said, well, I am, but he was from the Kursk region. And in fact, my grandmother, who was Ukrainian, he was West Ukrainian. So she had three native languages, Polish, Ukrainian and Russian. And when Khrushchev often liked. Wanted to speak Ukrainian, she said, I always wanted to fall under the. Under the floor because it was so embarrassing. It was such a. Such a bad Russianized Ukrainian. So I think this part of it is that personality. He comes from a certain place where, I mean, Rutskoy was like that. Remember, he was one of those flamboyant politicians. I mean, a lot of them are similar. I mean, there's something about Ukrainian culture that is. Let's put it this way. But I mean, his own personality. Who knows why somebody is somebody else? It is bizarre. I mean, I agree. It is bizarre that he got in and he kind of got in, which is fine. He can get in, but got in and remained. That is a little bit strange, because one of the things that happened to the apparatus, to the nomenclature of that level, is that they then turn out to be very Molotov, like, very Malenkov, like they're very sort of performing the role of the apparatchik. And Khrushchev never performed the role of the apparatchik. That makes it different how he survived, among all others who performed the role of an apparatchik. That is a question for every biography of Khrushchev. Nobody really knows exactly how it happened, I think, because he was carnivalesque. He was playing a fool more than he was a fool. He was sort of playing a guy who they don't need to worry about. And he's a useful idiot for them because, I mean, one of the reasons Stalin, for example, sent him to Ukraine in 38 is because they needed this unification of east and West Ukraine. Who is going to do it? Which one of them is going to go do and unite? Nobody in that apparatus would have enough experience and force and willingness to go and do it, because everybody else was basically sitting at the table. They were sitting at the desk and they were giving instructions. And Khrushchev, from day one of his political career, he would put on boots and he would just go into the field. He was always in the field. And so Stalin knew to send somebody to do it from the field, in the field. And for that he was kept. I mean, one of the. I mean, it was interesting. Marie, you would, I don't know, maybe Max too. I don't know if you worked on this, but Maria probably did and looked into it. Who was standing when Stalin dies? Who stands on the mausoleum next to whoever? I mean, what is their order? I mean, in all the parades there's always an order and people criminology would figure out what it means. So suddenly Khrushchev would be an executor of Stalin's funeral, which is an important job. Oh, that means that he's. No, he's only there because he's going to execute. I mean, who else is going to do it? What Berry is going to do? It's just the crown will fall off his head if he needs to do it. Malinkov is going to write notes how to do it. So the only person who's going to do it is Khrushchev. So they put him in that position not because he was important, but because he's that doofus who's going to do it.
- [18:07]
B
And besides, on that one, if I may follow up, Nina, the tragicomic nature almost of Khrushchev has been described by some of the commentators. Maybe you can tell us a little bit how he managed to simultaneously be willing participant within the Stalinist system.
- [18:27]
C
Right.
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B
You describe him as an executor rather than initiative of Stalin's crimes, but in execution nonetheless, while at the same time important proponent and reform in some ways of the, of this, of the Stalinist system later on. So how do you make sense of this, this almost contradictory, I would say, personality, which is also famously depicted by the Soviet sculptor Ernst Nien Sviesnay in his famous culture at Khrushchev's tombstone that also combines black and white elements precisely to reflect these contradictions in Khrushchev's personality.
- [19:06]
C
Well, but Russia is contradictory. I mean, it is what it is. I mean, that's why Khrushchev is such a perfect Russian in this sense. I mean, you cannot. It's on one hand, on another hand, it's this very famous saying, Christiane Laptev Gagarin cosmos. It's the peasant in birch, birch shoes and Gagarin in space. And that's Russia. And that's what Khrushchev was because. And he was not shy of being that. Both. I mean, and that's, I think that makes him a Little different because everybody else would then become somebody else. They would become that apparatchik that would have to like, well, if I am the member of Politburo, I am going to. I mean, he tells. I mean, he was very unfair to Georgy Malenkov, one of his colleagues and very close friend, at some point saying, well, and when Malinkov would come to the front, he would carry the toilet, the special toilet with him because he was very important. Yes, Malenkov did this. I mean, because he did. He was like, well, you got into this position. So if you're in this position, you were supposed to have certain privileges which for Khrushchev really didn't matter. And I think that made him different and somehow never mattered to a certain point, not actually, not even to a certain point. Just never really mattered. Mattered that much. And so I don't think the contradiction is contradictory. I think actually the contradiction is what. That's why Russia is so difficult to be analyzed and to be read by, as Maria Zakharov would say, Anglo Saxons, just because it's, it's not evolutionary, it's not linear, it's all the things at once. And Khrushchev was all the things at once. But he was so in your face about this. He was so not shy about it. He was so obvious about it that that's why we're still debating how is it possible. And when I say that he was not initiated, he was an executioner, I do want. He was a willing executioner, not that he was coming to stand. It's like, well, I'm not going to, I'm not going to do that. Although there were times when he did. There were times when he really did at certain points, especially at the time later in the 49, I think when he got back to Moscow, there was a Leningrad case, as everybody knows. And so Stalin wanted a Moscow case because in Moscow it was the time when suddenly Russian republic wanted to have its own, like all republics wanted to have its own government and wanted to have its own everything. And Stalin really thought it was an. It's undermining his authority. And so he wanted to create that Moscow case. And Khrushchev said, well, anybody who read this reports the squealing reports. His line was he was either an idiot or a traitor. And so Stalin then kept chem asking him as he is he certain? Is he certain? I'm not kind of overestimating his rejection, Khrushchev's rejection of Stalin or overestimating his descent, but he sometimes would say, Things that Stalin would follow. And Stalin never punished him, although he actually threatened him quite a bit of times. And my feeling there was a very important Yugoslav Communist, Milo Van Gilas, who I forgot which year. I think 47, 40, whatever, whatever year. He wrote a book about the kind of describing all the Soviet upper right chicks at the time. Because he was dealing. Jilis was dealing with Stalin on behalf of Tito. And so kind of zealous describes this. One of the reasons Khrushchev is kept around is because he was the one who's going to do things. I mean, nobody else is going to do things. So they needed Khrushchev to do things. So yes, he was. It was unusual in, in a sense that it was in the open, because I would. I mean, I don't know, I can't predict this, but I would imagine that, for example, today's Kremlin changes how many people are going to come out of woodworks. All these elites that you're talking about come out of woodworks and saying, well, and I said to Putin something now, I mean, it's. The story already began with Cossack, which I for a second do not believe that all the things he said, like, oh, hang me, but I'm, you know, I'm gonna be, I'm gonna be against it. Please, nobody, nobody says these things unless it's in literature. So how many of them are going to say that? And I was against this and I was saying this and I wasn't hurt and I was manipulated and I was something, something. So Khrushchev was unusual just because he was pushing it out. It was obvious. It was so obvious you could not see it. But, but by them, by Molotov, by Malenkov, even later, he was considered a total fool that he was like that. And I think in this sense he was unusual. And I said that his legacy lasted until 2020, which is a remarkable run because his legacy, I mean, it was. Because Mikhail Gorbachev's legacy is a very important legacy. But ultimately it was Khrushchev's legacy that Mikhail Gorbachev picked up. Although, as you know, by the time it was over, suddenly Mikhail Gorbachev was even a play in Moscow called Gorbachev for a bit in Tyatarnadse, in the theater of nationalities in which he was. Oops. There was actually. Khrushchev was not mentioned at play once everybody's mentioned, including Putin, but Khrushchev was not mentioned. He always falls through the cracks because he's neither here nor there. He's not a. He's not a Stalin. He's not.
- [24:41]
B
He doesn't fit any narrative.
- [24:43]
C
He doesn't fit any narrative because he has his own. Suddenly in this play, who do you think Gorbachev came out of? He came out of Yuri Andropov and like, oh my God, how did that happen? So it's. He's like that. And Nizviesny's statue shows that. Nizviesny was genius with words, actually, precisely because he was such a great artist. So he called Khrushchev Chilav Kontrapunkt. He was a man in a counterpoint. There is thesis, so there is thesis, there antithesis, but there is no synthesis in it. And so his monument is that because Khrushchev himself said that when I die, they put all my deeds on two parts of the scale and the good ones and the bad ones. And I hope he didn't say it will. He said, and I hope the good ones will be heavier.
- [25:37]
A
You're one of the few people that have been traveling back and forth to Russia and the US and the west, and you wrote, I think, a very important piece in foreign affairs about Russia's descent into tyranny. And you've sort of seen changes in Russia since the full scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. I was wondering maybe if you could talk about what are the changes that you've seen? How has Russia evolved in the four years that Russia has been at war? What are some of the things that you have seen and how is Russian society evolving?
- [26:13]
C
Your program was not long enough for that. Well, at the beginning, when I first. So I first got in was June 22, and it was already. The borders were closed, was still Finland open. So I got into St. Petersburg. It was amazing. There was this crazy sun, you know, kind of burned by the sun. It was that absolute insane sun going in your face. And it seemed like you're getting into the. Into the city or into the country of soon to become apocalypses, just because the sun was like that. But then you walk around and I was shocked. You walk around St. Petersburg and suddenly there's still Angelina Jolie. That, that Maria would know all of these places next to Catherine the Great Stadium Nevsky in the little park. So there was this street artist and there would be Angelina Jolie and Barack Obama, and it was still that. And so I actually asked the guy and he's like, wait a minute. But didn't, you know, we're pivoting to Asia. And it was still funny in some Ways it wasn't tragic, but it was also kind of ridiculous because they promised pivot to Asia that very second. And the guy said to me, well, if I drew ccp, nobody's going to buy it. It's like, okay, well, that explains things to you. So the first year, it was supposed to be quick and fast. And so people were still protesting or were afraid to protest, but kind of lived through hoping that it's going to end soon. And then kind of at last that, I mean, there were George Orwell books everywhere. I mean, they're still actually everywhere, which is remarkable. You to bookstore, and there are four versions of George Orwell right there on display in front of. In front of. In front of the door. So kind of telling you exactly what to look for, where, what do you have to. What do you have to buy? But one of the things, I mean, one of the things that is expected always from Russian society, that it's going to be protesting because it disagrees with something. But that would be. And that's another thing that I learned in the book is that writing a book, that that's not what Russian society does. It never really has done it, because ultimately it is a society that never got out of 1862 when. When Russia stopped being serfdom. I know. I mean, it's a very horrible thing to say, but I mean, we have to accept it. It is still. And today, the way the authorities deal with Russians today, it's kind of the same thing. The same thing with Wistadian is that you are all Serbs. It doesn't matter how we call you the dictatorship of proletariat. And so Russians do. They do surrender to this. They are susceptible to this. So most of their protest is sort of with this kind of with the behind the back is under the table or something. And so when I was there, I knew that it would be very few protests in the open, because as my niece, who's 20 at the time, she said to me, well, if we're going to win, like you, meaning we in the west, you in the west expect us to go on the Kremlin, and don't you care that we're all going to get killed so that even young people would understand that they're going to get killed. But what was really amazing, how many this kind of underhanded protests that I've seen, I mean, and I was looking for them because a lot of journalists, a lot of Westerners, I guess, well, there are not that many Westerners, but people go and we have an idea What Russia is, which is not incorrect. But then you go to find how all Russians are susceptible to this 85% support Putin and whatnot. And I was going for different reasons. I mean, for different reasons. I was looking, not that I was going for different, but I was also looking for something else. What I was looking for, will Russia survive this as it did survive Stalinism, as it did survive Andropovism, as it did survive all these other. It's not going to get out easily or it's going to be tragic getting out, but will there be elements still remaining that will allow it to get out and have another thaw in another perestroika? And I saw that. I mean, it wasn't every day and everywhere, but a lot of it was there. And so at the beginning, and I was sort of, when I was looking at the emotional scale, I mean, I even studied, because I was talking to psychiatrists there, and I even started thinking in this, in this terms, because it is a psychological disease in some ways that Russia kind of always wants to circumvent and adjust to the despotic system, rather than. I mean, Maria and I were talking about this last month. Yuri Lottman wrote a book which is called Culture and Explosion, in which he talks about paradox of tyranny. So Russians are willing to tolerate the worst despots in history because they're afraid that it's going to get worse. And then you really see that, that like on larger scale, they afraid it's going to get worse. I mean, it's getting worse, but they afraid it's going to get worse. And so in some ways, it's like that straight jacket. And you think, oh, I can tolerate this. Oh, it's more. I can tolerate this. And I can tolerate this until it's going to completely strangle you and kill you, but you're going to tolerate until it kills you rather than fight at the beginning of the strangulation. I mean, that. That's what it is. And I'm just stating that. And so you see how all the straitjacket is getting tighter. And so the range of emotions, first was despair and disbelief, then sort of shock, then despair and then disbelief, then anger, then fear, then apathy, but not even apathy. Last summer was changing, actually, because fear lasted until 25. But then when Stravoji, the former governor, of course, committed suicide, and when WhatsApp was blocked for phone calls and something I forgot, whatever, some other things were happening. And so then you suddenly see that it's no longer fear, but people Feel, screw you. I mean, the more you're going to push me into that corner, the more I'm just going to like, I cannot care about this anymore because it is ridiculous and it makes no sense. And so it is interesting, sort of the more in this last year. Exactly year when it seems to me much better understanding that from all this kind of rearranging Russia's unique civilization with a special something something. But, you know, one of the things that another philosopher writer Abram Tierz, Andrey Sinyavsky, was saying in his work from Gulag, by the way, I mean, later, Gulag, saying that you really cannot invent that many emotions. I mean, I'll try. Ultimately, they're all going to come to the same range. I mean, he was talking about in a prison camp, what people are feeling. And so it was sort of this screw you feeling in the summer. And now the feeling is that with all this idea of great civilization and how it's going to be rearranging. I'm sure you remember the beginning of the war. Oh, the new economy, Nova economies like which Nova economic. I mean, there's only that many moves that you can invent. And so all Nova economic cartoon, this new economy turned into basically military industrial complex that eliminates everything else. But it was a normal economy. We're just going to do this. It's going to be like that. Like what? It is america of the 19th century again. No, that's not how it works anymore. And certainly not in Russia. That's not america of the 19th century. In this sense. Last year was important because Karol Goli turned. I mean, now a lot of people see that the king is naked and Evgeny Shvard's play, Drakkon the Dragon is being played around me. It's like you walk around Moscow and you suddenly like, oh. And you see like, oh, Drakkon. It was written by hand. So there's just the whole group of people just performing that play. So you see that as a sign of we don't go on the Kremlin with guns and sticks, but we are just doing it the way we're doing it. And so I think in the last year, many understand that Putin is just a banal authoritarian because all these ideas that he's having 10 chess games and he's ahead of. Oh, we just haven't gotten to why what this great chess move is going to be. It's like, no, it's just ultimately authoritarianism. And that's another thing that is interesting is that, I mean, now the more diversity in Authoritarians, I mean, there is Narendra Modi, there is Erdogan, there was Viktor Orban. They're all different in some ways, but generally authoritarianism, ultimately, when they get to the final point or to the point of their desire for full dictatorship, then they're just very basic. It's really very basic. It's either me or everybody or everybody else. And that year showed it. And so now I was talking to a colleague who is there now also goes a journalist, and he said, since last year, I cannot talk to people anymore. I mean, there's a lot of fear. And I said, I actually don't think it's fear. I think people are not that afraid anymore. I mean, they are afraid, but they're not that afraid anymore. It's that idea that one time I actually spoke to Abram Tiert, to Andrei Senyat, I think it was 95, when he was in New York, shortly before his death. And he said to me this amazing thing, and I haven't thought of it since 95. I mean, that's amazing. So I haven't thought of it for 30 years. And I was in Moscow last time in March, and I thought of this exactly that. It's not fear. I mean, fear is there now. It's an underlying emotion. But what is there? He said, when I was in prison, when I was in Camp Nanara. So what is it on the bunk? On the bunks. That's how he said it. On the bunks in a room in that place where they were all kept. He said, we never spoke about politics. And I said, why? And he said, because what's the point of talking about politics when you're in prison? And so I just suddenly felt that what's the point of talking about politics when you basically feel, I mean, it's not a gulag, I'm not comparing it to gulag, but the emotional form is. Is very gulag. Like, so what's the point of talking about politics? While at the beginning of the war, when I would go there and I would go to a coffee shop and would walk around in the evening and go to places where young people gather, the only thing they talked about was the war. The only thing they talked about for first year and a half, the only thing was the conversation about the war, about how Ukraine. And so we are going to win, we are not going to win. Somebody would say, how dare you to say we're going to win. What about Ukrainian children? And so. But you would hear it all the time. But here, by the way, the Story was, oh, somebody would squeal and you'll get arrested. Maybe somebody would squeal and somebody did squeal somewhere. But in my experience for the first year and a half, the conversation was completely open and the conversation was everywhere.
- [37:21]
B
And that's a great way, Nina, to connect this to our last question that I want to ask you because I think your impressions are very valuable because they really nicely talk to also more recent evidence that we get from Russia. For example, the polling showing some frustration accumulating within the Russian society with the war, you know, with the way the things are even with Putin. And I think your personal impressions really nicely cross check that evidence. So then the question and also connecting to your book on Khrushchev, then where does it leave us? Do you think there's a realistic way in which the public opinion may impact the criminal decision making based on everything you've learned about how you know the crime decision making works when writing your book?
- [38:07]
C
No, I don't think it will. I mean it's not that they care anymore. We actually don't even know what gets to Putin. I think something gets to him. It's not. But we don't know. I mean look, 25 years Khrushchev actually tells a very enlightening story of how when Stalin dies and they walk around his dacha after his death and sort of looking at open closets and look at desk drawers and what they find and how they find. And so one of the things that they see in his office is the incredible amount of red folders of red envelopes urgent secret. And none of them are opened. And some of them are open just because his secretary would open open them to pretend that Stalin still cares. But Stalin was only caring about the enemies of the people and his own rule and how his own rule may or may not suffer from those enemies of the people. So the kind of the uncovered there and cover the environment. And I think that that's what we're seeing today where we are not seeing it in that probably slightly more diverse because 21st century is slightly more diverse and there's still more groups and also was running Stalin's world. And now we have Putin and KGB on top. But his administration is still at least until recently was the civilian administration was writing the war and that's why it was special military operation. Now of course it was outsourced to the uncovered day and they're not even KGB people anymore. This is uncover the types and so it's outsourced to them. But there's still clashes on with civilians. And so it's more complex, I think, to some degree. I don't know where it's going to go. I actually think it's going to last much longer than we think. I mean, I still think it's Afghanistan as is, because it's all gone so far. And also current power like Putin, not Putin, because there was a baby Putin who still could have kind of manipulated and pushed back and moved forward, forward and somehow. But that, that Putin, that Stalinesque Putin, he doesn't. He's ossified. He's not going to go anywhere. He's not going to admit anything. I mean, if anything, he's going to get to the very end because he cannot possibly believe that he could possibly, once again, like Stalin, would make mistakes. So it's either going to be something forced and something over, or it's going to be physical interruption of, of life. And then normally, because Russia's history is pendulum swing, you have remission, oppression, remission oppression. Normally, hopefully it can be another thaw. But at the same time, I think what they've done in NKVD ing the whole system, even Stalin didn't, because this system was abruptly turned backwards. I mean, Stalin's system was still moving forward in some ways, but this one was abruptly moved backwards. And those who moved it backwards, would they be willing to give up something? So Maria and I actually had this, once again, that conversation last month. And I would now hope for Beria. I mean, I would hope for Khrushchev, but I would hope for Beria. Because when Beria took over, of course, not officially, but he did take over after Stalin. He was the most important man in the government at the time. If we talk about the elites, even Berish started dismantling the Gulags because he thought that that repressive system is a road to nowhere. I mean, would they be somebody. Forget Gorbachev, forget Khrushchev, somebody there who would understand that you need to dismantle the traditional values. The marrying at the age of 12 and giving birth to children, canceling education. I mean, Iran now opened the Internet. I mean, my God, this is actually theocracy that opened the Internet understanding that after 88 days, it's problematic. I don't see whoever is there running all these Internet closures. We really need to open. We look bad. And it does. It really doesn't. It doesn't bode well for the future. I don't think so. I think they would say we don't need the future. We're just going to have 11 time zones and develop whatever it is we're developing. And as Stalin said, one time and one separately taken country.
- [42:27]
A
Nina, thank you so much for joining us. Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there. I want to thank you for coming on Russian Roulette. It's been a fascinating conversation and incredibly wide ranging. We're going to put a link to your book and some of your other pieces in the show notes. Really encourage our audience to go check those out. And thank you for joining us on Russian Roulette.
- [42:48]
C
Thank you.
- [42:56]
B
You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you've enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.
- [43:01]
A
Russian Roulette releases new episodes every two weeks and is available wherever you get your podcasts. So please subscribe to our show, share our episodes online and give us a five star rating. Also, be sure to check out our sister podcast, the Europa, where we talk Europe through a Washington lens. This show is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
- [43:21]
B
Also, don't forget to subscribe to the CSIS channel on YouTube for live and recorded video events featuring leading experts. Finally, you can read all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at the center for Strategic and International Studies website csis dot org.