Hanna Notte on What the Israel-Iran War Means for Russia

Summary

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Russian Roulette: "Hanna Notte on What the Israel-Iran War Means for Russia"

Podcast: Russian Roulette
Host(s): Max Bergman, Maria Snegovaya
Guest: Dr. Hanna Notte
Release Date: June 27, 2025
Duration (main content): ~00:06–00:35 MM:SS

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Episode Overview

This episode of the CSIS "Russian Roulette" podcast features Dr. Hanna Notte, director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and non-resident senior associate at CSIS. The hosts and Dr. Notte dissect recent escalations between Israel and Iran—focusing on missile strikes, nuclear threats, and the broader repercussions for Russia’s foreign policy, its leverage in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the future of Russia-Iran cooperation.

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Major Discussion Points & Insights

1. Russia’s Calculus in the Israel-Iran War

[01:22–06:34]

• Dr. Notte outlines how Moscow's initial perception was that turmoil in the Middle East could benefit Russia, mainly by diverting Western attention away from Ukraine and allowing Russia to weaponize allegations of Western hypocrisy.
• However, the direct Israel-Iran escalation exposed Iran as weak and highlighted Russia’s limited power projection capacity in the region.
• Russia prefers “small fires”—calibrated regional tensions where it can play a broker—rather than all-out escalation, where it lacks capacity to intervene.
• “Russia in the Middle East has always looked towards fueling what I would call small fires, right? Calibrated tensions and conflict… But the moment that you have a big escalation like we just saw… Russia doesn’t actually have the capacity or the bandwidth to be really a factor.” (Hanna Notte, 05:37)
• The fall of Assad and the weakening of Iran has left Russia with notably less influence and leverage; observers compare Israel's swift military success in the region to Russia's stagnation in Ukraine.

2. Evolution of Russia-Israel Relations

[06:34–12:05]

• The relationship has always been multi-layered: historical ties, a significant Russian-speaking Israeli population, economic links, and strategic coordination over Syria.
• Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, relations cooled, particularly after Russia adopted a more pro-Palestinian stance post-October 7 and with anti-Semitic rhetoric increasing in Russian official discourse.
• Even so, Israel values keeping communication lines with Moscow open, seeing Russian presence in Syria as preferable to Turkish dominance and wary of Russian-Iranian defense cooperation.
• “Putin is not an anti-Semite, not at all. There are certain things he would not do to jeopardize the security of the state of Israel. But… if he has to use anti-Semitism instrumentally because it serves him in the war in Ukraine, he will do it.” (Hanna Notte, 10:48)

3. Russia’s Domestic Position and Rhetoric

[12:05–17:46]

• At the UN, Russian diplomats vocally condemn U.S. strikes. Yet, Moscow’s practical response is muted: Putin sends best wishes to Tehran, but offers no tangible support.
• Hanna Notte highlights Russia’s careful rhetorical balance—condemning Israel only moderately compared to past events, as it recognizes Israeli military supremacy and avoids overcommitting to Iran.
• The threat of instability in Iran is a genuine Russian concern, given possible impacts on the South Caucasus and Russia’s declining regional bandwidth.
• “There’s a long-standing concern in Moscow about unrest in Iran… conflict with Iran destabilizing the South Caucasus.” (Hanna Notte, 16:53)

4. Projecting Forward: Russian Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Program

[17:46–25:00]

• Given the U.S. and Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Russia has limited leverage over what happens next.
• Despite its legacy as a JCPOA participant, Moscow’s ability to shape diplomacy is constrained—especially since even Iran is likely disappointed by the lack of concrete Russian support.
• Iran’s reliance on Russia for reconstituting defense capabilities is now uncertain; trust may shift toward China depending on Russia’s ability to supply air defense systems—hampered by its own war requirements.
• “I think from an Iranian perspective, you might be disappointed with what Russia has or hasn’t done for you… but you will still want Russia and China involved in [diplomacy], because you are even less likely to trust the United States.” (Hanna Notte, 21:31)

5. Military and Defense Supply Dynamics

[25:00–27:29]

• With depleted S-300/S-400 stocks and manufacturing overstretched by the Ukraine war, Russia cannot resupply Iran effectively.
• Iran’s air defense vulnerabilities are acute; the likelihood of turning to other suppliers, particularly China, is increasing.
• “That, I think, is a huge problem right now for Iran, which is airspace is now completely open to the Israelis… because they are completely… at the mercy effectively of Israeli air force.” (Max Bergman, 25:38)
• Israel’s October strikes impaired Iranian-operated Russian air defenses; there’s no clarity on Russian willingness or capacity to provide replacements.

6. Limits of the Russia-Iran Military Partnership

[27:29–31:32]

• Hanna Notte asserts that Russia’s critical dependence on Iranian drones peaked early and is now subsiding—thanks to domestic production and redesign efforts, plus heavy Chinese support.
• Iranian military aid to Russia (e.g., drones, Fatah 360 missiles) is now less crucial; North Korea and China have emerged as bigger supporters for Moscow.
• “There was some shells and ammunition, but I don’t think that the quantities were so meaningful… Russia cannot have an acute need for Iranian missiles. Otherwise, we would see them on the battlefield.” (Hanna Notte, 28:47)

7. Economic and Strategic Ramifications

[31:32–32:29]

• Economic cooperation—such as the North-South Transport Corridor and Caspian trade—is mostly aspirational; instability in Iran would jeopardize these already limited plans.
• Prolonged Middle East conflict saw only a brief, unsustained spike in oil prices—not enough to salvage Russia’s fiscal outlook.

8. Wider Implications and Final Analysis

[34:04–35:39]

• Dr. Notte urges skepticism of the “axis of upheaval” thesis (Russia-China-Iran-North Korea strategic alignment), as recent events show hesitation and limited commitment between partners when tested.
• On the global stage, rising “might makes right” dynamics (what Notte calls a “more Hobbesian world”) may not ultimately benefit Russia, as it is too weakened by its Ukraine quagmire to take advantage of the new order it helped foster.
• “This is perhaps the kind of world that Russia thinks is more amenable to it… But actually, Russia doesn’t have the means to really play in this kind of world, especially while it’s still bogged down in an unwinnable war in Ukraine.” (Hanna Notte, 34:54)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Russia’s Real Capabilities:
  • “The moment that you have a big escalation like we just saw… Russia doesn’t actually have the capacity or the bandwidth to be really a factor.” (Hanna Notte, 05:37)
• On Instrumental Use of Anti-Semitism:
  • “If he has to use anti-Semitism instrumentally because it serves him in the war in Ukraine, he will do it.” (Hanna Notte, 10:48)
• On Iranian Disillusionment:
  • “From an Iranian perspective, you might be disappointed with what Russia has or hasn’t done for you during this phase of active combat.” (Hanna Notte, 21:31)
• On Military Dependencies Shifting:
  • “Russia's reliance on Iran reached its peak maybe one year into the war… and has subsided since.” (Hanna Notte, 27:35)
• On the “Axis of Upheaval”:
  • “What are these partners willing to do for each other when push comes to shove? And I think we've actually seen both Russia and China being real cautious…” (Hanna Notte, 34:17)
• On Russia’s Hobbesian World:
  • “This is perhaps the kind of world that Russia thinks is more amenable to it… but actually Russia doesn’t have the means to really play in this kind of world.” (Hanna Notte, 34:54)

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Key Timestamps

• Context Setting: [01:22–06:34]
• Russia-Israel Relationship: [06:34–12:05]
• Russian Rhetoric and Internal Concerns: [12:05–17:46]
• Projecting Forward & Iran-Russia Nuclear Dynamics: [17:46–25:00]
• Comparison of Air Defense and Supply Constraints: [25:00–26:22]
• Limits of Russia-Iran Defense Partnership: [27:29–31:32]
• Economic and Energy Ramifications: [31:32–34:04]
• Axis of Upheaval and Concluding Analysis: [34:04–35:39]

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Takeaway

This episode unpacks how the current Israel-Iran conflict has exposed the limits of Russia’s ability to shape events in the Middle East and revealed the fragility of alliances between Russia, Iran, and China. Far from reaping the benefits of regional instability, Moscow finds itself sidelined—its resources drained by Ukraine, its traditional partners weakened, and its capacity for decisive intervention further curtailed.

Summary in Hanna Notte’s words:
“It’s really a mixed balance sheet for them, I think.” (34:58)

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Transcript

[A]

Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.

[B]

And I'm Maria Snigavaya, Senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia.

[A]

And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies. Welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman here with my co host Maria Snegevaya. And today we are speaking with our fantastic colleague in Berlin, Hanna Noti. Hanna is the director of the Eurasia Non Proliferation Program at the James Martin center for Non Proliferation Studies and most importantly, a non resident senior associate within our very own Europe Russia Eurasia Program here at csis. Hanna's work covers many topics, but she's particularly focused on Russian foreign policy in the Middle east in the context of Israel conflict. She set a number of recent pieces out, one in the Atlantic and one in the Financial Times, that we'll put in the show notes. And we're going to discuss today Russia and the Middle east, the fallout of Israel strikes on Iran and what this means for Russia and for Russia's war in Ukraine and its posture in the Middle East. So Hannah, welcome to the show.

[C]

Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure.

[A]

Okay, so let's begin with some context. First, let's talk about how the events in the Middle east over the last few weeks, the outbreak of renewed hostilities between Israel and Iran and then the US Strikes on three sites connected to Iran's nuclear program have been understood and viewed in Moscow. How is Russia reacting to Israel strikes, to the US Strikes? How are they perceiving events in the Middle East?

[C]

Yeah, Max, I think if we take a few steps back and look at the situation really broadly, there are perhaps some benefits here for Russia from this renewed war that were emphasized by Russian commentators early on. And we can talk about this later, later. But I would say that overall this is an undesirable situation that is presenting itself to Moscow because Iran, its strategic partner, has been exposed as very weak and vulnerable. And I want to sort of step a few steps back and put this in context because I think there was an expectation after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, that Russia could benefit from this turmoil that was ushered in by this attack. And then Israel responded militari because political attention was diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East. US Military hardware was going to the Middle east last year as we entered this protracted period of Israel taking on Iran and Iran's partners in the axis of resistance and they responded. And of course, Russia could also tap into notions of hypocrisy, of Western double standards when it came to reactions to the war in Ukraine on the one hand, and then to events in the Middle east and particularly the war in Gaza on the other. And so that seemed to benefit Russia. And Russia could continue this anti Western tilt of its Middle east policy that we've seen since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, nudging closer to Iran, keeping Syria stable without putting too much effort in keeping Iran at a nuclear threshold status. That was sort of the situation as it presented itself to Russia. But then I would argue that the dynamics ushered in by October 7 actually proved too intense for Russia to steer in a favorable direction. And they exposed the limitations of Russian power in the Middle East. Last year, as we saw this escalation between Israel on the one hand and Iran and its partners on the other, especially with the direct strikes in April and October of last year, Russia wasn't really anywhere to be seen. Russia did not come to Iran's support then. And ultimately these dynamics, they are not the only factor that explains why the Bashar Al Assad regime fell in Syria in December. I think that's a complex story, but I think Israel decimating Hezbollah was certainly an enabling factor here. And so we're in a situation where if you look at sort of the balance sheet from Russia today, Assad is gone in Syria now, Iran has been considerably weakened. And we're sort of entering a period where some are talking about Israeli military superiority in the Middle East. And if you look at what just happened in that 12 day war, observers are drawing comparisons between the massive superiority of the Israeli air force claiming control of the skies over Tehran and comparing that with what has eluded Russia in three years in Ukraine, which is air superiority over Ukraine, or drawing comparisons between Ukraine's air defenses and Iranian air defenses. So I think this is an undesirable picture overall that presents itself to Russia. Russia must worry going forward about the prospects of further strikes of further confrontation between Israel and Iran, which might only weaken Iran further. And we can talk about what that actually might mean for Russia, you know, what an internal destabilization of Iran, let alone regime change, might mean. Russia must also worry about the prospects of the decimation or even the dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program. And you know, my point here, Max, is really that Russia in the Middle east has always looked towards fueling what I would call small fires, right? Calibrated tensions and conflict in Iran that is sitting at a Nuclear threshold status, but not exceeding it, because that is a situation in which Russia can play. But the moment that you have a big escalation like we just saw over the last two weeks, Russia doesn't actually have the capacity or the bandwidth to be really a factor. And I would actually argue that even without the war in Ukraine, it's quite unlikely to me that we would have seen Russia intervene militarily directly into a confrontation between Israel and Iran, let alone the United States and Iran. Because Russia's Middle east policy over the last 10 years has always been geared towards avoiding that kind of escalation. So I think that is sort of broadly the picture as it presents itself to Moscow. It's a more undesirable than desirable situation.

[A]

In Russia's relationship with Israel, it's a rather sort of complicated relationship. There's a lot of Russian Israelis. Russia having intervened in Syria, had kind of established, I guess a businesslike relationship with Israel is maybe how I might characterize it. But that's also evolved with the collapse of Assad and Russia sort of having less leverage and influence in the region. Right. So what's the Russia, Israel relationship and how would you kind of characterize that presently?

[C]

Yeah, you noted a few of its pillars or its dimensions. I agree that it's multi layered and complex. President Putin actually invested quite a bit into that relationship over the last two decades. There's been an economic relationship. There's the large Russian speaking, not just Russian, but Russian speaking, diaspora in Israel. And if you go to places like Haifa, I think you'll hear almost as much Russian as you'll hear Arabic and Hebrew. Russia priding itself on playing a role on the Israel Palestine conflict. That's a long standing tenet of Russian foreign policy back in the Middle East Quartet. But also later we had this interesting alignment when Putin first came to power, I think with an Israeli government, both Russia and Israel bandwagoning with the global war on terror, sort of an alignment between Putin and Ariel Sharon at that time. And then, yes, after 2015, Russia became what the Israelis like to call our neighbor to the north with Russia's military presence in Syria. And it was then very clear that you had to deconflict with Russia. And there's always been a long standing concern also over Russian Iranian defense cooperation. What Russia might or might not do for Iran, what we've seen, I would say with the full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, is a certain chill in the relationship. Not immediately, by the way. I think, you know, when the invasion started you had Naftali Bennett still leading the government, who tried to mediate. It was a very short lived effort. But I think the relationship really cooled when Yahya Lapid took over from Bennett. I think that that summer you had a debate in Israel over how the country should position itself over the war in Ukraine. I think with some arguing that now was the time to sort of go all in with Israel's Western allies and condemn Russia and stand with Ukraine. But actually there was a more realist camp, let's call it this, which I think Bibi Netanyahu belongs to, that argued. Well, we cannot afford doing that. And this is not our war and we are in a dangerous neighborhood and Russia remains in Syria and Russia has a relationship with Iran. So we need to keep talking with the Russians. That argument won out, is still prevalent. It still holds. I think what happened after October 7th, Max, is that we've had Russia adopting a more pro Palestinian posturing on the war in Gaza. Even if you accept that there was always an affinity for the Palestinian cause in the Soviet and then the Russian Foreign Ministry. I think previously Russia tried to be a bit more evenhanded, but that sort of fell by the Wayside after October 7th. And we have a certain anti Semitic rhetoric in Russian media and even among Russian officials. And certainly I think that disappointed many in Israel and it caused a cooling in relations or maybe a realization in Israel that this is really the Russia we're dealing with now. We have sort of no more illusions, Right? But at the same time also an understanding that this is just what Russia is doing because its priority is the war in Ukraine and the confrontation with the west over Ukraine. It's very interesting to me. I was in Israel earlier this year, had many conversations about the Israel Russia relationship. And what interlocutors keep emphasizing is Putin is not an anti Semite, not at all. There are certain things he would not do to jeopardize the security of the state of Israel. But of course, if he has to use anti Semitism instrumentally because it serves him in the war in Ukraine, he will do it. So I think that is the reading in Israel, but the argument that Israel has to retain a modicum of relations with Russia, that argument prevailed. I would say that it even holds now with Russia gone, well, not gone from Syria. The Russians are still in Syria. They are still present at the military bases in Tartus. And I think that it's even preferable to Israel that the Russians stay, because the last thing that Israel wants is a Syria that is very dominated by Turkey. And I think the Israelis also understand that, you know, even though Russia didn't emerge as Iran's knight in shining armor defending Iran in this round of confrontation, Russia is still a factor when it comes to Iran's future military capabilities. They still have a defense relationship. And so I think there's this notion if we talk with Russia, if we have a reasonably decent relationship, we can at least exercise some influence on the margins. And I think actually the Israelis feel vindicated if they look at what's actually happened, because they will say, well, Russia did not give the SU35 advanced fighter aircraft to Iran last year or certain other offensive capabilities. And so, you know, I think that's how the Israelis basically look at the relationship today.

[B]

Thank you, Hanna. What about Russia's own domestic position on the issue? Russia's permanent resident of the un, Vasili Ni Bienzia, has openly condemned US Strikes against Iran, claiming that they have opened a Pandora's box that would place the whole world on the verge of nuclear catastrophe. But in the meantime, when it comes to actual actions in response to the Ayatollah's appeal to Moscow help, Putin sent his best wishes to the Iranian leadership, but wasn't really eager to take any concrete action. In your opinion, is this an appropriate reaction for Moscow, given everything that you've described? What would the potential consequences of this current situation be for Russia going forward, especially if the conflict does not just stop here, but escalates further?

[C]

Yeah, it's an interesting question, Maria. And let's talk for a moment about the rhetorical reaction, because I think we can then also separately talk about the military reaction and what Russia could have conceivably done before, during, or now after this fighting. But as to the rhetorical reaction, I think, I mean, the Russian Foreign Ministry is saying what it needs to say on the UN Security Council and elsewhere. Right. I mean, there is the argument that Israel violated international law with this, what the Russians call aggression. And even Putin, when he met with the Iranian Foreign Minister in Moscow earlier this week, said this was an aggression that was completely unprovoked. So that is kind of the official Russian position that you would expect. But I find it very interesting and very important that Russia has really not gone overboard with kind of anti Israeli remarks this time around, especially if you compare it to the Russian rhetoric amid the war in Gaza. So when this fighting started, when Operation Rising Line started on that day, Putin called both the Iranian president as well as Bibi Netanyahu when he talked in St. Petersburg at the International Economic Forum last week about this conflict. I thought he was trying to be very even handed in his language. He talked about interests of both sides. You know, Iran's legitimate interest to have civil nuclear energy, but also Israel's need for security and that circle could be squared, that a solution could be found. He noted the Russian speaking diaspora in Israel when he spoke in St. Petersburg. So it's a more evenhanded and I would say less Israel critical rhetoric that we're seeing from the Kremlin. And now the question is, why is that? What explains that? I think there's one element here that is just a Russian recognition of Israeli strength and might that has also come out, I think, in Russian commentary over the last two weeks. This idea that I think Margarita Simonyan sort of tweeted it very early into the conflict, the stronger winds and Israel is that stronger party. So if we are indeed entering a period in which Israel is sort of so vastly militarily superior in the Middle east and Iran is very weak, if you're Russia, do you want to sort of go all in with Iran rhetorically, perhaps? That question was thought through in Moscow. And the other factor here is Trump and the United States. I think, you know, there's been a desire and we can talk more about, you know, how all this relates to the Russian American relationship. But I think there's been a desire ever since Trump re entered the White House and signaled a desire for a certain rapprochement with Russia. There's been a desire by Russia to be receptive to those overtures and to make the conversation about geopolitical dossiers and not about Ukraine. So to signal to the Trump administration that one can talk about the Arctic or Iran, and of course you want to signal that you can be helpful. And that also probably informed the Russian rhetoric over the last two weeks, you know, to kind of point to legitimate interests on all sides and the need to return to diplomacy and the negotiating table and to telegraph a Russian willingness to be helpful. Now, there were some concerns also in the Russian rhetoric, those warnings of World War three and nuclear war, I think those were hyperbolic. And I mean, I must just add that Russian lamentations about attacks on nuclear facilities in Iran and lamentations about Israel and the United States undermining the nuclear non proliferation regime, one can agree with those. But they're pretty rich coming from Russia. Right. If you consider that Russia has occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for, you know, more than the last three years. So we've had that. But I think the real concern in Russia has not been about that. It's been about internal unrest in Iran being provoked by this fighting all the way leading up to potentially regime change and a very unknown situation in Iran and what that would mean for the future of the relationship and then what it means regionally. I think there's a long standing concern in Moscow about unrest in Iran, conflict with Iran destabilizing the South Caucasus. I think we've had some reports during the last two weeks of Iranians making it across the border to Armenia. I don't think that those numbers were vast, but these are the kinds of scenarios I think that Russia worries about. And that a greatly weakened Iran will also have implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus, where already Turkey is quite strong. And this is a region for which Russia has only had so much bandwidth itself over the last three years. So I think these are concerns in Moscow and they're actually not new. They're long standing concerns going back at least two decades.

[A]

Let's project ahead a little bit. So the U.S. has struck Iranian nuclear sites. We're recording. On June 25, there was just a press conference at the NATO summit in which President Trump was quite defensive about leaks that came from the Defense Intelligence Agency that basically said that this didn't sort of permanently set back Iran's nuclear program and it may have only set it back months. President was quite defensive about that, saying that, no, no, no, this sort of really pushed it back further. It does strike me that where we are now is that Iran's program has been significantly hit. The Israelis, I think, have a problem in that they're not going to be 100% that Iran is not going to be able to rush to get a nuclear weapon. Even if they have tremendous and exquisite intelligence inside of Iran. There's always that paranoia of what don't you know? And this is sort of what in the lead up to the Iraq war, oftentimes it's described as the US Lied about the intelligence that it had. Well, the US Intelligence community firmly believed that Iraq had wmd, but it didn't quite have the intel to prove that. And I feel like where we may be heading is a place where the Iranians want to try to engage with the United States, but at the same time rush to basically get a nuclear weapon in order to deter the Israelis. Now, for Russia, I would think that Iran rushing to get a nuclear bomb is not in their interest. The Russians were part of the jcpoa. So projecting forward here, how does Russia then approach this situation in like, let's say, six months, a year from now. The Israelis are on edge, potentially wanting to strike again. Meanwhile, the Iranians are going to try to turn to the Russians to try to rebuild their stockpiles of air defense. I don't know how the Russians are going to be able to meet those needs given the war in Ukraine. So how is Russia going to sort of posture itself going forward when it comes to Iran's nuclear program and the potential that this isn't over and that this is sort of stage one and what will be sort of an ongoing conflict over the next few years?

[C]

Yeah. You asking the million dollar questions?

[A]

Yeah, a lot's in there.

[C]

You know, I mean, there's so many, so much uncertainty about how all this is going to shake out going forward, whether we will see renewed confrontation, military confrontation, and this isn't over between Israel and Iran. I think that's entirely conceivable given where we're at or return to the negotiating table. I believe that Trump also said today that apparently the United States and Iran will meet next week. I mean, as a general remark, I don't think that Russia has a whole lot of leverage over how this situation in its entirety will shake out, but let's sort of address it on the political and diplomatic front and then on the military front. I mean, on the political, diplomatic front. Of course, Russia has a long history being involved in the diplomacy. On the nuclear file, you mentioned it, it was a party to the jcpoa. It was involved all the way up to the invasion of Ukraine and beyond that in talks to restore a nuclear deal. And then those talks sort of fell through, I think, in fall 2022. But there's a sort of legacy Russian role. And initially it seemed that President Trump would welcome Russian support in negotiations with Iran. But more recently he seems to have called to that idea. It seems to me, I think he said now on at least two occasions that it's very nice of President Putin to offer to help on Iran, but he should sort of mediate his own conflict first. He should deal with Ukraine first. So that is interesting. I think from an Iranian perspective, you might be disappointed with what Russia has or hasn't done for you during this phase of active combat. Now, having said that, if you Iran, you're also strategically absolutely isolated and vulnerable right now. So I think you will still want Russia and China involved in multilateral or international diplomacy because you are even less likely to trust the United States after what just happened over the last two weeks. So I think from an Iranian perspective, there's probably a desire for a Russian role. But before we can ask sort of what role Russia can play in any mediation or negotiation or political front, we kind of have to ask, what are we talking about? Are we talking about sort of diplomacy between the US And Iran on some sort of deal, some kind of post JCPOA deal? That depends on where the negotiating positions go. Because before this latest war, the problem was that you had irreconcilable positions between a Trump administration that said zero enrichment and an Iran that sees that as essentially surrender. If that remains the playing field, then I don't really see Russia having a role. The moment you move beyond that and you move towards some sort of some enrichment diplomacy, that's when Russia can actually play a technical role. If Iran agrees to certain constraints on its enrichment, but doesn't have to forego enrichment entirely because Russia has offered to take the HEU out of Iran to convert it into nuclear fuel for Iran. So then there's a sort of technical role to be played for Russia. But whether we get into that space, Russia has very little influence about this. And then there's the question, Max, over how all of this is shaking out in multilateral diplomacy. We now have the IAEA getting active, wanting to go back into Iran, and Russia is already showing that it wants to shield Iran against pressure at the iaea. We have the UN Security Council where Russia and China and Pakistan have wanted to introduce a resolution. We have the whole issue of UN snapback looming, the October deadline for European countries to snapback sanctions and prior UN resolutions. So it gets kind of complicated. But the moment we move into that multilateral space, there's of course, a role for Russia to be played, I think, in terms of shielding Iran, taking some pressure off Iran, but that's not going to, I think, be so decisive in terms of how this shakes out. And then on the military front, yes, Iran will conceivably turn to Russia as it is now thinking about reconstituting militarily. I think there's an interesting question to be asked here, which is how is Iran going to assess not just what Russia has or hasn't delivered to it last year as it was feeling more and more vulnerable and during this round of active fighting, but also what have those Russian air defenses and radars and Russian designed radars that Iran had from the past, how have those performed in this latest round of conflict? And will Iran want to go with Russia in the future? Or are there perhaps indications and chatter that we're seeing that Iran wants more from China in the future. I think these are questions. I don't have answers to those questions. But the extent to which Iran will want to sort of reconstitute with Russian help as opposed to some other partners is also going to be interesting to see going forward.

[A]

Let me turn to Maria in a second. I just wanted to say quickly give a plug to Michael Kaufman's podcast because in his most recent episode, he dissects with some great guests about Iranian air defense and compares that to Ukraine. And, you know, it's sort of hard to blame the system when the Ukrainians have employed effectively Soviet S300 air defense in the first two years of the war, incredibly effectively. I do think there is this larger question of security, of supply, that if the Iranians are firing all this S300 and S400 systems and interceptors and then they run out and then Russia doesn't have equipment to resupply them, doesn't have the batteries, doesn't have the interceptors. That I think is a huge problem right now for Iran, which is airspace is now completely open to the Israelis and whether they need to turn to someone else to provide that, because they are completely right now at the mercy effectively of Israeli air force. And that, I think, is a huge challenge for them militarily.

[C]

That's right. And just very quickly on that. I mean, we know that Israel's strikes in October at least impaired the Russian S300 system that the Iranians have. And I don't think we have a good indication that Russia repaired those or sort of provided new ones precisely for that reason.

[B]

So to pick up on that particular topic, we know actually that Russia probably is overstretched. And it's not the first time it's kind of moderated its assistance to the countries that it would have probably backed under normal circumstances. For example, last year Russia did nothing to help prevent the toppling of the Bashar Al Assad's regime in Syria. Now, basically, the pattern has emerged somewhat similar with Iran, where a lot of nice words on Putin's side but no real action. So, Hanna, I know that you just had a new article come up in financial terms. Congratulations on that. The question is, how would this be basically moderated action or non action on the Russian side impact the Iranian support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine? Do you see that it's going to be a potential problem? It may perhaps impede the collaboration between the two countries. Iran has been quite instrumental in assisting Russia in this war with its drones missiles. Or do you think at this point, it's no longer relevant because basically the situation has changed and Russia perhaps is less dependent on Iran now. Could you please walk us through your argument?

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I think, Maria, the bottom line here is that Russia's reliance on Iran reached its peak maybe one year into the war when Russia got both finished shahed drones from Iran, but also acquired the production technology for those drones. And Russia's reliance has subsided since. And I don't think that Iran being considerably weakened now and having to reconstitute will have a meaningful impact for Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine. So Russia acquired the drones, it acquired, more importantly, the production technology, the blueprints, the designs. There were Iranian trainers coming to Russia, and Russia then localized the production of shahed drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone near Kazan in Tatarstan. Not just that, but Russia also changed the designs of those drones. You know, the engines, more sophisticated, anti jamming capabilities, the warheads. You know, it was quite interesting. Ruslan Pukhov, who is one of Russia's well known military analysts, he had a piece out in Kommersand last week which made some, I thought, fairly derogatory remarks about Iran as a military defense player. I think he called it a paper tiger and noted that even for Russia to benefit from the shahed drones, Russia had to do so much to those systems to transform them into the capable technology that these drones are today. But that was the most meaningful support that Iran gave to Russia. There was some shells and ammunition, but I don't think that the quantities were so meaningful. And then the Iranians delivered, I think, about 200 Fatah 360 ballistic missiles to Russia last fall. But what's so interesting about that is that we haven't actually seen any evidence that Russia ever used those missiles on the Ukrainian battlefield, I believe. So then the question is why? And there might be different answers. But I think at a minimum, it means that Russia cannot have an acute need for Iranian missiles. Right. Otherwise we would see them on the battlefield. And so what's of course also happened over the last two, two and a half years is that the DPRK emerged as a major supporter of Russia in Ukraine with munitions, with missiles, and then most recently even with troops. And China, of course, in terms of its dual use goods and components, probably the most meaningful enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine, and I would say also has become increasingly important to Russia's drone enterprise. So even some of the components for the shahed drones are coming from China. Russia and China are working on new Drone designs, and some of those have been used in Ukraine already. There's a big Russian Chinese logistics complex that is built in Alabuga. And I think when President Xi was at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October, he was updated on the progress of the building of that logistics complex. It suggests a growing Chinese role in Russia's domestic drone production going forward. So for these various reasons, I think the reliance on Iran for sort of immediate battlefield needs, that reliance has really greatly subsided. I do just quickly want to say I don't think that means that Russia is just blase about seeing Iran's missile and drone production capacity being degraded and that there's nothing that Russia would have wanted from Iran. I think there's still probably a Russian interest in new drone technology because Russia will want to adapt its strike packages for Ukraine going forward. You can see if the war in Ukraine continues for a long time that an interest in Iranian missiles could arise at some point in the future. I still think that this is not a desirable situation for Russia, but I also don't think that it will have a negative impact on the battlefield for them over the upcoming period.

[B]

A quick follow up on that, Hannah, thank you. Very explicit explanation, but what about perhaps some other collaboration between Russia and Iran? Is there any significant economic collaboration, perhaps some infrastructural projects that they're working together that may be impeded by the unraveling war effort?

[C]

That's a good question. I mean, they have talked a lot about increasing their economic cooperation, investing in transport corridors, the international north south transport corridor, trade via the Caspian Sea. I'm not sure that that is doing all that much for the Russian economy, to be honest with you, yet I think it's still more aspirational than, you know, in the realm of practical impact. But of course, if Iran goes into a period of kind of protracted crisis or even instability, then that would have a negative impact on those kinds of projects, on transport diplomacy, corridor diplomacy. And I think that would not be desirable to Russia, maybe.

[A]

Lastly, I think one thing we haven't talked about are the impact of oil prices on the Russian economy. And it does strike me that Russia may have been quite excited, at least maybe in the Finance Ministry and the Russian Central bank that, oh, a prolonged war in the Middle east that could cause oil prices to structurally increase. Oil prices did go from the low $60 range up to the 70 plus dollar range. I think the Russians were probably quite excited about that. But then after the Iranian response to the US missile strikes on its facilities, its strikes against US Air bases in Qatar and I think in Iraq as well. Actually oil prices went down because I think it was instantly seen that that was sort of a performative act by the Iranians. And then Trump I guess, tweeted or truthed whatever social media platform he used to announce a ceasefire. And so oil prices are back down in the $60 range. So I think, you know, if the Russians were hoping to get this big economic kind of jolt in, the increase in oil prices may have happened for a little bit, but it doesn't look like that sustained. And so I think the economic impacts of this on Russia, I think are rather minimal. And while Russia, I think might have been able to really take advantage of this in providing Iran with a lot of arms and defense industrial equipment, it just can't afford to do that. So this is in some ways a war that normally, I think in normal times Russia would really be able to take advantage of. It just simply doesn't have the means to, in part because it's so stuck in its Ukraine quagmire. I don't know. Hannah, any last thoughts on that?

[C]

Yeah, no. I mean, maybe sort of a very big broad thought at the end, which is that it doesn't seem like this situation is now presenting Putin with an opportunity to engage in great power diplomacy with Trump on an issue that is not Ukraine. That's how it maybe looked like initially, but there seems to be an American aversion to that. I also think that what has just played out in the Middle east is perhaps encouraging all of us again to rethink this notion of a so called axis of upheaval out there, by which we mean the partnership between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, because this was just a real test case. What are these partners willing to do for each other when push comes to shove? And I think we've actually seen both Russia and China being real cautious over the last two weeks. And the last thought on this is that I feel like we're sort of entering this more Hobbesian world in which might seems to make right and the stronger sort of can impose their will. That is sort of an initial reaction to what we see Israel doing in the Middle east, sort of creating fair accomplice. And sort of intuitively, if you think about it, this is perhaps the kind of world that Russia thinks is more amenable to it, the kind of world that Russia likes. But actually Russia doesn't have the means to really play in this kind of world, especially while it's still bogged down in an unwinnable war in Ukraine. And so this is maybe like a slightly counterintuitive conclusion from Russia's point of view, but it's really a mixed balance sheet for them, I think.

[A]

I think that's a fantastic place to end. That's an incredibly interesting point. Russia has both created the world that it's always wanted, yet it's too weak because it's bogged down in a quagmire of its own making to actually take advantage of it. Hanna, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you again to our listeners for always tuning in. If you haven't already, please be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five star rating. It really helps other people find the podcast. Additionally, if you get the chance, be sure to check out our sister podcast, the Europhile, wherever you get your podcasts and we will see you next time on Russian Roulette.

[B]

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[C]

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[A]

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