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Russian Roulette
Has the War Come Home to Russia?
00:46:52
Max Bergmann sits down with Maria Snegovaya and Jade McGlynn, senior associate (non-resident) with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and senior research fellow / head of the Ukraine and Russia Program at King's College London, to discuss how Russians have responded to major shocks over the past four years, and whether polling data in Russia truly indicates shifting attitudes toward the war.
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A
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, Director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia program at csis.
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B
And I'm Maria Snigavaya, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia.
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And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies.
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C
Foreign.
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A
And welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm your host Max Bergman and here with my co host as always, Maria Snagovaya. Before we begin, loyal listeners will know that we at Russian Roulette truly appreciate your feedback. If you have feedback or ideas, you can send in ideas for Future episodes@erepsis.org or find us on social media. We want to hear your thoughts. Let us know how we can make things better or give us your ideas for what topics you want to cover for today's show. We are thrilled to welcome back Dr. Jade McGlynn. Jade is a scholar of Eastern European and Russian Studies and has conducted research on the region at universities across the United States, Russia and England. She taught at Oxford before joining the Department of War Studies at King's College where she now works as a Senior Research Fellow within their center for Statecraft and National Security. Her first book, Russia's War was published in 2023 and is about Russia's domestic political approval for, for the invasion of Ukraine. And her second book, Memory the Politics of the Past and Putin's Russia came out later that same year. She was very busy in 2022 and 2023 and now she's also a non resident senior associate here at CSIS where she has published reports on the resistance efforts in occupied Ukraine and the ideology surrounding Putin's rule of Russia. Jade, welcome back to the show.
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C
Thank you, thanks for having me back.
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A
So maybe we'll start with a piece that you co wrote with my co host Maria Snagovaya about Putin's standing, about Russian public opinion and signs that it may be shifting. Maybe you could start by outlining what's your core argument? What do you think is happening? Are things changing or is everything still the same?
- [02:18]
C
I think the argument that we're making, and I'm sure Maria will correct me if I'm wrong, is that there are shifts in terms of, of course there is always a shift whenever there's a, whenever there's some sort of shock and you know, the fuel strikes 196, you know, different sites were attacked across 2026. Of course that functions as such a, such a shock but that whilst it can add to the general war weariness among, you know, let's say quite a significant wave of the population. Population. You know, Russian public opinion is not a monolith. It can't. It's going to spark different reactions in different types of people and that ultimately Russian public opinion functions a bit more as an output rather than a lever. So we probably shouldn't be looking at it as something that, okay, well, people are going to be. I think it's quite a jump to suggest there have been fuel strikes. People are annoyed about being in queues, that's fine. Therefore they are going to turn against the war in a really kind of, you know, in a way that's actually much more coherent from a Western viewpoint than from a Russian viewpoint. They're going to really turn against the war and then they're going to do something about it. And that's going to have an impact, I think. You know, it starts off on very steady ground and then it ends up on very shaky ground. Is the argument that we're trying to make that it's just not going to work like that though. Maria, you have to forgive me if I've, if I've managed to kind of misummarise our piece.
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B
No, absolutely. And Jay strikes me as one of the most nuanced thinkers when it comes to really understanding the Russian public opinion, its shifts. The key takeaway is that while, and I stand by my argument, which some of the liberal communities debate challenge, that Russians in general do rally around this war, they support the war nonetheless, as China. There are two broadly understood groups within the support. It's heterogeneous support, there's hawks, they are more ideological, they constitute slower share of the supporters and they tend to rally around the flag in response to strikes calling for stronger action. From their perspective, Putin is too weak, he's not strong enough in response to the west in Ukraine. And then there are the majority of so called loyalists, or moderates, whatever you want to call them. There's also the term swamp that some sociologists are using. They just follow whatever Putin does and if Putin stops the war, they'll support it. And as long as Putin wants the war, they're sort of fine with it because from their perspective they're just ordinary people and he knows what he's doing. Right. They're not foreign policy professionals. But the unique feature of the ongoing strikes is that for the loyalists they are highly problematic given that they impact the economic perceptions and for the loyalists, the status quo and support for Putin and the status quo is sustained as long as economic things are fine. Economy is doing well. But because strikes in particular influence the economic well being, reinforcing the negative trends accumulating in the Russian economy, this is the group that's more likely to withdraw support. And as we show in the article, that's exactly what's happening. We do see a decline in support, not just because of the strikes. In fact, there's accumulating factors. Right. We've discussed a lot on this podcast how Russian economy is basically passed its sugar high period that it experienced at the start of the war because of the state induced investment in the economy and it's already sort of stagnating. On top of that, Ukrainian strikes are reinforcing all of the negative trends and as a result, all of the authorities approvals are declining. The war support is declining even more. And even by Kremlin's own official post of tio, which by the way, already changed the methodology once this year in order to sort of curdle the decline. Nonetheless, the decline has continued by its own data. And In July, by July 12, it actually fell to 65%, the lowest figure since the start of the full scale support. I'm talking about print approval rating here. So. So the Ukrainian strikes are making a difference. That's what we're saying.
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A
Let me pick up on that for a second, Maria, and maybe Jade, back to you. How do you assess Russian public opinion? There's been a lot of debate about the veracity of polling inside of Russia. Given if you were asked, if you called someone up and said, what do you think of Vladimir Putin? I think the answer might be shaded by the fear if you say something negative, then you would be found out. And people want to keep that to themselves. So how do you, how are you, both of you assessing Russian public opinion? Is it this polling? Is it just monitoring social media? How are you assessing it?
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C
I think, unfortunately, because the debate is quite an emotional one because it links into how people want to see their countries, countries from which people are obviously displaced. Often the conversation is had on in a rather simplistic way. And as always, I really like Maria's additions. I think that, of course, okay, can you trust polling? Well, can you trust polling anywhere? I mean, you should always be triangulating your data and not just looking at one point. And of course, if you're dealing with an authoritarian country, then you're going to want to be even more careful. But I think with discipline, of course, you're looking at. What is this instrument measuring? I mean, we've had preference falsification. We wrote about this. So moving on from sort of the preference falsification, I think there are also different tells. For example, certainly in the free polling efforts that are, that I've kind of had engagement with, I can't see that since 2022 and that initial shock, the refusal or the don't know rates have especially spiked or the interview lengths where those happen. There hasn't been a collapse. There are difficulties in terms of getting through, but there are technological difficulties imposed by the Kremlin rather than from trying to speak to people themselves. And also I think it's about, of course, if you going to ask people a question like do you support the special military oper? But I'm not sure how helpful that necessarily is as a question given your point that you were making. But there are other questions. How hopeful do you feel about the future? And there again, as of any polling, you're not going to say, oh well, 59% of people definitely and definitively feel excited about the future. What you're going to say is, oh, that's really interesting, there's been a huge dip and then it's come back again, what happened there? So it's the trend that it allows you to track. And then you can triangulate it against other types of data, whether that's statistics, whether that's qualitative data, to sort of make sense of it. And I think that polling data is an important part of that triangulation. And also as well, part of me thinks, well, I mean, I spend a lot of time researching the occupied territories as well, which is even harder. And I wouldn't trust any polling actually from the occupied territories broadly, unless it was on very specific when did you last receive water in your apartment block? But at some point we have to just accept that our tools are instruments, they are flawed. But as researchers, what's the other option to just say, oh, we can't know, that's a black box. That doesn't seem very satisfactory. It's much better to engage with the data. We have of course, recognize its limitations and its caveats, triangulate as much and as often as we can and give it an honest and sincere go to try and work out what is happening and track it, always with humility, but also with curiosity. We can't just say, oh no, that doesn't work.
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B
And maybe if I could just quickly jump in and add to that. In political science, for social scientists, discovering something as major as radically biased polls based on composition or based on sensitivity biases, people's responsiveness to polls, whatnot it would be really fantastic finding, really easily publishable. And you know, it's all about publish or perish. And so there's a lot of scholars who have worked since 2022 trying to major discrepancies between post 2022 and pre2022 polls. And so far there are no consistent findings. Just as jade flag on a variety of indicators, not necessarily only sensitivity bias, but sample composition and whatnot. On top of that, alternative measures. Right. If Russians fundamentally are anti war and they cannot speak up, then we should see maybe powerful anti war movement emerging outside of Russia. That, however, also did not happen throughout almost five years of the war at this point. In fact, we see that instead Kremlin is all of the many of the schools, including the. As Michael Kaufman flags in his recent War on the Rocks article, real unprecedented recruitment levels. Russia has been able to recruit enormous amount of people by post Second World War standards in the last four and a half years. And last but not least, historical patterns. It's not the first war Putin started, unfortunately, it's his fifth war. He's been in power over quarter century and every single time the pattern is very similar. That is unfortunately, Russians rally around the wars that he starts and over the time this effect dissipates. And that's exactly what we've seen in 2022. So if we argue 2022 is different, then we should, then the burden of proof is on the opposite side. Yeah, they have to explain as to why they think the 2022 war was fundamentally different from every single war that Putin has started before it.
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A
Now, it does seem that there are starting to be some cracks in Russian public opinion. Ukrainian strikes on Russia's oil refining infrastructure, leading to fuel shortages and high cost of fuel. And just sort of a general angst, I think, about the direction of travel, both in the conflict, but also in the economy writ large. And also you see Vladimir Putin doing things that I think he tends to do when he's perhaps not the most popular or somewhat concerned about his popularity. I think the FD had a great kicker to one of their stories. When Putin went to a kid's judo class and he was kissing a young girl on the cheek. And someone said it's never a good sign when Putin is kissing a child on the cheek, for him at least, meaning that he's having to sort of put himself out there to show that he's a man of the people.
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B
But.
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And for the child, I would be a little terrified. But so, you know, is this having effect? Are we Starting to see, because, Maria, I guess one challenge I would have to you is that this is now sort of a Russian consumer society, that it's, you know, it's different than the Soviet period. And this is not a war that it seems that the Russian public is that excited about now. They're not. They don't want their country to lose the war. But there also would be, I think, quite content if it ended, or at least that's what it seems. So I'm curious, are we seeing sort of is this war coming home at all? And then is that leading to a surge in support, rally around the flag, or, you know, more anxiety?
- [13:45]
C
Jade I sort of think about this in terms of like a stamina axis almost in the sense that it's not about whether or not people kind of support, I suppose, the priors or assumptions or worldview that kind of made the war possible. It's about whether or not people are willing to make sacrifices for it. And I think, you know, broadly, this is what we write about in the article as well, is that, you know, people are, people are kind of war weary in this sense of they don't want to have to make more sacrifices for it. I mean, that's perfectly legitimate. But it sort of also then comes, I guess, if you're talking about the effect, I mean, what, I guess depends, what effect do you mean? I don't. I think that public opinion will not stop this war. But at the same point, that also means it wouldn't stand in the way of it stopping. So suppose, if you depend, do you want to be half glass, half full? I mean, some of the more hard liners that we've written about, I think that's a different kettle of fish or that's a different group, a different segmentation. But if we're talking about the kind of large, you know, moderates, loyalists, warrior, whatever you want to call them, I don't think that they're going to, you know, cause the world to stop. I also don't think that they would, provided that if, let's say there were a ceasefire, I'm very skeptical there would be. But let's say there was a ceasefire tomorrow and everything just froze along the current lines. You know, I don't think they're going to cause any problems about the fact that sort of, I think, in fact many of them would feel quite relieved and would just want to kind of get on with their life, but with nothing of the kind of underlying worldview or interpretation of the world challenged. Which means that those views could be mobilized again for future wars in my reading. So I guess what we're talking about in some ways is more stamina rather than support. You know, are they growing tired within a kind of accommodation of the war and how much they're having to accommodate? Yes, I think we can see that. And we can see a draw on resources, including public goodwill for the war. Does that mean that it's swinging into opposition? I don't think. I don't read it that way though I'd be interested in Maria's view.
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B
Well, I definitely echo Jade on the point about the importance of the public opinion, but I will flag that. Also important to keep in mind that Putin is not fighting this horrible, horrible war that's one of the most atrocious, right? Like by far the most atrocious in Europe after Second World War by himself. Right. That's a lot of people involved. Those who are being recruited into the army, even if they include recorded through economic incentives, not necessarily ideological incentives, they're still going, right? They're still pushing on the front line. They're still killing Ukrainians, sending drones and missiles every night and whatnot. They're still working at the factories and by the way, labor shortage, right. And the competition between civilian and military industry for labor is a huge, huge factor. So people who are more willing, who are more supportive of the war, right, they're more likely to go and get paid at factories. They're still circumventing sanctions, which is one major engagement of much of the Russian private business at this private end. State connected business at this point. So all of that matters. And even if Putin may be driven by considerations other than the Russian public opinion, from Ukrainian perspective, having fewer willing participants in his endeavor would be really, really welcome. Also because it's unlikely that Putin is going to stop the war just because he realizes, you know, he can't achieve these goals. From Ukrainian perspective, defensive, defensive actions alone would not going to tilt this dynamic. And so inevitably they're going to have to be switching to the offensive that is bringing the war into Russia, right? They're developing their own missiles, they're intensifying the strikes and refineries. All of that is basically from their perspective, the inevitable next step. If the war were to end at some point, they just have to make the war really very difficult to endure for the majority of Russians. And as we see, the strikes are ready somewhat starting to have that effect going their direction. They increase anxiety, war fatigue, demand for the peace and decrease war approval. I will also flag that the drone strikes in particular are very well noticed by Russians. And I'm not just talking about the gazelle and lines in Russia, but also the fact that the Ukrainian strikes have been named as number one most notable event in May and June and most likely will be also in July. That is, for Russians, this is the biggest news of the month.
- [18:22]
A
So I guess the crux of the question from a policymaking perspective, or from, I guess the Ukrainian government's perspective, is does Putin have sort of total freedom of movement here? Is public opinion constraining him? And you can put it in two ways. One, is there concern for Putin about public opinion turning against the war so that therefore it's going to sort of push him to want to make concessions, negotiate something, and you could tie that together with the battlefield not going his way. So you could say, okay, public opinion is running against him, so he needs to make concessions and make this war go away. Or the alternative, and you guys outline this as well, that, well, there's now a group of hardliners that are demanding success and progress. So if he were to hit the pause or stop button with a ceasefire, that could give him internal problems. So I guess, how do you see that from the right? And then maybe I don't want to call it the left, but sort of an anti war, and is there any sort of public opinion pressure on him, or does Putin have this kind of freedom of movement where he can sort of manipulate it and he can sort of go whatever course he wants to in the war? So is public opinion an important factor in what and how you think the Kremlin is processing the war right now? Jade, over to you.
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C
I don't think that public opinion functions inside Russia and probably other countries, other authoritarian countries, in the same way that we are used to talking about public opinion in democratic countries. But at the same point, I also don't think it's just a case that, you know, the Kremlin doesn't care. We know, you know, they, they put in considerable effort to polling and to controlling things, you know, like Vitzium and making. The director of Vitium did not amend the trust rating methodology because. Because he had a problem with the methodology. It was a political issue, I imagine. I don't want to be too unfair, but we know that they track this. Sometimes we even get leaked versions of the polling or Medusa and others do. So it's definitely a factor within their decision making or the way that they frame decision making. If we think about the last league polling, or at least the last leak polling, I'm Aware of that came out at the end of last year and you saw this kind of division of, of Russian society into two groups. You know, those who want a great Russia, it's not my division, it was sort of the, from the Kremlin. But those who want a great Russia, those who want a comfortable life. And so you, they obviously are kind of tracking things. I don't think they live completely in cloud cuckoo land. And I think the fact that there's this real reticence to have a second wave of mobilization, that's pretty clear because any polling doesn't matter which type of falling you look at, it's very, very adamant. You know, the one thing the Russian public opinion is very, very clear on, well, there are many things, but it's especially clear on they do not have any appetite for a second wave of mobilization. And you know, if we do have, you know, Maria was kind of talking about how you have this kind of draw on resources and having the war coming home, does it dampen, you know, the rush, the available manpower that the Russia might have to call upon on in terms of giving people money? So they sign up to Ukraine and I mean, there's some really interesting interplays there that become quite complex because, you know, if that's happening and he's losing public, and he's losing public opinion or people are becoming more war weary, less willing to kind of accommodate sacrifices and in certain groups less willing to sign up. So you have a complex interplay really between you. A need to perhaps mobilize, but also with, but also with perhaps dampening. However, we also need to think about if there is continuing economic pressure that's also going to widen the pool of people who may end up attracted to sign up to these contracts, which are incredible. I was looking at some of the mobilization posters that are in Mariupol at the moment. There were some pictures from June 2026 and the figures being offered there compared to the average salary amount which is about kind of 40,000 rubles or like 4, $400 a month. It's just astronomical. It's sort of like 3 million rubles. And you. That's just the sign up bonus. Of course, marbles are very complicated cases just because they're the ones I have the most recent photos of. And of course it's not Russia, it's, it's Ukraine and occupied by Russians. But it's just, you know, a symbol that this is still going on and they are still able to offer quite a lot of money. So I think that drawing down of resources. But at some point it's going to come to crunch elements. And is that crunch element in itself going to be public opinion? No, but I think it's going to be the constraints of which public opinion will add to one to the options available.
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B
Well, I completely agree with everything that Jade said. We just have to look at what the Kremlin thinks about this. And just as JJ flagged all of this effort to quote unquote, normalize the war, make sure that Russians not looking there, look in the other direction. Nothing to see here, just special military operation using avoidance of the use of conscripts, the switch to this so called volunteer army and very intensive indoctrination of the society. They all speak of the importance that the Kremlin assigns to the role of the Kremlin society, at least in enabling the war. I also have a forthcoming book on related topics. And I think that the Kremlin continues to think of the war, any war, in somewhat Stalinist terms, in which stability of the home front, so to speak, is absolutely crucial. So if you want to have a successful war, you absolutely need to have your society under control. And that's why, by the way, if you look at what happened before 2022, it was a very targeted repression against all the leftover NGOs and political groups precisely to enable the stability of the war front. And the second point I will make is that hawks, so called hawkish groups, they're themselves divided about whether the war should be continuing or not. So we know that the moderates and loyalists are tilting towards stopping this war. They're exhausted. The economic strain really begins to show. But in the hawkish groups there's no alignment. Indeed, Max, as you said, one part of that does basically lobby for the nuclear option, God forbid and whatnot. They want Putin tougher invade all of Europe, go to take Berlin and whatnot. But there's another group that actually believes that Putin is highly unsuccessful, that he's doing everything wrong, sort of prigozhin style, so to speak. And they actually also start thinking that the war needs to stop. Unfortunately this case, in order to reconstitute, rebuild in do it again, but this time the right way. But I just want to flag that even within the hawkish groups there is a significant share that supports stopping the war.
- [25:26]
A
Maybe to shift gears a little bit, I want to bring up the Economist had a cover story that was quite controversial with a Russian oligarch, Andrey Malenchenko, where it will caused a lot of waves and maybe Jade, maybe I could ask for Your thoughts on the article? How would you characterize it? What do you think that sort of represents?
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C
It's funny because I've actually deliberately avoided commenting on it. A bit like with Masha and the Bear, where I'm just like, everybody's had an opinion. But since you've specifically asked me, I found, for me personally, I found the interview. There were certain aspects that I found interesting about it. I think, you know, clearly he's def. He's not. I don't think that it's correct. It's certainly. It's obviously not correct to read him as kind of, you know, a critic or I don't believe it's, you know, correct to read what he's saying as criticism of the Kremlin. Nor do I think it's just like complete parroting. What I sort of see it was as almost evidence of something a bit more worrying than eva, because he seems to be asking for some sort of settlement in which Russia's interests are respected, which we kind of know what that means. Unfortunately, I don't think it is Russia's interest. I think it means, like, you know, what the Russian state sees as its interest to sort of interfere in and control its neighbors and have, you know, a sort of veto over the European security architecture. And I think it's interesting as well to see what sanctions did to him. They didn't teach that the war was a mistake. From my understanding, his wealth has not been especially impacted by the war, but obviously, perhaps his. I thought he was living in the UAE for some considerable time before moving back to Moscow after war, managed to catch up with him out in the Gulf. But he makes the argument, if we take him, his word, he makes the argument that the sanctions taught him that he had to stand with his country. And this is quite common, actually. I was reading through some research, some qualitative interviews. Quite common in this sense of. Well, the west is sort of rejected, all of us. The west wants us to be, you know, like these. This awful other, you know, these awful barbarians. Fine. Well, let's just be it, then. And this kind of sense of. This sense of grievance. And I think that reading it, he's not really arguing against the war, and he is arguing for a belief system that, in my view, made the war available. I think it is a sand. I would interpret it. It, though I'm not, you know, a specialist on the elites as a kind of outreach or a messaging that certainly I would find it very shocking if it wasn't done without some kind of nods. From the Kremlin. But that doesn't mean it's, he's parroting the Kremlin line. You know, there's, you know, there's shades of gray within things. And I don't think the question is really is Melnchenko sincere? I think it's just, I actually think it's worth engaging with what he says because it shows us that, you know, there are a number of kind of problems that exist within different groups that I think also speak to a kind of strategic dilemma from a European perspective of, well, how do we engage with that or how do we, in my view contain that? Because there is a certain view of the world that even if somebody is not committed to, you know, the total destruction of Ukraine as they're speaking, Putin appears to be, it's still going to be very difficult, especially after all of the atrocity that's happened to come to some sort of accommodation with these views even when they're made, you know, I'm sure very eloquently and very, you know, and very articulately by, you know, an intelligent and very rich person.
- [29:02]
B
To me, I would also add to everything that Jade said, we've been, you know, there was some discussion about whether oligarchs are, you know, correctly sanctioned at the start of the war. After all, as the argument went, these are possible independent businesses that according to democratization theory are going to eventually take over Putin and build a new beautiful Russia of the future. And I think Malenchenko's interview is very important in that sense that it completely refutes that evidence. This is in terms of our early conversation, a moderate loyalists article that parrots actually this is where I actually don't fully agree with Jedi. I think it's parrots nicely Kremlin's points. So I think it's really almost verbottom reproduces the Kremlin's talking points, especially in this so called op ed part. Just to give you some numbers from the Bell interview, sovereignty is absolutely crucial for Putin and Putin has since 2023, since 2022 mentioned sovereignty more often than words like medicine, science or budget. Melnichenko mentioned sovereignty 31 times in this written piece. I'm sure that Russian oligarchs are completely obsessed. That's all they think about is Russian sovereignty. It's the first time I've ever heard any one of them mentioning this word. But I want to flag that basically his argument demonstrate that fundamentally he is part of the Kremlin support. Everything he's saying is repeating almost the bottom Putin's talking points and the conclusion is very Putinist, like the west has, has to come to its senses. It has treated us, the poor Russian oligarchs and Putin and the Kremlin unfairly. And things can only be resettled and reset once the things are adjusted on the side of the West. All of that just demonstrate that basically oligarchs in a lot of ways act exactly the way the loyalists and moderates act of the broader society that we've discussed. That is, they fall in line with whatever the Kremlin does. As long as the status quo is satisfying for, for them, and as long as Kremlin allowed these people to make a lot of money to basically live their comfortable lives, they're happy with it and they're not going to change much. And that is why the sanctions are completely right, because essentially they are reducing the influence of these groups in the West. They're fundamentally reducing the Kremlin influence in the West. But I'm not fully sure why the economists, such a notable influential platform, allows this basically Kremlin talking points to be promoted to wider Western audiences for four and a half years into this war.
- [31:39]
C
Sorry, go ahead.
- [31:40]
A
No, go ahead.
- [31:41]
C
Yeah, I agree with the final point. That's, I found it interesting as somebody who's kind of interested in reading Russian views about things, or at least how these views are presented, but I was kind of confused why I was reading it in the Economist. There are plenty of sites I can go to to read these views. And I agree with you. I'm not really sure what the editorial decision behind that was because we can quibble around the point of parroting and perhaps your point is more accurate than mine. I think what I was trying to say is I don't think he didn't just go and he wasn't sent with a gun to his head to deliver certain talking points. But yes, it completely aligns with a Kremlin, the argument that the Kremlin would want to have. You know, of course, the Kremlin always has an array of arguments rather than just kind of, you know, one set framing. And I really don't understand, you know, in general, I don't, I don't like to criticize, but I just don't understand what, what purpose this served. I don't really see that it enriched our understanding of very much, unfortunately.
- [32:48]
A
Yeah. And I think the, the, you know, the title, you know, the headline was the man who Would Change Russia. And it's quite suggestive that this is the guy that is going to somehow kind of do something. And then you read it and you're like, okay, well, as you both have outlined. And so I think it was just interesting, the editorial judgment, to elevate this as if it was this huge deal. And if anything, my interpretation is a bit. That maybe the sanctions actually did work because they're clearly annoyed by them. Right. They're clearly like, this is like, these suck. And we really want to get out of, you know, from being sanctioned. And that, that was sort of the point was to take people that were tools of the Kremlin, that were operating in, you know, Jade, city of London and in Miami and other places and. And say, get. Get out. And it, I think, has been effective. And so, I don't know. It was just an interesting editorial choice. I would say my broader interpretation is it does reflect, I do think, probably a simmering debate underneath about we need to figure out a way, a different. A slightly different path. And I think it does represent perhaps that there is some churn underneath the surface and different forces sort of pushing against each other about what direction to take a war that is not going well. But maybe that's my, you know, eternally
- [34:20]
C
American optimistic fatalism there.
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A
Yeah, no, no, it's a whole bit, maybe, maybe to shift gears to Ukraine. The war looks like it's going increasingly well for Ukraine, but there's just been this huge shakeup, Jade, where the minister of Defense, Fedorov, has been let go. It's all on the press. Syrsky, the commanding general, basically was like, it's him or me. I think the country and most of the Western publics and governments would have said, well, Zelenskyy made the wrong choice here. And there's protests in the streets of Ukraine. It's sort of the biggest protest since Zelenskyy tried to move against the Anti Corruption Bureau and officials about a year ago. Jade, I'm curious how you're in Ukraine all the time. You're a keen watcher of all things Ukraine. How do you interpret this?
- [35:23]
C
I think it's somewhat bigger than a Fedorov versus Syrsky, though I do appreciate that Fedorov has tried to make it that way. And given some of Syrsky's unpopularity among the troops and among the general public, I would probably, probably try, try and make it that way too, if I were him. But he also said, a wise point yesterday at his quite explosive sort of like press conference or, or whatever you want to call it, long interview that he. That he gave. Fedorov said, you know, I don't think that the people are protesting their fore minister Fedorov. And I think he's right in that sense. Yes, Fedorov is very popular. People like him and cards on the table, you, you know, I'm going to try and present like a more balanced or somewhat less hysterical than some of the Western media kind of view have given, but cards on the table, you know, I also, you know, much prefer Fedorov's approach methods. I think that the ultimate question has to be, you know, who. A question that he himself has posed. Who is, who is doing the things or enabling the things that allow soldiers on the front to do their missions more effectively, effectively and better and quicker. And that was in my view and in the view of the soldiers that I speak to, of course it's not representative, there's an anecdotalism of course to it, but it was unanimously, you know, positive about Fedorov and unanimously less positive about Syrsky. You know, that doesn't mean it's a fact. It's just, you know, you deal with kind of the evidence you have, but I think it's also a kind of a process around systems because what you have, you know, it wasn't just when the prime minister kind of when the government is dissolved, then it's not just Fedorov who's removed the whole, all of the ministers, you know, according to kind of the Ukrainian constitution like then all of the, there are no ministers, anyone you have to reappoint. And it wasn't only Fedorov, you know, he wasn't the only change. You know, some people didn't like the fact that he was due to be replaced by Klymanko. It seems like Zelensky listened to the protests and did not make that change. Klemenko is seen in some parts of society as quite Soviet, but on the other hand he also has support, you know, from Azov and Hatia and some of these kind of more well known, you know, seen as more modern brigades or corps now. Sorry. So it's always, it's never black and white in Ukraine. There's always like 7 million shades of gray. But to come to the kind of broader point, I think, I think what people are upset about, certainly in my conversations with them seems to be this sense of the old system, a system that they associate with a certain generation with a Soviet way of doing things. The pretty horrific revelations about the Skelia and some of Syrsky's so called pet brigades and the treatment of Ukrainian soldiers there, which has been akin to Some of the horrible stories we've read about Russian treatment of some of their soldiers had a huge public resonance, quite rightly, because you can't be treating human beings like that, let alone, you know, soldiers who are defending your country. And that is then pitted against this sense of this is closed insider group who are there because they protect the network's interests. And yes, sometimes the network's interests intersect with the interests of the state, but not always versus somebody like Fedorov, who is of course not perfect. Perfect and not an angel, nobody is. But who is trying to kind of digitalize and bring transparency, especially to areas that have been blighted by accusations of corruption, such as military procurement. And I think what people felt sad about was this sense that that old insider system was winning over Fedorovs more transparent, you know, more effective or at least trying to be more effective than system that, that they viewed as, as placing the state's interests and interests of the war or winning the war or not losing the war above the interests of the network. And I mean, seeing yesterday, I know that a lot of the anger yesterday was also coming from people who were upset. The allies of Oleg Tatarov, who's a famous or infamous, well known. There we go. We'll keep it neutral. Well known deputy head the presidential administration who was also, you know, in the Interior Ministry during the revolution of dignity under Yanukovych. And you know, there's a lot of people who have questions about maybe why he's still so powerful and has so much power over kind of law and policing and why some of his close allies are indeed kind of being promoted during this recent reshuffle. And that's obviously not the type of Ukraine that they are hoping for before. And we've seen that on the streets.
- [39:55]
A
So why do you think Zelensky went in this direction? Do you think this represents sort of a broader shift in strategy? Is it sort of. There's too much. If I was going to take a step back, it does seem someone pushing for radical bureaucratic change versus someone that is sort of wants to keep things going the way they were. And, and I think there's always a case for radical bureaucratic change probably, but I could see anywhere. But on the other hand, sometimes it can be too, too much, too fast. There's a war going on, General, on the ground different than a minister. Probably easier to change a minister to some degree. I, I guess. Does this pretend some. Does this sort of send a signal about where Ukraine is headed? Because everyone was feeling quite positive about where the War effort was going. How do you see this now playing out? Looking ahead?
- [40:56]
C
Yeah, again, I think I'll probably take a step back from some of the more. And I know that you're not saying this is your interpretation, you're asking questions, but there have been some more dramatic interpretations that, you know, as if this is close to apocalyptical. And bluntly, I mean, a lot of the changes that are associated, you know, and I have no problem with them being associated with. Well, it doesn't matter if I don't think it's incorrect to associate them with Fedorov, because he very much enabled them. But you know, things like the strategic decision to shift, you know, towards the middle strikes on command and control in the occupied territories, those shifts were already happening and in some cases decisions were already taken before Fedorov. He also did a number of really wonderful things, you know, some of which involved him personally. We know about the Starlink cut off, you know, and he made some good things that were already happening. He really enabled them and put the weight of the Ministry of Defence behind them. And sometimes it's money, which is, you know, what some people in General Staff got annoyed about, allegedly. So, you know, there were already positive things. The good thing about Fedorov is often when I'm. If I just speak sort of from a personal perspective of what I see say when I go out east or when I'm spending lot of time, a time with soldiers who obviously different units I'm going to keep anonymous, but sort of a range of them as they're often doing really incredible things, just like really incredible, really intelligent and very strategic. They could be strategically very useful. But there's very often a huge lack of strategic thinking, particularly since 2024, because some very talented people left the government or were asked to leave the government. And I think what Fedorov did is he not only was aware of all of those really clever things that different core and different soldiers were doing almost organically and horizontally, he then enabled them and set up the government to help them. And I think what people are worried about is that those things will now collapse. It will go back to this need to constantly kind of feel like you're battling the state rather than being enabled by the state to fight Russia. And I think that would be a real shame because even just in those six months you did feel the sense of enthusiasm. And not all soldiers are unanimously for Fedorov and all are unanimously against Syrski. You know, I should be clear about that. But in my experience, the ones I speak to they are, they are pretty much, you know, not for Syrski at the very least. And I think that's the impact that it might have on morale. There was a sense that things that were and are real problems could change and I worry that that hope will dissipate. I think that's the more kind of decisive factor rather than I don't think it signals any strategic thinking or a strategic decision on Zelensky's part. In fact, I just don't think there's a lot of strategic thinking going on in general. And that was one of the things that Fedorov one of the opportunities Fedorov have presented that now may be lost.
- [43:45]
B
Maybe I'll just add a quick comment.
- [43:47]
C
Max.
- [43:47]
B
I remember when we been to Ukraine, we were in Ukraine a couple of months ago. One of the officials we met with compared Ukraine to a marathon runner under missile strikes who simultaneously has heart surgery going on. And I think unfortunately we do often see Ukraine struggling to address several problems simultaneously while also surviving this horrible aggression with old established networks within the elite systems also that have to be updated somehow and the system has to be reformed. But doing it simultaneously while fighting this horrible aggression is extremely challenging. And I just want to give credit to Ukraine for having really managed this and President Zelensky also to some extent haven't managed this with success over such an extended period of time in the situation when there's no election. So it's not easy. And I would refrain from equating like reducing all problems as some commentators have done to corruption alone. I think the problem is much deeper. It has to do with the way the power systems are organized that they will rely on these closed off networks and reforming them is extremely difficult even in the situation of peace times and complete transparency, not to mention obviously the situation Ukraine is dealing with.
- [45:04]
A
Yeah, I think democracies are messy and you tend to have opportunities for, you know, bureaucratic turf battles to come out into the public to then elevate. And in some ways it represents that there's difference of views and those views get heard by then became became somewhat of a crisis. But we shall see. Jade, I want to thank you so much for being here on the podcast, but we're going to have to leave it there. Unfortunately we're out of time. I want to thank all our listeners for tuning in. Links to Jade Substack and the article she published with Maria are available in the show notes for those who are interested. Don't forget to subscribe to our show and leave us a five star rating wherever you get your podcast, it really helps. Please do that and also be sure to check out our sister podcast the Europhile wherever you get your podcast. Also give that a five star rating and we will see you next time on Russian Roulette.
- [46:04]
B
Been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you've enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.
- [46:09]
A
Russian Roulette releases new episodes every two weeks and is available wherever you get your podcasts. So please subscribe to our show, share our episodes online and give us a five star rating. Also be sure to check out our sister podcast the Europhile where we talk Europe through a Washington lens. This show is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
- [46:29]
B
Also don't forget to subscribe to the CSIS channel on YouTube for live and recorded video events featuring leading experts. Finally, you can read all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at the center for Strategic and International Studies website csis dot org.