Podcast Summary: Russian Roulette

Episode: Keith Gessen and Bryn Rosenfeld on How We Should Interpret Russian Public Opinion Data About the War in Ukraine

Date: April 23, 2025

Host: Maria Snegovaya (CSIS)
Guests: Keith Gessen (New Yorker journalist, author) & Bryn Rosenfeld (Associate Professor, Cornell)

Overview

This episode examines the reliability and interpretation of Russian public opinion data regarding the invasion of Ukraine. Host Maria Snegovaya engages Keith Gessen and Bryn Rosenfeld in a nuanced discussion of polling methodology, public sentiment, and broader implications for both scholarship and policy. With sharply contrasting views circulating in the West about the validity of Russian polling, the guests break down why headline numbers may be misleading, the complexity of Russian attitudes toward the war, and the challenges—and necessity—of measuring opinion in authoritarian contexts.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. On the Contested Nature of Russian Public Opinion Data

• Keith Gessen opens by noting the Levada Center’s consistent polling that suggests 70–80% support for the war among Russians, but highlights research by PS Lab and Yelena Koneva suggesting that actual hard support is far smaller—perhaps just 15%, with a similar-sized group of clear opponents, and a vast, conflicted middle ("loyalists"/"conformists").
  • Quote: “You have a core group of war supporters, which is much smaller than 70%—more like 15%. You have a similarly small group of war opponents… and a large middle group... who show up in the polling as war supporters. But that support is thin.” (04:31)
• PS Lab’s qualitative interviews reveal initial shock, dismay, and later rationalization among many “supporters,” casting doubt on what “support” actually measures in surveys.
  • Quote: “Even people who show up as supporting the war had to go through a kind of... spiritual agony to come around to the war.” (05:47)

2. The Role of Atomization, Demobilization, and Conformity

• The regime has long depoliticized society: "We take care of politics; you live your lives." The shock of war disrupted this but didn’t fully remobilize society.
• Under wartime conditions, people may seek solidarity, resulting in public conformity to majority views—even if privately conflicted.
  • Quote: “People who were atomized now actually are seeking community... Most people are going to go along with the majority, because they seek this sort of solidarity and community.” (10:11)
• The alternatives available to Russians—especially after the assassination of opposition figures—are essentially non-existent, impacting how poll respondents answer war questions. (11:43)

3. Trustworthiness and Nuance of Russian Polling

• Bryn Rosenfeld analyzes reliability, noting that response rates and composition haven’t shifted dramatically post-2022.
  • Quote: “We find that the willingness to participate in surveys changes very little in terms of the types of people who are willing to participate in the surveys before the war and after the war.” (15:06)
• People motivated by opposition views may, in fact, be even more willing to participate.
• Non-response rates to sensitive questions (e.g., about Putin or the war) remain relatively low. Elevated "don't know" rates often reflect genuine ambivalence or limited information, not simply fear.
  • Quote: “Much of the evidence... suggests these responses more likely reflect respondents’ lack of clear opinions on the war rather than a fear of expressing opposition.” (18:56)
• Question wording deeply affects results. Levada’s question about “support for the Russian military’s actions in Ukraine” elicits higher support than alternatives. Explicit mention of Putin boosts affirmative responses.
  • Quote: “If one asks about the desire to continue the special military operation, stated levels of support are a lot lower.” (21:47)

4. Polling in Autocracies and Comparative Considerations

• Russia allows polling without direct government registration; no evidence exists of prosecutions simply for survey responses. The regime values polls as a management tool.
• Social desirability bias and methodological challenges exist in all societies—not just autocracies.
  • Quote: “We have to use the kind of best practices that we have... and triangulate across, looking for kind of stability in the response patterns across these approaches.” (26:08)

5. The “Conformist Majority” and Its Policy Significance

• A large middle group tends to side with the Kremlin, more by acquiescence than active support.
  • Quote: “They are people who are conflicted... I think they’re acquiescing and they’re loyal and they’re not going to stick their necks out, but they would be very happy if the war ended today.” (30:06)
• This group will neither resist nor drive major change; they are adaptable to shifts—from war to peace, if such a narrative is offered by leadership.

6. Why No Mass Anti-War Movement?

• Deep repression, societal adaptation, and practical risks have prevented the rise of wide protest—even among dissidents who have left the country.
• Genuine anti-war activism is courageous but a decided minority.
  • Quote: “These are not people who are going to go out in the street. They are going to go along with the war, but I also think they’ll go along with the peace.” (34:49)
• Gessen: “A big anti-war movement under the current conditions is impossible. Totally impossible.” (34:53)

7. Policy Implications and “Alternative Russias”

• Both guests stress that the Russian public is not “zombified”—there is nuance, adaptability, and pronounced internal conflict.
• Policy communications should recognize heterogeneity and avoid monolithic views that demonize an entire population.
  • Quote (Gessen): “I think at least Bryn and I agree... they are not supporters of the war continuing. So... having a public dialogue where we look at Russian opinion, Russian population, as quite as heterogeneous... might be a start.” (42:08)
• However, willingness to end the war does not equate to readiness to return occupied territories, and beliefs about “victory” are malleable and leader-dependent.

8. Role of the State-Dependent Middle Class

• Russia’s middle class, especially dependent on the state, tends to align with the regime and be skeptical of democracy—contrary to modernization theory predictions.
  • Quote: “This group was easier for the regime to mobilize... because they were already aligned with the regime and saw its policies as benefiting them and their support as benefiting them personally.” (46:23)
• The war and subsequent emigration have hollowed the liberal-oriented middle class, amplifying the voice of the state-dependent one.

9. Future Scenarios for Public Sentiment & War Termination

• If Putin declares victory and ends the war, the majority will likely support such a move with relief; restarting the war post-ceasefire would be challenging.
  • Quote (Gessen): “If he declares victory and peace, well, people will be quite relieved... it’ll be harder to start it again. And that’s a reason from his perspective, not to stop.” (50:51)
• Russian public opinion is highly malleable, largely following cues from above.
  • Quote (Rosenfeld): “Public opinion is quite malleable based on the cue that it gets from Putin... Most Russians prioritize spending on the wellbeing of citizens... How long [Putin’s government] is able to do that... is an open question.” (53:16)

10. Concluding Thoughts

• Russian polling post-2022 is not fundamentally less reliable, but requires careful contextualization and skepticism toward headline numbers.
• The absence of viable alternatives, continued economic stability, and regime repression combine to sustain current attitudes—though they rest on shifting, not unwavering, foundations.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Gessen on Internal Conflict:
  “What you learn from PS Lab is that people are internally conflicted. So, there’s 65% for the war internally and 35% against it.” (29:24)

• Rosenfeld on Protest Risk:
  “The Kremlin itself relies on these tools [polls]... they rely on [polls] to test messages, to identify pockets of discontent... so they’ve not gone in the direction of more repressive measures.” (25:20)

• Gessen on Endurance:
  “From the findings of PS Lab, the answer is... people have gotten used to the war. It’s become part of their everyday reality.” (32:11)

• Rosenfeld on Postwar Attitudes:
  “I think the ability to relaunch the invasion likely stands now. But... there’s a tension between financing the war and financing social programs. Most Russians prioritize the latter.” (53:00)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 02:57 – Gessen outlines key takeaways: Levada vs. qualitative polling, the “conflicted” Russian middle
• 08:08 – PS Lab’s theory: atomization, demobilization, and postwar solidarity-seeking
• 13:36 – Rosenfeld’s analysis: polling methodology, reliability, question design
• 18:56 – Discussion of “don’t know” responses and internal conflict
• 24:18 – Polling under autocracy: limitations vs. possibilities
• 30:06 – What does “support” really mean? Loyalty, acquiescence, indifference
• 34:53 – Why there is no mass anti-war movement—repression and risk
• 35:35 – Election study findings: evolution of support, mechanisms of regime mobilization
• 41:39 – Policy implications: communicating with/understanding the “conflicted middle”
• 45:53 – Impact and political attitudes of Russia’s autocratic middle class
• 50:23 – Can Putin “zigzag” back to war after peace? Prospects for public opinion change
• 53:00 – Malleability of Russian opinion and economic trade-offs

Takeaways for Listeners

• Data from Russia should be handled with care—headline numbers risk masking deep ambivalence, uncertainty, and adaptability rooted in regime tactics, repression, and historical patterns of public conformity.
• There is no “zombified” monolith supporting Putin’s war; rather, a small core, a small opposition, and a vast malleable middle.
• Policy must recognize the complexity and devise messaging, expectations, and future engagement accordingly.
• Russia’s future trajectory is shaped by economic, social, and political factors outside the reach of polling alone—but understanding these nuances is vital to informed policy and journalism.

For further reading, see Maria Snegovaya’s “Reluctant Consensus: War in Russia’s Public Opinion” (Atlantic Council), Keith Gessen’s New Yorker article “Do Russians Really Support the War in Ukraine?” and Bryn Rosenfeld’s research on Russian polling and public opinion.