Russian and Ukrainian Battlefield Adaptations with Dara Massicot and Kateryna Bondar

Summary

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Podcast Summary

Russian and Ukrainian Battlefield Adaptations

Russian Roulette – CSIS Episode Date: November 10, 2025
Guests: Dara Massicot (Carnegie Endowment), Kateryna Bondar (CSIS/Wadhwani AI Center)
Hosts: Max Bergman, Maria Snegavaya

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Episode Overview

This episode of Russian Roulette examines how Russian and Ukrainian militaries have adapted on the battlefield during the war in Ukraine. Hosts Max Bergman and Maria Snegavaya are joined by Dara Massicot and Kateryna Bondar, two leading experts on Russian and Ukrainian defense innovation, strategy, and adaptation.

Key themes include the evolution of military tactics and technology, the contrasting centralized and decentralized approaches of Russia and Ukraine, the challenges of scaling innovations, the dynamics and limits of attrition warfare, and the prospects for future breakthroughs or shifts in the conflict.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Russian Military Learning and Adaptation

• Adaptation Phases:

  • Dara Massicot outlines distinct war phases: Russia’s initial expectations of a quick victory (akin to Crimea in 2014) quickly fell apart, forcing an unexpected and “catastrophic” regrouping ([02:40]).
  • Major systemic change occurred post-mobilization in September 2022. Russia established a complex infrastructure to gather battlefield experience, codify lessons learned, and institutionalize change for a more permanent adaptation ([02:40], [04:14]).

  “They’ve built a pretty complicated system to learn from the war, their combat experience, and really drive it past adaptation into something much more permanent, complex, and lasting.” — Dara Massicot [03:49]

• Centralization vs. Adaptation:

  • Russian adaptation is hindered by extreme centralization and vertical hierarchy, which can slow response and “bury failure.” Still, once the system identifies effective approaches, it can mobilize resources at scale ([07:24]).
  • “Lessons learned” specialists are embedded on the front to circumvent low trust and lack of transparency ([07:24]).

• Integration with Startups:

  • Russia is calibrating its system by linking state defense enterprises with startups (e.g., Rubicon drones), building bridges between Soviet-era structures and innovation, although resistance and competition remain ([12:22]).

  "They’ve created something called the People’s Defense Industrial Base, a mechanism to link startups with state-controlled enterprises… bridging the Soviet system with startups like Rubicon.” — Dara Massicot [12:22]

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2. Ukrainian Innovation and Decentralization

• Early Adaptation:

  • Ukraine’s adaptation began in 2014 as it integrated NATO standards and Western weapon systems, dramatically improving flexibility and readiness by the time of the full-scale 2022 invasion ([05:01]).

• Drones as Necessity:

  • The proliferation of FPV (First Person View) drones wasn’t purely innovation, but necessity in response to resource shortages and the battlefield context ([05:01]).

• Decentralized Innovation:

  • Ukraine’s defense industry consists of hundreds of small companies producing diverse systems and protocols (“zoo of technology”), making integration and scaling major challenges ([09:06]).
  • The decentralization, while spurring rapid innovation and cross-sector collaboration, impedes large-scale production and selection of “national champions.” The Ministry of Defense is moving toward more centralized procurement to address this ([09:06], [14:51]).

  “All these startups are competing for limited resources… some of them are just dying because they don’t have enough government order. So it’s really hard to say is it an obstacle or is it for the good, because this is where these ideas are born.” — Kateryna Bondar [14:51]

• Procurement Bottlenecks:

  • With “procurement authority given to 700 military units,” the MOD is struggling to have a holistic picture and needs aggregation for efficiency ([09:06]).

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3. Centralization vs. Decentralization – Strategic Cultures

• Trade-offs:
  • Both Russia (centralized) and Ukraine (decentralized) face trade-offs: centralization enables scale, but evolves slowly; decentralization breeds innovation but hinders scaling and efficiency ([11:32], [12:22]).
  • Each side is now trying to find the optimal balance to maximize advantages ([12:22], [14:51]).

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4. Attrition, Stalemate, and Doctrinal Shifts

• Stalemate & Incremental Change:

  • The war is increasingly a war of attrition. Despite rapid innovation cycles on both sides, advances have become incremental and rarely game-changing ([24:38], [27:16]).
  • Both sides adapt quickly—what once took months now takes weeks or days—creating an ongoing cycle that generally cancels out advantages ([24:38]).

• Limits to Breakthrough:

  • Large-scale doctrinal breakthroughs are stymied by the new battlefield environment (e.g., large Russian formations can’t mass without being detected and destroyed; Russians are discussing the obsolescence of “traditional formations”) ([24:38]).

  “Our traditional formations no longer provide the keys to operational success… They openly acknowledge that.” — Dara Massicot [25:31]

• Potential Game-Changers:

  • Real change would require a technological or tactical breakthrough—e.g., fully autonomous, AI-enabled drone swarms. Current advances are largely scaling, not transformative ([27:16]).

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5. Frontline Realities and New Threats

• Critical Situation in Pokrovsk:

  • Russian advances near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya are the most critical. Encirclement tactics, infiltration by small infantry units, and targeting of drone teams have enabled Russians to advance while exploiting Ukrainian manpower shortages ([30:31], [33:00]).

• New Russian Capabilities:

  • Glide bombs and long-range fiber optic drones have shifted the range and threat profile along the front, under-reported in media and potentially enabling 100 km “deep” advances ([33:00]).

• Focus on Donetsk/Donbass:

  • Both guests agree that Russia’s obsession with Donetsk reflects both symbolic and strategic goals, but the broader campaign of continual punitive strikes is designed to demoralize Ukrainian society ([36:10], [37:47]).

  “If the ultimate goal is to suborn Ukraine, they're trying to do it… by terrorizing the Ukrainian population, to make them give up, leave, or ruin the idea of a vibrant Ukrainian state.” — Dara Massicot [36:18]

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6. Deep Strikes, Air War, and Defense

• Ukrainian Strikes in Russia:
  • Ukraine is now mirroring Russia’s strategy with massive drone strikes deep into Russian territory, targeting oil infrastructure and attempting to exhaust both Russian defenses and population morale ([41:05], [42:44]).
  • Dramatic successes (e.g., strategic bomber base attacks) are rare due to the technical and logistical challenges of such operations ([43:07]).
• Impact on Russian Operations:
  • Russian Air Force, less adaptive than the army, has had to relocate bombers far east, reducing bombing tempo and creating operational strain ([43:07]).
• Adaptation in Air Defense:
  • Both sides struggle with cost-effective drone and missile defense. Ukraine is increasingly using interceptor drones due to speed and altitude limitations of ground-based weapons ([46:32]).
  • Russia lacks sufficient coverage for critical infrastructure and faces bureaucratic turf wars between the army and air force ([49:06]).
• Limits of Current Systems:
  • There is skepticism about the feasibility of building continent-scale ‘drone walls’ or layered air defense due to infrastructure and cost ([46:32], [49:06]).

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7. Game-Changers: Missiles and Aid Flows

• Tomahawks and Flamingo Missiles:

  • Debate continues about whether the US will allow Ukraine to strike deeper into Russia using Tomahawks. Even if provided, limited supply would make them more political tools than war-changing weapons ([51:33], [53:21]).
  • Ukraine’s indigenous “Flamingo” cruise missile is promising but production numbers are too low for strategic effect, and questions remain about efficacy and scale ([54:19]).

• Western Aid and the War’s Future:

  • Continued US and European support is described as existential for Ukraine’s war effort; drones and innovation can’t compensate for deficits in artillery, armor, and fundamental military aid ([57:11]).
  • US is shifting to a model where allies finance weapons deliveries—this reduces the risk of sudden aid “cliffs,” but supply remains vulnerable to shifting political winds ([58:31]).

  "Ukraine is not self-sufficient... It cannot scale production of conventional systems without investment and funding from abroad. Technologies, funding, intel—this is what is critical for Ukraine to sustain in this war." — Kateryna Bondar [57:11]

• Russian Perspective:

  • Russia overestimated what it could achieve by expecting an immediate deal from the Trump administration; currently, it seeks more gains in Donetsk, hoping for Western fatigue but may risk simply sustaining a “forever war” with little strategic benefit ([59:44], [61:14]).

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On Russian Permanent Adaptation (02:40):

  “They’ve built a pretty complicated system to learn from the war, their combat experience, and really drive it past adaptation into something much more permanent, complex, and lasting.” — Dara Massicot

• On Ukraine’s Decentralized Defense Industry (09:06):

  “All these startups are competing for limited resources… some of them are just dying because they don’t have enough government order.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation (24:38):

  “Adaptation cycles are compressing and getting shorter—what used to be months is now weeks or days when a new tactic emerges.” — Dara Massicot

• On Breakthroughs and Stalemate (27:16):

  “We’re kind of in a stalemate situation. [A new] breakthrough—whether in technology or tactics—is what could really change things.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On Russian Goals and Limits (36:18):

  “They’re trying to suborn Ukraine with terrorizing the population... to ruin the idea of a vibrant and successful Ukrainian state.” — Dara Massicot

• On Air Defense Challenges (46:32):

  “It’s a cat and mouse situation… How to protect the country from inside, from outside, how these air defenses should be structured. I haven’t seen a proper answer yet.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On Western Support (57:11):

  "Role of the United States is really crucial and critical in this war. Ukraine is not self-sufficient in terms of military industrial complex and weapons production." — Kateryna Bondar

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Important Timestamps & Segments

• [02:40] Dara Massicot on Russian military learning
• [05:01] Kateryna Bondar’s overview of Ukrainian adaptation
• [07:24] Russian strategic culture: centralization, advantages, and pitfalls
• [09:06] Ukrainian decentralization: “zoo of technology” & procurement challenges
• [12:22] Russia’s attempts to integrate startups and encourage innovation
• [24:38] Evolution of adaptation—compression of innovation cycles
• [27:16] The need for a technological or tactical breakthrough
• [30:31] Critical update on Pokrovsk front and Russian infiltration strategies
• [41:05] Ukraine’s drone campaign and deep strikes into Russia
• [46:32] State of air defense adaptation and challenges for Ukraine and Russia
• [51:33] Discussion on Tomahawks, deep strike capability, and political signals
• [57:11] The centrality of U.S. and European support for Ukraine’s war effort
• [59:44] Russian miscalculation about Western resolve and scenario outlook

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Closing Thoughts

This episode offers a nuanced look at the interplay between adaptation, strategy, and resource constraints for both Russia and Ukraine. The conversation underscores that while both sides are learning, adapting, and evolving—Russia through heavy centralization and scaling, Ukraine via rapid decentralized innovation—neither has yet achieved decisive breakthroughs. The war’s outcome may hinge on the first to realize a major tactical, operational, or technological leap, or on shifts in Western support and political dynamics.

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For full insight and up-to-date analysis on the Russia-Ukraine war, subscribe and follow Russian Roulette and check out CSIS resources.

Transcript

[A]

Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.

[B]

And I'm Maria Snigavaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia.

[A]

And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies. Battlefield adaptation by the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. That's the topic for today's conversation. I'm Max Bergman. I'm the director of the Europe Russia Eurasia Program here at csis. And it's my real pleasure to have you here for what will be a live streamed edition of our Russian Roulette podcast. I'm of course joined by Maria Snegavaya, who's a senior fellow here at the Europe Russia, Europe Eurasia Program and co host of the Russian Roulette Podcast and also joined by two really esteemed guests that I think are the perfect people to talk about how the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are adapting to the war in Ukraine. So we're joined by Katerina Bandar. Kate is a fellow here at CSIS with the Wadhwani AI center where her research focuses on the different ways the Ukrainian defense sector is integrating artificial intelligence and high tech solutions into its weapons systems, particularly drones. Previously, Kate served in various roles for the government of Ukraine, where her portfolios included work for the ministries of defense and finance. She's sort of one of the perfect people to talk to about this topic. And another perfect person to talk to is Dara Masico, a senior fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Our sort of arch rivals across the street here on Mass. Dara previously worked as an analyst at both the Rand Corporation and the Department of Defense. And she really is one of the leading writers covering the Russian military and Russian defense industrial base today and has a, has a great new piece in Foreign affairs on this very topic. So thank you all for being here. Maybe let's jump right in, Dara and Kate. Maybe we could start about how this war has evolved. And Dara, maybe I'll start with you on the Russian side because Russia instigated this war. I think they had a particular vision for how this war was going to evolve and it didn't quite turn out that way. But maybe you could outline what was your main sort of takeaway in your recent piece in Foreign Affairs.

[C]

Sure. Well, thanks for having me. My piece details Russian military learning and that goes beyond the adaptation that we've seen on the front line. Making modifications to tanks and different types of tactics. And it looks at a much larger system that they've created over the past four years to gather this combat experience and bring it back into the system system inside the Russian Federation to learn and improve and try to make some of these improvements permanent. If I could break it up by phases, maybe looking back at the, the four years of the war, I think you're absolutely right. They had a vision of how this war would go. They thought it would be a lot like Crimea 11 years ago now, that they would just road march in and the, the resistance would be minimal. And that's certainly how they organized the force, how they planned their initial invasion plan. And then we saw for the six months after that, there was this realization that this was pretty catastrophic for them and they had to regroup and focus more on a much smaller objective. And I think really the genesis of this piece and why I wrote it was after mobilization in September of 2022. That's really when I think there was a more sustained systemic change in Russia that has gone under the radar. They've kept it quiet, but what they've done is built a pretty complicated system to learn from the war, their combat experience, and really drive it past adaptation into something that's much more permanent and complex and lasting.

[A]

Kate, maybe over to you because, you know, the Russians are adapting, but they're adapting to what the Ukrainians are doing. And there's been a lot of attention and talk about how the Ukrainians are demonstrating tremendous, tremendous innovation on the battlefield. The focus on Ukrainian development of first person view drones and their own internal domestic production. You know, maybe from a, from a 20,000 foot level. What is your take on how has Ukraine adapted in this war? Are they being as innovative as they're sort of being triumphed by, by the West? Or maybe you could. How do you see Ukraine's innovation? Are they innovating fast enough based off of some of the things that Dara just said about how Russia is also evolving?

[D]

Yeah. So Max, when everyone's talking about innovation and innovation on Ukrainian side, of course the first thing that you have in your mind is drones. And yes, of course we've seen a big proliferation of drones, not because that's what Ukrainians came up with, but that's a necessity, basically. And of course we can dig deeper into drones topic a little bit later, but I also want to stress a little bit different aspect in adaptation specifically. So we have to remember that the war started in 2014 actually, and this is where Ukrainian military has started this adaptation process. And Integration with NATO. So Ukrainian military implemented a lot of NATO standards and now when the full scale invasion happened, it was more or less prepared already. So what is happening now? Ukraine is fighting with a lot of West Western weapon systems, even if we put aside drones and everything. So Ukrainian military managed in four years to fully adapt and adjust itself to completely new types of weapons systems. And for example, if you talk right now for, with the, with like people who shoot shells on the tanks, I'll just try to make it really simple. You need to make 10 shots and those 10 shots are made with five types of ammunition. And Ukrainians suggest really fast. It's unprecedented case for any Western military and for Russian military as well because they have their own production and they have same types of systems. So Ukrainians demonstrate a lot of adaptation in terms of weapons and in terms of internal processes and procedures that happen within the military. I'm happy to expand on this, but it'll take a long time. So let's dive a little bit deeper later into this.

[B]

Maybe I can pick up here, Dara and Kit. Maybe my question is actually from the broader perspective as to how you feel the differences in political strategic cultures of corresponding countries maybe help or obstruct this adaptation effort. Like Russia perhaps more integrated, Ukraine more decentralized. I can see how that can be advantage and disadvantage depending on the context. Next, Darren.

[C]

Yes. So I'll speak first from the Russian side. I think their disadvantage is that they are far more hierarchical and vertical when compared to the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian defense industrial base. There's a lot of centralization that goes on. That's not necessarily a bad thing once that system correctly identifies what it needs to do. And the advantage that Russia has, I think over Ukraine at this point is that they have largely rallied around the war and supporting the war from the begin. But really putting finances behind it, putting research and development behind it, making modifications to the defense industrial base to support it in conjunction with soldier demands from the bottom up. So I think I would give you a mixed answer. I don't know that this is unique to the Russian military, but there is a tendency to maybe bury failure and maybe not always report everything up the chain so that the chain can accurately assess what's going on. That's still a problem for the Russian milit military. They have workarounds to try to get around that now by embedding lessons learned specialists in the front line so that they can make direct observations themselves and report it in. That's only because it's a low trust environment. That's not used to transparency. Transparency holds them back. Centralization can hold them back. But again, the flip side of the centralization is of course, when it is actually mobilized appropriately, it makes resources available and quite a lot of resources.

[B]

On the contrary, as we know, right. When the Kremlin mobilizes all resources towards the goal that wrongly perceived, like invading of Ukraine, they're failing no matter how much they're committed to it.

[D]

Correct? Yeah. I'll just pick up on the centralization, decentralization point. What we see in Ukraine, it's very decentralized system. So Ukraine nurtures its newly formed defense industry. And this defense industry consists of hundreds of companies. And all these companies produce their own systems with their own protocol standards. And you need to integrate all this into C2 systems. For example. That's what Ukrainians currently call zoo of technology. Because it's really hard to manage, it's really hard to integrate, and it's really hard to provide a comprehensive situational awareness of what is happening on the battlefield. That's one side of the problem. Another side is in scaling. As Dara said, when Russians identify the system which works and put all resources behind it, they really can scale up production, they can iterate fast, they can improve the system. Contrary to Ukrainians who have big choice, a lot of innovation going on, but they don't have these national champions who can really double down on production, who can really invest in R D and get a competitive advantage on the battlefield or in other aspects of the war. So currently from my perspective, this decentralization plays against Ukraine. And the Ministry of Defense started to work on this problem and they tried to centralize procurement just to see at least what military units buy, what they need. Because procurement authority is given to military units and there were like 700 of them. And the Minister of Defense didn't have this common picture what they're fighting with actually. So to aggregate this order from the military units, give bigger contracts to manufacturers, allow them scale production based on this bigger order and long term contracts. This is what Ukrainian military is trying to implement right now, to fight against this complete decentralization and zoo of technology. So, and we can see on the battlefield how these two systems perform. It's hard to give, you know, identify who is the winner. But for the Ukrainian military industrial complex and defense industry, actually it plays against it right now.

[A]

So if I was to maybe sum this up or to try to simplify it, in some ways it does seem that, you know, Russia has certain advantages. Its centralization gives it scale, but the problem with scale and centralization is that sometimes you're then slow to adapt because you're, you know, you're building one thing and you're, you're pumping that out, but then the war evolves, that thing is less effective. Ukraine, where you're constantly adapting, there's all these different things that you can buy, but then you're not then producing that one thing at scale that then, that you really need. And so it's, it's, it's then sort of a mess. And so it seems that both sides are trying to find this sort of sweet spot between centralization and decentralization. Is that kind of the way that you would characterize it and, or how do you think about this?

[C]

Well, I think that's a really, really interesting point. I didn't know that, that there was this attempt to maybe centralize things a little bit more in Ukraine because the opposite phenomenon is going on in Russia as they're trying to calibrate, I guess both are calibrating in the Russian system. They, this very Russian. Okay, what I'm about to say, they've created some, there's the, there's the defense industrial base in Russia, state owned and controlled. They've created something called the People's Defense industrial Base, again very Soviet. But it is a mechanism that they have created to link startups with the state controlled enterprises because they are not naturally partners. The state controlled organizations view these startups as competitors and they were not either constrained by legal restrictions or regulations or just business interests didn't want to fund them as startups. Belousev, I think in particular the new Russian Defense Minister for the past year. He is very astute on fixing regulatory problems, especially when it holds back innovation. That's what he did before he came to the Ministry of Defense. He created this bridge between this Soviet system and some of the startups. And one of the startups that people hear the most about is Rubicon and that's the drone unit. They create their own drones or they try to modify them, they train operators, they actually operate now one in every operational group in Ukraine. They're now training Russian SOF to be like them. And they're quite problematic for Ukrainian defenders actually because they, they use them in very specific ways. I think that Belousev himself may be the patron of this organization because anytime you succeed in the Russian system, another element within the system will come and try to acquire you forcefully. But right now I think he's defending them. But there is that calibration. It has very many limits In Russia it's not a decentralized scenario at all, but I guess they're inching where they can towards it.

[A]

And I guess Kate, to bring you back in is that, I mean, how much of an obstacle is this decentralization? I mean it seems like a, in some ways big advantage, lots of innovation, lots of units are trying things out and maybe sharing lessons learned. But is this a, is this a problem or is this something that the Ukrainians are, are just, they're trying to get their head around how to, how to actually yield this in the most optimal way?

[D]

Yeah, I would say they are trying to get around this because they want to, don't want to kill this decentralization completely because these startups and these small little companies, they bring people from all sorts of industries because in Ukraine everyone joined the army, everyone joined this startup movement and newly established military industrial. That's not military industrial complex, it's defense industry let's say. So it actually brings a lot of innovation. But what the government should do and where it's missing is actually probably picking the champions. So basically identifying those systems which work better on the battlefield and putting resources behind them because resources are limited. And if you listen to Ukrainian government officials and representatives of startups, for example, they all are saying that Ukrainian production capacity is exceeding buying capacity from the government. So all these startups are competing for limited resource and limited amount of funding basically. So it creates this competition and some of them are, are just dying because they don't have enough government order and they, they don't fulfill it. So basically it's really hard to say is it an obstacle or is it for the good? Because this is where these ideas are born. But then they have to be pick the government and brought to scale and actually you have to build these companies to national champions. And you know this is this competition between big primes and non traditional companies and non traditional vendors. It happens everywhere in the world right now because a lot of innovation happens in commercial sector and how this affects this, big primes, Neo primes, et cetera. So there is no exact answer what is the best model and how this should work. But Ukraine and this war is actually a lab where you have very fast iteration loops and you can test different approaches and models really fast and get a result and see what's going to happen and what really works or not.

[A]

Maybe just one quick follow up before turning it back over to Maria. That's really interesting that there's in some way spare capacity in Ukraine that there's not enough money to then buy all the weapons that could be produced. And I guess the question there is, I mean, there's lots of talk about a Danish model of providing money to the Ukrainian defense sector, but is that the right way that Europeans should be approaching this is to sort of make sure that everything is maxed out or in terms of everyone's producing as much as possible, or does that need to be focused on a few number of systems?

[D]

I think the answer lies in the demand from the battlefield. That demand has to be satisfied and then you just need to identify the most efficient ways how to do that. You see that the funding is limited in Ukraine. So what are the ways to provide more money basically for the Ukrainian government to buy weapons systems which perform the best, let's say. And there are Danish model, there is all sorts of models. And European allies help Ukraine a lot in different ways. So the question is what to buy? What's the best way to identify which systems have to have to be bought? Again, I think this signal should come from the military, what they need, what works the best. And of course there should be safeguards from corruption risks related to government procurement. In Ukraine, they still exist. We have to acknowledge it, and it's an issue. So these models actually tackle these problems and they don't solve them completely, but it's a good way to try to solve these problems. Yeah.

[B]

I have to say that I find it fascinating that the war that started as Putin's effort to impose Russian style governance of Ukraine in some ways also ends up being a competition between two modes of governance, more decentralized and more centralized ones. But where does it leave us in terms of this, in this context, which has become the war of attrition? And conventional IR theories tell us that in this situation, the state with more resources, perhaps more centralized, is one that gets an advantage. In this case, it's more likely Russia. So is it this in some ways a model of Second World War where Russia at first suffered defeat, then regrouped, learned, reconstituted and essentially pushed forward? Or is it a different situation? How do you see this, Derek?

[C]

I think it's a bit different than World War II. I see both players on the battlefield. And if you asked me a year ago where I thought how this would look, it actually looks better for Ukraine than I thought that it would. There are a lot of political constraints on the Russians and even though their society is very calloused at this point to casualties, those just really don't scan. They don't really register in the national discourse anymore. They are constantly calibrating what they can get away with on the ground based on their monthly intake of volunteers versus their monthly killed in action or irrecoverable losses, which means you can't ever come back to fight, you've been wounded so badly. That is actually influencing a lot of their strategic goals right now. I mean we, we hear all sorts of things out of them about what they want right when they're engaging with the United States or any other interlocutor. But then there's the reality on the ground about what that military can actually achieve. And it's certainly not the, the four regions that they've laid claim to. So there, there are constraints built into the system as long as it's managed in the way that they're fighting right now, which is pretty inefficient and casualty intensive, I will say.

[B]

Thank you, Keith. What do you think about it?

[D]

Well, I think that technological progress also made some changes to tactics and doctrine and strategic goals because take for example deep strike, deep strikes and drones which are able to go deep into enemies territory and it changes the balance from both sides. Russians use shahed drones and all other types of systems and they act very systematically. So they destroy energy infrastructure, they destroy transportation infrastructure, they target trains, train stations, they target oil and gas facilities as well. So it's a complex approach how to immobilize the country, how they target civilian infrastructure and they target civilians as well. That's also a psychological war to demoralize population, let's say, to exhaust population. And these new types of systems they allow to affect strategic goals and probably achieve strategic goals in a bit different ways. So it's a little bit different approach than we saw in the World War II. And the same happens with Ukrainians conducting deep strikes into Russian territory because they also change their tactics by striking oil refineries, etc. So I think it's very different and it's a whirlwind right in front of us. And it's also there is an element to creativity, how you use this technological advances to destroy your enemy from within as well. Not only on the battlefield, maybe to.

[A]

Sort of unpack a little bit about how the battlefield is evolving. You know, I think artillery is still a major factor in this war. But I think one of the narratives was that the Ukrainians were running short on supplies. First person view drones became really critical in sort of helping Ukraine sort of plug the lines, hold the line. From Russia's offensive. Then that has evolved into now fiber optic cable drones. We've seen A lot of evolution in the deep strike with Shahid drones becoming more sophisticated in how Russia is using them, but then also using things like glide bombs. Ukraine responding now with, with its own drone campaign. So is, is this sort of evolution in learning that is happening on both sides, is it just sort of canceling each other out? And is it. Are we sort of in this kind of attritional fight where both sides have demonstrated an ability maybe to, to learn, to adapt, to develop in, in ways that, you know, if you're Ukrainian, you hope the Russians would be stuck in their Soviet ways and wouldn't adapt and evolve. Dara, your piece sort of says, well, they're kind of doing that and Ukraine is, has this whole mess of, of evolution, which is great, but on the other hand, not really able to scale it. Is this evolution and adaptation, is it just, you know, canceling each other out continuously? I'm curious for how your sort of broader take on how this is impacting the conflict right now. So Darren?

[C]

Sure. Well, we've seen over the past four years that these adaptation cycles are compressing and getting shorter and shorter over time, where a new capability would be introduced, most often from the Ukrainian side. The Russians would take a few months to figure this out and vice versa, but now it's compressing down to weeks or days when a new tactic emerges. Both sides now have an established architecture where they can share that information across. We encountered this. This is how we beat it, or we don't have a solution yet. Help. And they communicate. Both sides do in this way. I think that's just a, that's a factor of a very technologically advanced and very intense war that you have these compressing adaptation cycles and learning cycles, really, which is just another deeper and more permanent form of adaptation. The Russians, I have noticed since Bel Yusov has been in the job for the past year, are now starting to speak a little bit more about their challenges and problems. And they have correctly, in my opinion, identified the main challenge for themselves, which is we can't actually mass equipment together because as soon as we try to do that, we are targeted with cruise missiles or artillery or drones. We can't actually get into contact anymore. They have a very polite, politically correct way of saying that our. Let me see if I can remember, I don't have my nose in front of me. It's something along the lines of our traditional formations no longer provide the keys to operational success or something which is very Soviet and very, very coded. But they openly acknowledge that. I think when the war is over that they need to take a break and really revise a lot of their offensive doctrine, in particular for how to operate in this kind of new environment. They don't have it figured out yet. And they say we just actually don't have a solution to this. And so when they're using small infantry teams and they're using motorcycles and a drone carousel or wave to suppress Ukrainian defenders in the trench, that's the best that they can come up with for now. Whether that's, you know, they have other mechanisms that they use like putting longer ranges on shaheds, longer ranges on cab bombs to make them more lethal and make this more painful for, for Ukraine. But they, they, they can't, there's, they can adapt to a point, but then there's the central issue that they can't crack, which is trying to occupy more ground requires you to, to actually use large formations and they can't make that happen.

[D]

Yeah, I completely agree. And exact same thing happens from Ukrainian side because the battlefield evolves every day. But you know, I like my impression from what I see right now is that yes, innovation cycles are really fast, but these innovations and changes are really small, like incremental. And what can change the situation on the battlefield and in this war is some sort of breakthrough which probably could happen in technology, for example, or tactics. Well, with technology it's a little bit easier for me to imagine because I'm tracking technological aspect of it more than tactical, but still. So for example, take FPV drones that everyone is talking about. We had same FPV drone in the beginning of full scale invasion and it's actually the same right now, they just have become bigger and you can attach a bit different type of equipment and depending on what you attach to it, it can perform a different mission. But it's the same FPV quadcopter and it's assembled from the same components produced on the same factory in China. And actually both sides do this assembly from the same components. Not that much has changed since then. Yes, communications, this is where the main competition is, because fiber optic drones is just another way to connect an operator with the drone. You can operate by radio signal, by fiber optic or by satellite, where Ukrainians have shown the so called innovation by attaching a starlink to a sea drone to a boat, basically. So these are like small little iterations which happen but we don't see big breakthrough. Such breakthrough can be, for example, AI enabled autonomy where you completely don't need a connection between a drone operator and any type of A system, it can go as deep as you want into the enemy territory and perform whatever mission you want, let's put it really simple. And this is where it changes the balance. And they can work in swarms and like this technology actually exists in labs. It's not deployed on the battlefield. There is no full autonomy on the battlefield. But this is something that might change the balance on the battlefield. So I think we're kind of in a stalemate situation. And whatever side deploys this breakthrough, I don't know, technology or innovative tactics, this is where we'll see a real change or a political solution.

[B]

On the stalemate situation. I actually wanted to ask you both about the current situation on the front line. Since there are some concerning news coming from Bokrovsk. Could you perhaps describe as to what's going on and to what extent Russia, despite all the inefficiencies that we have described, unfortunately is about to achieve certain breakthrough on the front line?

[C]

Yes, sure. I'll start. The situation, I think in Danya, around Pokrovsk and Dobropillya, I think, is the most critical on the front right now. The Russians have been trying to capture this town for well over a year. I think that was delayed a bit by the incursion into Kursk and they had to deal with that situation and now they've returned that as their primary objective. Right now, unfortunately, the town of Pokrovsk is nearly completely encircled. There are Ukrainian units inside the pocket. The pocket's not closed, but there's a pincer movement to try to do that. And so this is probably going to be a pretty hard few weeks, I would think, for that particular sector. The Russians are trying to do a larger development of the Donbass, moving south from Lyman and up from the south of the region to get the remainder of Donetsk. In particular, there's some additional movement slightly south in Zaporizhzhia. But the reason that this is happening again is the, the tactic that the Russians have settled on or been forced into is the small man infiltration tactics to flood the front line with as many targets as possible to try to confuse the drones operators. They're also targeting the drone teams themselves, the Ukrainian drone teams as well. So, so that allows for them to take advantage when they get close of the sparsely defended areas of the Ukrainian frontline, because their manpower is pretty bad in a lot of these units at this point, they're not being replenished and so they're able to walk through essentially these defense positions and then establish themselves and Then they link up with other small groups that do this and then that's how they keep making these bites. They get fire control every time they advance. They can move artillery into place. They actually control most of the roads in and out of Pokrovsk. So it's a pretty critical situation. We've seen this sort of tactic play out several times now, whether it was Bakhmut or Avdiivka or things like that. So that's what I'm watching next few weeks, how they handle the situation in that particular salient.

[B]

Thank you, Dara. Very concerning indeed. And Kate, a question to you. Actually, I was wondering if, given that the situation has been there for quite some time, they reflected almost a year, have Ukraine been able to create some sort of defenses, some sort of surovikin style lines perhaps to, you know, contain Russia's further advances?

[D]

Of course Ukraine is trying to contain Russian advances and we've seen that Ukraine has thrown its best units and formations into Pokrovsk, like Gore and others, like the most elite, which, which is actually a sign that the situation is really bad out there. And I just wanted to add that in the media the coverage is kind of fragmented because Bukros gets full attention right now. But when I talk to Ukrainian military they keep signaling like hey guys, it's not only what we see on the deep state maps and you know, those everyday reports. Take for example gliding bombs, they can fly 100 kilometers deep right now. That extends this advancement distance considerably. Fiber optic drones can fly 100km. It just depends on the mission and how big the spool is, but it is possible. So the problem is a little bit, bit bigger I think and it's underestimated and it's under covered by the media and you know, all the attention goes to Pokrovsk right now. But the situation along the front line and the means that Russians have right now that they use and deploy against Ukrainians are getting really threatening. I mean the situation gets really worse because of these new means. And they can advance, you know, 100 kilometers each time because this is how far their offensive can reach. And those fiber optic drones can sit in ambush and destroy logistics for weeks. And that's where Ukrainian military actually sees one of the biggest threats. So Pokrovsk is really important and it should be treated respectively. But the situation in other places and along the front line is, is also getting worse. And I think not enough attention is.

[B]

Paid to this very important reminder, Kate. And if I can ask you both one follow up question that actually came up previously, we just published a report together with Max about possible worst scenarios going forward. The report is written based on the premise that despite all the horrible attrition and the casualties that Russia suffered, the key goals of subordinating Ukraine seems to have been considered. And we can see, for example, Gerasimov a couple of months ago presenting against the backdrop of the map in which all of the eastern territories of Ukraine are marked as Russian, not just currently the full one that are in the Russian constitution now. But my question is to what extent that broader vision actually aligns with what we see on the ground? Because it appears that Russia really devotes a lot of resources to specifically occupy the rest of Donetsk region, which it seems like maybe there would have been potentially more success. It would have been potentially more successful if it tried something else. But there's a lot of focus on the Russian army based specifically to Donets region. So how do you see the situation on the front line aligning or misaligning with this announced goals?

[C]

I think that's something I've said to various audiences for the last year and.

[D]

A half that this is.

[C]

They're obsessively focused on this one particular area. Can you use that to your advantage somehow? And I think that they have as best they could. But in terms of the misalignment question, I think that if the ultimate goal is to suborn Ukraine to the Kremlin, they're trying to do it with the mechanisms that you were discussing with Constant Shahed every night shahed attacks, missile attacks, drone attacks, human safari in Kherson and other areas just really terrorizing the Ukrainian population. To do a few different things is to make them give up. It's to make them decide, I just can't live this way anymore. My children, I can't have them exposed to this. I'm going to leave to Europe is to ruin the idea of a vibrant and successful Ukrainian state. And so if they can't get what they want on the ground, typically I see seasonal pattern playing out, or when they have setbacks on the ground, they will typically issue more punitive strikes on the rest of Ukraine. Because if there's nothing to tell the Russian people about territory exchanging hands and we've captured XYZ Objective, then they'll show them videos of Ukrainian cities being bombed every night. And that's what's offered publicly is progress. So I think, unfortunately that trend, I think will continue through the winter and it's going to be kind of another tough winter for Ukraine.

[D]

Agreed. Well, the obsession with Donetsk And Donbass region. I'm from Donetsk. Yes. And I grew up in this narrative, pro Russian narrative. And there's always been a propaganda that, that it's originally a part of Russia and it has to belong to Russia. And there was a big amount of population share in that sentiment. It was one of the reasons why I left that region before 2014, just because it was really, you could feel it. And there are a lot of narratives like this about Malorossia and other parts of Ukraine that should belong to, to Russia. So I think these are the objectives, that kind of first line objectives that should be achieved and communicated to the population. And of course Ukraine shouldn't exist as a country and as an entity, sovereign entity. That's always been the ultimate goal. And I think going from minimum goals with Donbass and eastern part of Ukraine to max maximum just destroying Ukraine completely depends how it goes and where what can be achieved in this situation. So yeah, Donbass is as a minimum goal and that's why there is such an obsession. And I'm as a Ukrainian, I just hope all the rest won't work out and Russia will not, not succeed on this.

[A]

Let me ask a little bit about the air war, the effort by Ukraine to sort of bring this war to Russia. There's been a spate of drone strikes against Russian oil refineries. Also the dramatic attack on Russian strategic bombers this summer with Ukraine sort of planting drones inside of a truck and then dramatically exploding the truck and the drones. It was really amazing. It does strike me and Maria, good plug with our recent paper looking at sort of the scenarios for how this war may evolve. One of the scenarios we look at is really that the way to sort of bring Russia to the table is to cause a lot of pain to Russia so that they don't want this war to continue. And that strikes me as deep strike is really critical. And I'm curious how you all see the evolution of, of Ukrainian deep strike into Russia. So we've talked about the Ukrainian defense industrial base, FPV drones and kind of small scale, but there's also an effort to build longer range cruise missiles, build, build more advanced against drones. And Kate, maybe I'll start with you and Dara, I'm interested in how you see the effects of this on Russia and Russia's willingness to sort of continue. But it does strike me that Ukraine's ability to respond to Russia in kind for what it is doing to its population could be one of the key ways this war evolves, but also evolves in a way that leads the Russian side to decide the. That this is.

[C]

They.

[A]

They want to have some sort of end here. But curious how you see the. The air component that Ukraine is now inflicting on Russia, how, how that's evolved.

[D]

I see it as an absolutely necessary component. And this tactics is borrowed from Russia, of course, and we see how this evolved together with Russian strategy. So Russia started sending shaheds, then they started. Started sending decoys together with shaheds. And Ukraine actually follows the same strategy right now because Ukraine sends also hundreds of drones. It's just Russian territory is much bigger and it's not so concentrated, so you cannot see that obviously. But Sometimes they send 500, 600 drones per night, including decoys. So it's not that expensive and it's not that destructive. But you have to do that because you have to distract air defenses, you have to go through the line of electronic warfare on the border, et cetera, et cetera. And of course, it's an essential part of this war and this strategy, it has its implications in Russia. And I'll let Dara share about this way more. But again, it's starting with destroying the main revenue stream for Russia's war economy, which is oil, and finishing with also exhausting Russian population with simple fear of these strikes, and finishing with, for example, turning off the mobile networks and mobile Internet as a tool of fighting against Ukrainian drones.

[A]

To turn the teenagers against the war.

[D]

Yeah. As well. Or put Russian population under control. Another option. But again, Russian population starts to feel this in their backyard, which is good for Ukraine. And I hope they can just scale this strategy to the extent, at least, what Russia does.

[C]

Yeah. From the perspective of the impacts of all of these things on Russian life and social dissatisfaction, there is gas shortages in many regions across Russia. But my understanding in talking with people who study the strikes, the impact of the strikes, some of them are excellent specialists based in Kiev, is that the problem in Russia is not necessarily that they don't have the oil and gas available because the consumption is obviously much less than they actually produce. But there's some distribution problems out in the rural areas of Russia. And the rural areas of Russia are also the ones sustaining the most casualties. Right. So if there are pockets in Russia that are unhappy, there's people who are really feeling the squeeze out there from inflation, all of the death that they do absorb largely in silence. Now, gas isn't working in the larger cities. And in European Russia, they don't feel it as much because there's better rail networks and they're literally just railing around oil to try to compensate for this. Another impact of these strikes, I mean obviously there's, there's wildly successful operations like on the bomber base, those are, those are rare unicorns. They take a long time to plan and execute. But there's some follow on effects that I think do matter as well. So Russia has responded to that attack by basing its bombers much farther away, even like over towards China. And that is a very long flight. And we're talking, I don't know how many hours it's been, ten hour flight basically. But instead of, instead of a few hours flights to get down to the Caspian, you're doubling, you're tripling your flight time. That reduces the amount of bombs that you can launch. It increases the maintenance requirements on those aircraft and leads to their wear and tear. They're doing the same thing with tactical fighters. They have to constantly move them around to try to prevent them from being attacked and destroyed at their base. And that limits the amount of sorties they can do in every day. So they are launching things that are very damaging, but there is a slight reduction on it because they're trying to keep the plane safe. That's the innovation and learning story has been not as pronounced in the Russian Air force. I guess being, let me say this, I don't think they're learning as well as they are in the army over there. The Russian air force is not really been the dominant source of power in this war and they're still struggling with how to defend against drones. Their air defense systems were not properly configured to do these sorts of things, particularly the strategic SAMs, you know, your S3 hundreds, S4 hundreds.

[A]

And maybe you could both talk about the air defense side for a second because that does strike me as one of the most critical areas, especially for the Ukrainians and now also for, you know, NATO countries that are concerned about, about drones of unusual kind coming into NATO airspace.

[C]

How.

[A]

This is an area where it does seem like there has been adaptation. The Ukrainians adapting different techniques to try to respond to shahid drones and other things with, you know, mounted machine guns. But it also feels an area where perhaps there hasn't been quite as much adaptation or it's just maybe very hard. Maybe you could talk a little bit about, about the air defense adaptation on both sides. And is Russia adapting to now that they're seeing more Russian or more Ukrainian drones coming into their airspace? But Kate, maybe start with you.

[D]

Yeah. Ukraine faced this problem the first and again it's a constant race it's iteration in shahed technology and Ukrainian response to that. It started with mobile groups and now Ukraine started developing interceptors, interceptor drones, because shaheds are flying that high and that fast that mobile groups cannot just reach and you cannot reach shahed with a machine gun. Again, it's not the end. We'll see more developments, more iterations, and it's a cat and mouse situation. I think this whole new phenomena in warfare poses broader challenges to air defenses. How they should be organized on the borders, how they should be organized inside the country. Because we saw that not everything goes across the border like spiderweb operation that you mentioned. The striking capability was brought directly to the target. It took Ukrainian drones two minutes or one and a half minute to reach the target. And no air defense's conventional system could even react and notice small FPV drones. So it poses broader questions, how to protect the country from inside, from outside, how these air defenses should be structured. It's definitely going to be multi layer system. But how the drone world project in Europe. Many experts, including me, I name myself an expert in this. But many experts think that it's infeasible, it's not feasible concept and project just because it's too complicated. It requires a lot of infrastructure to be built, interceptors to be deployed, electronic warfare to be connected. It consumes a lot of power, it requires a lot of people to be trained. So then what's the answer? And I haven't seen the proper answer yet. And it will definitely require a lot of innovation, a lot of funding and proof of concept as well. So yeah, the evolution is going on. We're in the middle of this and we'll see what's going to happen next.

[C]

And I think the Russians are. There's two main lines of effort that they're trying to accomplish. One is inside occupied Ukraine. They are trying to marry up various strategic and tactical systems that they have to make the altitude altitudes deconflict a little bit better. And the Ukrainian forces are good at altering their routes and their altitude to try to confuse these Russian air defense systems. In the Russian system, air defense systems are owned by two different services, the army and the air force. And there's actually a little bit of bureaucratic fighting right now that you see splashed out in military theoretical debates. The Air Force says, hey look, why don't you just give me all of it and I'll coordinate everything. But the majority is actually owned by the army and they don't want to do that. So that's just good old fashioned bureaucratic politics that's getting in the way, although they do recognize that as big as Russia is, they just don't. There's no way for them to cover all the critical infrastructure that they have. And so they're doing things like cages around refineries or nets, other sorts of passive defenses to try to cut down on the problem. But you know, it is expensive. And all militaries, if we're just talking about NATO within a certain range of Russia, have to think about this and they're a little bit behind in most cases. So this is very expensive. The Russians are grappling with it, the Ukrainians are grappling with it, and I don't think anyone has a cost effective solution on this.

[B]

I've seen in the news that Russia may be one of the reasons reasons Russia is organizing this year long conscription now is to get the conscripts to I guess defend their targets potentially. But my question is actually also about the possibility of Ukraine getting Tomahawks or some other missiles that would allow it to send them deeper into Russia. First of all, do you think the previous sort of informal ban on Ukraine striking deep into Russia has been already lifted or not? There's some confusion about that. I've seen some news about Ukraine hidden Russian chemical plan that was far enough that there was some speculation about it. So I wonder what your perception of that is, whether you think Ukraine is likely to get Tomahawks again. The Trump administration sort of fluctuated in its position on it and to what extent is going to be a game changer for Ukraine, Right?

[C]

I wish I had an easy answer to this question because the debate seems to fluctuate so much here in Washington. It's a few times every week, so it's not yet clear to me where this truly is settling. Whether or not they'll receive Tomahawks. It would be quite helpful for them. The range on Tomahawks and the speed and the things you can do with the Tomahawk are very advanced. You know, assuming that it can cut through air defense and electronic warfare, which I guess it would be a test of that, to my knowledge. I don't think that we've flown Tomahawks through that kind of environment lately, if at all. My big question is how many would they receive? Because just launching three or four Tomahawks is not going to get you much at that kind of low salvo rate. One of them, couple of them will be shot down. And the Tomahawk cruise missile is designed to damage a building with precision. It's not designed to obliterate an entire base or anything like that. So I think that it would have to exist in the numbers which then what's going to launch them? We launched Tomahawks in the US military from submarines and ships. They're very large. There are some ground based systems that we have like the Typhon, it's very large, looks like a semi truck, not really survivable. I don't think we're going to send that because we don't have that many. There are some other alternatives in the works that look a lot more like almost like a Russian Glick EM system on wheels, but those are not fielded yet. So I just, I have a lot of questions about this story, like is this real or is this just something that's being discussed to you?

[B]

And maybe also a question about the Flamingo.

[D]

Well, yeah, so just picking up on Tomahawks, from my point of view, it's political tool. I mean I fully agree that it depends on number, how many of them Ukraine can get and that will define if it makes a difference in the war or not. But from the estimates that I've seen from different experts, it's not that many, from 100 to 500 max. So it won't make a huge difference. That's why I think it's more a political tool, a signal, a tool to press Kremlin to push the negotiations, et cetera. So I would take it more as that. And going back to Flamingo issue.

[A]

The Flamingo.

[D]

Flamingo.

[A]

Not the bird.

[D]

Yes, not the bird.

[A]

Ukrainian design cruise missile.

[D]

Yeah, Ukrainian design cruise missile. Cost effective, not that expensive, was pretty good technical characteristics at least what was claimed and declared. But there are a lot of questions on real production scale and real deployment. So we've seen a couple of videos where they being launched. We haven't seen any confirmed strikes. And the information on production scale varies a lot. And like from information that I've got from Ukraine, the production still varies from three to six missiles per month, which is not enough. And there are a lot of issues related to origin of this company, its connection to Ukrainian political leadership and other issues. So we have to see this weapon system in action and then we can evaluate how effective it is and what difference it can make on the battlefield. But for now we haven't seen too much action related to that.

[A]

Maybe one final question and it gets to the role of the US in the adaptation, particularly for Ukraine and then perhaps how Russia is interpreting this. So you know, the United States is still supporting Ukraine militarily. Weapons deliveries are continuing, but the weapons deliveries that the US Is providing, it's really all money that was spent during the Biden administration. So the amount of equipment being delivered to Ukraine is likely to decrease rather significantly, at least that's my understanding over the next six months to a year. There's a lot of intelligence support continuing. But Kate, maybe to you first about how important is the US in the kind of in Ukraine's defense, but also in Ukraine's sort of defense industrial efforts and adaptation or is the defense industrial progress that we've seen in Ukraine really to make up for what could be a lapse in US support? And then Dara, I'm curious, how do you think the Russians are perceiving US Support for Ukraine and is that seen as sort of a motivating factor that they can continue on? Do you think that there could be maybe a situation like what we had in spring of 2024 when US aid had lapsed, the Ukrainian military was sort of seemed like it was on a on a diet, had to ration artillery and other things and the Russians made some advances. Is that what you're looking out for going forward? So maybe Kate, to start with you and then to Darren.

[D]

Yeah, I'll try to be really brief. So role of the United States is really crucial and critical in this war. There is no discussion about that. You Ukraine is not self sufficient in terms of military industrial complex and weapons production. That's 100% in different. Like you won't win this war with cheap FPV drones. Drones is a tool. It's not a game changer. I don't like this word, but yeah, 100%. So Ukraine is dependent on Western support and US support in particular. That's been basically. Ukraine cannot scale its production, especially of conventional systems without investment and funding from abroad. So technologies, funding and investment and intel. This is what is critical for Ukraine to sustain in this war. I'm not even talking about winning this war. And on international arena in negotiations and political aspects, the United States is the leader. So Ukraine cannot lead these negotiations without the major player in the world. So I'll try to be really brief. That's basically it.

[C]

Yeah, I think the situation is, at least from my perspective on supplying weapons is more stable now than it was in early 2024. A lot of the deliveries are being paid for by the Europeans. It seems to me that the administration is comfortable with providing all sorts of weapons to Ukraine as long as somebody buys them and that we're not just giving them for free anymore. And so in that sense, I don't think we've seen the disruption. There's a few little blips in the beginning of the Trump administration, but so far I haven't seen any major cliffs as long as this pipeline continues. I mean, obviously the situation is not ideal, but it's not, I don't think, I don't see the sort of catastrophic stoppage that's coming that I was really concerned about last year. In terms of the rest of your question, which is now I'm forgetting the second half of your question, which is I was.

[A]

Yeah. How is Russia are perceiving this and how. What is their sort of game plan, do you think, over the next six months, do they. Are they expecting perhaps Ukraine to be a more diminished four, six, you know, three, six months from now? How are they kind of going to approach 2026?

[C]

Well, I'm interested in your opinions on this as well, but I think they really misplayed their hand with the Trump administration who came in in January saying, look, let's just bring this to an end. It's not really in your interest anymore. Russia to keep going was just kind of call it where it's at. And the Russians, I think, blew that opportunity by saying, no, these are our demands, and we demand that we solve all these root causes. That phrase root causes does not resonate with the Trump administration. This means a lot to the Russians, and they will give us hours upon hours of history lessons every time we get into a negotiation room. That also doesn't resonate. 2008 and they misplayed their hand. And now to me, it seems that the administration is annoyed with them because they're wasting time while they try to eke out some gains in Donetsk. So what is the Russian master plan? I guess it's to continue to just grind its soldiers to death in Donetsk and hope that they can get the remaining 20% of the oblast. Perhaps when that happens, there's a moment of where diplomacy can come in. I don't know. I don't really see the master plan anymore for the Russians. I think it's just grinding and hoping the Americans get bored and lose interest and just say, I want out of this. And that's what they think that they're doing, the residents think they're doing, but they're actually just irritating this administration, to be honest.

[B]

It's not like there was a fantastic, fantastic master plan from the start.

[C]

Oh, there was, but it was, like, fantastical. It wasn't real.

[A]

Yeah, yeah, I, I mean, one hopes and I, and I think I really empathize with the Trump administration and wanting to just try to have this war come to an end. And if anything, I think if the wines were to freeze and Ukraine can move forward on, on its European integration plans, then it's a great outcome for Ukraine. I mean, it's not great they were invaded, would be better if it never happened, but it would enable Ukraine, I think, to basically say they won the war. And I think that's why it won't happen. I mean, that's my. Is that the Russians can't really have the war end. And so if the primary course is to try to just bang their head against the wall, keep going, keep going, hopefully something breaks, but if not, then the thing that I'm concerned about is them sort of dialing it down and then maintaining a war effort that it's sort of a forever war that never ends, they can sustain. It's harder on Ukraine than it is on them, but it feels sustainable and it sort of goes out of the news. We stop doing events on the csis, people sort of stop paying attention. And yet it prevents Ukraine from actually getting out of this morass. And that, I think, is my concern, which is why I think, I think that hopefully the Flamingo missile and another deep strike means that Russia actually needs to get out of this war and that brings them to actual negotiations. That is, unfortunately, I think, a really depressing way to end. But I want to thank you both for what is a really fantastic conversation. It also strikes me to make a plug of our other podcast, the Europhile. Part of what's so critical is to keep the Ukraine war effort funded and financed. We've been talking a lot about the reparations, loans, Europeans looking at frozen Russian assets, looking at Euro bonds, other ways to basically step up and finance the war since it looks like Europe is going to pay for it, whether it means giving money to Ukraine or buying U.S. weapons. You can check out the Euro file wherever you get your podcast. I also want to thank you all for tuning in for this, what was an outstanding conversation. Please follow and track all the CSIS events, but also please be sure to subscribe to the Euro File and. And Russian Roulette. I should say Russian and Russian Roulette wherever you get your podcast, because we have these sort of conversations all the time. So thanks so much for tuning in and thank you all for being here.

[B]

You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

[A]

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[B]

And be sure to check out all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and eurasia [e-mail].

[C]

Sam.