Podcast Summary

Russian and Ukrainian Battlefield Adaptations

Russian Roulette – CSIS Episode Date: November 10, 2025
Guests: Dara Massicot (Carnegie Endowment), Kateryna Bondar (CSIS/Wadhwani AI Center)
Hosts: Max Bergman, Maria Snegavaya

Episode Overview

This episode of Russian Roulette examines how Russian and Ukrainian militaries have adapted on the battlefield during the war in Ukraine. Hosts Max Bergman and Maria Snegavaya are joined by Dara Massicot and Kateryna Bondar, two leading experts on Russian and Ukrainian defense innovation, strategy, and adaptation.

Key themes include the evolution of military tactics and technology, the contrasting centralized and decentralized approaches of Russia and Ukraine, the challenges of scaling innovations, the dynamics and limits of attrition warfare, and the prospects for future breakthroughs or shifts in the conflict.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Russian Military Learning and Adaptation

• Adaptation Phases:

  • Dara Massicot outlines distinct war phases: Russia’s initial expectations of a quick victory (akin to Crimea in 2014) quickly fell apart, forcing an unexpected and “catastrophic” regrouping ([02:40]).
  • Major systemic change occurred post-mobilization in September 2022. Russia established a complex infrastructure to gather battlefield experience, codify lessons learned, and institutionalize change for a more permanent adaptation ([02:40], [04:14]).

  “They’ve built a pretty complicated system to learn from the war, their combat experience, and really drive it past adaptation into something much more permanent, complex, and lasting.” — Dara Massicot [03:49]

• Centralization vs. Adaptation:

  • Russian adaptation is hindered by extreme centralization and vertical hierarchy, which can slow response and “bury failure.” Still, once the system identifies effective approaches, it can mobilize resources at scale ([07:24]).
  • “Lessons learned” specialists are embedded on the front to circumvent low trust and lack of transparency ([07:24]).

• Integration with Startups:

  • Russia is calibrating its system by linking state defense enterprises with startups (e.g., Rubicon drones), building bridges between Soviet-era structures and innovation, although resistance and competition remain ([12:22]).

  "They’ve created something called the People’s Defense Industrial Base, a mechanism to link startups with state-controlled enterprises… bridging the Soviet system with startups like Rubicon.” — Dara Massicot [12:22]

2. Ukrainian Innovation and Decentralization

• Early Adaptation:

  • Ukraine’s adaptation began in 2014 as it integrated NATO standards and Western weapon systems, dramatically improving flexibility and readiness by the time of the full-scale 2022 invasion ([05:01]).

• Drones as Necessity:

  • The proliferation of FPV (First Person View) drones wasn’t purely innovation, but necessity in response to resource shortages and the battlefield context ([05:01]).

• Decentralized Innovation:

  • Ukraine’s defense industry consists of hundreds of small companies producing diverse systems and protocols (“zoo of technology”), making integration and scaling major challenges ([09:06]).
  • The decentralization, while spurring rapid innovation and cross-sector collaboration, impedes large-scale production and selection of “national champions.” The Ministry of Defense is moving toward more centralized procurement to address this ([09:06], [14:51]).

  “All these startups are competing for limited resources… some of them are just dying because they don’t have enough government order. So it’s really hard to say is it an obstacle or is it for the good, because this is where these ideas are born.” — Kateryna Bondar [14:51]

• Procurement Bottlenecks:

  • With “procurement authority given to 700 military units,” the MOD is struggling to have a holistic picture and needs aggregation for efficiency ([09:06]).

3. Centralization vs. Decentralization – Strategic Cultures

• Trade-offs:
  • Both Russia (centralized) and Ukraine (decentralized) face trade-offs: centralization enables scale, but evolves slowly; decentralization breeds innovation but hinders scaling and efficiency ([11:32], [12:22]).
  • Each side is now trying to find the optimal balance to maximize advantages ([12:22], [14:51]).

4. Attrition, Stalemate, and Doctrinal Shifts

• Stalemate & Incremental Change:

  • The war is increasingly a war of attrition. Despite rapid innovation cycles on both sides, advances have become incremental and rarely game-changing ([24:38], [27:16]).
  • Both sides adapt quickly—what once took months now takes weeks or days—creating an ongoing cycle that generally cancels out advantages ([24:38]).

• Limits to Breakthrough:

  • Large-scale doctrinal breakthroughs are stymied by the new battlefield environment (e.g., large Russian formations can’t mass without being detected and destroyed; Russians are discussing the obsolescence of “traditional formations”) ([24:38]).

  “Our traditional formations no longer provide the keys to operational success… They openly acknowledge that.” — Dara Massicot [25:31]

• Potential Game-Changers:

  • Real change would require a technological or tactical breakthrough—e.g., fully autonomous, AI-enabled drone swarms. Current advances are largely scaling, not transformative ([27:16]).

5. Frontline Realities and New Threats

• Critical Situation in Pokrovsk:

  • Russian advances near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya are the most critical. Encirclement tactics, infiltration by small infantry units, and targeting of drone teams have enabled Russians to advance while exploiting Ukrainian manpower shortages ([30:31], [33:00]).

• New Russian Capabilities:

  • Glide bombs and long-range fiber optic drones have shifted the range and threat profile along the front, under-reported in media and potentially enabling 100 km “deep” advances ([33:00]).

• Focus on Donetsk/Donbass:

  • Both guests agree that Russia’s obsession with Donetsk reflects both symbolic and strategic goals, but the broader campaign of continual punitive strikes is designed to demoralize Ukrainian society ([36:10], [37:47]).

  “If the ultimate goal is to suborn Ukraine, they're trying to do it… by terrorizing the Ukrainian population, to make them give up, leave, or ruin the idea of a vibrant Ukrainian state.” — Dara Massicot [36:18]

6. Deep Strikes, Air War, and Defense

• Ukrainian Strikes in Russia:
  • Ukraine is now mirroring Russia’s strategy with massive drone strikes deep into Russian territory, targeting oil infrastructure and attempting to exhaust both Russian defenses and population morale ([41:05], [42:44]).
  • Dramatic successes (e.g., strategic bomber base attacks) are rare due to the technical and logistical challenges of such operations ([43:07]).
• Impact on Russian Operations:
  • Russian Air Force, less adaptive than the army, has had to relocate bombers far east, reducing bombing tempo and creating operational strain ([43:07]).
• Adaptation in Air Defense:
  • Both sides struggle with cost-effective drone and missile defense. Ukraine is increasingly using interceptor drones due to speed and altitude limitations of ground-based weapons ([46:32]).
  • Russia lacks sufficient coverage for critical infrastructure and faces bureaucratic turf wars between the army and air force ([49:06]).
• Limits of Current Systems:
  • There is skepticism about the feasibility of building continent-scale ‘drone walls’ or layered air defense due to infrastructure and cost ([46:32], [49:06]).

7. Game-Changers: Missiles and Aid Flows

• Tomahawks and Flamingo Missiles:

  • Debate continues about whether the US will allow Ukraine to strike deeper into Russia using Tomahawks. Even if provided, limited supply would make them more political tools than war-changing weapons ([51:33], [53:21]).
  • Ukraine’s indigenous “Flamingo” cruise missile is promising but production numbers are too low for strategic effect, and questions remain about efficacy and scale ([54:19]).

• Western Aid and the War’s Future:

  • Continued US and European support is described as existential for Ukraine’s war effort; drones and innovation can’t compensate for deficits in artillery, armor, and fundamental military aid ([57:11]).
  • US is shifting to a model where allies finance weapons deliveries—this reduces the risk of sudden aid “cliffs,” but supply remains vulnerable to shifting political winds ([58:31]).

  "Ukraine is not self-sufficient... It cannot scale production of conventional systems without investment and funding from abroad. Technologies, funding, intel—this is what is critical for Ukraine to sustain in this war." — Kateryna Bondar [57:11]

• Russian Perspective:

  • Russia overestimated what it could achieve by expecting an immediate deal from the Trump administration; currently, it seeks more gains in Donetsk, hoping for Western fatigue but may risk simply sustaining a “forever war” with little strategic benefit ([59:44], [61:14]).

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On Russian Permanent Adaptation (02:40):

  “They’ve built a pretty complicated system to learn from the war, their combat experience, and really drive it past adaptation into something much more permanent, complex, and lasting.” — Dara Massicot

• On Ukraine’s Decentralized Defense Industry (09:06):

  “All these startups are competing for limited resources… some of them are just dying because they don’t have enough government order.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation (24:38):

  “Adaptation cycles are compressing and getting shorter—what used to be months is now weeks or days when a new tactic emerges.” — Dara Massicot

• On Breakthroughs and Stalemate (27:16):

  “We’re kind of in a stalemate situation. [A new] breakthrough—whether in technology or tactics—is what could really change things.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On Russian Goals and Limits (36:18):

  “They’re trying to suborn Ukraine with terrorizing the population... to ruin the idea of a vibrant and successful Ukrainian state.” — Dara Massicot

• On Air Defense Challenges (46:32):

  “It’s a cat and mouse situation… How to protect the country from inside, from outside, how these air defenses should be structured. I haven’t seen a proper answer yet.” — Kateryna Bondar

• On Western Support (57:11):

  "Role of the United States is really crucial and critical in this war. Ukraine is not self-sufficient in terms of military industrial complex and weapons production." — Kateryna Bondar

Important Timestamps & Segments

• [02:40] Dara Massicot on Russian military learning
• [05:01] Kateryna Bondar’s overview of Ukrainian adaptation
• [07:24] Russian strategic culture: centralization, advantages, and pitfalls
• [09:06] Ukrainian decentralization: “zoo of technology” & procurement challenges
• [12:22] Russia’s attempts to integrate startups and encourage innovation
• [24:38] Evolution of adaptation—compression of innovation cycles
• [27:16] The need for a technological or tactical breakthrough
• [30:31] Critical update on Pokrovsk front and Russian infiltration strategies
• [41:05] Ukraine’s drone campaign and deep strikes into Russia
• [46:32] State of air defense adaptation and challenges for Ukraine and Russia
• [51:33] Discussion on Tomahawks, deep strike capability, and political signals
• [57:11] The centrality of U.S. and European support for Ukraine’s war effort
• [59:44] Russian miscalculation about Western resolve and scenario outlook

Closing Thoughts

This episode offers a nuanced look at the interplay between adaptation, strategy, and resource constraints for both Russia and Ukraine. The conversation underscores that while both sides are learning, adapting, and evolving—Russia through heavy centralization and scaling, Ukraine via rapid decentralized innovation—neither has yet achieved decisive breakthroughs. The war’s outcome may hinge on the first to realize a major tactical, operational, or technological leap, or on shifts in Western support and political dynamics.

For full insight and up-to-date analysis on the Russia-Ukraine war, subscribe and follow Russian Roulette and check out CSIS resources.