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Sergey Radchenko on Ukraine Peace Negotiations
00:47:49
Max and Maria spoke with Sergey Radchenko about the state of affairs in peace negotiations over Ukraine as we come to the close of 2025. They discuss the different parties' goals and positions, and how this current round of negotiations compares to the talks in Istanbul at the start of the full-scale invasion back in 2022.
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- [00:07]
A
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.
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B
And I'm Maria Snigavaya, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia.
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A
And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies.
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C
Foreign.
- [00:34]
A
Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. It's a busy time in US Russia relations and for our last scheduled episode of 2025, we have a fantastic guest here back on the show to help us close out the year. Today we are joined by the always informative Sergey Rodchenko. Sergey is the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and one of the leading historians writing today at about Soviet and Russian foreign policy. Today we're going to get all of Sergei's latest takes on the war in Ukraine, the state of negotiations to end the war, and how he understands the motivations of the different parties, in particular the motivations of Vladimir Putin and Russia. So Sergey, thanks again for joining us and welcome back to the show.
- [01:21]
C
Thank you for having me, Max. It's always great. And hi Maria.
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A
So Sergey, let's dive in. You recently had a piece in Foreign affairs titled America's Magical Thinking About Ukraine. A Bad Deal is Worse than no Deal is published earlier this month I think December 4th. Maybe you could outline your argument in that piece and also how you see the current state of play of talks and negotiations. I should say we are recording on Friday, December 12th at around 9:30 in the morning, East coast time. We're all in D.C. we're not together, we're recording virtually, but we're all in D.C. and there's been a flurry of activity over the last few weeks. 2028 point plan that gets whittled down by the Europeans in Geneva through Marco Rubio and others that then gets kicked back to the Russians with Jared Kushner and Sergei Wykoff, Steve Wykoff going to Moscow, meeting with Putin for five hours. I think they also had to wait for three hours in Putin's accustomed fashion. Putin said no, but somehow they've come back. Still think there's a prospect for a deal. Ukraine has been a lot of pressure on Zelensky. There was a meeting in London with with Keir Starmer, with Zelenskyy, with Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, and Emmanuel Macron. There apparently is going to be a meeting in Paris this upcoming weekend, but it doesn't quite look like anything has really shifted because it doesn't really look like Russia is interested in actually negotiating it. That's sort of an overview state of play of where we, I think, stand. But, Sergey, correct me if anything I'm saying is wrong, and then tell us what you think is going on with these talks.
- [02:58]
C
So I think, Max, you've got it exactly right. And in fact, this is what I presented in the Foreign affairs piece, except that I also then questioned the underlying motivations for US Foreign policy. And I asked whether it's actually in the US Interest to try to force Ukraine, armed with Zelensky, into a deal that would be very bad deal for Ukraine, or is it in the US Interest to sort of just continue supporting Ukraine, especially that the Europeans are picking up the tab, and especially that the Ukrainians are certainly not desperate to get the United States involved in this negotiation. In fact, we've seen the Ukrainians practically, you know, begging the United States to ease off a little bit and let Ukraine deal with the Russians, but actually, you know, while asking, obviously, for American support. And the argument that I made in the article was that it's not, you know, as terrible as it sounds, but this is not a war that the United States should be in a hurry to finish. By finishing it, we mean surrendering Ukraine to Russia because this would strengthen an American adversary in Europe and undermine American allies to a certain extent, create new potential threats in Europe. What does the United States have to win by forcing Ukraine's surrender after several years of providing support to what effectively has become an American ally? Where's the American interest in all of that? And I argue that there is no American interest and that the Trump's administration approach is not well thought through, that the way they've approached this negotiations has been, well, should I say incompetent? I didn't quite use that word, but basically I said they do not rely on regional expertise. They do not necessarily know what they're doing, and they are empowering Russia. They're allowing Putin to claim to clutch victory from the jaws of defeat, jaws of strategic defeat, by which I mean that Russia is not doing so particularly well. Yes, it's gaining some square kilometers. And in Donbass and Ukraine, maybe, strategically speaking, you know, going into months and years into the future, may well lose the war after all, but that does not mean that Russia will win it. Both countries, in effect, are losing this war, and Russia has weakened itself, has become more reliant on China, et cetera. So why is the United States so much in a rush to rescue Putin from his predicament? So that's the argument that I made in the article.
- [05:40]
A
That's a very persuasive argument, one that I think with the new national security strategy that has come out, where Russia is not really treated as an adversary. I mean, I guess the way I think the Trump folks are seeing this, and I think we can tell this a bit from a Wall Street Journal article that came out that apparently there's sort of additional annexes or plans to. Connected to the peace plan, which basically involve turning Ukraine into, you know, I don't know if people saw the. The videos about Gaza, how it was going to be turned in sort of, you know, you know, a Trumpian palace where there would be, you know, Trump hotels everywhere. But essentially an economic plan for Ukraine that looks in some ways very positive, but also in the interests of the United States, particularly Steve Wyckoff, Jared Kushner and others that are involved in real estate. And I think a lot of that would be funded by European money. I think they see Russia as essentially, you know, that they can make an economic deal there, but that they see that there's. That. I think, for Trump, Moscow is rich. He has been to Moscow many times. He has dealt with Russian oligarchs in his own businesses, and so he thinks there's sort of an economic deal if only Ukraine would get out of the way. And the national security strategy sort of seems to confirm that outlook. I want to get your thoughts on that, but also we want to question whether you think the Russians are actually interested in any form of serious negotiation right now, or is this just kind of an elaborate ploy to try to get the White House, Trump in particular, to blame Ukraine for the failure for peace to then cut off US support for Ukraine, particularly in the intelligence domain, similar to what we saw after the Oval Office meeting last February, and that this is essentially this dance between Kyiv and Moscow over trying to blame the other for the fact that there's no actual ceasefire, negotiation or ceasefire or peace. Do you think Moscow is actually willing to kind of sit down and negotiate here? I sort of question how authentic all these feelers and discussions about peace really are. And I think in the end, Russia would just say no to any sort of anything that Ukraine actually puts forward.
- [07:44]
C
So they're really. These are two interesting questions. First, you broach the National Security Strategy, which came out the day after I published the piece in Foreign affairs, and.
- [07:54]
A
I think it came out the day of. But just.
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C
Or the day off.
- [07:58]
A
It was at 11pm so it was technically on.
- [08:00]
C
Yeah, it was. It was on the Same day, practically. And I thought, well, oh, here we go. I argued in the Foreign affairs piece that the US does not know what it's doing in terms of its national security strategy. Effectively, here comes the national security strategy, which seems to confirm that observation. But let me be devil's advocate here and criticize myself. I like doing that because you know how Isaiah Berlin had this way of saying there are two types of people. There are the hedgehogs and the foxes. The hedgehogs are really stubborn in their ways and will always insist on the things they say. The foxes are kind of, you know, they go back and forth. They try to sniff out where's the truth here. And so I've been reading and rereading the National Security Strategy, and I've commented on this already in the very critical vein that I think many other observers have as well. You know, when you see that Russia is not emphasized as a threat at all, but actually it seems like the threat comes from the European Union. You know, some of the, some of the stuff there is quite bonkers, actually, if you think about it. But this question of whether Russia is actually threat, you could make the argument. You could make the argument. I want to see how you would react to that. But I, you know, I've been thinking about that. Let's make the argument that Russia is actually not a national security threat to the United States, that it is actually regional power. Remember, that idea is not even Trump's idea. It is an idea that came from the Obama administration. Russia is a declining regional power. It's not doing so well demographically, economically. It's on its way out somewhere. And by the way, in the Foreign affairs piece, I basically argue that's exactly the case. You know, we should help it. We should not obstruct Putin, making Russia irrelevant, as it were. But suppose Russia is not a threat to the United States. Is that a viable proposition, aside from, like, nuclear weapons and nuclear Armageddon? I think you could probably defend that idea. Then the second question that comes in is, is Russia a threat, an existential threat to the Europeans? And the National Security Strategy actually addresses this point. In one of the paragraphs, it directly talks about this point, and it says the Europeans are exaggerating Russia's threat to Europe, because if you look at hard power across all of the indicators, the Europeans are much stronger than Russia. But whether it's, you know, in the military spending, whether it's the economic resilience, it's, and this is even before we get to 3.5% of GDP, being spent on defense already. Now, the Europeans in nominal terms are spending much more on defense than the Russians are. Now you might say, well, that doesn't actually, it doesn't add up too much because, you know, Europe is all divided and Russia can still certainly in PPP terms compared to what the Europeans are doing. But you can kind of see where this argument about Europe, rather Russia not being an existential threat to Europe comes from. And you could say, well, maybe actually it makes sense. And so from the American perspective, you might say, well, if Russia is not an existential threat or if the Europeans have enough to cope with this threat for themselves, then is it something that we should be worried about? Let the Europeans handle the Russians. Even if Russia conquered Ukraine, established itself over Ukraine, it may take a number of years to pacified, quote, unquote, right? And, you know, you'll probably have some kind of a running insurgency there and so on and so forth. And you might say from the US Perspective that once again, the Europeans can handle it. The Europeans can handle the hybrid warfare that Russia is conducting. And if Russia were to invade the Baltic states or do something stupid along those lines, which cannot be excluded, the Europeans would be capable of dealing with this particular situation. So this is on the, on the first part of your question, right? The national security strategy, is it completely insane? I think you could actually make an argument that it makes sense from the American, from the side, from a particular interpretation of American national interest. Now you might actually counter that argument that I just made, and this is exactly what I do in the Foreign affairs piece. You might say, well, no, the American national security strategy, among other things, talks about the necessity of preventing the emergence of a dominant adversary in anywhere in any region. And if Russia conquered Ukraine, it would put Russia in a position to threaten the balance of power in Europe. Is that a wrong argument? No, it's a valid argument. So in other words, what I'm saying here, you see how it's actually kind of a complex thing, right? I'm saying, yes, I've taken a particular argument in Foreign Affairs. I can see the holes in my argument. That is, I can see how you can actually defend the American national. The national security strategy as published by the Trump administration. And I can also see how you can criticize the defense of that strategy. Right? So it's very complicated. Now, the other part of the question, are the Russians negotiating in, in good faith? And this is where it becomes really complicated. You know, I've been trashed along with my dear friend Sam Cherup for arguing in that Foreign affairs article back when was it, I guess about a year ago or more that the Istanbul talks could have led to a peaceful outcome, or I think the title was the talks that could have ended the war in Ukraine. I always encourage people to read beyond the title because you can get a wrong impression. And in the actual article we argued that we don't know whether Putin was actually serious about negotiations or whether Zelensky was serious about the negotiations. We know that the parties who were negotiating in Istanbul were probably serious about the task at hand. The reality is that Putin would not mind a negotiated outcome if it met his objectives in Ukraine. Is that fair? Of course. Why would he mind that? Of course he would want to get the stuff that now he's currently trying to, you know, he's expending thousands and tens of thousands of people to get. He's trying to get that without expending those people, without expending the material. He's trying to achieve his objectives, which may, which probably includes political control of Ukraine through peace negotiations. So is he seriously negotiate? Yes, if he can achieve those objectives. That's the, that's the point. Right, that's the point. The question is how much is he willing to compromise those objectives, like which particular parts of his broad agenda for Ukraine. He can actually say, well, let's put it aside, we don't really care about this, or that could be just negotiated away. And that is I think, where we can have a back and forth and maybe question some of the things that on his list are the, is he serious, is he less serious about this, you know, what, what is really core to his vision?
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B
Many thanks, Sergei. And since you already started talking about this other article about so called Stanbul communique, the Istanbul Agreements, would you mind clarifying to what extent do you think first of all the key issues that Russia is concerned about have changed in the so called 28 point plan or you know, the new versions of plan that keep popping up every day. So whatever version you want. And to what extent you think the issues that derailed the peace talks back in the day are still in play today as well.
- [15:02]
C
That's a great question, Maria. And you know, a lot of people have said that the 28 point peace plan was written in Moscow and maybe parts of it where. But there are also things there that are clearly not reflective of Putin's strategy. So I don't think we can just say that Kmitryv wrote it or something like that. Right. It's much more complicated. I think there are Certain overlaps with the Istanbul agenda. And, you know, I guess, yeah, we can. We can talk about what the overlap and where the overlap exists and where the overlap no longer exists. So, first of all, it's clear that Putin wants Ukraine in a permanently neutral state that is would not be able to join military alliances. This was there at Istanbul. The treaty they were negotiating Istanbul in 2022 was about, you know, a treaty on permanent neutrality of Ukraine. This means not having, you know, Ukraine out of NATO. This means not having NATO bases in Ukraine or joint exercises and so on and so forth. So is this a real thing? Is this like something that Putin will insist on? I think so. I think it's important. I think it's important to him. I don't think he will give up on that particular idea. What I think is interesting is I don't think this is a big obstacle to peace. Why is it not a big obstacle to peace? Because Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO anyway, and we have known that for a long time. There's considerable resistance, not least in the United States, to this idea, which makes me wonder why NATO summits in Washington, they said that Ukraine's future is in NATO. I mean, what is the point of even doing this if you know, and a lot of people know and understand it's not going to happen? So what's the point of doing that? You're creating false hopes for Ukraine or what's what? I don't understand that anyway. So I think that is something that could actually be achieved viably, and it's a realistic proposition. The next thing is security guarantees for Ukraine. And that is something that President Zelensky has insisted times and again. And that, of course, was there in Istanbul. In the Istanbul discussions, famously, or rather infamously, the Russians tried to veto, they allow the form of Article 5 type guarantees even stronger than Article 5. But then the Russians tried to put in a veto over the exercise or the implementation of those guarantees, which obviously was unacceptable to Ukraine. So this is one of the issues they could never agree on in Istanbul, and despite Putin saying that they were very close to agreement that they could not agree on. So now again, we have the same discussion of security guarantees. We know that Zelensky insists on them. Most recently, he had that. He issued that appeal about elections in Ukraine, saying, yeah, we'll have elections as long there's. As long as the Western partners are willing to guarantee security, which is a funny kind of way of putting it, connecting the two issues. But what are the prospects for that? I think the United States will resist like crazy. Any real security guarantees for Ukraine? I think the United States will resist this for the reason that the United States is not keen to fight a direct war with Russia over Ukraine. That has already become clear over the last three and a half years and it's not going to change. So some sort of paper tiger style guarantees, you know, a replay of the Budapest memorandum or something like that. Well, that's possible, but will the Ukrainians accept it? And then you have this whole issue of foreign troops or contingents on the ground serving as a tripwire, like during the Cold War in West Germany. It seems that some European nations are willing to entertain this idea, but the Russians will not accept that. Right. So you have this whole problem around security guarantees. It's not just what's acceptable to the Ukrainians, but also what is acceptable to the Russians and also what is acceptable to the United States. So it's a huge problem that cannot possibly be resolved. I think despite the fact that they've been circling this or trying to, you know, square the circle for some time, in a sense. I don't think that's an issue really. I think that is something that the Ukrainians are putting a lot near. Zelensky in particular is putting a lot of emphasis on, for no particular reason, because in the end we know that the American are not willing to fight a war with Russia over Ukraine. Ukraine's security can be assured best. By who? By Ukraine itself. And that is where Ukraine's troops, its army, it's the types of weapons that it can have, etc. All of that comes into the picture. We know that the Russians in Istanbul tried to limit that. And we don't find the same limits in the 28 point agreement or peace plan. Rather, I don't know where this, this particular item is at the moment, how it's being discussed in the 28 point point peace plan. The idea was to limit the Ukrainian army at 600,000 troops, which is gigantic. It's a gigantic army, you know, for peacetime army. For Ukraine, that's something that is very difficult to sustain. It's tantamount to not having any limitations whatsoever. And also there was nothing there in the 28 point peace plan about limitations. Any limitations on Ukraine's weapons that it would be allowed to have, like the range of missiles, the kind of weapons, you know, foreign weapons, domestic weapons, etc. Whereas at Istanbul three and a half years ago, this was a big issue, right? They were debating back and forth. The Russians wanted 85,000 troops for Ukraine max. They Wanted to limit the types of weapons, ranges of weapons. By the way, drones were not even mentioned in Istanbul. That just shows how fast the war has changed. It's just completely new. A completely new issue has arisen now. So that's where we find ourselves. And then there are a bunch of other issues that will continue to feed into this discussion. What about this whole thing about changing Ukrainian language laws, for example? This was there in Istanbul. It's still part of the Russian. Part of the Russian demands. Is this something they'll abandon or is this something that they will insist on? What about the status of the Orthodox Church? It wasn't in Istanbul, but it has come up now more recently because obviously Kyiv has banned the Russian Orthodox Church. So, you know, and Moscow has wanted to return it because it sees the church as a major tool of geopolitical influence in Ukraine. Memory laws, you know, Bandera, all of that stuff that. It was all being discussed in Istanbul in 2022, and this is still part of the broader Russian package today. Now, what about the territories? Territories were not, not explicitly anyway. They were not really discussed in Istanbul. The idea was that you draw some kind of an agreement, and then it will apply to the territory that is under Ukraine's control at that particular moment. Today, we're talking about something else entirely, because after Istanbul, Russia annexed the four territories, obviously, in addition to the annexation of Crimea back in 2014. And so now this is all part of. Of Putin's vision for victory. He wants those territories. Is he trying to control all of them? Probably. Is he trying to get the Ukrainians out of the part of Donbass? Well, that's a sticking point for him. Right. He's been talking about the ceasefire, but the Ukrainians have to leave Donbass first. The Donetsk oblast, which is obviously quite heavily reinforced, very well defended, and it would make no sense for the Ukrainians to give up this territory. But now we see, see the Trump administration trying to arm, twist Ukraine to do exactly that, which is obviously something that Putin enjoys very much enjoys the side of this. And then I guess finally, and I'm missing a bunch of skipping a bunch of other things, but finally this question of Ukraine's, or in particular Zelenskyy's political future. Putin clearly wants Zelenskyy out of office. He wants Zelenskyy head delivered to him on a silver platter. Why? Because Zelenskyy was a guy who stood up to Putin and who humiliated Putin in some way by standing up to him. And so now Putin wants to exact revenge because He's a vengeful person. We know that. He also wants to signal to any would be challengers in Russia's immediate neighborhood that anybody who stands up against Putin will suffer the same fate. So getting rid of Zelenskyy is a key part of any agreement for Putin, which we can see the Americans have already internalized because they have also put in the provision about elections and are trying to effectively force Zelensky out. I think the Trump administration will not regret if Zelenskyy is somehow removed from this picture. But, you know, they, they also have their limits on how you do that. Right. So, but it seems to be as far as Zelensky's political future, the Russians and the Americans, not all Americans, but the Trump administration are interestingly on a similar page.
- [23:34]
A
Let me just jump in quickly. Sorry, Maria, about the security guarantees, because I think it's a very important point.
- [23:39]
C
Right.
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A
The Europeans have spent the last year talking about this coalitions of the willing. I mean, I am deeply cynical about this. I sort of see it as a UK French effort to be relevant when they have no money to actually provide to Ukraine. It demonstrates that they're backing Trump's peace efforts. But then, you know, as you sort of unpick this and they develop plans, the issue of the US Backstop, quote, unquote, and it's a very anodyne term to basically mean, well, you would go to war, the US to defend us if we're shot at. And that's what is this force supposed to do. And the idea that Putin would accept UK French and NATO forces in Ukraine as a peace settlement just strikes me as, well, that's what this whole war is sort of about in his mind. So do you think, I mean, as you noted, the security guarantees for Ukraine is Ukraine. And so in Ukraine sort of harping on the security guarantees, is that them kind of knowing that this is totally a nonstarter to anybody and that this is sort of, but it seems sort of reasonable, I mean, to just be very cynical about this. I mean, I think the Ukrainians know that the Europeans aren't actually going to put troops in anytime soon. And, and so, I mean, should we just drop the discussion of the security guarantee if we're actually serious, if either side is serious about the negotiation or the Ukrainians are serious?
- [24:59]
C
Yeah, I mean, yeah, Max, I think you're right. Right. First of all, it's the whole coalition of the willing is a farce. And it was a farce from the start, from the time they, they announced it. And yes, The United Kingdom with its very small under equipped army is in no position to do anything like that. And the French, you know, sometimes, you know, some you look at these people, you think, okay, Ted Roosevelt talk softly but carry big stick. We have the opposite with some of these European countries. They talk very loudly and then as a result they undermine their own credibility and become a laughingstock because nobody can look at it seriously and say, God, oh well, this is. Putin must be trembling because he's not. But you're right, I mean, Putin is unlikely to accept anything like that. Why is Zelenskyy so insistent on these things? My view personally is that Zelensky is mindful of the domestic opinion first and foremost. So it is important for him, if he's to make concessions on the territorial issue, among other things, among a range of issues, he will want to show to the Ukrainian people, to the Ukrainian public, that there's some kind of a promise of some great help, including military help from the west in case Ukraine is reinvaded. So it seems that he's trying to do it for PR more than anything else, while understanding that it's not a real thing thing. That's why he insists on it so much.
- [26:22]
B
Thank you so much, Sergi. That's very comprehensive. And so just to wrap it up, everything you said, to what extent do you think the issues that ultimately derate the so called St. Bull communique, the talks back in the days are still very much the same or have things changed? So who is weaker now in the sense to the. And what does it tell us about the possibility of reaching peace agreement now?
- [26:43]
C
So again we go back, Maria, to this question of the where the Russians are willing to compromise and where not they're not willing to compromise. I mean, one thing that you saw in the Istanbul agreement, which I actually found quite striking, was that Russia agrees to facilitate Ukraine's entry into the European Union, which was like really, you know what? And you find the same sort of idea now as well. It seems that Russia is not necessarily opposed to that. But we don't know whether this is a thing, whether they would actually drop their objections, especially given that the signing of the association agreement between the Ukraine and the European Union back in 2013 was such a big thing for Putin, you know, that he had to arm Twist Yanukovych to drop this whole thing, which obviously led to Maidan and so on and so forth. But in any case, in Istanbul there were certain concessions that the Russians were making at that time. The reason we know that they have made concessions is because we have several versions of the document for the Istanbul talks. We have one that the Russians originally presented in March, which basically reads like capitulation by Ukraine, Ukraine capitulates. All the demands are on Ukraine, no demands on Russia. Here you have an elaborate scheme of security guarantees, even with a Russian veto. You have a whole list of the equipment that Ukraine will have or not have, etc. And this is, by the way, where they could not agree. They went back and forth on this equipment, on, on the size of the Ukrainian army and so on. So all of which is to say that it seems that the Russians are willing to drop some of their objections sometimes. But what we don't know is to what extent they're willing to compromise on core objectives. And this of course concerns the question of Ukraine's political future. If we say that Putin is not, you know, he's just happy with securing some kind of a territorial victory in Donbass and some limitations in Ukraine's military activities, but he's actually willing to let Ukraine be itself and just remain a sovereign, independent state. That's one thing. If we say, well, that's not the case fundamentally for him, given his obsession with this whole thing of controlling Ukraine as part of his legacy is that, you know, the gatherer of the Russian lands or whatever, you, you know, take your pick there you'll say, well, no, he's not willing to. He wants Ukraine under Russia's control. He's, he, he wants Ukraine to be Belarus 2.0, run by Yanukovych 2.0 or something like that. And that's a very different thing. Right. So it, it all comes down to our core assumptions about what Putin wants. I would say, and I think many Ukrainians would agree with me, that Putin is simply after three and a half, after all this investments, after three and a half years of war, is he willing to drop that idea of actual political control of Ukraine, which the Russians have been, by the way. It even goes to Yeltsin's time. You know, it goes. I've been working on this subject lately and in connection with another project. You look at the 1990s, the Russians were actually quite keen in trying to project their political influence to Ukraine. Ukraine. So it's a long standing project, leaving Ukraine in charge of its own destiny, even the truncated form of Ukraine, but leaving it in charge of its own destiny, sovereign, independent, and therefore likely, likely very anti Russian. Is that something that Putin is willing to tolerate? I would say no. That's my gut feeling. Do I have the evidence for it. I don't. Because, you know, we don't know. The only evidence we have for it is Putin fooling around with the peace talks about. Because it seems that if you really wanted at this point to score a reasonable deal, which, by the way, would reopen Russia to the American investment, you name it, he could do it by now, but he's not willing to do it. So why is he not willing to do it? It seems that he's not willing to do it because he wants political control of Ukraine. That's what he's after. And if I were Ukrainian at this point, I'd look at the situation, I would say, well, can we actually have peace and deal with this guy? And what are the consequences of this? Or should we. Are we better off just fighting? I'm not on the front lines. I'm not fighting there. And it's very sad, you know, for, for all those people who are dying there now. It's a very hard call. I was just speaking to somebody in Kyiv this morning, and, you know, they're sitting in darkness. They're sitting in darkness because there's no electricity. It's cold, it's miserable. And you can see how the society is just suffering. It's still very resilient. You know, who are we to say when they should give up or what kind of deal they should sign with Putin? But, you know, I think we should understand what the stakes are for them.
- [31:21]
B
Thank you so much for clarifying that so explicitly. So ultimately saying the question is whether Russia still is imperialist in this claim over Ukraine. And unfortunately, chances are it is. But then, just to play the devil's advocate, the counterargument I often hear in the liberal Russian community on social media is, are you a warmonger? If you saying that the chances of concluding this peace agreement are very limited at this point, meaning Russia is bound to win, given that it so seriously exceed Ukraine in terms of resources. And in the war of attrition, a more resourceful country gets a benefit. So then what are the options for Ukraine left, given this current situation? How do you see it?
- [32:04]
C
So, Maria, I think the answer to this should come from Ukraine and not from us. If we are sitting here in Washington saying, oh, you know, the Ukrainians are going to lose this war one way or another, it's not going to be great for them, so let's just pull the plug. It's like having a patient who's struggling for his life. He'll say, ah, he'll die anyway. Let's just unplug the patient. It's not our call. And especially, you know, you might say it could be our call if we were spending a lot of money on it. But the United States States is not. Is no longer spending money on the war in Ukraine. Right. It's the Europeans who are spending money. And the United States actually stands to weaken a major adversary by supplying weapons to Ukraine that the Europeans are then paying for. Are the Europeans unwilling to pay for that? No, the Europeans are saying, please, please, we'll buy this stuff. We'll give it to Ukraine, because we understand that this is potentially an existential question for us as well. And the Ukrainians, instead of saying, oh, you know, stop all your aid. We're so ready to surrender to Russia, they're saying, no, continue supplying aid. And we can look at also the public opinion polls and so on and so forth. We can see that the Ukrainians are not eager to capitulate. So can people accuse me of being a warmonger by writing this article on foreign affairs in which I say it's basically in the US Interest to continue supporting this war? Yeah, yeah, I can see how some people will say that. I can see how people will say that. But I've just explained the logic here. The alternative is to deliver Ukraine to Russia and to force a surrender of a key American partner of a key American ally in the region. And we can strengthen Russia and weaken American allies. And what's the benefit of that? Exactly? Is that going to be so wonderful? Anyway, it's not our call. If the Ukrainians want to surrender, they will surrender. But as long as they're fighting the Russians, I think it's our duty to help them, especially that also help our strategic standing in the world.
- [34:00]
A
Sergey, I want to go back to the point about the European Union, because I actually, to me, I think this is the critical question. Right. So the Russians have indicated that they're open to Ukraine joining the European Union. They would not object. So no NATO, but eu? Yes. I think what everyone sort of misses is that the EU actually has a more ironclad security guarantee than Article 5 in NATO. It's not, like, implementable in a sense, because there's no sort of real structure behind it. But article 42.7 of the Maastricht Treaty basically requires states to come to the defense of others. Article 5 actually does not require that. And it's very dangerous for NATO that Trump has discovered that. Article five, quote unquote, depends on your definition. But I think this is the critical question, because I could see Right. I think the way the Russians see this is there's no way Ukraine's going to join the European Union. Everyone would have to confirm in a referendum. The EU would likely need a new treaty. It would have huge impacts on Polish farmers. You know, with a common agricultural policy. They have their, their Trojan horses inside the eu. You know, Richter, Orban and others that could block it. On the other hand, I do think that if there was an actual peace agreement, that the only way for Ukraine to get in in an expedited fashion is that basically it's European citizens voting for Ukraine and for the peace agreement. But I'm curious, how do you think Russia perceives of the eu? I mean, you hit on this, but that does strike me as the kind of, would they, you know, do they have little understanding of it? Is this sort of a way to get Ukraine a security guarantee through the back door, through, you know, the Russians not realizing what they're actually agreeing to? I'm curious, maybe you could just unpack that a bit.
- [35:41]
C
So, Max, I think you, you would agree that Russia's longstanding aspiration has been to weaken the eu. In fact, I think now Russia and the Trump administration on the same page as far as that goes, both see the eu, the European Union as something that is not in their interest, and they want to deal with various European countries on a bilateral basis. That, by the way, is a Russian and even a Soviet position that goes back decades and decades and decades. Sort of one of the two pillars of the long term Moscow position, the other being, of course, getting the US out of Europe and undermining NATO. So I don't think they will relinquish this idea that they want to weaken Europe, undermine it from within. And in this context, actions of countries like Hungary, for example, are very helpful, very helpful. You can see how Orban's activities, his complaints about the violation of the unanimity rule, would really play into Russia's preferences on the European Union. So taken from this perspective, you might say that the Russians, first of all, do not believe this will ever happen, that Ukraine will ever join the European Union because of these other actors like Viktor Orban or other issues that will just have to be resolved that are very difficult to resolve, like agricultural issue, you have opposition from Poland, for example, and so on and so forth. So Russia doesn't have all that much to lose by just saying, okay, let's see what happens. But part of me says, well, if this is the case, then why were they so concerned back in 2013? Right? Why all this fear about the association agreement, what is the issue there? And maybe there's just some kind of an internal contradiction to Russian foreign policy. So I don't know. I don't know. I don't think fundamentally, I think Russia does not mean anything good for Europe. That's pretty clear. They want to weaken the European Union. They want to under undermine the European Union from within because that allows them to divide and conquer. That's just a long standing position. So therefore, will they support Ukraine joining the European Union? I think only to the extent that this will create more tensions and more problems for Europe, then maybe yes, but I still have doubts about this. So I don't know how to read that whole thing about Russia facilitating European, rather Ukraine's membership in the eu.
- [38:09]
A
So let's look ahead. I think we're all unfortunately, I think, somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for the war to end anytime soon. So where do you think things are headed? I mean, this is in some ways an attritional war. Feels like Russia thinks that it has the upper hand. Do you think we're going to be having this same conversation in a year from now, two years from now, where would you sort of project how you see things headed? Both? Not necessarily. I'm not asking to be kind of the military strategist, but how do you see the dynamic shifting or do you see this dynamic shifting at all when it comes to potential talks and negotiations in the months and years ahead?
- [38:47]
C
Yeah, I mean, obviously we know that Ukraine is not doing particularly well, whether in manpower or just a general economic situation in the country. European help is very important. The Europeans will continue supporting Ukraine, but there are limitations there. And even any war of attrition can just be suddenly lost because there's just simply no more resolve, no more willingness to defend the country. And so I don't exclude the scenario for Ukraine and particularly because these peace talks are in some ways kind of demoralizing actually for Ukraine. They undermine Kiev's long term ability to defend itself because it seems that the Trump administration just determined to arm, twist Ukraine into surrendering. And so that's an interesting question. But if these peace talks lead nowhere and Ukraine will continue fighting, then I think it could actually hold out for months and months and months and months, maybe a year before losing more territory in Donbass. Because remember, the Russians are also not doing so particularly great. Right. They also face manpower issues. They also face economic problems. And yes, in the end, Russia is in some ways more resilient simply because it has more resources to, to fall back upon. But if Europe supports Ukraine, then you could say that Ukraine could be also more resilient in the long term because Europe collectively has much greater economic resources than Russia does. So it's not, you know, the military situation, I think, is a big question. I don't want to, because I'm not a military expert. I don't want to prejudge here how the situation might develop. We can see that Putin has been very optimistic about taking little, you know, towns and villages and, you know, the Ukrainians have been able to retake them after Putin has claimed that the Russians have taken them. You know, here comes the Ukrainians and retake some of those towns and villages, probably at enormous cost to both sides. But here's a, here's another issue though to consider, and this is the role of the United States. If, as currently seems to be the case, the United States continues with this relentless effort to achieve a peace deal at any cost, which means effectively arm twisting Ukraine to surrender, maybe surrender its territory, etc. If they finally come around to doing that and Zelenskyy agrees to that, then we could see a ceasefire, I think, because Putin, for example, has announced his willingness to conclude a ceasefire if the Ukrainian forces withdraw from Donetsk. Right, we've heard about that a few months ago that he first announced that. He seems to continue insisting on that. And then the next question to ask will be, well, is that going to be the end or are we going to see political evolution in Ukraine, you know, Zelenskyy's fall from power or potentially, you know, emergence of some kind of candidates, which would be more pro Russia? I doubt this, frankly. You go to Kyiv, you don't see a lot of pro Russia candidates there at this point or anywhere in Ukraine. But maybe this is something that Putin would try to accomplish after having a ceasefire on the condition that he has influence over the political situation in Ukraine. So all of this is to say that already something like a few years ago I wrote a piece in the New York Times saying that it would be better if we had a permanent division, so to speak, like in Korea, you know, Korean Korean War was terrible and had a very high human cost. But in the end Ukraine was, or rather South Korea was able to recover and become a major world economy and so on and so forth. Could Ukraine also do that? And I still don't know if this is a possibility. I certainly hope that is, because in the end it's not about territories, it's about the people, it's about the economy. It's about resilience. And I do hope that we could have a ceasefire that will maintain that political independence for Ukraine. But I'm not an optimist because I can see what's happening. Not only do I see the difficulties in Ukraine itself, I can see what the Trump administration is doing. And how can any country survive this? Dual pressure, even triple pressure from Russia, military pressure, internal difficulties, and also pressure from the Trump administration. That's going to be very, very difficult. So when is it going to end? I don't know. But I would imagine that things could change in some direction for better or worse by the spring of next year, maybe.
- [43:01]
A
One final question is the influence and role of the U.S. i mean, Ukraine is under a lot of pressure from obviously Russia, as you mentioned, but also from the US The Europeans sort of are acting as, in some ways, Zelenskyy's bodyguards whenever he comes to Washington. But as you noted, you know, the US Is not funding Ukraine anymore. We're providing intel sharing, we're selling weapons to the Europeans to provide to Ukraine. I cannot see us stopping selling weapons to Europe to give to Ukraine. I could see us turning off intel sharing, but our leverage is not what it was back in February of this year. So I'm curious, why would Ukraine feel a lot of pressure from us? Do you think our leverage, the US Leverage is decreasing? Our influence in this is going to decrease? I mean, part of me just is waiting for us to just sort of wash our hands. It looked like in some ways Trump was gonna do that earlier this fall where this true social post saying good luck to you all as a kind of sign off by you all. It also meant it was Europe, Ukraine and Russia. So does is the US Basically not gonna be a big player in this conflict, do you think, in 2026?
- [44:08]
C
Well, I think the US leverage is decreasing, but as max, as you say, it still has some leverage. For example, sharing of intelligence and that is important for missile strikes, tax and you know, all of that stuff operates in U. S. Intelligence. So that, you know, turning this off would be, would be terrible. Could the United States actually turn it off? Possibly. I mean, Trump tried to do that right shortly after coming to power and that was a dire situation. Might he do that again? Who knows? But it's worth trying to keep him engaged, which I think why Zelensky is sort of playing this game, knowing full well that Trump is trying to arm, twist him into giving away perhaps much more than the Ukrainian public will tolerate. Will Americans continue selling weapons to Europe? I guess they will. I mean, why not? Right? It's, it's good for American arms exports and the Europeans are willing to pay for those weapons. Does the United States therefore have a diminished leverage? Maybe. But I think, you know what the issue for Zelensky is that even though the Americans no longer have that kind of leverage, it doesn't seem that the Europeans are yet willing to step up and actually say, look, we are going to help you in the long term. Because the Europeans are also looking over their shoulder and trying to see what the Americans are doing and encouraging Americans, etc. And you have different European leaders praise Trump or even praise Steve Witkoff saying you're doing such a good job, where, etc. And you look at a certain, you think, do the European and have the Europeans lost their game? I mean, are they, what are what, what are the European and where. It's like Kissinger used to say, right? If I want to call Europe, which number do I call? Because we have various voices in Europe and Zelensky is probably just not sure at this stage that the Europeans can act together and provide the kind of long term security guarantees or, or help or anything without the US Backed backstop. So that's why I think he's engaged with the Americans. Because although you might say the Americans do not have the leverage, it doesn't seem that the Europeans understand that they still act. And in, in a way that suggests that the United States is basically running the show. And that's for all of the things that have happened, right? For all of those things. And the American, the Europeans almost seem to think that the Americans are still in, involved in this game, they're still in Europe. But increasingly the evidence is pointing elsewhere that the Americans are basically tired, they don't want to be there. So I think that's where we find ourselves today.
- [46:38]
A
That's, I think a great place to leave it. It's also a good plug for our sister podcast, the Europhile where we talk about all the chaos that is the European project and Europe trying to get its act together. Sergey, thanks so much for joining us. This was a fantastic conversation. I also want to ask our listeners that if, please be sure to subscribe to our show, give us a five star rating. It really helps raise the visibility of the podcast and we will be back in the new year ready to talk all things Russia policy in 2026. Until then, please have a happy holidays and we will see you next time on Russian Roulette.
- [47:19]
B
You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.
- [47:24]
A
Russian Roulette releases new episodes every two weeks on Thursdays and is available wherever you get your podcasts. So please subscribe and share our episodes online.
- [47:34]
B
And be sure to check out all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and eurasia program@csis.org.