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Russian Roulette
The 2025 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections
00:50:51
Max and Maria spoke with Leah Kieff and Vlad Lupan about the outcomes of the recent Moldovan parliamentary elections at the end of September, and why they're significant for both Moldova, and the broader region.
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- [00:07]
A
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, Director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.
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B
And I'm Maria Snigavaya, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia.
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A
And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies. Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman here with my co host as always, Maria Snagovaya. And today we are joined by two excellent guests to talk about the geopolitical ramifications of the recent parliamentary elections in Moldova. First, we have Leah Keefe here today. Leah is a Senior Associate non Resident Fellow with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development. She also works for global consulting firm ICF where she supports federal cybersecurity policy. And previously she spent over a decade in senior government positions, including but not limited to, roles at the White House and the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, she also served as a Peace Corps volunteer on the ground in Moldova. Additionally, we are delighted to be joined by Vlad Lupin. Vlad is an adjunct professor at the New York University NYU Department of Politics and has previously served both as a Member of Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations. He's also served as a foreign policy advisor to the President of Moldova and worked in election monitoring with civil society organizations in the osce. I should note that both guests are here in their personal capacities and their comments today reflect their own opinions and not the positions of their employers. Leon but it's so great to have you both on the show. Let's jump right in. So it seems like almost every year brings a decisive election in Moldova. Vlad, why don't we start with you? How about you give us some background on the current political moment in Moldova, in the country's political system. In the parliamentary elections on September 28, it was President Maya Sandu's party, the Party of action and solidarity, PAs. PAs won an outright majority with over 50% of the vote. This is really a big deal given legitimate concerns that Russia would use all the various levers that it has when it comes to election interference to support pro Russian parties on the ballot. And the victory of her parliamentary party and in her victory last year now creates a situation where Moldova really looks on the path towards European membership. How do you see this? What's the impact? Maybe give us some background on this election.
- [02:44]
C
Thank you for the invite. First of all, glad to be here with you. Yes, Moldovan elections. Well, it's an extended story. Moldova is a semi parliamentary republic, which means that the president has a relatively limited power. The current president chairs the National Security Council. The President is responsible for the foreign policy of the country and of course for promulgation of the laws for final adoption, the act of adoption of the laws, signing them off or opposing to sign off a certain law, which may lead to the blockages in the parliament, up to even early elections, both of the Parliament and potentially even of the President, if the Parliament attempts to counteract. Also, the President acts as a sort of a political mediator between political parties in the Republic of Moldova. Two interesting things is that the President does not run the government because of that, unlike in the United States, where you have the presidential Republic, the President is the head of the government in Moldova that's more of a mediator, as I've mentioned, and responsible for several security, foreign policy related fields. So parliamentary elections are obviously extremely important for the Republic of Moldova, because actually it's there where the political party is going to win, a political party is going to win these elections, or a group of political parties forming potentially either a single party government or a coalition government to actually run the country. So the elections of the parliament are even more important than the elections of the president. During the recent period of time. What we had and what happened these years, last year and this year, we had an appearance of a new party which is very regular in the Republic of Moldova. Political parties appear and disappear regularly in the Republic of Moldova after elections. If the people do no longer trust to political parties, they practically disappear. So Moldova is known for appearance of new and new and new and new political parties, with some exceptions. Party of Action and solidarity appeared in 2015. Maya Sandow, the president of the party, attempted to run as a president in 2016 without any prep. And she was that close, extremely close to actually beating Igor Dodon, the head of one of the pro Russian political parties. And in Moldova, I should mention that left wing political parties are essentially production, while the center right and right wing political parties are pro European and anti corruption. Surprise. So Maya Sandu leaves a liberal Democratic party in which she was a Minister of Education, another Minister of Interior of Police leaves that party and two of them. His name is Dorin Reyn, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, who just resigned a day ago. So these two form the Party of Action and Solidarity and they enter into an anti corruption campaign, pro EU rule of law, which means also anti corruption. So they go with this campaign. Maya Sandow attempts to run against the Socialist leader. Pro Russian socialist leader igor Dodon. In 2016, she misses several percents without any prep. Fast forward to 2019. There were a number of changes in the Moldovan political scene. We end up in 2020. These two are facing off each other again. Maya Sando wins, this time with an anti corruption campaign. Why? Because one year earlier, there were some recordings leaked in the media from one of the Moldovan oligarchs, presumably involved in the theft of a billion dollars from the Moldovan banking system, which is an enormous amount for a small country like the Republic of Moldova. So these leaks, as well as some investigations that followed, basically lowered the popularity of the socialist leader. They show that he's actually involved in some acts of presumably involved in some acts of corruption. Maya Sandu wins on an anti corruption platform. In 2019, she actually joined forces with Igor Dodon to oust another corrupt oligarch. But they knew that ultimately they will have to face each other in the presidential elections. So she wins those presidential elections after ousting one oligarch and after beating the pro Russian socialist leader. So in 2020, she becomes the president, but she does not have the political party in power in the parliament to back her up. Another interesting point in Moldovan politics is that the president cannot be a member of the party. Unlike in the United States of America, where you have, for example, Donald Trump, member of the Republican Party, or at least supported by the Republican Party in Moldova, you cannot legally be a member of the party. So what do parties do to circumvent that and to gain that complete, almost complete full control of the political system? Any party wants full power, right for themselves. So the past party, as a pro European anti corruption party, nominates in 2020, Maya Sandu as a candidate. She resigns or signs a waiver that she suspends her participation in the political party. She wins. Her image is then used for a transfer of positive image towards the party. In 2021 elections and we have both the president and the parliament essentially controlled by a majority of pass. That way, while Moldova, on paper de jure legally is a semi parliamentary republic, the reality is that we actually have a sort of a presidential republic where the president does decide. This is probably the third time in Moldovan history where legal provisions and the reality do not necessarily meet. So 2020, 21 we have these pass promoting both the president and the parliament. Then we have the war in Ukraine. I recall heated debates on some of the Moldovan televisions where I participated in February, where experts were saying, no, Russia is not going to Invade. While me and another colleague of mine were saying they will obviously pass becomes a crisis government during that time. Why? Because Moldova is an important transit country for Ukraine and it becomes even more important over time. During that time, we don't have a raising economy, et cetera, et cetera. So we see in Moldova a kind of a 5050 situation which might favor pro Russian political parties in the elections of 2024, 2025. What Maya Sando does is that the president of Moldova does. She goes into the presidential elections in 2024 and combines two topics, popular topics, A Do you want Moldova to become a member Referendum, do you want Moldova to become a member of the European Union? Which is a very popular topic. And she overlaps that with presidential elections. That automatically gives her a boost in elections. And we see a higher participation during that election than before. So she wins again. And she also wins because people do want to get into the European Union. But the problem that we saw during this particular set of elections is a shift from previous plans of the Russian Federation of regular type of interference that we are kind of used to in Moldova, to a new form of interference, and that is direct buying, direct purchase of votes during that referendum, which essentially decided that Moldova is going to leave the Russian sphere of influence. That was extremely important for the Russian Federation. The only power that is able to revert that would be the government, which means the elections of 2025. So Russia invested heavily, heavily in buying voters in various schemes, even training people abroad in order to organize various forms of coup. This is not the first time during these elections it was tried in 2023. An FSB officer was arrested in February of 2023 for that in Moldova. So you had a rolling number of events that was happening and the population, even those who did not necessarily support the PASS party and who still remember the fact that in 2019, Pass was saying, it's not about geopolitics, it's not about Russia, it's not at all about European, it's about Moldova. In these elections, PASS went into, it's either Europe or not, or Russia. And we lose and we become kind of a war party.
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A
It really does seem that this election was a referendum on Moldova's future, Europe or not. And the outcome, much like last year, where in 2024 Maya Sendou won her party overperforms, does quite well. Was that a shock to you?
- [12:07]
C
No. As I said, these elections were very clearly about whether we are going to become Europe or not. So this is a continuation. The only way you can become a part of Europe is if the government is going to implement the reforms and the European Union is going to work with the government. So the referendum of 2024 could not go through if there is no government. So that was the second step and the most important step for Moldova to actually start negotiations, direct negotiations on becoming EU member. These direction negotiations are not necessarily an outcome of Moldovan's super performance. No, of course, and there is plenty of reasons to criticize path for floating and shifting pace of reforms, lack of focus and perhaps sometimes even lack of outcomes. But the war in Ukraine is what motivated the European Union to open the doors to both Ukraine and Moldova. Basically Russia created itself a scenario which it did not want. It did not want to lose Ukraine, it did not want to lose Moldova because Moldova represents the southern flank and it's a part of a concluding gate to cut off Ukraine from the seaside. But its own war against Ukraine actually motivated both countries to run away as fast as they can towards particularly the European Union and Ukraine in particular for NATO.
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B
Thank you so much. I'd like to bring in Leah into our conversation. Leah, would you mind perhaps sum up based on the background, very helpful background that lot provided. Would you say this election means for Russia's influence and also together give us a little bit insights regarding Russian interference in this election? We know stakes were very high to the way a lot of competition and so what is the current reality in the aftermath of this election?
- [13:59]
D
First, thank you so much for hosting this conversation today. I'll try not to miss any of the questions you asked there and maybe you'll let me know if I have. So let me start perhaps with some of the fears about the Russian interference in the most recent elections, that they would be sufficient to alter the results. I think it's important to say how well founded these were based on the intelligence that was available leading up to it and that regardless of the outcome of these elections, that there was really a high likelihood that there was going to be some significant disruptions following, whether that came in the form of riots or cyber attacks. But you know, I think first and foremost there's good news, which is that there haven't been any riots or really significant cyber intrusions following these elections. And I think that can largely be credited to the work of law enforcement within Moldova as well as the collaboration that Moldova has had with a variety of partners and allies. So I think it's important to note and obviously Ambassador Lupin provided an excellent history of sort of recent history of elections in Moldova, but election interference in Moldova isn't new, although in the past, it wasn't always clearly affiliated with Moscow in the past, even as today, I think a lot of this interference is orchestrated by oligarchs who are really seeking their own personal gain. But now these oligarchs are much more uniformly aligned and funded by Moscow, which is a key, key shift. And certainly the scale and types of activity around elections have been increasing really steadily in Moldova since 2022, especially during the local elections. In the fall of 23, there was a doubling in violations. And during last fall's presidential election and EU referendum, it's estimated that Russia spent over $200 million on influencing that election. And that's as compared to about $200,000 that all of the pro EU parties spent during that same period. And it seems, at least from what I've seen, that Moscow has doubled down yet again, with estimates suggesting that They've spent approximately $400 million during this year's elections. So you mentioned, and Ambassador Lupin mentioned, a few of the tactics, whether that was direct vote buying or convincing voters of false narratives. But I think that it's really important to note that in addition to getting more creative on the ways that they're going to move money into Moldova, there was a crypto scheme in the most recent election that the US Government actually sanctioned. There's also a lot of disruptive activity that's outside the ballot box. Now, in the most recent elections, there was a Moldovan oligarch who was offering $3,000 a month to Moldovans to engage in protests ahead of the election. And just to kind of put that in context, the average income in Moldova is about $16,000 a year. So $3,000 a month is a really substantial amount of money for the average citizen there. And the arrests were mentioned, some recent arrests around a training camp in Serbia. That's a training camp that's alleged to be affiliated with the Russian intelligence services. And allegedly they were training Moldovans and Romanians there to incite riots, fight law enforcement, use drones to drop explosives. And there were a couple of arrests made in Serbia also. There was a really significant Moldovan enforcement operation that occurred in Moldova, where they arrested 74 people who were accused of preparing these attacks on persons and property to occur during and after the recent elections. And, you know, I think this law enforcement operation, which occurred before the election, is a great example of the execution and the focus of the tools that have been developed and are now being delivered by paas and the law enforcement agencies within Moldova to ensure election security and the Moldovan president has publicly credited the government's ability to largely disrupt the efforts of direct vote buying in the most recent elections for why they went smoothly. And in other good news, I think at least right now, Moscow is not alleging that the results of these elections weren't free and fair, although one of the Moscow backed political parties in Moldova has said they will protest if these results are ratified. But you asked about sort of what this looks like going forward. You know, I think regardless of this election, Moldova's continued adoption of policies that, while in Moldova's own national interest aren't in line with Moscow's preferred trajectory for the country is likely to continue to displease the Russian government and likely to frankly continue to encourage the Russian government to be disruptive.
- [18:52]
B
So excellent. Precisely on that question, Aliyah, now that my Sanders party won the elections in a way that was convincing despite all the spheres that you brilliantly summed up are the fears of Russian escalation inside of Moldova going forward. And to add to that, right, we've just heard about the resignation of the Moldovan prime minister. He's not going to be seeking the continuation of into the new term. And apparently there are also deep concerns about the sluggish economy that's been hit obviously by the Russian invasion. How do you see the situation unravel? Shall we sort of feel a little bit relieved now or are there reasons to be more worried going forward?
- [19:30]
D
Well, I'll speak for myself on the relief or worry. I think for me and maybe a lot of other people who were watching the elections this time around, I breathed a sigh of relief when I saw the results and that there haven't been any really significant disruptive actions following and hopefully that continues. But as I said, I think, and as Ambassador Lupin said, the results of these elections are really clear that the Moldovan people believe that posh should, for sort of lack of a better equivalency, have both the executive and legislative branches to continue to execute not only on the reform agenda that they first came to power with, but also on moving Moldova towards EU membership, on moving Moldova closer towards the west. And you know, Moscow is going to continue to be displeased with that. We just saw this week, in addition to the prime minister resigning, Moscow released their ten year defense plan. And Moscow responded accusing the plan of militarizing the country in support of closer ties to NATO and supplying Ukraine. So I think Moscow is going to continue to express their displeasure in a variety of ways. I think we should probably expect some of the Same false flag attacks we've seen before in Transnistria, similar activity. The Moldovan government has done a good job of debunking these in real time. I also think that there's frankly a likelihood of escalation in these false flag attacks, whether that's in terms of the scale of these attacks or the location of them, with maybe some potential cross border attempts. But I'm fairly confident that the Moldovans, Romanians and Ukrainians are already watching this very closely and coordinating on this really closely. I also think there's some significant risk of a large scale cyber attack, similar to Perhaps the famous DDoS attack in Estonia from 2007 being executed in Moldova. But I know that the Moldovan government has been and continues to be focused on cyber as part of their digitization efforts. And you asked about the economy. Look, I mean, as Ambassador Lupin said, and I think others have said, rightly Haas has taken on an ambitious agenda and they haven't always executed on that perfectly. The economy is certainly somewhere where they deserve some criticism and where there's a long way to go. And frankly, I think if Moldova wants to be a real part of the Ukrainian reconstruction, which I think they do, they need to execute on those economic reforms, whether that's in the banking sector in terms of ensuring that there's a full rule of law system so that foreign investors feel comfortable investing in the country sooner rather than later. And certainly improving the economic situation for the citizens of Moldova will continue to ensure that those citizens see the pathway to the EU as the right pathway.
- [22:26]
A
Vlad, maybe over to you with a similar question about how do you think Russia is going to react to the victory of Maya Sandu's party and the kind of pro EU bent that we now see. Moldova, at least that seems like the trajectory Moldova is taking. There's the breakaway region of Transnistria, there's a Russian base there. Is that an active live concern? It seems like Transnistria, since Ukraine basically cut off gas flows, Russian gas flows into Transnistria, their economic future is sort of no longer as much tied to Russia, but maybe tied to Europe and the rest of Moldova. How do you see the current dynamic going forward now that we have kind of an administration with a parliament that seems to be rowing in the same European direction?
- [23:11]
C
Yes, previously we did not see more or less clear and active strategy of the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Moldova. In 2023, I believe there was a leak about one of their strategies and it was based on using gas as leverage, online activities, et cetera. Et cetera. So pretty basic. And of course online activities, plus political involvement now, gas and electricity, Moldovans actually cut off that leverage. The Moldovan side has connected to European networks in both gas and are now working to do the same in electricity. So that was a surprisingly active, good, positive outcome. In that way, they diminished the attempts of Russian influence. So now what we're seeing the latest attempts of vote buying and political undermining, etc. Etc. This is a new approach that we have seen after the changes within the Kremlin about who is taking over Moldovan file. Previously we had some SVR guys in charge of the office that was actually focusing on Moldova. Currently there is a change. So we're seeing that change in these past and present elections. What we can expect is probably that the Russian Federation, just like it did in the past, it had a sort of a plan to undermine potentially the activities in the Republic of Moldova. And the political situation in the Republic of Moldova, they are going to continue to do that through the means that they can. Ukraine blocks them from any potential military advance. Yes, Moldova was on the map of physical military attack in 2022. That is no longer possible. Ukraine is covering the airwaves and therefore you cannot bring more military into the Republic of Moldova by air. So that honestly, I've seen someone waving this kind of plan. No, that's not going to happen. This was preempted before, but the base in Transnistria is going to be used definitely to continue to attempt to undermine the activities in the Republic of Moldova and in Odessa region, in particular in south of Ukraine. This was attempted before, this is going to continue now. The Transnistrians, however, do have a dilemma because up to now Russian Federation was sending them free gas and they had a higher debt than Ukraine and of course Russian Federation. If you recall, in the war between gas war between Ukraine and Russian Federation, they were claiming that the Ukrainians have a high debt, Transnistrian small region had a higher debt than Ukraine. The Moscow did not disconnect the Transnistrian region. They were attempting to disconnect Ukraine. So it gives you a perspective of the fact that the gas leverage was used and is going to be used as much as it is possible for political reasons. But the problem now is that again because Ukraine closed the gas pipelines, they are attempting to redeliver the gas through various networks, shell companies, third companies to the Transnistrian region. And the gas has stopped now because those companies are again under sanctions. I would argue from my perspective as a former negotiator of the Transnistrian conflict, that this is a great moment to actually sit down with the Transnistrians and basically tell them it's over. And we haven't seen that type of a plan for a very long time from pas, to be honest. And I was a bit critical towards PAAS about that. So hopefully now with these kind of developments, PAAS will be pushed to do so. And hopefully with the support of external partners, this kind of development can be helpful. It's not an easy task. It sounds easy. You force them and, you know, defund Transnistria and it's over. No, it's not going to be easy. It's a difficult process, but it's. I think this is a moment where you would be able to eliminate the Transnistrian region as a danger for both Moldova and Ukraine, which was used for that specific purpose. Transnistrian region through the recent years was used as a blockage of the transit between Moldova and Ukraine. It was used as a. An attempt to distract Ukrainian military towards the trans region from the Eastern front because that would give the Russian Federation more power on the Eastern front. So it's a unique opportunity. It's a great opportunity. And I think Moldova has a lot on the plate. Economy, yeah, it's lacking. That's why they have come up with a candidate who is actually. His name is Alexandro Monteano. After prime minister resigned, he is the designate person to become the prime minister. That's today, that's happening right now. And he previously worked with various international organizations as well as investment, just like Maya Sandu worked with the World bank, for example. So we have that type of person. That person is focused on economy. So dealing with Transnistrian region, yes, it will require economy, but not only. So as I said, there is a lot on the plate still to work on and I don't think PAAS had a proper plan to do that, but they will have to. The events around them are pushing them to do so.
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B
Hopefully they learn and in particular by listening our Russian roulette podcast, among other places. Lee, another question I want to ask you that is somewhat controversial, but in the Russian brunette that unfortunately I follow a lot, for better or worse, there was a lot of criticism of the Moldova election for the alleged violations of the sort of liberal dimensions, party exclusions, media environment, diaspora voting, hybrid interference. What's your take on it? How seriously should we take these claims? And also what are the limits of liberal pursuing liberal democratic procedures at the situation where the country is de facto at hybrid war with Russia? What's Your take on it?
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D
Yeah, Maria, that's a great question. You know, I think that this is something that Moldova is not alone in confronting. I think all democracies across the world are trying to figure out how do they confront foreign malign influence in their countries. And you know, in this instance, and especially around elections, without limiting those values like freedom of speech that are so essential to the democratic process. Moldova certainly hasn't done this perfectly, but I think that Moldova is a success story here. I think that they held free and fair elections without having to reschedule or rehold those elections and without really significant suppression of speech. They do it perfectly in every instance. No? And, you know, I think that there's a lot of lessons here to be learned for that broader hybrid war that's happening in Europe and especially across post Soviet states, especially knowing that Moldovan elections are, in my estimation, a testing ground for the tactics and methods that the Kremlin is going to use in other elections elsewhere. And so, you know, I think the rest of Europe, post Soviet states, the rest of the world should be looking at what they can learn here. I talked a little bit about the law enforcement efforts in Moldova and how well coordinated those were and how focused the past government has been on ensuring that there are those tools for law enforcement to use to enforce. But I think also the past party and post Soviet states in particular should look at this, did a really great job of engaging Russian speakers with messages about what a future with Russia would truly look like during this election cycle, just how bloody and unjust that future would be. And I think that that's super important, that engagement of the Russian community in these countries. But in addition to this engagement in Russia, I think that Europe and the rest of the world have to take away the importance of ensuring that foreign powers can't inject money into elections and that citizens have to believe that their democracies are going to continue to deliver on security, rule of law, prosperity, the basics of the social contract, at least as well and imperfectly as they can. And in the good news that when these elements are present, that free societies can repel even really, really well funded foreign malign influence.
- [31:29]
A
Leah, I'm curious if there was a US Response or approach to the Moldovan election. There was a lot of criticism by the Trump administration of Romania, which had an election the pro Russian candidate won. It was later found that there was a lot of Russian influence and Russian election interference into that election. That election was annulled. There was another one that candidate was not able to run and they held new elections and that was then won by the pro European leader. And that has been criticized BY People like J.D. vance that have accused that as sort of putting the thumb on the scale of democracy and especially of content, social media content moderation, as being a form of censorship. So I'm curious, was there a US Response and maybe on the social media side, was that a key aspect to this election? Of you mentioned the hundreds of millions of dollars that the Russians potentially had spent to interfere in this election. I imagine it was. Was that just sort of washed over? Did it have a big impact? Maybe you could talk a little bit more about the US Response. Where was the United States in this? And maybe on the social media side.
- [32:35]
D
Yeah, so let me start with the social media side and then come to the US Response. So the social media side, I mean, as I mentioned earlier, I think when you're talking about a ratio of 200 million to 200,000, certainly the ability to, let's say, flood the zone to that degree is going to have an impact. And certainly a lot of money was spent on social media engagement by the pro Moscow side of it. And that's part of why that engagement in the Russian language was so crucial in terms of the US Government. And I think in particular you're talking about the Trump administration's response to this election. Unlike the Romanian elections, there weren't those statements about the potential limiting of speech, the potential limiting of voters rights. And I actually think that that is a response. And I would couple that with something else, which is that in September of this year, the US announced an additional $130 million of funding to build an additional electrical line to connect Moldova and Romania, which increases Moldova's ability and to have security in their supply. And that was done in advance of this parliamentary election. And as Ambassador Lupin mentioned, energy has long been an important issue in Moldova. It's long been a tool of Moscow to twist Moldova's arm and extract other geopolitical outcomes. And certainly voters know this. Certainly when voters go to vote in Moldova, part of what they are voting on is ensuring that they will hopefully have access to energy, and especially in the winter, both in terms of the supply and in terms of the cost of this. So I do think it's notable that the US Government provided that funding and provided it in advance of these elections. And I do think it probably had an impact at the ballot box.
- [34:31]
A
Excellent. Vlad, back over to you about where Moldova is headed now. As I sort of mentioned earlier, it does seem that the boat is firmly pointed towards the eu and everyone's rowing in the same direction now. Or at least there's some certainty that there is going to be a Moldovan government that is eager to press ahead with the EU membership ascension process. And for our listeners, oftentimes the notion of joining the EU is, you know, oh, well, just. You're just joining a club, you know, it should be easy, why not next week? But this is like if Canada were to join the United States or Mexico to join the United States. You have tens of thousands of pages of laws that have to be adopted. There's a whole process and there's also reforms before any country has joined the eu. The EU has also oftentimes adopted a new treaty and reformed itself. So I'm curious how you see the Moldova and EU ascension process working out. Do you think this is intimately tied to Ukraine and where the war in Ukraine goes, which I could see as having benefits for Moldova because if Ukraine moves forward, if there's a peace agreement, then Moldova joins that. But I could also see that as being somewhat worrying if there is sort of no real settlement to this war and then Moldova is sort of stuck in this purgatory, much like Western Balkan countries that's been waiting now for decades. Many have done a lot of the reforms but aren't on the prospect of joining, in part because the EU is not sure about adding new members. That would make, you know, unanimity in the European Council even harder. So I'm curious how you perceive this going forward, how much momentum is behind this within Moldova? How excited are you about the future prospects of this?
- [36:09]
C
The European Union has very strict criteria of membership. They are called Copenhagen criteria. You need to fulfill those criteria to become a member. And in basic terms, it means rule of law, including anti corruption democratization and an economy that is capable to withstand the market forces of the European Union. European Union is a giant economic block and it requires a country that wants to join to be capable to resist potential pressures, economic pressures from inside the European Union itself, towards a new member. So taking into account that the Republic of Moldova income per capita shows that it's not there yet, obviously. Right. And we just talked several times and mentioned several times that the, and everyone is speaking about that the economy is extremely important for the Republic of Moldova. I mean, we would like to see some progress in the reforms that underpin the economic development and that is the rule of law. These reforms have been partial and have had a mixed set of results. So more efficient, more focused approach is necessary in that area. And then in the economy. Energy is an important element in that. And we're talking about four years. Do that in four years. Laws, to be honest, it's easy peasy. That's absolutely not a problem, for a very simple reason, because the neighboring Romania, with whom we share the same language and history, are an enormous advocate of the Republic of Motova within the European Union, but they also help enormously Moldovan authorities with the expertise, with their past expertise, of European integration. So transferring the laws, which are extremely similar in case of Romania and Moldova is going to be extremely easy. They are already translated in Romanian. We speak the same language. So the transfer of laws and their micro adjustment is probably the easiest part. Moldovans are often praised for speedy adoption of the laws. And historically, because I've worked in some of the peacekeeping and development missions, what we have seen, both in Moldova and other countries in development was a different problem. It wasn't the legislation, it was the implementation. Okay, so that's where the real challenge is going to be for my own country, for those who live in that country. I live in the United States of America, but I have family back at home. Of course, I want them to be members of the European Union because it's a predictable system. It's a system of welfare for the people. It's a system of rule of law for the people. It's a much better system than anything we have up to now. It has its flaws, but as Churchill said, democracy is probably not the most efficient system, but it's the best we've got. And the European Union definitely provides us with that type of system and with that type of better welfare than the Moldovans have now. So for that reason, there is no doubt that Moldovans would actually want to live better. Right? The problem is the term of four years and this government's capacity to absorb and negotiate, absorb, implement reforms that will require an enormous amount, and that means dependency on external support and external help. Moldova will not be able to implement all these reforms by itself. I do recall a phone call conversation with someone from one of the previous US Governments where I said, could you please give me the number of the person who did the reform, the police reform in Georgia? The Moldovan police maybe is not in the same relatively precarious situation as the Georgian police was. I worked in Georgia, I know what I'm saying. And I had direct work and encounters with police, some pleasant, some not. The current development in the Moldovan police is much better than we had in 1998, 1999, when I was in Georgia and we are in 2025, that's expected. But it's not only about the police, it's about the courts, the performance of the judges. It's about the economic development systems that are in the country. And it's also about the people, and sometimes even luck of properly prepared, trained people who would implement, not only negotiate with the European Union, but actually work on the implementation of those reforms. That's what we see in case of Moldova, that there is definitely a need to boost that capacity and there is no way this can be done without an external support.
- [40:50]
B
Many thanks Vlad. It seems that the road forward at least is quite clear. And I also want to flag that, you know, to some extent it feels based on this discussion that Russia somewhat lost the element of unpredictability. So we know what the game is about. So in some ways it looks a little bit easier to counter it. And accordingly, my next question to Leah is about again the same four years ahead of us that Vlad has pointed out as we look into 2026. With the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine still unclear and a moment of self promotion, me and Max have a brief devoted to the most likely future scenarios of the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the continuation of the same trajectory is very likely. So how will events in Ukraine impact Moldovan security and Moldova's long term efforts at European integration? I will also flag a RUSI report that some time ago pointed out that Moldova was actually very much a military bull of the Kremlin as long as the Ukrainian invasion went according to the original plan. Luckily it did not happen, but we see that the consistent effort to subordinate Moldova one way or another continues. So Lee, what do you think about the future trajectory of this venue?
- [41:59]
D
Yeah, Moldova being coupled with Ukraine is ultimately what got their bid moving in 2022 for the European Union. And I think it is worth noting that while Moldova and Ukraine have moved through that process together so far, there's no mandate that they have to continue to do so. But I do think that there isn't a scenario in which there is an eventual ceasefire in Ukraine that doesn't involve Moldova, at least insofar as it relates to Transnistria. I just can't imagine a scenario in which Ukraine signs a ceasefire with Russia and leaves Russian troops and a Russians weapons depot in Transnistria. I think it's worth noting that had the elections turned out differently, either last fall or this fall, and Moldova had a government that was largely controlled by a pro Moscow contingent, there is a likelihood that Ukraine would have had to take control of Transnistria, whether preemptively or after it became a way station for moving Russian military assets into Ukraine or even for launching attacks on Ukraine. And I think this is why we saw such happiness in Transnistria for the election results this year, and why it's estimated that 40% of the residents there voted for pass. Because I think the residents there, like most people, want peace and safety for their families and don't want the war to be in their neighborhood. And I do think that there's still a possibility that Russia could seek to build a corridor between Crimea and Transnistria. It would make sense for a number of reasons, including cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea and having control of the manufacturing and electrical infrastructure in Transnistria. I mean, of course, that's only if Russian troops could make and hold such an advance. But it highlights just another reason why the resolution of the Russian troops and the weapons in Transnistria have to be part of the eventual peace agreement or ceasefire in Ukraine. And, you know, I want to echo Ambassador Lupin's positivity about Transnistria. You know, the situation there, I think, has been thawing since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But it was really significantly unfrozen in January of this year when Russia stopped providing gas to Transnistria, which, as the ambassador mentioned, they had been doing since the independence of Moldova for free, to Transnistria. But even more than Russia stopping providing that gas, Moldova providing that gas to the Transnistrian region with EU support, it's opened up new avenues for collaboration between Brussels, Chisinau and Terraspool. And while there's still a long pathway and a difficult plan to implement a full reintegration, I think for the first time in 30 years, there's really a lot of light in terms of that happening. And that's a good thing for Moldova's EU trajectory, it's a good thing for Ukraine and the region's security. And frankly, it's going to be a really good thing for the Moldovans who are living in Transnistria.
- [45:04]
A
Vlad, quickly over to you.
- [45:06]
C
The disconnection of gas to Transnistria region in the beginning of 2025 was a concern because the elections were coming and people did not want to have a humanitarian crisis that would affect both Moldova and Ukraine ahead of Moldovan elections and in a difficult war situation with Ukraine. Elections are over. This is it. Now you can move on to the next phase, and now you can actually discuss the gas properly, because it's no longer flowing from Russia. So there are plenty of nuance here. And there is one more. Remember one interesting thing. Over 60% of the Transnistrian exports on behalf of Moldova as a part of the Moldovan economy to the European Union are to the European Union itself. So Transnistri experts more to the European Union than elsewhere. I think European Union has a considerably higher leverage now and the Republic of Moldova considerably higher leverage and an attraction, both carrots and sticks. They don't work one without another. Exclusively relying on attractiveness did not work because Moldova is still more attractive. Even now Moldova is more attractive than the Transnistrian region. So that's definitely the case. The second part is about the game and you know, the conflict, Russia's game in Moldova and Ukraine and the conflict in Ukraine, how it's going to connect with Moldova. I totally agree with Leah about that because that's exactly what I was talking about. But there is one also nuance that I would like to add. The negotiations with the European Union. There were a number of concerns historically for Moldova to be connected to Ukraine in negotiations with the European Union because we could see a leader of a country, a member of the European Union saying, well, this tandem is going to be blocked because we don't accept Ukraine or we don't like how Ukraine specifically performs in an area or another. The fear was that would block Moldova. Moldova is a smaller, much smaller country and can, despite the challenges, implement reforms. This happened before I was asked to go to Ukraine to discuss how did Moldova in the past, long time ago, how did Moldova manage to have better and faster reforms than Ukraine in the past? If that was possible in the past, it's possible now. Brussels does one thing, a very important thing, one distinction. They judge the performance on the basis of a country, not on the performance on the basis of these tandems. Ukraine, Moldova, or for example, the complexity of Serbia being taken into the European Union before Bosnia would have serious repercussions. That's not the case between Ukraine and Moldova. So to be honest, I don't think we have that type of the relationship and interdependence as in Balkans. For that reason, I expect that even the war in Ukraine is definitely going to affect the security outcomes for the Republic of Moldova. The economic particularly outcome and energy security related outcomes are going to be separate from what is happening in actually Ukraine and possibly Moldova is going to be used again as an example of speedy reforms. Look, we have a successful case in the Republic of Moldova if the government performs and if the European Union, honestly speaking, will close a little bit of an eye to the pace of reform in the Republic of Moldova. As long as Moldova does good overall.
- [48:33]
A
I think that's a great way to end it. For those interested in learning more about the ways of the European Union, please check out our sister podcast, the Europhile, where we go deep on all of this. I think it's a great point about resolving the situation in Transnistria. There is one example in the past of EU enlargement that has involved a divided territory, and that was Cyprus in 2004, where the Greeks basically held hostage. The big bang enlargement which let the Eastern European countries join the EU in exchange for Cyprus joining. The hope was that, well, once they're in, then they can resolve this conflict and it hasn't happened. And I think if anything, that has sort of hardened a lot of European leaders to be quite suspicious of letting the country in and then that difficult situation will somehow get resolved. I think the Europeans are beyond that. The other thing I think maybe just to close, is that I do think that the one challenge for Moldova is it's great having a pro EU government now that can really set the course. But the durability of this, because I think there is concern and Western European capitals, well, you know, what happens in the next Moldovan election? Do they elect a pro Russian leader and then suddenly we can't do anything at the EU level. And so I think this is going to be an onward journey. But the elections that just happened really I think set the course. And I think I want to thank both of you all for really outlining how important these elections were and really unpacking what is a very complex situation. It's a small country, geopolitically, extremely relevant. The Russians are meddling, the EU is there, the US is there, Romania, Ukraine, it's all sort of tied in. So thank you so much. And if you haven't already, please be also sure to subscribe to our show and please give us a five star rating. We will see you next time on Russian Roulette.
- [50:21]
B
You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon. And be sure to check out all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and eurasia program@csis.org Russian Roulette releases new.
- [50:35]
A
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