Russian Roulette – The Increased Level of Repressions Within the Russian Elite

Date: November 20, 2025
Hosts: Max Bergman (A) & Maria Snegovaya (B)
Guests: Nikolai Petrov (C), Mikhail Troitsky (D)

Overview

This episode of Russian Roulette delves deep into the rising repression among Russian elites amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and broader political transformations under Vladimir Putin. Hosts Max Bergman and Maria Snigavaya are joined by two prominent experts—Nikolai Petrov and Mikhail Troitsky—to dissect new data, elite dynamics, the Kremlin's tactics, comparisons to historical purges, and the actual influence of the Russian elite class on policy. The discussion is rich with historical context, analytical debates, and candid assessments.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why Elites Matter in Russian Policymaking

[02:03] Maria Snegavaya introduces the topic

• Russian governance, especially in foreign policy, is highly centralized; understanding elite composition is essential.
• The impact of sanctions and political pressures depends on elite backgrounds and intra-elite dynamics.
• Recent research (Projek database):
  • 1,329 Russian elites documented; nepotism and dynasties rampant.
  • "Almost like inherited monarchy… 25 such families with more than 20 members in government."
  • 60% of officials come from Soviet-era bureaucratic dynasties.
  • Criminal ties: 1 in 10 lawmakers have criminal connections.

2. Interpreting the Data: Nepotism, Dynasties, and Continuity

[04:54] Nikolai Petrov's response

• Projek’s findings are solid journalism, not full-fledged political analysis.
• Cautions against using terms like “dynasties” for Russia:
  • Many families listed are regional, esp. North Caucasian clans, not traditional political dynasties.
  • “In my view in the United States, we do have more evidences of ruling political dynasties than in present day Russia…”
• Dynastic appointments are a sign of Putin’s lack of personnel reserves, not entrenched aristocracy.
• Managerial “corporations” exist in many professions; seeing such in governance isn’t unique to Russia.

[08:26] Mikhail Troitsky’s view

• Elite continuity across regime changes is common in world history (Germany post-1945, USSR post-1917).
• Russia has significant KGB/bureaucratic continuity, but that’s not as abnormal as it might seem, although the practical implications are important for policy.

[10:41] Maria’s counterpoint

• Russia is an outlier even compared to other post-Soviet states in elite continuity.
• The Bolshevik Revolution led to deeper elite replacement than the post-Soviet transition.
• “Democratic transition was a sudden collapse… implemented primarily by no cultural elites, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, for different reasons… preserved many features of the old regime.”

3. Do Russian Elites Really Matter in Kremlin Decision-Making?

[12:05] Max Bergman to Mikhail: Do elites matter for policy, or are they just implementers?

• [13:06] Mikhail’s analysis:
  • Autocrats need to hedge against elite defection, especially before risky gambits like war.
  • Pre-invasion, Putin used “dual-track signaling”: reassuring globally-connected elites (oligarchs, technocrats) that aggressive action was not imminent, lulling them until action was taken.
  • Forums like St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Valdai Club used to signal moderation to the West-oriented elite.
  • “The storm that would take all of that away… was gathering in plain sight. And yet they somehow remain demobilized.”

[18:29] Maria’s challenge:

• “Why would we anticipate this time [2022] to be any different from previous wars? Past elite responses were largely acquiescent.”

[19:16] Mikhail’s reply:

• The difference in 2021–22: build-up was visible and predictable; prior wars came as a “surprise.”
• “Everything was, you know, predictable very well predictable and obvious to Western governments.”

[20:17] Nikolai’s intervention:

• Russian “elites” are not political subjects—no autonomy to challenge the Kremlin.
• “They are so much focused on how to fulfill their duties, how not to be punished, how to please their bosses, that we should not wait for any… serious opposition…”

4. Are We Seeing an Elite Purge or ‘Business as Usual’?

[21:38] Max: Is there a new purge?
[22:21] Nikolai’s historical framing:

• Systemic elite repression began after Crimea 2014; intensified post-2022.
• “Repressions is not any kind of deviation. It's the basic pillar of neo nomenclaturian system.”
• Functions of repression:
  • Control and intimidate elites.
  • Redistribute resources and property (“inheritance tax” on oligarchs).
  • Feed “repressive populism”: show the public that the government is cracking down on corrupt elites.
• “Russian history when wayward boyars heads given to the public… how Putin… is still a kind of populist leader who is very popular and who should feed this populism.”

[25:40] Mikhail’s response:

• Purge serves as public diversion and for resource extraction; major figures are often untouched.
• “Much of the old guard is actually running this process; they are not about to leave… the core… have been there for decades.”
• New ideologues may be pushing for purges for their own sake, possibly destabilizing the system.

5. Are War “Heroes” Replacing the Old Elite?

[28:54] Maria: Are we seeing a true “literature shuffling” à la Stalin, replacing old elites with new, loyal war participants?

[29:53] Nikolai:

• No large-scale replacement of old elites yet.
• Only a tiny number of war “heroes” (900 out of 30,000) entered local or regional government, and mainly through special status manipulation.
• Stark statistic: “The scale of [elite] repressions… is about 3 to 4% in general… exactly the scale of Stalin repressions… before the Second World War.”
• New features: prosecutions against judiciary, and “expropriation of kulak property” (taking property from relatives of disgraced/deceased officials).

6. Is There a Qualitative Change Post-2022?

[33:40] Maria: Is the regime fundamentally changing since 2022, or just more of the same?

[34:15] Nikolai’s thesis:

• Current transition is generational, not just replacing individuals.
• Putin’s plan:
  • Replace “old guard” with loyalists/bodyguards; keep elites “motionless” through intimidation.
  • Move toward a system where Putin remains at the top, acting more like Deng Xiaoping—hands-off but omnipresent.
  • System on “autopilot”—Putin to intervene only if needed.
  • Operation to be completed by 2030, potentially setting up for yet another term.

[36:49] Mikhail:

• No real “big fish” being purged yet; the old guard largely manages the process.
• “If we see some ministers really… ensnared… then I'd be questioning whether the system runs on the same rules as it used to…”

7. Sanctions and the Myth of the Elite Pressure Valve

[38:40] Max: The idea that Western sanctions could pressure Russian elites to effect change—has this theory collapsed?

[40:16] Nikolai:

• Sanctions completed Putin’s effort to “fence in” the elites, deepening their dependency and reducing options to defect.
• Sanctions, “if… to use elites or business elites… as a kind of leverage against Putin's war plans… it was counterproductive and it was mistake.”
• “The reason why personal sanctions were imposed was a kind of populism from a side of Western leaders… at no cost.”

[42:38] Mikhail:

• Elites are closely monitored; “freedom of maneuver is extremely limited.”
• However, “if there are options, they will move”—elites are opportunistic if cracks in the system or stream of resources dry up.
• “There's something entrepreneurial in their mindset and spirit, which… tells everyone… these guys would mercilessly exploit any opportunity that would arise…”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On ‘dynasties’ in Russia:
  • “It's funny to hear these names as of ruling dynasties in Russia. I would say that in my view in the United States, we do have more evidences of ruling political dynasties than in present day Russia.” —Nikolai Petrov [06:44]
• On repression and neo-nomenclaturian system:
  • “Repressions is not any kind of deviation. It's the basic pillar of neo nomenclaturian system.” —Nikolai Petrov [22:57]
• On the paradox of elite passivity:
  • “The storm that would take all of that away from them was gathering in plain sight. And yet they somehow remain demobilized.” —Mikhail Troitsky [17:42]
• On sanctions backfiring:
  • “If only you are right and the idea behind personal sanctions was to use elites… as a kind of leverage against Putin's war plans, then it was counterproductive and it was mistake.” —Nikolai Petrov [41:39]
• On future system design:
  • “Putin should keep the office of the President. But in all other cases, I think the plan is to put the system onto autopilot regime, to define the cause, to appoint this new generation… but to let Putin the opportunity to intervene in case it's needed.” —Nikolai Petrov [35:23]

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Intro & Guests: [00:06]–[02:03]
• Elite Composition & Dynasties: [02:03]–[04:54]
• Assessing Nepotism, Clans, U.S. vs Russia dynasties: [04:54]–[08:26]
• Continuity in Russian vs other post-Soviet/elites: [08:26]–[11:58]
• Do elites matter for Kremlin policy?: [12:05]–[19:16]
• Why was 2022 different? Paradox of inaction: [19:16]–[20:55]
• Are there true ‘elites’ or only functionaries?: [20:17]–[21:38]
• Purges, repression as regime business: [21:38]–[25:40]
• Purpose and visibility of purges: [25:40]–[28:54]
• The myth of war “heroes” as a new elite: [28:54]–[33:38]
• Stalin-scale repression comparison: [33:38]–[34:15]
• Generational shift and regime transition: [34:15]–[38:40]
• Sanctions as a failed “pressure valve”: [38:40]–[42:38]
• Elites’ opportunism and the regime’s future: [42:38]–[44:37]

Conclusion

This episode provides an incisive exploration of Russian elite dynamics, revealing that despite apparent visibility, neither nepotism nor imported concepts like "dynasties" fully apply. The consensus is that the Russian elite serves as functionaries locked into Putin's neo-nomenklatura system, with intimidation and periodic repression as the central pillars of control. Western strategies that imagined leverage via sanctions underestimated the regime’s grip and the structure’s adaptability. Yet, cracks could emerge should economic or political stability falter.

A must-listen episode for anyone seeking to understand not only how Russia’s top circles operate but also how the regime’s survival instincts re-shape the very concept of “elite.”