B (4:21)

No, not at all. It's not an easy situation to paraphrase, and I think it's very helpful, what you just said. Let me offer two points for your consideration, max, and the consideration of our listeners. And one is sort of in line with your description that the tempo and the process of Trump administration diplomacy and negotiations vis a vis the war in Ukraine. Let's take it back all the way to January 2025, if not to the campaign trail and the promise that it could be resolved in 24 hours, which was a campaign promise. The tempo and the process have just left a lot to be desired over the last 10, 11 months. And it's not the first time that there hasn't been sufficient consultation with key actors in the situation. It's sort of not the first time that language and reality seem to be out of sync, and it's not the first time. I'm just thinking back to the Alaska summit of pretty recent memory, where there just seems to have been a rush. Right. The Alaska summit, I believe, was announced seven, eight days before it happened. It didn't feel on the outside like there was a huge amount of preparation for it. The results were underwhelming, and apparently the meeting didn't go all that well between President Trump and and Putin. And this seems to be just of a piece with that. You know, why Thanksgiving Day as a deadline? You know, why this rapid timeline, you know, why, you know, the messaging. Why is the U.S. government, you know, it's not unprecedented, but the degree is surprising. Why is the US Government offering multiple narratives and explanations of the same set of circumstances? And so, you know, this is not true across the board with the Trump administration. They do have successes to their credit when it comes to conflict resolution. But somehow with the Ukraine file, it just seems like there's never enough time and a never enough process and never enough preparation. So point number one. But point number two, just to make it an interesting conversation, I think that there's a certain utility to this madcap diplomacy, or just the kind of diplomacy that's happening before our eyes, in that it reveals where the different parties are to a degree, not 100%. I don't think we really know where Russia is, probably where Russia was one year ago, two years ago, three years ago. But it does reveal something about Ukraine, that there's probably a growing willingness in Ukraine to trade territory for a security degree, a security guarantee that's been on the table for. For quite a while. But it feels like Ukraine is maybe has a bit more stretch in that maybe because of difficulties on the. On the battlefield or for other reasons, and in ways that are both helpful and unhelpful. I think that this has revealed that there are quite big differences between Europe and the US that the US Wants a mad dash to the finish line and some kind of messy conclusion to this conflict. Whereas Europe has very important principles that are at stake, and they're not willing to rush or to fudge or to qualify or to compromise on the basis of those principles. And I'm not happy about that. Transatlantic discord. But it's not useless to know it. It's sort of useful. And so a spotlight has been shown on our very unruly reality. And there's something a bit helpful about that.

A (7:37)

Yeah, I want to maybe dive into a little bit what you think the Russians are up to. Maybe just a quick thought, that it does strike me that Ukraine is more willing to now sort of entertain the possibility of negotiations and in some very big concessions, because that is, I think, going to be necessary if there is going to be a negotiated settlement to the war. However, it does, and I sort of go back to this, that you have, you know, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who are real estate people, and it's a little bit like if you and I were negotiating a real estate deal, right, and we're trying, I'm going to buy your house, but there's like, no one else in the room. And then we have to sort of figure out what the contract is for that house and, like, how to make that look real and legal. And what we would come up with is sort of the equivalent of what they came up with in this sort of diplomatic. This looks like sort of a real estate thing that just has all these provisions that don't. The lawyers haven't vetted, the diplomats haven't. The experts haven't gone through and said, no, this is how you do a contract. This is how you do a negotiation. And, and so there's, there's sort of an. There is an amateur hour quality to this. And maybe it's not the worst thing to just have people trying to figure things out, throw things out there. We do know that basically Trump, the way he operates is people just go and try to bring back deals for him. And now this deal is getting vetted. And what is important here, I think, is that the deadline that was supposed to be Thursday, take it or leave it. U.S. officials in Ukraine, you know, putting the squeeze that seems to now have evaporated and that there's sort of more time. But I want to go back to, like, what is Russia up to here? So if, if this, it's this proposal, as the critics say, and I think there's a lot of truth here, that it largely came from Russia, the Russians know what they're doing. Wyckoff and Kushner maybe don't know what they're doing. And so there's a lot of sort of Russian proposals here. Why didn't Russia just say yes to this? And the cynical view that I have is that what this is really about is the Russians want to. Are taking another go at trying to create a rupture between not just the U.S. and Ukraine, but the U.S. and Europe. And so here the Russians make a bunch of concessions. They're not going to say they don't actually still want this proposal, but it puts Ukraine in a tight spot. And their hope was that Ukraine says no. They look like the. The country turn, you know, rejecting peace causes a rift, and then the war just continues as is. And I think that's really where Russia intends us to go. It's just the war continues as is. But I'm curious what your take is on what is Moscow thinking here?

B (10:27)

Yeah, I feel similar. I mean, if, if the proposal were to work, if the peace plan were to work, even though it requires almost all concessions from Ukraine and almost none from Russia, my guess is from a Kremlin perspective that it still is too little, that the formal Russian control over Crimea, parts of the Donbas and some limits on Ukraine's military stature. But basically Ukraine would continue integrating into Europe if this plan were to be actualized. I don't think that that works on the Russian end. So my guess is if it were to be realized, I don't think it will be. But if it were to be realized, what it would be is an operational pause on the Russian side, a sort of consolidation of position. Let's Remember that in 2014, Russia annexes Crimea and then in 2022 invades Ukraine from Crimea. So I think on the Russian side you could look at it that way, that it's a kind of chance to take a deep breath, consolidate the military position and just think about the next round of, of the war. But my sense is that Putin is clever enough to know that it's just not going to work. And so it goes to your explanation, Max, which I would agree with. I mean, in a way, Putin and Zelenskyy have been competing since January 2025 to see that the other one is blamed for the failure of the negotiations. I think that Ukraine and Russia both expect American led negotiations to fail for the short to medium term and they want the other person to be to be blamed. And so this is certainly a Russian method of doing that. Appealing to Trump's post Gaza sense of himself as a great peacemaker, appealing to what you described, Max, as the kind of real estate approach to this, to very, very quickly get to. Yes, and maybe that worked in Gaza where a lot of the details were kind of left open, but they were able to get to the ceasefire. I don't think it's going to work that way in Ukraine, but sort of appealing to that mentality, the Jared Kushner Witkoff Trump mentality in the US government and then just seeing what it would yield. It has not been a pretty week for Europe, you know, to see all of these negotiations taking place without real European buy in is, you know, it's not just frustrating. I think in European capitals it's also humiliating. And that of course works in some way to Moscow's benefit because the real supporters of Ukraine at this point are Europe more than the U.S. and so, you know, the more that you can impose costs on the Europeans, the better off things are for, for Russia. So in that sense it's kind of win win for Russia. If they get something that's tangible that they want, they can take it. If not, then you just kind of use it to muddy the waters and to drive further wedges between Europe and the US at the Moment.

A (13:13)

Yeah. And I think part of what we seem to be seeing in Geneva is a little bit like what we saw back last February after the Oval Office meeting that went so poorly in the US Cut off assistance and intelligence support. Then Marco Rubio sort of intervenes. There's. There's a meeting that takes place in Saudi Arabia with Waltz, the then national Security adviser. And Rubio comes out of that and says, well, Ukraine has now agreed to the concept of a ceasefire balls in Russia's court. And I feel like what Rubio is sort of doing is intervening here, creating probably more of a joint posture with the Europeans. And it does seem to me that what they're doing is sort of rounding off, so they're sort of nixing some of the provisions that were, you know, frankly, offensive to the Europeans. That was going to require them to do all these things and spend all this money, but have no say and no involvement. There's a quote, you know, from a White House official last week, basically saying, we don't care what the Europeans think, but yet the Europeans have to basically pay and implement. And all the money from the frozen Russian assets, or at least half of it, or a lot of it, is going to go to U.S. companies. And I think they're probably getting rid of some of those provisions that are kind of gratuitously put in. But then the other thing that they're going to do, my expectation, is probably make this even, you know, a non starter for Russia, even more so than what it was. And I guess one of the questions here is, how much do principles matter when we start getting into these peace negotiations? Because I think the principle here, the principles at stake of Russia invading a sovereign country, seizing its territory, wanting recognition. The initial proposal was also very confusing. If it's going to be legal de jure recognition or de facto recognition, all of that matters. And all these sort of principles about putting a cap on the Ukrainian military. Initially, I think back when talks were happening back in 2022, the Russians wanted a cap of the Ukrainian military at 85,000, this would be 600,000, which in some ways is, from just a practical perspective, is quite acceptable. But then you could say, well, you know, the US doesn't have any limitations on its military forces, so, you know, Ukraine is a sovereign country. And so I think there is a big question for the Europeans and for the Ukrainians of how much do these sort of broader international principles matter versus Ukraine being able to realize its European future? Because the thing that this document seemed to suggest is that Ukraine could realize its European future, that it could join the European Union. Now, my guess is the Russians have, would think that they have other mechanisms and ways, you know, I. E. Orban, Hungary, others that could get in the way of Ukrainian ascension. You know, Russians are very active in trying to meddle in European politics. But I guess how do you view that kind of decision? That I think, you know, if we, if the Russians say actually we're ready to end this war, but here are in where they're very serious about negotiating. Negotiating. I don't think they are. But if they were, how do you see that kind of principle verse, verse kind of pragmatism coming into the fore?

B (16:38)

I mean, I can give you my personal view how much it corresponds to thinking in Europe. I don't, I don't quite know. In, in this respect. I don't think a messy end to the war is necessarily bad. It's obviously not a war that Ukraine or Russia is going to win to 100% of their satisfaction. So there is going to be some kind of, you know, messy, tangled end to the war. And, you know, the US Was capable of that at the end of the war in Afghanistan. And Europe has been capable of compromising on principle in a number of conflicts as well. That's kind of normal. It's almost to be expected. I mean, I think that the core issue is the security guarantee to Ukraine. And one of the weaknesses of the plan as it was put forward is that there was a sentence that just sort of declared Ukraine will receive a security guarantee. Well, I mean, from the Ukrainian side, it's not sufficient to declare that. That has to be spelled out. And if the US Is withdrawing from Europe, which at times the Trump administration indicates, or if Trump is the president of Europe, which is also language from the Trump administration, that's sort of unclear and ambiguous. That's a problem in Europe has been slow to get to the point where Europe can provide on its own a security guarantee to Ukraine. Now maybe that will be there a year from now and two years from now, and then Europe can really take the lead in these negotiations. I'm not particularly pessimistic and fatalistic about all this. There are lots of options that both Europe and the US have, but that security guarantee has to be the essence of it. If that's really there, and I think Zelenskyy has said this over and over again, if that's really there, then the questions of territory, line of contact, you know, what the exact disposition of forces is going to be, how it all works out if that territory is all going to be mined or if air defenses are going to be the thing, I mean, I think that that will be sort of hashed out. But the proposal that was put forward, the 28 point proposal, maybe we'll get some 40 point proposal in the next few days that will be very different. But I doubt it. It just was insufficient in that respect. And so if it's insufficient on the security guarantees, it's almost as if nothing else matters. And so that's why I suspect Europe and Ukraine will sort of stick to their guns and not be a part of something where the US is going to rush to the finish line on the basis of a very abstract and faulty plan. And hopefully in the next six months, as we sort of sober up from this experience of what it is to rush and not be well prepared for negotiation in the next six months, we can just try to do better. We collectively, the sort of transatlantic space, can try to do better. But it's been a sort of a discombobulated and depressing seven to 10 days in the very recent past.

A (19:12)

Yeah, maybe one final topic before we wrap up is sort of the role of Europe in this. We're co. This, this is going to go out both as a Russian roulette episode and a Europile episode. Now the Europeans have been very much annoyed at being sidelined that here's, you know, a whole conversation with the Russians about, you know, European security. The Europeans aren't involved. It requires the Europeans to spend money. Poland, you know, was even explicitly mentioned in the 20 point plan. They're like, what? What are we doing here? And to me, I think this reflects a problem for Europe. One, there's a sense in Europe that foreign policy is a national sovereign prerogative amongst of European states. And what I would say is that's a fiction and has been a fiction basically since 1945 that Europe largely has deferred to the US when it comes to defense and foreign policy decisions. The difference is with this administration, previous ones is that America would come and try to hold European hands and say, no, no, no, it's okay, we have your best interests at heart. This is not that this administration is not doing that. So this, so the basic issue is you can't have 27 different countries, you know, all in the mix, you know, in this negotiation. And there isn't any European effort to put forward any sort of plan for how this war would end. From, from a peace process perspective, there are no talks going on with Russia. And I think this is in Part because Eastern Europeans, you know, if any Western European tried to do it, they would be, you know, knifed in the side at the European Council. They'd be iced out. But I think they need to figure out who is speaking on behalf of Europe. Now there's the E3, which is UK, France, Germany, which have sort of gotten together here. And if the Eastern Europeans just want to defer to them, fine. But it would strike me is that this is. It's time for the EU to figure out who is going to speak on their behalf. Maybe it's Macron, maybe it's the former Finnish president, Ninisto, maybe it's Draghi, maybe it's someone else, maybe it's von der Leyen, who. Whoever it may be. But you need to, I think, pick someone and not have just like 18 different characters or seven different characters running around, all, you know, you know, throwing sand in the gears, which in some ways is effective if you're trying to stop something. But they're not. I think they need to figure out where does. What is. What does Ukraine actually want here, how is a peace plan possible? And I think they think it's not. So they're just, you know, playing defense. But I'm curious for your thoughts, Michael, as also a keen watcher of Europe, how is Europe engaging in this and what should they be doing here?

B (21:58)

Yeah, no, I mean, one very general point, not to be overly pessimistic, but to be just cautionary, is that if you take a step back, both with China and at the moment with the US And Russia, Europe is risking becoming an object of international affairs and not so much of an agent of international affairs. And you can kind of see in geoeconomics that China is starting to dictate certain outcomes for Europe. And although I don't think that this diplomacy of the last week is going to go very far, you have the optics of basically Moscow and Washington dictating outcomes for Europe as well. So to stick with the spirit of your question, maybe that will be sobering enough or shocking enough or unpleasant enough that Europe will try to consolidate its forces and find one or two institutions or people who can really articulate the European position. Difficult as that's going to be, but that does seem like it's a necessity at this point. And then the second point that I would make, which I think is in harmony with what you're. What you're saying, is that there is certainly such a thing as principle in international affairs. And the EU and Europe in general has been fantastic at adhering to principles. I think that they're really a role model, and certainly in 2025, they're kind of the only role model of that in international affairs. And that's very, very significant. But principle is only salient to the degree that it can be enforced. And I think that there's still that space in Europe. And you saw that with the European plan, right? There's going to be Russian reparations for the war in Ukraine. Well, how in the world is that going to be enforced if the war is where it is? And so it's not a matter of critiquing, I think, the European position for that distance. It's a matter of shortening that distance between principle, the articulation of principle and the ability to enforce it. But probably it goes hand in hand, a bit more consolidation, more leverage, and you're getting it now from German military investment and from other sources that that leverage is going to be there to a greater degree in a few years in Europe. But it's like you can just see that there's all this ground that still has to be covered. And that's why this week is perhaps agonizing, but maybe in the scheme of things, usefully agonizing.

A (24:03)

Yeah, we tend to lionize peacemakers. Blessed are the peacemakers. But there's something grubby also about peacemaking because you have to compromise on principles that are righteous. And I think that's sort of Europeans have not grappled with that. I think Ukrainians haven't quite grappled with that. And I think what's interesting about what Trump is doing, and this is maybe final thought, is that it is provoking that conversation. Now, the problem is I don't think the Russians have any interest in actually sitting down and negotiating. So in some ways it's sort of an abstract exercise, but.

B (24:34)

Or maybe it just means that there's time, or you could put it this way, that Europe gave us Henry Kissinger and we can give a little bit of Kissinger back in return, perhaps at this moment of that sort of pragmatic diplomatic spirit for which, you know, Kissinger is for good and bad reasons, you know, sort of he's synonymous with that European. Right, right.

A (24:54)

No, of course. But it does feel that the merry go round of peace talks, you know, that there's a lot of action we're spinning around and we're probably going to end up exactly where we started. I think this war is likely going to continue, but a lot more to follow to track what's happening. And if you are interested in this conversation. Please please be sure to subscribe to Russian Roulette and the Europhile wherever you get your podcast, and we will see you next time on Russian Roulette and the Europhile. So Michael, thanks so much for joining us.

B (25:23)

Great to be with you. Max. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

A (25:36)

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B (25:46)

And be sure to check out all.

A (25:47)

The latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and eurasia program@csis.org.