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SCOTUS Oral Arguments
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Supreme Court oral argument audio recordings paired with show notes that include helpful information and links to additional resources on the Supreme Court's website. Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity. Audio credit to the Supreme Court of the United States. Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y.
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Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
Apr 2901:00:20Tap to summarizeHikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889Argued on Apr 29 2026.For petitioners: Charles B. Klein, Washington, D. C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.Question Presented:Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use?Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES B. KLEIN(00:11:20) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART(00:28:12) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON(00:57:08) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES B. KLEINDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe
Apr 2901:46:24Tap to summarizeMullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe, No. 25-1083Argued on Apr 29 2026.For petitioners: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents in 25-1083: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal. For respondents in 25-1084: Geoffrey M. Pipoly, Chicago, Ill. VIDED.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedBrief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER(00:44:09) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AHILAN T. ARULANANTHAM(01:24:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEOFFREY M. PIPOLY(01:43:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUERDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Cisco Systems v. Doe I
Apr 2801:57:16Tap to summarizeCisco Systems v. Doe I, No. 24-856Argued on Apr 28 2026.For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.Question Presented:1. Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. 2. Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than purpose suffices to show the requisite mens rea. 3. Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially- implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM(00:37:14) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON(01:17:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL L. HOFFMAN(01:53:58) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAMDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Chatrie v. United States
Apr 2702:00:27Tap to summarizeChatrie v. United States, No. 25-112Argued on Apr 27 2026.For petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Question Presented:This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular time. In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then - again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 2. Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence warrant.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ADAM G. UNIKOWSKY(00:57:11) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN(01:55:14) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ADAM G. UNIKOWSKYDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
Apr 2701:14:15Tap to summarizeMonsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068Argued on Apr 27 2026.For petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.Question Presented:The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'') creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The Act preempts any state "requirement[] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under" FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. §136v(b). For decades, EPA has exercised its authority under FIFRA to find that Monsanto's Roundup product line and its active ingredient, glyphosate, do not cause cancer in humans. Consistent with that understanding, EPA has repeatedly approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning. FIFRA prohibits Monsanto from making any substantive change to an EPA-approved label unless it first obtains EPA's permission. Respondent is one of more than 100,000 plaintiffs across the country that nonetheless seek to hold Monsanto liable for not warning users that glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, causes cancer. The federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are divided over whether FIFRA preempts such claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does. In the decision below, the Missouri Court of Appeals joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and state appellate courts in California and Oregon in holding that it does not. The question presented is: Whether FIFRA preempts a state-law failure-to- warn claim where EPA has repeatedly concluded that the warning is not required and the warning cannot be added to a product without EPA approval.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT(00:36:40) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS(00:51:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ASHLEY C. KELLERDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau
Apr 2201:29:33Tap to summarizeBlanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau, No. 25-429Argued on Apr 22 2026.For petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.Question Presented:Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), various categories of aliens, including those who have committed or been convicted of certain crimes, are "ineligible to be admitted to the United States" and subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); see 8 U.S.C. 1229a. Under 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who is returning to the United States after a trip abroad is generally not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States" and is therefore not typically subject to the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a). But that general rule does not apply to an LPR who "has committed an offense identified in section 1182 (a)(2)" i.e ., an offense that would render him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The question presented is: Whether, to remove an LPR who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR's last reentry into the United States.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI(00:50:21) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHAY DVORETZKY(01:24:17) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHIDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →FCC v. AT&T
Apr 2101:24:32Tap to summarizeFCC v. AT&T, No. 25-406Argued on Apr 21 2026.For AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D. C. For FCC, et al.: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.Question Presented:The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq ., empowers the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to assess monetary forfeiture penalties for certain violations of the Act or the FCC's regulations by issuing a notice of apparent liability, giving the regulated party an opportunity to respond in writing, and then issuing a final decision. If the regulated party declines to pay and the government sues to collect the penalties, the regulated party is entitled to a de novo jury trial in a federal district court. Alternatively, the subject of an FCC forfeiture order may pay the monetary penalty and file a petition for review in a court of appeals, thereby triggering a judicial-review proceeding in which no jury is available. The question presented is as follows: Whether the Communications Act provisions that govern the FCC's assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY B. WALL(00:53:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURIDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Sripetch v. SEC
Apr 2001:10:56Tap to summarizeSripetch v. SEC, No. 25-466Argued on Apr 20 2026.For petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Question Presented:This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over an exceptionally important question regarding the SEC's civil-enforcement power. In Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), this Court held the SEC may seek equitable "disgorgement" in civil-enforcement actions if an award "does not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits" and "is awarded for victims ." 591 U.S. at 74- 75 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that investors can be ''victims" for disgorgement purposes despite not suffering pecuniary harm. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit recognized a direct "split" on this question, "reject[ed] the reasoning of the Second Circuit," and "joined the First Circuit in holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required." This statutory holding was the sole basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it leaves the SEC's enforcement power in disarray: disgorgement requests are ubiquitous in SEC actions, and there are now conflicting rules in the two main circuits (the Second and Ninth) where enforcement actions are most prominent. There are millions (if not billions) of dollars at stake. The question presented is: Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm .Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL L. GEYSER(00:40:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART(01:07:30) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL L. GEYSERDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp.
Apr 2001:01:56Tap to summarizeT. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp., No. 25-197Argued on Apr 20 2026.For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.Question Presented:Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR(00:40:46) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT(00:58:24) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH B. PRELOGARDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Transcribe →Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara
Apr 102:08:30Tap to summarizeTrump, President of U.S. v. Barbara, No. 25-365Argued on Apr 01 2026.For petitioners: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Cecillia D. Wang, San Francisco, Cal.Question Presented:The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those "born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship , which restores the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the Order's effective date. The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.Oral Argument Links:SCOTUS Oral Argument PageTranscript PDFDocket Links:SCOTUS Docket PageQuestion PresentedPetition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)Chapters:(00:00:00) Case Call(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER(01:09:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CECILLIA D. WANG(02:05:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUERDisclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
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