Serial S04 - Ep. 3: Ahmad the Iguana Feeder

Summary

Serial S04 - Ep. 3: Ahmad the Iguana Feeder – Detailed Summary

Release Date: April 4, 2024
Host: Sarah Koenig
Produced by: Serial Productions & The New York Times

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Introduction

In the third episode of Serial’s fourth season, titled "Ahmad the Iguana Feeder," host Sarah Koenig delves into the complex and troubling case of Senior Airman Ahmed Al Halabi. This episode uncovers the intricate web of accusations, misinterpretations, and systemic failures that nearly destroyed Ahmed’s life following his service as an Arabic translator at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

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Background: Ahmed Al Halabi’s Military Service

Ahmed Al Halabi enlisted in the Air Force in 2000, motivated by a desire to escape his civilian life in Dearborn, Michigan, and pursue a 20-year plan to rise through the ranks. His proficiency in Arabic made him an ideal candidate for a translator position at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, where he believed he would serve an important role.

Notable Quote:
"I felt important, by the way." – Ahmed Al Halabi [02:00]

Upon arrival at Guantanamo in November 2002, Ahmed was assigned to the DOCX office, responsible for translating detainees' letters to and from their families. Despite the lack of advanced training, Ahmed thrived, utilizing his computer science skills to streamline the translation process and manage a substantial backlog of letters.

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Life at Guantanamo: The Iguana Feeder

Ahmed’s nickname, "the Iguana Feeder," originated from his repeated violation of camp rules forbidding the feeding of iguanas. This seemingly minor infraction was emblematic of Ahmed’s relationship with authority—he adhered to rules when they made sense but questioned those that didn’t.

Notable Quote:
"If the government tells me not to feed the iguana, I will never feed the iguana. But Ahmed fed the iguana." – Sarah Koenig [03:34]

Despite the stress of his job, Ahmed found solace in the prayer area, forming a close-knit group with fellow Muslim personnel, including Chaplain James Yee and Captain Tarek Hashem. However, the extended deployment and living conditions at Guantanamo began to strain relationships among the linguists, leading to increased tensions and rivalries.

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The Catalyst: The Missing Disposable Camera

The turning point in Ahmed’s story began with a seemingly innocuous incident involving a disposable camera. Ahmed had received the camera as a Secret Santa gift and used it to take casual photos at the camp. However, the camera went missing, leading investigators to suspect that Ahmed had taken unauthorized photos—an offense within Guantanamo.

Notable Quote:
"The camera thing was the beginning of everything. Like the beginning of the end of my career, I believe. So." – Ahmed Al Halabi [28:02]

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Arrest and Accusations

In July 2003, as Ahmed prepared to leave Guantanamo, he was abruptly stopped at Jacksonville Airport. During a routine search, investigators questioned him about the missing camera and the unauthorized photos. Despite providing a plausible explanation, the situation quickly escalated.

Notable Quote:
"I was just trying to figure out how the camera worked." – Ahmed Al Halabi [32:12]

Shortly after Ahmed’s arrest, fellow chaplain James Yee and another linguist, Ahmed Bahelba, were also detained under similar suspicions of espionage and mishandling classified information. The government’s primary evidence against Ahmed included the two photos he admitted to taking and 186 detainee letters found on his laptop.

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Investigation Flaws and Government Misconduct

As the investigation unfolded, significant flaws and inconsistencies emerged. It became apparent that the prosecution’s case was built on shaky grounds:

1. Misclassification of Documents:
   Prosecutors initially believed that detainee names and ISN numbers were classified, but a later review contradicted this, weakening the case against Ahmed.

2. Inexperienced Investigators:
   The lead investigator, Special Agent Lance Wega, and his team lacked counterintelligence experience, leading to procedural errors and oversight.

3. Bias and Prejudice:
   Captain Jason Orlich, a devout Catholic, harbored suspicions about Muslim linguists, including Ahmed, which influenced the investigation’s direction. Orlich’s Islamophobic attitudes and actions, such as distributing offensive media, biased the probe against Ahmed and his colleagues.

4. Inaccurate Testimonies:
   Statements against Ahmed were often taken out of context or fabricated. For instance, Sergeant Ed Brooks’ remarks were manipulated to portray Ahmed as anti-American, despite Brooks clarifying the context years later.

Notable Quote:
"The associations, the linkages that they made... the associations they made were stupid." – Gail Heldt, Former CIA Analyst [45:00]

These systemic failures highlighted a broader issue within the military’s counterintelligence efforts at Guantanamo, where fear and prejudice overshadowed factual evidence.

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Legal Proceedings and Outcome

Ahmed’s legal battle was marred by the government's inability to present substantial evidence of espionage. Faced with a flawed prosecution, Ahmed’s defense team exposed the enmeshment of bias and incompetence in the case against him. Ultimately, Ahmed pleaded guilty to mishandling classified documents and making false statements related to the two unauthorized photos and the Airbridge mission papers. He was sentenced to time served and received a bad behavior discharge from the Air Force.

Notable Quote:
"It was just a beginning of a very long and cold ending of an entire career." – Ahmed Al Halabi [53:10]

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Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Moving Forward

Ahmed’s case serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked authority, prejudice, and procedural incompetence within military and intelligence operations. It underscores the importance of due process and the need for objective investigations, especially in post-9/11 contexts where fear can cloud judgment.

As the episode concludes, Sarah Koenig hints at further developments in Ahmed’s story, promising to explore the lingering suspicions and the ongoing impact on his life in future episodes.

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Key Takeaways

• Systemic Bias:
  Ahmed’s prosecution was significantly influenced by personal biases and Islamophobic attitudes within the military investigating team.

• Investigative Incompetence:
  The lack of experience among the investigators led to procedural errors and reliance on weak evidence.

• Due Process Concerns:
  The case highlights the necessity for robust legal safeguards to prevent miscarriages of justice, particularly in high-stakes environments like Guantanamo.

• Human Impact:
  Beyond legal and procedural aspects, Ahmed’s story is a human tragedy of a young man’s life being derailed by systemic failures and prejudice.

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Notable Quotes with Timestamps

• "I felt important, by the way." – Ahmed Al Halabi [02:00]

• "If the government tells me not to feed the iguana, I will never feed the iguana. But Ahmed fed the iguana." – Sarah Koenig [03:34]

• "The camera thing was the beginning of everything. Like the beginning of the end of my career, I believe. So." – Ahmed Al Halabi [28:02]

• "The associations, the linkages that they made... the associations they made were stupid." – Gail Heldt, Former CIA Analyst [45:00]

• "It was just a beginning of a very long and cold ending of an entire career." – Ahmed Al Halabi [53:10]

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Final Thoughts

"Ahmad the Iguana Feeder" meticulously unravels a narrative of overreach, prejudice, and flawed justice, providing listeners with a comprehensive understanding of the intricate dynamics at Guantanamo Bay. Through Ahmed Al Halabi’s experience, Serial illuminates the profound personal and institutional consequences of systemic failures in the pursuit of national security.

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Produced by Jessica Weisberg, Dana Chivas, and Sarah Koenig. Special thanks to contributors and fact-checkers. For more episodes and behind-the-scenes content, visit Serial Productions or subscribe through Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Transcript

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[Sarah Koenig]

How much of that is true? None of it is true. Previously on Serial. We are humanitarians here. That was my belief. That is how we talked about it. That is what we believed. Everybody's in good shape. Everybody's looking good. I mean, just everyone was getting drunk and getting laid.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I tried to explain everything I can.

[Nasser]

And try to persuade them that we're.

[Sarah Koenig]

Not the people they're looking for.

[James Yee]

This whole thing, man, it's like, I.

[Sarah Koenig]

Still have resentment about this guy.

[James Yee]

I still think that he's complicit some way, and we'll never know how.

[Sarah Koenig]

From Serial Productions and the New York Times. This is Serial Season four. Guantanamo one prison camp told week by week. I'm Sarah Koenig. After September 11, a call cascaded down through the ranks of the military. If you speak another language besides English, raise your hand. Pashto, Urdu, Arabic speakers, We need you. So at Travis Air Force Base in Northern California, a slight young supply clerk named Ahmed Al Halabi raised his hand.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I felt important, by the way. Yeah.

[Sarah Koenig]

I'm like, you were important.

[Ed Brooks]

Wow.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I'm like, everybody wants my skills. Like, yeah, I am here. So I went and they tested me and of course, I passed.

[Sarah Koenig]

Of course he passed. He's originally from Syria. A couple of months later, senior airman Al Halabi landed in Guantanamo. November of 2002, less than a year after the camp had opened. He'd be working as a translator, but the military calls a linguist. Ahmed said he got no advanced training for this job. Instead, as soon as they got off the plane, the new arrivals gathered in a huge empty hangar for a briefing.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

You get a quick briefing of, you know, you're here. Don't feed the animals. Don't, you know, do this and that. Don't touch the iguanas. It's gonna be hot. Hydrate. You know, just the basic information.

[Sarah Koenig]

They literally are telling you about the iguanas and the animals. The first thing you get off the plane.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah, of course. That's. Yeah, that's like the very first thing. And at every briefing, you hear about the iguanas. At every single briefing that you get, they Talk about the iguanas. I don't know why, because they said this is an endangered species. Don't. Don't feed them, don't touch them, whatever. And, you know, they go on with other things.

[Sarah Koenig]

This was and still is an important rule at Guantanamo. Don't feed the iguanas. But then when Ahmed was showing me photos later of his time in the Air Force and at Guantanamo.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Oh, this is military. This is iguana. Of course I'm feeding the iguana.

[Sarah Koenig]

You're not supposed to do that.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I know. That's what they said. They said don't feed it. But it was very, very cute. Just coming, looking for food. So I left something outside and ate it. So I'm like, she better eat. She needs more Guantanamo.

[Sarah Koenig]

If the government tells me not to feed the iguana, I will never feed the iguana. But Ahmed fed the iguana. I took this as an opening to analyze his relationship to authority. You're not a stickler for the rule, for the sake of the rule. It's more like if it feels rational to you, you'll follow the rule. But if it feels totally irration feeling, what's the harm?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah.

[Sarah Koenig]

Is that true?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

That is absolutely true.

[Sarah Koenig]

Okay.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

It's absolutely on point. Like, I. Okay. I mean, rules are rules, and I respect the rules, but there's an alternate to the rules. You know, there's a.

[Sarah Koenig]

That's what the military likes to hear.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

What did they say? You know, the alt. Alt fact. Right. Alternate facts. Right. So alternate facts, alternate rules, alternative rules. Alternate, yeah.

[Sarah Koenig]

At Guantanamo, Ahmed El Halabi followed some alt rules. That is, he broke some rules, rules he considered minor. His miscalculation was assuming that were he to get busted for breaking minor rules, the consequences he'd face would also be minor, that the punishment would match the crime. What he didn't bank on was that American investigators and prosecutors, in a fever of hypervigilance, were also operating under a system of alt rules and alt facts, which, once arrayed against him, nearly destroyed his Life. At age 24, Ahmed was facing the full force of the government, accused not just of being a criminal, but of being an enemy. And then about a year later, the government let him go. What happened to Ahmed, it's safe to say, is also what happened to many detainees at Guantanamo. Someone with authority suspected they were dangerous and then looked for information to support that suspicion. But for the most part, the information our government gathered about detainees is invisible to the public. Murky, often secret, uncontested. So that all these years later, we regular people don't really know what to think. Whether or not it was right to hold them or right to let them go, we're left guessing. Ahmed's case, though, made it back home to the mainland to a court martial in sunny California. And voila, a fat record of trial witness statements and search warrants and hearing transcripts that tell us exactly what went down. The who, the why, the what, in the name of all that is sacred. Garish details of the case against Ahmed al Halabi. Ahmed's never told this story before. Not in 20 years, not in full. It's going to unfold over two episodes. Part one after the break.

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[Sarah Koenig]

App is how much variety it gives me.

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I start my day with a cup.

[Sarah Koenig]

Of coffee and Wordle and Connections, which.

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Is all in the New York Times app.

[Sarah Koenig]

It's well organized, it's multimedia. I can also save my articles easily in this area. I can add politics or Paul Krugman or Jamal Bouwie. I like him. I like that the cooking tab on top is really easily accessible. So if I'm on my way home and I'm just thinking, oh, what am I gonna make for dinner? I'll just quickly go on to cooking.

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And say, oh, I've got this in my pantry.

[Sarah Koenig]

The photos are just phenomenal. I have my saved articles, my entire history, which is actually very interesting. I'm just scrolling through the home tab. There's already so much stuff. I'm like, oh, interesting. I spent a lot of time to unwirecutter. I like that it's just right there. I loved how much content it exposed me to. Things that I never would have thought to turn to a news app for the New York Times app.

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All the times all in one place.

[Sarah Koenig]

Download it [e-mail] app Ahmed joined the Air Force in the year 2000. He'd just graduated high school, was working two jobs, restaurant, post office, living with his old school dad in Dearborn, Michigan and experiencing the generational chafe of a 20 year old who wants out from under. So he figures, let me check out the military. An option his father did not condone. But Ahmed, muscles forward, finds one of those storefront recruiting strips. Air Force recruiter signs him up. They send him here and there for training. And finally off to Travis Air Force Base to work the night shift as an airplane parts guy. Not a flashy job, but Ahmed thrived in the Air Force. He earned an early promotion to senior airman at the base commissary. He bought an aspirational lieutenant insignia and planted it on his desk. This was his 20 year plan. He'd be stationed all over the world.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Maybe retire as like a lieutenant colonel or maybe a colonel, and I'll be like the first, you know, person who from Syria made it this far. Right. He had all these ideas.

[Sarah Koenig]

He was in it to win it. Still, Ahmed knew he was an oddity at Travis. A Muslim, Syrian, Arabic speaking airman. He figured he was anomalous for at least a hundred mile radius, which people were mostly cool about, he said, until September 11th. And then his differences began to prick. A few people made comments about his name, Al Halabi. Sounds like airman Al Qaeda to me. Or questioned his loyalties. For the most part, Ahmed let this stuff slide. His English wasn't as strong then. He wasn't confident he could marshal the arguments and the vocabulary to change anyone's mind. And then came the call for Arabic speakers. Ahmed and his Arabic were needed at Guantanamo. So they sent him to Guantanamo. And suddenly he's seeing all these troops like him, Muslim, Arabic speaking people who were also serving. And not just Air Force, Navy, army, Marines, National Guard.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

And that was like amazing, you know, like that is the best thing I ever seen. Like, I see uniform, you know, people from my, you know, from my culture, right? Like even though from different countries, like not even a Syrian. There's no Syrians.

[Sarah Koenig]

Well, there was one guy, but he wasn't from Damascus like Ahmed, so he didn't really count. Anyway, Ahmed's getting to know this gaggle of linguists, about 30 people, Russian speakers, Urdu speakers, Pashtu speakers, Turkish speakers. Most are Muslim, some are Christian, some are religious, some are not. Ahmed's Arabic, spoken and written, is excellent. Many of the Arabic linguists at Guantanamo couldn't say the same. He's placed in the DOCX office document exploitation, which means letters. Basically his job is to translate letters detainees write to their families and also letters the families write to the detainees after they get translated. The letters go to the intel folks who decide what to censor.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

So as soon as we arrived, we saw that there's boxes of backlog boxes.

[Sarah Koenig]

And boxes of backlog, Outgoing or incoming.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

We don't know, just huge boxes.

[Sarah Koenig]

The docx backlog, around 1500 letters by one estimate, was a big deal. The camp was holding 600 plus men at the time. Another DOCX translator told me the International Committee of the Red Cross was complaining that some families hadn't heard from their detained relative for more than a year. But these letters, a lot of them were complicated, impressive to read maybe, but agony to translate. The detainees would write of dreams, discuss stories from the Quran, which might require a high level of Quranic knowledge on the part of the translator. So you don't say, translate a reference to a 7th century martyr named Jaafer who flies with the angels as Jaafer the pilot, and thereby send the whole intel group into a tiz because they think they might have a lead on the 20th hijacker, which happened. Besides being devout, some of the detainees were erudite. Ahmed remembers their written Arabic was dense and formal.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Quotes from medieval time, right? Just on non, never ending. They have nothing to do and they've got a month to write this letter, right? So they take their very long time. So you've got like a half page introduction and like few sentences of news, which has no news, and then another.

[Sarah Koenig]

Half page of conclusion. One well crafted letter like that. If you translated it word for word, it could take you hours. They're working long shifts in this trailer and they're writing this stuff out by hand. So they start looking for shortcuts. Maybe instead of literal translations of all those poetic introductory prayers, for example, why.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Don'T we just say greetings? Oh, okay, so we did that. We started saying greetings and you just skipped like five lines.

[Sarah Koenig]

Ahmed is a computer guy. He'd been working toward a degree in computer science. He's scandalized that they're doing this work with pen and paper. It's so slow. He's got a personal laptop, so they ask the boss, can we bring in our own computers to use for these translations? The boss okays it. They're waiting on office computers, but in the meantime, sure, knock yourselves out. Ahmed brings in his laptop. A couple other people do too. They begin to conquer the backlog. Maybe some of what I'm telling you here sounds fiddly and small, but the details of Ahmed's story, exactly how he did his job, exactly what he did in his spare time, these all start to matter now, because many months later, Ahmed's going to see a lot of these same details reflected back funhouse style on a Criminal charge sheet, his whole self mistranslated. By the end of that first year, the prison complex was growing. More detainees had arrived on the island. The guards, the medical staff, the Muslim chaplain. Everyone needed more help communicating. So Ahmed started working inside the prison blocks. I'd assumed the translators at Guantanamo were treated with reverence, or at least respect. They were skilled and rare, like neurosurgeons or magicians. But in fact, Ahmed and many of the other linguists occupied a liminal and sometimes lonely realm at Guantanamo. They were a link between us and them, needed by all, but fully trusted by none. That betweenness at a place like Guantanamo would end up making Ahmed and his cohort vulnerable.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

So you're kind of in a. What do you call it? Between a rock and rock, between a rock and a hard place.

[Sarah Koenig]

The rock was the detainees, who, by and large, hated the interpreters. They'd throw water on them or pee or whatever else call them infidels.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

There was also a very funny way they used to call, you know, so when we would come in from the gates of the cell blocks, you say, wasalut taratir. So wasalut taratir means here they arrive, like the low. The low class, low level people. Right.

[Sarah Koenig]

Here come the bums.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Here come the bums. Exactly. So here come the bums. Exactly. We would laugh, because that's how they think of us.

[Sarah Koenig]

The bums were working for the American oppressors, which, of course, Ahmed didn't feel that way. He assumed the prisoners had done something to warrant their capture and detention. Ahmed already had a sense of who some of them were from reading their letters, or at least what their lives were like. But now he was talking to them face to face, hearing their stories.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

There wasn't an outlier that like, oh, yeah, this guy is really, really bad, so you can't not start having these thoughts like, what the heck did he do to arrive here? Is it true that this guy is guilty or no?

[Sarah Koenig]

Ahmed knew better than to openly ask that question. All the interpreters knew better. A friend of Ahmed's, the guy we're calling Nasser, who helped the Special Projects team with the mock rendition of Mohammadu Salahi. Nasser is the person who made me understand how carefully linguists like him and Ahmed felt they had to tread, how the very same skills that earned them this important assignment made them equal opportunity targets. Nasser translated during interrogations, which sometimes got ugly.

[Lt. Col. Brian Wheeler]

As I'm translating, they would stop answering. Or if they're one of those stubborn people that don't answer anything, they just have their head on the ground and they're hearing me say all these nasty, insulting things about his family and what we're gonna do to his wife and his sister and his daughter and all of these things. He just puts his head up and he looks at me, he's like, you're one of them. He would spit on my face and I would just completely keep going, translating like as if nothing happened, right? But leaving that, you're like, you know, am I one of them? I mean, is he innocent? I don't know.

[Sarah Koenig]

Nasser's Muslim. He spent his teenage years in the Middle east surrounded by news of war. He gets why a kid from Yemen or Kuwait might be tempted by the adventure and heroism of running off to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen to protect Muslim land from a foreign inventory invader. That image of jihad, a positive image, was drummed into him too, when he lived in the Middle east, both at home and in the media. But he's also American. Like Ahmed. He was living in the US on 9 11. He believes in this mission and he's good at this job. Truly bilingual in English and Arabic. He was a favorite of the interrogators, his fellow Americans, shouting when they shout, matching their pitch hours.

[Lt. Col. Brian Wheeler]

Just like you think your Allah is going to help you. You think your Quran is correct. You know, it's a bunch of garb, garbage. It's a pop up. And I'm listening to this and I'm translating it. I am translating. I'm not like changing any of the words, but I'm like, you're not only disrespecting this object that's in front of us, you're disrespecting me. I'm on your side. I'm on your team here. Or do I need to pick a team here? Am I on his team? There was some kind of personality, like, you know, identity crisis even within me. I'm like, where do I belong here?

[Sarah Koenig]

I asked Nasser a touchy feely question. Did you ever say anything to the interrogators after about how it made you feel? Nasser said, no.

[Lt. Col. Brian Wheeler]

I didn't want to feel like I'm a sympathizer with the detainees because that would open up another can of suspicion, right?

[Sarah Koenig]

I'd always associated a sympathizer with Nazis or McCarthyism, but after 9 11, this word made a comeback. Terrorist sympathizer, Al Qaeda sympathizer. Politicians are saying it. It's coming up in congressional hearings. Muslims all over America were feeling surveilled and they were Surveilled. It was the dawn of the Patriot act and no fly lists. The FBI was asking thousands of Muslims to come in for voluntary interviews. People's phone records were gathered, their mosques infiltrated. So, yeah, sympathizer was in the air. All the linguists I spoke to were hearing it, especially from the guard force. If the detainees hating the linguists was the rock, the guards hating the linguists, that was the hard place. With the exception of a unit from Puerto Rico that everyone said was nice and reasonable, the guards, army, military police, looked askance at the interpreters, especially the non white, non Christian ones. Ahmed said they didn't even bother to hide their disdain.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah, yeah, they would kick us out of the block sometimes, you know. Yeah. So sometimes, you know, we'll be working and, you know, either distributing books or, you know, trying to do our work, like, yo, you, you get out. Get out of him here. You're you sympathizers. You get out here. You're, you know. Yeah, yeah, it was just right there.

[Sarah Koenig]

In your face, stepping inside. That relationship between the guards and the detainees was the most harrowing aspect of the job for a lot of the interpreters, Ahmed included, now that he was working in the prison blocks, mostly because of what's known as irfing.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Irfing actually is disturbing to see. It was, and I've never seen, a reason for it.

[Sarah Koenig]

IRF stands for Immediate Reaction force, a team of guards who'd be called in when a detainee was determined to be obstinate or combative. Their job was to forcibly remove the detainee from his cell, a process known un euphemistically as a forced cell extraction. Euphemistically, it's an irfing. The irfings were frequent. They were violent and sometimes bloody. 10, maybe 15 times, Ahmed said he was called in to interpret when an IRFing was about to happen. He'd try to get the detainee to comply with whatever the guards were asking. He'd plead with the person sometimes, or maybe quietly ask the guard's team leader whether all this was really necessary. But he says it rarely worked. Other linguists I talked to, including Ed Brooks, an army sergeant at the time, got the impression that Ahmed had an especially hard time witnessing the irfings, which, to Ed anyway, made sense. Ahmed lived in Syria until he was 16. Of course, he's going to identify more with the detainees than someone like Ed, who learned Arabic in the army and described himself at the time as the, quote, most annoying type of born again Christian Unquote. Ed, too, was disturbed by the earfangs. He described them like this.

[Ed Brooks]

Like, five dudes in hockey gear would come to the cell, spray him with oc, which is, you know, pepper spray, and then storm in there and hog tie them, cuff his hands and feet together behind his back, put him on a stretcher, take him out to the yard, spray his face with water to get the pepper spray out, and then, like, take all his items. And eventually one of the colonels, I can't remember who, decided to start, like, shaving them.

[Sarah Koenig]

They would shave the beard, like. No, they would shave them completely, like, hair and beard.

[Ed Brooks]

Yeah, I saw them shave eyebrows at one time.

[Sarah Koenig]

Ed said the official explanation for the shaving was a medical one, so that the pepper spray didn't cling to the person's hair and cause further skin irritation. But.

[Ed Brooks]

But everyone knew it wasn't that bad. It was to shame them, because a beard is a, you know, status symbol. The shaving is ridiculous. And the guards would laugh about like it was. It was a relief valve for animosity. It was bullying. It's simple bullying. Like, they had the chance to. They had the chance and the excuse to do something, and they did it.

[Sarah Koenig]

Ed's discomfort with the irfings neither here nor there. But Ahmed's discomfort would come back to bite him. To relieve the pressure of their work at Guantanamo, troops commonly turned to the twin diversions of booze and sex. But Ahmed's an observant Muslim. He doesn't drink or go to clubs, wasn't looking for love, at least not in Cuba. He'd recently become engaged to a Syrian woman living in the uae.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

So I found refuge in going to the prayer area, just going and spending time there because there were some books, there were some Qurans, and it was peaceful. It was nice.

[Sarah Koenig]

Soon enough, the Muslims who gathered for Friday prayer became a small circle of friends, including Army Captain James Yee, the Muslim chaplain whose Arabic wasn't great. So Ahmed started working directly with Yi, running the detainee library, evaluating and delivering books and magazines to detainees. Nasser was also part of their group. So was a Navy petty officer, a Palestinian guy who worked in the DocX office, and who asked that we not use his name. And so was their commander, Air Force Captain Tarek Hashem. Ahmed and Captain Hashem hung out a lot, which was noteworthy. An enlisted Guyinan officer palling around. They got scuba certified together. And for a while, Ahmed said, the various linguist cliques, the partiers, the video gamers, the religious types, all seemed to get along. But then, Ahmed said, the mood began to shift. A bunch of people, Ahmed included, were originally told they'd be going to Guantanamo for a 90 day deployment. But early 2003, we're evading Iraq. The military needs everyone to stay put on duty. An Air Force commander is quoted in Guantanamo's weekly newsletter announcing that airmen like Ahmed are, quote, frozen in place indefinitely. Their tours are extended until who knows when. Now, that roommate you can't stand, you might be stuck with that person for six or eight or 10 months. People are getting cranky with each other. And some of the other linguists start resenting Ahmed in particular. He's always hanging around with officers. Captain Hashem, Chaplain Yee, what's that all about? Why does he get to drive around with them? Ahmed said that was a big thing. Cars were a luxury on the island.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

You know, I go with Captain Hashem, so let's go to the prayer area. Let's go to the beach. We can go, you know, for breakfast instead of waiting for the bus. So you started seeing some people with, you know, kind of jealousy that, why am I so close to Captain Hashem? For example, why is the circle so tight?

[Sarah Koenig]

People grumbled that Ahmed was getting preferential treatment. Better hours, better assignments. Captain Hashem chose him to go on what's called an airbridge mission, a military flight to pick up a bunch more detainees from Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan and bring them back to Guantanamo. An airbridge mission like that was a coveted assignment. It was exciting. The details were secret. Ahmed had only been at Guantanamo a couple months, and he didn't even have security clearance. But Hashem chose him anyway, which caused an intense amount of grousing. The atmosphere got so acrimonious, a military inspector general came down from Miami to look into the complaints. According to a story later published in the Seattle Times, the favoritism was unsubstantiated. By month seven or eight, Ahmed said the alliances and antagonisms had subdivided. Christians versus Muslims, less religious Muslims versus more religious Muslims.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Tension, right? So we're no longer now wanting to hang with each other, so became separate groups. We are not talking, like, properly, just talking work. And even the work is, you know, you do it. Why didn't you do it? It's not my job. You know, the smallest thing now becomes an issue to a point that some people moved out from dorms and changed, so they no longer want to live with each other. Like, I moved from a room to the kitchen.

[Sarah Koenig]

His roommate was a loudmouth, instigating Russian. So Ahmed Put a bed in the corner of the dining area, dragged over some lockers for privacy. He tried to keep the petty rivalries in perspective, keep his eyes on the prize. A visa for his soon to be wife, his summer wedding in Damascus.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Again, I didn't care. Like, I'm leaving, I'm going to get married. I don't care about all of this. It's going to be history very soon. And then you get the camera.

[Sarah Koenig]

A disposable camera that Ahmed had gotten from his Secret Santa. Ahmed had misplaced the camera. The Navy petty officer said Ahmed was looking all over for it.

[Nasser]

I remember one time, Al Harabi, he was asking me again and again, said, hey, remember I had a disposal camera in the desk here. I used it yesterday. I'm like, I don't know if you use it. Where did you put it? He said, I put it here on the desk. So somehow that camera he used, somebody took it. Al Halabi did look for that camera everywhere and could never find it. And now we know where it went.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

The camera thing was the beginning of everything. Like the beginning of the end of my career, I believe. So.

[Sarah Koenig]

A couple of lousy snapshots. We're about to do them in. That's after the break.

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[Sarah Koenig]

York Times themes make me feel like I'm amazing. Wordle makes me feel things that I.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Don'T feel from anyone else I absolutely love.

[Sarah Koenig]

Spelling bee. The Times crossword puzzle is a companion that I've had longer than anyone outside of my immediate When I can finish a hard puzzle without pins, I feel like the smartest person in the world. When I have to look up a clue to help me, I'm learning something new. It gives me joy every single day. Join us and play all New York times [e-mail] games Ahmed finally got permission to leave Guantanamo in June of 2003. He started what's called out processing, packed up some stuff into a box, clothes, some snorkeling gear, a blanket. And on June 24, 2003, he took the box to the Guantanamo post office and mailed it back to his address at Travis Air Force Base in California. Also, on June 24, he signed a form that included a security debriefing acknowledgment. I affirm the form read that I have returned all JTF Gitmo defense information in my custody. About a month later, Ahmed flies out. He'd been anxious about making it off the island in time to catch his flight to Syria. But in late July, a seat suddenly frees up on an outbound flight to the military air base in Jacksonville, Florida. As soon as he arrives at the Jacksonville terminal, some men approach him.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Investigators, I'd like to talk to you. Where's your duffel bag? And they just pushed me, so. Just, like, took my hand, you know, and, like, pushed me. And there was, like, one guy who opened the bathroom door, and they locked the door.

[Sarah Koenig]

So they pushed you into the bathroom and locked the door?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

And, like, you know, what's going on? He said, you know, we're just gonna do a quick search, you know, and, you know, started going through my pockets, and I'm confused. Like, what. What are you doing? What's going on?

[Sarah Koenig]

He thought, maybe they've confused me with someone else. Or maybe there was a screw up in a translation. He remembers telling them, my commander, Captain Hashem, is here somewhere in the airport. We were on the same flight. You want to grab him? Maybe he can clear this up. No, they want to talk to Ahmed alone. They handcuff him and escort him into the main terminal, where he's hoping the hundreds of people aren't seeing him. At the center of this entourage, the men, an Air Force investigator, an FBI guy, an Air Force counterintelligence guy, drive Ahmed to a nearby office, sit him down, ask him if they can search his bags. He says, okay. They ask him questions. They ask him, did you take any photos inside Camp Delta? Unauthorized photos.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Did you take pictures? I'm like, well.

[Sarah Koenig]

Well, he did take a couple pictures. He says he can't remember exactly what he was thinking, but he had this disposable camera in his pocket. He's standing outside his office trailer, which is to his left, some fencing. To his right, a guard tower straight ahead. And he snaps a photo, maybe half accidentally. He says he thinks he was trying to figure out how the camera worked. Then he snaps a second one. Same view, but deliberate, composed, more carefully. The guard tower isn't manned, but still, he knew he wasn't supposed to take pictures. Inside the prison camp, everyone knew. No photo signs were posted everywhere.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Then I'm like, oh, shit, this is. Yeah, this is. I need to stop. I'M not gonna take any more pictures because, you know, they always talk about, don't take pictures.

[Sarah Koenig]

He took a bunch more pictures with that camera of his friends fishing, the beach, etc. All aloud. And then the camera disappeared. Ahmed sweated it a little, asked around, but it never turned up. So he let it go. But here was an investigator asking him directly, did you take unauthorized photos?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I immediately went back to that moment. I'm like, the camera went missing, so no one knows if I took any pictures. So, no, I didn't take any pictures, right? And he said, well, no, we have the pictures. Like, okay, so you have it. Great. You have my camera. So, yes, I took pictures. So I immediately acknowledged that if you have my camera, then, okay, so I need the other photos, because I'd like to see them. I didn't get to see them.

[Sarah Koenig]

It's like you were sort of missing the point of the question.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I know. Actually, I was more concerned about.

[Sarah Koenig]

Says he was actually relieved. He figured now he knew the size and shape of the trouble he was in. Personnel had snapped unauthorized photos before. According to a prison commander at the time, the consequences for it were usually pretty soft.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Okay, good. You got me. Let's talk about the camera. And that's completely, you know, for me, I thought this is what they all want to know. Okay, so you took pictures. It was wrong. Okay, let's. Let's get on. Let me go. I need to go catch a flight.

[Sarah Koenig]

I've got a connecting flight today back to my base in California, and then in two days, I'm flying to Syria to get married. My mom's meeting me in London on the way. Everyone's waiting for me in Damascus, So can we move it along? No. Because suspicions Ahmed didn't even know were cooking had begun to boil over. The camera is not all they want to talk about. And he's not the only person they want to talk to. Back at the airport that same day, July 23, 2003, investigators had also stopped in, questioned Captain Hashem. A month and A half later, September 10, Chaplain James Yee took that same flight to Jacksonville to go on leave. He collected his bags, and as soon.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

As I got to the door, these two FBI guys were there. Can we ask you a couple questions?

[Sarah Koenig]

The US Military has charged a former Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo with mishandling classified information. It was all over the news. First, the announcement of Yee's arrest. He supposedly had secret documents in his backpack. Then of Ahmed's. Senior airman, Ahmed Al Halabi. Al Holabi worked as an Arabic translator.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

At Guantanamo, trying to pass classified military.

[Sarah Koenig]

Secrets violations of the Federal Espionage Act. So far, three former workers at Guantanamo have been arrested in a probe of alleged espionage. Alleged espionage, including charges El Hallaby tried to. Third guy arrested was another Arabic linguist. Ahmed Bahelba, a civilian contractor originally from Egypt, stopped at Logan Airport in Boston in late September. When customs agents searched his bags, they found 132 CDs, mostly music and videos, but among them was one with classified information copied onto it. Also in late September, their friend, the Navy petty officer, he's at a training in Los Angeles when he sees a couple of Navy investigators in the lobby of the hotel where he's staying. He recognizes one of them from a prior assignment.

[Nasser]

So when I saw him, I'm, like, smiling. So they.

[Sarah Koenig]

Oh, because you're like, oh, hey, how are you doing?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah.

[Nasser]

But they look at me, and their looks look different, like I am guilty or something.

[Sarah Koenig]

He found out they'd questioned his shipmates back in Italy. When he went to his commander for support, the guy told him, I would advise you to hire a lawyer. The investigators in Jacksonville interviewed Ahmed for four or five hours, including a break when Ahmed says they fetched him a limp filet o fish sandwich from McDonald's. Afterwards, they took Ahmed to jail. He still didn't know what was going on. Pretty soon, he sits down with a lawyer, Air Force Major Kim London.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

And she said, well, Imam Al Halabi, they're accusing you of very serious things.

[Sarah Koenig]

Espionage, aiding the enemy, misbehavior before the enemy. Ahmed didn't even know what some of the words meant. Over time, this charge sheet would grow. Attempted espionage, making false statements, bank fraud. At its most alarming, it contained 30 offenses. What major London was seeing, and Ahmed was slowly catching up to her, was that the government thought Ahmed was a spy, possibly part of a spy ring or even a sleeper cell. That first meeting, Major London talked him.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Through it, and she lays out all of the charges and that the government made it so clear that they have so much evidence, and you know that I'm gonna go away for a very long time, if not the execution.

[Sarah Koenig]

She told you that?

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah. So she said that this is so grave that, you know, execution is on the line.

[Sarah Koenig]

As of July 2003, when Ahmed was arrested, the government's principal evidence against him consisted of two photos from inside the wire he'd initially lied about having taken. And on his laptop, they'd found 186 detainee letters he'd translated that he said he'd forgotten. To delete. Not exactly overwhelming. But then Ahmed, rule breaker made this grave situation even worse for himself. Remember that box? When Ahmed was getting ready to leave Guantanamo, he'd packed a box of his stuff and mailed it back to himself at Travis Air Force Base in California. Now that box is sitting at the base post office waiting for him. Ahmed's in jail, though. He can't pick it up. So he tries to get his mail, including this box, forwarded to his sister, who lives in Anaheim, instead. In early September of 2003, an investigator figures out it's sitting there. They get a warrant, collect the box, and bring it back to their office. Lt. Col. Brian Wheeler was the lead prosecutor on Ahmed's case. The day the investigators opened the box at Travis, Wheeler was working the case at Guantanamo.

[James Yee]

So after they opened the box, we had a conversation on secure line.

[Sarah Koenig]

Oh, they called you?

[James Yee]

Yeah.

[Sarah Koenig]

Okay. Were they excited?

[James Yee]

Sure, yeah. I mean, we. When you're working a case, you're looking for more evidence. And this was, frankly, I thought, better evidence than what they had so far.

[Sarah Koenig]

Back at their office, the investigators opened some beers to celebrate their smoking gun. Inside the box, wrapped in a blanket, were a bunch of papers. Many of them innocuous, but others, well, there was a complete list of detainee names and their corresponding internment serial numbers, or ISNs. At the time, the US government hadn't publicly confirmed the identities of any detainees, so this list was alarming. Also in the box, they found papers related to Ahmed's Air Bridge mission to Afghanistan, the one some of his colleagues got worked up about. The papers included details about logistics and security, and they were marked secret, which meant Ahmed had knowingly sent himself classified documents and even more. Suspect had then tried to get the incriminating box moved to his sister's address.

[James Yee]

We. We have to be very suspicious about that.

[Sarah Koenig]

It did not look good. Why would he have secreted these papers out of Cuba? Why would he try to send them to his sister? Along with the box, investigators at Travis also intercepted a letter to Ahmed from the Syrian Embassy in Washington confirming Ahmed's passage to Syria and Qatar. Was Ahmed trying to pass information about detainees to someone overseas? The box contributed additional spying crimes to the already vertiginous charge sheet. The government treated Ahmed not so much as a defendant, but as an enemy asset. An operative working for who knows who, maybe Syria, maybe Al Qaeda. They took no chances on security. While he awaited trial at Travis Air Force Base, Ahmed was confined to a makeshift holding cell, A toiletless metal box that his attorneys would later describe as akin to the inside of a filing cabinet. Later, the Air Force moved Ahmed more than 300 miles south to a different base, which had better jail offerings. But they kept him isolated, forbade him from speaking Arabic on the phone or in person. For his arraignment, they put him in a Kevlar vest and helicoptered him to court, masses of cops at the ready. When they transported him by van, they fretted about being followed. During one drive, a guard reported that Ahmed was messing with his digital watch, perhaps timing the route. They confiscated the watch and claimed they were sending it out for analysis. Meanwhile, back at Guantanamo, linguists were reading the shocking news of these arrests and not knowing what to think. Maybe there were spies among them. Maybe they're going to accuse me next. One by one, the linguists were brought in by counterintelligence for questioning. Interrogations basically, some that lasted six hours, nine hours. People were polygraphed, read their rights just to be on the safe side. A handful of Ahmed's fellow linguists, perhaps to hedge their bets, would end up writing insinuating statements about Ahmed, describing him as excessively conservative in his beliefs or excessively shady in his behavior. Notably, the ones who gave such statements were not Muslim. By late fall of 2000, three, months after news stories all over the world showed Ahmed being brought into court in handcuffs, the government's big balloon of a case against Ahmed was threatened by a big hat pin of a problem.

[James Yee]

We weren't sure about the espionage.

[Sarah Koenig]

That's Lieutenant Colonel Brian Wheeler again, the prosecutor. The government, it appeared, had no evidence that Ahmed passed any information to anyone or that he planned to.

[James Yee]

We had indications that something had happened.

[Sarah Koenig]

What were those indications? Do you remember what the indications were?

[James Yee]

Well, there's some things I can't talk about.

[Sarah Koenig]

You can quote me on this one. It was total bullshit. And that's Donald Rakoff, one of Ahmed's three attorneys. He'd been in the Air Force himself for 28 years. But by the time he joined Ahmed's case, he was a civilian, freer than the uniformed attorneys to deploy spirited language. This was probably the worst of any U.S. military court martial I've ever been involved in, and I've tried 200 court martial. It was just the cascade of errors. I know litigators tend to be fast and loose with the superlative insults, but it's true confusion abounded. In Ahmed's case, the government tried again and again to find indications that the way Ahmed had done his job in Guantanamo, the way he translated, simplifying the prayers, the way he'd used his computer weren't simply shortcuts, they were deceptions. Investigators needled deep into his hard drive, looking for evidence he'd uploaded secret information or embedded it in his personal website or emailed detainee information to someone, but there was nothing. FBI agents secretly raided his sister's house in Anaheim, breaking a window and rifling through their home office, traumatizing her in the process. No evidence there, either. Also, gutting to the government's case, they did not know what was classified and what was not. Brian Wheeler, the prosecutor, told me that early on in the case, he'd gone to a meeting at the Pentagon, where he'd been informed in serious tones that the list of detainees and their ISN numbers was classified. Not just secret, but possibly top secret. Months later, after a formal classification review.

[James Yee]

They told him, well, maybe not so much. That's not secret at all. Well, that really affected things.

[Sarah Koenig]

The 186 letters on Ahmed's computer weren't classified either. In fact, the only classified papers Ahmed had were the ones from the Airbridge mission. Meanwhile, the government's case against James Yee was falling apart, too. They'd accused him of mishandling classified information, but never produced any evidence to back it up. After two and a half months in a Navy brig, they let him out and eventually dismissed the charges. And Ahmed Mahelba, the linguist arrested in Boston, would end up pleading guilty to one count of unauthorized possession of classified materials, a crime he insisted was unintentional on his part. He'd spend a year and a half in jail. It had been only two years since 9. 11. We'd just had the biggest scare of our lives. So when you think about the weaknesses in the government's case against Ahmed, it's only fair to keep that in mind. If Al Qaeda could take control of commercial airplanes and steer them into skyscrapers, into the Pentagon, was it irrational to think that they could be operating inside Guantanamo, one of the most secure facilities on Earth? On the other hand, the number of times that simple, logical explanations for what investigators and prosecutors were seeing were brushed aside. The sheer sloppiness of some of their work. That, too, is remarkable. Mistakes are one thing, but this started to feel like something else was at play. It's worth pointing out the investigators looking into Ahmed were young, in their twenties, and inexperienced. The lead investigator, Special Agent Lance Wega, was so new at his job, he was still on probation with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Another agent on the team. He'd just turned 23. Their supervisors were A little older. But one of the investigators told me, as far as he knew, none of them had ever worked on a counterintelligence investigation before. And within a couple of months of Ahmed's arrest, one supervisor was pulled off the case. He'd later plead guilty to mishandling classified documents and a slew of sex crimes against two young girls. None of the investigators would talk to me on the record, but let's just say the people trying to prove Ahmed was a spy. This wasn't exactly the A team. Some of the accusations they made against Ahmed were eminently checkable, but simply hadn't been before ending up on a charge sheet. The bank fraud allegations, for instance. Complete nonsense. A military judge noted the prosecution's, quote, appalling lack of evidence for that one. Or that Ahmed had lied about being a US Citizen, when in fact he was a US Citizen. He'd been naturalized just a week before he arrived at Guantanamo. Other allegations were so thin, yet so casually and confidently weaponized, the only explanation seemed to be not just incompetence, but bad faith. After a court hearing, for instance, a government translator realized she'd made a mistake translating a piece of evidence the government was relying on to show Ahmed was trying to peddle secret information abroad. But when she notified a prosecutor she'd misinterpreted a crucial word, he told her not to mention it to anyone. He, too, was thrown off the case. To demonstrate that Ahmed was a sympathizer and possibly an extremist, the government assembled a patchwork of statements from far flung sources, a couple of which turned into criminal charges. He was accused of making anti American comments and then lying to investigators about that. The lead investigator, Lance Waga, testified that one such statement had been relayed by Ed Brooks, the Arabic linguist and formerly annoying evangelical Christian. Sergeant Brooks allegedly told FBI agents that Senior Airman Al Holabi said, quote, that Camp Delta's detainees were treated unfairly and the guards deserved to be spat upon. Are words to that effect, unquote. But when I asked Ed brooks about this 20 years later, he didn't know what I was talking about. It was the first time he was hearing he'd been part of Ahmed's case in any way to prove it. I read to him from the court record. Special Agent Waga said, oh, my God.

[Ed Brooks]

Okay, yes, that just triggered it. I did say that in an interview, but it wasn't to slam him like they were saying.

[Sarah Koenig]

Like Ed said some investigator had come to him asking whether Ahmed had said those things. And Ed said, yeah, he did. But here's what happened. There'd been an irfing that had gone south. The interpreters had suspected this one guard of denying a detainee food on multiple occasions and harassing him by keeping him awake. And so the detainee had finally spouted the guy. The guards decided to irf him, called for an interpreter.

[Ed Brooks]

How have he responded to the surfing? They started without him, which is completely against sop. Like, they were dead wrong to do it, but they wanted to. So they tune this, you know, they. They Earth, the detainee, they hog time. And then Hal was there for, like, the end of it. And Halby had come back angry about it. It was like, they deserve to be spit on. Blah, blah. Like, not the guards, as in all, like this one Earth that had gone down badly. So that is super out of context. The fact that someone would then take me and quote that as an anti American, that's fucking ridiculous.

[Sarah Koenig]

A bunch of statements in Ahmed's case were like that. Ridiculous. Even in context. It really is striking how so much of this, the inexperience, the tenuous connections, the lack of rigor and professional restraint, all echoes inside the case files of Guantanamo detainees. I've spoken to a handful of people who've seen inside the classified intelligence files we kept on the detainees, and most of them told me, quote, yeah, we had some good information, but overall, we should be skeptical. A former CIA analyst named Gail Heldt, who reviewed the detainee intelligence, told me, quote, the associations, the linkages that they made, like, I don't want to be unduly harsh to people who are working under very intense and immense pressure after 9, 11, but the associations they made were stupid. Another analyst, Jake Meyer, an Army intel guy who worked at Guantanamo for about five years on and off, said, especially in the earlier years, they were working at breakneck speed to get information, and everybody's caught up in it. And you're producing, you're producing and compiling this massive swirling pile of bullshit is what he called it. And some of what's in that swirling pile is good and important. But as an analyst, we're supposed to be able to filter through all the other bullshit to find the good stuff we found that we probably should have been filtering through our own bullshit. Ahmed doesn't blame the government for investigating him. He just wishes they'd done it with an even hand. He said, I was able to give them the benefit of the doubt. They didn't give it to me. Okay. I asked him, so why did you take those papers home? Everybody else seemed to know that wasn't allowed. What were you thinking when you packed up that box, for instance, with the classified airbridge papers he was about to ship out? He said, and those documents, he thought they were cool, he wanted to keep them.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

And then like, I'm not going to keep it with me. Let me just send it in a box in case they search and they find it on me, right? So I'm like, I'm just send it.

[Sarah Koenig]

So you totally know you're not supposed to have it.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

Yeah, like I said, you know, I had the inner self telling me maybe I shouldn't do this, but like, what's, what's the worst that can happen? Of course the worst that can happen, I get arrested, right?

[Sarah Koenig]

The word naive tends to come up when people describe Ahmed back then. He used that word to describe himself. Maybe that was true, but also true. Ahmed was the iguana feeder. He didn't plan to do anything with those papers, he said, so he didn't see the harm in taking them. And these documents, he told me he felt entitled to them. He'd just spent eight rough months working in a detention facility.

[Ahmed Al Halabi]

I'm like, yeah, I, I deserve to keep something from that time because I literally had nothing take, you know, leaving like I, I was supposed to get a medal and I didn't. And I was very pissed off, you know, because everybody gets a medal. But for some reason or another they didn't have medals at that time and they didn't have the time to do a ceremony for us leaving. And I didn't get that. So, you know, like, well, let me get something, let me take something. So I took these documents or papers.

[Sarah Koenig]

The most logical explanation for what Ahmed did is this one, the one he admits to, that despite the government's year long effort to prove otherwise, his intention wasn't nefarious, it was just dumb, petty. What shocked Ahmed about his case, he told me, was how sudden it all was. It was shocking, he said, to know that you can turn on one of your own this quickly and this heavily. I was taken aback for a second by this idea that they'd turned on one of their own, because did the military consider Ahmed one of their own? Maybe they didn't, not really. And maybe that's why they didn't entertain the logical explanation for what Ahmed did or for what other Muslim personnel did consider. Around the same time, Ahmed and Captain James Yee and that other linguist Ahmad Mihalba, were all original arrested and imprisoned and charged with crimes. A fourth person was also stopped on his way out of Guantanamo with a number of classified documents in his briefcase, his computer, his footlocker. He was an intelligence officer, older, a decorated colonel. He was not Muslim. He looked and spoke like one of their own. His case ended with no detention, no criminal proceedings. Instead, he got an administrative ding and the benefit of the doubt. The investigators I spoke to all denied that Ahmed's foreignness, as Ahmed put it, my accent, my funny name, my religion played any part in his prosecution. They were following the facts, they said, full stop. But in the end, it's not just the wrongness of some of their facts that makes me disagree. It's the origin of some of those facts. The case against Ahmed was spun up in part because of a guy named Jason Orlich, an Army Reserve captain who worked as the camp security officer. Captain Orlich's office shared space with the DOCX office for a while, and his swirling suspicions about religious Muslim personnel at Guantanamo were at the root of the government's investigations. As one of Ahmed's lawyers said in court, Captain Jason Orlich, frankly, your honor, was the one that started this whole mess to begin with. Captain Orlick didn't want to talk to me. But back when all this happened, the Seattle Times newspaper did a nine part investigation, mostly about the Yi case. And Orlich did speak to that reporter, Ray Rivera, at length. Orlich told Rivera he became suspicious of Chaplain Yee almost as soon as he got to Guantanamo when he sat through Yi's cultural awareness briefing for incoming personnel. Basic information about the detainees and about Islam. The presentation made Orlich uncomfortable, as if YI was justifying extremist actions. You could ask anyone who went through that initial briefing, Orlich is quoted as saying. Everybody who walked out after it was over sat there going, is he on our side or is he on the enemy's side? After that, Orlich began keeping tabs on Yi and on Yi's group of friends, including Captain Hashem and the Navy Petty Officer An Ahmed. The way they prayed in particular rubbed him the wrong way. Orlich himself was a devout Catholic and described himself in Ray Rivera's series as accepting of other religions. But he said the way Yee and his quote, unquote Muslim clique behaved was strange to him. In statements he made to investigators, Orlich said, many times our section could hear the Muslim linguists, including Al Halabi, praying at the end of the hallway. Al Halabi and Captain Hashem would try to get others to come to prayer. The room at the end of the hallway became crowded with their recruits. Unquote and they were fervent in their beliefs. A lot of their religious beliefs mirrored those of the detainees. Orlich told the Seattle paper that some of the non Muslim linguists, some of the same ones who'd complained about Captain Hashem favoring Ahmed, began coming to him with information about sympathizer y things Ahmed had supposedly said or done. Orlich himself couldn't open an investigation, but he could and did pass along his concerns, especially about Chaplain Yee, to the camp's counterintelligence officer, who took them seriously and who in turn, pushed them up the chain until finally, In May of 2003, the military officially opened an investigation on Chaplin, Yee, and also on Ahmed. Look, nobody wants to be accused of being a racist, prejudiced, bigoted, Orlich told Ray Rivera after the cases had fallen apart. But if we hadn't done anything, some of us would have lost our jobs. But Ahmed's lawyers did think Orlich was prejudiced. At the time, Captain Orlich and his pals were passing around homemade CDs loaded with offensive content. Ahmed's defense tried to introduce this stuff in court, but the judge wouldn't have it. I've seen it, though. Sexist, racist, jingoistic, juvenile, Islamophobic images, cartoons, and little films. Even worse, some years after Captain Orlick left Guantanamo and was promoted to Major Orlich, he made a PowerPoint about Islam based in part on lessons learned at Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. If you Google it, you'll see Orlick's dangerous argument that there's no such thing as a moderate or peaceful form of Islam, accompanied by images of burning towers, severed heads, bloody children, quotes calling for death to all Christians and Jews, and many exclamation points. According to court records, Jason Orlich is the guy who ended up with Ahmed's disposable camera. It's not entirely clear how and had the film developed and identified those two verboten photos. The incident that kicked off Ahmed's case, Lance Wega, the lead investigator, testified that he took extensive guidance from Captain Orlick when he was gathering evidence, including about what documents in Ahmed's possession were classified, what documents included, quote, unquote, extremist content. Even though it turned out Captain Orlich didn't definitively know what was classified and didn't know Arabic. Lanswege was praised for this investigation, by the way. A performance report noted that he developed one of the most prolific espionage aiding the enemy investigations in recent memory on, quote. And that his actions led to 18 other investigations, none of which turned up any serious violations, much less aspiring. But he got an extra 2,000 bucks as a thank you. By September of 2004, a little more than a year after it started, Ahmed's case was a shadow of its most threatening self. The espionage, aiding the enemy. Most of the false statements, the bank fraud had all dropped away until about half the original charges remained. And half of those, his lawyer said, were rinky dink. Meanwhile, the mood of the press had soured on the prosecution. Spiring at Gitmo became three counts dropped against Gitmo translator. Finally, the government was grudgingly ready to let go. A year earlier, prosecutors had offered Ahmed a deal of 50 years in prison if he pleaded guilty to espionage. Now they were agreeing to zero. No more time at all. Ahmed admitted to mishandling classified documents, violating a general order, making false statements, all to do with those two pictures and the Airbridge papers. He was sentenced to time served and a bad behavior discharge from the Air Force. After the evidence in Ahmed's case was aired out, the world learned Ahmed wasn't an Islamic extremist or spy. He was just a young airman with sticky fingers who'd learned the harshest shoplifting lesson of all time. Or that's what the world should have learned instead. And this too is true for the detainees. Even after the investigation investigation was finished. The suspicion wasn't. Even after sentencing, Ahmed's case wasn't over. As part of his plea, he agreed to be debriefed by the government. I assumed this debrief was a lessons learned sort of thing. The government trying to understand how its big, splashy case ended up more than a year and God knows how many dollars later as dude gets caught with two boring photos and stale Airbridge instructions. I'm minimizing, I know. But surely somewhere, someone with stars on his or her lapels was asking what went wrong here. The debrief was not that. Ahmed's case was about to get a lot weirder. That's next time. Serial is produced by Jessica Weisberg, Dana Chivas and me. Our editor is Julie Snyder. Additional reporting by Cora Currier and Amir Khafaji. Fact checking by Ben Phalen and Jessica Suriano. Music supervision. Sound design and mixing by Phoebe Wang. Original score by Sophia Deli Alessandria. Editing help from Alvin Melith, Jen Guerra and Ira Glass. Our contributing editors are Carol Rosenberg and Rosina Ali. Additional production from Daniel Guillemette and Emma Grillo. Our standards editor is Susan Wessling. Legal review from Elimeen Sumar. The art for our show comes from Pablo Del can and Max Gutter. Supervising producer for Serial Productions is Ende Chubu. Our executive assistant is Mac Miller. Sam Dolnick is deputy managing editor of the New York Times. Special thanks to Janelle Pifer, Ray Rivera, Mahima Chablani, Jordan Cohen, Jeffrey Miranda, John Michael Murphy, Zoe Murphy, Pierre Antoine Louis, Peter Rentz and Colleen Wormsley.