Transcript
A (0:00)
Foreign. Welcome back to another episode of Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and on the other line, Bill Bishop. Bill, it's great to be back. How you doing?
B (0:16)
It is. Hi everybody. I missed. You missed the podcast. I know. It was nice to see family. I think we've, we've all had enough turkey. It's time to get back to work.
A (0:24)
Yes, we know you're not a fan of turkey. I enjoyed my turkey last week. But now here we are, we're back. It's December. It's pretty cold. It feels like December around Washington. And I'm not complaining. I like the, the wintry feel here, but we have a lot to catch up on here, so I don't want to do too much Prelude at the start, but we should talk about Chip Controls we got a resolution to the months long speculation over what sort of steps the US Might take to patch some of the obvious loopholes in the Biden administration's chip policies. On Monday at long last, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security announced a package of rules designed to, quote, further impair China's ability to produce advanced semiconductors that can be used in advanced weapon systems, artificial intelligence, and advanced computing. So to frame this conversation, I will give you a quote from Gregory Allen, an analyst at CSIS who's done great work on these export controls for the past two years. Here's what he said to the Washington Post about the updates. He said, these controls are weaker than what the United States should have done. You can make a halfway logical argument that says sell everything to China. Then you can make a reasonable argument, sell very little to China. But the worst thing you can do is to dramatically signal your intention to cut off China's access to tech, but then have so many loopholes and such bungled implementation that you incur almost all of the costs of the policy with only a fraction of the benefits. So I think that articulates the issue well and sounds an alarm that we have sounded on the podcast a number of times over the past 18 months or so. The most concerning costs obviously being that you focus China's energy and investment on developing alternatives to the Western supply chains, but you fail to actually limit China's ability to build its own infrastructure. Does that track with your read on where things stand two years after the initial round of semiconductor export controls were announced?
B (2:36)
Well, I don't think there's any real surprise that these are so there's more bark than bite to this specific update. I mean, we've talked for a while about how it Was, you know, the rollout was delayed. There was a lot of internal debate. One of the issues was that the Biden administration was not able to convince or coerce the Japanese and the South Koreans and the Dutch to get on board. And so I think that allowed the industry to make a fairly compelling argument that it makes no sense to restrict US Companies when they'll just lose share to Korean and, or Japanese or Dutch companies. And so. But I think, you know, Greg Allen's quote, it just makes sense. It's like if you're going to do it half assed, it's going to really be a mess. And I think that's where we are. I will say Politico, Trade Pro, the morning Trade Pro this morning had a great quote in their newsletter quoting an industry insider quote. BIS was really receptive to arguments around maintaining a strong source of revenue from China for equipment companies and as a result really watered down the original intent of the rule, which is to address circumvention attempts by companies like SMIC and Huawei. So again, here we are. I think the Raimondo and her team are trying to go out there and talk about how this is being so tough on China. What's been interesting, I think, is the media coverage has actually, the media is not really buying it. There's a fair amount of skepticism in the reports about these controls and just how they were really watered down by the industry lobbyists and their allies within the Department of Commerce. And so here we are, honestly, I think, going into the Trump administration, the first round of these semiconductor controls, which came out in October 7, 2022, soon after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and the PRC reaction. My understanding is those controls were tougher than expected precisely because of the PRC reaction. And that allowed the people in the administration who were pushing for tougher controls to actually overcome the industry lobbying and some of the resistance inside parts of the bureaucracy. And then now two years on relationship has stabilized. Seems like that sort of momentum has really flagged. I think also there's a real chance DC has passed peak tough on China. Between these controls and then the TikTok ban, when Trump comes in, I know everyone thinks he's gonna be super tough on China. We'll see.
