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A
Foreign. Welcome to Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and you are listening to a free preview of today's episode.
B
Hello and welcome back to another episode of Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and on the other line, Bill Bishop. Bill, how you doing?
C
I'm doing well. Peace appears to have broken out. Maybe hopeful, I don't know.
B
For now, for the next few hours. It's been 12 hours. The ceasefire has held so far. Um, oh, well, I guess in certain places it hasn't. But it is good to be back. As the World Turns. We're going to have a shorter show today and we will begin with the New York Times. New York Times, Tuesday night in the wake of the cease fire announcement, the cease fire between the US And Israel and Iran. The New York Times wrote. For years, China has been one of Iran's most important lifelines.
C
China.
B
China has bought almost all of its oil exports, shielded it diplomatically and helped it weather international isolation. Now, according to three Iranian officials, Beijing has used that influence for a different purpose to press Iran to accept the cease fire with the United States. Iran's decision to accept the two week cease fire proposal brokered by Pakistan came after diplomatic efforts by Pakistan and and a last minute push by China. According to the Iranian officials, China asked Iran to show flexibility and diffuse tensions. They said the intervention reflects not only Beijing's influence over Tehran, but also its own stake in preventing a protracted war that could disrupt energy supplies or set off a global recession, as well as hurt Persian Gulf countries with which China also has close relationships. The deal also calls for the immediate opening of the Strait of Hormuz. So Bill, obviously very imperfect information environment right now. We don't know how durable a cease fire will be for one. But what do you make of that reporting concerning China's involvement in all this?
C
I mean, I wish we had more information. The Chinese side has not really taken credit for this specifically, you know, they've been. The foreign Minister has made 20 something phone calls to counterparts calling on all sides to stand down. They did veto a UN resolution on Tuesday that Bahrain had put forward. It was a very watered down resolution after multiple rounds of negotiations. But they still saw it as too broad that it would potentially allow for multiple countries to take military action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Even the language was couch as defensive.
B
I can't say I was shocked by that move at the UN But I do wonder in terms of China, China's relations with the rest of the Gulf countries, do you think their posture on this issue will have any negative long term impact on the relationships.
C
You know, I think that actually a lot of the Gulf countries, you know, I don't, I don't think they're particularly surprised by this because China is generally quite transactional and so, so I think, but I think back to the resolution, you know, they, and you know, the, the UN Ambassador had comments after, after the, the veto. One of the reasons he cited was Trump's truth social post yesterday that talked about sort of effectively destroying the civilization, you know, which again was just, I, I don't think in any universe there's just an absolutely grotesque tweet or post or whatever you call it. But so, so fast forward, you know, last night, the deadline and then the deadline sort of slips and the bombers are in the air and then the bombers turn around and now there's some sort of a ceasefire thing. Although Israel's still bombing Lebanon, there's still reports of drone attacks across the region. Back to what China did or didn't do, we don't know China. I think, you know, there are a couple pretty obvious reasons they would want a ceasefire. One is the disruption in the Gulf to energy, petrochemical supplies has, you know, some effects on their own economy directly, but also lots of downstream effects on countries that are big markets for their exports. And so they want, they don't want this kind of disruption. It is not, and we've talked about this before, you know, they have vulnerability on some of the petrochemical derivative things they have to import, but also they have vulnerability if some of their export markets suddenly go into, you know, deep recession and stop, stop buying or buy less. Also, you know, and again, this goes back to, so far at least the Chinese haven't really been pushing or sort of talking up what they may or may not have done with Iran is it goes back to, you know, they could also theoretically then say, well, here we are, we're the peacemaker, right? You know, we're the, we're the responsible great power. The sort of positioning they have, you know, the, and so from the, from
B
the, and Trump's true social posts certainly play into that particular.
C
Well, especially the one yesterday morning. Just, I mean, that was, that was just, I don't know if he wrote it or one of his, you know, I mean, it was just deranged. There's no other way to put it. Grotesque and certainly hurt America's position currently and I think going forward in a lot of areas, and rightfully so, I mean, but anyway, this is, we'll talk about China. So then Going back to, I think, how they, how this is viewed in the Gulf, you know, I think Bahrain's probably not happy, but at the same time, I don't think they're surprised. I will say, you know, I'm going to quote again, Jonathan Fulton. We quoted him last week. He has, you know, this great China Middle east newsletter and he posted overnight specifically in his post, and we'll put it in the show notes. How will this be interpreted in Gulf Arab countries? He said, Hard to say. I'm sure the Trump administration will use it as a talking point with the GCC countries, but I doubt it will resonate when the most recent story broke about the alleged shipment of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran. That's a precursor for making ballistic missile fuels.
B
Ballistic missiles.
C
I asked a China expert from a GC country, GCC country, if Iranian missiles were launched at your country using Chinese fuel, would it change local attitude, attitudes towards China? The response was no, it would confirm them. This person's take reflected the belief that China is a purely transactional actor in this region. And if you think China is on Iran side or the Arab side, you're delusional. China is on China's side. Yeah, so. So anyway, I think that accurate, I think. Right. And so. And so again, if China was able to play a constructive role in getting their endings to at least agree to the ceasefire, great, and then we'll see how we built from that. But ultimately, was China, did they play a pivotal role? Pivotal role? Hard to say. Skeptical. And certainly we don't have enough information to know.
B
Yeah, well, I mean, speaking of skepticism, I will just say, generally speaking, the reactions to the ceasefire news Tuesday night were quite something like just lots of strident declarations that the war was an utter failure. It was completely disastrous. The US was going to make all these different concessions in furtherance of the cease fire. Iran now has tolling authority until the end of time at the Strait of Hormuz. And just generally speaking, leaving room for the possibility that all of those things are eventually true. We have no idea how the next couple of days will play out, let alone the next couple of weeks or next few years. So I was just struck by the certitude with which everyone was discussing the war in the wake of the ceasefire News and the PRC's involvement would make sense if you assume that China is being hit particularly hard by the closure of the Strait and they finally told Iran to fall in line. And in that scenario, it would be a resounding rebuke to the Various experts who have said actually China's winning the war in Iran. My guess is that some of what was happening and China wanted an off ramp more than anyone involved here. And if, if you listen to what Wang Yi has said publicly over the last month or so, like the Chinese have been pretty sincere in trying to diffuse tensions and make this go away. But this is also, as you said, another case where we really don't have much information. And I was looking for confirmation from the PRC side all day on Wednesday at least we're recording this Wednesday afternoon or Wednesday at 11:15 in the morning. Didn't see anything from the PRC side confirming any of what was in the New York Times. So who can say how much of a role China played and, or why they did it. But there does appear to be a ceasefire for the next 14 days.
C
Well, we'll see. I mean, you know, again, there have been reports of various, you know, drone attacks and so let's hope it, let's hope it holds. I think again, we've talked about some previous podcasts, we talked about it a little earlier is just that, you know, on net there's a lot of downside risk for China from this war really expanding in the Gulf. And you know what's interesting back to sort of the, you know, the bigger, you know, this is part of the grand strategic plan to go after China thing. It's interesting over the weekend, or I guess it was actually Tuesday, there was this massive New York Times piece from Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, who are two of the best sourced reporters at the New York Times covering the Trump specifically sort of went through how the decision was made to launch this war in Iran and there is not one mention of China in the article. There is also the detail that Scott Bessett, Treasury Secretary, who is really the point person on China for most things, was excluded from the discussion. Pretty clear from this article that China was not the consideration in spite of what you have Some people in D.C. think Tank World trying to spin up and some of the post facto, I think justifications, I think it's pretty clear that China really wasn't a big consideration when they decided to launch this war.
B
Interesting. And is that just drawing on that reporting and like, because some of the public statements don't mention China. But by the same token, if China played any role in the calculus, it would be crazy to publicly announce that to the world.
C
But if you look at.
B
That's why I don't find that line of argument all that.
C
I mean, I know I knew you Wouldn't we can have our regular weekly debate about this. I'm just gonna, I'm just gonna make that point that I, I still, again, what's public, whatever, again, I just think that that whole this is all part of this grand chess game against China thing is completely overblown. Now there are benefits if, you know, again, if this, if this, if Iran and really, if there really is a regime change and Iran, you know, it becomes less of a theocracy and more of a country that the US could work with. And if, as Trump tweeted earlier this morning, there'll be, you know, business, everyone can do business, make lots of money,
B
we're both going to take tolls.
C
I mean, again, there are scenarios where it works out that it's, it does hurt China in the region. But again, I think back to what I, the piece I quoted before. I mean, China has played this in a way that they'll deal with whoever's there. Yeah, right. Yeah.
B
I don't know, I don't, I don't think there's any scenario where this is some sort of critical blow to China. I do think it hurts China's years long effort to cultivate Iran as sort of a proxy in the region.
C
Well, I mean, I think what, I think the bigger damage to China potentially is what, you know, if it does shift attitudes, you know, in, in the other Gulf states. Right. And if it does, for example, this outcome leads to some of the Gulf states require relying more on the US for security and for weapons. And if, right.
B
And if you go back to like the Biden administration, China was making real inroads with Saudi Arabia for a few years there and the uae. And so to the extent any of that progress is stunted and, or reversed.
A
Right.
C
I mean, one thing, if you saw the Trump administration say, okay, you know, to Saudi Arabia, to uae, to some of these other countries, okay, we will deepen even more security partnerships. However, we want some conditions which would be we want more investment in the US we want you to maybe not be investing in PRC tech firms not being cornerstone investors in some of the big IPOs coming out of Hong Kong buying US Treasuries. If you start seeing some of that, then that would be an interesting outcome from this conflict. But so far, at least we're not hearing any of that.
A
All right, and that is the end of the free preview. If you'd like to hear the rest of today's conversation and get access to full episodes of Sharp China each week, you can go to your show Notes and subscribe to either Bill's newsletter, Cynicism, or the Stratecheri Bundle, which includes several other podcasts from me and daily writing from my friend Ben Thompson. I'm an incredibly biased news consumer, so I think both are indispensable resources. But either way, Bill and I are going to be here every week talking all things China, and we would love to have you on board. So check out your show notes, subscribe and we will talk to you soon.
In this episode, Andrew Sharp and Bill Bishop tackle breaking news regarding a surprise ceasefire in the US-Israel-Iran conflict and growing reports of China’s behind-the-scenes pressure on Iran. The hosts analyze the credibility of claims about China’s diplomatic efforts, discuss the implications for China's relationships in the Middle East, and consider how these developments affect China’s strategic position globally, especially within the context of the Gulf states.
[00:21 – 02:07]
Bill Bishop: "The Chinese side has not really taken credit for this specifically... They did veto a UN resolution on Tuesday... But they still saw it as too broad." (02:07)
Bill: "I wish we had more information... so far at least the Chinese haven't really been pushing or sort of talking up what they may or may not have done with Iran." (02:07–04:54)
[02:42 – 04:54]
Bill: "China is generally quite transactional... they don't want this kind of disruption. They have vulnerabilities if their export markets suddenly go into deep recession..." (03:21)
[04:54 – 06:46]
Expert Quote via Bill (Jonathan Fulton):
"If Iranian missiles were launched at your country using Chinese fuel, would it change local attitudes towards China? The response was no, it would confirm them." (06:01)
[06:46 – 08:41]
Andrew Sharp: "I was just struck by the certitude with which everyone was discussing the war in the wake of the ceasefire news... we have no idea how the next couple of days will play out, let alone the next couple of weeks or next few years." (06:46)
[08:41 – 10:56]
Bill: “It’s pretty clear that China really wasn’t a big consideration when they decided to launch this war.” (09:48)
[10:56 – 12:16]
Bill: "If you saw the Trump administration say... we want you to maybe not be investing in PRC tech firms... If you start seeing some of that, then that would be an interesting outcome from this conflict. But so far, at least we're not hearing any of that." (11:41)
On China’s Transactionalism:
"If you think China is on Iran side or the Arab side, you're delusional. China is on China's side." — Jonathan Fulton (via Bill, 06:01)
On Media and Analyst Overreach:
"I was just struck by the certitude with which everyone was discussing the war in the wake of the ceasefire news..." — Andrew Sharp (06:46)
On China’s Economic Motivation:
"They don't want this kind of disruption... they have vulnerability if some of their export markets suddenly go into deep recession and stop buying or buy less." — Bill Bishop (03:21)
The conversation is skeptical, analytical, and somewhat informal, with Bill providing deep-dive context and Andrew prompting with clarifying questions and healthy skepticism. Both hosts avoid sweeping statements, focusing on nuance and the ambiguity of a fast-moving international crisis.
This episode offers a level-headed, context-rich look at China’s involvement in the US-Israel-Iran ceasefire. While international media attribute growing influence to Beijing's diplomacy, Bill and Andrew caution that the evidence is thin and the effects—both economic and geopolitical—remain uncertain. At the heart of the discussion is a recognition of China’s pragmatic approach and the complexity of great power dynamics in a region on the brink.