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Foreign.
B
Welcome to Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and you are listening to a free preview of today's episode.
A
Hello and welcome back to another episode of Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and on the other line, Bill Bishop. Bill, how you doing?
C
I'm doing well. Hello, everybody.
A
Yes, it's good to be back. Great to see you as always. One programming note at the top of the show here. We're probably going to be off next week unless something especially crazy happens, in which case we'll pivot, but probably off for vacation with the Thanksgiving holiday and we'll return to the regular schedule for the first week of December. Again, unless something crazy happens. Bill, do you think something crazy will happen next week?
C
I mean, depends where is something crazy will happen somewhere?
D
That's true.
C
But yeah, next week, as most people know, it's Thanksgiving and so we're family in town having a turkey. We're also having a Peking duck. This year we have some friends Peking duck.
A
So, yes, that's very exciting.
D
Okay.
A
Well, I'm sure Tashi will eat well next week. I'm happy for him and the family he loves.
C
Foul of any kind.
A
Indeed. Not the most discerning eater, Tashi, but a happy eater regardless. We'll begin this show with a story that we discussed last week. We the new Japanese Prime Minister, Sanai Takeishi drew the ire of PRC diplomats when she said that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would count as a situation threatening Japan's survival and could trigger a military response from Tokyo. Those comments initially sparked the PRC Consul General in Osaka to warn the prime minister that, quote, a dirty neck, end quote, sticking its head into China's internal affairs must be cut off, which is what we discussed on week's show. And since that initial back and forth, the vice foreign Minister, Sun We Dong summoned the Japanese ambassador to China in the middle of the night to, quote, lodge a stern representation over the erroneous remarks and actions of the new Japanese prime minister. A CCTV account asked whether Taka Ishii was kicked in the head by a donkey. Hu Xi Jin, the former editor of the Global Times, called Taka Ishii an evil witch, while a retired China Daily writer called her the American running dog. I won't read every offensive comment I've come across over the past week, but people get the gist. That has been the tone. And then for more official messaging, the PRC Ministry of Foreign affairs released a statement. No one shall have the illusion that China will swallow the bitter fruit that undermines its sovereignty. So Security and Development interests. Whoever dares to challenge China's bottom line will face a resolute head on blow and be shattered against the Great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people. And then the PLA Daily ran a story that read in part if the Japanese government willfully goes its own way and once again makes itself an enemy of the Chinese people, it will only heighten China's vigilance toward Japan's external strategy to and constructive, stable China. Japan relations will become impossible to talk about. Second, there is a risk that the entire country could become a battlefield and it goes on from there. All fairly ominous. And various propaganda organs have been mooting sanctions and trade retaliation. The PRC has warned its citizens against visiting Japan in the near future. The Ministry of Education has issued a warning regarding studying abroad in Japan, noting that Japan's Social Security is unstable. Just generally speaking, there's a lot there. When you think back on your time covering China, are there any parallels that come to mind for this sort of reaction? I'm trying to get a sense for how extraordinary these tensions actually are over the last six or seven days.
C
So in 2012 I think it was the Tokyo municipal government purchased the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese. Both countries claim sovereignty over the islands. It was actually owned by a private citizen. They were owned by a private citizen. So there was a transfer of ownership that caused a huge ruckus on the Chinese side that led to days of actual encouraged organized protests in front of like the Japanese embassy in Beijing. In other cities, mostly peaceful, although there were some violence. Some guy got his head bashed in and Xi' an, because he was sometimes guy because he was driving a Japanese car.
B
Wow.
C
Yeah, I just remember we were, our kids were at, in kindergarten up near. For folks who've been in Beijing, up by the park, by the, by the Lido complex and across the street from their kindergarten was the Japanese school. And after this protest started, we took kids to school and there was graffiti on the walls of school and it looked like one of the windows had a little hole from a BB gun. And then immediately the whole street was effectively blocked off by police. And you can only go in if you for example, had to drop your kids off at kindergarten. And then that lasted for. I forget the number of days. I just remember one Sunday as things were sort of heating up and you had these waves of protests, protesters coming to express their anger at Japan Sunday afternoon, if I'm remembering correctly, because this was 13 years ago, we are not getting any Younger. Suddenly the propaganda messaging switched to, like, rationally protesting. And then by Monday morning, the switch was turned off and there were no more protests. And anyone who still thought it was okay to protest, anyone who else who still thought it was okay to protest got rounded up, sort of got taken off the streets. And then. And that was, I think, the last huge outpouring of state allowed. Anger towards Japan has come in waves. This case so far has all been. It's been official. It's been, you know, multiple, you know, from the Ministry of Foreign affairs, you've had these warnings from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, about travel and studying in Japan, you've had Japanese films that were scheduled to be released have been. Their release date has been postponed. Threats, threats of other kinds of countermeasures. Lots of angry. You read some of them. Lots of angry pieces in various propaganda.
A
Outlets and some of the propaganda, CCTV reporting too.
C
Yeah, working on. Working on X, certainly on Weibo. It's been, you know, I think a lot of the top trending topics are related to anger over what Japan has done or, you know, allegedly done. So far, there has not been any allowance of people to take to the streets. That would be quite something if that were to happen. It was part of the old playbook, but I think now it's a little bit risky because, you know, when you let people go on the streets, for one thing, if they're angry about other stuff, things also can pop out. Right? And so, but this is, you know, people are primed to hate Japan. People are primed to be able to sort of turn on the we hate Japan approach. In this case, you know, the Japanese are saying that the prime Minister. What she said does not mean a change in policy. She didn't say anything new. The venue where she said it was different. And I think there are some folks in Japan who were kind of surprised that she said it in the Diet.
D
Can you explain that piece of it? Why does the venue render this more.
C
Because it was in the Diet. It was just. It was just. It just was something that was kind of pushing it further than had been said before. I guess it's. What is the Diet that the legislature.
A
Okay.
C
It's somewhat analogous to, I think, you know, the US Strategic ambiguity where, you know, the Joe Biden multiple times said the US Would intervene, even though that's the. Say that. And that his aides all had to, you know, do clean up on aisle six. There's a cleanup on aisle six, seven, eight and nine, I think maybe 10, too, because he kept saying it. I think, you know, the Japanese assumption is the US would envine in a Taiwan contingency or. Sorry, the PLA's assumption is that I think that the Chinese, given the US Japan treaty relationship, I think they also, they're not naive. I think they would assume that somehow Japan would be involved in a Taiwan contingency as well if the US Is involved. The Japanese view of this is what she said. The context of it is that they would get involved if the US Were involved and came under attack, not that Japan would individually get involved.
B
Interesting.
C
The Chinese side, of course, is saying no, no, she may be changing it. Right. That's what they're saying is, you know, she may be. This may be a shift in their policy so that they get involved. Well, regardless which the Japanese side is saying no and they sent a diplomat to Beijing to try and explain that this is not a change in policy. The Chinese side has taken a very maximalist approach where they are demanding that the Prime Minister retract her statement, clarify their intentions. But also the context here too is Japan is, you know, they're talking about increasing their defense budget. They're talking about potentially shifting their stance on nuclear weapons, at least having. Letting the US station nuclear weapons in Japan. Not a done deal, but it's, it's a, it's been under discussion. You know, the US just, just announced that South Korea was going to get a nuclear submarine. I think the fair to think the Japanese will want that as well. And so I think the Chinese are trying to stake out this maximalist approach to one, nip it in the bud, two, signal to any other country in the region that if you even dare to think you'll get involved, you're going to be massively punished. The problem though is that, and I think they also, they have been concerned about the new Prime Minister because she was an acolyte of the late Prime Minister Abe. She has expressed sentiments around Taiwan and some of Japan's militarist history that the Chinese, you know, for justifiable reasons, find disconcerting.
B
Yeah.
C
So one of the propaganda threads or themes going from the Chinese side is all about how, you know, these comments are a sign of Japan's, you know, Japan's militarist past is resurging. Right. And this is all about, you know, everyone in Asia should be worried because, you know, we know what they did 80 years ago or 85 years ago or almost 90 years ago, and they'll do it again.
D
And there it is sort of writes itself.
C
This is the Sign they're going to do it again.
A
Where.
C
And you know, and certainly in China, that is a. Again, it's like, it's just. It's really easy to turn on Japan's bad. We hate, you know, we hate Japan. They did horrible things to China, which they did, you know, 80, 90 years ago. Never forget. A lot of other countries in the region, I think, are less likely to sort of immediately jump on the bandwagon of, you know, Japan bad militarist. You know, it just, it's just sort of. They have. A lot of these countries have moved on to a large degree. China has really not because of the way the Communist Party has done a lot of work around propaganda to make sure that generation after generation of Chinese kids grow up thinking Japan's bad.
A
Right.
D
And remembering what happened.
A
Well, on Japan's side. Do you think this was a mistake from Taka Ishi?
D
Do you think that ultimately this is.
A
A faux pas on Japan?
C
Great question. Wish I knew. I heard different things so far. At least the polling doesn't look like it's hurt her. In fact, the way the Chinese have reacted I think has actually helped those people in government and the legislature and politics.
A
That's certainly one way to read it is if you want to spend more on defense.
C
Right.
A
Who were saying deals with the U.S.
D
I mean, this is exhibit A. Why that behavior is necessary.
C
Very, very clarifying. And so it's a mess. I think one of the, you know, again, how does this get walked back? Because, you know, it seems from a domestic political perspective, very difficult for the new Japanese prime Minister to effectively bow down and say, yo, sorry, China, we were. I was wrong.
B
Yeah.
A
Let me officially retract.
C
Even. Even if she thinks that, which I'm not even saying she believes that, but I just. The way the Chinese are pressing it. So. So it's a. The Chinese aren't, at this point, at least publicly, are not giving the Japanese any off ramp.
A
Well. And what Takaishi said was legally reasonable.
D
And realistic in terms of what Taiwan.
A
Contingency would look like.
C
It is not. It is. Again, it's not a change from what has been said before.
D
The difference was naming Taiwan and Yeah. Doing it in the Diet.
A
Yeah.
C
But going back to how does this get resolved? So so far, what the Chinese have announced, you know, the advising folks not to travel to Japan, advising people who may be, you know, thinking about studying Japan, that they might want to rethink it, you know, it'll have some impact on Japanese economy, not particularly huge. And frankly, I think there are certainly some parts of Japanese society that think there have been too many Chinese tourists. I was going to say not unhappy. You know, I think what the Japanese side is particularly worried about are things like cutting off rare earths.
B
Right.
A
And which they did in 2012.
C
That was the first time. 2010. Yeah, 2010 was the first time that was over fishing boat and Japan had reduced its reliance on rare earths from China to around 60 something percent over the years. Although the last few years it's gone up a little bit. It's still in the 60% range, 60 to 70% range, still too high. You know, if the Chinese play that card with Japan, you know, it makes Trump look stupid. Right. Because the White House came out saying, you know, they got this effectively, you know, the global deal for rare earth, even though they didn't because Europe is still having problems getting rare earths. And so I think, you know, the Chinese, that is their best card to play. So far. They haven't. There was a meeting again today. There was this meeting between the Japanese Senate, a Foreign Ministry official to Beijing to meet with, with his counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign affairs. And, you know, so far there have been no announcements of any particular solution. It is interesting that the videos that came out of the Chinese official escorting the Japanese diplomat, the Chinese diplomat escorting the Japanese diplomat out of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. The Chinese diplomat is in what is known as sort of the May 4 youth attire clothing. And that was of course picked up and sort of highlighted by propaganda organs because it's a symbol of, you know, May 4th Movement was in the, you know, the 1919, and it was in large part about protesting imperialism, Japanese imperialism. In part, not entirely, but in part. And so, you know, this was, this was sort of the quote unquote, uniform of educated patriotic youth who were standing up for China. So, you know, he doesn't, he didn't pick that clothing because that was not an accident. What was in the dry cleaning bag in his closet.
A
Right, right.
C
So, you know, again, how does this get resolved? If it sticks to invective criticisms, demands that China, Japan completely walk it back and Japan can kind of threadle or keep saying, nothing's changed, nothing's changed. And the Chinese stop at cutting off some movies and cutting off some tourism. You know, it'll, it'll just sort of play out over a few months. I mean, if you remember the Chinese, you know, the crazy response to the Fukushima water release, and, you know, the Japanese just sort of said, everyone else has blessed, this is okay. We're going to be testing it.
A
Right.
D
You know, the entire world has said.
C
The Chinese drew fit. They boycotted. They banned the import of Japanese seafood, you know, for. For a bit of time.
D
That was nuclear wastewater from a nuclear power plant that had been shut down, and China claimed it was toxic and polluting the entire region, all as the rest of the world said it was safe.
C
The Chinese, again, were trying to sort of use this as a pretext to put pressure on Japan. The Japanese effect effectively, you know, didn't rise to the bait. And, you know, then they, over the last few months, have started allowing Japanese seafood from the allegedly affected regions back into China.
A
Right.
D
About last week, six months ago, I think there was an announcement. Okay, it's all safe then.
C
You know, the day. I think the day before Takahashi's comments on this prime minister. Take his comments. You know, they announced that the Chinese were now buying, again, Japanese scallops. So maybe the scallops will suffer again.
A
It could be. Well, I mean, there's all sorts of.
D
Leverage points that China has on trade and economic warfare is a playbook that has been employed all over the world. So if the tensions continue to escalate, it's definitely possible that they go that direction. I will say stepping back. What's crazy about watching this all play out is the PRC is basically trying.
A
To bend reality and bend the reality.
D
Of what was said and taking what was initially an egregious diplomatic error and overreaction from the Chinese Consul general, and now turning it into a situation that the Japanese side should have to apologize for. And it's like every day the rhetoric gets crazier.
C
There's a. There's a. There's a whole playbook about how to turn being the. It reminds me of aggressor into the victim. Exactly. It's a. It's a remarkable skill.
A
We watched this exact playbook play out when the balloon flew over the US and then suddenly, the Biden administration is.
C
Sending emissaries for emissaries, scrambling to get the permission. I mean, it's. It's remarkable how people repeatedly fall for it.
A
All right, and that is the end.
B
Of the free preview. If you'd like to hear the rest of today's conversation and get access to full episodes of Sharp China. Each week, you can go to your Show Notes and subscribe to either Bill's newsletter, Cynicism, or the Stratechri Bundle, which includes several other podcasts from me and daily writing from my friend Ben Thompson. I'm an incredibly biased news consumer, so I think both are indispensable resources. But either way, Bill and I are going to be here every week talking all things China, and we would love to have you on board. So check out your show notes, subscribe, and we will talk to you soon.
Episode Title: (Preview) A Maximalist Response to Japan’s PM; More Bad Real Estate News; Leaked Warnings on Alibaba; Hasan Piker Touring China
Release Date: November 19, 2025
Hosts: Andrew Sharp and Bill Bishop
This episode deeply examines the explosive diplomatic fallout following controversial comments from Japan’s new Prime Minister, Sanai Takaishi, about a potential military response should China invade Taiwan. Bill Bishop and Andrew Sharp dissect the breadth and intensity of China’s reaction—ranging from official statements to wild propaganda—putting the current standoff in the context of previous Japan-China flare-ups. The conversation explores the broader playbook of Chinese diplomatic escalation, propaganda, and economic tactics, as well as how the situation might resolve or further escalate.
On the Propaganda Switch:
“Suddenly the propaganda messaging switched to, like, rationally protesting. And then by Monday morning, the switch was turned off and anyone who else who still thought it was okay to protest got rounded up...” (05:38, Bishop)
Official Rhetoric Escalation:
"Whoever dares to challenge China's bottom line will face a resolute head on blow and be shattered against the Great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people." (06:07, Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Bishop)
The “Japan Bad” Narrative:
“China has really not [moved on] because of the way the Communist Party has done a lot of work around propaganda to make sure that generation after generation of Chinese kids grow up thinking Japan's bad." (10:56, Bishop)
Domestic Impact in Japan:
“The way the Chinese have reacted I think has actually helped those people in government and the legislature and politics…” (11:13, Bishop)
On China’s Aggressor-to-Victim Playbook:
“There's a whole playbook about how to turn being the aggressor into the victim. It's a remarkable skill.” (16:56, Bishop)
The conversation is frank, pragmatic, and deeply informed. Bill Bishop delivers detailed historical context and connects dots between current and past events, while Andrew Sharp prompts with clarifying and pointed questions. The tone blends dry humor (“cleanup on aisle six-seven-eight and maybe ten too,” Bishop at 07:49) with sharp analysis and clear institutional knowledge.
This episode is an incisive guide to the Japan-China diplomatic crisis, breaking down not just the surface-level rhetoric but the political, historical, and psychological machinery behind it. Listeners gain nuanced insight into how China’s leadership orchestrates these standoffs, why Japan is unlikely to back down, and how such crises often unfold according to well-worn scripts in both capitals. The episode is vital for anyone seeking to understand the ever-tense triangle of China, Japan, and the US vis-à-vis Taiwan.