Seizing The Commanding Heights; Decoding Shangri-La Dialogue; Europe Moots Trade Policy; The PRC Expels a New York Times Journalist

Summary

Sharp China with Bill Bishop – June 4, 2026: "Seizing The Commanding Heights; Decoding Shangri-La Dialogue; Europe Moots Trade Policy; The PRC Expels a New York Times Journalist"

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Episode Theme Overview

This episode dives into China’s push to dominate future strategic technologies ("seizing the commanding heights"), Beijing’s tightening control over outbound investment, dynamics at the Shangri-La Dialogue—a key regional security summit—and escalations in EU-China trade tensions. The hosts also discuss the expulsion of New York Times reporter Vivian Wang, the shrinking space for foreign journalism in China, and end with lighter NBA-related banter.

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1. China’s "Commanding Heights": Strategic Focus on Future Industries

• [00:16 – 08:27]

Key Points:

• China’s Politburo study session (June 30, 2026) centered on "future industries." Xi Jinping's speech and the Chuhan magazine highlight six industries: quantum science, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence (robots), and 6G mobile communications.
  • AI notably omitted, likely as it's already in full development.

Insights:

• “Seizing the commanding heights” is a loaded, Marxist-rooted phrase, signaling not benign ambition but intent to outpace the world in key technologies. (01:47)
• China channels vast state resources into these sectors, with a seriousness that outsiders underestimate at their peril:
  • “You underestimate the seriousness of PRC officials at your own risk.” – Bill [08:11]
• The system sometimes results in inefficiency, as local governments everywhere try to overfund "hot" projects.

Memorable Quotes:

• Bill: “Seizing the commanding heights is not a benign term. It’s very much a Marxist term… we’re going to dominate, we’re going to be the leader.” [01:48]
• Andrew: “I have no doubt that the PRC is pursuing brain computer interfaces, biomanufacturing, quantum science with full force. And I can't imagine what that will look like 10 or 15, 20 years from now.” [08:26]

Timestamps for Notable Segments:

• [01:19] – Key future industries outlined
• [02:41] – Discussion on the global importance of technological leadership
• [04:35] – Comparison to US innovation in quantum/fusion/SpaceX

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2. China’s Tightening Controls: Outbound Investment Regulation

• [08:27 – 18:41]

Key Points:

• Chinese State Council approved sweeping new outbound investment regulations to better manage capital flows, prevent technology leakage, and reinforce supply chain ties to China.
  • The regulations institutionalize disparate prior rules, creating an “approval apparatus” and outlined security reviews for overseas investment.
  • Controversially, the document explicitly mentions regulating individual outbound investment, sparking uncertainty about future rules for wealthy Chinese moving capital abroad.

Insights:

• “The broader point… is the seriousness of the PRC officials—you underestimate at your own risk.” – Bill [08:11]
• Andrew describes incremental rule tightening as a “frog in the pot” situation—each new measure is small, but cumulatively they radically change the landscape for investors and companies. [16:39]
• Bill: “This cycle is broken… this is much more of an institutionalized process for greater control everywhere—even as they talk about opening.” [18:07]

Downsides/Criticisms:

• Policy shifts risk alienating the professional and upper-middle-class who seek overseas investment opportunities, but aren't likely to trigger major protest.
• For the outside world: “If you play by the PRC rules, you’ll be treated pretty well up to a point. But if you… need to reduce reliance or shift supply chains, it’s only going to get more painful and harder.” – Bill [19:00]

Notable Quotes:

• Andrew: “You look up and… 10 years later, the state control and the prohibitions seem to have dramatically expanded over the course of the decade.” [17:34]
• Bill: “This is about tightening in multiple domains. What they had in place no longer meets the current needs given geopolitical risks and intensifying international competition.” [10:59]

Timestamps:

• [10:25] – Why observers find this regulatory expansion notable
• [13:16] – Three regulatory "tracks": foreign firms/markets, domestic companies, and individuals

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3. Shangri-La Dialogue: Subtle Signals & Taiwan Rhetoric

• [20:16 – 35:04]

Key Points:

• The annual Shangri-La security forum in Singapore displayed a subtle shift: US Defense Secretary Hegseth’s speech did not mention Taiwan explicitly, a first in over a decade, even though deterrence-by-denial policy was still clear.
  • PRC officials didn't view the comments as “soft,” noting consistency with the US National Defense Strategy, but were attentive to reductions in rhetorical temperature.
  • US regional policy now emphasizes multilateral military preparedness in the Indo-Pacific, urging regional allies to boost defense spending.

Insights:

• Bill: “If you’re reading that… our approach in the Pacific centers on deterrence by denial on the first island chain. Taiwan is a key link… so Taiwan is still there.” [22:27]
• China sent lower-level representation (not the Defense Minister), as participation yields mostly criticism; the PLA prefers to use its own Xiangshan Forum for narratives.
• The hosts highlight the symbolic, rhetorical dimension of arms packages to Taiwan and the signaling wars between US and PRC.

Memorable Quotes:

• Bill: “From a substantive policy perspective… I don’t think they [PRC] see much of a shift yet from the US.” [32:07]
• Andrew: “My read is that the White House is invested in stability before the Xi visit in September and the midterms in November.” [29:53]

Timestamps:

• [22:11] – Hegseth omits Taiwan for the first time in years
• [27:10] – Taiwan arms package dynamics and PRC goals

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4. EU–China Trade Tensions: Fault Lines, Retaliatory Threats, and European Inertia

• [35:18 – 45:39]

Key Points:

• The European Commission is considering major policy shifts to address China’s “overcapacity” and defend against another “China shock,” including new “safeguard” measures and compelling firms to diversify supply chains.
  • Beijing has threatened anti-discrimination and supply chain security investigations, listing French cosmetics, EU meat, alcohol, and luxury goods as potential retaliation targets.
  • Elite opinion in Europe (notably German business) is hardening against China, but political leaders remain hesitant and risk 'self-dwarfing' their influence, as one German newspaper put it.

Insights:

• Bill: “We are closer to a real EU-China trade war than ever before… but the Chinese are skeptical of the EU’s collective will to actually bear the costs.” [38:18]
• EU’s response to China’s support for Russia in Ukraine has also been weak, reinforcing doubts in Beijing.
• China uses asymmetric, targeted reprisals to maximize pain for foreign industries, often in sectors with political influence.

Memorable Quotes:

• Bill: “Anyone who capitulates and downplays their own bargaining power has already lost. If you have a 'How to negotiate with China' handbook, that should be on the cover.” [40:15]
• Bill: “A real trade war would hurt the Chinese economy. There are costs if this spirals up.” [45:39]

Timestamps:

• [38:18] – Beijing’s explicit threats, “here’s the menu”
• [40:10] – German ‘self-dwarfing’ and intra-EU division

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5. Media Crackdown: The Expulsion of New York Times Reporter Vivian Wang

• [45:39 – 64:22]

Key Points:

• Vivian Wang, NYT China correspondent since 2020, had her visa revoked after Taiwan’s president appeared at a NYT-hosted event—a clear message from Beijing.
  • PRC authorities increasingly target ethnic Chinese (esp. female) reporters with state-backed harassment.
  • The move is part of a broader strategy to control how Taiwan is discussed globally. Coverage that frames Taiwan as separate is met with punitive measures.

Insights:

• “This is part of a campaign—an intensifying campaign—to control how Taiwan is discussed globally.” – Bill [49:39]
• Beijing prioritizes discourse control, actively managing overseas Chinese-language media via economic and political pressure, and supplementing with English-language “influencers” and social media campaigns.
• Reciprocal visa restrictions hinder American journalists, while PRC state media continue to staff large US bureaus.
  • Bill argues for one-to-one parity by visa status and worries about the loss of foreign perspectives.

Memorable Quotes:

• Bill: “Why do you want these pesky foreign journalists around when you’ve got a whole bunch of people happy to talk about… the subway train that goes through a building—it's amazing.” [54:40]
• Bill: “More, I do think more is better. It is useful for [US] authorities to see who [PRC journalists] are trying to talk to… but I preferably would much rather see lots more foreign journalists in China.” [57:11]

Timestamps:

• [47:36] – The context and method of Wang’s expulsion
• [51:31] – PRC actions to control Taiwan discourse
• [53:10] – Discourse control and the shrinking foreign presence

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6. Memory and Control: Tiananmen, Generational Amnesia, and Information Suppression

• [60:14 – 64:04]

Key Points:

• Approaching the June 4 anniversary, Bill reflects on the near-total erasure of 1989’s Tiananmen crackdown from Chinese memory, a success for party control.
  • “Most people honestly… either think the party was right, or just don't get upset about it. The memory hole gets deeper, the risks of mass anger are basically asymptotic to zero.” – Bill [60:46]
• Outside China, memory and commemoration hit obstacles: A California Tiananmen museum was vandalized (likely not randomly), highlighting transnational repression concerns.

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7. NBA Banter & Branding Moves

• [66:13 – End]

Key Points:

• Steph Curry's 10-year, $400 million deal with Chinese brand Li-Ning is more about solidifying market share in China than US expansion.
• Lighter speculation on Victor Wembanyama’s global appeal (NBA Finals, ties to China) and potential sports branding strategies for Chinese companies.

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Notable Quotes (with Timestamps)

• “Seizing the commanding heights is not a benign term... they want to be the global leader in the next generations of key technologies.” — Bill [01:48]
• “You underestimate the seriousness of the PRC officials at your own risk.” — Bill [08:11]
• “It’s a frog in the pot situation… the state control and the prohibitions seem to have dramatically expanded.” — Andrew [16:39]
• “This is much more of an institutionalized process for greater control everywhere.” — Bill [18:07]
• “If you play by the PRC rules… you’ll be treated pretty well up to a point. But if you… shift supply chains, it’s only going to get more painful and harder.” — Bill [19:00]
• “Anyone who capitulates and downplays their own bargaining power has already lost.” — Bill (quoting German business sentiment) [40:15]
• “Why do you want these pesky foreign journalists around when you’ve got a whole bunch of people… happy to talk about the subway train… amazing.” — Bill [54:40]
• “They’ve done an incredibly good job of memory-holing the whole thing (Tiananmen).” — Bill [60:45]
• “It is working for them… The argument that this is hurting China falls on deaf ears.” — Bill [55:04]

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Guide to Key Timestamps

| Segment | Start | End | |-------------------------------------------------|----------|---------| | Seizing Commanding Heights / Future Industries | 00:16 | 08:27 | | Outbound Investment/State Control Regulations | 08:27 | 18:41 | | Shangri-La Dialogue / US-PRC-Taiwan Dynamics | 20:16 | 35:04 | | EU Trade, Fault Lines, and China's Approach | 35:18 | 45:39 | | Vivian Wang Expelled: Media, Discourse Control | 45:39 | 64:22 | | Tiananmen Memories & Info Control | 60:14 | 64:04 | | NBA/Li Ning/Cultural Notes | 66:13 | End |

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Summary Takeaways

• China’s future tech push isn't just about development, but about dominating vital sectors. The US and allies must take this seriousness to heart.
• Regulatory tightening is now permanent, multi-layered, and increasingly affects individuals—not just firms and sectors.
• Military diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly calibrated, with both sides focusing on symbolic gestures and alliances. Subtlety over Taiwan masks deeper policy continuity.
• EU trade friction is rising, but skepticism remains about Europe’s resolve to challenge Beijing meaningfully.
• Media suppression and discourse control in China is both sophisticated and central to Beijing’s global strategy, with implications for both reporting and policy.
• Tiananmen’s erasure within China is a case study in autocratic information control and generational amnesia.

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This episode delivers a nuanced, wide-ranging look at how China’s internal priorities, regulatory state, and information control shape its global impact—and how the world struggles to respond collectively.

Transcript

[A]

Foreign. Welcome back to another episode of Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp. And on the other line, Bill Bishop. Bill, how you doing?

[B]

Hello, everyone. I'm doing great. Hope everyone's doing well.

[A]

It's a beautiful day in Washington, D.C. it's June. All of a sudden, summer is here. Doesn't really feel like summer just yet, but we've got a lot to cover today and we can begin Bill with an eye toward the future. I'll read from Monday's edition of cynicism. The June 1 issue of Chusha has as its main theme the development of future industries. And the lead article from Xi is part of his speech at the June 30, 2026 Politburo study session on this topic. The six future industries chosen as the main directions of attack. The that's in quotation marks are quantum science and technology, biomanufacturing, Hydrogen energy and nuclear fusion energy, brain computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, and 6th generation mobile communications. So I found it pretty surprising that she did not list artificial intelligence among the six technologies.

[B]

But I think that's sort of already well underway in some ways, I think.

[A]

Okay, so this is an eye toward what's the future.

[B]

And this is, you know, this is a, this, this is consistent with what they talked about in the 15, five year plan. You know, he explains why these are important and his quote, and it's a, it's a loaded term which we could talk about. Cultivating and developing future industries carries major significance for us in seizing the commanding heights of science, technology and industry. Seizing the commanding heights is not a benign term.

[A]

Okay, what does that mean?

[B]

It's a very much sort of a Marxist term. It's very much, you know, know we're going to dominate, we're going to be the leader. And so they are staking out, as they've said repeatedly, that they don't want to just develop these, they want to be the, the global leader in the next generations, the next generations of key technologies.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And you know, they're putting massive amount of organizational, financial, technical talent, resources behind this. And so, you know, we should take it seriously. I, I translated several of the articles that are in this issue of Choshi. And also there was a People's Daily, then there was a follow up as well, People's Daily article by the Minister of Industry and Information Technology, MIT Minister Li Le Chung. So I mean, it's an important again, it's not, it's nothing new. It's not surprising. It is very consistent with what they've been talking about and what's in the 15, five year plan, but it's absolutely worth paying attention to.

[A]

And their view to the future where the technology superpower will ultimately control the world. And historically speaking that has been true. I mean US has been technologically dominant for the last hundred years and has been the global hedge mod. So I think if nothing else this just sort of underscores China's ultimate ambitions over the next 50 to 100 years here.

[B]

Right. And it is a challenge for certainly for the US and when you look at the changes underway in, you know, in the sort of the way the US government funds research, basic research,

[A]

you

[B]

know, I think this is a moment where the Chinese see a lot of more opportunity as the US seems to be taking more of a slash and burn approach to public.

[A]

Yeah, I mean there's been a lot of anxiety around that over the last year and a half, understandably so. I also would caution a lot of our development now happens in the private sector and innovation wise the US has still been leading in the private sector including over the last 10 or 15 years.

[B]

And on Quantum, I think that is absolutely true. When you look at some of the stuff Google's doing, for example and you know there are multiple now public companies that trade it really healthy valuations that are in Quantum. You look at things like fusion energy, you know that kind of, that takes a lot of investment. And the Chinese are pouring, that's a great example. Their approach is they're, they're trying all the different theoretical path toward to fusion energy with massive state support.

[A]

Yeah. And the returns on that are not great. And so that's an area where, but

[B]

when they hit, they're astronomical.

[A]

But I mean from a profit standpoint, I don't know that there's an appetite for funding that for the private capital. Yeah, right.

[B]

But then again, I mean you look at the private company, SpaceX is far ahead of their entire, you know, not quite on the moon yet, but private capital, they've done a pretty, pretty good job of innovating. Right. Quantum, Google, I mean they've all done a, you know, and again the Chinese side on Quantum and the Chinese clearly have made a lot of breakthroughs in Quantum. A lot of them are classified. So we don't, you don't think we fully understand what, how, how much they developed. But I don't think anyone should be surprised if they are near or even ahead of say the, the US at this point.

[A]

I think we're all trying to wrap our mind around what exactly Quantum entails over the next five to 10 years the development has been over the last several years. I'm going to a quantum computing conference in mid June, so perhaps back. It's here in dc, so I'll report on this show.

[B]

That sounds exciting.

[A]

I'm sure there will be some speculation related to the PRC and the gains that they've made in that area. So you mentioned SpaceX. Just out of curiosity, do you know anything about the PRC's efforts to counter what SpaceX has done and what they've been able to build?

[B]

Well, they're. There are multiple companies that are private trying to build sort of a similar network.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

Have not been nearly successful. There's also parts of the Chinese government are very concerned about Starlink and how, how ubiquitous it's becoming and how much, how much is taking up in space and also seeing not just the sort of civilian communications, but also how it's being used from a military perspective, especially in Ukraine. Yeah. And that is something that they are actively trying to replicate, but again, don't seem to be near where SpaceX is at this point.

[A]

Interesting. Yep. I know that it's cause for great anxiety on the PRC side and on the American side, SpaceX builds in a lot more resilience to military communications and whatnot.

[B]

Well, they have. What is it called? Starshield. I mean, and I'm tempted, you know, SpaceX, they need to goose their numbers. I keep getting offers for really good deals on Starlink.

[A]

Oh boy. Well, I'm sure the price will apparently come down in the years to come here, so we'll see what it turns into. I've heard Starlink is great. And biomanufacturing and brain computer interfaces. I'm afraid to ask more about what that development might look like in practice, but I have no doubt that the PRC is pursuing those areas with full force.

[B]

And it's interesting. I mean, brain computer interfaces, I mean, Elon Musk has neuralink. Right. So again, he's. He's sort of just to grab his brain and he's already ahead. And you know, some of these. Well, all we need is Musk is to go after nuclear fusion too. Right?

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And he. And embodied, embodied intelligence is robots. So, you know, Elon is leading the

[A]

charge on a lot of these.

[B]

He's his own future industry guy.

[A]

Indeed. All right, well, the other big domestic news this week was related to new regulations.

[B]

One last thing. It's just the point I made in the newsletter Monday is is people Again, we'll post a link to some of these translations and you can read through it. And yes, it's turgid, but it's useful, I think, to understand how they're thinking about it. And one of the essays points out some of the challenges with their approach of all these different localities. It's this classic they all try and fund the same hot thing. And so how do you squeeze out some of the pretty significant efficiencies? The broader point, though, and this is something it's hard to think that anyone still underestimates what China can do on the science technology side and innovation side. But really, you understand the serious underestimate the seriousness of, of the, of the PRC officials at your own risk.

[A]

Yeah, I mean, I, I don't think anybody, I can't imagine anybody listening to this podcast would underestimate the seriousness and the capacity on the PRC side.

[B]

I hope not.

[A]

But, but I mean, and that's why when you look at quantum science, biomanufacturing, brain computer interfaces, like, I'm not joking, I have no doubt that they're pursuing those areas with full force. And I can't imagine what that will look like 10 or 15, 20 years from now as they get further down that path. But here we go, you know, we'll all barrel toward that future together. The other big domestic news this week was related to new regulations from the State Council, which dovetail with our conversation on capital outflows and AI talent last week. And I'll read from the Wall Street Journal, China's government moved to tighten scrutiny over outbound investment, hardening the geopolitical fault lines around artificial intelligence amid an intensifying technological rivalry with the U.S. the new rules, which China's cabinet, known as the State Council, approved in April and which were published Monday, are part of Beijing's playbook to prevent technology it views as critical to its national security from seeping beyond its borders. And per a translation that you posted in full over at cynicism, Article 1 of the Regulations states these regulations are formulated in accordance with the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China and other laws in order to advance the high standard opening up, promote the high quality development of outbound investment, effectively implement the management of outbound investment, protect the lawful rights and interests of investors and their outbound investments, and safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. So can you help me parse what these regulations mean and why a variety of folks found this development notable and arguably remarkable.

[B]

So at the highest level, I think it's further institutionalization of the efforts Underway to the intensifying efforts underway to control capital flows, prevent technology leakage and prevent supply chain decoupling. I've seen some commentaries say, oh, this is a reaction to, say, the Manus deal. This actually, I think has been underway for a while. They've been talking about this. And this effectively takes several disparate rules, regulations and laws and puts them into one bucket.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

It also creates this overseas investment security review.

[A]

Basically. Like an approval apparatus.

[B]

Yeah, approval apparatus. But they also said there was a. There was a Q and A that sort of, you know, when I issue these big documents usually have a. Like a quote unquote Q and A explainer from one of the. One of the top officials at the sort of the relevant organ and they explain is sort of a useful summary of what they're trying to get at. And I think, you know, one of the things they say is that there are more, you know, the implementation rules will be coming. So there's still some uncertainty about what this ultimately means. But I think, again, going back to what I said at the high level, you know, this is, again, this is about tightening in multiple domains. And it's, it's, it is, as you said, I mean, what they had in place no longer meets the current needs given geopolitical risks and intensifying international competition. Mm. So that is the context or the backdrop for this. And it is, you know, last week we saw that several of these brokerages that were online, brokerages that were allowing PRC nationals to open accounts and trade and say the US markets, they got hit with a regulatory two by four, massive fines, basically, you know, confiscation of quote, unquote illegal assets. They all have to unwind that, you know, block access for.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And that, you know, that is. Some of it is related to concern about capital flight. A lot of it is also just related to concerns about control. Right. And making sure that, you know, people are going to be investing abroad, that they use the official channels. Yeah. And this. And also these three companies that were penalized that were named last week, they're also pretty bad actors. This is a, this campaign started In, I think 2023, then in 2022. Right. And they just kept finding ways to kind of sort of comply but really get around it, you know, and at some point it's just, you know, what the authorities are just like, okay, really, here's. We're going to show you. We're serious.

[A]

We wear the pants. Yeah.

[B]

So it all sort of is sort of converging. And then what's interesting is in this outbound investment regulation account Monday, there's a section about individual investors or discussion of individual investors that has people speculating whether or not this also means that it's, it's again back to the control that it's going to add much more significant controls and regulation around individuals investing overseas.

[A]

Right. And where you can put your money. I mean, that's what it seems like. This is an omnibus document where there are three different tracks being regulated, where on one hand there's a rock solid foundation to punish foreign companies and potentially foreign markets who impair China's development. There's some of that in there. There are rules on domestic companies and what they can do abroad, who they could sell to, etc, and then there are these rules that potentially implicate individuals and financial institutions who are doing business offshore. What do you make of the language around individuals? Because it seems a little bit ambiguous right now.

[B]

It's, it's ambiguous. Is, is, I think, you know, there's a Bloomberg story talking about what it, I think it was Bloomberg.

[A]

Yeah, no, I, the Bloomberg story. I read it this morning. China has expanded its outbound investment regulations to explicitly cover individual investors for the first time.

[B]

And then we're all trying to figure out what does that, what does that mean? And again, I think we have to wait for further implementation documents generally though, I would say that given the context, sort of the, you know, again, back to our early discussions of, you know, us, China, you know, yes, they had a nice meeting in the middle of May and maybe there's a floor in constructive strategic stability.

[A]

Well, and Steph Curry signed with Li,

[B]

but it is, but it is not. It is the trajectory and how the PRC views the competition with the US has not at all changed. And this, this is I think also part of that, part of also the general effort, the other regulations, they rolled out recently to make it much harder for companies to call it a couple, call it the risk shift supply chains out of China. So they, they are, this is all part of trying to more tightly bind foreign supply, foreign companies and global supply chains to China and raising the costs of efforts to shift those supply chains.

[A]

Yeah, well, and it's sort of pulling out the sword so that everyone else around the world can see it and recognize that there will be consequences.

[B]

But you know, so, so the question for, you know, you read these documents, you see what the watch tv, these regulations, and it's like, okay, should we just submit and then everything be fine or is it only going to get more difficult? And you know, is this really? Again, it's the conversation that's happening in a lot of capitals, certainly in companies too is the trajectory of increasing reliance on the prc. Is that something we want to sign up to and it only gets harder or do you have to rip the band aid off now and take the pain?

[A]

Yeah, I was, I was going to say just ripping the band aid off is sort of the, the problem is

[B]

it's not just the band aid. It's like a, it's like a, you know, a splint and a sewn on limb. I mean it's a, it's so big that it's, it's really not that simple.

[A]

And particularly if you're a public company that's answering to shareholders and has to explain massive hit to either profits or just general costs that aren't necessarily urgent and existential now but are only going to compound the longer you wait to take it.

[B]

Rare Earth is the classic example.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And that became pharmaceutical ingredients is the next big one. Became urgent because the Chinese basically didn't. Basically the Chinese put in these global export controls and companies started to realize, oh gosh, we might not get what we thought we're going to get. Yep. And suddenly they weren't.

[A]

Yeah. I mean reading about this over the last several days, it sort of looks like a frog in the pot situation. A frog boiling slowly where like the new rules are layered on top of one another with each pass year here and on their own. Nothing is particularly dramatic considering the conversations that you and I have been having and have every single week about what China prioritizes getting a little boring. Yeah. And. But at the same time, you look up and you know, five years later, 10 years later, the state control and the prohibitions seem to have dramatically expanded over the course of this decade at least. Or maybe it goes back further, I don't know. But I mean there's all these regulations that do seem to put some pretty serious constraints on what anyone can do.

[B]

And they're, and they're, they're much more institutionalized. They're, you know, the Chinese, that, the Chinese government and the party, they're very focused on building the legal frameworks, you know, rule by law. And you know, once they're institutionalized like that, they're much harder to pull back from. They're much harder, not impossible, they're much harder to get around. And so you're seeing that this intensification, this increasing focus on control, at the same time you're seeing this increasing institutionalization of these sort of control, sort of the what's the right word? Basically, the lattice work of control measures and regulations and laws. And so it used to be years ago when the Chinese government would go through these periods of tightening and loosening, tightening, losing. People say, oh, they'll loose up eventually. You have to. Yeah, this is. That cycle is broken. That cycle is gone. This is more. This is a much more of an institutionalized process for greater control everywhere. Even as they talk about opening more and more to the rest of the world and, you know, the, the. But, but the core is around increasing control.

[A]

Right, right. The external messaging is all about win, win cooperation with the rest of the world. But you look at the rules and I would say China certainly takes priority as far as the Party and what it wants from this. What are the downsides from a policy like this?

[B]

It's the broader philosophical argument about, you know, is it. Is it better to be. Have a more controlled economy or less controlled economy. There's also, you know, again, people, wealthy people, for example, depending on how they actually implement the rules around these individual overseas investors, you know, wealthy people who are investing overseas, they tend to be, you know, from very rich to pretty well off, middle class, upper middle class, they're not going to be happy. Is it going to be some sort of a, you know, tipping point for them? Probably not. Yeah. But does it from. From a sort of foreign government's foreign perspective, though? I think it just again, is a more of a signal of, you know, if you, if you play by the PRC rules, yeah, you'll be treated pretty well up to a point. But if you, you know, if you are thinking that maybe you need to reduce reliance or shift supply chains, it's only going to get more painful and harder.

[A]

Yeah. And you're ultimately beholden to an authoritarian state that can behave pretty capriciously and coercively.

[B]

And then also all the financial services firms that are hoping for some massive infusion of Chinese money to invest overseas, the foreign ones at least keep open.

[A]

Don't hold your breath.

[B]

I keep hoping for the Powerball, but, you know, isn't happening.

[A]

Yep, yep, fair enough. Well, we'll see where we are in the weeks and months to come and whether we get a bit more detail on the implementation. But it was interesting to have that follow on our conversation last week about controlling capital outflows and everything else. There are now labyrinthine structures in place to effectuate everything that the Party has wanted to do for quite some time. The Shangri La Dialogue is an annual security forum in Singapore and typically functions as kind of an interesting window into where US Policy is, where US China relationships are. And the Financial Times wrote in the wake of Pete Hegset comments this week, relations between the United States and China are better than they've been in many years. Hegseth said in a speech that did not directly mention Taiwan, the main potential flashpoint between the US And China in the region. But he said to maintain strategic stability with China, the US and its allies need to negotiate from, from a position of strength which would require American partners in the region to raise military spending sharply to 3.5% of GDP. And the new York Times in the wake of Hegseth speech, notes that in 2025, Hegseth told the assembly of Asian Military leaders that, quote, china's military harasses Taiwan. The threat China poses is real. Any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo Pacific and the world. And you noted in advance of Hegda's comments that he mentioned Taiwan five separate times in 2025. And again in the main speech, Taiwan was not mentioned once for first time

[B]

in at least a decade by a US Minister, the defense minister or, sorry, Sec. Defense secretary or war secretary, I guess, is the new term we're using.

[A]

Well, I mean, you wrote Monday that PRC officials did not see these comments as soft on China.

[B]

They were very consistent with what was in the national defense strategy, at least the public version, the unclassified version we all got to read. And so I think they were not surprising. The PRC sort of, you know, PRC kind of academic expert, think tank world did not see the NDS as anything as soft on China at all. It was certainly toned down around Taiwan, too. But and then in Heg's speech this week, you know, he doesn't mention Taiwan, but he talks about, you know, he says our approach in the Pacific centers on deterrence by denial on the first island chain. Taiwan is a key link in the first island chain. So again, if you're reading that, okay, he didn't say Taiwan, yes, we have this happier feeling between the US And China. But from what he's talking about in terms of how the US is looking at the Indo Pacific and what they're doing with these other countries and how they're describing what matters called core interests of the US Taiwan is still there. And Taiwan, this is not a saying. Okay. Yeah, this is not any, you know, yes, he did mention Taiwan, and I think that was. And he didn't. He didn't. He praised several countries for increased defense spending. He didn't mention Taiwan again, which I think certainly is seen as, you know, is the US Changing policy on Taiwan. You know, the questions that came out of the Trump's visit to Beijing and his comments to Bretbert, you know, the lack of any news on this, the arms package that was teed up waiting for the president's approval. But from what he said in terms of the substance of his speech, again, I don't think there's any, there's no indication of a shift. Certainly the rhetoric is a little softer. Marco Rubio, Secretary of STATE I think this week on a testimony in Congress, I think he reiterated our policy towards Taiwan hasn't changed. So now we're waiting to see again what happens with this arms package, what

[A]

happens with the second massive with President Trump.

[B]

And that Bret Baier interview on Fox News said it was 12 billion. New York Times reported 14, the Financial Times reported maybe up to 19 or 20 billion. So whatever it is is a big number, biggest ever, I think in one go.

[A]

Yeah. Well, and it is interesting, I mean the other thing that Hegsa said when we look across the region today, there is rightful alarm regarding China's historic military buildup and the expansion of its military activities in the region and beyond. We share a clear eyed assessment of the security environment and a mutual understanding that a Pacific dominated by a hegemon would unravel the regional balance of power and undermine the equilibrium we all seek to preserve. And I think the coordination with other allies in the region, particularly on defense spending is probably what would unsettle the PRC regardless.

[B]

And expanded exercises, Japan getting involved. I mean the stuff that's happening from I think from Beijing's perspective, it does not look like the US is withdrawing or conceding.

[A]

Yeah. Why weren't there more comments from PRC leadership at this summit? I recall in years past we would hear from them.

[B]

Well, the PR the PRC used to send their minister of defense, you know, who is lower on the in the sort of peel in the military hierarchy than or the Communist Party military hierarchy than the US Ministry of Defenses. You know, there was a bit of turmoil in the Ministry of Defense job.

[A]

They was the drummer from Spinal Tap for a couple years there. Sure.

[B]

Right. So two of Dong Jun's predecessors are gone. I think last year there were rumors Dong Jun was about to go down. He didn't go last year. They sent sort of the kind of the academic expert types. He didn't go again this year. He did pop up in South Africa this week. So he's not averse to travel. He just Didn't. I think they just don't want to deal because usually, you know, it devolves into a lot of criticism about China and activities in the Indo Pacific or the Asia Pacific region. And so they just don't need the hassle. They have their own forum, the Xiangshan Forum, in the fall and outside of Beijing and in Beijing. And I think that, you know, they're. They're trying to make that the place where the more senior PLA officials talk about the region and, you know, make

[A]

their case to the world.

[B]

Their case. You know, this is. This is not their home turf. This is. So I think, you know, they said they send a contingent. They usually, you know, they ask some, you know, trying to ask some controversial questions, and then they have the various propaganda outlets have reporters there trying to, you know, act like they're aggressive journalists. You know, they tried to. They tried to backstop the Philippines minister of Defense. And, you know, they make a big show of, like, he didn't answer my question. You know, as they sort of, you know, I missed it. It's all theater. It's all performance. Right? But it's great because it's super useful performance for the domestic audience. Right?

[A]

Yeah. Yeah. Well. And I mean, as far as the Q and A on the American side, Hegseth was asked explicitly about the Taiwan arms package. And he came up and it seemed like he was kind of cleaning up some of what Hung Cow had said about that arms shipment, where he said it's not actually related to Iran. Nothing has changed. The decision sits with President Trump here. I don't know. I'm not holding my breath for that arms package to be approved before September and the visit from Xi Jinping, But I suppose we'll have to wait and find out over the next few months, right?

[B]

I mean, and, you know, and. And again, I think that. I think it's been reported, and certainly what I'd be hearing is, you know, the Chinese want no arm sales to Taiwan, but if that package were broken up into more discrete bits, they would.

[A]

They could tolerate it.

[B]

They would, you know, have their usual rhetorical attacks, you know, their criticism of any deal, but they could tolerate. It's the big number that. That is of what really has gotten Xi Jinping upset is what people. Is sort of what. What people are saying.

[A]

It's so fascinating to me how much of the conversation around Taiwan is rooted in ultimately symbolism and, like, rhetorical gestures because, like, the arms package wouldn't be delivered for years on end.

[B]

I mean, there it's in the we're into the2030s now. Right. I mean, given, given, given everything. What are we doing burned up in Iran? No, and, but I think it is, it is a, again, it is a, it is a win from the PRC side. It's very useful because it demonstrates that they can push back on the US and get the US to change its policy or part of its policy that has value domestically, that also has value when you push it out into Taiwan and say, look, these guys aren't reliable.

[A]

Yeah, right.

[B]

You know, the US Is in this, you know, this is one of the, one of the pillars of the, you know, the, the messaging from the, from the PRC, directly and indirectly through proxies and whatever into Taiwan is, you know, ultimately, you know, they're not going to be there when you need them.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

They being the US and if I

[A]

were on the American side, I would say, look, we sold you $11 billion worth of arms in December, which is more than was sold across the previous four years.

[B]

Right. It wouldn't be a huge problem unless if this hadn't actually been leaked.

[A]

Yeah, no kidding. Yeah.

[B]

And so now, now it looks like if, again, if the, if it's out there and if the US doesn't do a big arms package, it looks like President Trump changed policy on ERC pressure

[A]

after meeting with Xi.

[B]

And then it's like, okay, well what did he get anything for it? Even though it shouldn't be be something that's negotiated.

[A]

And again, it's this back and forth posturing rooted in symbolism and rhetoric. My read is that the White House has got to prioritize stability and avoiding any provocative moves or comments, not only before the Xi visit in September, but before the midterms in November. I just think they're invested in stability.

[B]

I think that's a reasonable guess. I will say that the US did because someone had written a paper pointing out this massive loophole and chip export controls that the Trump administration looks like out of sheer incompetence, had missed. You know, this paper was going around DC Last week and then on Sunday morning, the BIS issued this update that tightens, you know, the, will be enforcing those rules. We'll be enforcing these rules around exports of advanced chips to PRC subsidiaries or PRC or PRC companies. Right. And so, so that is something where, you know, it looks like we're tightening. The US Being with the US Is tightening chip export controls, which again, the Chinese would see as a violation of the, whatever, you know, the Busan Agreement or the summit. But I think the US Would say, hey, we're just, we're just fixing a loophole.

[A]

We're not adding new rules. Right, exactly. We're enforcing.

[B]

But so that, but that could certainly be seen. Again, this is my point around Taiwan is, is, yes, the Trump made administration may just kind of want to wait this out and there's obviously a lot of other stuff going on, but you just never, you never know. Yeah, right. That's, that's the thing with these guys. And that's why I go back to, I thought some of the coverage around the Hexis speech was, was way too quick to say, oh, look, they've caved on Taiwan, where if you actually read the speech, it's toned down in a way that a lot of things have been toned down by the Trump administration around Taiwan. And that certainly is, is part of the, we want a more stable relationship.

[A]

Right.

[B]

But from a substantive policy perspective and the work with allies in the Indo

[A]

Pacific region, it's the work with allies that definitely pay attention.

[B]

Again, this is why I say I don't think, I think Beijing sees some progress from the sort of the rhetorical perspective, but from the actual substance in perspective, I don't think they see much of a shift yet from the U.S. yep, that makes sense.

[A]

And one of those allies, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Kozimi, said at the Shangri La dialogue in his speech, some of you may have heard the term new militarism, but nothing could be further from the truth. Think about it. There is a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. Japan has neither of such weapons and yet Japan is labeled new militarism. Isn't it strange he asked the audience, which I feel like is a fair question and I'm sure did not go over particularly well in Beijing. And the Ministry of Foreign affairs issued some condemnations of Japan and its planned cooperation with NATO. All of which is to say that the tensions with Japan continue and will persist indefinitely here. Japan's not backing down.

[B]

No. And the Chinese side of course, was not at all happy with his, with Koizumi's comments. I thought, you know, last around his comments, the Financial Times had a, you know, they wrote about his comments and then they, they quoted Kevin Rudd, who, you know, former Australian Prime Minister, until Recently Australian Ambassador, D.C. now President of the Asia Society. And I thought what he said to the FT was actually pretty, pretty interesting and I think makes a lot of sense, which is he told the FT that he doesn't think China's looking for an off ramp. Right. And you see how they're ramping up the pressure on Tokyo, both rhetorical, but also things like squeezing, for example, squeezing exports of certain types of railroads. But Rudd said that China's global strategy is to work out how it can create as many fault lines as possible, particularly between the U.S. and its allies or between allies of the U.S. and I think that's right. And one of the fault lines is certainly from a public support perspective, the Japanese side is not happy with the level of the support they've gotten from the Trump administration.

[A]

What substance can you offer us in response to the adversity and the economic setbacks that we're having to endure in the course of these tensions?

[B]

Well, I think one thing will be interesting is if these tightening of exports of rare earths, if those start causing problems in the Japanese supply chain that actually have companies that supply the US So that you end up with a ripple effect in the US where certain products aren't coming or aren't, aren't available because of the control, the rare earth controls on Japan. You would expect the US to do something, but it's unclear the Trump administration will, you know, and the question is, is real work being done to strengthen some of these foundations.

[A]

Right. And solidify the coordination and how much substantive support are these countries getting?

[B]

But anyway, again, I think back to the Chinese. They don't. And again, they don't. They just sort of get harangue when they go there. They don't even need to go there. Yeah, sort of like why? You know, in some ways it's a, it's a, it's a, it's kind of, it's too bad for Singapore. Right. Which, you know, where the, where this dialogue is held.

[A]

But the Chinese are just saying, why undermine our messaging?

[B]

Right. And all you guys gang up on us, so why waste the resources of someone senior? But again, he doesn't. It's not a problem for the Minister of Defense to travel. He's in South Africa this week. That's a little bit further than Singapore.

[A]

Yeah, well, and he's not in jail, so that's a victory as well for Dong John to keep it moving. The South China Morning Post. The European Commission agreed on a tough new approach to trade relations with China at a rare Beijing focused debate among Brussels leadership on Friday. In a presentation, trade chief Morrow Sefkovich laid out why the bloc needs to take stronger or needed to take stronger steps to defend itself from what is described as a new China shock to its industries. According to people briefed on the event, this may require developing A new instrument to compel companies in critical sectors to expand both the number and the locations of the suppliers they use. Sefkovich is also expected to ramp up the use of safeguard measures in sectors that are under severe pressure from Chinese overcapacity. The trade focused orientation debate is seen internally as the firing of a starting gun ahead of an intense period for China policy. Bill, should we take these efforts seriously and how does Beijing view any of what the EU is currently?

[B]

So I think, I think that the EU for many of the countries, I mean it's a big block. There is much more of a sense of crisis about what's, about the risks of de industrialization. And you know what the Chinese, what they say is over capacity, you know, exports of, of goods and industries over capacity that are, you know, flooding, flooding or potentially will flood the eu. Of course the Chinese say, you know,

[A]

so called over capacity.

[B]

Right. So called overcapacity. So there was a meeting Monday with the European Commission College of Commissioners and they, you know, they, they had a meeting to take stock of the, of the EU China relations. There's a, another meeting where the European Commission President Von der Leyen will, there's a meeting in mid June where I think they're going to talk about actually pushing forward with some of these measures. The Chinese are, have been signaling that they will retaliate over the weekend after this Friday meeting of this College of Commissioners. This account that's affiliated with China Media Group CCTV called Yuyuan Tan Tian came out with a long piece about this. And then according to an exclusive disclosure from a source, which means, okay, this is very official. Here's our threat. Right?

[A]

Right.

[B]

China can launch anti discrimination investigations and industrial supply chain security investigations into the EU's relevant practices. And then they mention France, you know, and France is you know, their largest source of cosmetic imports. Right. So okay, and then also eu, EU or EU exports to China of meat, alcohol, luxury goods, cosmetics and other products. They all have big shares in China. So they're basically giving you the menu. Here's where we're going to.

[A]

If you push again, taking out the sword and saying, all right, let's see where this goes.

[B]

So you know, if the concludes with this, this, this, this un timetamp concludes with the. If the EU uses the absurd logic of production capacity exceeding demand to accuse Chinese products of overcapacity than whether these European products sold in China are in the same situation is also, also worth considering. Yeah. So I would say that we are closer to a real trade war. A EU China trade war than we have been before. I think though, that the Chinese are skeptical of the EU collective will to actually bear the costs of real actions against Chinese products and Chinese industries. And so we'll see. Right. Noah Barkin, who, who's he's at, works for Rhodium. He's. I think he's based in Berlin still. He writes a great weekly, a monthly newsletter called Watching China in Europe and his issue for June came out yesterday. He has a. It's all, it's, it's all about, you know, well, the Germans may not be on board, even though large swaths.

[A]

That is amazing to me that the Germans.

[B]

He opens with, you know, large, large swaths of German industry, including this, this federation of German industries, BDI are on board with a much tougher approach to China, but the politicians are not. And he has this wonderful. And I'm going to butcher German. But he quotes Hannelsblad, the German newspaper, because the minister of, I think of Economics, I forget Katerina Reich, all right, had just gone to China and she basically talked about, basically said she would temper any measures coming out of Brussels. Right. And so Hannes Blah, in their newspaper described her trip as an exercise and excuse my German pronunciation, I did have a German stepfather. But what we're going to try in.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

Self vers. Ver gu. Which means self dwarfing.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

Well, so anyone who capitulates and downplays their own bargaining power has already lost. That is a, I mean that should be. If you have a How to negotiate with China handbook, that should be on the COVID Yeah, Well, I would say

[A]

self dwarfing captures a lot of the EU interactions with China, whether it's Macron going to China. You had Keir Starmer over there as well.

[B]

Well, Mark Carney, you know, I mean, we've had, last week, we've had, you know, while you went to Canada, I met with Carney and his, his pharmaceutical counterpart, UK Foreign minister was in Beijing this week. Relations are back to normal, effectively their exchanges are back to normal. You know, they learned their lessons.

[A]

I suppose so. I mean, look, man, the German example, because there were several European countries who signed on to a paper basically pointing a finger at China saying something here needs to be done. Spain, whose prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, I don't know whether he's a prime minister, but his leader, the Spain's leader was in Beijing, has a really good relationship with China, but Spain signed on to that document as well. And Germany has suffered more than anyone. Like the Trade data for 2025, the exports to Germany were up 108% year over year. Germany has lost an estimated 400,000 jobs over the last several years as well. And with the eu, I mean, this is a problem in a variety of countries in the eu And I'm just curious as to whether they can really do anything meaningful about it because they don't have the mutual points of leverage that the US has as far as Chinese countermeasures in response to anything the US The EU tries to do on trade. And then also their own industries like their, they don't have the strength. Energy is a lot more expensive in Europe than it is in the United States.

[B]

They're in a really tough position. And you look at biggest land war since World War II in Europe that is heavily supported by parts of the prc and lots of anger at the PRC over support for Putin and Russia and what they're doing in Ukraine. And yet the countermeasures of the response has been, I think, from Beijing's perspective, has been, like, pretty timid. They've shown Beijing that they don't have the stomach for tough, tough responses in the face of the biggest land war since World War II in Europe. And so I don't think, if you're in Beijing, I don't think you would really believe that they're going to follow through.

[A]

No, exactly.

[B]

And they might, they might be. They might be. Right. I mean, what'll be interesting, right, is you've got, you know, there as clearly, you know, Ukraine has been making some progress in pushing back on Russia. And, you know, it's interesting today, their videos, they, they bombed like a fuel depot in St. Petersburg, right, on the opening day of this St. Petersburg forum, you know, which is a big, a big business economic forum for the Russians. The Chinese Vice President Hanjiang is supposed to be there. You know, and then there are reports that they're, I don't know if they're verified, but there have been reports floating around that the North Koreans are sending a whole bunch more troops to, to, to, to fight. To Russia to help fight Ukraine. Yeah, there have been these reports that Xi Jinping was going to go to North Korea soon. There were a couple reports that said it'd be last week. Didn't happen. I hear that it may still be happening soon. I mean, if you're the EU and, and there's wars going on with, with, with Russia and Ukraine and the, you know, obviously the prc, whatever people says, obviously the PRC is giving pretty significant material support, even dual use to the, to the Russians, you know, the North Koreans involved. She goes to North Korea and you're still not going to end up doing anything. What does that say to Beijing?

[A]

Yeah, I mean, and I think what it says is that they are particularly vulnerable.

[B]

They're vulnerable and economics determines, you know, economics determines the outcomes and we have the upper hand economically.

[A]

Yeah, no, exactly.

[B]

And so I think, you know, and there's been a lot of, you know, talk other, you know, we're tougher this time. This, you know, we're, you know, this is serious. We, you know, and I think there is a lot of China is also

[A]

serious about reprisal if the EU takes any of the steps that have been mooted.

[B]

The Chinese are very smart about how they, about how they implement countermeasures. They're very targeted and they do minimal damage to the Chinese economy. And yet they cause significant pain in sectors in these other countries economies and sometimes, excuse me, quite often politically sensitive sectors that have significant influence with their government. And it's asymmetrical, but it works. And so again, I'll believe it, believe it when I see it, that the EU actually gets tougher on China. Yeah. Because part of it too is they're, you know, they're not happy with the US if, again, if they were more of a united front approach, then there might be more appetite, but, you know, they're fighting their own set of trade

[A]

battles with the U.S. yeah, yeah, well. And I think for China, I mean, I believe 30% of exports still go to the EU and the UK so it's a meaningful market. I believe that's the largest market in the world for China as far as where their exports are landing. And they can't allow the sort of protectionism to take root in Europe that has taken root in the United States.

[B]

And a real trade war would hurt the Chinese economy. I mean, there is, there are costs if they, if this spirals up, which

[A]

I think is why there's been a lot of saber rattling now to try to avoid the escalation. And there would be a lot of pain on both sides if it devolves further. But also doing nothing will incur, will involve a lot of pain on the European side, at least as far as the manufacturing base is concerned and the employment base is concerned. So we'll see. It does sound like there are a lot of meetings planned over the next several weeks here, so I'm sure there will be more news that emerges from Europe shifting gears at the end. The New York Times wrote last Friday, I believe the expulsion order in February of the Times reporter Vivian Wong is the latest example of a crackdown by Beijing on foreign correspondence, whose reporting challenges the official line of President Xi Jinping's authoritarian government. It also inflames long running tensions between China and the United States over the media presence each country has within its borders. Chinese officials told the Times they acted against Ms. Wong, a China correspondent for the paper since 2020, in response to the appearance by video of Taiwan's president at a Times deal book summit in New York in December. Ms. Wong played no role in the event. But Chinese officials had complained for months about Ms. Wong's coverage, which focused on the lives of ordinary Chinese people and often addressed sensitive matters such as censorship, Beijing's unpopular response to the coronavirus pandemic and the steady expansion of China's security state. Bill, what's your reaction to what's happened here? The news of Vivian Wong's visa being revoked surfaced I think like a month

[B]

or six weeks ago more the first time was in post it in the cynicism chat. Okay then it was and then there was some anyway there was a guy on substack writes about Taiwan. He wrote about it. Got it actually got it mostly right. The New York Times tried to and lots of journalists had it and no

[A]

one, you know, it was notably quiet.

[B]

Well the New York Times was trying really hard to, you know we're going to, we're still negotiating. There's still a chance. And so they, they were, you know, they wanted to keep it quiet and control the story. The wire China Post wrote about it I think two or three weeks ago with more details. And then finally New York Times, you know they, she, she was able, she's a very good journalist. She was able to get a visa, like a seven day visa to go cover the, the Trump visit. But that was it. Okay. And the, you know, the Chinese, they did it in a classic sort of super inconvenient way. I think she was, I heard that she was went to Seoul for like a New York Times editorial meeting and then her visa was revoked while she was in Seoul. So she couldn't go back and deal.

[A]

Her stuff was still.

[B]

Yeah, I mean it was the classic it wasn't just like you got 48 hours is like okay, we just, you're gone and mess up your life. You know there's prefer, there are obviously personal consequences. There are professional consequences potentially. I think that you know there, there are a couple things going on. One is she is a good reporter. They, he has reported on things that they were not happy about. I think there is also generally they're not happy about ethnically Chinese, Chinese, American, ethnically Chinese, overseas Chinese reporters. They tend to have better access, better language skills. Also the fact they also there's been regular waves of sort of state backed campaigns attacking female ethnic Chinese journalists. And so I think there's a, you know, there's, we shouldn't discount some of the misogyny as part of this backdrop.

[A]

Interesting. When you say state backed campaigns, people

[B]

attacking like bloggers, affiliated bloggers, social media, like highlighting, you know, the trader, you know, race traders, whatever. Just all sorts of, of really, really, really nasty.

[A]

That is not organic stuff.

[B]

Yeah, no, but I think also the Ministry of Foreign affairs on the Chinese side, they did also accuse her of doing interviews without telling people she's a journalist, which the Times denies. But the key point was that I'm quoting from the issue of foreign affairs. The New York Times provided platform for Taiwan authorities to peddle separatist rhetoric for Taiwan independence and blatantly called China's Taiwan region a country, you know, this grossly violates, blah, blah, blah. The New York Times should correct its wrongdoings rather than continue down the wrong path. So again this is, and I've heard reliably there was an Australian journalist who was about to get, you know, because Australia was frozen out for a while and journalists were frozen out and they're starting to restore journalist visas. Australian journalist was about to get a visa and their paper published an op ed from the Taiwan representative. And then that person, the paper was told your not getting the visa. You go to the back of the line. This is part of a campaign to, an intensifying campaign to control how Taiwan is discussed globally. Right. And that is problematic, I think and people should be aware that that is, there's, there's a broader thing going on here than specifically this one individual reported. There are, you know, they have other pretexts to go after this reporter or they claim they have these pretexts, but this is about trying to normalize a sort of a resetting the discourse about Taiwan. And so, you know, this was a video addressed by President Lai at the New York Times deal conference. So one of the questions is, okay, the deal book conference every year, what's going to happen this year? Are they going to talk about Taiwan? Are they going to talk about China? Who are they going to have as guests? If they're talking about China or Taiwan, it'll be interesting to watch. You know, did the New York Times, as the Ministry of Foreign affairs suggests, are they, are they going to correct their wrongdoings and go and, you know, and no longer continue down the wrong path.

[A]

And it's not. And I'm laughing, but it's not funny because it probably works to chill some of the speed.

[B]

So again, as I wrote in the newsletter, I think on Monday, you know, one of the questions will be how does the deal look? You know, cover this. Will they, will they give a slot to a PRC official? Will they give a slot to one of the sort of the US China experts that are preferred by the prc? It'll be interesting to see how. Or maybe they just don't talk about it at all. Though again, if you're talking about AI and tech, you can't really not talk about Taiwan. Right. So that'll be, that'll be interesting. I think, you know, the path of

[A]

least resistance is very attractive to a lot of these news organizations. Just figure out how not to sidestep it. Yeah, exactly. And I mean the other thing that is frustrating, reading news like this and hearing about the treatment, I didn't realize that they had revoked it while she was out of the country for like a weekend basically. And then she just couldn't reenter to get any of her stuff. Like, that's unbelievable.

[B]

Petty.

[A]

No, no, that's, that's intentionally petty, unnecessarily petty and provocative or maybe necessary if you're sitting in Beijing and implementing any of this. But it also, like the number of journalists, the number of foreign journalists has dramatically decreased over the last like 10,

[B]

the number of Western and specifically from, especially from American outlets.

[A]

And it's from a strategy standpoint similar to the Shangri La situation. Like it allows China to control its message and disseminate its story on social media far more effectively if there's no foreign journalists meddling.

[B]

It's a strategy. Right. You see the responses, you know, from various, you know, media outlets and reporters like, oh, this is terrible for China. You know, they're, they're by, by shutting out these, these great reporters, they're losing the ability to add texture to China's story, which is true. Right. You lose a lot of human interest stuff. But Beijing clearly doesn't see it, that this is a strategy. They have for a long time wanted to increase their share of international discourse power. They want to control the narrative about China globally. And they were never going to be able to control these Western media outlets. They actually have been very successful at controlling the Chinese language discourse because directly or indirectly can buy up lots of overseas Chinese language outlets or through coercion of the advertisers. In those outlets in other countries, starve any overseas outlets that have incorrect thinking, just to use their term. So they've been actually very effective in controlling the Chinese language discourse. Not 100%, but made a lot of progress on the English side. They become this whole influencer thing. They've set up these. The China Media Project has written a lot about these international communication centers that, down at the provincial and even in some cases municipal level, where they're finding ways to push out China's story globally using social media, using mostly American platforms like X, like YouTube, like Meta. And it works, right? You know, and so why, like, like, why do you want these pesky foreign journalists around when you've got a whole bunch of people who are, you know, happy to come and talk about, oh, my God, there's a, there's a subway train that goes through a building. It's amazing.

[A]

Yeah, no, exactly. And it's just sort of illiterate.

[B]

Look at all the drones.

[A]

Antithetical to a lot of what Westerners believe about the media and how it should work. However, it's not counterproductive if you're in Beijing.

[B]

No, it's working for them. And so I think that the argument that, oh, you know, this is hurting China, that's falling on deaf ears. I will say that one of the, I think it's kind of the hook for the New York Times to write this story, because again, this happened a while ago and they weren't writing about it, is that the Trump administration, in response, did expel or revoke the visa of a Xinhua employee. Didn't say who, didn't say where, which is an interesting reciprocal action. It goes back to this discussion of, you know, journalist visas in the US And China and reciprocity. And in the Biden administration, they actually had worked out a deal that then my understanding, what I was told was actually it was scuppered on the US Side by the Department of Homeland Security.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

So there was, there was a hope that there'd be more foreign correspondence there, but it fell apart.

[A]

This is a two plus espionage concerns.

[B]

But so, so you have far more PRC propaganda system employees in the US Than you do foreign journalists. Journalists, employees of American organizations in China. And so there's been this long running discussion of reciprocity and should it be one for one, for a long time, and I'm not 100% sure now, but for a long time, actually the foreign journalists had a much better visa situation. They would get a J visa for China. It would be one year multi entry The Chinese ones here basically had to get a new visa every time they left the country. In many cases, the visas were three months. It wasn't actually a parody in how the visas were treated. I mean, ultimately the ways this should go is there should just be a one to one based on visa status. So for every. If there are 15 people for American outlets in China that have J visas with one year multi entry, there should be 15 for Chinese outlets here in the US if there are a grand total of 25 journalists for American outlets in China on different visa status, there should be a grand total of 25 from China here. My preference is to open it up. I think more, I do think more is better. One of the things you hear in the U.S. sort of objections on the U.S. side is, oh, well, you know, they're spies.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

Right. And, you know, I don't. There's no question that some of them are undercover, but frankly, the FBI is pretty competent. I mean, it's actually useful for them to see who they're trying to talk to. Right. Are they, you know, are they talking. No, honestly. Are they talking to, you know, former U.S. officials? Former, you know, intelligence community officials. Right. You know, why are they spending so much time with this person who once had a senior job in the, you know, in the, in the intelligence community or in the White House? Right. It's interesting to figure out what they're trying to talk about. And so they're, they're in the, and the US has capacity to track spies too, right?

[A]

Yeah, no, of course.

[B]

And so I'm less, I'm less supportive of the kick them all out because they're all spies. I think that is wrong. I would, I preferably, I would much rather see lots more foreign journalists in China too. I don't think that's where we're headed at this point. So then I think from the US Perspective, it is, it is reasonable to then push for really one to one parity or one to one reciprocity down to the specific visa type, because there is still some disparity in visa types.

[A]

Well, and I mean, it is very frustrating prepping for the show every week. It would be a lot more useful to have a wide variety of foreign journalists who can report on what Chinese people actually feel and think and what life is like.

[B]

There's a, there's a, you know, again, it's asymmetric. The US Is much more open. There's a big loss there. Again, I don't think the PRC government sees it as a loss.

[A]

No, of course Not. And as far as the reciprocity is concerned, I mean, I'm sure that there are more Chinese journalists in America than there are American journalists in China right now. And so one to one response would be, what percentage of American journalists was Vivian Wong? And we're going to cut that percentage of Chinese visas and expel all of those Chinese journalists. So expelling one Xinhua journalist isn't actually reciprocal because there's only so many Americans.

[B]

More than. It's more than, frankly, I expected the Trump administration to do, given how. Given sort of how they're trying to keep the relationship on an even keel and also how much the president personally seems to have real animus towards the New York Times. It was actually. I think it was an interesting response. It used to be you could also have foreigners who would freelance. They live in China and they do freelance for various outlets. That is extremely risky now. It was never really legal, but it was tolerated for a long time. Now you're missing that for the most part, you know, and. And the ones you know. And also the Chinese outlets can hire foreigners. Yeah, right here in the U.S. other countries in China, the, the foreign media outlets have, like, researchers of like, like local Chinese researchers who tend to be really, really good reporters, but they're not allowed to be reporters. And there's. Their jobs come with significant personal risk. Yeah. And so, again, you know, if you really want to talk about reciprocity, there's a whole bunch of things that would make this much more reciprocal.

[A]

Well, and in terms of telling China's story well, and controlling the domestic messaging, certainly it is notable that we're recording this on June 3rd and tomorrow is June 4th. And a lot of that history has eroded across the decades here, which, again, serves 37 years. Yeah, I mean, you were there. I don't know whether you have any thoughts this year.

[B]

I mean, every. Every year it's like, it's. What do you say, 37 years later. And they've done an incredibly good job of memory holding the whole thing.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And, you know, it. It is a. Most people don't know. Most people honestly don't even. They do. They don't. Either they think it was the party was right, or it's just not something they get upset about. And so it's. It's an important part of history. But as every year goes by and the memory hole gets deeper, the risks of somehow the people who witnessed what happened in 1989 somehow getting angry and doing something, it's basically asymptotic to zero.

[A]

Yeah, well, and you were there working as a translator for CBS News during those weeks. Yeah.

[B]

No, I mean it is.

[A]

Do you think any of that would have been allowed today if it happened today?

[B]

No, I mean, I think the security services capacity is much greater, both you know, personnel and discipline and technically also, you know, the reason, for example, CBS News and there's a, there's an interesting new documentary out about CBS News's coverage of specifically of the spring 1989 movement. They had the most equipment and staff and journalists there because they, they bet big on the Gorbachev visit. Right. The Sino, so the, the Sino Soviet rapprochement. And so they were pre positioned and then were able, you know, and then the first round of protests happened right before Gorbachev arrived. So they were pre positioned and were able and they already had all these visas that people coming in.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And they just kept pushing it all in. And the, the Chinese government didn't suddenly step up and say, oh, we're going to cancel all this stuff. You got your other folks, other women can't come in. It was all sort of, the bureaucracy was already, already in process to get everything there. So you know, I mean it's, it's, it's, it's a tragedy. But again, 37 years on, you know, today, but the Chinese government still cares about it. You know, there, there, there's a story today and you know, Radio Free Asia that that message went out to the mothers of, of their kids who were killed in the crackdown. They're not allowed to go mourn them. Right. I mean, yeah, but that's every year, right? There's surveillance steps up, censorship steps up. It's, you know, they have a playbook for how they deal with this. And you know, they've cynically done a, I think a very good job of really memory holding it in ways that it's kept alive outside China. It used to be kept alive in Hong Kong, not at all now. And you know, there's a Tiananmen Museum, I think out in California. It was vandalized a couple days ago. The FBI should be all over that. Like, why did someone break in and deface a whole bunch of stuff on US Soil? You know, probably not some random incident. And so that, that is if that kind of stuff is happening in other countries, those other countries, legal authorities should be very concerned about that kind of transnational repression.

[A]

Yeah, I mean it's tragic and infuriating and it also underscores the importance of, of journalists highlighting any of that behavior and keeping the Truth, alive. The truth of what happened on June 4th alive. And the Chinese Communist Party is doing everything it possibly can to.

[B]

And again, they've, they've been extremely successful. Yeah.

[A]

I mean, well, and that's part of what makes it even more infuriating as the years pass here.

[B]

Yeah. But you figure out the people, I mean the people who are in their 20s or the people who are the, the mainstays, the movement in their, you know, the like 20s into 30s, they're all pushing 60. They've already moved on with their lives and they've, you know, it's, it's again. And the other generations, they either don't know, they don't care.

[A]

Yep. Well, that is a dour note to end.

[B]

Sorry. I mean it's. No, I mean it is, it is. Makes you very cynical. But you have to. I mean, again.

[A]

Well, it's reality.

[B]

Yeah, it's reality. Yeah.

[A]

I will note that the documentary you mentioned, there's a great still of young Bill Bishop. We don't have to lead the sharp China post with it, but I loved seeing. How old were you in that picture?

[B]

19. I was 20.

[A]

20 years old. I love seeing 20 year old Bill Bishop translating for CBS News. Is the documentary out already?

[B]

It's been shown at various film festivals. I have not because I really want to watch. I didn't even know it was. Yeah, I just saw it. Somebody posted about it on Substack and I'm trying to. What is it, what is it called again? I should know off the top of my head. I wrote about a few days ago. Yeah, we'll put a link in the show Tiananmen tonight.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

It looks like a pretty interesting because it really, I mean CBS News really from. As an American media organization, they really had the best, they had the best coverage of the sort of the protests and the crackdown and the aftermath of all the media organizations just because of the logistics they had in place. And there were some legends on the CBS side who worked there. It was funny. I remember the CNN was just getting started and they were referred to derisively as the Chicken Noodle Network. They did a pretty good job.

[A]

Great.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

Well, cnn, they did well for themselves in the ensuing decade.

[B]

Yes, they did.

[A]

I'm glad to learn of the humble beginnings. Well, perhaps when that documentary is released more widely we could talk about it in more depth on this show. But for now we've covered a lot of ground today and it is again beautiful weather.

[B]

We missed one thing.

[A]

What did we miss?

[B]

The curry. Oh, we did Are we going to be. Should we all start shopping at the Steph Curry Leaning stores?

[A]

Well, I don't think Leaning has much of a presence in the United States, but will have a bigger footprint in China over the next 10 years. $400 million for Steph Curry across the next 10 years. A deal that will encompass basketball products, athleisure, and a full golf line for Steph, who is a big golfer.

[B]

I'm skeptical of what. I mean. Well, Shaq had shoes. I mean, Dwayne Wade has shoes. How. How do they sell? Are they good? Do we know how big they are?

[A]

No, neither of their shoes did any. Did very well. Klay Thompson had his own line of Leaning Kyrie also. I think. I don't think there's going to be any inroads made in the United States, but I think this is more about Leaning securing its place in China and sort of further entrenching its dominance and maybe making some inroads in Europe. Who could say? What the. I think they're like 97% of their revenue comes from the mainland, though. So, yeah, bad news for Nike in China, if nothing else.

[B]

And how, you know. And then the question is, how good is Steph Curry's brand as he, you know, goes off in retirement? Maybe it's still great.

[A]

Yeah, it. I. I don't think it's been good for several years. It wasn't going well with Under Armour, so this is a. Yeah, that. Right.

[B]

I mean, parachute for him Under Armoured wasn't particularly successful, right?

[A]

No, it wasn't. So this was really the. This was a more logical move. And Nike was not going to give Steph Curry $400 million because they're already paying a lot of money to LeBron James and Kevin Durant and some of the other biggest names of the generation. I'm still deciding how I feel about all of it. I may write about Steph and Li Ning later in the week here, but,

[B]

I mean, I understand there's a lot of money, but I just. I'm more skeptical on the business side just because I. It's sort of like he's. He's past his peak. So the one they should go for is the Shaolin monk trainee in the NBA Finals. Wemby. No, seriously, like, you could do. I mean, it's not as a Buddhist temple, but you can do the way of Wemby. Right, but that would have. He'd have to go spend some time at a Taoist temple. But, you know, there's gotta be all sorts of ways, you could especially if the spurs win. How you could do like the the Chinese branch should be all over Wemby given his time at the Shaolin Temple.

[A]

So Wemby would be open to it. He's clearly had a great time in China. And the issue there is Nike is not going to let Wemby walk out the door under any circumstances.

[B]

So they should do more for like China specific with him if, especially if they win because he's got a great. I mean again, you get all.

[A]

There's no one bigger in the world. Maybe literally 7 foot 5 and all

[B]

he has to say if they win is, you know, I credit my, you know, my, my improvement this year to my time with the challenge.

[A]

You know what? I'm sure if he wins, the monks will come up in the post game press conference. So we shall see. But the NBA Finals tips Wednesday night and we'll continue for the next.

[B]

Who do you think is going to win?

[A]

I picked the Knicks, which surprised me. I don't really trust the Knicks that much, but I think it's a favorable matchup for New York and Wemby will be tested more in this series than he was in the previous series against the defending champion Thunder. So are you going with Wemby?

[B]

I mean I'd like disperse to win. What can I say? Yeah, I just, you know I'm a, I grew up a Commander Redskins Commanders fan. I just New York. I can't deal with New York sports team.

[A]

Fair enough. Fair enough. The NFC east rivalries run.

[B]

I look at the Knicks as like the Giants of basketball. I mean even though the Washington basketball team is will suck for my entire lifetime, I'm sure.

[A]

Yep, right around the corner. I hear you though maybe they'll trade

[B]

it for Steph Curry for the last what's most important.

[A]

Yeah, again Steph he the peak is. Is behind Steph Curry. So I would not be surprised if Steph is traded to the Wizards at some point and paid way too much money. But what's most important is the Oklahoma City Thunder, who are a scourge on the sport, did lose in the Western Conference final. So I'm eternally grateful to Victor Wembanyama and the Shaolin Monks. On that note, Bill, we will come back next week and keep it rolling for now. Enjoy the rest of your week and I will talk to you on the other side.

[B]

Thanks Andrew. Thanks everybody.