← Sharp China with Bill Bishop
Sharp China with Bill Bishop
The U.S., China and Iran; A PRC-Pakistan Peace Plan; KMT Chair Set to Visit China; Huawei, Manus and ZXMOTO
00:57:15
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- [00:00]
A
Foreign. Welcome back to another episode of Sharp China. I'm Andrew Sharp and on the other line, Bill Bishop. Bill, how you doing?
- [00:14]
B
I'm doing well, Andrew. How are you? Happy April Fool's Day.
- [00:18]
A
Indeed. This will publish April 2nd, but we're recording Wednesday, April 1st here. No April Fool's jokes on the podcast, though. Can we make that?
- [00:27]
B
Come on. You don't want to tell them.
- [00:29]
A
Okay, yeah, I think I'm all set.
- [00:32]
B
Set.
- [00:33]
A
It's a beautiful day in Washington and we made it to April. That's what's most important here.
- [00:37]
B
I wish this were an AI generated podcast and we're in the dog park with our dogs because it's already 80 degrees out and beautiful. But we are in person, sadly.
- [00:45]
A
That's right. Well, and hey, I'm in a good MOOD despite the 10 minutes we spent before recording the podcast on how obsolete we're all going to be as the AI tools proliferate and continue to develop here. It sounds like your daughters are going to be dominating the future, which is the silver lining in the midst of all.
- [01:07]
B
We'll see. Right now I'm just trying to figure out. I mean, we're definitely in the. You're going to get disrupted, either disrupt yourself or be disrupted. So I'm trying to figure out how to disrupt yourself. Yes. Have a little more active input into the disruption.
- [01:20]
A
There you go. Yeah, well, and it takes time to do that. That's on my agenda for the spring. A goal is to incorporate Claude code and who knows what else into my daily workflow here. For now, the war in Iran continues and we've got a bunch of different headlines to discuss at the top of the show. First headline is from Bloomberg. China, Pakistan issued joint call for peace and reopening Hormuz. And Bloomberg writes the two countries call for the protection of vessels and crews in and around the Strait of Hormuz and the restoration of normal navigation as soon as possible. China and Pakistan said dialogue and diplomacy are the only viable paths to resolving the conflict, stressing respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of countries in the region, including Iran and Gulf states. They backed the launch of peace talks and said parties should refrain from the use or threat of force. So, Bill, we have to mention this at the top, do you think that there's anything about that peace plan that was put forward earlier in the week that might bear on what happens in Iran in the weeks and months to come?
- [02:35]
B
Hard to say. It's hard to know how much, if at all, either side, Pakistan or China, coordinated with either the US or the Iranians or any of the other key countries in the Gulf, like Saudi Arabia, uae, for example. Yeah, China put this out. It sounds good in theory. Neither are really players in this conflict. It's ultimately going to come down to obviously what President Trump decides really on his own. And I think today there was news, there's potentially maybe direct conversations there in unclear. I mean, China is, you know, they're, they're, they're watching it from afar. They are obviously affected in many ways, some very negative, some actually positive for China. This is a way of them putting out there again, you know, we're a responsible power. We want to, you know, this is the right way to solve this issue. It's not dissimilar, I think, from sort of the points they put out. Some of the points they put out for the Russian Ukraine conflict, which of course that initiative has gone nowhere.
- [03:30]
A
Right. It did remind me of the peace plan that was like 2023, maybe it was a couple of years ago where they put out that elaborate peace plan that ultimately did not really make a difference in terms of how that conflict was unfolding.
- [03:44]
B
But then there's a good scholar named Jonathan Fulton. I think we're going to talk about another post a little further down in the podcast. But this morning you put out a post on this plan and he sort of listed the Chinese exploit plans for X as a number exploit plans for the Middle east since 2013. And he comes up with seven of them, including this one and you know, several around Palestine and Israel. One was around Syria. Ultimately, you know, he describes as consistency the political solution, political solution rather than force, emphasis on non interference and sovereignty, focus on UN international law. But ultimately none of them went anywhere.
- [04:23]
A
Yeah, that is good context because, because
- [04:26]
B
I think ultimately his point is that Beijing didn't actually do anything to operationalize or implement these plans, as he writes. And I mean that's, you know, again, China, China has influence but has less stencil, I think people assume. But also they don't, they don't want this, they don't, you know, they want this to be resolved. But again, it's one of those things where it's, it's, it has, and I think it's the, I'm not the math major, my kids are. But I think, I don't know if you call it like multivariable impact or multifunctional impact on time. It's not a binary like good or bad for China. Right. There are many different moving pieces here. David Redding, the Economist, had a good column Today he just spent a couple weeks in China where he says, you know, talking a bunch of scholars and former officials and he just says, look, you know, the Chinese are, you know, a short war would be bad. A relatively long war that sucks in the US and makes the US look, you know, weak. It would be great like up to two months. After two months, I'm paraphrasing here, we put it in the show notes after two months, then it becomes a real problem for China because of the impact it has across the global economy for a lot of Chinese trading partners, export markets as well as inputs for Chinese own, China's own industry.
- [05:30]
A
Right. I mean, they need the Strait of Hormuz open for their own industries, number one. And then also for the global economy and the depression that seems inevitable, inevitable if it stays closed for much longer.
- [05:43]
B
But also, I mean, you're seeing increasing stress and you know, in Europe and throughout Asia, Southeast Asia, I mean, all these, in Africa, I mean, the world is having, you know, many countries are starting to have fuel shortages. Most of these countries don't care about Iran. They're happy to, they'll just buy Iranian oil. They don't care about what's going on in the Gulf in terms of, you know, whether or not Iran gets a nuclear weapon or is funding proxies, you know, et cetera in the region. They just want their cheap, they want their, their energy supplies. And so I think for a lot of countries, they're pissed at the U.S. china is very well positioned to take advantage of that. Both, I think they sent some fuel shipments to places like the Philippines, other Southeast Asian nations in the, in the last few days. But also, you know, you think about how the Chinese, you know, external propaganda apparatus works. You know, the Trump administration completely disarmed through Doge, right. Getting rid of all the, all the US government external propaganda operations. They just can control, you know, dominate sort of the narrative around this is all, all your chaos and pain and shortages and you know, lines at gas stations and reduced work schedules are because of, you know, the US Sort of war of choice, hegemonic US words of choice, where they don't care about anybody else. Right. And so that's something that will be a benefit to China.
- [06:56]
A
Yeah, well, and that's sort of what I wondered. And when I, when I was reading the peace plan here, it was a five point peace plan. Part of what I wondered was, is this just an exercise in optics? China here, because they can't honestly believe that this is going to make a difference in the resolution they're putting, they're
- [07:17]
B
putting a flag in the ground saying, you know, again, we are, here's a plan. We're the responsible power. We're trying to uphold international law, yada, yada, yada. And again, some people probably buy it. I think a lot of people will buy into it and also a lot of people just don't. We shouldn't underestimate. I mean, we're in D.C. there's, you know, we shouldn't underestimate the anger towards America right now.
- [07:38]
A
Yeah, no. And the pain.
- [07:39]
B
And the pain that, you know, whether or not you want to go through the argument and you. That sort of collective view of sort of why Iran is a problem for a lot of reasons and for a lot of countries, but for most people in the world, they don't give a shit. No. Right. And so, and so they. It would have been much easier for the entire war chaos for them and messing up their own lives individually. Right, right.
- [08:00]
A
Not prosecuting this war right now would have been preferable for literally the entire world. And they all would have chosen to kick the can the road regardless of what the consequences might be a couple years from now. I mean, many countries in Europe, for instance, are facing tremendous economic pressure as it is, even before the war started. So there's lots of frustration in the wake of all this and in the midst of all this. On the point on opera.
- [08:29]
B
OPERA operation operationalized.
- [08:33]
A
Operationalized. Thank you so much. I do wonder, if the US were to walk away, would China play any role in opening the Strait of Hormuz? I've seen that proposed by other geopolitical analysts. Do you think that there's a role for them to play?
- [08:53]
B
I think they cut a deal. I think the Iranians, I think, haven't they said it will just be close to us and Israeli ships and you know, and I mean that ultimately it's a global energy market will have an impact on prices. But, you know, China doesn't. I don't. I think the Iranians, again, they also need to sell oil. They need the revenue. So they're not going to like screw the Chinese on this. I mean, this is, this is. The Chinese don't have to do anything, I don't think.
- [09:14]
A
Okay, so they are happy to stay on the sidelines regardless of what happens.
- [09:18]
B
I mean, you know, again, we have, we have to be careful quoting Economist covers at least when it comes to economic issues given, you know, sort of the dream Jim Cramer of covers effect. But this week's one is, has a nice, you know, picture of Trump and Xi and Xi. The bubble of text above his head is never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake.
- [09:37]
A
I've seen that bandied about from the beginning of this.
- [09:39]
B
I think there's certainly, you know, again, there's certainly. You sort of look at some of the writings from various Chinese scholars. I mean, there's certainly a belief that the US Is potentially making a mistake. But again, a quick ending to this war where actually the, you know, Iranian capabilities were destroyed and the Straits reopen and things get back to normal as fast as possible. Even though there's gonna be some lag because real damage has been done, then it looks less like a mistake from the US Side. Right now, we're not trending in that way. One of the things I think that will be interesting is Tonight, again, we're April 1st. We're about noon, April 1st. In about nine hours, President Trump is going to give a speech to the. About the conflict and the leaking so far, or his comments to reporters so far. I think ones who have a cell phone number are, you know, that he's going to bash NATO and again, say he maybe wants to withdraw from NATO because he's really, you know, he's, he's angry that, you know, none of the NATO countries or most of the NATO countries didn't offer any support. Some, I think, like Spain, you know, allow basing of US Assets used in the, in the campaign. France, I think, was denying overflights. UK had some issues. NATO fracturing is something that would make Beijing very happy. Why is that during the Biden administration. Right. When, you know, there was much more of an effort to do a united front against China, including NATO countries, EU countries, Japan, you know, there was talk of NATO opening office in Asia, in Japan. Right. The Chinese went nuts. Right.
- [11:05]
A
Yeah.
- [11:06]
B
You know, Naito, again, is a problem for Russia. Right. Which is, you know, China's call it an ally of people, you know, China's friend, so. So to speak. But the fracturing of NATO also would mean this broader fracturing of any hope of the US creating some sort of a united front with like the sort
- [11:25]
A
of a security coalition. Right. That.
- [11:27]
B
And it's an economic one, too, because it, again, it also, it also helps poisons the economic cooperation in a lot of sectors which China, China loves. Divide and conquer. Divide and conquer. And the Chinese will win every day.
- [11:38]
A
Yeah. And in the event of a Taiwan invasion, do you have people who you can rely on to, let's say, embargo Chinese trade or apply pressure in all sorts of Economic ways, even if they're not sending assets to the Pacific to help stave off Chinese aggression, I think
- [11:58]
B
it potentially reduces that likelihood. If only that. What you see is, you know, again, divide and conquer with the NATO countries, with EU countries, you end up with, in some cases, more reliance on China. I know the EU countries keep talking about how they, you know, they're, you know, the China shock Germany now. Yeah, right. And they're, and they're honestly been, you know, again, they've really have gotten, I think, quite dysfunctional and they just are not at the point where they can address these issues. And you see it with, you know, Germany, you see it with France. It just, it. China, I mean, again, China, if, if China weren't supporting Russia, if the war in Ukraine ended and China stopped supporting Russia or, or, or no longer had to support Russia because the war was over, I think they would make a lot more progress in the EU than they've done. I mean, the, the thing is, is if there were no Russian invasion of Ukraine, China would have a much, much, much better relationship with the eu that I think would. Would even be made even better given the stresses between the US and the EU that have intensified under the Trump administration.
- [12:59]
A
No, there's no question about it. I mean, there was a wide open lane for China to go down. And the problem there is that, you know, the PRC is the prc, and they have existing relationships with Putin and similar ideologies.
- [13:14]
B
I mean, they also think, I think they believe that it ultimately, the EU countries have no choice because China's just too big and too powerful and economically too powerful. And they need the market they get. They, you know, they need the clean energy, they need the clean tech, and what other choices do they have? So ultimately, the Europeans are going to have to suck it up and take it well.
- [13:33]
A
And as we bounce around at the top here, I mentioned a bunch of different items. One item was this op ed from Adam Toos in the Financial Times this week. The headline was A Blueprint for Chinese Global Leadership. What Should China Do? This is the strategic question. He writes. It is a truism of the moment that China is the last adult in the room. Not sure that's actually a truism.
- [13:55]
B
Toos is. He's coming off the Chinese informant. Tooz is a Columbia professor. He's really good at economic history. He's, he's kind of. I should say he's gone off the deep end on the Chinese stuff, and he's very much. There's a reason why all the Chinese propaganda Outlets love to quote him and interview him. He's. He's gone off the deep end.
- [14:11]
A
Right. I don't know that it's a truism of the moment that China is the last adult in the room. But he writes, if China chose to play the part, global leadership would be there for the taking. If you were drafting a five point plan for Chinese hegemony at a think tank in Beijing, it might look like this, and it continues from there. And that piece went viral, but the
- [14:31]
B
Chinese don't want it.
- [14:32]
A
Well, see, that's my question is like, does China want global leadership along the lines of what the US has been doing for the last 75 years?
- [14:42]
B
No, they're not stupid. And that's why also, like the fact that Tuz wrote this was kind of a head scratcher, because it's projecting maybe on someone who, who, you know, wants the US to be replaced, but not really understanding what the Chinese actually want. This is not how they operate.
- [14:58]
A
Yeah, well, and that's the thing that I find interesting is like twos. He lays out a number of proposals that aren't particularly realistic, like exporting Chinese oil reserves to Europe or demanding a ceasefire in Ukraine and refusing to export critical minerals to Russia and Ukraine to try to enforce that ceasefire. Like those are things that China would simply never do, in part because the PRC needs gas and oil from its relationship with Russia, but also like the material benefits to the PRC in that scenario aren't very well articulated. And he came out afterward and said the point of the piece was that US behavior has made it very easy for China to potentially establish global leadership if they want it. And it should be telling to everyone how easy that now looks. I would also say, though, that the PRC has proven to be pretty smart and strategic, and it should be equally telling that China has seen the sacrifices the US has made economically and, you know, with its currency and with security guarantees all over the world. And China's looking at all that and saying, well, we would never make any of those sacrifices. That makes absolutely no sense. Like the bargain that the US has struck for global leadership, at least in the eyes of the Chinese, looks like a losing bargain. And that's why I would be pretty surprised if they were out there trying to secure the strait of Hormuz six to 12 months from now, if that's what's required.
- [16:25]
B
They don't need to. They'll cut it. They'll cut a deal with the Iranians. I mean, again, I anyway this.
- [16:30]
A
But helping on behalf of the other Asian countries that need it. Australia, Europe, I mean, they do. If it's just China that's getting shipments through this Strait of Hormuz, as we've said, like they're,
- [16:45]
B
it's all these other countries, you know, that aren't involved in the war effort. Right. And so if there is a deal like that, the Chinese can certainly claim leadership and claim like they did all this stuff for these other countries and it will then benefit back to them for sure.
- [16:56]
A
And that was a strange scenario for them.
- [16:58]
B
That was a strange op ed. I'm now sort of waiting whether or not see he shows up on Tucker Carlson's podcast too. Sort of following, following on Jeffrey Sack. There's something in the water at Columbia.
- [17:07]
A
The Jeffrey Sachs talking points. Always great. We need global governance as well. Yeah. It'll be interesting to see what emerges. But again, I think it should be clarifying in terms of what the US role has been over the last 75 years and why the US is now reevaluating some of its commitments. Because a country like China looks at it and says, absolutely not. That's crazy. We're selfish.
- [17:31]
B
We can't afford it. I mean, Trump isn't wrong necessarily about that.
- [17:35]
A
Right. So that goes a long way.
- [17:38]
B
We certainly argue about where we are. Yeah. We can certainly have a long argument or not about how he's going about it. But I think generally speaking, it's, you know, it does has become unaffordable.
- [17:48]
A
Right. And I think has recognized that problem for about 20 to 25 years now. And it's now hitting a tipping point. It'll be interesting to see what happens with Naito. I mean, I think the sobering and clarifying takeaway from the past month is that the relationship with Europe is going to get worse before it gets better. And it may not get better at all. We'll have to wait and see.
- [18:12]
B
No, and that again, that is an opportunity for China.
- [18:15]
A
Yeah, yeah. Well, and I the downside risk for China is that in the midst of all this, over the last month, the US Is deepening ties with energy partners in the Middle east who actually have a lot more leverage over the PRC than anyone in Europe does. And then at the same time, what's happening with NATO is the US Is building a narrative with the US Public that is going to put more pressure on European allies to actually act like allies and more pressure than there's been on European allies.
- [18:47]
B
And I think a lot of them won't. A lot of them don't want any, anything to do with this.
- [18:50]
A
So what's happening is there are new alliances being formed and deepened in the Middle east. And then preexisting alliances that were increasingly hollow may end up just being fractured entirely or some of them may end up being fortified at the end of this.
- [19:05]
B
But, but, but, you know, ultimately, you know, again, if whatever the resolution is to Iran, if they're still a big oil exporter, which I think they will be again, it's a global market. If that, that oil is going on the global market, it's going to. Whether or not China is directly buying Iranian oil, they're going to be buying oil and it'll be cheaper.
- [19:21]
A
Well, they'll be buying Iranian oil, but will they be able to buy Saudi oil or buy from the uae? And why would they not?
- [19:30]
B
Why, why would, I mean, why would any of these countries join in some sort of coalition that's like block China, for example, even our Taiwan, they don't care.
- [19:37]
A
The US Is currently guaranteeing their security in the midst of this war and
- [19:43]
B
I would guess trying to.
- [19:44]
A
Yeah, yeah. That I think is what's happening here, is that there's now more of a coalition among those countries with the United States. But again, the news changes every single week here. And who knows how much longer this war will last or whether US Operations will be remembered as successful at the end of all of it. Jonathan Fulton of the China Mena newsletter, not mincing words you said in the substack chat. Since this war started, I've seen lot, I've seen a lot of pieces from think tankers in D.C. who try to explain why this has something to do with China. And frankly, I usually just skip past them. They're mostly garbage. And it's become very clear that the war has more to do with a broken decision making process in an administration full of enabling careerist cowards and a president very much out of his depth. And a lot of these pieces are written by people hoping to hitch their wagons. So rather than reading hacks that haven't actually studied anything about China, here is some commentary from China that should give you a sense of what Chinese analysts think about.
- [20:53]
B
It's, I mean, the way he sort of. Yeah, he goes through the analysis. It's an interesting, you know, it's an interesting post in sort of giving a perspective of what, what the, what the conversation, what the conversations look like. Yeah. At least what we can see publicly. I mean, one thing too, back to the whole this is about China. I mean, if you listen to the US officials, most recently Marco Rubio, about what this war is about, what the objectives were. They were 1, destruction of the Air Force, 2. Destruction of the Navy 3, severe diminishing of their missile launching capability and for destruction of their factories so they can't make more missiles and drones to threaten us in the future. That's it. That's where they've narrowed it down to. And so whether or not the successful destruction of all those things, if that were to happen, has some sort of blowback on China. Okay, we can have discussion. But the idea again that this is some sort of broader strategic plan, you know, 4, 5, 6, maybe now it's Trump. So 8D chess about China, 16 dimensional chess.
- [21:52]
A
Well, maybe it's not 16 dimensional. Maybe it's very clearly three dimensional chess and it very clearly bears on China's future and the US Ability to deter Taiwan.
- [22:05]
B
But even the idea that somehow the u. This is the US now controls oil and if they, if this goes well for the US and then China's screwed again. You're asking a. The people making argument are asking a lot about how oil flows get disrupted and controlled in the global market.
- [22:18]
A
Yeah.
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B
And how many countries who really need
- [22:20]
A
oil revenue would want to oil, petrochemicals, natural gas. I mean there's a lot that is going to Asia and not go to
- [22:29]
B
the U.S. so anyway, I. We'll see. Again, I just think that the trajectory now is that this, I think the net benefit, there's a net benefit to China of this operation in Iran that could change. But I am and we've had this
- [22:46]
A
the Economist cover man. Never interrupt your enemy while he's making a mistake. I whatever you need to tell yourself
- [22:54]
B
editors at the current moment, obviously things can change. But my point is that I just will. I just, I am very allergic to the argument that somehow this is part of some grand Trump strategic plan. Just having some information about how they do their decision making.
- [23:11]
A
The decision making I can't speak to. However, I will say reading the Jonathan Fulton excerpt there, I just appreciate it coming from the sports world where people tend to be no holds barred in their writing.
- [23:26]
B
I really appreciate the takes. Cowards maybe, I don't know, maybe if you listen to this podcast you probably are offended or unhappy with his take. But it's just out there and it's, you know.
- [23:39]
A
Well, I just appreciate it as entertaining writing. I mean I like you posted it in the cynicism chat and I didn't join the chat but I like I found the post to be useful as a roundup of all the different readings
- [23:53]
B
of war in China for some discussion Right, absolutely.
- [23:58]
A
The framing there. The idea, though, that you shouldn't listen to the Americans who are explaining why this is a setback for China. And serious analysis pays close attention to the Chinese analysts who say the war is not really that big a deal and perhaps even strategically beneficial. So that's where I do sort of bump up against the logic. But I think he's honestly conveying what a lot of people in D.C. believe.
- [24:24]
B
And he joined the chat. He said, I'm just trying to give perspective. The Chinese sort of thinkers on this.
- [24:29]
A
Yeah. And I think that is a useful counterpoint to the insane conversation that continues to unfold in our country, where, I mean, I honestly, I think Trump's involvement in any of this just makes it impossible for anyone to have a conversation about the implications.
- [24:46]
B
Look at, like, the strategic, you know, the idea that, like, the strategic claim about China. I just go back to Treasury Secretary Bass, who was absolutely clueless when he went into the negotiation with China that their Chinese are playing with a pair of twos.
- [24:57]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [24:58]
B
They happen to be a pair of, like, two. Two of the most valuable, rarest magnets right in the world.
- [25:04]
A
There are more rarest than that.
- [25:06]
B
Crafted into a really strong vice that was that applied to parts of the president's anatomy to keep squeezing until they had to basically back down.
- [25:15]
A
Yeah. See, and I hate to be the Trump administration apologist on the podcast here, because I definitely have mixed feelings about everyone, but I think Bassett was talking about the domestic economy, and he wasn't wrong that the domestic economy was weak and is a source of vulnerability.
- [25:33]
B
They didn't understand how much leverage China had. They do now. Right. Which is why you hear, you know, even the last meeting they had in. Where was the last meeting? Do you remember? This is a couple weeks ago.
- [25:43]
A
Was it Paris?
- [25:44]
B
Yeah. I got to guess I think we
- [25:45]
A
added Paris to the sharp China, US
- [25:48]
B
China meeting on the discussion because in spite of a deal, some US Companies are still having problems getting rarest that they thought they wouldn't be having problems. And so the US Is still having to push for that.
- [26:03]
A
Well, speaking of meetings, a follow up on last week's podcast, that is old news.
- [26:09]
B
We know what we're doing here, right?
- [26:11]
A
Yeah. Well, I mean, now we have Trump and Xi meeting in May. The first visit to China for a US President in eight years. Or Trump's first visit to China. Actually, Biden never went to China, so, yes, the first visit in eight years. It has been officially rescheduled in the context of that meeting and what may be achieved Jameson Greer gave an interview this week where he said the Chinese want stability, we want stability. I actually see a positive agenda with China going forward where we learn to manage our trade with each other. What do you make of that messaging from Greer?
- [26:47]
B
So a couple of these one, it's consistent with this idea of like a board of trade to sort of manage how manage trade between the US and identify areas where the two countries can happily trade. I think the Chinese are not as I understand, you know, they're not really super excited about that, but they'll go along to, they'll indulge. Yeah, but you know, it's, it's, you know, Greer I think talked about it's like low tuck goods from China. The problem is China's also really aggressively quickly moving up the value chain. And so that will just lead to more tension, more frictions as the Chinese are exporting really good high tech goods to the rest of the world. And if the U.S. you know, and they can't get in the U.S. market. I think he also was out there, he needed to clean up. The White House press spokesman had said that there might be cabinet, cabinet officials or secretaries going to China before this, the May meeting. And I think that's not correct. And so I think part of that was he said that won't happen. He also said he didn't expect to have another like Besant Greer meeting with he Lifong and then the Li Chenggang on the Chinese side before the May meeting. Although actually I hear that might be happening. So there's a little bit of a lack of clarity there. He did also in the interview he did also mention rare earths and so how they talked about it at the meeting in Paris. And again, I think the background there is that there have been US Companies going to the US Government saying we're not getting what we're supposed to be getting. So there's still problems. And the US Government I think is on the one hand they've been trying to downplay it because they want to have the deals done and they want everything to look good so that, you know, Trump can have his visit.
- [28:10]
A
And they genuinely want stability in the midst of all this and there's only so much that they can do to lever the Chinese.
- [28:18]
B
So but on the visit, you know, again the, the excuse that the, sorry, the reason given for delaying the visit was, you know, you can't be, you shouldn't be traveling when there's active combat operations. So, you know, we're looking at what is May 14th.
- [28:30]
A
Yes, six.
- [28:30]
B
Six weeks, 30, 44 days, 43 days. So seven weeks. I guess the assumption is one, either that there won't be continued combat operations by then or two, that if there are, he'll just have to delay it again. I think delaying it again would be a real problem. I think then it runs up into some issues on the Chinese side and the Chinese then it might make it less likely that Xi Jinping would travel to the US ahead of, you know, for like an actual summit with Trump in the fall. So I think it's important if they want to sort of have their expected cadence of leader to leader meetings this year. I think it is important that Trump gets there in May and I think it's also important that they have those meetings because they really, they're issues that just aren't going to get resolved at any level below Trump and Xi.
- [29:11]
A
Well, and I mean, look, they were supposed to be meeting in Beijing today as we record this podcast. So an extra six weeks of cushion is probably welcome for both sides. I know that the US doesn't want to go there until there's more clarity and resolution on the Iran war side. And so that's the headline news is this is now a date by which we can all expect the Iran war to have concluded one way or another.
- [29:42]
B
Let's hope so.
- [29:43]
A
But to be continued, we'll see whether that actually materializes. But I think that's everybody's takeaway is okay. We now know when the US wants to be done with Iran, so time will tell. Lower stakes US China news Bloomberg Beijing summoned the US's top envoy to Hong Kong after the consulate posted an alert about new rules giving authorities the power to demand passwords for smartphones or other devices in national security investigations. The meeting followed a March 26 security alert from the US Consulate General warning that it is now a criminal offense for anyone, including US citizens to refuse to provide police with passwords or decryption access for personal electronic devices. So I saw that Hong Kong travel advisory from I believe the State Department last week. Is that law in Hong Kong stronger than the law if I were traveling to Beijing? Like, how remarkable is that development in Hong Kong?
- [30:49]
B
Well, it's remarkable for Hong Kong. I mean, the Chinese, the Hong Kong government tried to sort of clarify, sort of walk it back so that it, you know, there had to be like a national security reason. It's pretty clear that like in China,
- [31:02]
A
mainland China, pretty broad definition of what constitutes national security.
- [31:06]
B
Right, Right. I think the Hong Kong government, though, realized that, you know, the media coverage was Pretty negative for Hong Kong. But then also the US Travel advisory was, you know, again, just saying assume you're traveling. It's like traveling to. If you were traveling to, you know, Russia, China, North Korea with sort of how you deal with devices. But if I, you know, but at the same time, the U.S. government can, you know, access any devices at the border.
- [31:30]
A
Yeah, probably.
- [31:31]
B
I mean, this is no. To know your devices aren't safe wherever you travel. So either, you know, take burner devices, but ultimately you could tell sensitivity because
- [31:39]
A
the US Would turn people away and not let them into the country. They wouldn't necessarily throw them in jail. Although, look, look, there's no illusions about what the government can do in any country. But this is the letter of the law would allow Hong Kong to jail people if they're not decrypting their phones and sharing passwords. Is there a similar law in Beijing or would that be more of an unwritten situation where you still should feel good about the security of your devices?
- [32:08]
B
So, I mean, you've seen reports of Chinese police doing it to people on the streets in China. I think if they come up to you and say, well, let me, you know, we want to look at your phone.
- [32:16]
A
And you say, no, it could end badly.
- [32:19]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [32:20]
A
Okay.
- [32:20]
B
Well, what exactly the league. I mean, again, there, there. I actually, it probably is legally justified. I just don't know what law that would be, but I would, I would. If you're in Beijing and the police officer comes and says, I want to look at your phone, good luck resisting.
- [32:34]
A
Okay. All part of the rich pageant here. Well, we shall see. And we'll return to US China next week. For now, we will shift back to the mainland here. KMT Chairwoman Chung Liwen will head a delegation to visit Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing from April 7th to 12th. And it is not confirmed that she will meet with Xi Jinping, but that is the expectation you write, especially since the PRC announcement of the visit stated CPC Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping welcome and invite KMT Chairwoman Chung Liwen to lead a delegation visit. And the KMT obviously is the opposition party in Taiwan. Can you put that news in context for people? What does it mean that the leader of Taiwan's opposition party is likely meeting with Xi jinping in about 10 days.
- [33:27]
B
Well, I mean, so the KMT, the Guomindang, I mean, they're the. They're the opposition party now. They obviously, they were the party. They were Tankai Shex Party. They were the party against which the Communist Party had a civil war in the 40s. You know, she would be, I think, the fourth chair of the KMT to visit China since 2005. The first was Lianjian, and then there was Hong Xiuzhu in 2016, and then Ma Ying Jeou, who he was exceptional because he was also the former president when he went. And then it would be the only one going this time. You know, the Chinese, the mainland, they prefer to work with the kmt. They see the kmt. You know, the KMT is less, very much less, the sort of quote unquote, pro independence party that the TPP is seen as. And so this is a, you know, it's only one became, you know, I think last, I forget, sometime late last year, she became chair of the kmt. She is very much saying all the right things about working with the mainland and we're all Chinese that, you know, the Beijing wants to hear. And so, you know, they, I think they, you know, they would love it if she were to become president. And, you know, she's someone they can work with. This visit, I think is quite controversial, not just in the sort of dpp, but also just even among the kmt. It's not unanimous that this is a good idea that she goes, because this is not, this is not some peace offering from Xi Jinping and the Communist Party. This is effectively, you know, divide and conquer.
- [34:48]
A
Yeah.
- [34:49]
B
But the good news is, you know, worrying about where sort of how does the mainland look at resolving the Taiwan question? You know, have they given up on any possibility of some sort of a peaceful accommodation and therefore they're going to have to move towards coercion or outright invasion. Her being terror, her making this visit, it's part of a. Continues to keep the hope alive that there's a way to find a political solution here.
- [35:14]
A
Right.
- [35:15]
B
And so from that perspective, it's a good thing.
- [35:18]
A
As long as there's that carrot, you can sort of mollify the more aggressive impulses on the PRC side and keep hope alive and potentially keep hope alive
- [35:29]
B
so that at least the status quo can be maintained for, you know, again, as we've discussed many times, that is the, that is, that's what they want. Well, that is, that is the best case scenario here. And, and so we'll see. But at least from, I think from the Beijing perspective, this is a. Hope is not lost. Right. They can still, they can still continue to think that, you know, this is a possibility. It's interesting, you know, she'll be there before the Trump visit. So whether or not what, you know, Again, I assume I'd be very surprised if she, if she doesn't meet with Xi Jinping. But whether or not the visit and sort of the way what Xi says, what the Chinese leadership says, what the propaganda says about the meeting, how that feeds back into the Trump Xi summit, where Taiwan, I think is clearly going to be on the agenda, that'll be interesting to see because again, I think President Trump is not Taiwan. I think for him, I think related Taiwan is just even weapon sales are basically they're not strategic from my understanding. They're just more of like a trade deal.
- [36:33]
A
Yeah. More people to buy US Weapons and
- [36:37]
B
buy US Weapons that we can't deliver.
- [36:39]
A
Yeah.
- [36:40]
B
We couldn't deliver them anyway and now it's going to take even longer.
- [36:44]
A
Lord only knows when those weapons will be delivered. In any event, I guess we'll hear more over the next couple of weeks in terms of what emerges from any potential meeting between Chung and Xi. To close here, we'll go with a couple tech stories and a motorcycle story first from Reuters. Customer testing of Huawei's new AI chip has gone well, and big tech giants including ByteDance and Alibaba plan to place orders, two people familiar with the matter said. Despite a government campaign to encourage the use of domestic semiconductors, the Shenzhen based firm struggled to persuade big tech firms in the private sector to adopt its current flagship chip, the Ascend 910C, in large quantities, industry sources have previously said. This time around, tech firms intend to use Huawei's new 950PR more extensively, much happier now that the chip is more compatible with Nvidia's Cuda software system and has better response speeds, said the two people and a third person with knowledge of those plants. Huawei plans to ship around 750,950 PRs later this year, according to two of the people. So two notes on that chip story from Huawei. First, Leonard Heim, formerly of rand, a great analyst in the chip space, provided some context for what that means. Reportedly 750 Huawei Ascend 950 PRs this year, he wrote on Twitter. That's less than 1% of US designed quality adjusted production, or what Huawei plans to ship all year is what the US Designers churn out in less than a week. And then he finishes the tweet by saying chip making controls have worked like really well. What Reuters calls a milestone is less than one week of US and partner production. The gap is widening now, mostly because of the US AI boom. So did you have any reaction to that line of thinking there.
- [38:52]
B
If Huawei now or come out with Cuda, then Nvidia's moat's still there. So why they need to sell chips?
- [38:57]
A
Well, that's the other piece of it because I like, I honestly come away from this. The, the note that the Chinese companies are more enthusiastic about incorporating these chips because they're compatible with Cuda software and Nvidia software. It's possible that both sides of the chip debate are right here because continuing to sell Nvidia chips have kept these companies hooked on the Cuda software system. And then at the same time, Huawei is struggling to actually produce chips in any meaningful quantities relative to what the US is producing.
- [39:37]
B
Yeah. And what they, and what these companies need. And one of the things too that's interesting, right. Is we're still waiting for the latest Deep SEQ model. We don't know what's going on.
- [39:44]
A
Oh, that's right.
- [39:45]
B
And they had a, they had a huge outage over the weekend. And you know, there have been rumors that the new model was, was a train on Huawei, then it was trained on Blackwell, but it's not there. And it's kind of crazy because things have moved on.
- [39:57]
A
Oh my God. I mean moved on to the point that I forgot we were even waiting on the new Deep SEQ model.
- [40:03]
B
That's what happens.
- [40:04]
A
That's what the cycle has been. It's like, oh, it's coming, it's coming, it's coming. And then four months pass and we
- [40:10]
B
don't hear about you Guy Quinn. You got, we got all these other companies out there that have really good models that keep iterating and you know, some have gone public and you know, they're getting usage open clause driving a huge amount of, you know, token consumption by those folks. And so yeah, it's, it's.
- [40:23]
A
Perhaps the US has an optimal chip policy right this minute.
- [40:28]
B
That's my takeaway. I love, I love your optimism.
- [40:31]
A
Yeah. Look, I just saying both sides of the argument ultimately validated by that.
- [40:36]
B
Well, it'll be interesting because David Sachs is now out. He's at his, his end of his run is the special government employee. His end did.
- [40:43]
A
We'll always have the memories. Yeah.
- [40:45]
B
But I think, you know, at least in Jensen Huang has a direct line of the president now, so it doesn't really matter.
- [40:50]
A
Right. It's not Congress Sachs actually made, but Congress.
- [40:55]
B
I think he made a fair amount of difference at the beginning. At least Congress will have a say. And they seem to be pretty pissed about Nvidia's Exports to China, especially in the wake of those recent revelations of smuggling and attempt. There's another case last week there was announced they actually compliance worked and the chips weren't actually smuggled. But I think that you'll see more from Congress to try and restrict these exports.
- [41:15]
A
I hope so.
- [41:16]
B
And potentially at a veto proof number so that the President has no choice, although he'll just ignore it. Like ignore TikTok if he wants to.
- [41:23]
A
I mean Congress has been pretty hawkish on the chip front on a bipartisan basis for quite some time now and if only because the process here has been broken where Jensen Huang is basically like personally lobbying the President and then the President is making decisions based on those efforts. Yeah, seems like a suboptimal outcome. Although again the net effect of all this has been pretty positive on the US side. So strategically speaking we at least thus far have not suffered any egregious setbacks.
- [41:58]
B
And all these, you know, again they're data issues but all these big bytedance, they all have access to the best Nvidia chips in the cloud overseas. And Huawei is interesting. Huawei is ahead of their NOAA's, I think it's called Noah's Ark. The head of their AI lab just resigned. It's unclear why but Huawei seems to be at least on the actual AI model side. Seems to be have had some real issues over the last few months.
- [42:22]
A
Interesting. Well, and the threat to Nvidia's business and America's tech leadership around the world would be that Huawei and Chinese developers develop an alternate software stack that that AI builders are building on top of
- [42:38]
B
and can produce enough good enough AI chips to actually export in volume and they still can't.
- [42:44]
A
Yeah, and I would expect them to get there eventually. But the key would be keeping the rest of the world on American AI software as opposed to Chinese AI software.
- [42:54]
B
Right. Which is why I think, you know, the Trump administration was right to redo a big chunk of that Biden era AI diffusion rule. Yeah, again that was something that Sachs was certainly behind.
- [43:05]
A
That's true. Yeah.
- [43:06]
B
But all those, all those Middle east data centers, we'll see how secure are they? I mean imagine like one $5,000 drone blowing up a data center with a lot. I mean how many, you know, the ROI of that drone if it takes out a bunch of like Blackwells is pretty high.
- [43:21]
A
Yeah, no kidding. Well, and that's why the US security guarantee is going to be pretty important to those countries. So all part of the landscape, I suppose. The four of Financial Times also A follow up from last week. China has restricted two co founders of Manus from leaving the country as regulators review whether Meta's $2 billion acquisition of the AI agent company violates Beijing's investment rules. That confirms what was sort of implied by the initial reports, but we didn't know when we were talking about it last week that the two co founders of Manus were allegedly exit banned or reportedly exit banned from leaving China.
- [44:05]
B
You know, and it may be that they, the process that they undertook to sort of convert the company to do the Singapore washing. So they converted it to this all starship company. They may have broken rules that are on the books that all VCs and venture lawyers and accountants all know about. And if that's the case, then the Chinese government has a legitimate pretext to get involved in the deal. But then of course it's really not about that. Right. It's about the much broader issue of we don't want AI technology and AI talent leaving the country.
- [44:35]
A
It's almost immaterial as to whether there's some sort of legitimate pretext because the signal to AI talent in the country is going to be the same regardless, which is you're not leaving. And then AI talent abroad that could potentially return to China will see this message and think twice before doing it.
- [44:56]
B
It should be an opportunity for the US and US labs and other, you know, where I guess there's Mistral in France, I mean, you know, but on the US side at least that, you know, one of the problems is the relatively hostile environment towards a lot of Chinese researchers. And so, I mean, I know you certainly some of the companies are trying to mitigate, I mean, places like anthropic and open air, they have lots of.
- [45:17]
A
It's unbelievable how much Chinese born talent there is in all of these.
- [45:22]
B
As Jensen Huang says, It's 50% of the global AI talent pool.
- [45:26]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [45:27]
B
And you know, again this, if you want to win the AA competition, you need the talent. And so the ways to do that are to attract the best talent. And so this is a, this is potentially an own goal. On the Chinese side, the question is whether or not the US labs US government is in a position to actually capitalize, capitalize or there are just other reasons or other problems, other politics that make it. Also the US keep committing own goals too.
- [45:49]
A
Totally. Well, and you can argue it both ways for China because the US is going to continue to have deeper capital markets than China has and it's going to be an attractive off ramp for Chinese AI talent for now, but you
- [46:03]
B
know, the Chinese are really aggressively pushing, building out the capital markets, especially for high tech companies. You look at what came out of the, you know, the recent policies from last year, what's in the 15th Five Year Plan. You look at the successful IPOs of like Chillipool, you know, some other tech firms in Hong Kong and then potentially also in the mainland. There's still a way for some of these folks to make a fair amount
- [46:26]
A
of money, I'm sure.
- [46:27]
B
Yeah. And the Chinese are. And the Chinese understand that they need to fix that. They need to, they need to build, you know, viable pass liquidity for these entrepreneurs and these companies and their investors because they understand that is one of the key sort of Underpinnings of the U.S. innovation Silicon Valley model.
- [46:44]
A
That's right. There's no question they're trying to replicate that. And there are, I'm sure, incredibly attractive exits available to all sorts of startups in China. I just understand
- [46:57]
B
it's still much better in the U.S. but the Chinese have really, I think we're seeing a real shift in how they've thought about understanding the problem and trying to fix it. I don't know if that will be successful.
- [47:06]
A
Yeah, it would be very difficult to be as successful as Silicon Valley has been over the last 25 years, but
- [47:12]
B
lots of countries have tried. If any country is going to pull it off, it's going to be China.
- [47:16]
A
And in the meantime, they want to keep their domestic talent in the country and don't want to risk losing any of these companies to the United States.
- [47:25]
B
And so, and the irony of course is Manus is like, isn't it sort of irrelevant with Open Claw?
- [47:30]
A
And I wondered about that as well.
- [47:32]
B
Another one of these, like over Meta overpays because they're just flailing around, AI kind of of feeling, I don't know.
- [47:39]
A
It's one of those, it's, it's a meta move that at the time was hailed as being incredibly shrewd. I mean, if you go Back to like 6 months ago when they announced this acquisition, it was like, all right, MET is really paying attention. Now they're acquiring this nimble startup and this is great. And now it's like, well, what difference could Manus possibly make in a world of Codex and Claude code, but Open
- [48:05]
B
Claw and, you know.
- [48:06]
A
Yeah, no, exactly. So who could say? It has not necessarily been a string of hits for Meta over the last couple of years, but it's also, it
- [48:14]
B
also has an impact, I think, on the. Some of the VC firms, some Chinese, several Foreign who were trying to do this model of sort of taking these Chinese firms and washing them into becoming like a global Singapore. Yeah, the Singapore washing or you know, where, where I think the Chinese. This is one of the things is that is that model I think is for anything that's in a sort of a very high tech area, sensitive technology. That model would assume that that model is no longer operative.
- [48:39]
A
Yep, I think that is a fair takeaway from the.
- [48:42]
B
And then the other question will be if this investigation demands proceeds and it really is around not getting the right sort of paperwork filed and permissions for the restructuring, Whether or not they just limit it to going after the company or they also go after some of the investors and the like the law firm, the legal advisors and the accountants. Because all of those folks, this is what they do, they all know the rules.
- [49:02]
A
Ah, right, interesting.
- [49:04]
B
So if this, if these rules were ignored for expedience purpose, expediency purposes or whatever, there is potential blowback from.
- [49:10]
A
There could be crackdown on everybody that was involved in this.
- [49:14]
B
So if the Chinese side, if they really wanted to make the point, they could make that point too. I don't know if that's going to happen, but I don't think it's the probability zero.
- [49:22]
A
Yes. Well, I think best case scenario, Xiao Hong and Ji Yi Xiao, the co founders of Manis, probably taking a pretty considerable haircut on whatever they were getting from the $2 billion.
- [49:35]
B
Well, all the money's offshore, so the question is how do they spit it back out if they'd send it back? I mean, it's going to be interesting how this gets resolved because I think the Chinese, some folks on the Chinese side are certainly aware of the downside risks of being too harsh and the signal it does send to the other. We just talked about the other AI companies, the other AI talent in China.
- [49:52]
A
Okay, well, we'll see what details emerge in the weeks and months to come. Speaking of founders though, we can close with China Daily. On Sunday, French rider Valentin de Beast clinched victory in the second race of the Portugal round on ZX Moto's 820rr after winning the opening race one day earlier. The World Superbike Championship uses production based motorcycles, making it a showcase for manufacturers. The ZX Moto success story began in April 2024 when Zhangshu, a former. Zhangshu, a former mechanics apprentice from Hunan Province, founded the company in Chongqing. The company debuted its inaugural model, the 500RR, at the 22nd China International Motorcycle Trade Exhibition in September 2024. The first deliveries rolled out in March 2025. And by the end of that year, sales had surpassed 25,000 units. By 2026, Zhang revealed a total output value of 750 million yuan, $108 million for the previous year, with an R and D investment of 69.58 million yuan. Bill, did you have any reactions to this story? You flagged it for me and I thought it was pretty awesome.
- [51:18]
B
One, I think, again, and, you know, folks who like to collect Ducatis or, you know, you should buy one of these now too. Right?
- [51:26]
A
Yeah.
- [51:27]
B
I had a former CFO at a former company. He was, he was, I think he had a few Ducatis and yeah, he's got one of these now. But no, but seriously, it's like these, these bikes are obviously amazing. This guy's story is amazing. He, like, has a junior high school education. He, he's been an entrepreneur for, for a really long time. He had a previous company. I fall in with the founder. You know, this, this has been interesting, the interviews, I mean, he's, he's, he's infectious. You watch these interviews with him and you just, it's like, this guy's amazing.
- [51:53]
A
Yeah.
- [51:53]
B
And, you know, he had a bunch of media, of course, this is a big deal. And they were interviewing like, you know, your success. And, you know, they wanted him to say, like what? You know, because he's in Chongqing. Right. What did the Chongqing government do? They didn't do anything. It's like, I came here, they didn't give me any policies. No. So I came here because this is where all the suppliers are. Right?
- [52:08]
A
Yeah.
- [52:08]
B
So he just tapped into again, another one of those ecosystem stories where China builds these ecosystems and then you have these amazing entrepreneurs who can then build on top of it. And very quickly, he's obviously world class.
- [52:20]
A
It's unbelievable. I mean, literally, it's like two years and he's suddenly competing with Ducati.
- [52:26]
B
Yeah. I mean, he's been building stuff for a lot longer than two years, but this company, again, he left the previous company, he's had a falling out with the founder. So I mean, this was, it's not like zero from two years ago in terms of his knowledge, but. Yes. But in terms of actually building this. And, and so again, this is a brand that should start seeing all over the world for at least since they're the high end sort of performance motorcycles. Right. I mean.
- [52:49]
A
Yeah.
- [52:50]
B
And they look pretty cool. I mean, the bikes look pretty cool.
- [52:52]
A
I mean, I haven't, I haven't ridden
- [52:54]
B
the bike since I almost got killed in Taiwan in 1990.
- [52:58]
A
I'm not a discerning motorcycle expert. However, I just thought the story itself, I mean, like, Chongqing is apparently the motorcycle capital of China, was not aware of that. And he was drawn to Chongqing by the abundance of motorcycle parts in the city's markets. And that's. That was. He arrived in 2013. And 13 years later, here we are.
- [53:21]
B
Yeah. And now. And the funny thing, too is now, of course, the government, the Chongqing sort of take credit for it. And of course, you know, like we said earlier, you know, he was asked. Oh, he didn't do anything for me. They were just. All the suppliers were here. I think that story will sort of shift overall because this is. Yeah, evolved because this is a. This is a big win for Chongqing as well. But so, yeah, Chongqing's got the sort of the dystopian future skyscrapers, and now it's got, you know, among the best performance motorcycles in the world.
- [53:46]
A
There you go.
- [53:48]
B
It's got really good food. Right.
- [53:50]
A
So you have ridden a motorcycle, though? You rode one in Taiwan.
- [53:53]
B
I had a nice Honda sort of pocket rocket in Taiwan and almost got killed in a tunnel. Got nicked by car and almost. Almost went down going 60 miles an hour. And that was about it.
- [54:02]
A
Oh, my God, that's incredible. And that was. That was the end.
- [54:05]
B
It was a lot of fun. I was stupid, but it was. It was a lot of fun.
- [54:09]
A
Yeah. I have always known that I would enjoy a motorcycle, but it's just not the. The benefits are not worth the downsides as far as I'm concerned.
- [54:19]
B
So. Yeah. Yeah.
- [54:20]
A
So I've never ridden a motorcycle. Michael Jordan went through a motorcycle phase where he was secretly riding motorcycles at night in Chicago while he was.
- [54:31]
B
While he was in the NBA.
- [54:32]
A
While he was playing in the NBA.
- [54:35]
B
I don't know if that avoided his contract then, but that would avoid any contract now, right?
- [54:39]
A
NBA cost up for you. Yeah, he would go out, he'd ha. He had like, a motorcycle jacket. I think he bought a motorcycle team at one point. But he'd be like riding through the streets of Chicago at 4:00am well, now he's.
- [54:53]
B
And now he's got the NASCAR team. And who knows, maybe you could hook up with Junction and do like a Z Moda, you know, do it. Do a super ZX photo.
- [55:00]
A
I'm sure he would love it. I think Jordan's getting a little long in the tooth, but, hey, he's always been a bit of a psycho, so get him on a motorcycle he'll do well, I'm sure. Final Sharp China Sports update for you. I was told this week. Speaking of off the record gossip, members of the Portland Trailblazers front office are under investigation for tampering to draft young Hansen in last June's NBA.
- [55:29]
B
What?
- [55:30]
A
So that's not public yet either, but apparently.
- [55:34]
B
Oh, it is now, if it's going on the podcast. That's right.
- [55:36]
A
On Sharp Chai. It's not public in the NBA world.
- [55:40]
B
But how do they. How did they tamper?
- [55:43]
A
I don't know. And here's the thing, Bill. They drafted him 25 spots higher than anyone else in the NBA would have
- [55:51]
B
drafted him, Rated him.
- [55:53]
A
Yeah. So it's really unclear what sort of advantages were gained there.
- [55:58]
B
Did they get some deal for like China exposure? Was there some deal, like.
- [56:03]
A
There have been a lot of theories as to what might have been driving.
- [56:08]
B
But he's struggled still in the. In the bush leagues, right? Or is he back up on the team?
- [56:12]
A
I'm sure he's played some in the G League this year, but he's.
- [56:16]
B
Sorry, not the. Not the bush league. Sorry.
- [56:18]
A
It's the same difference. He has struggled in the NBA this season, which I'm sure makes the tampering investigation hurt all the more because it's like, why did we do any of this? But we'll see.
- [56:31]
B
Damn.
- [56:32]
A
If that goes public, we'll have more news in the weeks to come here.
- [56:37]
B
That'll be interesting.
- [56:38]
A
Young Hudson, great kid. I'm rooting for him.
- [56:41]
B
It's not. It's definitely not his. Definitely not his fault.
- [56:43]
A
Exactly. So in any event, great to see you. You can now go enjoy the 80 degree spring weather that we have here in Washington D.C. i hope Tashi is enjoying it as well. And we can come back on the other side next week and keep it rolling through April here.
- [57:01]
B
Pre April fools.
- [57:02]
A
Oh, God.
- [57:04]
B
Talk to you soon. Thanks, Andrew. Thanks, everybody.