← Shift Key with Robinson Meyer
Shift Key with Robinson Meyer
The Biggest Energy and Climate Stories of 2026
00:44:51
A lookahead with Heatmap’s own Emily Pontecorvo, Matthew Zeitlin, and Jillian Goodman.
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- [00:02]
A
You are listening to Shift Key Heat Maps weekly podcast about decarbonization and the shift away from fossil fuels. On this week's show, what is coming up in 2026? Heat Maps writers and editors share our predictions for the new year and the stories we're tracking. We discuss a recent and controversial op ed on climate politics. It's all coming up on Shift Key after this. This episode of ShiftKey is brought to you by Heatmap Pro. Heatmap Pro is the premier platform designed to help user community supported clean energy and data center projects. Heatmap Pro brings all of heatmap's research, reporting and insights down to the local level in a data and intelligence platform that gives you the information you need to navigate political and permitting risk. It's heatmap software platform that tracks all local opposition to clean energy and data centers, forecast community sentiment and guides data driven engagement campaigns. Go to heatmap News Pro to book a demo and see the premier intelligence platform for project permitting and community engagement. That's heatmap News Pro or check it out in the show notes now. Hi, I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding Executive editor of Heat Map News, and you are listening to Shift Key Heat Map's weekly podcast about decarbonization and the shift away from fossil fuels. My co host Jesse Jenkins is off this week. It is Tuesday, December 23, 2025. We are releasing this week's episode a day early because tomorrow is Christmas Eve. I want to wish you a very merry Christmas Eve and very Merry Christmas if you celebrate. The working year is winding to a conclusion and we here at ShiftKey are looking forward. On this week's show, we have a special panel with Heatmaps writers and editors about what we're watching in 2026, what might surprise us, what could happen on the upside, what could happen on the and our predictions for what's coming next. We also discuss a recent op ed from the opinion writer Matt Iglesias in the New York Times, arguing that Democrats should work more closely with the fossil fuel industry. Now, I want to say one thing before we start, which is we recorded this week's discussion unusually early. We recorded it the afternoon of last Friday, December 19th, and since then two things have happened. The first is that a number of people, including former Shift Key guest and sitting US Congressman Sean Kasten, have responded to Matt Iglesias op ed on Twitter. We don't talk about those responses because when we recorded they hadn't happened yet. The second thing is that on Monday, President Trump attempted to freeze all offshore wind projects allegedly due to national security concerns. This is the second time the president has tried to block offshore wind construction due to national security concerns. He tried to block Revolution Wind off the coast of Rhode island for the same reasons. That didn't work. But as you'll hear, we don't talk about the president's new effort to block offshore wind on this episode. I'm sure we will talk about it in the new year, though. So without further ado, though, let's get into it. Let's turn to the biggest topics of 2026. I'm joined now by Heatmap founding staff writer Emily Pontecorvo, Heatmap staff writer Matthew Zeitlin, and on this side of the digital recording studio, Heat Map's deputy editor and also Shift Key's producer, Gillian Goodman. Emily, Matt. Gillian, welcome to the show. And let's go to our discussion now. This past week, the columnist Matt Iglesias wrote in the New York Times, democrats should learn a lesson from the Obama administration, from Mark Carney to the north, from Claudia Sheinbaum to the south in Mexico, and more openly ally with the fossil fuel industry in their politics. I should say this is something that people have talked about, like, privately in climate and energy politics discussions, I would say, for the past several months, in some ways, really since the reconciliation bill and also since Trump began doing things that fossil fuel industry didn't like. But I think Matty Glacier's piece is the first to blow it open in public. Emily, I want to start with you. I'm going to just put you on the spot. Do you think we will see a Democrat openly align with the fossil fuel industry at, like, the, and I think to qualify for this at the congressional level or the presidential primary jockeying level in 2026.
- [04:23]
B
I'm glad you're starting with me because I feel when I read Matt's piece, I felt a little bit confused about what he was even arguing for. Like, I'm not sure I really followed the argument because I don't feel like Democrats are out there saying oil and gas is evil. And we have prominent Democrats like Kathy Hochul already kind of openly supporting the natural gas industry as part of her strategy. So I am like, can you give me an example of what you feel that Matt is actually calling for? Because I, I just, you know, I don't, I don't really see the gap, I guess.
- [05:02]
A
Yeah, I act, I feel like I can. I mean, what, what other people feel a chance to take at this.
- [05:10]
C
I mean, I feel like some specific examples are helpful. So like when there was that Congressional Review act override vote for California's banning of gas powered sales of gas powered cars by 2035, I believe the only Democrat to vote for it, you know, to get rid of the rule, to get rid of the legal structure that allows California to make those rules was Alyssa Slotkin, who's a Democrat from Michigan. I don't think she was so much representing the oil and gas industry so much as the car industry. But obviously the big three in the oil and gas industry are very closely related to. I think another interesting example is Ruden Gallego, the senator from Arizona. So that's like a slightly Republican state. He's widely expected to run for president. You know, he's visiting New Hampshire and he released an energy plan recently that, you know, it's kind of a pretty typical like affordability, reverse the ira, reverse the OBBVA cuts, the IRA focus on developing nuclear geothermal, kind of pretty much down the middle for a moderate Democrat, especially one in a state that has, I think, substantial geothermal and solar resources like Arizona. But another thing he talked about was like the importance of cheap gasoline. And like the policy stuff to that was not like particularly thick, like how to ensure that gasoline stay cheap or that prices don't get too volatile. But it was like he clearly wanted people to see that that was something that he cared about. And I think to Emily's point, it's like when it comes down to it, Democrats, they don't love the oil and gas industry, but they care about that the outputs of the oil and gas industry are plentiful and inexpensive. This is something that the Biden administration really struggled with after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And they came up with some innovative, some nifty policies to support American oil production. But they were never bragging about record oil and gas production. And they did in their first hundred days really try to restrict new oil drilling. And so there was a kind of a legacy of distrust between the industry and the White House. And I think what Igles is saying is like, we should not. No more distrust.
- [07:23]
A
I'm going to fully defend the change here, which is, I think, Emily, you are picking up on the fact that this has already begun to happen. Like Ruben Gallego would be one of the candidates who we would maybe expect to see change his tune here. He's been talking about the importance of moderation on other topics. But I wanted like say, yes, a change has happened, but there's a lot more that Democrats could be doing. Like in 2019, Joe Biden. At a campaign event, a climate activist, 24 year old climate activist asked Joe Biden, are we going to end fossil fuel? And he says, I want you to look at my eyes. I guarantee you, I guarantee you we're going to end fossil fuel. He also called her kiddo and like took her hand. And anyway, the climate activists later described this as patronizing, but he said we're going to end fossil fuel in 2020. He said we're going to end the oil industry. He had to clean up those remarks the next day and said we're only going to end the oil industry after 2050. So the Biden administration was positioning itself against the fossil fuel industry and actively saying we are going to shut down the fossil fuel industry. Not necessarily like in our term, but in a way that is going to require, require near term policy changes. And I would add when the Biden administration ultimately approved key fossil fuel projects, they did not do so with a Obama like argument about keeping energy costs low for Americans. When Biden approved Willow, he was like, I am doing this because my hands are tied. I feel like I have no other legal option here and fighting it would not be effective. And so I think that there's a lot that Democrats could change in how they approach fossil fuels. I think you could say, look, Claudia Sheinbaum has massively expanded the gas network in Mexico and it's reduced Mexico's facial emissions. We can argue about whether it's actually reduced emissions. There would be room for a Democrat to do that in the US it would require pushing the natural gas network into New England though, where states don't want it, where environmentalists don't want it. There's a lot of places that Democrats could still go here if they wanted to make a full on energy affordability argument that would be in line with what we've seen leaders do across the country. And I guess my question is do you think that's something that Democrats will keep leaning into and that we will actively see or not? Because this is actually an issue that's so important to their base that they're not going to touch it.
- [09:51]
D
I don't know if it's so important, but I do think that the Democratic base has been conditioned to view vocal support for fossil fuels as a betrayal. Like you still see so many people talk about like, oh, what the Biden administration could have done if Joe Manchin hadn't been in Congress. But like they needed Joe Manchin to get the IRA done. So like what could, what would they not have done? What Wouldn't they have been able to do without Joe Manchin either? And so I think that it is extremely possible to carve out a lane that involves support for low energy prices and an acceptance that natural gas is a thing that can help bring that about or like the expansion of the fossil fuel system is a thing that can bring that about. But I think it's a pretty like, I think you have to walk a pretty narrow rhetorical lane to make that case in 2026.
- [10:43]
A
Emily, you were going to say something.
- [10:46]
B
I was going to say just in response to your the question that you kind of left us with without commenting on the strategy or what I think Democrats should or shouldn't do. I think it's extremely unlikely that you will see Democrats in the Northeast pushing for the Constitution pipeline to expand into the Northeast for more natural gas in the Northeast. I think we could see more kind of rolling back of the ambitious electrification policies happening there, more supportive sort of existing natural gas business. But I just, I think they've like come too far to really backtrack on that.
- [11:24]
C
I also think it's interesting that we mentioned natural gas pipelines in Northeast and obviously the Biden administration and you know, New York has very aggressive climate targets that Kathy Hochul is kind of meh about. It's interesting that Joe Biden and Andrew Cuomo were kind of two Democrats who got involved with very aggressive environmental both legislation's kind of rhetorical stance vis a vis fossil fuels. I mean, these are no one's ideas of like anyone's experience the mayoral campaign. So like Andrew Cuomo is not some dyed in the wool progressive. And then Joe Biden has kind of been at the middle of the Democratic Party for the past 50 years. So I think maybe to Emily's point, to the extent anything is a grassroots or I think a lot of Democratic leaders were responding maybe not what to all voters wanted, but to certainly what the most engaged and activist voters. I mean, and climate activists made such a huge point of kind of doing this direct action type of stuff with people like Joe Biden, with AOC's protests against Nancy Pelosi. And very much the goal of that was to get them to kind of prioritize an aggressive climate agenda above everything else. And I think that on its own terms, I guess kind of worked in the Biden administration. I think that's going to be maybe the next question. Not so much, oh, will the next Democratic presidential nominee say, I want to work with our great oil and gas industries, but it's like if they Win. Are they going to sit down on day one and be like, okay, what's our climate agenda? How are we going to use our precious political capital in Congress to pass a big climate bill? That I think is much less likely, but I think much more likely than embracing oil and gas. But much. I think the priorities will be different.
- [13:10]
A
I think on that topic, this has been probably the worst year for the American climate movement as a movement since 2016. Certainly in terms of the number of political losses there have been, some of which were expected at the beginning of the year, some of which maybe weren't. I think you could argue it's maybe the worst in, like, 20 years or 24 years. Because. Because in 2016, climate came out of the Obama administration with a lot of credibility and a lot of internal capital. And it only built on that through the first Trump administration in ways that I think it does not stand in the same place today. Do you think environmental groups feel that way, number one? And number two, do you think that it's going to mount a comeback in 2026? And what would that comeback look like?
- [14:00]
C
I think it's like environmental groups have suffered from the same kind of progressive malaise that other progressive groups have suffered in terms of fundraising and operations. I think Sierra Club, they specifically had fundraising issues as well. And, yeah, I guess in the first Trump term, I felt like coming out of the Paris Agreements and then, you know, things like wildfires in California. And then with COVID there's a kind of a mixed sense. There was a mixture of alarm over climate that was quite acute. And then also just kind of, I think, especially in 2020, expansiveness with which people thought about public policy. You know, I think on kind of the macroeconomic side, people do not see worries about spending being a huge barrier to kind of policy outcomes and policy planning. And I think also kind of people maybe thought they had a kind of more Promethean sense of how to, like, deal with stuff in relation to Covid. Just, you know, there was such so many massive, you know, shifts of people, employment and money all over the world, and I feel like everyone else now is just kind of much more beaten down about everything. I feel like people are not optimistic, not even optimistic about the climate trajectories, optimistic about kind of, like, the power of public policy to, like, work in this kind of expansive way. I think people are feeling much more kind of batting down the hatches, feeling defensive, trying to kind of maintain what gains there are. And, yeah, I mean, I don't think we're hearing so much less about using climate policy as kind of lever to change the economy, which I think was a lot of how people thought of, say, no one says Green New Deal anymore. Those. And now I feel like everyone's much more limited in scope of how they think about things.
- [15:44]
A
Which is funny because it comes at the same time that I think, not climate policy, but the technologies of decarbonization have actually transformed the global economy and have. Are transforming the relations between the countries, between the most powerful and countries in the world and the biggest economies in the world. It's interesting, for instance, that, like China is massively deploying batteries in lots of different product sectors in a way that seems to be transforming its economy. But the. We don't feel the same, maybe excitement or possibility about that here. And I wonder why that is.
- [16:20]
C
Yeah, I think that's the other big difference, that the United States has been dethroned both as, I think, kind of like the primary villain of global climate change and the primary savior. We are no longer the largest emitter and nor are we at the forefront of technological development of decarbonization technology, let alone deployment. We develop XYZ technology in America, but then it ends up getting deployed in China. I feel like even that calculation is changing a lot as well. So just like the United States just feels so much less central to the climate conversation, which I think then kind of saps the animal spirits of people involved in it.
- [16:59]
A
Emily, how are you thinking about this?
- [17:02]
B
I don't see climate change making any kind of big comeback next year. I don't see the environmental movement or the climate movement making a big comeback in 2026, specifically. I think, like, the groups that make up that movement will continue to work at the local level as they've been doing work at the state level, like intervene in public service commissions and work on building codes and those kinds of things to some amount of success or not. But I don't really get the sense that the environmental movement has that there's any momentum that people are really starting to work on what's next? What is the next kind of big national push next time something like that would be possible again? It feels like that has yet to reveal itself.
- [17:57]
A
I guess I feel like listeners are going to be listening to this and they're being like, man, these people are just ragging on environmentalists. And I think we should say one of the reasons I like working at heatmap is because I think we can say pretty clearly we think decarbonization is good. We think it should be pursued Stipulated. Emily. I mean, do you think that that is because environmental leaders of the environmental movement have failed to reckon with the political unpopularity of the end stage of the Biden administration with the own contradictions within their messages, or do you think this is. They have begun to kind of privately reckon with this, but they don't have any answers, and the macroeconomic and macro geopolitical environment is, like, not very friendly to their goals at the moment.
- [18:42]
B
I think it's a little bit of both. I was just reminded of, I wrote this story recently about this policy in California where cities are adopting this policy that requires people to replace their air conditioners with heat pumps. So if your air conditioner dies, you have to put in a heat pump that can both heat and cool. And I asked one of the advocates behind this about the kind of affordability concerns that people have. Like, you know, was that coming up in the advocacy around this, where was the public raising concerns about that? Or, you know, and. And trying to kind of get him to recognize like, that that was. It was it is possible that people's bills will go up as a result of this, at least in the near term. And it's like, I feel like at Heat Map, we spent so much time this year talking about affordability, talking about energy bills, and it just seemed like that question was just. He was just like, did not want to engage on it. And so, anyway, that's just one example, but I think that there's a little bit of both, of kind of turning a blind eye and then also recognizing it privately, but not really knowing what to do.
- [19:55]
A
I was thinking when Matt was talking about how different the current moment is from 2020, that back then there was this idea that there was some risk, maybe that some costs would go up a little, but inflation had been out of the picture for so long that it was like we were in an environment where unemployment was the concern and not the price level. And so the idea that prices might go up a tiny bit in exchange for economic activity seemed like an okay trade. And I would actually say this is where I think there's some potential for a comeback for kind of more traditional types of environmental and climate activism in 2026, which is the unemployment rate's currently 4.6% as of a release last week, which historically, it hasn't been above 4.6 very much in the past several decades. And when it is above 4.6 usually means unemployment is about to spike. And I think in a world where we switch from talking about affordability to talking about Unemployment and a lack of job general economic activity, especially in a world where AI is like a big deal and people are very worried about job loss from AI. Suddenly all the ideas about generating economic activity by doing kind of pro social decarbonization activities are going to swing right back into the conversation. And we know what a Donald Trump administration is like when prices are increasing by 3% a year and that is. He's not very popular. We don't know what a Donald Trump administration is like when unemployment's at 5% or 5 and a half percent. And if that were to happen, like, the floor could really drop out and we could see a huge swing back to the type of policies that we were talking about not so long ago on that front. What could Donald Trump do that would be worse for decarbonization that he has not yet done in 2026?
- [21:47]
D
I have an answer that I just don't think is likely, though.
- [21:51]
A
Hit it.
- [21:52]
D
Which is turn on nuclear.
- [21:54]
A
That's for decarbonization.
- [21:57]
D
Would be worse.
- [21:58]
A
Turn against nuclear.
- [21:59]
D
Yes, yes, yes.
- [22:00]
A
Oh, yeah.
- [22:01]
D
Which is like, that has been arguably the biggest decarbonization bright spot of the past year is attention from the administration and excitement and activity around nuclear development in a way that hasn't been seen in decades. I don't know what would happen to make that, to generate that about face, which is why I hesitate to say it. But, like, that would be very bad if that singular bright spot were to go away.
- [22:26]
C
Yeah. Also, like, one of my predictions for next year was that this goal of having three new advanced mini reactors on by July 4th of 2026 wouldn't get hit. Also, I think another risk to Jillian's point is that Trump Media and Technology Group is now a fusion company. They've merged with this, you know, a natural marriage. This company founded in 1998 that says it's going to build a power plant next year. So I think a risk is not just maybe disappointment, but what if nuclear policy gets kind of in this, like, fusion rut and it's not just like the blocking and tackling of like, how do we actually deploy a new advanced reactor? How do we deploy a large reactor? Like, there's a lot of like, kind of detail oriented basic questions around nuclear deployment that like a million people in D.C. could walk you through, but if it just becomes like this moonshot thing, you could just kind of end up nowhere because you just wouldn't be addressing the meaningful questions.
- [23:28]
A
Whole apparatus of state programs and federal programs meant to help deploy nuclear basically got captured by his new fusion.
- [23:36]
C
Yeah, not just fusion. It's like also it's like these companies that have designs that aren't approved by the nr, NRC or are approved, but they have never actually deployed. I think like the prominence of these nuclear startups of the atomic, the oklos of the world could work, could not. But it's like you could see a world in which nuclear policy really ends up trying to benefit these advanced designs, these designs that haven't been tested yet, these companies that have never built anything before. These companies are super popular with day trader stock investors who are like this kind of the crypto sports betting crowd. That's. I think the Trump administration really sees themselves as their allies. And it's like, what does Westinghouse need for the administration? What does GE need from the administration? What does Hitachi need from the administration? It's like if those questions don't get answered, you could just kind of end up with a bunch of fancy mini react micro reactor designs that don't actually get deployed anytime soon.
- [24:38]
A
Well, conversely. So what would Donald Trump do? We've had such a downer conversation. We're going to now begin to climb out. What could Donald Trump do in 2026 that would be best for decarbonization that he hasn't done yet? Obviously, let's stipulate, undergo a total, a kind of reverse Federman moment, so to speak, and decide that he cares deeply about the parts per million in the atmosphere and reverse all his cancellations and attack on EPA regulatory edifice. We could. And allow new solar and wind plants to get permitted. There's lots of things that he could do if he had a total personality replacement. However, barring that, what could he do that might be like in line with his policies that we would look at it and go, oh, that could be good for decarbonization?
- [25:19]
C
I think it's like if he gets freaked out about the midterms and just decides to chill out on the trying to kill off the solar and wind business, perhaps at the urging of vulnerable House Republicans. You know, right now, as a recording, Friday, December 19, the Speed act has passed the House, this permanent reform bill, but it has all these amendments that has caused the clean energy industry to the extent it had embraced it at all, to, to run away from it. And people think it's, you know, it's going to have a really tough time in the Senate. So like, and this is a bill that in its original form was endorsed by essentially the whole oil and gas industry, the American Petroleum Institute and the groups representing Kinds of smaller independent oil companies are typically seen as more conservative. And so like we're in this funny situation or from a decarbonization perspective, if the head of the American Petroleum Institute's like government relations department was the President right now or was the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Energy or the speaker of the House, like climate policy would be in a better place than it is right now. And so I think the optimistic case, heavy quotations, is that like, you know.
- [26:26]
A
And that's solely because they won on every other issue.
- [26:30]
C
Yeah, but they just don't want the President to be empowered to randomly kill projects because he doesn't like them.
- [26:35]
A
Right.
- [26:36]
C
That's like their, that's what they want.
- [26:37]
A
I think they would find things to kill. I think they would be diligent enough to find things to kill that Donald Trump hasn't found yet.
- [26:43]
C
But yes, but it's like, oh, if it's some kind of freak out situation, it's like, let's just not make people angry anymore. The extent of solar project on public lands has gotten through. It's because the governor of Nevada really wanted it. There's dozens of Republican officials that want random projects in their areas to continue. And so I'd say the optimism would be like the political conditions change such that Trump listens to those people more than he is right now.
- [27:09]
B
I was going to say something a little bit similar, which is just signing a permitting reform deal that has something for transmission in it, which like obviously that, that requires a bill like that even getting to his desk, which at this point I think is a total toss up. We really don't know if that's possible. But I feel like I've heard sources kind of talk repeatedly recently about how the best thing that could happen for renewable energy under Trump is getting like help for transmission, getting more transmission built and doing that through permitting reform. And that seems within the realm of possibility.
- [27:46]
A
Well, let's expand the aperture all the way and ask what story are you most excited to cover in 2026? Emily, I feel like you've borne the brunt of a lot of the downer talk so far. So I'm going to start with you. What are you most excited to cover in 2026?
- [28:01]
B
Oh my God. Excited. That's, that's tough, Rob.
- [28:05]
A
Okay, what story are you looking forward to covering in 2026?
- [28:11]
B
I'll say the story that I am most curious to see how it continues to play out in 2026 is the climate United lawsuit. This is just to remind folks, the lawsuit where the EPA is trying to claw back this $20 billion meant for to set up a bunch of green banks around the country. This just feels so kind of essential to the future of the country. And you know, people think this case is going to go to the Supreme Court. It will decide how we deal with the Impoundment Control act and presidential powers of impoundment. So anyway, that's kind of slowed down in the past few months. Not much has been happening in that case, but it's really important and I'm curious to see where it goes.
- [29:02]
A
And that would. So this would be a case that's all about basically the constitutionality of the President's ability to just cancel spending.
- [29:09]
B
Exactly.
- [29:11]
A
Jillian, what store are you most excited or at least looking forward to covering in 2026?
- [29:16]
D
Yeah, and this has been an area that especially the past few months has been quite a downer, which is like there are a bunch of exciting EVs coming out next year. I'm excited for the return of the Chevy Bolt. I'm excited for the return of the Nissan Leaf. I'm excited for the R2. I think this has the potential to be a real moment of consumer adoption for EVs because they are cheap enough that some of the price issues go away, some of the price concerns go away. The range is a lot better than the previous iterations of the Nissan Leaf and the Chevy Bolt. And with the R2 you get all kinds of exciting like AI and self driving capabilities. Or at least this is what they said recently at their sort of launch event for the R2. And so there are a lot of things like cool things to be excited about with EVs coming up next year, not just relative to previous years or like, wow, the industry is developing. No, I think these things are objective, productively cool.
- [30:09]
A
Also, I just love that AI event they did. So Rivian recently did an event where they were like, we're developing our own chips in house and we're really far on self driving. We just haven't told anyone yet. Their stock has Almost doubled since November 4th in value now partially November 4th. That's the midterms. So people are anticipating maybe the end to the Trump moment in EV world. But like they have had a great two months after a really tough year and they're not at a. Rivian isn't out of the woods yet. They are financially dependent or they financially require these compliance payments from the other automakers. And the Trump administration has basically completely broken the system that allowed them to receive those compliance payments. But it could be a big year for Rivian. That's so true. Matt, what's your story?
- [30:53]
C
The thing I'm looking forward to covering next year is geothermal. You know, we like to joke that Democrats like it because it's clean. Republicans like it because it involves manly oil drilling equipment to do. So I think it's something that's kind of survived the one big beautiful bill act saying the Republicans say they like taking pictures of the equipment. You know, Fervo. So kind of leading startup in this area is their biggest new project is set to come online in 2026. It's also the type of thing that could really benefit from kind of the iterative improvements that we've seen in stuff like solar panels. A path where they can kind of really benefit from learning by doing it where more and more people are doing it, it will get better and more efficient and more cost competitive. That would be quite exciting.
- [31:39]
B
Before you go, Rob, I'll just, I just want to jump in and say I am excited about. There are like a whole slew of really great decarbonization projects that are supposed to come online next year and I think that could really start to kind of like prove the case a little bit.
- [31:56]
A
What's an example?
- [31:57]
B
Yeah, so there's Vineyard Wind is supposed to be completed next year. The Northeast could get a lot of offshore wind energy. The Champlain Hudson Power Express, the big power line being built from Quebec to New York City. It will come online next year. The Fervor project that Matt talked about and then one more is like the form energy battery project I think in Minnesota is also supposed to be completed next year. That's a long duration battery project. So yeah, all of those are pretty exciting.
- [32:29]
C
I also think in general an operating project is much more durable than a planned one. And so if you're worried about the political durability of decarbonization and renewable energy, it's like something that's actually generating power. It's much more likely to be generating power in five years than a planned project is.
- [32:47]
A
I'm hearing 2026 year of deployment. It is actually a lot of the bets that survived from 2023 and 2024, such as the R2 or the form Energy project or the continued expansion of geothermal are really actually going to develop next year. That's actually very exciting I think because that's kind of how you would imagine these things begin to turn a leaf and also maybe begin to depolarize some of these technologies. Okay, my story that I'm most Excited, or at least most kind of captivated by in 2026 is the electricity price story. And specifically I've been thinking about it in terms of transmission. So back during the Biden administration when we started talking about, or at least when I started getting, in spite of myself, into transmission and into the idea of expanding America's transmission backbone, one of the big moonshots is that you would be able to build some grid or at least some kind of policy mechanism that would then create a grid that would create a so called copper sheet across the country, or at least stitch the country's many regional grids together and bring some equilibrium and some connection to all these disparate electricity markets across the country. I think this idea would be like good for the economy. This is how the US has historically grown its economy is by knitting its many disparate regions together into one unified internal market. It would also be good for decarbonization, I think, because we basically already have the technology, we already have the pipelines to move natural gas across the country, we already have the rail lines to move coal across the country, but we don't have are the transmission lines to move clean electricity from the country's sunniest or windiest areas to its most electricity demand intensive areas, the cities on the coast largely. So it was, it seemed like a great idea. The issue in the Biden administration that came up was that if you were to knit the country's different electricity regions together, it would have like pretty geographically discreet, or at least seemingly geographically discrete winners and losers. And those winners and losers would line up disconcertingly too well with the country's geographic political polarization, by which I mean the interior of the country benefits in many cases from very cheap electricity because of its ample wind and solar resources or fossil fuel resources. And cities and other places where there's a lot of industrial development have relatively expensive electricity. And if you were to connect those two places with a big power line, then the interior, where there's more, Republicans would see their electricity costs go up. The benefits wouldn't necessarily accrue to ratepayers in those areas. Now I think across the country, is this story one of Republicans lose, Democrats win? I don't think so. I think there's usually kind of more broad based benefits from stitching different disparate, unconnected markets together. But this is like the obstacle, political obstacle to advancing transmission that people in Congress during the Biden administration to some degree, data centers have solved this problem for us because data centers are getting built in the places where electricity is cheapest and they have done the arbitrage for us. And the geography of where the winners and losers of a large transmission bill now would be or a large transmission bill that would be are much less clear, I think, than they were even three years ago because there's such big data center demand and construction in the places where electricity was cheap. And so this is the story I'm interested in covering, which is if we are seeing electricity prices go up everywhere, but especially in these otherwise more rural areas where power prices are really low, then that begins to create a political opening to do a larger scale transmission policy that could hopefully lower electricity prices across a lot of the country and also spur, and this is the real idea, right? Spur a lot of additional zero carbon energy development in ways that would hopefully decarbonize the national grid. So that's the story I'm looking forward to the most. Okay, so finally, I want to end by asking all of you for your three quick predictions for 2026. We, inshallah, will return to these next year. But I want to hear what you think will happen in 2026. And remember, sometimes the most fun predictions are the wrong ones. Gillian, my esteemed shift key colleague, I'm going to start with you.
- [37:20]
D
Well, to kind of echo Matthew's nuclear fears, one of my predictions is that next year is going to be a big one for fusion. Commonwealth is aiming to start up its demonstration plant in Massachusetts next year, which is a buildup to eventually achieving that positive energy in 2027 is what they're targeting. Obviously, the new parent company of Trump's media outlets is also aiming to turn on a plant next year. And you know, there's been a lot of activity and excitement around fusion. And I think that we're going to start to see that backed up with some more actually concrete progress next year. Prediction number two is that some of the lawsuits against the Trump administration, stonewalling of renewable development will succeed in breaking some of this logjam and that we will see a restart to some degree of utility scale solar and wind Construction in 2026. And then my third prediction is that, and this is, I don't know if it's like a wild prediction or an extremely safe prediction, but that the increasing unsteadiness in the air market will throw the grid into total chaos. Like nobody is going to be sure what's going on. And so nobody will have will know.
- [38:29]
A
What to do the year of grid chaos. Emily, what are your predictions?
- [38:34]
B
Okay, first, I think solar will continue to outpace all other energy sources around the world. Second, I think that China's emissions will continue to be flat, if not decline. And third, I think Trump will officially lose the MTA congestion pricing lawsuit.
- [38:56]
A
The congestion pricing headlines recently have been so insanely positive from, like, local New York press and not just pro congestion pricing press such as hemap. I think I saw a Spectrum story that was like, mta invests in dozens of new elevators and signal improvements, quote, as congestion pricing pays off, unquote. I was like, oh, my gosh, like, you cannot. Like, Kathy Hochul could not pay for that kind of coverage anyway. Ultimate congestion pricing advocate vindication. Matt, what are your three predictions for next year?
- [39:28]
C
Yes, my three predictions are we will not have three nuclear designs reach criticality by July 4, by our 250th anniversary as a nation. My second prediction is that there will be one, at least one major personnel change among kind of senior energy policy officials in calendar year 2026. I'm giving myself an out. There could be a response to the midterms. A cabinet level or similar type person I think will leave the administration next year. And then my third is related to what Gillian said earlier. I think there will be some kind of reliability moment. There's going to be something that happens, or almost happens, where everyone will get really freaked out about the grid. It could be in the summer, it could be in the winter. Heat map has covered both eventualities extensively.
- [40:15]
A
Do you think it is bigger or smaller than like the Texas winter storm?
- [40:19]
C
I don't know. It's hard to imagine a grid disaster worse than Yuri in terms of it. Almost like, can't be as bad again because there's resilience built into the system for that exact thing.
- [40:31]
A
But I guess, I mean, of that kind of prominence.
- [40:34]
C
Yeah, I mean, I think there's gonna be something that happens where people are like, oh my God, we need to like, really worry about the reliability much more than we are.
- [40:43]
D
Rob, what are yours?
- [40:46]
A
Okay, so you can kind of see where my brain's at from the questions that I've already formulated. So maybe these are not going to be a shock after this, but I think we will see two Democrats flirt with rejecting climate change as a governing goal or kind of actively embrace fossil investment in an all of the above style way, try to make a play to regain all of the above. Which, by the way, one thing we didn't even talk about is that the only reason any of this is politically possible is because of Trump's war on renewables. But that one, I think one Democratic would be lawmaker in a battleground or kind of reach Republican seat will try to do it. And I think we'll see one would be presidential nominee flirt with it. The second prediction is that the data center buildout will hit a significant power shortage. And I think the data center build out will see an intersection with the wildfire issue. Like if you think about the big grid stories of the past five years, you've had wildfires and data centers. And I think we'll see a nexus of data center and wildfire. In fact, I think we may already be seeing one. But I'm not going to say it so that I can then claim it a year from now for my successful prediction. And the third is I'm actually going to go further than Matt. I am willing to put my. I'm willing to make a kind of reckless prediction here. I have no inside information beyond what's being publicly reported. I think Chris Wright is going to step down. I think that man is having a miserable time of it. And I think he is the first energy policymaker to depart the Trump administration. But I think it might not happen until after the midterms.
- [42:17]
B
Rob, I'll make a bet with you that if Chris Wright leaves the administration, it will not be of his own volition.
- [42:23]
C
Well, he will resign.
- [42:25]
A
Oh, I think that. But I think that's included in my bet.
- [42:29]
B
You said he was having a miserable time and wanted to leave.
- [42:32]
A
I think I, oh, no, I don't think he's. But I think he could be having a miserable time and gets fired.
- [42:37]
C
And that's the pattern for the first Trump administration.
- [42:40]
A
It's not the happiness or that he has a miserable time and has kind of shown the door. Like, I don't think he, he's happy, but I also don't know that he's so unhappy he would stay. I think Chris Wright benefits sometimes from more favorable coverage than maybe he deserves as compared to other climate policymakers because he's not seen as totally political. Because every so often he says something that seems to elicit some kind of reasonable view of the energy system. It might be that every third sentence he says is like, completely kooky. But like, every so often, he seems to actually understand how the energy system might work a little bit. And this, I think, actually leads to more favorable coverage than he might deserve. But that's neither here nor there. Emily, if you were going to bet that he was going to stay, I was going to bet you like a bottle of whiskey or something.
- [43:20]
D
But it sounds like no, I mean.
- [43:23]
B
I'm with you that he's not long for this administration.
- [43:27]
A
Okay, well, that brings us to the end. We have not yet found something to My bet is that in 2026 we will find something to successfully stake a bottle of whiskey or scotch on or at least to kind of pledge malort shots against each other. That's my other bet. And with that, I'm going to adjourn this session of the Shift Key panel for the year 2025. We can all return to our holiday and New Year's celebrations Christmas celebrations. Thank you all so much for joining us and I will see you all next year in 2026.
- [44:00]
D
Thanks Rob. See you next year.
- [44:03]
C
Thanks so much. See you next year.
- [44:06]
B
This was fun.
- [44:08]
A
This is our last new episode of Shift Key for the year. We'll have a rerun in the feed next week, actually one of my favorite episodes we've ever done. And then we'll be back the following week on January 7, 2026 with a new episode with Jesse and me. Until then, have a great holiday. Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Gillian Goodman and Nico Loricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Cromwell. Thank you so much for listening. Have a very merry Christmas. If you celebrate, Happy Hanukkah, but that's already over by now. Have a very happy New Year and peaceful New Year. Thanks so much for listening to Shifts Key as always and see you in two.