Sinica Podcast: "Does Beijing Really Want Trump?"

Host: Kaiser Kuo
Date: August 28, 2024

Overview

In this special episode, Kaiser Kuo shares an original essay exploring a hotly debated question in Western analysis of US-China relations: Does Beijing really want Donald Trump back in the White House? Kuo unpacks varying perspectives within China—from Chinese social media users to policy elites—and critiques the assumptions Western analysts bring to the discussion. The essay urges listeners to question whether American analysts are projecting their own strategic logic onto Beijing, or if there's evidence that China's leaders truly have a preference in the 2024 US presidential contest.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Question of Beijing’s Preference

• Western media and analysts have speculated deeply about whether Chinese leaders prefer Trump, Harris, or neither in the 2024 US elections. However, there is "no clear consensus ... among Chinese elites," and any signals are opaque (01:25).
• The most visible expressions are found on Chinese social media, which is not a reliable indicator of official government views.

2. Chinese Social Media Attitudes

• Posts in the wake of Biden’s endorsement of Harris heavily favor Trump, often for superficial or negative reasons regarding Harris, sometimes laced with sexism and racism.
• Some, however, pushed back and supported Harris, especially after her Democratic National Convention speech, indicating a diversity of views even in online discourse.

3. Types of Chinese Trump Supporters

Kuo identifies three distinct attitudes among Chinese Trump supporters (04:08):

i. Admiration for Trump’s Persona and Policies

• These individuals "openly admire his direct style, embrace his ethno nationalist ethos and share his contempt for woke culture ... the so-called baizuo they believe are disseminating it in China" (04:35).
• Ironically, some Chinese liberals align with Trump for his anti-Communist rhetoric, while some pro-Party supporters approve of his "authoritarian tendencies."

ii. Trump as a Beneficial Isolationist

• Supporters in this group believe “his isolationist, non-interventionist approach would benefit China.”
• They perceive a Trump victory as reducing the risk of war, making Trump "unapologetically transactional and could be bought off" with economic incentives like soybean purchases.

iii. Trump as a 'Nation-Builder' for China

• They root for Trump "precisely because they think a Trump victory would be disastrous for American power and would therefore be a boon for China" (06:02).
• Trump is nicknamed "Quanjianguo" (Trump who builds the nation – namely, China) for his tendency to damage US institutions and alliances, thereby inadvertently aiding China’s global standing.

4. What China's Strategic Elites Think

• Chinese IR scholars and think tankers diverge from internet trends and popular sentiment. Some, like Yan Xuetong (Dean, Institute of International Relations), say Trump would escalate economic confrontation more than Biden, despite Trump's tough talk.
  • Quote: "If Biden wins, the bilateral relationship will basically continue along the same path ... But if Trump wins ... the economic confrontation ... will increase and it will be even more serious than their disputes on security." — Yan Xuetong (09:42)
• Chen Dingding & Zhu Xinrong (The Diplomat, 2023): Trump would be more "disruptive and destabilizing in the short term," but Biden’s multilateral "focus on technology, competition and economic de-risking" poses greater long-term challenges for Beijing.

Da Wei’s Perspective (Tsinghua University)

• Quote: "Biden represents less surprise, more predictability ... focuses more on domestic policy and not so much on keeping China down." (12:10)
• Under Trump in 2020, US policy approached “regime change” logic—perceived as more dangerous and unpredictable by Chinese policy circles.

5. Pragmatism at the Top: No Clear Interference or Preference

• Despite speculation, US intelligence, including the 2021 National Intelligence Council, found no evidence of Chinese election interference in 2020, nor in the current 2024 cycle (18:08).
• China "did not view either election outcome as being advantageous enough ... to risk getting caught."
• Beijing maintains engagement via "traditional influence tools" (economic measures, lobbying), not direct tampering.

6. Why the Ambiguity?

• It’s possible, as Yun Sun (Stimson Center) argues, that Beijing views both outcomes as negative: "There's only the bad scenario and worse scenario."
• No credible evidence that Beijing has shifted strategies or sees one candidate as a major opportunity.

7. American (and Western) Projection

• While many US analysts assume Beijing would of course prefer Trump—to disrupt American alliances and order—Kuo questions if this isn’t projection:
  • Quote: "Perhaps the widely held assumption that China's leaders would rather Trump win ... says more about how Americans think than how the Beijing leadership actually does." (23:42)
• Kuo posits that China’s real preference is stability, not the internal or external chaos Trump might bring.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Chinese internet slang:
  “Baizuo is a pejorative that can perhaps be most accurately translated as libtard.” (05:02)
• On Trump’s reputation in China:
  “One of Trump’s nicknames in China is ... ‘Quanjianguo’—Trump who builds the nation, said nation being China.” (06:15)
• On Beijing’s caution:
  “...there’s no clear consensus that we can see among Chinese elites. Perhaps most importantly, it’s still anyone’s guess what the man at the top of the Communist Party thinks.” (03:33)
• On policy differences:
  “...I will say these are two different negative approaches. So I don’t know which one is better, but I’m quite sure which one is more predictable.” — Da Wei, Tsinghua University (12:48)
• On the stakes of assumptions:
  “Our eagerness to divine Beijing’s preferences says as much about our own biases as it does about China’s strategic calculus.” (26:10)

Timestamps of Key Segments

• 01:25 – Introduction to the debate about Beijing’s US election preference
• 03:33 – Ambiguity and lack of consensus among China’s elite
• 04:08 – Social media attitudes and types of Trump supporters in China
• 09:42 – Chinese IR scholars’ distinct and more nuanced takes
• 12:10 – Da Wei on stability and predictability
• 18:08 – Review of US intelligence findings on Chinese interference
• 23:42 – Kuo questions American projection in policy analysis
• 26:10 – Reflections on the significance of these assumptions

Tone and Style

Kaiser Kuo combines analytic rigor with wry, accessible prose, peppered with Chinese slang and an inside view of both elite and grassroots discourse. The essay is clear-eyed, skeptical of easy answers, and always invites the listener/reader to question prevailing American and Western narratives.

Conclusion

Kuo concludes that the West's eagerness to declare Beijing's preference may say more about Western anxieties than about China's real intentions. While factions in Chinese society lean different ways, official silence and risk aversion suggest that stability—not electoral chaos—is China's truest preference, regardless of who wins in November. “In the end, the question of whether Beijing wants Trump or Harris may be less important than what it reveals about our understanding of China and ourselves in this pivotal moment of global realignment.” (26:35)