Sinica Podcast – Inside COP30 in Belem, Brazil, and China’s Climate Leadership

Date: December 10, 2025
Host: Guest Host Iza Ding (for Kaiser Kuo)
Guest: Dr. Deborah Seligson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Villanova University; former Science and Environment Counselor, US Embassy in Beijing

Episode Overview

This episode offers a unique, inside perspective on COP30, the 2025 UN Climate Change Conference in Belém, Brazil, and critically examines China’s evolving role in global climate governance. Guest host Iza Ding speaks with Dr. Deborah Seligson, a seasoned climate policy expert and longtime observer of both Chinese and international environmental politics. Their conversation is divided into three parts: onsite impressions and negotiations at COP30, a deep dive into a historic moment in China's air pollution governance (the US Embassy air monitor in Beijing), and a reflective discussion on the summit’s outcomes and what they mean for global leadership in climate action.

1. Impressions of COP30 in Belém, Brazil

[04:01]

Local Involvement and COP Structure

• Dr. Seligson praises the integration of local Brazilian communities into the conference, a notable contrast with recent COPs:

  “There’s a lot more interaction between local people and people participating at the COP... The Green Zone is full of local people looking at exhibits on renewable energy, low carbon options… There’s a people’s COP downtown, there’s just a lot more happening.” – Seligson [04:12]

• The usual split between the closed ‘Blue Zone’ and public ‘Green Zone’ was bridged, encouraging cross-fertilization of ideas and activism.

Logistics and Organization

• Despite negative portrayals (e.g., in the New York Times’ The Daily), Ding and Seligson agree the event was "well run" given its scale (~100,000 attendees).

  “I would say they've done an awfully good job on logistics... At the big pre meeting in Bonn, it took them two days to come up with an agenda. I think this time it was about 15 minutes, which is a sign of just incredible parliamentary and bureaucratic skill...” – Seligson [08:54]

Brazilian Leadership

• The Brazilian presidency made efforts to keep negotiations on schedule and include wider voices, setting a positive tone for inclusivity.

2. China’s Presence and Perceptions at COP30

China’s Dual Identity

[09:06]

• Ding observes the contrast: The US presence was barely visible, while China was prominent but “not the villain” (as is often cast in Western media).
• Seligson notes:

  “What’s different between what China does and what the US formerly could do... is being one of the creative leaders and helping to figure out how to get to language that actually gets you to a negotiated conclusion. The Chinese have made it very clear they don’t want to be leaders in that way in the negotiation.” – Seligson [16:52]

Academic and NGO Collaboration

[09:50]

• Seligson’s event at the China Pavilion, hosted by a Tsinghua-led international university coalition, highlighted ongoing US-China climate cooperation, despite geopolitical tensions:

  “We talked about how there are a bunch of new barriers out there. We think there are things that both countries could do to make cooperation easier, but we still have lots of examples of actual cooperation moving forward…” [09:50]

Media Narratives vs. Ground Truth

[12:22]

• Ding and Seligson discuss a NYT episode framing China as dominating via a “flood of green tech.”

  “The problem with the word glut is it suggests there's too much of it out there. The reality is we need to decarbonize the world. … There's no glut at all.” – Seligson [35:20]

• Seligson also critiques Western focus on China’s coal while ignoring its massive advances in solar, wind, and electrification:

  “The over focus on the number of Chinese coal fired power plants was missing the larger picture, that solar and wind... were going to overtake that.” [13:17]

3. Negotiations and Leadership Dynamics

US and China: Contrasting Roles

[15:02]

• The US’s absence this year was “very visible,” but Seligson observes some at COP felt it was better than discordant US participation:

  “People around us have been saying they would rather not have a US government delegation than a US government delegation bent on creating havoc.” [15:02]

• China: Present but low-key. Leadership manifests more through technology, practical demonstration, and collaborations with developing nations than through diplomatic negotiation or “creative” language-shaping in treaties.

  “They want to be leaders in terms of technology... But they don't feel comfortable being a leader in this kind of international negotiation space.” [16:52]

Why China Avoids Negotiation Leadership

[21:25]

• Seligson attributes this to China’s desire to remain a “friend” to the Group of 77 and its discomfort with being targeted for criticism.

  “When you put your neck out, some people aren’t going to like it. And I think the Chinese really value being a friend to the Entire Group of 77 nations, the developing nations.” [21:25]

• Anecdote: China rarely receives the "Fossil of the Day" award (for obstructionist negotiation) because “they are very careful about what they say.” [22:55]

Negotiation Language and Tactics

[25:18]

• Ding and Seligson describe the minutiae and cultural nuances of COP negotiations (e.g., “urge” vs. “encourage”, “coordination” vs. “workshops”). They highlight the performance of institutionalized ‘good guy’ language by the EU and the difficulty for developing countries in navigating cumbersome metrics for climate finance access.

Finance Fights

• The decades-running tension between developed countries (seeking strict accountability) and developing countries (desiring flexibility and less red tape) over climate finance.
• Seligson: “A fight for decades—how much money is actually going to get delivered, and how many strings are going to be attached.” [27:34]

4. Tech, Economy, and the “Glut” Narrative

Chinese EVs and Automation

[33:35]

• BYD’s prominence in Brazil exemplifies China’s global reach in green tech; affordable EVs tailored to local needs have made an impact:

  “BYD has a high quality electric vehicle for about US$10,000. So it's a much more appealing option for folks in a developing country like Brazil.” [33:35]

• Much of China’s competitive edge comes not just from subsidies, but heavy** automation and supply chain sophistication**:

  “Chinese domestic production is incredibly automated... The vast majority of the workers were at the End of the assembly line, doing sort of final assembly, popping in windshields and that kind of thing, and doing quality assurance. … These were clean, comfortable jobs that were very safe.” [36:43]

• Seligson notes a key structural advantage: China’s extensive technical training for factory automation that the US lacks. [38:27]

“Glut” and Overcapacity

• Seligson rebuffs “glut shaming” (an emerging Sinica in-joke) as misleading:

  “We need so much more wind, solar and electric vehicles than we’re currently producing… There’s no glut at all.” [35:20]

5. Rewriting the “US Embassy Air Monitor” Story

[41:24]

• Seligson, responsible for the installation, debunks the myth that US Embassy data “proved” Chinese government air data was wrong:

  “The data collected by the Ministry of the Environment was accurate. The problem was what they supplied to the public was a 24 hour average rather than real time data. … Our original idea is if we got one for the embassy and started publishing the data, the schools would learn from that and they would buy their own.” [41:24]

• Real-time data sharing (enabled by Twitter) became transformative for the public and was later emulated by Chinese officials (first locally, then nationally), but key policy moves (e.g., tough new regulations on power plants) predated the monitor and were domestically driven.

• Key Quote:

  “People think, ‘Oh, it was these international people telling China that they had an air pollution problem.’ No, China knew it had an air pollution problem. It also had lots of experts who knew all the details... This was a Chinese-driven effort.” [55:13]

6. Outcomes and Reflections on Leadership After COP30

Final Agreement, Disappointments, and Process

[101:46]

• The closing plenary was theatrical—with Latin American countries decrying the presidency, Russia dramatizing in Spanish, and disagreements over terms like 'gender'. Seligson affirms such drama is typical, though perhaps less so in rare “breakthrough” years like Paris.
• The much-anticipated Brazilian concept of "mutirao" (collective effort) structured the final agreement, aiming for consensus despite clear disappointments.

Assessment of Progress

[107:20]

• Despite disappointment over lack of bold language (“transitioning away from fossil fuels”) and adaptation finance, Seligson is optimistic:

  "At the time of the Paris agreement, the expectation was that business as usual would lead to 4°C increase... and now we’re down to somewhere between 2.3 and 2.5°C ...The work is happening... This was the COP that might have been a complete failure of the UN process. Without the US there, you could have had just kind of a global rebellion... and that didn't happen.” [107:20]

• Ding and Seligson stress the value of the process itself as a bulwark against climate regression, even when substances falls short.

7. China’s Current and Future Leadership Trajectory

Policy vs. Negotiation Leadership

[115:47]

• China wants to lead by technological and implementation example (e.g. green urbanization, grassland restoration, solar, EVs), not by sticking its neck out in the diplomatic arena.

  “The kind of leadership the Chinese were interested in asserting was leadership on the technology side... not at all interested in leadership in the negotiation space.” [115:47]

• China’s conservative NDC targets are “modest,” as is typical; Seligson notes, “They like to exceed their targets and so they probably will. The challenge is people want them to put in a tough enough target that other countries feel pressured to also speak up with more ambition.” [119:13]

Why China Does Not “Over-Pledge”

• Ding highlights that China prefers to under-promise and over-deliver, noting this is “actually the more ethical approach” but potentially lowers global ambition if replicated elsewhere. [120:55]

Looking Forward

• Seligson foresees China’s leadership style and negotiation posture evolving, albeit always “lagging a little behind where they really are” in terms of global expectations and capabilities. [123:56]

8. Cultural and Social Realities at COP30

• Cultural presence: National pavilions, indigenous groups, and even corporate sponsors (like BYD and their EVs/cars) played a big part in COP’s social tapestry.
• The “Fossil of the Day” ceremony provided comic relief and civil society participation:

  “There’s a guy in a dinosaur blow up outfit dancing around and there's music playing...” [29:50]

• Ding and Seligson wax poetic about Brazilian ice cream and the importance of informal networking and cultural exchange in making progress possible.

9. The Value—and Critique—of COPs

[95:21]

• Critique: Are COPs themselves climate hypocrites due to their emissions? Seligson is unapologetic:

  "I don't know how you solve problems without getting people together. I've… been enriched by spending time in other countries and cultures. … I want to solve the problem. I believe technology will be part of the answer. But I don't want us to become isolated from each other." [97:54]

• Ding notes the indispensable value of in-person dialogue, protest, and observation.

10. Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On China’s negotiation role:
  “They want to be seen as the world leaders in renewable energy… They don't want to be given the task of coming up with creative new language for the treaties.” – Seligson [20:05]

• On the ‘glut’ narrative:
  “There’s no glut at all. … We need to decarbonize the world.” – Seligson [35:20]

• On soft power and credibility:
  “I think what’s more important for the Chinese is not so much soft power, but credibility. How reliable are you? Can people trust you and are you supportive?” – Seligson [73:01]

• On evolution of Chinese climate governance:
  “You had a lot of people in China advocating for air pollution control... But the big change actually happened in 2003, which is seven years before the air apocalypse and four years before the US air pollution monitor, when the Chinese brought in new standards for power plants...” – Seligson [53:25]

• On in-person diplomacy:
  “I don't know how you solve problems without getting people together… I don't think that will make any of us better off.” – Seligson [97:46]

11. Looking Ahead: COP31 and Evolving Leadership

• Next year’s COP will experiment with a split presidency-hosting model: Turkey will host, Australia will preside.

  “It’s going to be very interesting… Australia and Turkey trying to work together may be super interesting.” – Seligson [88:03]

• Seligson expects further challenges to global climate governance, but ultimately sees hope in relentless technological progress and durable (if slow) multilateral action.

Key Timestamps

• [04:01] – First reflections on COP30, local involvement
• [09:50] – China Pavilion, US-China cooperation event
• [15:02] – Absence of US government and implications
• [16:52] – China’s avoidance of diplomatic leadership
• [35:20] – The “glut” narrative in green tech
• [41:24] – The real story behind Beijing’s US Embassy air monitor
• [101:46] – Reflections on final plenary, drama, and consensus
• [115:47] – China’s leadership posture at COP30
• [119:13] – Assessment of China’s new NDC

This episode is a must-listen for anyone interested in the evolving geopolitics of climate change, China’s complex approach to leadership, the gritty reality of global climate negotiations, and the sometimes comic, sometimes poignant, humanity in the battle for our planet’s future.