E (5:53)

Well, thank you all for being here. And I regret other duties kept me away from the morning session, but I hear it was very lively and informative and I'm delighted to have the opportunity to chair this one because we have so much to talk about and because we also want to give time for all of you to participate. I'm going to dispense with the usual introductions. You've seen the biographies and so you can read them for yourselves. And I want to go directly into this panel just to frame this a bit. I think one of our goals here is we're obviously focused on the US China relationship, but we all are practitioners of strategy. And in thinking about this, there's, I think, important to recognize and to think about U.S. and China in the broader context of U.S. strategy. And so when we the question posed for this panel is what does the US Want? But what I want to do to begin with is to open the aperture a little bit to sort of think about what is it the US Is looking for more broadly in terms of its grand strategy and how does that affect what we are looking for, what we expect in the bilateral relationship. Got a great panel who can bring a variety of different perspectives on this. I'm going to begin with Matt, sort of looking at the broad lens here. I love the idea, Matt, that I starting on my far right. We will start with Matt. So Matt, over to you.

F (7:15)

Thanks very much. Great to be up here with everyone and great to see all of you. Thank you for inviting me. So to get to the question, what the United States wants, the United States does not know what it wants. We're in a moment right now where to state the obvious. The old consensus has come apart. I think that memo first landed with Trump's election in 2016. There was a brief interregnum in 2020 with where it seemed that, you know, at least if you ask Joe Biden about it, we got through this weird anomaly, this hiccup of Trumpism and now we were ready to get back to the business of running the world and upholding the so called rules based order and all the things. But it turned out that the hiccup was that four years and Trump proved again, in 2024, that this is an enduring phenomenon. It does not come, in my view, with any really kind of well thought out, you know, strategy for the world. We can try to divine a strategy from the national security strategy that was put out a very strange document. Again, not, not unique in that way. I mean, these are whatever, even in a more normal administration, these are polyglot documents written by committee that are often in tension with each other. But this very much was that there was a statement that we were going to be disinvesting in this region and reinvesting more in this region. But essentially there was very little in terms of specifics about where and how we actually going to disinvest in order to focus on the regions that really matter to us. What does this mean for the US And China? I think many have remarked. I, I would agree that I think Trump has surprised a lot of folks with how little he has actually talked about China. I mean, given that his first administration kind of elevated strategic competition with China into the new hotness in Washington. Now, the lens, starting with Trump, the lens through which, you know, much of this city views kind of US Global policy, and I think the Biden administration picked up on that in general terms, obviously didn't follow every little path that Trump had laid down. They had a different spin on it. But interestingly, Trump really has not leaned that hard into a lot of the hostility that we saw from him and from his administration in the first term. But to get back to my original point, that just means that we don't really have a coherent sense of strategy from him. We can identify certain people in his administration. We know who they are, who have their own vision, but we haven't seen Trump certainly express that. There's very little process to speak of that could produce that kind of strategy, I think from Trump. And then on the Democratic side, again, I think you have a Democratic foreign policy establishment that essentially wants to restore the old order, even if they understand we can't free fully do that. They do recognize we are in a more multipolar moment, if not fully in a multipolar moment. But the old habits of the post Cold War era are very, very hard to break. I mean, these are ways of thinking about America's right and necessity of America kind of holding up the order. I mean, you saw this in Secretary of State Blinken's speeches multiple times. If the United States is not around the table asserting its interests, then our enemies might do it, or worse. No one will do it if not the United States Then cha. I think you can see the contours of an alternative being developed in the left progressive wing of the Democratic Party, which, despite my position on this stage, is where I locate myself. But I do think as we get into not the midterms, but more into the 2028 primary, this is very much where these issues are going to be hashed out, where some of these real questions will be debated.

E (10:52)

So let me just stay with you one more second on this, Matt, which is say a little bit more about that. So, you know, we have a grand strategy from both the first Trump administration and Biden, which really did focus on the centrality of US China relations as a sort of framing for broad policy. If we were to move away from that in a progressive center left, I mean, where would China fit into that broader narrative?

F (11:16)

Right. And I think what you just said about where does China fit in is how I would approach it. I think the issue that I have and I think a lot of progressives have with the way Trump approached it and Biden did, is we allowed, you know, concern about China to define our prior approach to the world. In a sense, we allow China to determine our policy. And I think what we need to do is start with the question of American foreign policy. Is the goal of foreign policy is to promote the security and prosperity and the freedom of the American people. What does a relationship with China look like that promotes all of those principles?

E (11:51)

Great. And I hope maybe we can come back a little bit more detail on that. So, Catherine, you've been in the seen this from the past Pentagon point of view. You know, we've gone, as Matt said, from, you know, on the military and security side, sort of China, the pacing threat and the like. To now some open questions. How do you see sort of the broader military security strategy of the United States and where China fits into that?

C (12:15)

Yeah.

B (12:15)

Well, thank you for the question and thank you for the opportunity to be here. This is a really important conversation. I'm glad we're having it. I would say I would maybe make a couple observations first from obviously my experience in an administration, in this administration, but also as a staffer on Capitol Hill, because I think despite the right Republicans having both dominance on Capitol Hill and the White House right now, I do think there's sort of a fissure on how we approach this question of US China relations between the Congress and the executive branch when it comes to the right. So I would maybe make just a couple observations. The first, I think.

C (12:54)

Right.

B (12:54)

Like, and Matt kind of alluded to this in Talking about how the NSS and the NDS talk about the US China relationship, I do think. Right. I mean, even if it's not a perfect document, it is ecumenical, as Matt kind of identified. I do think what it opens up is a window into challenging this sort of, what has been a prevailing bipartisan consensus that has leaned more aggressive, leaned more hawkish on the China questions for the better part of the last. And you've seen this really play out on Capitol Hill, you know, after the 2018 National Defense Strategy and sort of, you know, the elevation of China writ large as China bad. You know, in the first Trump administration, the Biden administration kind of built on this in various ways. You saw policymakers reacting to that, saying, okay, we have to do something. We have to have this bias toward putting out policy that fits this one narrative without thinking about how that would impact broader U.S. strategy, how that would impact, in particular, other priorities. Right. If we spend a lot of time focusing on the Indo Pacific, doing things like the Indo Pacific Deterrence Initiative, if we were to have gone down the rabbit hole of the Strategic Competition act, if we provide a preemptive authorization for the use of military force for Taiwan, if we erode strategic ambiguity, what is that going to mean in the broader context of US Strategy? What are we going to have to give up? And I think you saw some of these trade offs really exemplified in the discussions around arming Ukraine. If we arm Ukraine and we draw down from our own stockpiles, then we're not going to have, you know, certain exquisite munitions available to do deterrence by denial in the Indo Pacific. That's a really big trade off. And I think the Trump administration's national defense strategy, in trying to articulate, you know, four key lines of priority, including, you know, at the expense of other theaters, I think really tried to, you know, grapple with this and say, no, like, if we're going to prioritize the Indo Pacific and deterrence in the Indo Pacific, you know, even if we're gonna come at it as the nds, you know, uses the language of, you know, not wanting to humiliate China, not wanting to domina China, but instead, you know, back up sort of our position and our interests in the regions with a credible deterrence, that's going to take a hefty amount of resourcing, and that's going to mean that we're going to need our allies in other theaters in particular to take on more of the burden. Now, I think one of the biggest threats to our ability to do that is what we're seeing happen with Iran right now, right, Like Iran is a factor that we have to acknowledge and talk about because in order to do prioritization and to actually maintain integrity of having, you know, four key lines of effort, it's going, going to come at the expense of other things. And I think the, you know, the expenditure of munitions, you know, we've seen it sort of discussed publicly in reporting that this is going to affect our ability to do things in the Indo Pacific. And I think the US Having to grapple with some of those strategic realities is not something that we've seen because there's been this bipartisan consensus amongst policymakers, thought leaders that, you know, we can take on China, but we can also take on every other enemy without having to grapple with the trade offs, without having to grapple with constraints on our own strategy. And I think the Trump NDS really opens at least the conversation in saying, no, we have to do that. Even if the president's decisions may not perfectly align and meet the mark on following his strategy to the letter. I do think it opens the conversation and I think it also gives political permission for folks, particularly on Capitol Hill, to engage in some of these discussions and to say, do we need to relook is, is the Indo Pacific deterrence initiative the right approach or do we need a different approach consistent with the new nds, like, should we be putting more resources, should we be preserving resources as opposed to starting wars in Iran? Should we be preserving resources to do what has articulated as our number two priority our pacing threat or pacing scenario for the US Military? Should we be doing those things? So I think there's an important window in the conversation opening here to challenge some of these conventional assumptions, to challenge the sort of China bad, therefore, we must do all of these things. And I kind of describe it as almost like a throw all the pasta at the wall and see which noodles stick strategy? I think that that hasn't been. I don't think it's served as well. And I think what the Trump NDS at least does, and maybe Trump's different approach than perhaps what we were expecting on the China question from a security standpoint, gives us the opportunity to have a broader discussion and offer some alternative perspectives.

E (17:17)

That's great. I confess I have not had a chance to look in any detail at the new Trump administration defense budget proposal. I wonder if you have and whether there are things that we can learn from that in terms of, I mean, obviously one is it's huge, right? And I think we all Understand it's not going to get 1.5 trillion, but any insights from that? Are you going.

B (17:37)

I've just started going through the document myself as well. But I think one of the biggest things right is there was a hefty focus, at least in the explainer on procurement, you needing to procure more exquisite munitions. So there is a recognition at least, if not, you know, explicitly, implicitly, by where we're putting our dollars that trade offs really do matter. Like when you deplete these reefs. We do not have in fact unlimited procurement capacity. We do not have in fact unlimited munitions. So we're going to have to, I mean, I don't think putting more money at the problem is just the answer.

C (18:08)

Right.

B (18:08)

Like you're, yes, you're going to have to spend on munitions, but also what are we doing in the regulatory space to make procurement of these things faster, more viable? I don't think that this administration or administrations prior have really grappled with that question. So I think that'll be an interesting follow on. But I think the focus on procurement of munitions in particular just illustrates that this is in fact a problem. It is a limiting factor for the United States and it's one in the US China security dynamic we're going to

C (18:35)

have to grapple with.

E (18:37)

So Jonas, on the economic front, I mean there's again, we're looking at the legacy and the run up to the second Trump administration. You know, so much had been focused on the question of Chinese competition, how we respond to it, both in terms of our bilateral relationship in the more global environment and the interrelated things with issues around things like EVs and solar and the like. As you see this evolving, right. How do you, is there a, is there a sense, and we ask what does the US Want of what the administration wants in terms of an economic game with the summit coming up and the like. And what do you see as the alternatives that might be available to us? Sort of framing the US China economic issue relationship in sort of the context of a broader American strategy?

G (19:27)

Well, first of all, I thought this was a small roundtable discussion. So I was very excited to see you all here when I walked in this morning and welcome everyone. So on economic competition and sort of, you know, I don't know what the administration wants. Having been in the Biden administration, I feel like there are a lot more possibilities in this administration and ways that I think things were more tightly organized and perhaps narrower in the Biden team in terms of US China sort of economic competition. I think the Problem has been that we've basically ignored the competition and not really used it to our advantage in the past. And so I think, looking forward, what I'm hoping we want, and I don't know what we want and what the administration wants, sort of philosophical question that kept me awake last night. But what I think we should want is perhaps frame it in much more narrow terms about particular issues that we have domestically and think creatively about how China could fit into these individual buckets of issues. And I think there might be a conversation to be had about how that relates to, you know, other conversations we're having here at the table and to security and so on. But, you know, I can think of at least three. I mean, we have an affordability and energy crisis in this country. You can't buy any gas turbines to, you know, get more generation online. And so China has excess capacity in solar panels and also makes pretty good batteries that are fairly cheap. So maybe we can think about creatively what China could bring to the table in terms of solving some of those issues and what the governance strategies would be for extracting some kind of learning out of that investment if it were to come. And I think sort of these comments about FDI and possible investments make me think that this is maybe not entirely off the table, a possible strategy. I think there is a second bucket in terms of technological learning and catch up. I think an acknowledgement that we are behind on a number of key technologies and figuring out how China can either motivate us to run faster or where we need to work with China in order to figure out how to get there. And could there be some sort of joint ventures, tech transfer, fdi? I think the Europeans are putting this on the table now with the Industrial Accelerator act in ways that is quite creative and worth thinking about. And so I think that's another very concrete issue where the competition could actually be framed in terms of something that could be beneficial and solve some problems. And then the third one, and the piece that I just wrote for the acf, is sort of on manufacturing itself. We've been trying to bring back manufacturing, make it more competitive domestically, but really not by looking at what other people are doing. And as China is automating and putting AI into the automation that it's been pushing for a long time, you survey domestic manufacturers that cannot afford the upgrades, that don't have machines that are digital. I mean, there's a long list of kind of grievances and obstacles for them. And so how do we sort of deal with the competition in that space, either as something that motivates us politically to remove some of these obstacles or directly, I don't know, buy Chinese robots, figure out how to do them, use them productively in ways that don't make American labor unnecessary, but actually augment productivity and make these industries more competitive. And I think if you break it down into these sort of very specific, concrete problems that we have in the economy at the moment, there might be different ways that China fits into that solution that I think in the past we've not really been able to address because we've had this sort of overall US China framework that doesn't allow for that amount of nuance.

E (22:43)

Right. So, Leslie, the Chicago Council has been at the forefront of helping us try to understand how Americans think about the world. And there's always been a great debate on this issue, as many others, how much the political class is responding to the public as opposed to the political shaping how the public sees it. We've seen some pretty dramatic changes in American attitudes towards China over the last decade. Be interested in your reflections on both, telling us a little bit about how you see those changes, how much they've been driven by the discussion in Washington, by the elites here, as that narrative has changed, and how much that shaped the American attitude as opposed to the underlying issues like economic competition and the like, and what that means in terms of a landscape for a future set of strategies for the United States.

C (23:30)

Thank you, Dean Steinberg. Jim, it's great to be here. And I'm a huge fan of. And I'm a huge fan of Professor Jessica Chemwai. So delighted to finally meet you in person after many webinars that you've contributed to brilliantly at Chatham House and at the Chicago Council. I'm very glad that you asked me. I know in my current role you would. But I'm glad that you've asked me about public opinion for a couple of reasons or one in particular which goes beyond public opinion. And it's that because I spent 20 years living in Europe, in the UK it was in Europe most of the time I was there, and then it was trying to get out of Europe for, for part of the time I was there and now it's out. But whenever I get this question, which I did frequently in London, the US Is doing this. The US The US And I've become accustomed to writing back the US And I do think it's really important in this debate and in many other debates, and we all know this in this room, certainly on this panel, but to disaggregate the different interest groups, but not only in Washington and across the aisle, but across the United States. And I think it's more important now than ever before because the last thing that we want is the rest of the world to collapse in on assuming that the United States is whatever comes out of one administration and one very narrow part of one administration. It's a big country, it's a diverse country, you all know that. But trust me, not everybody else in the world is willing to give us a pass on that very clear reality on the public opinion. As the Dean has said, there's been a big shift. And my colleagues who run our public opinion work have documented this brilliantly. They've not only documented US Attitudes, but recently released a really great survey of Chinese public opinion attitudes. But on the US side, just a couple of things. One is there's been a 40% increase since 2024 in the extent to which the American public has a sort of friendly disposition towards China. It's now at around 53%. I mean, this is an extraordinary figure. There's a partisan gap. As with most things in the United States right now, two thirds of Democrats and one third of Republicans have a positive friendly attitude towards China. But I think that. And that's significant. But even one third of Republicans is significant. The big shift is the overall headline number, and I had a look, and it's the Gallup numbers on favorability are much lower, but the change is still significant. Gallup has it going from 15 to 34% in the recent period. So that again, it's the change which is really significant, depending on how you measure. A couple of other figures. The opposition to tariffs, 81% of Democrats oppose tariffs, 67% of Republicans support tariffs. So a very significant dividend, obviously. And another way of framing that is do you think that trade with China is good or bad? And that's a pretty even split. 48% of Americans think it's good. 47% of Americans think it's bad. The third figure I wanted to focus on, which I thought was really interesting in our data, was on whether Americans see China as being sort of a peer competitor on the economic side and on the military, national security side. And on the economic side, Americans see China as not quite, but very close to being a pure competitor. On the military and national security side, they still don't. They still think that America's way ahead. To your comment, what really drives public opinion, I guess the sort of broad point I want to make here is we're Sort of, you know, we have this conversation about where is Trump, where was Biden? I think we're probably quite aligned on the difference. But I think it's important to remind ourselves in this conversation of the context. Right. The context in which American attitudes hardened against China was the first Trump administration and it was about the pandemic. And clearly President Trump used the pandemic to harden American attitudes towards China, the China virus. But there was something very real that was going on in the world that made Americans and most people unhappy in general. I mean, how can you be happy when you can't leave your house and you can't see your friends? And there was sort of. It was a context that was ripe for hardening attitudes. It was manipulated and used. And it's unsurprising that American public opinion sort of went along with the journey. But China did things too. I was in the UK at the time. China's crackdown in Hong Kong certainly changed how the British public viewed China, as did its Wolf Warrior diplomacy. So I don't think it's only. Well, I mean, we know this, but it's important to kind of make the point. It's not only about what the administration does. The end of the Trump 1.0 administration was very ideological in my view, very different from where it is now. But it was the COVID moment, I guess. The second thing, the final point, I just wanted to put out there for part of the conversation on what does the US Want? Nobody is more confused than America's allies about what the United States wants. And this is especially the case when it comes to China. I've sat in a lot of meetings recently where Europeans have said, what does the United States expect of us in our relationship with China, sort of generally. But concretely, what would you like us to do? I think there was actually tremendous clarity around the Huawei issue. As Boris Johnson was leading the uk, The US made it very clear what it wanted from the UK and other European partners. Now I think it's a little bit uncertain. And we talk about all these trips to China on the part of the Europeans. Is it okay? Is it not okay? I mean, they're sort of maybe less bothered about whether it is or isn't okay, but there is an overall lack of clarity. The second thing, where there is sort of an absence, and maybe there always has been an absence, but I think in the Biden administration, there was at least some notion of a policy towards recognizing that the United States needed to confront China across the developing world, across the so called global south that it needed to have some sort of strategy to, you know, it's impossible to talk about competing with Belt and Road, whatever you think of Belt and Road. But at least the Biden administration thought about the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which was more of a frame than a delivery. That seems to be that part of what the US Wants from the Global south when it comes to China seems to be missing in action at the level of actual articulating a framework, implementing a framework. And I think those two components are also really important part of the discussion.

E (30:54)

So I know you're not a political pundit, foreign policy person, but I mean, the numbers about Democrats I am are very striking. Right. And you can come up with a narrative by why Republicans would move, perhaps even slowly, but move given that Trump has made it more acceptable to not be as hostile to China. But it's not self evident why Democrats would respond this way, particularly on issues like affordability and the like. So if you have thoughts on what has changed, what has been quite a strong movement in both parties towards a harsher attitude towards China more recently, what's enabled that, do you think?

C (31:35)

Why is there more favorability? I mean, one doesn't want to overstate it, right? 53% still means that 47% of Americans are not favorable towards China. That's a very large number of people. It's a big country. Again, I would go back to context. I don't think it's reading the signals of the President necessarily, but it might be a. The absence of. Absence of powerful, consistently articulated, negative, ideologically grounded anti China rhetoric. We just don't really hear it in the same way from the US Government. So it's not so much following the president for the Dems, but it's sort of not having something to kind of bounce off against, sort of. The space is open. The pandemic is long since over. I mean, I know it sounds silly, but as we all know, it was really dominant. Right. The anti China feeling around the pandemic was really very dominant. So I would put those two factors right up front. I'm sure there's a broader conversation. I'm curious what you think.

E (32:41)

I'm not sure that I know the answer. I mean, I do think, I think that it's just curious that there would be movement at this time when there hasn't been significant movement in the US China relations or things that could point to that. You would say, oh yeah, well, here's something positive that China's doing that people are responding to and feeling somewhat More favorable.

C (33:01)

I mean the other thing I might add, although again I doubt that everyday Americans in their sort of going to the grocery store and paying too much for their groceries are paying attention. But Xi is communicating a stable, normal, positive message on most platforms about global stability and engagement. Working through the UN experts have a different interpretation of that. But to the extent that people are paying attention, that could be part of the story.

E (33:31)

So something to watch and we'll be interested in seeing your next round of polling on this. So I'm going to do one more round of questions with you all, but you all should get ready with your questions. So what the US wants and what China wants comes to this Venn diagram issue about where are the places where what China wants and the US wants our coordinate or as our Chinese friends would say, our win win opportunities. And where do you see sort of fundamental issues that are problems in the relationship that where fundamentally what the US wants or might want is fundamentally different from what you perceive as China's goals and objections. I'll start with you again, Matt. Sure.

F (34:10)

I mean to stay the most obvious one, I think it's Taiwan is a major issue again from my perspective as someone who you know, supports democracy, supports self determination, I think that's a very real question for Taiwan. I mean I also think that this unsatisfying status quo is the path of least harm for now. So I also support staying on this course. And interestingly, even when I was in Taiwan last year speaking to very, very pro independence activists, that was their view too is like there's no path to, to independence. So let's just like try to keep tensions low. But it's, you know, obviously it's an issue of enormous importance within China for, for its, for its government, for its people too. So, so managing, you know, not letting that kind of define the relationship I think is going to be really important. I think China, you know, probably has a vision for its own kind of power in its region that if not necessarily, you know, a big problem for the United States in the grand scheme is a big problem for US partners in the region. And so we're going to need to find a way to continue to talk with them about that. And then there are the bigger parts, you know, problems like non proliferation, not just nuclear and other kinds of weapons, but tech AI, cyber weapons that by their very nature their value is their deniability. How do we come up with some kind of international convention governing the use of these really, really potentially dangerous and destabilizing weapons?

E (35:37)

Catherine, on the security Front. I mean, one of the places that feels very zero sumish these days is the western Pacific. Right. And the question about the United States having a very strong, at least traditionally, a strong commit, and it's certainly in the new nds, the idea that we should have complete and unfettered access to the western Pacific and China with a military strategy which is clearly very much focused on access denial. Is this a fundamental problem which will, if not lead to conflict itself is a fundamental difference, or do you see paths in which there is an arrangement that can satisfy both sides in terms of the security deployments and forces in the region and the way we operate in the space which both sides seem so fundamental they're secured in?

B (36:23)

Yeah, no, I think it's a good question and I would kind of piggyback off of what Matt said. I think, yes, it's going to be a critical issue. I think the one thing that I think maybe both sides could agree on is that there's really not an appetite, particularly given the economic impacts for war in the region. Like, if we can avoid conflict, that's a good thing both in the western Pacific and over Taiwan. I think one of the things that I think is maybe most critical to this and that the Trump administration has started to open, at least the conversation on doing is not just in this region but also with our other strategic relationships, is rebalancing our relationships with our allies. I mean, we have a lot of allies in the Indo Pacific that, that have not necessarily taken as active of a role in their own security. And so this was a big push from the administration. It's not just US skin in the game. It's not just the US Driving this conversation. It's also Indo Pacific allies spending on defense. And this kind of dovetailed out of the conversations with NATO. NATO allies need to spend more. The president set the benchmark of 5%. And then that became, after the Hague summit, it sort of became more of the global standard. And so I think allies in the region taking on more of a defense burden for their own security and also having skin in the conversation about not wanting conflict in this region in particular, I think is going to be really pivotal. I will just say though, right, that I think is the security posture of the current administration. There's not an appetite for conflict. Obviously we will focus on deterrence to ensure that should conflict erupt, like we have credible deterrent to, to hopefully avoid that from happening or to fight if needed. But I think one of the challenges is that there's not a broad political consensus on that position. So you still have folks on Capitol Hill that I think would go a step farther, particularly on the Taiwan question, maybe we should erode strategic ambiguity and make a firm defense commitment to Taiwan more clear. And I think that that's, I think that introduces natural confusion and natural points of potential escalation where, if the administration is going one direction and policymakers on the Hill are going a more escalatory other direction, that's going to throw a kink in the ability for us to kind of come together on the Venn diagram to a more sustainable position. So I think that that's going to have to be grappled with, and I think certainly the expectations to our allies in the region and in others on what we will or would not be willing to do, I also think is a, is a conversation. And that's, you know, also I think, dovetails out of, you know, hey, you need to take on more ownership of your own security. And, you know, yes, you're, you're a partner in our conversations about what we do in the region. But it is, I think, an agreed upon general interest that none of us wants to fight a war with China in the western Pacific. It wouldn't be good for our economies. It wouldn't be good politically. And so, you know, having more skin in the game and having you all part of the deterrence exercise, I think really does at least bolster sort of the pasha that the US Wants to have in the region.

E (39:36)

So isn't there a bit of a tension here, though? It seems to me that if what the US Wants is for the allies and partners to do more on defense, it's clearly not what China wants. Right. I mean, you can see this now in the China Japan relationship, which is, as Takeichi moves forward with a pretty robust military buildup, including sort of the first arguably offensive systems that they've just launched there. I mean, is there an inherent tension that as we take this posture that says we want the allies to do more and be part of this thing, that this becomes even more problematic for China than just us being the ones who are sustaining deterrence?

C (40:12)

Yeah, I think it's a fair point.

B (40:13)

I think this is where ideas like those of my friend Jen Kavanaugh at Defense Priorities kind of come into play when it comes to US Posture. Right. If the allies are doing more, if they're in, if they're taking more seriously their responsibility and their own security and securing their own interests in the region, then perhaps that means that the US doesn't have to have such an extensive posture across the Pacific, which has always been a point of contention and potential escalation with the Chinese. They don't obviously like it. So could we do our part of deterrence by having a more second island chain focused posture as opposed to a first island chain posture? That's the work of my friend Jen Kavanaugh that I think is. I think it's apt and I actually think it does need to be. I think it's a natural follow on introduction into the conversation that if our allies are taking greater ownership of security in their own region, then that frees the United States up to do less, to pull some of our resourcing back and to tackle sort of our role in the conversation in a different way. It doesn't have to be the United States alone and it certainly doesn't have to be the United States doing all of the same things it's currently doing with the allies doing more. I think that's perhaps been a piece that has kind of gotten lost in the conversation. It's not something I think the administration has put forward a clear vision on yet of what would be the follow on of allies doing more. And could sort of a US Reduction in our posture and presence be something that would be, you know, negotiable on the table in perhaps a Taiwan conversation with the Chinese? You know, I think that this is. These are places that we could go in the future, but I think that might be a natural way of resolving the tension is that the US Sort of exchanges its own posture in that way.

E (41:51)

Artists win, wins. On the economic front,

G (41:57)

I think that China does not want to reduce the trade deficit. And I don't think Americans really actually want to either. If you go to Walmart, I think we're working pretty well with the trade deficit. And I think in the current moment there's lots of argument to keep it that way. And so I think it sort of depends a little bit on which level we're talking about.

E (42:14)

Right.

G (42:14)

We have these very abstract conversations about the economic relationship, but in practice it gets a lot more complicated and someone has to pay for all of this diversification and whether that's actually making us more secure, we're just rerouting stuff through other countries is sort of another question. I think the other thing where we may not see eye to eye is actually on this whole tech question where we might want to benefit from Chinese technologies that Arthur mentioned earlier. Battery tech might be one of the places where there might be sort of potential for collaboration. And the auto companies certainly are Interested the Chinese companies are interested in sending batteries to the US but there are real questions there about what China would actually send to us and what we would get. And so I think we're also not sort of open eyed enough about what the other side is looking at here. But I think on the affordability front we might find some common ground for the efficiency and the scale that China is bringing to the table here in the meantime. But I don't think that's a White House position. I think that's sort of mainstream position

E (43:11)

on do you agree, do you think that that's the driver? I mean if people felt that as they think about what's shaping their attitudes is the affordability thing and therefore the possibility that we might could get an agreement with China that allows for cheaper Chinese goods to come compared with the balance of the workforce job related piece of it.

C (43:36)

I mean people are not people as in I recently moved to Illinois, I haven't lived in the Midwest since 1986. I grew up in Omaha and I've been in a number of conversations with soybean farmers, with locally elected members of the US Congress who have constituents think very much about the US China relationship through the lens of the tariffs, the trade, the impact on their not only the farmers. I meet with a lot of CEOs and C suite people who have, I like to say their interests run from Davos to like rural Illinois. They're connected at all levels of the supply chain. They care deeply about US China policy because it impacts their businesses at the top line and it impacts their stakeholders and the people who are delivering. So I mean, you know better than anybody, it's obviously a very complex picture. I think what we hear and what we see in the analysis is at the headline level people just, you know, if we kind of treat everybody like they're the same, which in this country they're definitely not. I mean, God, the other thing about turning, you know, returning to America is it just really hits you in the face the role of money in this country. And you know I wasn't in a poor. Well there are parts of England that are poor but I was in central London and you know that Chatham House is in Mayfair basically St. James. But it really is an extraordinary differentiating factor in this country unlike any other I suspect. But affordability, yes, absolutely. But I think you have to, I think, you know, really it's about breaking down the constituent parts and on the trade question a lot of people would like to, to see better relationships because it impacts their business. I think since we're here at sais, we can't forget about the university exchange, the cultural exchange, the people to people exchange in the universities. The number of Americans studying in China dropped off the edge of a cliff surrounding the pandemic and it hasn't recovered. You probably know the numbers very well, but it's pretty tiny and it is to our detriment. My daughter's going to China to study abroad in the autumn. I'm thrilled. But, you know, she'll be one of how many, Jim?

E (45:58)

About a thousand.

C (45:59)

About. I mean, I haven't told her that part. What I was saying, you must apply there first. But it, you know, so there are a lot of reasons, but I think actually given the opportunity, made to feel safe. We haven't talked about the two Michaels thing. You know, I was in London, maybe got more visibility there, but the two Michaels thing, I think really impacted how people felt about safety and security and traveling and exchanging with China. But I think in general, people would like to get back and to get access.

E (46:26)

Great. All right, let me open it up to all of you. We've got a great audience here. I assume that we have microphones. Yes, microphones, somewhere. Great. So why don't we start right here in the front, if you don't mind introducing yourself. It's always good to know where you're coming from.

H (46:44)

Hi, my name's Asia Beckham. Like David Beckham, I am a former BBC News Washington journalist, Common Futures conversation member at the Chatham House, and I tour at the Chinese Embassy in London as a part of the Global Diplomatic Forum. We were the only group allowed in to the embassy and it was September, so that says a lot about sort of relations in the area. My question is with Keir Starmer approving. This is about the US as well. So with Keir Starmer approving a new Chinese embassy in London and making the first UK leader visit to China since 2018, is this a practical reset or a signal of a risky relationship between Washington and China?

E (47:34)

Great Leslie, why don't you start on this, if you don't mind, especially because you've seen this from the London perspective. And so, I mean, I, I spent some time there too, as you know, but interested in. So how you take sort of how the Europeans, in particular the British are now navigating this sort of question about where they position themselves vis a vis and how the US attitude shapes how the Europeans are.

C (47:56)

I mean, it's been a deep source of contention and contestation, as you know, within the UK for several years now. And And I was surprised. I mean, I read Keir Starmer's visit as he waited longer maybe than he would have waited because the UK wanted to maintain a good relationship with President Trump. And I read it very much as exactly what it said on the tin. Needing to have opportunities for British businesses. He went with, as you know, a very large delegation of UK businesses and cultural individuals, prominent cultural individuals in his government and elsewhere. So I read it as, I mean, the UK is struggling, right? Growth is not good, productivity is not good. They need to create a positive investment climate. They need a growth strategy. They're trying to reset the relationship with the eu. The US is a bully. I mean, it's a bully that needs to be managed. And so it seemed, I mean, the timing looked like it was an anti US moment, but I think it was actually part of a. They need good options. And I don't think it's. I think it's the right strategy. I think everybody I've talked to about the embassy issue thinks it was sort of blown up entirely out of proportion in terms of the politics and the.

E (49:16)

We could, but we could go a lot further. I mean, there is an interesting question about, you know, how the US Postures what it wants from China, what it expects its allies to do in support of its policy. Okay, we'll go right here. Mike. John in the white shirt,

F (49:37)

the U.S. do you think that we can trust China? Do you think that we'll ever get the trust from China? They have spawned some of the most heinous arrangements. These pig slaughtering factories, the cyber security attacks. What's the answer? What's the posture? What's the decisions on that

E (49:56)

trust? Matt, you want to start on this? Can we trust China? Does it matter that we trust China?

F (50:01)

I mean, I think can we trust any government? We want to verify agreements, we make some governments. That's harder with and we need to work harder, need to have. But that's ultimately the question is that there's lots of governments that we've had challenging relationships with in the past, but especially one as powerful and influential as China. There's no other option than to continue to try. And the hope would be to establish trust and a record of trust in maybe a few specific areas that you can broaden out into the wider relationship. We could find examples of that having worked in the past. But again, I would say especially with China, we really have no other option than to just keep trying.

E (50:46)

So let me just build on that briefly here and again, maybe come back to Leslie and others who want to Answer. But one of the issues in terms of what the US wants and the Venn diagram has been on human rights and governance and the like. And how do you see this going forward? I mean, at various times it's been very central. I had lived through this at the beginning of the Clinton administration, where we started out with it being fundamental, tying human rights to MFN and the like. Do you see this as remaining a set of central issues? Is the climate changing for the centrality of the issues of China's governance, its own human rights track record as being an important factor in shaping what the US can and will do with China? So maybe Leslie, you start and then I'll come down.

C (51:32)

I mean, the US has lost 100% of its credibility on promoting human rights on the global stage. And if part of the mechanism is, if it were to kind of make that a prominent part of its, you know, we're talking about the White House, right? The US government, not just all of the US if it were to try and make it part of its policy, it would, you know, it would have this dilemma of how do you get everybody to buy in to. Hypocrisy has always been a huge issue for any great power. Certainly for the US it's historically put a lot into its democracy promotion and support of human rights. But the hypocrisy thing has kind of gone off the charts. So it's backburner, as we know, promoting democracy, human rights, asking for much from China on this dimension. I think it's probably going to stay there for a period of time.

E (52:22)

Is that sustainable for the US to do that, do you think, to basically say we're not going to be concerned about those aspects. I mean, there's certainly hints of this in the administration's policy that this is not an issue, that there are other things in the Venn diagram where there's. But this is one that's outside. Do you want to come in on that?

G (52:42)

Just sort of an economic point. I mean, we have a Section 301 investigation to over forced labor to 60 countries right now, basically as an attempt to recreate the framework that was thrown out by the Supreme Court. Right. If we really cared about forced labor, there'd be ways to do that. But it's so obviously being used here as a sort of economic tool in order to recreate the tariff revenue. And so my concern is a little bit that it's sort of muddying everything. And so the issues where we really should be intervening and focusing on are now being thrown in with all of this other stuff. And so how do you then distinguish between what's just a way of getting at the Europeans in order to find a new justification for 20% tariff and what actually is a forced lab concern? And so I think that's part of where I think we could be doing better and probably to your hypocrisy point, but it's sort of in every part of the relationship. It's this kind of catch all accusation that then doesn't lend itself to very targeted interventions maybe on the things where we should really be focused on.

E (53:44)

Catherine, you have thoughts on this?

C (53:48)

Oh no, go ahead.

F (53:49)

I mean, I mean just spend a little time on what Leslie said about U.S. credibility. We definitely need to be cleaning up our own house. I'm not saying we need to make ourselves perfect before we can talk about these values on the global stage. I don't think that's right. But I do think it would be good to have a president who talked about the importance of global human rights standards, not just as a nice to have, but something that is part of our own security and prosperity and stability. Having said that, I do think it would be great for us to practice some of that here in the United States. We're in a situation right now where we have Stephen Miller's private militia snatching people off the streets in Minnesota, murdering two of them in cold blood on video. Showing that we can actually seek accountability and consequences for those kinds of activities is ultimately going to be part of the, I think generational project of beginning to reestablish credibility on these issues.

E (54:46)

But just let me push you a little bit in your capacity, is not sitting on my far right. I mean, do you see because certainly for Democrats, and particularly progressive Democrats or more center left Democrats, the human rights issues, which I have always been very important, Congressman Pelosi, speaker and others, I mean, do you see this re emerging as a central issue in terms of the focus of or seeing voices trying to put this back more centrally into the conversation?

F (55:13)

I mean, I do. I mean, I think this is an important value not just for progressives. I think for a lot of Americans who want America to do good on the global stage, our country was founded on some pretty important beliefs around the intrinsic value and rights of every human being. But again, you mentioned Congresswoman Pelosi and I think just to stay on that for a minute, the question will be what's the path where we can actually advance these goals and not undermine them? And her trip to Taiwan, as much as she might have enjoyed it, that did not make things better, that did not advance human rights in Taiwan or China. That made things worse. So I think the way progressives would approach this would say, okay, these are important issues, but what are the things we can actually do to put ourselves on a better track?

E (55:57)

All right, let me go start moving back to the back of the room. So the gentleman with a beard right there. Right there.

I (56:07)

Yes, my name is Prabh. So my question is on foreign reserves, US has been selling a lot of dollars to buy gold and a lot of other countries are falling, like Brazil, India also doing the same. So will us find a way, will this something they want, that they keep their dollar reserves, not buy some other metal or something that will not help dollar in longer term? And also a lot of brics countries doing that as well. So what can be done to brics or even that kind of. Of strategy that I just mentioned?

E (56:40)

So I'm going to let you start on this. Jonas is the nearest thing we have to a resident economist here.

G (56:45)

I think this is like way above my pay grade, so I don't think I have a good response to that. I mean, yeah, I think I'll have to pause.

E (56:54)

I'll just say one or two things. Again, recognizing I'm also not the resident economist here, but I think that actually not quite obvious to me that we're buying gold. I mean, there's been some unwinding of the balance sheet at the Fed, but I think it's more part of the view about unwinding the balance sheet rather than accumulation of gold. But I think more broadly the question is in terms of what the US Wants, what China wants is we have had a huge stake in the dollar dominance of the economic system. It gives us huge leverage. I mean, in addition to the economic benefits of seniority and all the things that comes with, we've seen the ability to leverage the centrality of the dollar. And the question is one, and again, we don't have economists on this panel, but how much is China really committed to trying to break the dominance of the dollar and how much limitation and how much are we willing to take the pluralization of the international economic systems? You want to try a little on that one?

G (57:53)

I just have a sort of a current observation on this, and that's the Iran situation and the situation around the dollar and oil and clean energy. And so it's very clear sort of how people's interests are. Are aligned there. The one thing you can do if you want to get off the dollar and get out of this Volatility in oil markets that the US Is contributing to is to invest in clean. And who's selling you all of that stuff? China. So I think in terms of the rest of the world, I mean, if you're looking at what Pakistan's doing and Ethiopia is doing and all these other places that are sort of looking at this as an opportunity to get sort of away from the dollar and get away from volatility in energy markets, we're seeing sort of a big move there right now. And I think the Iran situation is only accelerating this.

E (58:31)

And just to be explicit, I mean, one of the things that's very striking about what's emerging in the Gulf right now is that these basically tolls that Iran are charging are not being managed through the Swift clearing system. They're being done either through off balance payments. I think thoughts on this? But I mean it is quite remarkable as there's still lots of barriers to ending US dominance. There's still lots of reasons why the dollar. And so I'm not going to predict to you and again, I know I'm getting over my skis here that this is going to happen overnight, but there are lots of different forces that would be advantageous to China and others to weaken the US stranglehold over the payment system. All right, let me go over to this side right here. Thanks.

G (59:24)

The panel started this. The point that the United States does not currently know what it wants. I guess my question to the panel is how long do you guys expect the US to stay in this model phase? What will be your two or three variables to keep an eye on? That would either offer more intellectual and political clarity in terms of U.S. strategy work or potentially model the water even more. Thanks.

B (59:55)

I think it's a great question. I guess I would push back just a little bit in the sense of. I think one of the things that the NDS was successful at doing is articulating a. I mean, you don't have to agree with it, right? But it was articulating a set of core national interests. And one of those core national interests is reestablishing deterrence by denial on the first island chain in the Indo Pacific in order for us to have basically, hopefully a credible conversation with China that's backed up by the appropriate use of force if we need to use it to basically make the Taiwan scenario for the Chinese so unpalatable that they won't want to go. I mean, that's the whole theory of the deterrence by denial focus. So I would say that the strategy has at least been clear on that being a core national interest and avoiding war over Taiwan in the first island chain that could then spiral is something that is not in US strategic interests. And so we should put a focus on doing everything that we can to try to avoid it. But I think on the broader question of US China, right, the broader Venn diagram that zooms out beyond just the military piece of this, I do think this is going to be an interesting conversation on the 2028 debate stage for both sides of the aisle because you're going to have at least, and I'll speak, you know, I'll out myself, I'm probably appropriately positioned politically both, you know, on my seat on the stage and you know, on the sort of like somewhere in between on the right. That's where us libertarians, restraint minded folk fall. There's not a perfect pinpoint for us. But I think that you're going to have at least on the Republican side of the aisle, I think you're going to have have a broad spectrum of candidates that take the question of US China relations, you know, in multiple different directions. Right. So I think you might have some folks from sort of the old guard neoconservative faction that take more of a, this is a new Cold War mentality in terms of our relationship with China and a holistic approach where that applies militarily, economically, politically, human rights, et cetera. I think you may have, you know, then a more restraint minded, you know, camp that certainly on the military front does not want to see conflict in the Indo Pacific, does not want us to get involved in a war with China and doesn't believe that we have the resourcing to win a war with China. And so I think would make that very clear and that it's not in our national interest. And then I think you would also have some folks perhaps that are in more of a libertarian space economically that would say that still hold up the values of free trade, of free exchange of ideas, of favoring diplomacy that includes these things that is sort of the anti populist right message. And so I think that this is gonna be a huge focus of the debate stage. And certainly I think when it comes to questions of presidential candidates foreign policy credentials, I don't think you can escape the conversation on okay, what are you going to do militarily when it comes to China? I don't think anyone's gonna be able to to get around that question. But on the right I think you're gonna see a selection of different answers.

E (63:03)

So this is a great Question for us to end on others wanna come in and whether you see new consensus emerging or new lines of the debate.

F (63:13)

I mean, I'll just very briefly, I mean to your question, how long will this moment last? I mean, I really wish I knew. That's a question I ask myself all the time. And again, apologies to colleagues from around the world. Cause understand, like as we figure our shit out here, that obviously has consequences for all of you. So again, apologies, but again, I mean, the fact that our foreign policy consensus has broken is a reflection of the fact that our political consensus has broken. We have lost a shared sense of what the American political project it is. I mean, this is a deep crisis we're in right now. But I would say part of what I would hope we would avoid and what I heard from Catherine, again, having had the privilege of working with her both on the Hill and off, I think there is a sense there is a cohort of both Republicans and Democrats, conservative progressives, liberals, who do understand that we need to treat foreign policy more responsibly. Part of the challenge has been that Americans have become so, I think, understandably cynical about the ability of government and politics to produce real change. That they see it now just as an area for culture war. And that have been a problem specifically in foreign policy as well. That's what we see in Iran right now. The reason, I mean, why are we at war in Iran? This country didn't threaten us. That's not to defend everything Iran does. But Iran has just been part of this culture war in this city that is largely detached from the actual challenge that Iran poses. So I do think, given that China is much bigger, much more influential, its economy is much larger, it has much more of an impact now and even potentially on American life is to avoid that becoming just another instrument in the kind of culture war.

C (64:53)

Yeah, I guess I think that the US has so many problems to solve for at home to kind of echo what Matt and others have said, but especially and also overseas, multiple wars, that it seems unlikely that we could kind of go back to a moment where there's a singular strategic focus on taking on China in the way that happened before. Because how the war in the Middle east unfolds and is managed matters for what's going to happen on China policy, what happens in Ukraine and the extent to which Russia and China remain aligned on that matters for US China policy. So there's so many different factors out there that I think that, you know, I think we sometimes tend to slip into thinking that policy will be set by the people in Washington. In fact, the world has a lot to. And our engagement with the world has a lot to say about how our policies get set. So I think the external environment has changed partly because we've changed it by starting a war together with Israel that's gotten far beyond our control to manage the outcome and is not playing to the US Advantage, let alone to the people in Iran or across the Gulf or across the wider region. So, yeah, I think that if I had to anticipate it will remain moderate, if I had to talk about what was going to change it, I wouldn't actually point to the elections. I would point more to how these external factors change.

E (66:29)

Great. Jonas, final word.

G (66:32)

I mean, to me, this whole question of what does America want and how does China feed into that is really about who you're talking to. And I don't really see us coming up with a consensus on the economy. I think we've had a very successful economy historically. Everyone also really hates it.

C (66:47)

It.

G (66:48)

And so, like, you know, but everyone hates it for a different reason. And so you talk to folks, you know, talk. Talk to the hyperscalers that are in D.C. lobbying for export controls because they want the domestic market to be protected for their models. You talk to the manufacturing lobby that employs 7% of Americans but sort of shapes, you know, foreign policy towards China quite significantly. And, you know, they obviously have a sort of manufacturing view. And so these are all valid concerns and economic interests that I think we need to take seriously. But. But sort of to crystallize out of that one view of what China should do I think is really difficult. My worry is that the people who scream the loudest are not necessarily the ones who have sort of the most coverage in terms of the population. And if we can sort of shift the needle a bit on that, that would be helpful in figuring out what America wants and then figuring out how China fits into that position.

E (67:38)

Perfect. An excellent way to end the panel. Please join me in thanking our great groups for State Coffee says.

J (68:06)

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