Sinica Podcast – “The China Debate We’re Not Having,” Part 2: What Does the United States Want?
Date: April 15, 2026
Host: Kaiser Kuo
Featuring: Panel from the Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs (ACF), Johns Hopkins SAIS
Panelists: Matt Duss (Center for International Policy), Katherine Thompson (Cato Institute), Jonas Nahm (Johns Hopkins SAIS), Leslie Vinjamuri (Chicago Council on Global Affairs)
Moderator: Dean Jim Steinberg (Johns Hopkins SAIS)
Overview
This episode features a live panel discussion from a major SAIS conference exploring the fundamental question: “What Does the United States Want?” in the US–China relationship. Following last week’s panel on “What Does China Want?”, this installment delves into America’s grand strategy, the lack of consensus in US policy circles, security and economic priorities, the interplay of public opinion, global partnerships, and points of both conflict and potential cooperation with China. The discussion is frank, nuanced, occasionally pointed, and aims to surface the assumptions and dilemmas shaping current and future US strategy.
Key Discussion Points and Insights
1. Framing the “Grand Strategy” Question
[05:53–07:15] Dean Jim Steinberg opens the panel by stressing the importance of situating the US–China relationship within the broader sweep of American grand strategy. He challenges panelists to analyze not just tactical policies, but the deeper strategic aspirations and anxieties driving US decision-making.
2. Uncertainty and Fracture in US Foreign Policy
Matt Duss [07:15–11:51]
- Asserts that “the United States does not know what it wants.” The old post-Cold War consensus is shattered, and both Trump and Biden administration documents are “polyglot…often in tension with each other.”
- Trump’s approach is unpredictable and lacking coherent strategy: “There’s very little process to speak of that could produce that kind of strategy, I think, from Trump.” [09:12]
- The Biden team is “trying to restore the old order, even as they understand we can’t fully do that.”
- The only emergent alternative: the progressive Left may champion a foreign policy judged by its impact on US security, prosperity, and freedom, rather than focusing China as the defining frame.
“We allowed concern about China to define our prior approach to the world…we allow China to determine our policy. And I think what we need to do is start with the question of American foreign policy: Is the goal of foreign policy to promote the security and prosperity and freedom of the American people? What does a relationship with China look like that promotes all of those principles?” — Matt Duss [11:16]
3. Security and Military Priorities, and Hard Choices
Katherine Thompson [12:15–18:35]
- Experience in both the executive and legislative branches shows a fissure in Washington: a hawkish bipartisan consensus is giving way to debates about limits, trade-offs, and realism.
- Post-2018, both Trump and Biden elevated China as the “pacing threat,” pushing resources toward Indo-Pacific deterrence (e.g., the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative) [13:30–14:54].
- She critiques a “throw all the pasta at the wall and see which noodles stick strategy” and calls for candid discussion of trade-offs: “We have to grapple with constraints on our own strategy.”
- The Trump administration opened discussion on procurement shortfalls (“we do not have in fact unlimited munitions”—17:37), and tabled the idea that US cannot do everything, everywhere.
“If we arm Ukraine and we draw down from our own stockpiles, then we’re not going to have certain exquisite munitions available to do deterrence by denial in the Indo-Pacific. That’s a really big trade-off…” — Katherine Thompson [13:50]
4. Economic Competition: Pragmatism vs. Grand Narratives
Jonas Nahm [19:27–22:43]
- US policy has been reactive; opportunities to make economic competition with China work for US domestic challenges (like energy affordability, tech upgrade, and manufacturing) have been underexplored.
- Suggests the US should “break it down into…very specific, concrete problems that we have in the economy. There might be different ways that China fits into that solution that in the past we’ve not really been able to address because we’ve had this overall US–China framework” focused on confrontation [22:31].
- Examples: Leveraging Chinese solar and battery tech for US affordability, pursuing learning (automation, AI) via competition or mutually beneficial ventures, and recognizing the need for upgraded domestic manufacturing.
5. Public Opinion and Political Dynamics
Leslie Vinjamuri [23:30–33:01]
- Warns against reductive thinking: “the US is a big country, it’s a diverse country…not everyone else in the world is willing to give us a pass on that clear reality.”
- Documents a recent, striking rise in US public favorability toward China: “A 40% increase since 2024…now at 53%.” Notably, “two thirds of Democrats and one third of Republicans have a positive, friendly attitude toward China.” [24:31]
- Tariffs and trade split sharply along partisan lines (81% of Democrats oppose tariffs; 67% of Republicans support).
- The hardening of opinion under Trump 1.0 was deeply intertwined with the pandemic (“the context…was ripe for hardening attitudes. It was manipulated and used.”), but more recently, “the absence of powerful, consistently articulated, negative, ideologically grounded anti-China rhetoric” has helped soften views [31:35].
- Allies are “most confused” about US intentions on China; after a period of clarity, the US now sends mixed messages, especially post-Biden.
6. Points of Tension: Where US and China Differ (and Possible Win-Wins)
Taiwan and Strategic Ambiguity
Matt Duss [34:10]:
- “Taiwan is a major issue…this unsatisfying status quo is the path of least harm for now.” Even pro-independence voices in Taiwan endorse maintaining calm over seeking any radical change.
- Big challenge: not letting Taiwan become the existential definition of the entire relationship.
Military Posture and Burden-Sharing
Katherine Thompson [36:23–41:51]:
- The US wants “unfettered access” to the Western Pacific; China seeks “access denial.”
- Advocates for shifting more responsibility to allies: “If allies are taking greater ownership of security, that frees the US to do less…It doesn’t have to be the United States alone.”
“Having more skin in the game and having [allies] part of the deterrence exercise really does at least bolster…the posture that the US wants to have in the region.” — Katherine Thompson [39:26]
Economic Interests and Trade-Offs
Jonas Nahm / Leslie Vinjamuri [41:57–46:26]
- Despite the rhetoric, Americans still depend on inexpensive Chinese goods: “If you go to Walmart, I think we’re working pretty well with the trade deficit.”
- Business leaders and farmers “care deeply about US–China policy because it impacts their businesses at the top line and it impacts their stakeholders.” — Vinjamuri [43:36]
- Ultra-tight focus on national security and decoupling vs. local economic realities—especially in regions where China is a critical market or supplier.
People-to-People Exchanges
- Major drop in Americans studying in China post-pandemic; cross-cultural losses are seen as to America’s detriment.
7. Trust, Human Rights, and US Credibility
Trust
Audience Q [49:37]: Do you think we can trust China? Can we ever get trust from China?
Matt Duss [50:01]:
- “Can we trust any government? We want to verify agreements we make…But especially with China, we really have no other option than to just keep trying.”
Human Rights Hypocrisy and Priorities
Leslie Vinjamuri [51:32]:
- “The US has lost 100% of its credibility on promoting human rights on the global stage…The hypocrisy thing has kind of gone off the charts. So it’s backburner…promoting democracy, human rights, asking for much from China on this dimension, I think is probably going to stay there for a period of time.”
- Jonas Nahm points out that forced labor concerns are being “used as a sort of economic tool,” muddying the waters between genuine rights concerns and protectionism [52:42].
- Matt Duss adds: “We need to be cleaning up our own house…showing that we can actually seek accountability and consequences for those kinds of activities is ultimately going to be part of…reestablish(ing) credibility” [53:49]. But progressives want approaches that genuinely advance—not undermine—these goals [55:13].
8. Global Power Competition — Dollar Dominance & BRICS
Audience Q [56:07]: China & Others diversifying out of dollars—what does the US want?
- Jonas Nahm defers a detailed answer, but notes, “the one thing you can do if you want to get off the dollar and get out of this volatility…is to invest in clean [energy]. And who’s selling you all that stuff? China.”
- Dean Steinberg: Despite efforts at diversification, “there are lots of different forces that would be advantageous to China and others to weaken the US stranglehold over the payment system.” [58:31]
9. How Long Will the “Muddled” Moment Last?
Audience Q [59:24]: How long can US confusion persist, and what would resolve it?
- Katherine Thompson: “The strategy has…been clear on [the] core national interest…avoiding war over Taiwan…But on the broader question of US–China…I do think this is going to be an interesting conversation on the 2028 debate stage for both sides of the aisle.” [59:55]
- Matt Duss: “The fact that our foreign policy consensus has broken is a reflection of the fact that our political consensus has broken. We have lost a shared sense of what the American political project is.” [63:13]
- Leslie Vinjamuri: External factors—wars in the Middle East, Russia–China alignment, Ukraine—will drive US–China policy as much as Washington politics. [64:53]
- Jonas Nahm: The US cannot forge consensus because so many constituencies influence policy; the loudest, not necessarily the most representative, shape debate [66:32].
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
“We allowed concern about China to define our prior approach to the world…what we need to do is start with the question of American foreign policy: Is the goal to promote the security and prosperity and freedom of the American people?”
— Matt Duss [11:16]
-
“If we arm Ukraine and we draw down from our own stockpiles, then we’re not going to have certain exquisite munitions…That’s a really big trade-off.”
— Katherine Thompson [13:50]
-
“The US is a big country, it’s a diverse country…not everyone else in the world is willing to give us a pass on that clear reality.”
— Leslie Vinjamuri [23:30]
-
“The US has lost 100% of its credibility on promoting human rights on the global stage…The hypocrisy thing has kind of gone off the charts.”
— Leslie Vinjamuri [51:32]
-
“Can we trust any government?…with China, we really have no other option than to just keep trying.”
— Matt Duss [50:01]
-
“The fact that our foreign policy consensus has broken is a reflection of the fact that our political consensus has broken. We have lost a shared sense of what the American political project is.”
— Matt Duss [63:13]
Timestamps for Key Segments
| Segment | Topic | Timestamps |
|---------|-------|------------|
| Opening Panel Framing | Grand strategy and context | 05:53–07:15 |
| Does US Know What It Wants? | Matt Duss on strategic confusion | 07:15–11:51 |
| Military/Security Trade-Offs | Katherine Thompson on realism | 12:15–18:35 |
| Economic Competition | Jonas Nahm on sectoral approach | 19:27–22:43 |
| Public Opinion & Allies | Leslie Vinjamuri on shifting attitudes | 23:30–33:31 |
| Fundamental Points of Conflict | Panel on Taiwan, force posture, economics | 34:10–46:26 |
| Audience Questions | UK reset, trust, dollar system, muddled strategy | 46:44–67:38 |
Tone and Style
The conversation is candid, sometimes blunt, marked by self-awareness about America’s current internal dysfunctions and the challenge of simultaneously responding to Chinese competition, global instability, and domestic economic and political divides. Panelists avoid platitudes, admit uncertainties, and emphasize nuance over easy “China hawk” narratives.
Recommended For
Listeners who want a clear-eyed, non-sensationalist look at where US–China policy is headed, what’s driving the debate in Washington and beyond, and which assumptions need re-examination as both sides grapple with unprecedented global change.