The Highest Exam: Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin on China's Gaokao and What It Reveals About Chinese Society

Summary

Sinica Podcast: “The Highest Exam: Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin on China's Gaokao”

Host: Kaiser Kuo
Guests: Jia Ruixue (UCSD), Li Hongbin (Stanford), Claire Cuzneau (co-author/editor)
Date: January 21, 2026

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Episode Overview

In this episode, Kaiser Kuo is joined by Professors Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin, co-authors of The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China, to dissect the central role of the Gaokao—the Chinese National College Entrance Exam—in Chinese society. Their wide-ranging discussion explores the Gaokao not only as an educational gatekeeper but as a fundamental institution shaping governance, social mobility, labor markets, political legitimacy, and even emigrant attitudes toward education and fairness. Drawing on personal experience, empirical research, and political economy, they challenge both foreign and domestic preconceptions about why the exam persists and what it reveals about contemporary China.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What is the Gaokao? Beyond a Test

• More than a College Entrance Exam:
  The Gaokao is the summit of China's exam-centered education system. From early childhood, families “already have that targeted test in their mind” (06:18).
  • “It’s not just one exam—it’s guided at the whole education experience.” — Jia Ruixue (06:18)
• Selection, Not Just Education:
  The test’s difficulty serves a particular function:
  • “The primary function is for selection … to select people based on their intelligence and diligence.” — Jia Ruixue (07:31)

2. Gaokao as a System of Elite Allocation & Social Mobility

• Meritocracy and Fate:
  • “It’s an elite allocation mechanism … it can change your fate by working hard for the exam.” — Li Hongbin (07:35)
• Hierarchy & Stakes:
  With only a few points separating tiers, every fraction of a score can determine access to China’s top colleges, which in turn determines job, location (hukou attainment), and class for life.
  • “One point more or a few points more would give you a chance to go to a higher tier of colleges and that makes a big difference in the future.” — Jia Ruixue (09:37)
• Family Investment & Competition:
  Intense investment by families, reinforced by zero-sum competition; as more families gain resources, competition and inequality intensify (09:37–11:08).

3. Why the Pressures Are So Intense

• Few Alternative Paths:
  • “There are very limited alternative routes for social mobility … outside of the education system.” (11:08)
• Hukou & State Jobs:
  College attendance provides access to valuable city residency permits (hukou), and the best jobs remain within the state sector.
  • “If you do well in exams, you can get a valuable hukou in Beijing and Shanghai.” — Li Hongbin (12:37)

4. Personal Histories & Broader Implications

• Upward Mobility and Its Limits:
  Jia's rural background and Li’s experience in the transition out of the Cultural Revolution illustrate both the possibilities and the new inequalities arising from economic changes.
  • “Before going to college I… was just working hard on the exam. Then I observed inequality across my peers… and started thinking about the system.” — Jia Ruixue (14:23)
• From Survival to Selection Function:
  • “Today, because of development, some families are more wealthy than others… education became less equal … compared to 40 years ago.” — Li Hongbin (18:05)

5. Gaokao as a Political Institution

• Stability, Hope, and Justification:
  • “It gives hope to all the families… the prospect of mobility is very essential for stability… If you fail… you blame yourself. If you succeed, it’s because you’re smart.” — Jia Ruixue (19:07)
• Managing Elite Selection:
  The test allows rulers to select and control talent, manage ideological content, and allocate opportunity across regions (with quota systems dating back to the Ming dynasty).
  • “The ideology … can be centralized and manipulated through such a system.” — Jia Ruixue (23:08)
• Fear of the Alternative:
  • “This obsession… comes not from love of the system, but mainly from fear of the alternative.” — Jia Ruixue (25:02)

6. Historical Breaks and Restorations

• Qing and Cultural Revolution Suspensions:
  The abolitions of exam systems led to upheaval and political instability, illustrating their political importance.
  • “Destroying perceived mobility facilitated political instability…” — Jia Ruixue (28:30)
  • “The reform in China didn’t start from 1978, it started in 1977—with the reinstatement of the exam system.” — Jia Ruixue (30:42)

7. Equality, Technology & Persistent Inequality

• Inequality Evolution:
  Economic growth has expanded resources for some, but access remains unequal due to disparities in motivation, parental presence, and teacher quality, rather than material access alone.
  • “They really don't have a lot of motivating teachers… Bad teachers don't want to stay in rural area, they all work in the big cities.” — Li Hongbin (33:46)
• Marketization Erodes Local Opportunity:
  • “With more marketization in the education market, there’s more unequal distribution in terms of teachers.” — Jia Ruixue (35:00)

8. Why Reform is So Difficult

• Reform Attempts and Resistance:
  Attempts to emulate US-style AP or add English speaking/listening were dropped because they exacerbated urban/rural inequalities.
  • “Any reform will change how the testing results… So there will be losers and winners. That’s why it’s so hard.” — Li Hongbin (38:53)
• Flattening the College Hierarchy as a Solution:
  • “If the college hierarchy [were] a bit flattened, then the prize would be less severe.” — Jia Ruixue (44:09)

9. Education and Growth

• Human Capital & Centralization:
  China’s centralized system enabled rapid expansion of education, boosting productivity and GDP.
  • “Because of centralization… the government can quickly expand education if they believe it's important.” — Li Hongbin (41:23)

10. Signals, Selection, and Skill Formation

• College As Selection, Not Value-Add:
  • “The selection function is so strong… labor markets see this as a signal… there’s discrimination based on your degree.” — Jia Ruixue (42:44)
  • “99% graduation rate shows the focus is on selection, not on value-add during college.” (43:59)

11. Labor Market Planning & STEM Emphasis

• State Steering and Unintended Consequences:
  China’s state can quickly direct talent into priority industries, but over-planning sometimes leads to individual misery and mismatches.
  • “This kind of planning is effective, but also has unexpected consequences… There’s a cost at the individual level.” — Jia Ruixue (49:16)

12. Tournament Logic in Governance & Society

• KPI-Driven Promotions:
  The same tournament logic applies to officials—GDP growth is a de facto exam for advancement.
  • “The party manages the country like a big corporation… set a KPI to provincial leaders: whoever can grow the economy fast will be promoted.” — Li Hongbin (51:28)
• Cultural Imprint of Ranking and Competition:
  • “This is a zero-sum game… not very pleasant in a small environment.” — Jia Ruixue (56:25)

13. Exam Culture Abroad and Affirmative Action

• Immigrant Value Clashes:
  Chinese and East Asian Americans often distrust holistic admissions and affirmative action, shaped by their faith in tests as fair and transparent.
  • “If you succeeded from [the exam] system, you naturally think it’s fair…” — Jia Ruixue (58:23)
  • “Social capital is needed for holistic admissions; new immigrants often lack it, making them suspicious.” (58:23)
• Cross-Cultural Contrasts in Trust and Fairness:
  • “In China… if universities had more autonomy, there would be a lot of distrust… [Lack of] checks on power is the fundamental reason for preference for a transparent system.” — Jia Ruixue (64:30)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

On the All-Encompassing Nature of the Gaokao

• “Test started on day one… Not until later in middle school or high school. Even for first grade!” — Li Hongbin (07:35)
• “The obsession is not a love of the system, but fear of the alternative.” — Jia Ruixue (25:02)

On Political Legitimacy

• “If you fail… you’d blame yourself… it gives responsibility to individuals, rather than to the system.” — Jia Ruixue (19:07)
• “You’d have even less social mobility without the Gaokao—more corruption and more arbitrary allocation.” — Paraphrased summary (25:02)

On Reform Impasses

• “Any reform… will change how the titles are allocated. Then, there will be losers and winners. That’s why it’s so hard to reform.” — Li Hongbin (38:53)

On Comparison with US System

• “In China, the ratio [of elite college attendance] between rich and poor is 3:1. In the US, it’s 11:1... So it’s more unequal in this country.” — Li Hongbin (62:46)

On Immigrant Tension Over US Admissions

• “There is a survival bias: those who succeeded in a test-based system naturally think it’s fair…” — Jia Ruixue (58:23)
• “For Asian parents, trust in standardized rule-based evaluation is a moral framework for fairness.” — Paraphrased (60:36)

Broader Implication

• “The education system reflects the society—it’s not only shaping society, but also reflecting its broader structure.” — Jia Ruixue (56:50)

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Timestamps of Important Segments

• [05:42] – Defining the Gaokao and its social significance
• [11:08] – Lack of alternative mobility and the importance of hukou
• [14:23] – Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin’s personal stories
• [19:07] – Gaokao as a political institution (stability, legitimacy)
• [23:08] – Historical endurance and quota system
• [28:30] – Abolition and restoration: lessons from Qing/Cultural Revolution
• [33:26] – Technology, rural/urban motivation & teacher quality
• [36:55] – Why meaningful reform is so difficult
• [41:22] – Education’s direct role in GDP growth & human capital
• [42:44] – Gaokao as selection vs. college as skill development
• [47:11] – Market vs. state in STEM prioritization
• [51:28] – Tournament logic in government
• [56:50] – How tournament logic pervades society and work
• [58:23] – Transplanting exam culture abroad and clashes with US values
• [62:46] – Comparative inequality in China/US, trust in institutions
• [67:49] – Authors’ final takeaways

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Memorable Closing Reflections

• “The same system that could work in the past may not work well today. So it’s time to think together how to reform the system.” — Jia Ruixue (67:49)
• “For any institution to survive a thousand years is remarkable. We try to show it objectively to let people think harder about China’s way forward.” — Li Hongbin (68:53)

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Further Recommendations (70:33–end)

• Jia’s recommendations:

  • Film: A Town Called Hegang (French: Belamin) — “very humorous about desire and despair in a depressed Chinese town”
  • Book: Stoner by John Williams

• Li’s recommendation:

  • Book: The Dictator’s Handbook

• Kaiser’s recommendations:

  • Book: Furious Minds by Laura K. Field
  • Book: Black by Elle Reeve

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Summary Takeaways

• The Gaokao is more than an exam: It is a keystone institution knitting together China's education, bureaucracy, and societal values.
• It is widely perceived as both flawed and necessary: Families and the state both invest in and defend it because the alternative—nepotism, guanxi, corruption—seems worse.
• Historical and political context matter: The persistence and revival of exam-based allocation is tied to political stability, legitimacy, and adaptability.
• Reform is challenging: Any real reform destabilizes entrenched expectations and risks new inequalities.
• Exam logic is (perhaps uncomfortably) central to Chinese society: Its rationale permeates not just education, but government, business, and even the mindset of emigrants abroad.

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If you want to understand Chinese society—not just its schools, but its government, labor market, and even emigrant values—start with the Gaokao, and this episode.

Transcript

[A]

Foreign.

[B]

Welcome to the Seneca Podcast, a weekly discussion of current affairs in China. In this program we look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that can help us better understand what's happening in China's politics, foreign relations, economics and society. Join me each week for in depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to how we think and talk about China. I'm Kaiser Guo, coming to you this week from my home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Sinica is supported this year by the center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, a national resource center for the study of East Asia. The Sinica Podcast is and will remain free. But if you work for an organization that believes in what I'm doing with the show and with my newsletter, please consider lending your support. You can reach [e-mail] and listeners, please support my work by becoming a paying [e-mail] you will enjoy, in addition to the podcast, the complete transcript of the show, essays from me, as well as writings and podcasts from some of your favorite China focused columnists and commentators. And of course, you will enjoy the knowledge that you are helping me do what I honestly believe is important work. So check out the page, see all that is on offer, and do consider helping out. Today we're talking about one of the towering institutions of Chinese life, something that is dreaded, feared, with an outsized ability to determine life outcomes at once seen as deeply flawed and badly in need of reform, and yet also viewed as sacrosanct. Really, as something few Chinese want to see drastically altered, let alone removed altogether, it feels almost inescapable. Short of opting out entirely from adult life in China or settling for life consigned to dirty, dull or dangerous labor, I am talking, of course, about the Galkol, China's famous college entrance exam. So cards on the table. I am somebody who, having lived in China for so much of my life, had very strong preconceptions about the Galkol. I mean, the whole pedagogical plan that my wife Fanfan and I came up with, which is one of the few things that we, you know, were in perfect accord on this plan that we came up with for our two children, Guinevere and Johnny, who both attended primary school in Beijing, was basically centered around this idea that we would get them out of the Chinese education system before the classroom became increasingly oriented just toward preparing students for the Gulk hall. Because we knew that we wanted our kids to attend university in the US and we actually timed our departure, so that it was just after our oldest Guinevere had finished grade school. To us, the whole idea of a single test determining so much of the future of our children, the idea that their whole childhood after age 12 would be given over to preparation for this grueling, impersonal test, it just seemed like too much to ask of the kids, and we had a relatively easy way to avoid that. But it wasn't just us. Many people around us, friends and family who lacked foreign citizenship, who didn't have family living abroad, or even any strong foreign connections, they also opted out of the Galkao track quite early. They paid through the nose to send their kids to one of the international schools that were increasingly, in the time we were there, accepting Chinese students now. I had of course encountered many people in China who defended the institution of the Gaokhal. Still, still, when I read the terrific book that we'll be discussing today, I can say I really had my eyes opened in a way that happens too infrequently of late to me or to anyone. The book is called the Highest how the Gaokhao Shapes China by Jia Reishue and Li Hur Cusineau. I'm delighted that the two authors could join me here today on Syndicate to talk about their work on this enormously important topic, which really has complicated the way I thought about the whole college entrance exam. I think that it's going to challenge a lot of preconceptions that many people have about the Galka Rei Xue Jia is a Professor of Economics at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, ucsd, where she is also affiliated with the China Data Lab. Her research spans political economy, economic history and development, with a particular focus on how institutions such as the examination systems shape government governance, elite selection, and long run state capacity in China. Huangbinli is the James Liang Chair and Faculty Co Director of the Stanford center on Chinese Economy and Institutions and a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. An economist by training, his work focuses on education, labor markets, and the institutional foundations of China's economic development, informed by both large scale data and, as we'll see, by his own lived experience. Let me add that Claire Cuzneau is a writer and editor who collaborated closely with the authors on the Highest exam. She worked with the authors to translate very complex empirical research and historical analysis into a narrative that's quite accessible to a general audience, shaping the book's structure, voice and storytelling. Welcomed Warmly to Seneca.

[C]

Thank you, Kaiser.

[B]

Let's get started. For many people outside China, the Gulk hall is usually described as a very difficult college entrance exam. One of the arguments of your book, and I think it's a very persuasive argument, is that well, this description is far too narrow. It's not just that at all. Maybe to start us off, how would you describe what the Galka actually represents in the lives of of students and families in China? And why it's important goes far beyond just education ratio. Why don't you start?

[A]

Yeah, I think Gaokao is the peak of the exam system. At its heart, Chinese education system is an exam center. There are numerous exams from primary school to high school but the ultimate test, the ultimate tournament is the national entrance exam, the Gao call. So I think for many families, when they decided which primary school to send their kid to at this very early stage, they already have that targeted test in their mind. So that's why it's not just one exam is guided at the WHOO education experience and you mentioned it's difficult and it's supposed to be difficult and there's a logic there as we want to highlight such a kind of a system. The primary function is for selection, right? To have an effective selection system, you want to select people based on their intelligence and the diligence to be effective you have to design it as a difficult test rather than just, you know, it's much difficult to dance with SAT counterparts much more.

[B]

Yeah, humin. Do you have something to add to that? What makes it more than just an exam?

[C]

First of all, I think I'm glad that your kids also went to school in China. So my two kids were in Beijing, so my older one, I brought her to the US when she was 10 years old so she also went to school for four years in China. I think test started in day one in school that's right. Not until later in middle school or high school so of course I also went to school, I both went to school in China so we experienced the whole testing system. So it's not only a test itself, it's a allocation mechanism to basically allocate people to different colleges and then the different colleges also link to different job opportunities, right? So in the end it's elite allocation mechanism in the society we call meritocracy. So that make it really important actually because it can also change your fate in a sense by working hard for the exam.

[B]

In fact, your book has a lot of data about just how impactful it is on outcomes, how this test you take when you're 18 years old basically has a very, very strong correlation to how much you earn later on in life, more so than in the United States. Early in the book, you describe the relationship that families have to education and to the Galkhal as an obsession. As Raishui has said, you start taking tests very, very early on. I mean, this sounds very extreme, especially to readers outside of China, but your argument is that this behavior is actually quite rational. Can you explain the concrete incentives that families face and why, given how this system works, why it is that parents feel they must invest so much time, so much money, so much emotional energy into this one exam?

[A]

I think the perception for families is that one point in the final Gaulka test would make a big difference in their children's lives. And for the audience knowledge, the maximum points is 750. Yet family have this perception. And it's a very hierarchical college system indeed. Often like one point more or a few points more would give you a chance to go to a higher tier of colleges and that make a big difference in the future. So that's how family would take this into account. Right. They invest a lot and it's a tournament. So it's a zero sum. Right. You see other people, they are investing in our children, they have to invest a bit more. Everyone behave this way in the equilibrium of computation. And over time, in my time and Hongbing's time, China was poor. So not many families had such resources. With economic development, more families has, you know, almost all families have some resources. Obviously some family has much more resources. So this competition become more and more intensified and also more and more unequal. So one message we want to deliver by the book is that, oh, this institution that used to work well or the older cohorts now face a lot of challenges and we need maybe to think together how to improve this system.

[B]

Yeah, and in fact, one of you, Hongbin was actually asked to work on reforming the GAO cause itself. And we'll talk about that experience, but I want to get through some more of this sort of introductory material first. And Hong, another point that you guys emphasize is that in China there are very limited alternative routes for social mobility or for long term economic security outside of the education system. So if a student does not do well on the Galk hall, many of the doors in life are effectively just closed. So how important is this lack of alternative pathways in shaping the kind of pressure that students experience, that families kind of experience, and the broad social acceptance of the system?

[C]

I think the main thing is how China's labor market works. I think this is very important.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

So as you know that China has many important systems. One is the Phuko system, so the other is the so called state sector. So intermittent empowerer. Right. So hukou is very important. One way to change your fit is that for example, in my case I went to Beijing for college and then got a PhD from Stanford. But I returned to Beijing, I automatically got my Beijing hukou. So which is extremely available because there's no market for huku. But many people believe this is worth billions of RMB actually.

[B]

Right.

[C]

So this is very important. That's why if you do well in exam, you can get a valuable hukou in Beijing and Shanghai. So that's important. The second layer of this is in the labor market is that state is still a major player in the labor market and their jobs as are perceived as the best jobs in China even today.

[B]

Yeah. In some of the materials that you guys have used in other talks I saw some statistics. I mean it's across the board. Everyone still identifies a job specifically as an official working for a state ministry or for some state agency as the most desirable kind of a job.

[C]

Yes. We also mentioned this data in the book. That's the paper I wrote. So this is the key. Right. So if the state is on top of the empowerment hierarchy, if the best way to get into a state sector job is to test well and get into a good college, then this become natural.

[A]

Right.

[C]

So it's not testing itself or education itself, it's also about the labor market. Yeah.

[B]

So both of you actually went through this system yourselves, but from very different backgrounds and in different historical moments. So as you were writing the book, how did your own experiences as students shape your thinking about the Gaok hall today? When did you begin to see that this was not only a story about education, a story about families, but also a story about how the Chinese state selects talent and maintains political legitimacy. Rui Xue, let's start with your story and then go to Hongbin's story.

[A]

Yeah. I grew up in a rural village in Shandong province. It was used to be a revolutionary base. So it's pretty underdeveloped. Obviously before going to college, I didn't have time or capacity to think of this broad picture. I was just working hard on the exam. Then of course, after I attended college, I observed all this inequality across my peers across and started thinking about the system. And then when I went to Sweden to do my PhD in our work, my field is political economy because I always am always interested in this power. Why some group of people have so much power while others are powerless and yet couldn't really seem to be happy, or at least cannot really rebel or protest. So that motivated my thinking of this system. So gradually I feel the exam system, which has a long history, as you know, it's an institution not only as education, it's also a governance tool. So that's how I started thinking about the exam system as an institution, also as a moral framework in some sense, when we talk about people's belief in meritocracy and how this affect these tensions in the immigrant community in the US Et cetera. So that's how I see not only as economic of education, but political economy and even the moral foundation of the exam system.

[B]

Right, right, right, right. And what about you, Hung Bin? You also have a very interesting story.

[C]

So I'm 53. All my life I have been staying in school, first as a student and then as a professor. So I also study education itself. And now, like you, Kaiser, I have two children, one in college, one in high school. So both of them went to like. They went to like in total, 13 different schools in Hong Kong, Beijing and the Bay area.

[B]

Wow.

[C]

So I have seen so many schools in my life. So from my own experience, I was born in a very. A unique period. I was born in the early 70s, 72, when Nixon visited China. So basically that's in the middle of Cultural Revolution. So while I was a kid, I didn't want to go to school. Actually we saw those educated people being crushed actually. Yeah, during the Cultural Revolution. So that's really another option. Even so we just went to school, finish it, and then go to the factory to work. I mean, that's the goal actually nobody wanted to go to college. But suddenly China started to change. In the early 80s, people saw the higher return to education. By the way, when I was in school, there was no school teachers. So the teachers are based factory workers who maybe had elementary school education or middle school education, who started to teach middle school. So that was my education. We also did work hard in the 80s because people didn't know how to work hard. There's no books read anyway.

[B]

Right.

[C]

So it's all random actually. So I have brought the sister. Neither of them go to college. I was the only one. I was lucky I was younger so I could make it to college just for random reasons. So the point is that in my generation, your error was equally poor, like Ruja said. So just by chance, some went to college, some didn't. Which means everyone had equal chance, though the chance was really small.

[B]

Right.

[C]

So today is different today, I think because of the development, some families are more wealthy than others. There's more equality. Then education become less equal, I think, compared to like 40 years ago.

[B]

Yeah. We'll examine that, the change in the social mobility and the equality of access to the education system over this long period. But I want to go to a point. Rei Xue raised this idea that the exam system plays a political role. It's not just an educational role. In the book, you argue that the Gaokal is not just education policy, it's a political institution. This is quite a strong claim and it may surprise many readers. Can you explain a little bit more by what you mean by this? In what ways does the exam system help the Chinese state identify talent, manage competition for status, maintain social and political stability?

[A]

I think the exam system has several features that helps the governance of the state. So the first would be it gives hope to all the families. Historically, at least, give hope to all the male. Today it's both men and women. Even exposed, the success rate is very low. And the chance to go to elite college in today's China is still pretty low, lower than 5% for the eligible population. Nevertheless. Exactly. Every family feel that they have a chance. And this kind of prospect of mobility is very essential for stability. Right. Because you're more willing to invest in such a system. And if you fail in this system, the typical reason would say, oh, you know, you are not working hard enough or you're not smart enough. Right. You would blame yourself. Right. Whereas if you succeed, you think, oh, that's all because you are so smart. Right. So it gives this responsibility to individuals rather than to the system. I think this is a bit related to this belief in a bit like social Darwinism in some sense, which is still popular among a segment of the population.

[B]

Yeah. It reminds me what you just said about something that is often said of Americans. I think it was John Steinbeck who said, we're always wondering why it is that we see so many people who have very few economic opportunities in life, who are poor in America, but who still supports this billionaire who lives in a gold tower. Why do we see this? It strikes us as very strange. But Steinbeck said, well, all Americans think of themselves, no matter what their wealth is, as just temporarily embarrassed millionaires. They all think that they have a shot too. They believe in somehow the fairness of this capitalist system, which, whether that defies logic or not, they still believe it. Very few avenues of access in the Galkhau system, but they believe that it's still somehow meritocratic. Hu Bin, did you have something that you want to add to this idea of why Gaokao is a political institution?

[C]

Yeah, I think just one point. So gaokao is also a way to allocate people into the political system itself, actually, so they can recruit the best talents. I just want to add that in any country education is political, including this country. So if you look at all the debates culturally going on in the country, right in the U.S. absolutely. It's really political.

[B]

That point's been driven home as we've seen the Trump administration attack education institutions, attacking Columbia, attacking Harvard. You guys place the Gaokao, of course in a much longer historical context. I mean, you link it of course, as anyone does, to the imperial examination system, the Kuju system that existed for, well really since the Sway and the Tang, when it was kind of perfected during the reign of Wu Tsetian, all the way really until near the end of the Qing Dynasty. For some listeners, you might recall a conversation that I had with Hua Yasheng Huang of MIT about his book the Rise and Fall of the East. It focused quite a bit on the imperial exams as a factor in China's ability to scale in China's ability to maintain centralized control. But let me ask you guys this. Why has an exam based system of elite selection been so durable in China? What is it about Chinese society that makes this exam based system endure? What problem does it solve? I think Houmbin, you were just hinting at that about the allocation. But what problem does it solve for rulers who are trying to govern a very large and quite diverse society?

[A]

Yeah, I think you can think of this with different lengths. Thinking consider yourself as a ruler is actually pretty smart system. Besides what we have talked about in terms of perceived mobility, the exam has designed since the Ming dynasty has a quota system where you can use this quota to recruit talents from different parts of the nation of the or the empire, which is useful. And it also gives you as a ruler, gives you the leverage to think about what kind of talents you need. Right. Historically you need people who help you to govern. Maybe Confucius classics is the material to be tested. Today you need STEM talents, people speak English. Then you test people on the English skill and scam skill scale. Right. Even though the material content of the exam can be changed over time, the logic idea is the same. And on top of this, the ideology is also can be centralized and manipulated through such a system and you can Propagate the kind of ideology you want through the contents of the exam. So from Ruler's perspective, this all makes sense. And then from family's perspective, I would say it's a lot of pressure indeed on the families. Right. We see a lot of complaints nowadays. But you know, this obsession of the favor of this system, I think it comes from not really the love of the system, but mainly comes from the fear of the alternative. So the idea is that, oh, you know, this is a transparent rule. Even though it has a lot of pressure. We have to invest so much, but we can do it. And we know the criteria in the end is the test score. It's objective, it's transparent.

[B]

Right.

[A]

Suppose there no such a rule and given the current institutions in China, power would be so influential. It was already influential. Right. And without such a clear transparent tournament, then power would be even more prevalent and the society would be even more equal. So I would think it's the, this is the fear of the alternative rather than the love of the system that makes people want to stick to this system.

[B]

Right. This is the point that you make quite a bit in your book, how even though it is perceived as flawed, it's less flawed than so many of the other institutions. It's still considered to be relatively immune to corruption, whereas many of the other institutions in Chinese life are still seen as potentially corrupt. Corrupt. So that's a super important point. Did you want to talk a little bit about the Kzu system? About why it is that this exam based system has endured in China across so long?

[C]

Yeah, I think Yixun made very good points actually. But in any system, if you think even society is not equal, there's hierarchy where this rich, this poor poor or this elite, this commoner.

[A]

Right.

[C]

So the question is how do people become a commoner or become an elite? You can think two extreme cases. One extreme case is succession. So elite shouldn't be elites. Right. Commoners shouldn't be commoners. That's one extreme. The other extreme is random assignments. Anyone has equal chance. Let's start. Be afresh. So that's the other extreme. Right. So the courtyard system or the exam system is something in between. I think it allocates talent through testing. If we assume talents are randomly allocated in the society, if everyone has an equal chance to take exam or pass the exam, then everyone has equal chance. But of course the ability of testing is also related to family wealth. That's right, background. So in the end it's not fully equal. Now back to us, even today, a lot of the political discussion in the United States, the word elite appears actually. So in a sense that a lot of people don't like the elite actually in this country. So that's related to how it is allocated, actually.

[B]

So there were two moments in Chinese history during the late Qing and during the Cultural Revolution when you know, the gaokhao was. Was weakened or even suspended or you know, the examination system, the system in late Qing, first with the abolition of the eight legged essay and then with the end of the actual exam itself, they stopped administering it after I think it was 1904. Maybe it was later, I can't remember the exact date.

[A]

1905.

[B]

1905. You guys, in your book, you suggest that these periods are very important for understanding why exams matter so much today. So maybe what happened in the Qing when the exam system disappeared? What happened in the Cultural Revolution when the exams were suspended? And what did those episodes teach later leaders about legitimacy, about governance and about the importance of exams?

[A]

Yeah. So I have done some research on the abolition, the exam, the qing dynasty in 1905. And it's a hectic period. Right. As you know, there were already a lot of revolutionary groups, you know, argue for reforms and the differentiation of China's future. What we find is that after the abolition, there are more people joining these revolutionary groups from regions with higher quota per capita. So this is where there are more hope in the past. Now there are actually more young men, radical men joining the existing groups. Right. Suggesting that this destroy the perceived mobility actually facilitated like political instability.

[B]

Right.

[A]

Perhaps this was also, you know, realized by the leaders. You know, when the republic got established, when they started to have their institutional design, they decided to have the examination branch in the government.

[B]

Right.

[A]

Instead of three branches, have five branch and which is still in Taiwan nowadays. Right. Sun Yaxien decided to establish that branch which is reflected. We don't know what went on in his mind, but it's reflected the realization of how important such institution is for governance. And then coming to the Cultural Revolution period as well know, during that period, you know, it's like this Itai elite and the. The whole education system was totally, you know, reformed. And it's. It's very chaotic. And then there's some negative selection. Right. Instead of selecting competent people, selected people for their political traits, et cetera. And then when the, you know, in the late 70s, when the leaders wanted to get the reform started, there were not enough talented people working for the state or for the economic reforms. They need the talent, right. Then naturally they turned to the old exam system again and reinstalled the.

[B]

The goal in 1977.

[A]

Right, right, 1977. So in some sense you could see that the, the reform in China didn't start from 1978, it started in 1977. I think it's also difficult for, mainly for people who don't know China to think about this. Right. The reform actually started with the reinstallment of the exam system.

[B]

Yeah. You know, you were too young, Hu Bin, you were still only five years old when, when the exams were reinstated. But it clearly had a major impact on your life when years later, and presumably around 1990, you were ready to take the exam. By that time, by 1990, the exams were once again an absolute feature. Do you feel like the disruption of the Cultural Revolution really changed the way that people thought about the exams? Or did it return to what it had been been between 52 and 66 without much change?

[C]

I mean, I still remember. So while I was like 5 years old, so there was some protest of all the Dage, the big sisters, big brothers and also their parents. They are not happy actually. They were jobless, no education, and overnight they were all gone from streets, went back to study for the exam. Because Deng Haping decided to restate Goku in 77. Actually. So this really hypothetically, so you can see how powerful this is in terms of the system. I don't think there's much difference between 52, 78 or may come 89. It's the same thing. The only difference that at my hand, no family has resources, there are no good teachers. So you are on your own, basically. So people imagine basically raw talents, you can get into college because there's so little thing you can do at that time, actually. But today is different. Today there are so many resources. So that's why.

[B]

Yeah, I mean, that raises a question for me. Do you think that with the advent of the Internet, the access that people have even in rural areas to the same sorts of study materials, same sorts of online practice tests and things like that, that there's more equality of access to preparatory materials? Or do you think that the basic economic conditions that still the inequalities that have persisted or even have been exacerbated in the last 20, 30 years, has that caused inequalities to endure?

[C]

I think it is a very good point. I think technology can definitely help to reduce inequality. But I think more importantly the younger generation, especially from rural China, the most important thing is not really materials, it's the motivation.

[B]

Okay.

[C]

Yeah. So if you think about this most Kids in rural areas, their parents are outside in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, as a migrant worker to work there. So they are populous at home. So most kids are not even motivated to study hard, work hard to go to college. I think that's a major region problem. And also in the local schools in the rural areas, they have really good buildings because the government has invested heavily on rural education. The problem is that they really don't have a lot of motivating teachers. So bad teachers don't want to stay in the rural area. They all work in the big cities. So I visited some schools last year. Even so, I can see, I think these two are the main issues. They don't have good adults to be their role models and mentors.

[B]

Rachel, would you agree that the problem is not with the hardware but with the software, with the teachers themselves, with the lack of motivation or adult role models in those rural communities where they do actually have quite good access to the educational materials, is the problem of motivation?

[A]

I think motivation is endogenous in the sense you need good teachers and role models to motivate young people. It's true that teacher quality has been becoming more equal and this is related to marketization. In my time there was only one high school in my county. But still, each year we could have produced one to Beidao, one to Tsinghua. Now it's much more difficult because the good teachers, they were attracted by much higher salary in Beijing and other major cities. In fact, my high school English teacher was now she is now working in Beijing. So this have a common phenomenon that with more marketization in the education market, there's more equal distribution in terms teachers. If you don't have people who could go to Beidao or Tsinghua, you would also feel, oh, maybe my chance would be super, super low as well. So all this might affect the motivation. But I don't know for sure. I haven't done research about the changes in students motivation over time.

[B]

So inequality is only one of the many serious problems that people commonly recognize with the alcohol. Also the stress that it produces, the wasted potential. And yet the system seems extremely difficult to reform in any meaningful way. Hongbin, you have had quite direct experience with this. You were actually asked to help in a project to reform the Galkhal. From your own research and from this experience, why is it so difficult? Why is it so politically sensitive? What makes even modest changes so hard for people to implement?

[C]

Actually, I think Richie and I and we have talked about this, I mean, why this exam system is so sticky, right in the chat hub. So I was involved in this very specific reform of Gaukor. So. Exactly. For the reducing stress of students. So the reform, the idea was very simple. To copy the American AP system. We know American ap, right? High school AP classes.

[A]

Right, Right.

[B]

Advanced Placement. Of course. Yeah.

[C]

So we decided to have like Chinese AP exams. So students can take the AP test multiple times in high school. So once they pass, they pass. They don't have to take all the tests in one day. Right. You know, God for day. So this will reduce students stress level. Right. So I wrote a textbook and then we also started to train high school teachers. So I did it for two years before leaving China actually. But it annual dropped the whole reform because there's a lot of resistance. For example, the training session in the summer. Every high school teacher coming to the training in Beijing is from elite high school in China. There's no single school teacher from rural school. So since think about this. If we start this new system that the rural kids cannot even take economics, how can they pass the test? I mean, this is so unequal. So this is not doable. Actually another example is that there's a test of English speaking ability, our listening ability. And then that reform drops too. The idea was great because Chinese learn English so well, but we cannot speak at all when we first came here. Literally, I also cannot speak when I first came to us but the reform has a good intention. But again, it's so unequal.

[A]

Right.

[C]

Again, favorite urban case, not rural case. So that's reform job too. So you can see that any reform will change how the testing results and also changing how titles are allocated. So then there will be losers of winners. That's why I make it so hard to refile.

[B]

Understood? Yeah. I mean, it's ironic that some of those sorts of reforms introducing these advanced placement style tests might have actually exacerbated inequality. In the book, you argue that education has played a much larger role in China's economic growth than is often recognized. Again, I refer to some of these charts that you shared with me where there's a really, really direct correspondence between years in school and gdp. Where you see China prior to reform and opening languishing. Very, very low GDP and low number of years spent in school. And then it moves very quickly up onto the main line of correspondence. It no longer is an outlier. You even estimate that improvements in education account for a really significant share of China's growth since the reform era began. Can you explain in practical terms how the education system and the gaokao in Particular translated into higher productivity and faster economic growth development. What's the direct causal connection between the Gaokao and gdp?

[C]

So actually that research is not really about gaokao on gdp, it's about years spent in school. Sure, yeah. So when China started reform in the 80s, so the average yield schooling is four years. So basically less than elementary school education. Right. Today is like almost 1314.

[A]

Right.

[C]

So between high school, college, so this is a huge improvement. So across the world, if you educate people, make them literate, they can do simple mathematics. Today you can speak English or you can do some programming. All these skills will increase productivity of workers and gdp. So this is very easy to understand. We call it human capital economics and China. One thing about China is that we call it centralized hierarchical tournament. Right?

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

So because of centralization of education, the central government can quickly expand education if they believe this is important. So China started to do this in the late 90s. So when I took the GAO at that time, only like a couple hundred thousand students can go to college at that time a year. Today it's like 30 million. So there's a huge increase of college enrollment in China. Of course this will go down to high school enrollment. All this will help to boost human capital and income and gdp. So no doubt about it. So it's not really GAO itself is a centralized system that really help China to do this really quickly.

[B]

Yeah, that's right. Rishua, one of the findings in the book that I think is going to surprise some listeners is that college education in China doesn't seem to add much in terms of measurable skills. Student competencies actually can stagnate during the actual four years of university, but Gaokao scores remain a very, very strong predictor of long term income and of career outcomes. So how do you explain this gap between skill formation on the one hand and economic returns?

[A]

Yeah, as we said in the beginning, the gold CO is a selection system more than education system. It's a bit ironic. By education we mean, oh, give me your talent, you learn more and there'll be more value added by college education. So that what typical education mean. Right. Whereas selection means you are already pretty good and hard working before you were selected. So I think one way to reconcile the puzzle is the selection function is so strong, you're already of a quite high ability, so that matters for your future career. And also the labor market see this as a signal. Right. You and they understand how the system works. So they infer your ability to by looking at the first university or first degree you enter that. So there's such a discrimination as you know, on the labor market about your degree. And that's also related to how the system works. It's a system, it's very strict on selection on entry. Right. That's why it's so harsh, so competitive, but it's very relaxed exit. So the average graduation rate in China is like 99, I guess.

[B]

Yeah, yeah.

[A]

One year it was 90. Some college had 97%. It became a scandal. Whereas in the U.S. you see the graduation rate could be 60%.

[B]

Right.

[A]

And that gives more incentive for, you know, value added during the college. Whereas the exam system, because it's from our primary function is the selection system is put less weight on the value added part, especially post college. So that's one point we hope to deliver is that China has developed a lot in the past decades. Initially it's really needed to select people. Now the selection function has been working so well that the system still needed to pay so much attention to the selection function. At least I think it's the right time to think a bit more about the value added part rather than just select people. And that's related to also your earlier question about how to reform the system. The current reforms to reduce pressure is often about to suppress demand or just to say, look, we are buying all the tutoring, right? Just to suppress on the supply side of tutoring so that people couldn't take the turtleneck. But the demand is there, right? The family still wants to invest in this system so they would do all this underground territory which actually make this reform backfire and this was dropped. So if you think about how to improve this system, I think the fundamental reason is try to make it a little bit less hierarchical so that this one point change your life. This perception could adjust if one point doesn't matter so much if the colleague hierarchy bit flattened then the prior would be less severe. But there's no, you know, the reform so far the reform hasn't really addressed the fundamental reason for this prior. It's obviously touched on the symptom of this problem rather than the root of the problem.

[B]

That's fascinating. I mean, and I'm sure that we're going to start seeing a lot more focus now being paid to this value added compone in education. And that actually again has nothing to do with the selection process which doesn't need to be changed just to improve the focus on this. Huangi, you've talked quite a bit about the allocation function of the Galk Hal. One of the features of China's system is that the Chinese state has a great deal of influence about not only where students go but also what they study specifically at elite universities. I'm talking of course about the priority that's long been given to STEM education in your research. How does this centralized approach affect the way that talent is allocated across different fields and areas of study? Has this kind of coordination been in your view effective for China? Especially during these periods of very rapid growth in hyper industrialization? Has that been an effective strategy?

[C]

Yeah, I think there are two strategies, right? One is through market. So when I really manufacture, our AI become important people study that, right? So that's the market mechanism. So China is centralized system. China can do it through two ways. One is they really, if they care about industrialization, they will invest heavily towards that end, right? So that make those industries more attractive for young people, young content to get into, right? So that's one way. The second way is that they can directly affect education itself by starting new schools, ecologists, new schools just focusing on a cheap production or AI. They can also use their state so called propaganda machines to promote those fields actually making it more appealing to people. I think through both ways they can change, educate itself supply and demand. They can also affect industries, the market itself. Both will help to promote so called STEM fields. So in China, out of like 12 to 30 million college students a year at the enrollment a year, half are in the STEM field. This is much larger than any country in the world.

[B]

Yeah, it's remarkable. I'm wondering if you think that there's a proportion you can assign to the market to labor market demand versus deliberate state priorities, I mean which seems to have more effect on the direction of education.

[C]

Both are important I think. I mean if you think about China's largest manufacturer, it's not surprising. So I mean both demand, I mean engineers who help manufacture manufacturer also generate demand for STEM workers.

[A]

I just want to add to Hongbin's point point that this kind of planning is effect, you know, is effective on the one hand, on the other hand is also has unexpected consequences, right? It's difficult for the government to really predict the future and we see this from past experience. Like around 2000 the government promoted biology as the future of the 21st century field. And there's so many people study biology and it has its benefit side we see now the biotech industry in China evalu very well thanks to this. But in this process we also see, right, there's so many people studying biology without, you know, finding, getting a job, right? We had to switch then major and become a computer scientist or doing podcasts. Anyway, so the idea is that. The idea is that there is a cost of many, many individuals in this process, even though at aggregate level it's very effective.

[B]

Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you draw a comparison in the book between the Galkal and how local government officials are evaluated and promoted, especially during the reform era. It's very KPI driven when economic growth becomes a measure of success, as I talked about with Hua Yashong in our conversation, he made a similar point. He said that GDP growth becomes sort of the equivalent of the Cudju system, showing that you were able to deliver GDP growth in the district or in the county or in the province you were responsible for. In your mind, how similar are these two systems, the Galkhal and the economic growth KPI for official advancement within the party? How similar are they in practice? And why did this clear tournament thing, this comparative evaluation apparently work so well for motivating officials across such a large country? Is it because they're used to they all took the golf so they know how the game is played?

[C]

I think I wrote the paper like 30 years ago. While it's good. So the purpose actually my Julian, who is at B at the moment, is to explain why China could grow. So. So that was really puzzling because China was a one party system. No market, no private economy, no protection property. Right? How can a country like this even grow? So that's why. So the. The initial idea is that oh so ding. The party manage the country like a big corporation. So the organization department of the party is the HR department, right? They are in charge of promotion. So they set a KPI to provincial city leaders of GTP world. Whoever can grow the economy fast will be promoted. So the party basically manage country by managing officials and local officials are in charge of local economy, local society management. As you know that. So this kind of system become like internal competition, a tournament. So we call it GDP tournament. So in a sense this is similar to Gauka because you have not so objective, but some kind of objective number. You can compare each other. And this also aligns with our goals of the central government. So this is the game they play. So in a sense the local officials become a shareholder of local economy. So that's why they are so motivated to grow the economy. I'm not saying this is all great. It can also cost a lot of waste of resources. For example, you can see that a lot of over construction of road and buildings and over capacity. Once you have one idea, for example, we want to have EV. Like China suddenly has 500 EV factories, maybe 490 will lose money actually. So there could be a wasteful resources.

[B]

I mean it absolutely has been in many cases, I mean, beyond government or Russia, you know, you guys also describe different rankings evaluations, different tournament systems inside of firms, of universities, even just ordinary workplaces, people are always measured and compared and ranked in very visible ways. It doesn't always make sense for me. I've worked in Chinese companies and sometimes these measures seem very arbitrary and divorced from the work that we're actually doing. From your research, how common is this kind of evaluation in China today? Do you think that it's shaped how people behave at work or think about what constitutes success? What means failure? Has it become sort of part of the culture?

[A]

Yeah, I think the underlying logic is the same. It's a system designed to minimize the influence of power. As I said before, you can think about the counterfactual in the government. Without such a transparent comparison, then people just use their network for promotion. So it's kind of trying to see to carve out a small environment in this big institution where power is so influential. And it's very effective because often the incentive is is very high powered also. Right. It's very steep. High status in bureaucracy means so much. So people are heavily incentivized that they want to be promoted. But the logic is not that again, it is not that this is a good system. It's more about oh, without such a comparison then we cannot achieve the GDP growth as much as as the government wants. Or we cannot really select competent people that state wants. Right. The logic is the same. It's more about fear of the counterfactual.

[B]

Right. So the alternative is unacceptable. It's just too arbitrary. It's too guanxi, too network based.

[A]

So if you want to change this, you really have to have big societal change. And does that affect culture? I guess yes. This is a zero sum game which is not very pleasant in a small environment. A lot of computation. I see this among my students who are deciding whether to go back to work in Chinese academia. This is one kind of concern they often have is that oh, the unit tenure evaluation is often a zero sum. There's a quota like two people can be to get tenure.

[B]

Exactly.

[A]

So it's not very pleasant. So how to change it? It just need like broader societal change rather than just to change the education system we discussed. This is to say education system reflects the society. It's not only like shape society affects society. It's also reflect the broader structure of how China works.

[B]

Right. So it's not clear where to start. It's not clear that reforming the Galkhal system would change this inherent logic of tournament and competition in all these other institutions of everyday life. So it shapes families, it shapes governance, even, like I said, everyday working life. The last place it shows up and where many listeners, I think maybe we recognize it most clearly because so many of my listeners are in the United States, is outside China itself. In the final part of the book, you turn to what happens when people who are shaped by China's exam system move into very different education systems, especially in the United States. Conflicts around testing, around admissions, around fairness often follow this migration. I came to the States with my kids when they were 12 and 10 and joined a lot of Wei Xian groups with a lot of other Chinese parents. East Asian parents often end up really, really hostile to affirmative action in college admissions. They're hostile to this idea that there's some holistic criteria. They hate this idea that essays shouldn't matter. They hate this idea that extracurricular activities should matter. We're all very aware of this. How do you understand these tensions? I mean, to what extent are they about values and to what extent are they about just different institutional assumptions? To the extent that those are different things, yeah.

[A]

This is how we think about the exam culture or values as a moral framework in the sense, like how you think what is fair. We see three reasons for these tensions that seem not to to be discussed a lot in the public media. When they talk about affirmative action, I think wise, what you mentioned is this cultural transmission. Obviously, if you grew up in this culture, if you believe in meritocracy based on the exam, you naturally carry that part when you immigrate. I think that's natural. It happens in many other areas of cultural transmission. But on top of this, there are two other layers I think worthwhile thinking the second layer. These are the people who typically succeeded from the exam system when they were in China. Or so it's like there's survival bias, right? If you succeeded from the system, you naturally think it's fair, it's work well, and my children could succeed through the same way. So there's this survival bias. And the third one is that this suspicion toward the holistic approach is that it relies a lot on social capital. If you knew here you're immigrants, you naturally don't have so much knowledge and social capital to get your case into some organization and to let them to join some charity activity, all Those actually involve social capital. So that makes people suspicious of this kind of approach. So I think it's easier to say than to be down in the sense. Some mutual understanding of this tension would be useful, rather than say we should let the Chinese Americans get more assimilated to the society or the other way around. Hopefully there could be a bit more discussion and the debate. So there's mutual understanding of this, you know, this suspicion toward the action among Asian Americans.

[B]

Yeah, that's a very good way to think about it. I think my problem, of course, has always been that opposition to affirmative action often kind of serves as a gateway drug into full maga, you know, into full blown racism, into full blown xenophobia. And it's very unfair. Unfortunate. But as you guys discuss, a lot of Asian American families place very strong trust in standardized tests and clear rules. And they find it very frustrating when success on those terms does not lead to expected outcomes, into getting into Harvard and Stanford and whatnot. Yeah. So I think there is that moral dimension to it, this sense of unfairness. And I think that people should really kind of understand these reactions without reducing them to just stereotypes or to political slogans. One of the contrasts that comes through very clearly in the book is between systems that rely on these transparent rule based evaluations and systems that rely more on discretion and on judgment. In China, exams are often seen as protection against favoritism. As you say, in the US discretion is often seen as this way to be more humane. I mean, how do you think about this trade off and why does each system make sense? Well, I think you argue that each system does make sense in its own context, but then it becomes very difficult when you introduce people from one context into the other. It's such an interesting part of the book. The last chapter is just so interesting for me, especially given my own experiences here. How do you think about these trade offs?

[C]

This is related to the last question.

[A]

Right.

[C]

I will give you two data points. So the perception actually has a basis. So we know that China's education is not equal. Right. So we Compare the top 20% income to the bottom 10% income. What's their case? The probability of getting into a elite college in China. So the ratio is three to one. So rich kids are more likely to get into college. So the safety ratio in the United States is 11 to 1.

[B]

Wow.

[C]

So that means it's more unequal in this country. So because this holistic limitation system, a lot of these holistic elements are based.

[B]

On money, they're based on social ease. And as you say social capital and.

[C]

These things prioritize for the people to want to spread us into higher coaches. Right. It's very expensive. You do golf, you have to be rich.

[A]

Right.

[C]

So it's more unequal. The second data point is that is a recent Congress report of UCSD students. So there's a math remedy class about. I mean a thousand students who cannot do basic math but they still got into USD. So this, that's another thing that Asian patriots care about for K12 education. They really want the student to learn in school.

[B]

Right.

[C]

So learn math, actually learn stem. So but if the school, I mean, so in the absolute equality case, then every kids should perform the same in school. Right. That we should reach down to the bottom if everyone is equal. Right. In a class. So that is a very philosophical question whether we should let different kids take different classes in school. So this is a very, very important point Asian parents make, which I think have some validity in the argument actually. Yeah. Anyway, so this is the things to me, I think both China US need to change. I think something in the middle may be better.

[A]

I think just to add to Hongbing's point, I feel there's differences lie in the trust in institutions and authority. In the Chinese case, if you think let each university have their autonomy in recruiting students according to their own criteria, there will be a lot of distrust among the Chinese citizens which also makes sense. They shouldn't trust because the power would be very, very influential. I think the lack of checks on power is the fundamental reason for the favor of the transparent system. Whereas in the us although I don't have data, I imagine still people believe that oh, you know, the power would not be misused so much because there will be some monitoring, there'll be scandal if there's misabuse of power of say by a university. So that's why they have more trust in this holistic rule. In that sense, I think understanding changes in other East Asian societies would be very useful. Which is not in our book yet, but I'm reading and thinking about it. For instance, Taiwan started as exam system, right? Like the Lianco was equally competitive and intense but since the late 90s and early 2000, now they have this multiple track of college admission system. I think that happened after their democratization after power gets checked. I think people have more trust in the new approach. I think how to build in the trust in China in the current system without any change would be a major obstacle of adopting a different system.

[B]

Yeah, I think that social trust is a very, very important component in this.

[C]

I just want one point, that in this country, in the US the trust.

[A]

Is also declining, but still it's relative, right?

[B]

Yeah. I think it's going to be really interesting to see what happens. In my own observation, when I left China 10 years ago, I would describe it as a very low social trust country. But in recent trips back, I've noticed quite a bit more social trust that it seems to be developing. I'm not sure what the causes are. Is it just surveillance? Is it the anti corruption campaign? Is it just simply.

[C]

Maybe your reference part is different. You're from us.

[B]

So it'll be really interesting to see how this happens. Maybe just to close, after spending so many years, both of you studying this system, what do you hope that people will take away from this? What do you hope that that they'll think about differently having read your book, not whether they like or dislike it, but how they understand what it does for families, for state. What's the assumption that should be challenged? Maybe ratio, you can start. What's the one big takeaway for you?

[A]

I think hopefully this book gives people a lens to understand the system and the current challenges to face. You know, people are especially for those growing up in this system, they know so many details of it and. But maybe this is just, you know, once you wear this lens, you'll see it from different perspective. You can see it like a state, why this makes sense and see like families why this, you know, why families behave this way and see it's like a society, why the society have such values. And then the one message I want to deliver is that the same system that could work in the past may not work well today. So it's time to think together that how to reform the system. So it's not even if you benefit from the system, you will also realize now it's a burden for so many families and for the whole society.

[B]

Excellent, excellent. What about you, Hongbin? To wrap up?

[C]

Yeah, I think if I think about any institutions that can survive over a thousand years, there are very few in the world, right? Sure. In China, maybe education or Kogi or exam is maybe the only one. So that's why for such a long history. So we, I mean as economists have been studying this for years, we specialize it. So we are trying to write this in simple language to communicate with the world. So to let people know that this is the thing and that is important, you want to show it objectively. We try to be really balanced in writing the book, just to show it these are the facts make people think harder. What's the way forward for China? For China education?

[B]

I think you've succeeded in doing that very, very well. I think it's a fantastic book. I think it's one of the most important books on China in the year 2025. I cannot recommend it more highly. I think you need to read this if you want to understand how China works, because it goes much beyond just the education system. It really is a book that says something important about the function of. Of Chinese society, about the way that Chinese society works. I want to thank you both for taking so much time to talk to me about this. Let's close out with some recommendations. Reisha, why don't you start? Do you have something that you want to recommend? A film, some music, a book, something that you've read recently that you think our listeners would like?

[A]

Yes, I watched a good film in Hong Kong last year year called By. Have you watched it?

[B]

No, no, I have not.

[A]

It's French title called Belamin. Yeah, Yeah. I like it because it's very humorous about the desire and the. And the despair. It's happening. It happened. It's about the gay people in Hegang. I was Heligan has a special kind of status in Chinese social media as a town with depressed economy, collapsed real estate market, et cetera. And this is about different people, LGBT people in that very small town. I was joking with my friend that if Ying Van Bergman watched this movie, he should buy an apartment in Hegang rather than buy a house in Faroe Island. Anyway. Yeah. And I can also share. Yeah. Anyway, so I can also share a book that has been in my mind when I worked on this book. As I said in the introduction that the experience about very powerless people is very common, written in fiction, but not too much in nonfiction. So my own experience has many parallels in fiction. So I had one novel in my mind when I was working on this book, and that novel is called Stoner by John Williams. It's about assistant professor of English in a small town in Midwest America based on his own life.

[B]

Oh, wow, that sounds great. I love books that are about college professors for some reason. It's always really fun for me to read. That'd be great. Okay, thank you. So Pia Lang Pongyo and I will check that out. Hongbin, what about you? What do you have to recommend?

[C]

I think I would recommend a book. I mean, I'm sure you have read a book called Dictator's Handbook.

[B]

Yeah, Dictator's Handbook is very good.

[A]

Yeah.

[C]

I found this book is. So I mean fascinating because dictatorship appear anywhere in the world. So how it appears very similar across culture, even political system. So I think this is very, very important book for people to read, especially.

[B]

Living in our time. Yes, absolutely. That's great. I'm going to recommend two books that are related to that. I read these both recently, just in the last week or so. They're both about the American right. There's Laura K. Field's book Furious Minds, the Making of the MAGA New Right, which is about sort of the intellectual foundations. She looks at quite a number of prominent right intellectuals of the New Right. You know, not the old sort of William F. Buckley's. This is about people who you might not have ever heard of. Some of them you will have heard of before. But her classification of these different schools of the New Right is very, very interesting. The second book is called it's by Ellie Reeve who you might remember, she was the reporter at that time, was with Vice News. She did the reporting from the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville in August of 2017 and then she went to CNN. Her book from 2024 is called Black How I Witnessed the Darkest Corners of the Internet Come to Life, Poison Society and Capture American Politics. And it really is. It's about the journey of this so called alt right from 4chan and 8chan into the mainstream of American politics. It's really disturbing and extraordinarily both of them are extraordinarily well written and very frightening books, but I think they're both very important. Okay, thank you so much for taking so much time to speak with me. And once again I really cannot recommend the book more highly. Please read it. It's called the Highest Exam and congrats to you for such an excellent book.

[C]

Thank you Kaiser.

[B]

You've been listening to the Seneca Podcast. The show is produced, recorded, engineered, edited and mastered by me, Kaiser Gua. Support the show through [e-mail] where you will find a growing offering of terrific original China related writing and audio. Or email [e-mail] if you've got ideas on how you can help out with the show. Don't forget to leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Enormous gratitude to the University of Wisconsin Madison's center for East Asian Studies for supporting the show again this year. Huge thanks to my guests and thanks for listening and we'll see you next week. Take care.