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Welcome to the Cynical Podcast, a weekly discussion current affairs in China. In this program we'll look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents and cultural trends that can help us better understand what's happening in China's politics, foreign relations, economics and society. Join me each week for in depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to how we think and talk about China. I'm Kaiser Guo, coming to you this week from Beijing. It's great to be back in town. Seneca is supported this year by the center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, a national resource center for the study of East Asia. The Seneca Podcast will remain free, but if you work for an organization that believes in what I'm doing with the show and with the newsletter, please do consider lending your support. My support from Wisconsin Madison is now drying up because of President Trump and his ending of Title 6 grants, so I really do need some more institutional support. Listeners, meanwhile, can support my work by becoming paying subscribers at Seneca Podcast. There you will enjoy, in addition to the podcast, the complete transcript of the show, essays from me, as well as writings and podcasts from some of your favorite China focused columnists and commentators. And of course, the knowledge that you are helping me to do what I honestly believe is very important work. So do check out the page, see all that is on offer and consider helping me out. This week on Cineva, a double bill, I will be talking to both Zhoubo, Senior Colonel, retired of the People's Liberation army, who is a frequent commentator on Chinese military affairs. Sinic listeners will quite probably know him from his many television appearances. He is now a Senior Fellow at ciss, the center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. I will also be talking to Rana Mitter, who has been on Seneca several times and will be familiar to our listeners, author of two excellent books on the Sino Japanese War, both of which I've discussed with him. Every time there's a parade we have him on. He's formerly at Oxford and now at Harvard's Kennedy School. It will come as no surprise at all that the subject for today's discussion will be the military parade held in Beijing on Wednesday, September 3, commemorating, of course, the Japanese surrender that finally ended World War II 80 years ago. We will touch on some of the events leading up to the parade as well, including of course, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Tianjin. So please enjoy this double header. Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, now retired, has for some time been one of the most interesting commentators on Chinese military affairs, in part because of his extensive international experience, combined of course, with his long career in the pla. He served in the Guangzhou Air Force Regional Command in a number of posts and held the post of Deputy Director General of the West Asia and Africa Bureau and then Deputy Director General of the General Planning Bureau of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense of China, as well serving as Defense Attache in Namibia. He is a prolific writer and has been published in many, many major English language journals, newspapers and magazines, as well as appearing frequently on television. In April, he published a collection of his essays written over the last dozen years called should the World Fear China. He is a regular at the Shangri La Dialogue, something I've spoken about with guests on this program before, and at the Munich Security Conference, where he always offers fascinating perspectives from the Chinese side. He has an MPhil in International Relations from St. Edmund College at Cambridge University. He is, as I mentioned earlier, now a Senior Fellow at. Again, he is, as I mentioned earlier, now a Senior Fellow at ciss, the center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua. And let me take the opportunity to thank my friend Dawei there at CISS for making the introduction to Senior Colonel Zhou. Senior Colonel Zhou, a very warm welcome to Seneca. Very glad to heavy here.
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A
Thank you Kaiser for having me here.
- [04:51]
B
So, as you want to know, I want to focus on the parade today, but not just on the hardware on display. Impressive as that was, I want to start with this maybe from From A Planner's Eye, what were the parade's primary objectives? Were they about deterrence? About reassurance to a domestic audience, about maybe alliance management? And who were the intended audiences? I think there were multiple audiences for the parade, and maybe if you had to decide which were the more important and less Important audiences. How would you assess that?
- [05:23]
A
Well, this is a group of questions altogether. But first of all, let me try to say that first of all, in a correction of history and in part a correction of Chinese people's own understanding of history. Because in the past we talked about 80 years of world of resistance against Japanese division, but now we're talking about 14 years, I believe now we have actually recorrected our own understanding, because that is certainly true. Otherwise, how can General Yang Jingyu fought actually in the northeast part of China. Yeah. Before 1937. So that is correct. That we started this war in 1937. This is a primary purpose of understanding our own history correctly. But as you have mentioned, it also serves multiple purposes, of course, for domestic audience. It's. It's actually a showcase of national pride. Yeah, it is a promotion of patriotism, so on and so forth. But that is understood. But what is more important is how it would be received by international audience. Because this is almost like a double edged sword. It depends on how you read it. Because you could argue that this is flexing up muscles, right? Absolutely. But on the other hand, it could also be interfered as an unprecedented effort in transparency. Right. So if you read the Western media, you actually would find the Western media accuses China on both elements. That is China is not transparent enough or China is showing up its muscles. Right. So all these weapons are here. Now you could read, you know, the same thing in different lights. It's up to you to interpret what kind of things China wants to portray. But I believe this actually is a very good opportunity for the west to have a closing observance of the military strength of the pla. Because as a matter of fact, China hasn't published many white papers regarding its military. And these white papers tend to be somewhat short, very much abstract. Right. But these stuff that are on parade are basically those that are already deployed with the PLA. So it's a demonstration of PLA's ready capabilities is not about something that is still during research and development there, period.
- [07:59]
B
Right, right, right. You've seen a number of these large scale commemorations over your career, which began really in 1979 when you joined the military at the very dawn of reform and opening for listeners who might not have watched closely, what were the main differences between this year's September 3rd parade and the last major one that Xi Jinping presided over in 2015, in terms of equipment, in terms of the troop formations, or the overall presentation of the parade? What stood out for you as new or most significant?
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A
Well, the gap between this parade now and the last one is just a matter of six years. Yeah.
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B
Oh well, yeah. So then the 2019 parade, right?
- [08:39]
A
Yes. Yeah. Because well, if you talk about the parade itself, well, the people, Republic, China would just do two kind of praise. The one is to, you know, to mark the national celebration.
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B
Right.
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A
And the other is just to honor. Yeah. There's a sacrifice we made during the second World War. So which was held twice. Right. But if I compare this one with the last one, it, it could just tell you how in 6 years times pla has advanced by leaps and bounds. So as a PLA veterans, of course I'm proud of this big stuff like ICBM and so on and so forth. But those things, most of them were on display last time, but this time there are something new. Yeah. And it is those much smaller stuff that actually has drawn my attention such as drones or anti drones system and the laser weapon system and microwave weapon system against attacks at a low level. So these are something new. And what is important is that as an international relations expert, the question that I was asked most often in the last few years is that what lesson has PLA learned from the war in Ukraine? Right. And here's the answer. Because you see from these weapons on display you can actually know how PLA has been watching the war in Ukraine and how PLA has tried its best to become adaptable to the latest changes. Because these kind of anti drones weapons systems would definitely reflect how not only what we have learned, it's just not about lesson learned, it's how actually you have learned something and has actually made use of what you learned to make some new combat weapon platforms that is important.
- [10:46]
B
I think a lot of the attention in the west was drawn to the nuclear capable missiles. I mean for listeners who maybe don't follow weapons design, there was a lot of interest in the hypersonic missiles, for example. There was interest in terms of just the full nuclear triad on display, which is I believe the first time that we've seen all three legs of the triad on display of a parade. Let me suggest though that there's focus on the shiny new aircraft or whatever missiles is not as important ultimately as something you've written about, which is integration, command systems, communications, logistics. From your perspective, what advances in these less visible areas really stood out across the six years or across the 10 years? I think there's a consensus, for example, that in the India Pakistan conflict that just happened just a few months ago, it wasn't the J10s themselves, it wasn't the weapons platform so much as the coordinated command and communication systems, because, you know, Pakistan bought the whole package from China. The seamless interoperability between these platforms, that really helped Pakistan to do so. Well, is that a correct understanding? And what did we see in the parade that maybe could advance our understanding of where China is in that realm now?
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A
Absolutely. I'm very glad you mentioned this question, because first of all, hardware are so, so important, but that is understood. The point is, how could you integrate all the system? I have argued, as I was doing at cgtn, to give live comment. I believe in the future the international arms market will just be divided into two markets, basically. I don't know how long that will be realized, but that's essentially what I believe. Two markets, two systems. One is American system, another Chinese system. American system is expensive. It is already combat tested and allies would have to buy because they have to be correct politically. Right. And then on the Chinese system, Chinese system is good, as is proven during the Indo Pakistan era fight, and it is affordable. And what is more important is that in the future there are only two countries dominating AI Field, that is China and the United States. So right now, China ranks fourth in terms of arms sale after United States, France and Russia. But the point is, you know, nobody talks about how Europe is advancing in AI, Right? Yeah, yeah. So therefore, it's not possible for you to win a war just by a few Rafaels. Right. So then when we come to Russia, two years into the war, Russia's arms sales has already dropped by 47%. So you can imagine. I don't know how long this process will take, but eventually I believe it is just American system and the Chinese system.
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B
Fascinating, Fascinating. We do talk a lot about the hypersonic missiles. And maybe just since I have you here just for listeners, what does hypersonic actually mean in terms of speed and maneuverability? And how does it complicate existing missile defense systems?
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A
Well, this kind of hypersonic system, just like stealthness, you know, are very general terms. But what makes Dongfeng 17 and Dongfeng 27 is not only about hypersonic speed. It's also about where it can travel. It's just between, you know, the atmosphere and the outer space where there is a kind of layer where missiles can actually just travel much faster. I don't know technically how this could explain, but that's essentially the same. I believe in this year, China probably is next to none to any other countries. So I know we have two types, and distance in terms of projections are different. And even the airborne missiles are also supersonic. Right. And its range is much longer. The point is the Chinese bombers, strategic bombers actually is not that much advanced. But since the missile itself can just travel a long long distance. So therefore their effect is almost like sea launched strategic submarines that can launch icbm. So that is why we have already established this kind of nuclear triad system.
- [15:28]
B
Exactly. I mean obviously China didn't feel the need to bring a ship into Tiananmen, but it did highlight new naval missiles and new anti ships systems. For the average listener, I mean, I assume that they're not going to be really well versed in military hardware. How should we understand the importance of these weapons, these naval weapons, the anti ship systems, the new naval missiles, are they defensive? Are they intended to protect Chinese coastlines? Or do they point to maybe more Blue water aspirations, more ambitious aspirations beyond the island chain?
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A
Well, there are two things that are noteworthy. One is unmanned, you know, underwater vehicles.
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B
Right?
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A
Yeah. So this is even an eye opener for somebody like me. It's an eye opener for everybody. And I saw a lot of international media trying to analyze how this kind of unmanned underwater wheel can be used. So that is something new. And besides, we have a JL3, JL3 submarine launched ICBM. In the past we have J01, J02, but this one I suppose might have a range of more than 80,000 kilometers. So that matters tremendously. For example, if you only have JL2, that maximum has roughly about 7,000 kilometers. For you to strike a target that is far away, you have to move forward to launch your missiles. So that means actually you become vulnerable yourself when you are making such a move. But with your range become longer, you're basically stay where you are without movement of yourself, you can launch the icbm. And these ICBM definitely are multi world warheaded. So that is great leap forward because for sea launch missiles you just have to have a kind of a cold launch. Because the missile has to be projected into the air before it is ignited. Otherwise if it is ignited just on board the ship, the ship would itself would be burned.
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B
Right, right, of course.
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A
So the technically speaking that is more demanding.
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B
Yeah, yeah. I mean that that leg of the nuclear triad is something we haven't really seen conspicuously before. But all of this adds up to a quite muscular show. Chinese officials described this as a commemoration about peace. How does the PLA think about calibrating on the one hand, the visibility of these capabilities, you know, the missiles, the undersea systems, the unmanned vehicles, the whole nuclear triad. And on the other hand, to Signal restraint rather than threat. What are the internal red lines that are there to try to prevent demonstration of capabilities from tipping into intimidation?
- [18:28]
A
Well, this is such a natural question because there seems to be a contradiction, right. When you talk about peace, but you're showing up your muscles. But in China's case, this is absolutely perfect for us to combine these two into one. Why is that? Because ever since March 19, when China finished its war with Vietnam, China actually has entered into no war with anyone. So it is absolutely remarkable or even miraculous for you to see. Pla, you know, with growing strength, actually has not killed a single foreigners overseas in four decades.
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B
And plus, well, there were some Vietnamese who died in 1988 in the Spratly Island Conference conflict.
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A
Right. Well, that is not considered war itself. That's just skirmish. Yeah, yeah.
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B
And there were the Indians who died on.
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A
Yeah, yeah, but with Indians, that is different. But that is not even, you know, without. That is even. That is. That is a deadly brawl. Yeah. Without either side using a weapon. So I mean, China, ever since 1979 has not killed a single foreigner elsewhere apart from Chinese territory. Right. So the only debt to brawl is between China and India. That is about sovereignty. But still that is the only incident you can find where two modern military would fight in a stone age MANNER. Right. In 21st century. So that is still something positive. When people say how sad that is, of course, but still that tells you that both sides are fully aware that they should not use weapons. So that means the confidence building measures made in the past still have worked in a way. So China's rise is definitely peaceful. And from, you know, that level then we have made ourselves the second largest economy in the world. This process is definitely peaceful. And sometimes the west would describe China military as coercive or aggressive. But as a point is to give me example of us killing anyone. You just can't give me an example of China shooting at any other people. Actually, between China and the Philippines, definitely people will sympathize with a small country called the Philippines. Right. That is a human instinct. But what if I tell you between China and the Philippines, it is the Filipino who used force against Chinese because they killed Chinese fishermen in 2000, 2006 and 2013. And we, yes, used water cannons. That could be impressive on tv, but that actually could be interpreted as a way to avoid use of force. Yeah. So we use water cannon instead as a deterrence. So we have not killed a single Filipino.
- [21:35]
B
The other thing that I think gave the impression of intimidation was the image of Xi standing beside Putin and Kim. This was instantly framed as sort of an anti Western front. From your vantage point, how accurately do those optics capture actual policy substance? Where do Chinese, Russian and North Korean interests genuinely capture converge and where do they actually diverge in ways that actually constrain any kind of block behavior?
- [22:06]
A
Well, this kind of description of these three countries coming to lines just because these three people stand together in a picture is total nonsense. Yeah. Because for us to explain this relationship, we'll have to first of all talk about a binaural relationship first. Right. You see, just imagine, you know, what's the scenario in which China and the United States come into conflict in Taiwan Strait and who could come to assist China and who could come to assist the United States? On the American side, there aren't many people. On the top of the list is Japan, which is obligational to provide basis for Americans to use. And when it comes to logistical support, actually they have to decide themselves whether they would have to do that or not. It would have been very difficult decision for the Japanese to have the potential of having direct conflict with the nuclear weapon state. Yeah, that is understood.
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B
Australia.
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A
Yeah, for Australia. Australian government has made it clear. Yeah, yeah. Don't take it for granted that it will be evolving in the Taiwan Strait contingency. Just because we want to buy eight nuclear powered submarines. And right now it is even hard to say whether they can really buy these 8 meter power submarine or not. Because the Americans even want to produce enough for themselves. So right now this becomes questionable. So apart from these, of course we come to the Philippines. The Philippines important in that military speaking. Of course the Philippines would not be important. Right. Even if it is a weight American side, it would not be so heavy. The point is its location because it is located on the first channel of Ireland and it has provided the United States a number of bases for the United States to use. Right. But the point is, even the Filipinos are not stupid because they have made it conditional for Americans to use these bases. Such as no storage of ammunitions and launching of attacks from these bases. Because they are hedging for small countries. The best thing they have learned through history is how to hedge on our major paths. Then on the Chinese side. Okay, now I'm coming to your questions. Just imagine, would Russia necessarily stand on Chinese side should there be a war between China and United States? I highly doubt about it. Because if China has not provided military assistance to Russia in the ongoing war, why would Russia provide you assistance? And yes, they will continue to sell you oil and gas just like China continue to sell Russia different products. Yeah. So I think this is what they're going to do. Maybe they will provide a kind of lip service, but I think that's it. And then which other country? Pakistan. Well, is friendly with China, but how can Pakistan be involved in the world? In Australia. And besides, the US Is the largest donor to Pakistan.
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B
Right.
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A
So my central argument is, should there be a conflict between China and us, there won't be many countries on either side. So then we talk about dprk. Right. Dprk, at least on paper, is really China's ally because we have a treaty.
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B
The only formal treaty.
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A
Right. The owning treaty, allies. But in practice. Yeah. In reality, we seldom talk about DPRK as an ally.
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C
That's right.
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A
I believe that is because the development of China and the status quo of DPRK are so, so different. Right. So we are part of the international system and we support the system and. Well, the largest beneficiary of globalization, while DPRK is such an isolated country and its best wish is to become a nuclearized, normal country. Right. So. Well, if there is something to happen on the Korean Peninsula. Yeah. This treaty is still a card in China's hand. Right. If China wants to play. Yeah, to play it, because this treaty is still effective. But you can hardly imagine. Well, even as a veteran, I can hardly imagine when was last time the PLA and the troops of DPRK had a joint exercise. Yeah. I really can't recall. Yeah. When was the last time? It shows how seldom this kind of interaction has become. Well, while between China and Russia, we are doing exercise on annual basis. But because of what I said, I don't believe in a real war situation, they would come to our assistance. So what is a glue that can actually bind these three countries together? It's hard for me to imagine.
- [27:17]
B
Right, right. So you shouldn't be so worried about. I mean, as Trump alleges a conspiracy at the parade, Beijing pushed back, of course. What would the smartest Chinese diplomatic response for Washington Be when D.C. rhetoric gets all inflamed? Do you engage and try to rebut it as you just did? Do you ignore it and try to de escalate? How do you judge the audience costs and the benefits internationally and at home in responding to things that Trump does, these sort of provocations about conspiracy against the United States and things like this?
- [27:56]
A
Well, this is a complicated question, or maybe we can make it simple, because you never know whether Trump is telling the truth or not. And he's so unpredictable and he would often change what he says. Right. So I think what I have said about Donald Trump is that I don't know how the United States would look like at the end of his second term. Right. We still have some time, of course, we don't know, but I can tell that within the first 100 days, the damage has already done to Americans credibility when he talks about annexation of Canada, Greenland, all these kind of things that probably his voters could not imagine. Actually, the damage he has done is probably more than the damage is done by all his predecessors combined, I would say. Yeah. So. So in this way, I would not take too seriously about what he said. But it's interesting for me to mention that when he comes to China, I think he has a sort of deliberate caution when he talked about China. Right? Yes, very much so. He doesn't seem to have a solid China policy. Biden has a China policy, but he doesn't seem to. And he hasn't talked much about Taiwan issue.
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B
Right. Especially since the recall vote.
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A
Yeah. Yes. So this makes him different, but actually that give him a unique position to do something on Taiwan issue. Yeah. Because compared with his first term, he's not more powerful. Right. Yeah. And his new tenants would definitely listen to him. So if he believes that it serves American best interest not to have a war with China across the strait, I believe there are a lot of things he can actually do. For example, what is the point of selling arms to Taiwan except to make some money? Right. Taiwan is so close to mainland China and I don't believe that they can really, you know, resist an attack from the Chinese mainland.
- [30:11]
B
But Trump can't resist making a little money either.
- [30:14]
A
Yeah. He cares about making money. And American military industrial complex care about making money. Right. But the point is, if this kind of danger just, you know, become higher and higher, this is not in Americans interest. Right. And then look at the street. Who is making provocation? It's not us. We are just still the same. Talking about peaceful reunification. But Legend apparently is more stubborn than even his predecessor who also came from dpp. Right. Yeah. So he talked about how he is a pragmatic Taiwanese independence worker before he became elected. And he now describes, you know, the Chinese mainland as a hostile foreign force.
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B
Right.
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A
So this is dangerous because it is very much implying that it's foreign. This is very much like what Chen Shi Bin said. Yeah. Calling for a referendum when George W. Bush call him a troublemaker. Yeah. So I think, I hope Trump can.
- [31:27]
B
Do something he did prevent him from transiting through. I think that there's a little bit of pushing right now, and I think we've just been given a very big indication right now that help will not necessarily be forthcoming in the form of the previews of the new national defense strategy that we've seen that just came out really yesterday. Today, this appears to have a deliberate shift toward homeland defense, toward Western hemisphere defense. Really the Americas, sort of a new Monroe Doctrine, but at the same time a deliberate refocus away from the Western Pacific, away from Asia. Does that make the region to you more stable or less stable?
- [32:11]
A
I think it would make the region actually more stable because I think this trend is already reversible. Why would the United States want to focus on Indo Pacific region? I've been talking about the Indo Pacific region. That's because Americans strength for global presence would not be that strong. So they have to stay focused. I don't believe they just want to focus on the Indo Pacific to challenge China. That could be part of the reason. But essentially this is an area that is most dynamic economically. So they also want to catch the train to become benefited from the regional economic prosperity. So I think Trump is right to realize that basically American industry is hollowed out and he wants to bring it back. I understand why he wants to do that, but I don't believe it is possible for him to do that. So I think right now is having the right strategy, because when your strength is too much spread out, there is a way for you to reinvigorate yourself is to become focused. And this kind of monodochrome, whatsoever you talked about actually happened in history before, right? Yeah. So this is not surprising, but I think it would be bad news for Taiwan, right?
- [33:38]
B
Yeah, very bad news indeed. So Kaya Kallas made some strange remarks. I don't know if you saw this European top diplomat really about, you know, China and Russia defeating Nazism together being something new. We don't need to relitigate the history. I think we are all very familiar with it. But what is a constructive way for Chinese officials to address these sorts of comments? Is it. I mean, we need more educational outreach, joint communications, joint commemorations with Europeans. What response best reduces the apparently commonplace misunderstandings among Europeans about the reality of the war and Soviet and Chinese participation in it.
- [34:26]
A
Actually, it would be difficult for us to persuade these people to believe what is right and what is wrong, because what is right and what is wrong during Second World War actually is not debated. People know what has happened. Right. And so the, the problem is for Europe, they just want China to help Europe in the way they wish for. Right. Yeah. That is okay. Why can't you lead, pick up a phone and ask, put into stock for them. It's just as simple as that. Right. And so they just want China to play a bigger role. And they believe China through normal trading is actually providing a kind of lifeline to Russia. Yeah. So. So from their point of view, I understand. But as I have told them repeatedly when. When China look at China Russian relationship, it is impossible for China to look at this relationship relationship through the prism of Europe. China would have to examine this relation from bilateral basis.
- [35:33]
B
Sure. On its own terms.
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A
Yeah. And what can we see? We can see that this is our largest neighbor. And right now we have no problem. And for our own interest, we must make sure to maintain there's a good labor policy. So that is natural for China and vice versa. Right. I understand how you think about Russia, but China is not informed about the war. And China did not participate in this war. And just because you believe China has good relationship with Russia, therefore China's relationship with Europe has turned very much sour. And is that fair for us? We have made it quite clear that we should have respect for sovereignty. This actually was pointed out immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. So that is a bit subtle because that is Chinese way of criticizing Russia.
- [36:27]
B
Because I'm glad you said that because this is something that I've pointed out to everyone every time I say, every time a Chinese diplomat begins a conversation about the war in Ukraine by saying China's first principle is respect for territorial integrity, national sovereignty. That is an implicit rebuke of Russia.
- [36:44]
A
Yeah.
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B
But nobody gets that signal. You're right. It's maybe too subtle.
- [36:49]
A
Yeah. That is Chinese way of criticizing Russia because by pointing that out, that actually means Russia, you are not respecting sovereignty of another sovereign state. Right. Yeah. But that is because Chinese relationship with Russia is good and because China would try to avoid such kind of director criticism. But the point is it's not only about China. It's also about India. But all other global south countries, most of them do not even have an attitude about this. Right. China has an attitude. And China has refrained from providing any military assistance to Russia. Anthony Blinken had some suspicion about that when he mentioned at Munich Security Conference how he suspected that China was providing military assistance. But then later he was talking to BBC again saying that, okay, yeah, this was not found because if China really has provided Russian some military assistance, it would not go, you know, unnoticed. Yeah, unnoticed. It's just impossible. So I think Europe has too much expectation on China. But China can only do things according to its own national interests and also in not violating its international responsibilities. But as to what international responsibilities China may have, that is debatable. It depends on who you are.
- [38:22]
C
Right.
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B
Yeah. This is something that was addressed in a piece that your colleague Dawei wrote, actually in Foreign Affairs. I'm really kind of arguing that China, China has real limits on its ability to affect anything. That it couldn't really play anything but a very modest role in any kind of peace settlement or any kind of. I mean, it really is limited because of its sort of ambivalence. I'm wondering if there are. Well, first of all, whether you agree with that. You seem to very much agree with that. But I'm wondering if there are sort of concrete contributions, I mean, de. Escalation channels that it should pursue, or it could maybe play a role in reconstruction of both down. Because there has been damage to Russian territory as well. It's inconsequential compared to what's happened in Ukraine, of course. But maybe grain corridor guarantees what would be realistic and useful without engulfing China, without aggravating its already problematic relationship with Europe where it could actually play some more constructive role.
- [39:32]
A
I think so, because Dawi was right if he was talking about what happened in the past. But if we. Well, talking about the past, basically. I mean, China put forward the 12 point the peace plan that was not well received, and then China tabled a joint plan with Brazil that was just described by President Lesinski as destructive. Right. So this is what happened in the past. But looking down the road, I believe there are two potential areas where China could play a positive role. One is in peacekeeping, another is in providing, you know, kind of a collective security guarantee with other major powers. All these tools are conditional. Let's talk about the first one. For example. I believe what Russia can accept right now is to have full control over two regions, that is Donetsk and Luhansk, and leave two other regions for negotiation or for ceasefire, so on and so forth. Right. Because otherwise, how can Putin explain why people have fought, you know, for a few years? What is a gain? Right. It's difficult. But for these two regions, the point is not only about when, but where, you know, a kind of ceasefire can be established. But normally, okay, if they agree, they just stop immediately and it becomes a.
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B
Line, a frozen war.
- [40:59]
A
Yeah, yeah. And then the question is both sides are afraid. Of course, Ukraine is afraid of Russia. Right. But Russia is also afraid for some other reason. Russia is afraid of looking lonely. Yeah. So that is why Russia has been talking about how China, India and Brazil could become honest mediators. Yeah. Because you can imagine behind Ukraine is the whole west. Right? Yeah. Then Russia doesn't want to look lonely, so therefore it wants to have some other players that are considered by Russia to be neutral. It doesn't mean China is standing behind Russia. But still with these countries who are also members of SEO or brics, Russia just feel more assured that China could.
- [41:50]
B
Be a security guarantor that China for Ukraine. But at the same time it's maybe more trusted. I thought it was interesting that the blue berets were on display in the parade march.
- [42:01]
A
Yeah. But for that to happen, as I mentioned, is conditional because I myself have been in charge of peacekeeping. I know the process. First of all, the warring parties must have internal agreement. That means both of them agree. Okay, let's ask UN Security Council to set up mission and to ask peacekeepers to come. So then the question is, who are the best peacekeepers? I have told the whole world almost about why China could take the lead. Because a lot of European countries have been talking about, you know, some NATO countries, how can they be accepted by Russia?
- [42:42]
B
What about Turkey? Turkey is a NATO member.
- [42:44]
A
Yeah, Turkey, Turkey is more or less acceptable, but you just can't have Turkey as peacekeepers. Right, right. Because Russia would still have some suspicion because you are still a NATO country. But for China. Yeah. Its record is clean and India is one of the largest troop contributing country. So if China takes the lead, followed by India and some other global south countries, plus some selected non NATO European countries, that is the best formula, I would say. Yeah. So this is the first, first question about peacekeeping. The second thing is about kind of a collective security guarantee. If this kind of ceasefire eventually would have to become a kind of armistice, as we have seen, you know, on Korean Peninsula. Yeah, maybe. Yeah. A number of major powers, including China, United States, France and Britain would be involved then in this way, China is just one of them. Yeah. So still China, China can play a role. But here, remember there is a sad lessons because in 1990s all these countries, including China, have actually promised both positive and negative security guarantees to Ukraine. Negative security guarantee means I will not fight against you. And positive security guardian means if somebody fights you, I will fight against him. But in fact this did not materialize. Yeah, materialize as we have seen in this war. But still, this is something that the major powers have tried on Ukraine when Ukraine decided to give up nuclear weapons. So this kind of history might be repeated just as Mark Twain Said history never repeated itself, but it is rhymed, right? Yeah. So how do you know this time it is not rhymed?
- [44:37]
B
Yeah. Let's move from the potential of peacekeeping efforts in Ukraine to maybe the bigger US China peacekeeping problem. You have noted in your writings the importance of avoiding security dilemma spirals. You've talked about this quite a bit. Let's talk about what practices you think could help China to deter rivals without courting their humiliation. What are some of the strategies you think are really good for helping to avoid the security dilemma spirals that are so, so deadly in escalation?
- [45:14]
A
Well, I think it is fair for me to say that neither China nor United States wants to have a conflict. The only question is how to avoid it. In a way, actually we're in a better situation than during the Cold War when the United States and the former Soviet Union were absolutely enemies. Nobody from China or from the United States would describe China US relationship as one between two enemies. So in a way, at least in theory, it is easier for us to manage this kind of relationship. But in real practice, maybe it's not. Why? Because for the two enemies. Yeah. Two deconflict, you have a clearly marked sphere of influence. Right. And they just let the proxies to fight against each other. But now you see in South China Sea the Americans keep on sending ships and aircraft to challenge China's claims.
- [46:11]
B
Phone ops.
- [46:12]
A
Yeah. So we do not have demarcated spheres of influence. So we are just having too many dangerous encounters. According to the Pentagon, we would have over 180 interceptions by Chinese aircraft against American aircraft. That would actually mean one interception every four days. Right. So that is dangerous enough.
- [46:35]
B
The odds of something like April of 20 are very high.
- [46:38]
A
Right? Yeah, yeah. This kind of things. So talking about confidence building measures, actually it is easier if the strengths of the two sides are more or less equal because then they can manage. But between China and the U.S. the situation is a bit different. China is rising quickly, but China has not reached the level of the middle strength of the United States. Therefore, you can imagine for the US it would serve the better interest to freeze Chinese capabilities. Yeah. To maintain age over the pla. Right. So that is why this kind of course, China, China would, would fight against it. So therefore this kind of guardrails that United States talked about is very difficult to establish. Yeah. And another term people talking about is so called status quo, right? Sure, yeah, status quo. You know, United States talking about it and Taiwanese talking about it. But my argument is there is no status quo. That is static every day, every Second, status quo is changing. For example, Lancey Pelosi seems to be a godsend to PLA because of her visit to Taiwan. So we conducted a photo exercise around the island. Just imagine without her visit, how can PLA think of a big big reason that would enable PLA to do four days exercise with live firing of missiles. So once visit is done, PLA studies exercise and then the so called medium line entire straight is no longer existed. So now of course the PLA would just do more animal exercises and around Town Island. Yeah. To rehearse all kind of scenarios. So there is no such thing like status quo.
- [48:32]
B
If you had 60 seconds to sit down with Pete Hegseth, who's now I guess the Secretary of War and with say Mark Rutte, if you could sit them down and just correct one misperception that they have about the plaque, what would that one thing that you said, maybe you could also have like one wish, one concrete ask of them that would lower the risk in the Asia Pacific region over the next 12 months. What would you say and what would you ask for?
- [49:05]
A
It's very easy for me because when he was talking at Shangri La Dialogue, I was listening. And his assessment of the so called situation in Taiwan in which PLA might launch attack is imminent, inevitable. That is something wrong because his predecessor said something totally different. A war is not imminent or not inevitable. In this regard, I agree with Lord Austin. A war is not imminent or inevitable. And for us to avoid that from happening, I think the United States can do something very simple. Let the Chinese government believe peaceful reunification is still possible. Therefore the Chinese mainland will have patience so there won't be a war.
- [49:57]
B
Thank you, Senior Colonel Zhou. This has just been a fascinating conversation. I think it's going to be very valuable to listeners to hear directly the Chinese perspective on this. One of the things that I really have regretted about being in the United States for so long is that there's just not enough Chinese voices on this program. And now that I'm spending more time in Beijing, I'm hoping to correct that. So thank you very much for spending so much time with me and speaking so forthrightly.
- [50:23]
A
Well, thank you Kaiser, for this opportunity. I hope the American audience can hear my voice to have a better understanding of this issue.
- [50:31]
B
And now we're going to hear from Rana Mitter. Rana Mitter, great to have you back on Seneca. Seems like I always talk to you.
- [50:38]
C
Post parade, whatever's the parade you and I get together. Kaiser, even though we're doing so, I think at several Thousand miles distance. You're over in Beijing this time, I think, and I am over here in Cambridge, Massachusetts. So a little bit of distance between us.
- [50:51]
B
Yeah. You went from Oxford to Cambridge, as we like to joke.
- [50:54]
C
Indeed. And both of them have their virtues.
- [50:57]
B
So, Rana, I mean, obviously, China marked the 80th anniversary of the end of the second war with its largest parade yet in Tiananmen, explicitly tying wartime sacrifice to Xi Jinping's national rejuvenation narrative. From your scholarship on wartime memory, which is something that you've written about a lot, how do you read the balance between grief, triumphalism, mobilization, rejuvenation here? What is genuinely new in the 2025 narrative compared with 2015, especially, you know, the arguably, maybe expanded, and we can talk about this, the expanded claims about China's role in victory and the relative positioning of of other allies.
- [51:41]
C
Kaiser there's a huge amount to unpack around this parade and what surrounds it. And I hope in this conversation, as we always do, we're going to dive into some of the details. Yeah. Let me start by giving you a few of my headlines in terms of what I observe. I should say, by the way, for the purposes of openness, that 10 years ago, during the anniversary parade for the 70th anniversary, the end of World War II, I was where you are, in other words, in Beijing this time around. I wasn't, but I did actually visit Beijing about, as we're speaking here in early September, probably about three weeks ago, and so had a chance to look in at some of the preparations for what was going on in various ways. And I'll address some of those issues that came from that visit. Sometimes it's almost more useful. As you know, many, many listeners who know Beijing will know during the parade itself, everything is so locked down, it's often difficult to get around. But time, you can sometimes go and ask some interesting questions. So what I'd say is most different for me in terms of the interpretation of the war and what it means for China's place in geopolitics this time around on the 80th anniversary? Well, I'll give three things that stood out to me. The first one has to do with Taiwan, the second has to do with Russia, and the third has to do with international organizations. So let me just say couple of words about what I mean by each of those 10 years ago. Again, you know, Seneca listeners won't need much prompting on this, but just a reminder that in 2015, Taiwan was under the presidency of Ma Ying Jeou. To date, the last KMT president and someone who of course very much shared, and I guess in the present tense shares the idea that mainland history and Taiwan history share some common elements, including the experience of the Second World War. And as a result, both in Taiwan and on the mainland in that year, there was plenty of cross straits traffic of historians, curators, and a certain amount of shared history. And that, of course from Beijing's point of view, was all about trying to create a sense of warmth that over time would bring an economic and cultural closeness between the two sides. And so in that sense, it was very much about what they could find to say about the war together. Fast forward to this year and that's very much not what's going on. The DPP presidency of Lai Jingde has certainly made a strong case of it being eight years since World War II ended, but very much made the case that the lesson from this is about pushing back against authoritarian governments. And no particular secret to say that the DPP obviously means the Beijing government in terms of where its wrath is directed. In return for that, essentially, the PRC certainly hasn't been making any kind of gestures towards the existing Taiwan Taiwan government in terms of warm words, but has been doubling down on in some ways a historically rather partial view of the Taiwan question. And I'm drawing this not just from the parade actually, but from having visited some of the museums and educational institutions where some of the uprisings against Japanese occupation by the Taiwanese population in the years between 1895 and 1945, you know, there's 50 years of Japanese colonialism, were seen as part of a wider resistance movement. Now certainly such uprisings existed and they're recorded on the mainland side. But at the same time, more awkward bits of Taiwan history, such as the fact that over 200,000 Taiwanese Chinese fought on the Japanese side in the Imperial army, are simply not mentioned. So it's a very different engagement with Taiwan. The second highlight I want to give is the changing role of the Soviet Union and Russia in this story. Now, Vladimir Putin is one of the few leaders, and we'll probably come back to those leaders who was present on both occasions, 2015 and 2025. But the geopolitical significance of his being there was a bit more muted last time because at that point Russia had invaded Crimea but hadn't done its full scale invasion of Ukraine. And obviously that's led to the pretty much complete absence of Western leaders this time around in Beijing. But what we had 10 years ago was a sort of basic story about something, again, you and I think a Lot of cynical listeners will know about Kaiser, but it's not perhaps widely known, which is that before, before the famous American Flying Tigers, the American volunteer group that defended the skies over the wartime capital of Chongqing years before that, in 1938, 39, you had 37. 38, 39, I should say. You have Soviet fighter pilots sent technically as volunteers by Stalin. I think when Stalin tells you to do something, how much volunteering you really get to do, I'm not sure. But, you know, in terms of the defense made, over 200 of those fighters, I think, were, you know, served. Many of them were shot down. It was a dangerous engagement, but it did help Chiang Kai Shek's ground forces to essentially have some sort of air cover. That story was told 10 years ago. Now, it's huge because it's part of a wider story that really, the Soviet Union, that is Russia and China were the key players in that Asian war. And the significance of that shift away from America, something we'll, I'm sure, come back to. Let me just give you my final highlight there from the. This is from the parade. Amongst the many parading soldiers that we saw there, the Blue Berets, the members of China's UN Peacekeeping force. Now, that's also part of a bigger story. Again, 10 years ago, you did get a certain amount of emphasis on the idea that China paid a terrible price for being In World War II, millions of deaths, refugees. But as part of that, it was made a founder member of the new 1945 world order, including the UN. Well, these days, of course, in a much more turbulent world than it was in 2015, when the US role and attitude towards the UN is much more ambivalent, I saw those Blue Berets, really, as China taking ownership of one of the products of that 1945 world order, the post World War II order, and trying to essentially make that part of a new interpretation where China is the global stabilizer, according to the party, and America is the country which is abandoning that 1945 UN PAR. So there's other things, but there's three connections between past and present that I saw in and around the parade that I thought were definitely a shift from what we saw just 10 years ago.
- [57:49]
B
Yeah, I was sitting in the Atlanta airport on a layover watching the parade and commenting, you know, on one device on Twitter or Access, as it's called now. And I also noted the prominence of the Blue Berets, the UN Peacekeeping forces. I mean, until a few years ago, China actually was the biggest contributor of UN Peacekeeping forces. And I thought that was pretty good optics. I didn't read into it this whole business of claiming the mantle of leadership of this post 45 world order. But I suppose that's, that's in there as well. There was a Washington Post analysis that argued that, you know, Beijing is as even it's, you know, elevating this sort of Sino Russian co Victor storyline that it is downplaying U.S. assistance. You're an historian. Where do you draw the line between sort of legitimate narrative correction, forgotten ally and politicized revisionism? I mean, what evidence is most probative for audiences who don't maybe know the China theater very well? I mean, is it casualty distributions? Is it like strategic effects on Japan's timetable? Is it, is it something else?
- [58:56]
C
Sure. Well, Kaiser, a couple of things that come from exactly that thought. Just actually a quick indication on the question of claiming the legacy of the un, the United nations, as a post war legacy that China's taken up today. If you want to see visual proof of that. And you're speaking to me from Beijing. So if you have any time in the next few days, get down to Wanping, where the Marco Polo Bridge is located and where the Museum of the War of Resistance, which, which has been there for over 30 years now, there's a new supplementary display, it's in the basement that's just opened within the last few months. And in that display, one of the real highlights is the story of China at the UN and this very explicit link which I've seen for a while, but I'm intrigued to see it's really being kind of given even more prominence now between Chinese wartime sacrifice back in the 1940s and the establishment of China as a global power. Just to add in, of course, one of the things that is not mentioned in the display is the fact that that Mao's China, of course, was excluded from the UN from 1949 to 1971, when Taiwan ROC still had that UN seat. But that story is now very much part of that new display that's been opened literally within the last few months in Beijing. In terms of that bigger and really central question that you asked about where as a historian I can see accuracy and where there is distortion about the story of China and world or two, I'd say there's a rule of thumb that I've noticed looking at the parade, looking at a lot of museums, looking at recent movies, TV shows, you know, all that sort of way in which the war itself has put in both educational and popular culture in China. At the moment, my rule of thumb is this. It's now quite rare, not unknown, but quite rare for the Chinese authorities to put in something that actually historians would completely disagree with, say 100%, 180% that. 180 degrees, 100% that, that's wrong. There are one or two examples, but you know, that's, that's not the primary aim. The main thing is a sort of narrative by omission. In other words, you can find lots of things that are factually, absolutely true but imply something that actually isn't the reality. So let's just stick for a moment with. Well, let's go back for a moment to the Soviet contribution, which is, you know, very much a highlighted part of the, of, of the story. And that's important because these days that bigger story of is it China and the Soviet Union who were the primary battlefield of Asia? This is a debate that's now being set alight really in some ways in China itself. And the US is being cut out of that a little bit. One of the things that of course you need to assess if you're going to tell that story as a whole is not just the real contribution of the Soviet fighter pilots I mentioned or the fact that in August 1945, unarguably, this red army invading Manchuria is the short but decisive land phase of the war in Asia, which ends of course with that and the atomic bombs very, very quickly within just a few weeks in summer of 1945, some would argue.
- [61:47]
B
Because of the Russian participation.
- [61:49]
C
Well, again, one of the big debates, which actually is an entirely legitimate one amongst mainstream historians around the world, is the question of the atomic bombings, the Russian invasion of Manchuria, or the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, I should say. And the question of how close Japan was to defeat anyway. I mean, fascinating subjects, maybe not time to debate them on this podcast, but they are fascinating. But getting back to the question of how history is this bit of history is used, the one bit that you won't find anywhere or anywhere that I can see in these discussions is the fact, inconvenient but true, that in between, say between 1939 and most of early 1945, the Soviet Union was of course neutral against Japan. That's the reason that the famous conference where we have a famous photograph of fdr, Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai Shek and Sumailing sitting on either side, Stalin is not there. He's over in Tehran waiting for a follow up meeting a week later because he is not directly in the war against Japan. Now there are perfectly good strategic reasons for that. Largely opening up a massive eastern front in Europe that helps win the war in Europe or decisive in winning the war in Europe alongside D Day. That's fine. But of course, it turns out to be very, very difficult, if not impossible, to make that historically accurate story compatible with making the argument that the Soviets are really central to the Asian field of battle. And that was, of course, as you indicated in your question, has one very, very important factor that we have to bring right in the United States. Now, you can love the United States, you can hate what the United States did in China during the war. There were many people at the time who were angry at what they saw there, but there's no doubt that it was decisive. Not in terms of American intervention with ground troops. I mean, you've been kind enough to mention Forgotten Ally, my book on World War II, and that's one of the books that does tell the story about how no ground troops were offered by the United States for the Chinese war effort in China. That was Chinese troops fighting under Chiang Kai Shek with guerrilla warfare, also from the Chinese communists. Both of those are very much center of it. But the American air cover, American supplies, American lend lease flying supplies over the Burma Hump, you know, lots and lots of different ways. And with thousands and thousands of American personnel actually in China, mainly based in the southwest out of Chongqing, involvement, of course, also very much in combat in the Burma campaigns 42 and 44, which were very much part of that bigger China, Burma, India theater, like AT or loathe it, the United States is absolutely central to the overall story of cbi, the China Burnham in the theater. And what I said, you know, the past will say again, is that without China's continued resistance, nationalists and Communists between 1937 and Pearl harbor in 1941, it's much harder to see how you get to the global war in which the European and Asian wars are combined, because that depended on China holding on. But without the astonishing military and industrial might of the United States of America and the British Empire, let's put them in there as well. China would not, on its own, however bravely it fought, in my assessment, have been able to win the war outright. So you have to bring the United States back into the story. And I will say that is one element that the Flying Tigers story, in a slightly kind of isolated way aside, I didn't see much of that when I was in Beijing and I didn't see much of it on television, on the parade either. So that is, I think A key element that certainly has been downplayed too much.
- [65:10]
B
Yeah, they haul that out every time they want to signal a rapprochement or an olive branch. But, you know, you've written about how the party has cautiously reincorporated the Nationalists contribution. Do you think that the 2025 commemorations, the museum in Wan Ping aside, did it recalibrate that balance much? I mean, were there signals, were there speeches, language, iconography that suggested maybe a widening embrace of KMT sacrifices? I mean, because my. What I was at my band's rehearsal yesterday. They took a cigarette break in the middle and I started. I told them what I was doing tomorrow. Talking to you, talking to Joe Bull. And I was asking them about just impressionistic representations of the KMT just in popular culture and especially John Kai Shek himself. And they all sort of told the same story about how in childhood Zhang was always depicted as this sort of, you know, with poor posture, skinny guy, he looked like an evil landlord, always sort of wringing his hands and sort of just like a caricature, a comic book figure. And then in, in, you know, beginning in the mid-90s and later even, he was quite upright. He was a, you know, sort of the John K. Shack that we all know. You're really stoic and kind of charismatic in his own way, but certainly not a villain, just not a. A cartoon villain. And they said that their sense of it was that the parade did not. I mean, it omitted direct references, but it was. They were very careful to say China when they met China, and not inclusive of the Republic of China, of course. That's what it was. I'm curious whether you think that it's moved toward maybe more historically responsible and while being still politically feasible. Synthesis this.
- [66:53]
C
It's a really good point, Kai. So the one word answer is yes, but let me give you a slightly longer than one word answer because there is complexity in all of this. First of all, it's worth noting that earlier in the summer there was essentially a spat between the PRC and RSC Taiwan, because as I understand it, the mainland side did make an offer to contemporary KMT politicians in Taiwan or generals or others who are associated with the party to come over for the celebration or commemoration, I should say, perhaps rather than celebration. And the DPP government made it very clear that if they did that they'd be rested on, on the way back or at least, you know, they would be treated very severely. So that didn't happen in, in. In practice. And in a sense, I think that, you know, that should not be all that surprising when right now, as you're very aware, political polarization in Taiwan is getting stronger and stronger. And many of these historical aspects are used as part of that, that polarization narrative in terms of what the current PRC government and the party, the ccp, says about their old KMT rivals. I think your band members had it exactly right, which is. And again, I've seen this in descriptions, I've seen this in TV documentaries, did say to the museum in one Ping as well, when they want to talk about the ccp, they talk about the ccp. And again, this idea, which really is a push, that the CCP are the leading force in defeating the Japanese. And that's something that, you know, historically is hard to push because the KMT contribution in terms of set piece battles is so massive at Shanghai, Tarajuan, all these sorts of places. But alongside that, you also have lots of mentions of things that clearly are knt contributions. But as your friends were saying, it's always talked about as China. So quite often again, I mentioned the UN Charter being signed and the way, if I remember correctly, at least one of the major descriptions that I saw said this is like representations of China were there. Now, these representatives of people who you know very well, they have names like TV Song Song Ziwen or Wellington Koo Gu Weijin, in other words, these are prominent, prominent nationalist politicians, but they are not listed as being Guobindang, they're listed as being Chinese representatives, which of course they were. And yet at that UN signing, the character who is really going to give him lots of stress of his own is Dong Biwu, who ends up much later in his life actually as president of the PRC senior, the only communist to be on that particular delegation. So again, in a sort of story of omission rather than commission, his role is given much greater prominence than it might have had. A lot of it goes along those lines. That said, you do also see explicit mention, you know, I want to be fair and say this in some cases again in museums of the KMT as such, the Kuomintang, not in terms of Chiang Kai Shek, his name, I think is still left out of it for the most part. But talking about KMT armies and their role in terms of the early phase of the war, and that is still there in many ways. Now what I don't know, and you may have had a chance yourself to get down there, but what is happening at the moment down in the southwest in places like Chongqing today, because in the last 15, 20 years, certainly the old wartime locations for policy and for fighting that Chiang Kai Shek and others had, such as Chiang Kai Shek's old mansion. The mansion is too strong, really. Kind of, you know, countryside place at Huangshan, you know, outside Chongqing. These were maintained very much as wartime relics where you could actually go along and, you know, see the wartime history told in a. A pretty straight sort of a way. But I haven't been there in a few years and I don't know if they've been fully maintained or not. Certainly I haven't heard that they've been, you know, torn down or anything of that sort in Beijing. That having been said, I think, you know, it is clear that the CCP contribution is really the one that gets absolute top. Billy.
- [70:48]
B
Yeah, no, I mean, that's. That's surprising. Yeah. And obviously I think we. That is in need of some correction. But I've been honestly getting very tired of reading these claims from people with kind of just enough shallow historical knowledge to be dangerous, talking about how the Communists sat out the war and then aside from some minor guerrilla actions, they made no meaningful contributions. I mean, we do, like I said, ahistorical claims should be called out wherever we see them. But I am really irked by this version that says the Red army could or should have shouldered more of the war effort. I mean, people forget about April 1927, right. And when the utter decimation of the Communists in and their allies. And then, you know, those years under encirclement campaigns in Jiangsi. And then of course, the Long March and the decimation of the Communist forces after that, you know, what was left in Yenan to fight the war. So I just. I keep wondering whether people understand that.
- [71:46]
C
I think the reality of. I mean, absolutely. I mean, the thing is that the history of World War II in China, as you know very well, Kaiser and I like to remind people, is very complex. And the quickest way that I can, I hope, sort of reiterate the point that you've made is that unless you take a whole variety of actors into consideration, the Nationalist troops, the Nationalist government, the CCP guerrilla forces, but also, you know, set piece forces in various base areas, the contribution of the United States, you know, huge amount there too, the contribution of the British Empire, which may not be a very fashionable thing to say, but you know, I'll make it explicit in that. In that case. And the Soviet pilots who made a really important job, job of keeping the skies open as well as in 1937-38, as well, of course, as their final thrust into Manchuria. And also the other, just to add one other element to the story which is on the other side, but just doesn't get very mentioned very much at all, which is the fact that China's Eastern seaboard was largely under Japanese occupation, with large numbers of Chinese collaborationist actors, most famously Wang Jingwei, who set up a client Kuomintang state in Nanjing at that time. But even he did it because of his own, you know, I think, distorted, but in some ways genuine belief that surrendering to Japan will get a better deal than continuing to fight them. Chiang Kai Shek and Mao disagreed with that. Of course. All of these complexities you have to have in your mind and more to understand what a complex place World War II China was. And anyone who thinks that one line, one story, one narrative, nationalist, Communist, American, whatever it might be, is enough to explain those events, is missing a huge part of the story.
- [73:24]
B
Absolutely. One person who's missing a big part of the story seems to be EU foreign policy chief Kaya Kalis. I don't know if you saw this, but she quipped that this claim that Russia and China defeated Nazism was something new. She said it sparked a mini storm beyond the political theater. What does this miscue reveal about European blind spots on the Asian theater? I mean, if you were advising EU officials, what two or three historically sound talking points would maybe help to diffuse this? I mean, obviously you just talked about the complexity that you do need to take into account the contributions of multiple actors. But what would be possible to say that might diffuse this sort of idiocy, but would avoid playing into Beijing's hands excessively, perhaps?
- [74:12]
C
I wrote about a paperback copy of my book. No, that's too. Too simple an answer.
- [74:17]
B
I think that's. That's not a bad answer. Not a bad answer.
- [74:19]
A
No, no.
- [74:20]
C
But I'll try and give one that involves slightly less royalties flowing to my. To my pocket. I, you know, I'm not sure that. I mean, historians, I have to say, perhaps I shouldn't downplay the power that we have, but I. We have that much power. If people want to believe certain things on any side, they will believe them. But I would come back with two pieces of, I think, pretty objective historical analysis, which I hope people would put into consideration whether they're Chinese, European, American, Japanese, whatever it might be about the China theater of the war. And I give them these two arguments. The first one is an answer to people who essentially say, even now, that China's role in World War II didn't matter. In other words, it's tragic. We know that 70 million people were killed, but essentially China's a victim and it has to be rescued by the, the Americans or whoever it might be. So I would say no, go back to When World War II starts in terms of the Asian theater. Now, as you know very well Kaiser, there is a debate even now in China, some of which has been closed off by official circles, others happened about whether the war begins in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria or 1937 with or Titi the 77, the, the Marco Polo Bridge. Now while the official version has now gone to 1931. I mean that's about the law rather than about historical analysis. The reason that I won't go to the huge reasons now, but basically I still like the 1937 start time. And the reason is that a year or two after the war was over, the 1940s, everyone, communists and Nationalists in China thought they'd been fighting a Banyan Kangran, the eight year war of resistance. So I go with what, I go with what Chinese people are actually saying at the, at the time. But the reason I bring it up is that of course by starting in 1937 and not 1939, you're pushing back against the idea that this war is only relevant when Poland is invaded by Germany. Now don't get me wrong, that's a hugely important geopolitical moment. Of course it is. But the idea that sort of the stuff before it is an incident, it's sort of something on the sidelines and it only becomes important when the European war comes in. That's not sufficient. I think you do need 1937 as your starting point point. And the reason being that a year later, 1938, the war in Europe hasn't yet started. It's looming. Everyone knows this, but it hasn't yet happened. Hitler's have taken the Sudeten man, all of that. Meanwhile, everyone is looking at what was still then the Sino Japanese War and saying that China's going to have to give in. There's like no way that this agrarian, technologically less advantaged, financially deeply, deeply troubled country is going to be able to fight back against the most technologically enabled power in, well, Asia certainly, but you know, one of the finest in the, in the world in terms of training and equipment. And yet, you know, these rebellious characters, Chiang Kai Sheka, the Nationalists, Mao and the other Communists. And of course as you read technically Mao is not leader of the Communist Party at that point. It's still actually I think Zhang Wen Tian at that stage. But, you know, he's. He's an increasingly prominent figure and he writes important works like On Protracted War at that point point. So we take his theorization with some seriousness at that point by deciding that they are going to do Protracted War and bearing in mind that this is the KMT as well as the ccp, not taking what might have looked like the logical path of saying there's no way we can win, we need to do a deal with the Japanese. They essentially paved the way for what we now know as the global World War II. Had Asia, meaning China, really essentially folded by 1938, then, although the European war would have broken out because of Hitler. The way in which you get that combined with an Asian war is hard to see because you don't have a Pearl harbor in a world where the Chinese have just been defeated by the Japanese. So the Chinese resistance and contribution, I would say, is essential in terms of that wider story of why China matters in that particular instance. In terms also the historical significance of what goes on elsewhere, I'd add one other point. I've often asked, I've been asked by Chinese friends, actually by Japanese friends too. You know, why is it that this particular battlefront, this particular theater of war, China, China bever India, but China in particular even now, is probably the least well known theater of World War II in the wider world. And I have to point out that it is the only major theater of war where the people primarily fighting each other on the ground are Asians. Chinese versus Japanese. There are no Europeans or Americans in ground combat. And maybe even now our kind of global story of the war tends to concentrate more on wars where Europeans and Americans are more directly involved in combat. It's not the only reason, as I say, the materials, vast majority are in Chinese or Japanese. So you need people who are going to be able to read those materials. They also have to go through incredibly complex history of how the battlefields operated during that time. There are great historians such as Cambridge's Hans Van de Bern, who have written in huge detail about the military history of that period. I'm more of a kind of social and political historian, but the military history itself is fascinating. All of these are in the mix. But I think the one thing that I really do push back against is the idea that the Chinese war story is either irrelevant or secondary or simply doesn't have global significance. I think it really does.
- [79:45]
B
Absolutely. Ronald, let's get back to the parade. And parades, of course, are never just parades. What functions do you see this year's spectacle performing? I mean, there's some obvious ones. Regime legitimation, maybe alliance signaling, deterrence, social discipline. I mean, methodologically used as an historian, how do we avoid overreading theatrics while still taking seriously the very obvious performative dimensions of Leninist politics on display here?
- [80:14]
C
Sure. Well, I would say that performativity is really an important part of what makes these parades work. I mean, if you think about the way in which not only the sort of perfect formation of these troops, the kind of display of weaponry and so forth, all of these are meant to send a signal, and I would say at this moment, probably a signal to the United States above all. I mean, it's never explicitly stated, but I think it's fairly clear that the US Is the key target. And I say that because perhaps 10 years ago there might have been more of a thinking that was directly a signal to the Japanese. You'll remember that 10 years ago, 2015 was just after the height of the Senkaku Dyayu crisis. In other words, the question of whether or not there's those islands. And while that's still simmering out there, it's not at the top of the agenda in the way that it was at that point. So Japan, I think, was less of a direct target this time than actually the US by implication. But what else does it mean? Well, let me put one word in front of you again. I'd love to get your thoughts, Kaja. That seemed to be the way that you saw it, too. And that word is Asian. In other words, there was a sort of very Asian dimension to the way in which not just the parade, but actually another very performative event two days before in Tianjin, the Shanghai Corporation Organization meeting. Of course, I put them both in there because famously, well, by now famously, I guess Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India was there and, you know, essentially again, performances is all here, deliberately went into with his eyes open, a smile on his face, a federal opportunity with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Now, I don't know about you, you're much more prescient than I am. But if I don't know, a year ago you'd say, well, actually, Modi is going to be actively seeking out a photo opportunity with Xi Jinping. He's going to go to China to do it. I wouldn't have been sure that that would have happened. But I think the changing global circumstances, particularly around the United States, which Modi obviously is now very unhappy with, what he regards as hugely and suddenly imposed tariffs on India and I think ambiguity about the partnership with the United States that provided one kind of performative moment. And then, although Modi didn't stay for the war parade, the appearance of, again, Putin, who sits at the center of all of this, and Kim Jong Un with Xi Jinping at the heart of the parade itself, really sent a very, very strong signal, not just as people have observed, about three leaders of authoritarian states, but beyond that also the idea that actually this is going to be an arena in which they're going to try the geopolitics of the region will be sorted out between these actors. In other words, obviously the United States was not going to be there because I guess they wouldn't have accepted the invitation to the parade. But by putting these actors forward, I think there was a very explicit signaling that actually the kind of regional nature, structure of order was going to change quite significantly during that time. So it was a sort of promissory note, you might say, a kind of a forward written check in terms of where those various actors will choose to go. And the changing role of India, I think, will be interesting and important as part of that. I still think, you know, being frank, that underpinning it, the security issues between China and India continue to be very, very significant still. The direct flights between the two countries, the trade is significant, but not nearly as significant as the size of the economies might suggest. So, fundamentally, a lot of structural problems that haven't been overcome. But those photo opportunities were deliberately chosen and I think are meant to indicate that all the leaders concerned, including Modi, are looking for a kind of fork in the road and a new term in terms of how they view Asia's role in the world.
- [84:00]
B
I think that's very, very spot on. And I think that it's interesting that the Trump administration seems almost to have acquiesced in this visa. The new national, what is it? The national defense strategy, which is entirely focused now on defense of the Western Hemisphere and especially of the homeland, with the explicit sort of downgrading of the western Pacific as a strategic security priority. So, yeah, ceding the ground.
- [84:27]
C
Just to note on that, of course, the one other actor, of course, from Asia who was important, very important, but not there, was, was Japan. That's not surprising. But in the week in which we're speaking and recording this, Prime Minister Ishiba has literally just resigned, I think a few hours ago, as, as we're recording this. And the sense, oh, my God, you know, you turn him these days, you turn your head for one moment and some new news story will kind of suddenly appear from. From nowhere. Yeah. So the Japanese are basically, after the last set of elections, didn't go at all well for the. The ldp. But the wider point being that Shiba had been very much part of pushing forward the idea that Japan would continue to be an American bulwark in the region. Now, I think there are figures in the Trump administration who are still keen to promote the role of Japan. I was going to say the Defense Secretary, but now, of course, the Secretary of War, Pete Hegset. That's changed too, in the last few days, I think would still take quite a traditional interpretation of the role of Japan. But I'm thinking internally within Japan, how they see themselves in terms of this new kind of Asian ness that is being put forward. Where does that put the relationship with India? The two both sit within the quad alongside the US and Australia. But at a time when actually there's perhaps ambiguity about how that develops, Japan is maybe left a little bit more isolated in terms of its choices than it would have wanted or would have expected even a few months ago. So I see a. A whole variety of different factors changing, not all overnight, but certainly in a relatively short period of time, really during the course of this calendar year. A lot of kind of fixed points seem to be more floating than they might have been.
- [86:03]
B
Indeed. So Donald Trump, who was, as you suggested, one of the intended audience members, I mean, he dutifully watched the parade. He had praise for it in a lot of ways, of course, avoided any comparisons directly to his sort of embarrassing spectacle or non spectacle of a parade in July. But he blasted the parade in other ways. I mean, obviously his parade was way better. But he claimed that Xi, Putin and Kim were conspiring against America. Setting aside the politics of the moment, if that's possible, how do you think this kind of rhetoric affects the way that sort of ordinary people in the west, in the U.S. in particular, understand China's role in World War II? I mean, does this just fuel more history wars? I mean, could it push people to look more carefully at the actual record? Which would be my hope.
- [86:52]
C
It was certainly my hope as well. I mean, the more people actually read and understand the history, the better it, the better it is.
- [86:58]
B
And the more books you sell.
- [86:59]
C
And the more books I sell, more than happy. I'm also available, you know, there's signed copies, birthdays, celebrations, all opportunities taken up.
- [87:07]
B
You do you do balloon animals, too?
- [87:09]
C
Oh, yeah, the whole thing. Nice. I can sort of, you know, recreate the atmosphere of the time by using puppet theater, you know, all sorts of possibilities are there. But I'd say that I don't think the kind of sort of back and forth rhetoric you get on X or any of these sort of social media formats are really where the big change in historical understanding comes about. And I'd refer you actually back to a couple of, I think, very positive developments in the west in recent years. So let me take what I think probably still count as the two flagship museums of the war experience in the United States and also in Britain. So in the United States, that would be the National World War II Museum in New Orleans and in Britain, the Imperial War Museum in London. And in both of those, compared to even 10, 15, 20 years ago, there's much, much more emphasis, perhaps surprisingly so, on China's role. So the Road to Tokyo exhibit, as I think it's called at the National World War II Museum in New Orleans, certainly has a lot in it about China and its sufferings and its contribution as well. And that's a relatively recent thing, but one that I think has been embraced pretty, pretty clearly. And that museum gets huge numbers of school children, tourists, visitors, conference, all that sort of thing year by year. Now, the Imperial War Museum, a little bit, as the name suggests, for many years, I think, tends to stress Britain's role in the war and perhaps to some extent, the British Empire around it. That's still very much the case and unsurprising for a museum based in London. But that having been said, the curators I know, because I talked to many of them and worked with them a bit, brought together huge amounts of new historical understanding to try and globalize the story of the war. In the new galleries which were opened, I want to say, three or four years ago, something like that, relatively new anyway. There is now a dedicated section of On China's contribution to the war, I think in particular, actually, if I remember correctly, they had materials from an air raid shelter in Chongqing, you know, which was constantly bombarded by the Japanese at that point. As an explanation of that, it's not the biggest element, but it's certainly prominent and notable and certainly acknowledges a part of the story that simply wasn't there before. So small but important steps and ones that over time I think, begin to change people's understanding of, of that story. But the bottom line, you know, to be frank about it, is that I still think, you know, even 30, 40 years after the subject began to be revived within China, amongst the historical profession, this sort of broader view of World War II that isn't just about the CCP, but about the wider contribution of China. That story still doesn't have huge amounts of purchase or visibility in the Western world as a whole.
- [89:52]
B
I would say you still have work to do. I don't know whether you saw this paper or the discussion around it, but I did a show recently with three scholars, Dave Kong from usc, Zenobia Chan at Georgetown and Jackie Wong at Sharjah, about something they published recently in International Security, MIT's journal, arguing that China's aims are actually quite limited. They're very regionally focused. There were people who saw China's display of arms at the parade and thought the sort of global coverage claims about the Chinese ICBMs, that phrase really stuck out. Everyone I talked to in China was talking about that. This calls into question the Kong Chan Wang thesis. They said, well, obviously they have global ambition. How would an historian test the claim? Using wartime and early PRC sources? I believe if they make any difference at all, what would count as disconfirming evidence that points to maybe more expansive hegemonic ambitions? Or have things simply changed too much in the, what, 50 or 80 years.
- [91:01]
C
Since they've changed and they haven't changed. So I'll explain what I mean by that and I'll try and be as concise as possible because it's the subject on which, if I were allowed, even on your generous podcast guys, a full reign, we might be here for a long time. So let me divide this into three brief phases and the first one, I think even your expert listeners may perhaps not be as familiar with it, which is what I call China's first post war globalization, which is actually, perhaps surprisingly, the same years of the civil war between the Guomindang and the ccp. What do I mean by that? Well, after the victory against Japan in 1945 and up to 1945, when the 549, when the Nationalists are defeated on the mainland and have to flee to Taiwan, it's often forgotten that that's also a time when actually China's leaders, the Nationalist leaders, are pushing outward to try and create a new post colonial Asian role for China. Remember in 1945, at the moment of Japanese defeat, only two countries at that point in Asia are sovereign. One is China, the other one is Siam, Thailand. India's not independent yet and Korea's put under, I guess, a UN mandate pretty, pretty quickly, but it's kind of occupied. Most of the Southeast Asia goes back almost immediately to European colonialism, having been relieved of Japanese colonialism, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia under the Dutch, all of that. So China's a pretty special place at that point. And there's no doubt when you look at the data, look at the documents, that the Kuomintang government, even in its last days, is profoundly anti colonial and really pushes hard to make China a global leader. Sorry, an Asian leader with global aspirations. You know, Wang Shijie, the Nationalist Foreign Minister at the time, has no bones. He kept a very good diary. You can find it free online on the Zhonghe and Zhengyun Academia Seneca website if anyone wants to see it. He makes no bones about hanging out with, you know, the biggest figures in global diplomacy. Molotov, Ernie Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, James Burns, the US Secretary of State, and saying, oh, you know, China's a wartime victory too. We get to decide not just about our own backyard, but about, you know, things to do with the wider world. The Western leaders were not very keen on this talk. That didn't stop Wang Shijie from putting it forward anyway. That turned to dust pretty quickly, of course, because the Guobindang defeat. And then phase two, broadly speaking, is one where Mao and Mao's China absolutely have a global vision and it's clearly laid out. They don't like, you know, they're not going to be America, they're not going to be the capitalist world, but they're also not going to be like those Soviet revisionists, you know, these kind of backward Khrushchevites. You know, this is a betrayal of true socialism. And yes, there is an armed element to that, no doubt, for instance, supplying the North Vietnamese side in the Indochina wars. But at the same time, it's also also about a combination of ideology and actually a kind of rather cheapskate but nonetheless first level version of what is today's bri, the Tanzan Railway, actually, which actually wasn't cheapskate at all. Important part of that development, all these things that's out in Africa in the 1970s. So you can see the beginnings of that sort of aspiration. Fast forward to today, when obviously today's China is very different from Mach China or indeed late KMT China, for a whole variety of reasons. But if someone says, does China have global aspirations? And I had to, I do have to. So I will give you a kind of concise answer to that. I'd say not, I think in terms of some kind of global territorial capacity. I think no state, even if it wanted to, either has the desire or capacity to do that. But in terms of what you might call the fields of contestation of the next 5, 10, 20 years. Technology in particular. Absolutely.
- [94:47]
B
I think standards and technology, things like that.
- [94:50]
C
Right, absolutely. Standards, international institutions. Remember those blue berets we talked about earlier? Well, there's plenty of absolutely equivalents out there in the UN and also in terms of, you know, large parts of South America basically are now running on Chinese 5G. Now you can then have a debate about whether or not there should have been alternatives for them to take up, whether Chinese state subsidies meant that people took up per Chinese 5G because it was just much cheaper to do so. But the fact remains that a lot of it is now there in the system. It ain't going to get ripped out anytime very soon. Ditto large parts of sub Saharan Africa, ditto large parts of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Obviously there are large areas where that purchase doesn't necessarily apply, but in terms of having global capacity to shape economies, polities, political decisions and so forth, I think that that is out there, out there at the moment. One of the interesting questions, I think, and you have, I think, thoughts about this too, Kaiser, is whether or not China is capable of creating a sort of ideology of its own that, you know, sort of mixes and matches Confucian thinking, Marxism, Leninism, you know, ideas about economic development to create something coherent. You know, back in the day, 50 years ago, Maoism, which emerged very much from these circumstances of rural China, ended up finding adherents in the streets of Paris, in the countryside of Peru, down in the Rhodesian bush, where, you know, Joshua Ngo and Robert Mugabe in particular were guerrilla fighting. So China has in recent years, relative, recent, from historical, in historical terms, come up with an ideological formation that had international reach. My own feeling is that the Community of Common Destiny and Xi Jinping thought do not reach that particular kind of capacity.
- [96:33]
B
No, indeed, no. So, you know, nor necessarily are they intended to. I mean, maybe, you know, some of the global initiatives, but I think, you know, the core ideology such as it is seizing pink thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era. I think just in the way that it's labeled and branded is, Is not clearly not intended for export. Right.
- [96:53]
C
I think, I think in that formal is certainly not. And yet the idea that if China wants to be a global power, that it wants to think in a global way is, I think, a very kind of widespread thinking, you know, form of thought amongst many intellectuals in China at the moment. You mentioned David Kang earlier and you know, he's someone who's written brilliantly on some of these sorts of questions about can you conceptualize using pre existing, you know, Chinese worldviews, ways and means to rethink the Westphalian or, you know, kind of post 1945 world that we have? I'm not saying that China has either succeeded or even is trying 100% to do this, but I think a lot of the most interesting intellectual debates in China at the moment are precisely about this question of what is possible and if it were possible, how do you conceptualize it?
- [97:40]
B
Rana, that's a fantastic place to wrap up for listeners. Let me just ask you in in lieu of paying it forward, which I usually have on the show, unless you want to add one, I want to ask you what you think people who really want to understand history in a more sophisticated way. How should we read? Who should we be reading aside from yours, if we want to inoculate ourselves against both sort of naive acceptance or reflexive dismissal of official Beijing or anywhere else Taipei World War II narrative?
- [98:14]
C
Well, could I put a couple of quick things into that thought first, if you'll excuse me. If you'll excuse me. Doing so, Kaiser, could I put a small advertisement in for a podcast? When people are not listening to your podcast, first and foremost, Seneca, which of course they should be doing. My old friend Jane Perles, formerly the New York Times, and I will be putting forward a new series, our podcast Face off, about US China relations, which will be out in just a few months time and we'll be very.
- [98:38]
B
I look forward to it. Yeah, no, it's been great. Very much enjoyed it.
- [98:41]
C
You'll enjoy that. A lot of questions being discussed there as well. And in terms of reading something that really I think will make people think again about China, I'm going to I mean, one of the things that's wonderful is there's so much great Chinese history being written at the moment that the kind of very small number of choices you'd have had a generation or two ago are now expanding into a huge number of choices. So I'll pick one book for a particular reason which I think is very impressive. I say that because I sit on the committee for the Levinson Prize, which is one of the kind of profession's own accolades for books in the field of Chinese history that have really stood out. And last year it was won by Professor Xiao Fei Kang for a book called Enchanted Revolution, which brings together it's a history of the Chinese Communist Party, but not as most readers will have seen it before, in that it looks at the way in which they went out into the countryside side that's well known, but also really drew on some of what have traditionally been dismissed as feudal and superstitious, you know, kind of magical ways of thinking and the old division that we may have thought that, you know, the Chinese Communists are these kind of authoritarian, rational creatures and they kind of do away with mixing, you know, superstition. All this actually what Professor Kang shows, not at all the clever, but also in some ways very complicit usage of these traditional Chinese ways of thinking about the metaphysical, about the spiritual, about the other world. These make for a much more complex story again of the Chinese revolution. And anyone who I think wants to understand even the very different CCP of today needs to understand, I think, that very complex, anthropologically rich history of where the revolution comes from. Even today, many of us certainly me, are asking why in the end does that Chinese revolution end up succeeding? And I think that book Enchanted Revolution by Xiaohui Kang is one part of that bigger story that's still going on of explaining why that world changing revolution actually happened.
- [100:37]
B
Fantastic. That's a great recommendation and I will actually grab a copy of that as soon as I'm able. That takes me to my own recommendation and mine's just a little more abstract. I'm going to recommend a couple of possible brands here. But I have rediscovered the joy of the electric scooter here in Beijing. I used to ride one around, but they have gotten, they've gotten so much better. I mean, mine will on a full charge take you 220km. And that is impressive. That's an awful lot.
- [101:06]
C
Have you in fact traveled 250 kilometers on it? Kaiser?
- [101:10]
B
Not yet, but I mean, I've put on, you know, quite a few miles on the thing already. What I've also just been astonished by is this gigantic, you know, city wide network of charging stations where you can go and you know, use of course your App, you know, WeChat or AliPay or whatever, what have you to just sort of, you know, fill up. You go when you're sitting in a cafe, you find a place nearby. It's usually in some, you know, Shao Chu residential area. You scan a little barcode, tap a couple buttons and you're charging away while you go, you know, work in your favorite coffee shop. And it's just amazing the, just the, the speed of these things. Actually they've just changed the rules. After September 1st, you were no longer able to buy ones that exceed a certain speed. I think it's 25km an hour, but fortunately I got mine ahead of the deadline. I had sent money to a friend to make sure he bought it for me and. But it's all, you know, related. It's all on his ID card too. So if, even if I get in trouble, it's actually him getting in trouble.
- [102:11]
C
So.
- [102:11]
B
So that gives me a certain. Anyway, what a joy it's been. I wear a helmet. I just bought myself a really cool helmet and. But it's just such a great way. I've just been exploring neighborhoods that I hadn't been to in ages. You can just do it in a way. I'm going to go down this alley. I'm going to make sure I explore all the way to the end of this little bit. But it's great to just reconnect with the city in this way. So that's my recommendation. Rana, what a pleasure.
- [102:39]
C
Kaiser is absolutely a joy as ever to talk to you and to have a chance to kind of, you know, swap thoughts about Chinese history and how it relates to the present. So thank you so much again for the opportunity.
- [102:49]
B
Well, I will before the next parade. We'll have you on again, I promise.
- [102:53]
C
Sounds like a plan to me.
- [102:54]
B
Next time you got.
- [102:54]
C
And stay safe on that electric scooter.
- [102:56]
B
I'd say thank you my friend. You've been listening to the Seneca Podcast. The show is produced, recorded, engineered, edited and mastered by me, Kaiser Guo. Support the show through substack@cinecopodcast.com where you will find a growing offering of terrific original China related writing and audio. Email me@synecapodmail.com if you've got ideas on how you can help out with the show. Don't forget to leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Enormous gratitude to the University of Wisconsin Madison center for East Asian Studies for supporting the show this year. Huge thanks to my guests Colonel Joe Block and of course Ron Emitter. Thanks for listening. See you next week. Take care.