Gregor Vand (7:28)

Yeah, that's awesome. I mean, I like the kind of theme, I guess just throughout when you did actually get bored, you made a switch. And I think a lot of people don't maybe do that enough. I mean, it's not to say jump around, but it is sort of. I like that you completely did a hard left when you went from technology into intelligence and then brought them back together. And obviously, as you call out, you've been at Coinbase now nine years and clearly there's still an intellectual challenge there for you, which is great to see. So I mean, you've kind of touched on it there. But again, just in case any listeners are not aware, just a sort of very, very brief. What is Coinbase?

Philip Martin (8:05)

That's a fascinating question. So for the vast majority of people out there, you experience Coinbase as one of two things. You experience Coinbase as Coinbase.com, which is a retail brokerage. That's what we would call that. Right? Similar to your pickup brokerage, your Schwab account or Fidelity or E Trade or whatever, where we provide the access and tools to buy, sell, trade, store, transmit, cryptocurrency. Now there's more than that, there's also staking, there's a bunch of other stuff. We'll just keep it simple to start with there. So it's either that or they're a customer of Coinbase Wallet, which is our self custody mobile app that allows consumers to do all those same things with cryptocurrency, but without using Coinbase as an intermediary. You can go transfer, trade on things like Dexes and similar things. You can do all of that, but not having to depend on a third party to store and facilitate those transactions.

Gregor Vand (9:04)

Got it. I don't have a huge relationship to crypto and it probably is because I got there very early and used a different exchange that fell over very fast and that was the end of that. So I think what's going to be a theme throughout today is the fact that Coinbase is such an established and think that runs throughout a lot of the. If you go to coinbase.com, et cetera, it's all about we are the most secure, the most established exchange.

Philip Martin (9:29)

Now I should note we're way more than that. We do a bunch of stuff on the institutional side or on prem brokerage. We have a qualified custodian, we're into derivatives trading. There's a bunch of other pieces to the puzzle, but for the vast majority of users, that's their relationship with us.

Gregor Vand (9:46)

So now we understand, at least at a very high level, what the Coinbase is you came from. I mean, ultimately he came from tech and then sort of what we might call traditional intelligence, and then now into crypto security. What mental models or frameworks did you have to actually rethink when you came from, I would say, traditional intelligence into Coinbase.

Philip Martin (10:07)

I'm not sure if it's rethinking so much as putting the proper context. Right. Perhaps that's a distinction without a difference, but I think that I actually took quite a lot from how the government, for example, thinks about designing systems that protect classified information to how we think about building Systems that protect cryptocurrency. From a system design perspective, there's a lot similar in the way that I think about those two things because the problem space is actually almost the same when you think about what's the problem space for crypto, it's. Well, I have all this value that at its core is tied to a. Not a short string of digits, but not a huge one either. Right. Something that if you could, you know, if you could memorize 20 digits at a time, you could smuggle a key out of a place. If you could see it, memorize it, you do it piece by piece, whatever, right. Not dissimilar from the classified data problem. Right. Of what you're actually trying to protect is something that can be in someone's brain. When we think about protecting cryptocurrency in that way, we think a lot about. Not to jump around analogies here, but I will. Anyway. We think a lot about that. Just sort of like radioactive material, right. How do you safely manipulate radioactive material? Well, you don't. You build tools to manipulate it. Right. So it can be at arm's reach and you can be protected from it. You're not exposed to it or exposed as little as humanly possible. It's a very, very similar philosophy that we would take or we do take in thinking about how we design systems that actually those core. Core systems that touch private keys is in a very, very similar way. I also think that, again, from that design perspective, very firmly embedded in our design process is that people shouldn't be trusted individually. Right. We want to see system design where it really does require a conspiracy for things to go intentionally wrong, because conspiracies among humans can be fragile things. We want to introduce that additional risk into a bad actor would have to do in order to cause bad things to happen. So lots of stuff like that, where I think are actually a huge number of parallels in how we think about secure systems design.

Gregor Vand (12:21)

Yeah, makes a lot of sense. I mean, when you were talking about your time in the military and you were saying it was all about humans, and at the end of the day, security basically is humans. It just so happens that there's this sort of interface that we all use called a computer and Internet, et cetera, but it's ultimately humans, and what can a human figure out versus another one?

Philip Martin (12:40)

I think that's very, very true. And I think it's an element of security that you can't overemphasize. And I'm not talking when I say that some people think, oh, security Training or whatever. And sure, fine, right. Educating the human about the risks is a component of good security, but more about understanding how humans are going to interact with the system. More about the understanding that the vast majority of humans that use the system that you're building don't actually care about the security or insecurity of that system. They care getting their work done for that day. And so that's their incentive. And instead of sitting here and trying to say, well, no, I'm going to make them care about security, I think people should be sit there and say, how can I make the fastest path to that human getting what they want to get done done, the one that takes them through the most secure path? How can I make security the feature that they want in this system design? And I think we think about that a lot as we think about building security systems in Coinbase. And of course there's some amount of fiat about you must use this or you must do that. You can never get away from that entirely. But I think at the same time, there's a lot we spend a lot of time and effort thinking about, like what roads do we need to pave for our engineers, for our. Whoever it is to get their work done in a way that is safe and secure, in a way that they are safe and secure, because they know that if they are, they're going to be faster and more efficient, more, More able to get their actual thing done that they care about. So it's. That you could even call it sort of some. Some security humility. Right. No one cares as much about system security as the security folks do. Let's just like say that and be done with it and ask ourselves, okay, great, what do they care about and how can we position ourselves that we're delivering that to them in addition to security?

Gregor Vand (14:32)

Yeah, I completely agree. I work in effectively email security, but I have to keep pointing out that email security is. It doesn't technically matter that a bad email lands in your inbox. It matters that the human interacts with the bad email. So to your point, it's around how can we always ensure that people are getting what they need to get done, but gracefully avoiding the bad stuff effectively?

Philip Martin (14:56)

Absolutely.

Gregor Vand (14:57)

That kind of brings us on to. Because that's effectively phishing. So just talking about the kinds of attacks we might see at Coinbase, what would you say the classic question, what's the most common kind of attack? And also just how have attack types changed over the last four to five years?

Philip Martin (15:14)

Yeah, I mean, Coinbase gets attacked the way every Other company on the Internet gets attacked. We see the phishing, we see the web app attacks, we see all the same things that everyone else does. And I say a lot of people sometimes ask me, wow, Coinbase, the security must be so different. I'm like, it's absolutely not. It's fundamentally ignore a couple of things on the back end that I'll talk about in a second. But it's fundamentally web app security at a large corporate enterprise. So you get all the same social engineering, phishing perimeter stuff, web app stuff, we have vendors, so vendor third party security, we have all the same attack types everyone else does. Now where it gets interesting is where we get into the cryptocurrency specific stuff because that creates a bunch of really interesting and unique security sort of threat surface for us. Everything from, hey, we're interacting with smart contracts, or actually in some cases, we're writing smart contracts. How do we write smart contracts in a way that is safe and secure? Which is a really interesting set of problems I occasion. It's sort of like, what if you're able to travel back in time and pick up a C programmer from 1970, fast forward to 2025 now, and asked them to write a secure application? They couldn't possibly, right? Because the whole classes of attacks have been invented that they would just have been unaware of, even as a state of the art practitioner back then. Very, very similar problem in smart contract security is that whole classes of attacks are getting invented on a regular basis as people really explore the boundaries of the security of the language, of how the compilers operate, of how the underlying network processes, the bytecode and the message types that are sent and all of this stuff together. It's changing, it's updating at a pace that is shocking. It shouldn't be shocking, not after nine years, but it still is sometimes to be shocking how quickly the space moves. And so we spin, we have a whole team, a blockchain security team that does nothing but work on the various pieces and parts of that. From smart contract security to protocol security, secure protocol design, to how we store, process private keys, the whole sort of ball acts there. That is really the unique bit of how Coinbase sees attacks. The other unique bit, as I talked about before, is just how much is at stake for Coinbase. And so while we certainly see our share of, you know, spray and pray phishing that went to us and a billion of our closest friends, we also see some very, very targeted attacks that attackers clearly spent time and effort and money executing, which is really awesome from the perspective of a security professional developers.

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Gregor Vand (18:53)

Couple of one I've heard of before, but one I hadn't. If I go to coinbase.com and there's obviously a lot on there about security because educating users is a of huge importance. There is a term a trust trading scam. What is that?

Philip Martin (19:08)

So I say a lot, right? There are no new scams in the world. They're just sort of scams that have a different coat of paint on them. And so something like a trading scam is really sort of a confidence scam where a bad actor is one way or another. And there are many sort of variations of this. Convincing a victim that they are going to teach them how to trade crypto or clue them in on some great investment opportunity or whatever. The pitch varies quite a bit. And getting that victim to in some way shape or form transfer money to either the attacker or attacker controlled address or wallet or something of that nature. And there are like, look there, there are as many scams as there are scammers, probably more out there. And so I think the really important thing that we focus on when we talk about scams, sort of two prongs to that the first prong is it's about to your point, educating customers and potential victims out there, getting the information in front of them. Because what we see on our end is that educated folks, meaning that folks who have heard about these games before, who have some inkling of the shape of them and what they might sound like, are much less likely to be victims to those scams than people who are encountering them for the first time. That seems intuitive, but the data backs it that that is actually true. And so we want to get in front of as many eyeballs as we can. Now, the hard thing about that is that scam details change. And they change not just over time, but they change in reaction to our education efforts and the different controls we put in place. And so when we talk about this stuff, what I talk about tends to be in fairly generic terms, right? It tends to be a. I equate it a lot to sort of what I might call real life security or security advice people have heard growing up for ages. If it's too good to be true, it probably is. That applies just as much online as it does in real life is the, hey, if you're being pressured into making a decision, if someone is pushing you to move faster than you're comfortable with, that's the moment when you take a beat, step back, ask yourself, talk to somebody. And the third thing is like, financial decisions should not be secrets, right? If someone's telling you, hey, I need you to do this thing, but don't tell anyone about it. Don't talk to your trusted loved one, your brother, your mother, your father, whoever, right? Don't tell them about it. They're not going to understand. That should be a red flag for folks. And these are very common. In fact, in most scams, we'll see some combination of one or more of these tactics, whether it be pressure, isolation or what have you. And those should really be. And I encourage folks to talk, not just educate themselves, but talk to their loved ones about this stuff and communicate these core concepts. One of the most fundamental things I talk about a lot is that it's almost independent. So almost anywhere I go to talk to people, people don't need to hear what I'm talking about. From a consumer protection standpoint point, the audience is probably like, I would bet your audience is in at least the top quartile, right, of educated. Educated meaning aware of online scams folks out there, which great, I'm very happy for that. But the folks that need to hear what I'm saying are not listening to software engineering daily. They're not reading the Coinbase blog, they're not attending Ripple's Swell conference in Miami. They are watching Good Morning America, they're reading the AARP magazine, they're in other venues and consuming media differently. And so two things. One, we do a lot of work to try to get out in those media channels too. But, and this is, you know, if I could encourage your audience to do one thing walking out of this one thing that will improve security for everybody, it is have a conversation with one person, you know, who you think might be at risk for being scammed online. You know somebody, I promise you, right? A cousin, an aunt, an uncle, a neighbor, a friend from a social group, whatever it is. There's one person that comes to mind for almost everybody. I'd worry about that person if a scammer, like called them. Go talk to them. We have a bunch of resources on Coinbase's blog. We've done some animated stuff on Coinbase's YouTube channel for sort of scam awareness. There are other resources that it doesn't have to be Coinbase. It's more important to me that the information gets out there than it's a Coinbase source for it. But that is really a rallying cry. I push everywhere I can is talk to the people in your life who might be at risk because you don't to want. You want it to be you that has that conversation with them first. Not a bad guy.

Gregor Vand (24:02)

Yeah, I think that's a great call out. I have sort of aging parents and I think they've managed to avoid most things, but they certainly have been targeted in the past. But luckily they do know to message me.

Philip Martin (24:12)

Perfect.

Gregor Vand (24:12)

Anything that looks a bit suspicious, they just say, what about this? And I'm like, yeah, that's a scam as well. Even my wife got a very sophisticated phishing scam recently. And I was almost saying, no, I think it's probably correct. And then we did some extra checking on it. It's like, no, that's also a scam. So, yeah, I think it's a great call out. Just as you call out, our audience here, probably more aware of things than the average person, but we all know someone who's not. So that's a great call out. I want to kind of just talk about mechanisms for a second. I mean, one thing that jumped out at me here in Singapore is we have this thing called SingPass. So that's government digital identity and it's used to log into. If I log into my tax or just any other government kind of portal. And then it can also be used to log into Coinbase. And I'm kind of curious around what that adds to something like Coinbase. And I've just got a little anecdote here, which I'm curious if you've got something that resonates alongside this, which is on my apartment door. I've got this. I didn't put it on there. It's a very fancy lock. It's got fingerprint, it's got digits, it's got all these things. And one day the batteries run out and we didn't actually know how to jump start it. There is a way, but we didn't know at the time. So we call the locksmith and we expect he's going to come with some sort of special rewiring device or something. And it comes with a giant metal bar. And I was like, no, no, no, this is a digital fingerprint. And he's like, yeah, yeah, yeah. And he pops out the eye hole and he puts his metal bar in and he opens the door from the inside. Which just for me this was just like an eye opening moment. I thought, geez, this is security in a nutshell, right? We can build all these amazing mechanisms on the front. So just kind of going back to that, things like SingPass and obviously multifactor, et cetera, et cetera, what kind of stands out as mechanisms that do work. And again, why something like? What does SingPass for example, bring to Coinbase?

Philip Martin (26:03)

So as you mentioned up front, half of Coinbase's mission is be the most secure, be most trusted as we say. The other half is be the easiest to use. And you could think about that as being as being two pieces of a mission that are in tension with each other. I don't think they are in tension or perhaps they are occasionally, but they don't have to be really. It is a challenge to us to say it is unquestionable that we have to be the most trusted exchange because if we are not, then the business dies. However, if we are so secure that no one can remember their password, no one can log into their account, then we have failed in our mission to actually be easy to use and thus we have failed in our larger mission of encouraging the economic freedom in the world. So we have to balance it. So things like SingPass or equivalent in the US would probably be closer to logging in with Google or whatever. We see that as making things a little bit easier for our customers. While at the same time in our overall security architecture design, we don't outsource 2fa. So even if when you log in with your SingPass you still have to present whatever 2fa you have configured, hopefully it's a Yubikey. If it's not, I encourage you to use a Yubikey. We see that that is by far the safest method of two factor that is out there.

Gregor Vand (27:23)

Do you have listeners know I like passkeys. I'm curious, do you have any sort of leaning on passkeys versus Yubikey?

Philip Martin (27:29)

The interesting thing for me about Passkeys is that they're not like a passkey is not a passkey, it's not a passkey. From a security design perspective, what's backing that passkey where it's stored? Right. There are implementations where that passkey, the backing private key, might be on a Google Drive, right. Or might be on a password manager with a bad password. We can't know. From Coinbase's perspective, there's no way for us to. And in fact, I think that's actually a gap in the protocol that I know our team has been working with or working to address. Is what we would love to know is, is this passi hardware backed or not?

Gregor Vand (28:03)

Yeah, I think that's a great call out.

Philip Martin (28:04)

If we could know that, then we could have a lot more faith in that. And even if maybe there's a world here where we're big advocates of using risk models in situations like this, so this is not how it works today, but you could imagine a future world that says, well, hey, you're logging in using username pass using a software backed passkey or non hardware backed PassKey and your IP address is new and maybe there's three or four more other factors. We're not going to let you log in like that. Whereas maybe if it was a hardware back pass key or a yubikey or something, we'd say like, okay, you physically possess a thing that is letting you make this assertion. So we have a lot more confidence that you were you and not a bad actor who got access to some sort of digital repository where that passkey private key was stored.

Gregor Vand (28:56)

I think that's a really good call out. I mean, I've always appreciated passkeys from a sort of conceptual standpoint and I was working with them at least two years ago. And the thing is, as things have kind of advanced, yes, okay, things have got easier for users in theory, but as you call out, it's almost become too easy in some respects that I can log into my password manager with literally just a password and then suddenly that's my passkey. And I don't think was really ever supposed to be how things were. And I'm noticing that my password manager is now saying they're going to start backstopping that with my email address. And of course this is a lot of what I work on, which is backstopping accounts.

Philip Martin (29:35)

And then you get back down to the locksmith who pokes out the eye hole and uses the stick to unlock the door is everyone is depending on a different layer to be the ultimate backing authority. And then someone comes along and says, well, that layer is vulnerable, and then the whole thing sort of collapses. Right. I think this is really the hard part about modern secure system design is systems have gotten to the point they're so complicated today. This is probably true in the past as well, but from my perspective, they're even more complicated today that it's hard to even know that that eye hole exists in the door. If you're designing door locks, you can make some assumptions about doors. You can think about eye holes and hinges and deadbolts and deadbolt depths, and you can make some assumptions about that and you design your deadbolt with those in mind. Trying to do that with an Internet application today is, gosh, the breadth of knowledge you'd have to have, right?

Gregor Vand (30:35)

Yeah, exactly. API security just virtually impossible. I mean, there are obviously platforms and frameworks for dealing with that, but every endpoint could have some strange anomaly in it that someone figures out.

Philip Martin (30:48)

You inherit a constellation of assumptions that you don't necessarily even know have been made as that person operating at the very top layer that imply constraints that you're not aware of that you may or may not break because you don't know that you shouldn't. That's a very difficult problem to solve without a large and active team of people that do nothing but pay attention to this stuff.

Gregor Vand (31:12)

Absolutely. So just going to move us along. I'd love to get your thoughts on a couple of topics. Obviously one has to be AI. Let's start there. In terms of security, I think when ChatGPT kind of became a thing and I think a lot of people all expected this to massively change, especially things like phishing. Now what was interesting was, I believe in the last Verizon dbir, which is a big report that's compiled every year, really well done and is about the most accurate from a stats point of view. What's going on in the world, security wise? They actually were saying that they hadn't seen any kind of material jump in phishing or phishing sophistication yet. Now we're due for the next report in a few months. Would you say you've noticed anything materially different since AI being such an available technology? And I guess the second question is any aspects that you're using internally, purely in the security part?

Philip Martin (32:11)

My guess is we'll see an uptick. I don't think it's going to be the world changing impact that people were predicting. I think that's for a good reason. There's a story it may be Apocryphal. Right. But at some point somebody had a conversation with the people that write the Nigerian prince email, like scam emails, right. And ask them, hey guys, a Grammarly subscription is not that much money. Like why don't you write these emails better, more sophisticated, with better punctuation, grammar or whatever. And the answer was because if someone responds to the email as poorly as it's put together, they're already in our target zone. Right. They're more likely to believe us when we engage in the scam than if we had written a perfect email that was very difficult to tell apart. Now we're getting people who are going to be skeptical. And so they're sort of. People talk about a sales funnel a lot. Their sort of scam funnel then becomes much more difficult for them to parse through. They're spending more human time. My guess is something like that is at play in the phishing world. That, number one, phishing has always worked really well. So why try harder than you have to in order to get the outcome that you want from a bulk phishing perspective? Number two, maybe it serves as that same kind of first step filter for these bad actors in a way that they don't have to do as much effort farther down in the pipeline. I'm speculating there, of course, but that's one of my guesses. I think that there's probably been more impact on the higher end. There's certainly been more impact on things like the use of chatbots in scams targeting consumers. That's a real thing. That's absolutely happening today in a way that it just couldn't have historically.

Gregor Vand (34:06)

Yeah. When you say using chatbots in scams, how does that sort of look?

Philip Martin (34:10)

I guess so an example here could be you've probably gotten. Or maybe not. I don't know if it works the same for scams in Singapore, but you've probably gotten a text message, something that it was just like a hi or hey, Kathy, looking forward to golf tomorrow or whatever it is. Right. And what's supposed to happen there? And sort of the scammer's happy path is you reply back and say like, I'm not Kathy. They then kick off a conversation. Well, historically that was a human on the back of that. Now frequently, very tragically, that was frequently a human trafficked human sitting somewhere in Southeast Asia in what amounts to a scammer sweat camp. There have been a number of really heartbreaking stories. 60 Minutes Australia did one. I think it was maybe three or six months back on this. But historically it had been an actual human doing that stuff or moving into a world where it can be a chatbot. And so what that means is the volume goes way up and the quality becomes more consistent. I think that's the kind of place where I think AI technologies are more likely to show up in the average potential victim's day to day life than in phishing emails.

Gregor Vand (35:19)

Yeah, makes a lot of sense. So moving on from AI, we're doing a few episodes sort of covering different aspects of this. But post Quantum Cryptography, how are you guys thinking about that? And just our listeners might not have heard of any of the other episodes. So we're talking about things like store now, decrypt later. That is when people get access to data that's encrypted today with a certain protocol and knowing full well that maybe in four or five years there's going to be increased computing power to be able to decrypt that and then use it at that stage. And I mean, I can imagine this very sort of something that you guys are thinking about a lot.

Philip Martin (35:56)

Yes and no. It's definitely something that's on our mind. I think the store now decouplator, that sort of world of things. It's fascinating, but it's also not really our problem to solve. That'll get solved by the browser makers who are already doing a good job, and really the protocol designers who are already doing a good job figuring out how to layer quantum resistant or what we believe to be quantum resistant algorithms. I think it's important to acknowledge that we actually have no idea, really. We have strong beliefs but no hard data because we can't test our assumptions against an actual quantum computer that doesn't exist. Doing the best job to sort of layer protections in such that when that does happen, it reduces the sort of the vulnerability window. Right. Because we've layered in some, you know, whatever, some lattice based encryption mechanism that turns out to be hard for computers to break. I think that will get solved. It's already in the process of being solved. It'll absolutely get solved. I think the more interesting problem for us is that basically all of cryptocurrency depends on private keys, asymmetric private keys. And now I think there are, there's a bunch of smart people thinking about this. As to how we could update protocols to become more resistant, the obvious answer is, oh, why don't you just change the signing algorithm to use a quantum resistant protocol? Well, okay, so every single person that has the private key is going to have to regenerate the Private key. What about people who have lost a private key or forgotten one? Is that money just up for grabs now? What about people who don't know how to regenerate a private key? There's a bunch of interesting corner cases around that kind of migration that makes it more difficult than someone just casually thinking about it realizes. That said, my belief, and I could turn out to be spectacularly wrong here. So let me just be clear here. I don't believe I have any particular expertise over anybody else in this space. But my belief here is quantum is something we will see coming from a long way of way and we're already seeing coming, right, the improvements in not just qubit count, but much more importantly error correction in these quantum computers and in sort of quantum networking. And like this is all. It's happening right in front of us every single day. And every single day it's improving the, I'll just call it computational power for lack of a better quantum or the computational power of these quantum computers. But it's happening in a way that we can see it. We can say, okay, they're getting closer, one step at a time. We're still well away from an algorithm that could effectively break a reasonable length modern asymmetric key pair. But I think what is going to happen here is we will see it coming from far enough off that at some point here we will see a 512 bit key get broken. And that I think will wake up a lot of people. And at that point we're still, right, we're still depending on or really for Bitcoin256. We'll see 128bit key get broken at some point here. Right. And that will really encourage folks to think hard about how are we migrating this stuff. But we're not going to jump from one to the other in the space of a week or a year. I think it'll be a long slog.

Gregor Vand (39:16)

Yeah, we did an episode recently with Meta and so the work that they've been doing on this and actually internally they've been using what they call a hybrid approach basically where some of it's done on a sort of regular protocol and then some is on a post quantum protocol. And yeah, there's various sort of reasons around that and encourage anyone to go listen to that episode to get into the nuts and bolts of that. But I think what you call out is, is absolutely right that this isn't a tomorrow problem, but it is a five, maybe ten year problem. And yeah, we'll start to see some Signals at some stage, not quite yet, but it's good that people are sort of thinking about it. So just moving on, obviously conscious of time. And I'd just like to hear a little bit around the team, maybe that you've built up at Coinbase. And what do you think about when you're hiring people into your team? I think it's often a bit of a. At any company, the security side is always almost a bit of a. Sometimes to outsiders, feels a bit of a club or secretive. So what do you look for when you're hiring for your team? And I'm also curious about some of the initiatives that you maybe do. Things like bug bounty programs, this kind of thing. How does that all look?

Philip Martin (40:25)

Sure. So we obviously look for different things across different teams from a specific skill set point of view. But if I back that up into generically, what are the characteristics I hope to see of any person in the Security Org or Coinbase? Number one is curiosity. I think in the world of security, and especially in the world of cryptocurrency security, Coinbase, dogmatic answers just don't work. It's not this way because it's this way. It's this way for a reason. Let's figure out what that reason is and let's figure out if that reason applies to our use case. Right. I think the second thing I hope to see in anyone that works in my org is humility. No one is always right and we're not here to be always right. We're here to solve a problem together with the business. And I think it's so easy to get pulled into a us versus them mindset in security. They won't listen, they don't care about security, they don't want to do the right thing, they're lazy. Whatever. Whatever the excuse is. Right? When someone that has the humility to step back and say, I'm not landing my message correctly with this audience, what am I missing here and how can I help them better grasp the concepts that I'm trying to communicate and how can I really listen to them and what they're trying to tell me, right? So that we can get to common ground and solve a problem. Problem that's. I think there's no more important place for that than insecurity. Because without that humility and that ability to take a step back and say, like, we're on the same team trying to solve the same problem, it's like, let's not fight, let's work together. Without that quality, you end up being a Security team that is consulted or less and less and less or bypassed more and more and more because your customers are going to think, well, if I go there, I know what answer I'm going to hear, so let's avoid going there. Let's say, oh no, this isn't a major change, it's a minor change. No security view needed. This system isn't security critical. For whatever reason, they'll seek reasons to avoid you. So that humility so, so, so important. I think I want people who are are good communicators. I think that quality is inconsistently valued in technology circles, in my opinion. But I think it doesn't matter how smart you are if no one understands what you're trying to communicate to them. That's a generalization, right? A single smart person can get a lot of things done. But even more than that, a single smart person who can communicate their ideas and help other people come along with them will get exponentially more done, right? Over the long term. I want people who can speak simply, directly, clearly. I want people who can cut through the all the security whiz bang words we throw around out there, all the Gartner abbreviations, all that stuff, and using sentences that an eighth grader can understand can explain a problem. You might not explain all of it when you explain it like that. You might not explain every single nuance, but you can definitely communicate the shape of it. And then you can invite people to come along with you for the rest of that journey into the details of it. And that again, that's an inconsistently valued skill. But I think it is absolutely critical to executing effectively the mission of a security org at a technology company. There's a bunch more I could probably go on for hours on this question, but maybe boil it down to a reasonable human being who cares about the mission, who cares about other people, and who cares about doing the right thing.

Gregor Vand (44:24)

I think that's obviously a great call out and it almost is full circle here where security is humans at the end of the day. And if humans, especially within security, can't communicate with each other, then that's usually where things start to break down. I think a lot of unintentional failures of security has sort of arisen from that. I can certainly remember a couple of episodes where basically a breakdown in communication has probably led to something not going so well. And I can certainly reflect on that. So I think that's a really great call out. And just looking at the kind of, I guess, sort of external side, if you want to call it that or community effectively. Do you run bug bounty programs or how do you interface with open source or anything like that?

Philip Martin (45:08)

Yeah, so we do both. We run a large and active bug bounty program. We have for really as long as Coinbase has been around, so call it whatever that is now, 13, 14 years and have a very active community of researchers out there who are are helping us find things that slip through the cracks. We also do a bunch of open source engagement. We open source a number of our technologies and have for a long time and we do it for a bunch of reasons, but from my perspective, because a lot of the problems we solve are unique in some way. But I think what we tend, it's less. I think our problem set is less unique and no one else will ever have and more unique in we have it today and it'll be a lot of other places in 10 years. And so if we think in that direction, the stuff that we're building today will really be the vanguard of future stuff. Right. So not saying we have the right answers here, because again, I think being humble about this stuff is incredibly important. I think we have good answers, but I think open sourcing some of this stuff enables other people to build even better answers.

Gregor Vand (46:21)

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, we see this more and more security products or frameworks, but being open source makes a ton of sense. If everyone can see and analyze that code, then you're always going to get someone who can point out the problems, which is helpful for everybody. So just as we kind of come to wrap up, I tend to ask this question to most guests now, which is a pretty simple question, but get some different answers. Knowing what you know now, what would you tell yourself sort of at the start of your career? Just something that you now know, but you could have in theory then told yourself at the beginning of things.

Philip Martin (46:54)

I think I would have told myself that. Really what I just said to you, that it doesn't matter if you're the smartest person in the room if you cannot make your case to the other people in the room. So spend more time on rhetoric and philosophy and public speaking. Really hone that craft in addition to your technical craft.

Gregor Vand (47:18)

That's awesome. I really like that. We've not had that answer before, so that's a great place to leave it. Philip, thank you so much for coming on. You've imparted, I think, a lot of wisdom today. You're obviously a great communicator yourself.

Philip Martin (47:30)

Well, it's been a pleasure, Gregor.

Gregor Vand (47:32)

Thank you so much and hope we get to catch up in the future.

Philip Martin (47:34)

Me too.

Gregor Vand (47:39)

Sa.