Transcript
Greg Koukl (0:04)
SA.
Grace Koukl (0:29)
Welcome to the show, friends. I am Grace Koukl, your host and the show is Stan Teresen. And thank you for joining me being a part of what we're doing here today. And this hour is going to be open mic calls, which means I will be taking calls that you leave on a recording on our website. Usually you can also call it in, but we prefer you go to str.org to our homepage under Podcasts. You'll see live broadcast, go to that dropdown and then follow the prompts and you can leave a question and it'll get in the queue and then eventually we'll get to it and that's what I'm doing today. So I have a series of questions that and I think the first two, I might be mistaken about this, but the first two from an atheist or a non believer. Yeah, Amy's giving the nod there. So knowing that will factor into the oh, okay. She says, not sure if he's an atheist, but certainly I'm a nonbeliever, which is fine. Glad to have those kinds of questions. If a person is an atheist, and I know that that means that and I've talked about this in the past, the notion of entailment, that is certain ideas, points of view, worldviews entail other things other of necessity as a natural part of that worldview, even though it may not be expressed. And a lot of people don't understand that. And so if there is an atheist who is then complaining about something that is immoral, then my question is going to be how could something be immoral if there is no God? Because it seems that if we're just molecules in motion, materialistic understanding of the universe, and that's where most atheists are at, then there is no grounding, no place for no coherence to the notion that there are objective moral obligations that one can apply to, say, Christians who they think are acting in an immoral way or a God who is immoral. Anyway, that won't be the factor here, I guess, when I get to the question, but we'll see how this goes. So let's hear from Dan on the nature of, of prayer and God's omniscience and whether that makes any sense at all. Dan.
Dan (3:06)
Greg, my question is this comma. Christians believe that God is omniscient, meaning he believes he knows everything, past, present and future, period. If God knows what happens tomorrow, then God cannot change what happens tomorrow, period. Therefore all prayers are void and null. If I pray for someone tomorrow to be protected on Their safe journeys to where they're going and they get in a car wreck and die. God already knew that. My prayer means nothing. My prayer will not change God's mind. Because an all knowing omniscient God cannot change his mind if he knows that the car wrecker is going to happen and not change that fact. I look forward to your response.
Grace Koukl (4:05)
Thank you, Dan. Period. What's the point? I don't get the punctuation there, but nevertheless, it doesn't take anything away from the substance of the question of. Okay, there's a number of things that are going on here in this question. And by the way, this is a question that's raised by Christians as well who are concerned about the efficacy of prayer in light of God's omniscience. And also how is it that God can. Sometimes a parallel concern is raised. How can God hear all these prayers at once? Well, if God is omniscient, that means he never learns anything when you pray, which is true. There never was when he didn't know what it was that anyone was going to ask for. All right? He always knew that. So we don't have a difficulty with God trying to hear everybody at once. And we imagine some kind of super being who can listen to a lot of people at once without getting confused. That's not the right way to approach that particular challenge. The fact is omniscience solves that problem. He doesn't learn anything from your prayer. He already knew what you would pray. Okay, but the challenge here is if God knows what you will pray or at least what will take place, then this means that he doesn't. Your prayer doesn't affect anything because it's going to be what it's going to be. Since God knows everything that's going to be and that's fixed in the future, God can't change it and therefore God can't respond to your prayer. Or so the challenge goes. Okay. Now the difficulty here is understanding the difference between temporal priority and logical priority, or temporal order and logical order. Okay. And I think what I would offer here is maybe an illustration to help you see these two different notions. And these, by the way, distinguishing these notions is really important to understand why the issue that Dan raised is not a problem for God with regards to omniscience, which basically implies the fixed nature of the future in light of God's omniscience. If God is omniscient, then he knows what's going to happen in the future and therefore it will happen. And there's no way to change it. That means things are determined in virtue of his knowledge, and not even God himself can change it. That's the kind of challenge. Okay, first thing I want you to see is that knowing something doesn't cause that thing. Knowing something doesn't cause something. Knowledge of anything in the future does not make it happen. It doesn't secure its certitude. It doesn't establish its reality. It merely represents an awareness of God for the thing that will happen that has not happened before. So let me give you my illustration to help you understand why that does not entail determinism. I think this illustration come from CS Lewis, and he might have been using it for some other purpose, but it has to do with the nature of time. And I think it does a good job in explaining the distinction between a logical order and a temporal order. He suggests that you imagine two books, one sitting on top of the other, so that the first is upholding the second. So you realize there is a dependency relationship of a sort of the second book on the first upon which it rests. The first one is holding up the second one. So there is a priority to the first one causing, if you will, the second one to be upheld. But now Lewis asks, or suggests that we imagine that these books were sitting there forever. So since they were sitting there like that forever, there never was a circumstance in which one book sat there and then at some subsequent time, the other book was placed upon it, representing that kind of relationship where one upholds the other, the first one causes the second one to be upheld. All right, well, in that case, you would have no temporal order, but you would have a logical order. In other words, no temporal order, because the second book wasn't placed upon the first book at some point subsequent to the first book being there. They're both there all the time. Nevertheless, there still is this relationship of, you might call it causality or whatever, of the first one upholding the second. So there's a logically prior relationship of one holding up the other, a logical relationship even though there is no temporally prior element that's involved. Now, this is just an illustration meant to distinguish the logical relationship and the temporal relationship. I guess you could do the same thing with abstract things like math. So you could say 5, 5, 10. You can imagine that being the case timelessly. Well, there is a logical relationship between those letters. Maybe that's not the best illustration. Let's just count. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. So 2 comes before 5 in logical order. But if those numbers are all just sitting there Forever. Then it doesn't come before five temporally. All right, It's a logical order, but not a temporal order. So now let's talk about God's knowledge of future events. Remember I said a few moments ago that God's knowledge of the future events don't cause the future events and they don't fix the future events in time. The future is what it's going to be for its own reasons. And arguably future events happen because people make choices that are genuine choices. The future is not fixed in the sense that it's determined. It will be a certain way, but it will be a certain way in the future because choices are made by people that establish the future to be that way. God knows in advance what those choices are are going to be. That's omniscience. But his knowledge of the future events doesn't cause the future events. His knowledge comes before those events in time. They are temporally prior, but they are not logically prior. That is, they don't cause those things to take place. God's knowledge of the future, of what the future is going to be, is based on other events in the future that result in those events happening. For example, people making choices. So God knows that tomorrow I'll be getting on an airplane to go to the East Coast. Now, that's my plan. Now, if that eventuates, if that will eventuate, let's just stipulate it will. Then God knows that's going to happen. But why do he know what's going to happen? What is the logically prior factor that grounds his knowledge? Well, the logically prior factor, not temporally prior, but logically prior factor, is me choosing to get on a plane and fly to the East Coast. Because I'm going to choose to do that. God knows I am going to choose that. Now, what if I decided not to go at the last minute, I changed my mind. Do I have the freedom to do that? Sure. But God would have known that I would have changed my mind. So even though God's knowledge is temporally prior to the events that take place in the future, that knowledge doesn't cause those things to take place. It is my own free choices that is logically prior to God's knowledge. It is because in the future I make choices that God knows what's going to take place. I guess you could think of it like, let's just say if I had a videotape of your behavior during the day, today and tomorrow. I looked at the videotape to see the events that you chose to do. Okay, now, once it's in videotape, you realize it's fixed forever. You already did that and you already chose to do those things. And it's all captured on the film. So nothing in the film is going to change because it's fixed. It's immutable because it's already done. But the picture I'm so me watching it doesn't change anything. But what if I were able to watch it before you actually videotaped it? I would still know the same sequence of events that you would choose to do on your own. Now, if you had chosen to do differently, the video would be different and I would know something different. But my prior knowledge is dependent on the future actions, is logically prior to the future actions that you take. So it's the actions that are the thing that cause my knowledge or that are the grounding of my knowledge, the free actions of the future. Even though I know those actions in advance, my knowledge doesn't cause anything to happen. So there with regards to one aspect of this. If God knows what will happen tomorrow, then God cannot change tomorrow. Okay, no, God can change tomorrow, but he will know what he is going to do. So in this particular case, instead of me making free actions in the future that God knows in advance, and the free actions ground the knowledge God has, now, we are talking about God doing actions in the future that God knows He is going to do. He's going to freely choose to do those actions, but he knows in advance. And if he wanted something different to happen, he would do something different in the future freely, but he still would know in the past what those things are going to be. And so that means that God can be aware in the future of prayers that we would pray, and also be aware immutably of what he will choose to do in the future in response to our prayers. So the liability here, Dion, is that you are confusing logical priority or a logical antecedent with temporal priority or temporal antecedent. And one of the key foundational things is knowing that something is going to happen of a certitude, not of necessity, because a whole range of things could happen, but only one set of things are going to happen. And because God is omniscient, he's going to certainly know that. But it could have been different. And if it would have been different, then he would have known the thing that was different. And he can also be the one who makes choices in the future that he immutably knows in the moment. It doesn't take away freedom of human beings making choices. And it doesn't take away the freedom of God acting in response to prayers that he always knew were going to be prayed, and he always knew how he was going to act in response to the prayer. So the future prayers are logically prior to God's actions, but they are not temporally prior to God's actions. So I hope that makes sense. I think it is a little bit of an esoteric notion. I did my best to try to explain it, but it is a kind of mistake in thinking about the nature of causality and the nature of omniscience that lots of people make, even Christians make. And I've even heard one Christian philosopher raise the issue. This is why he says God doesn't know the future because that would mean that it's. It's fixed, which I think is true. But that doesn't mean it's deterministically fixed. It just is going to be the case because of the free choices that humans or God makes regarding the future. All right, now, Dan had another question and might as well take this one. And this one's a little bit more difficult. I think the first question Dan asked is is not difficult to answer. I think it's difficult to understand the answer. And that's why I'm laboring to try to make this as clear as possible. But the second question is a little more difficult. So let's hear what Dan has to say about the second issue.
