Podcast
Stanford Legal
Hosted by Stanford Law School · EN
Law touches most aspects of life. Here to help make sense of it is the Stanford Legal podcast, where we look at the cases, questions, conflicts, and legal stories that
affect us all every day.
Pam Karlan studies and teaches a range of constitutional law-related courses with a special focus on what is known as the “law of democracy,”—the law that regulates voting, elections, and the political process. She served as a commissioner on the California Fair Political Practices Commission, an assistant counsel and cooperating attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and (twice) as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She also co-directs the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, which represents real clients before the highest court in the country, working on important cases including representing Edith Windsor in the landmark case striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act and Donald Zarda in a case where the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects LGBT individuals against discrimination in employment. She has argued before the Court ten times.
And Rich Ford’s teaching and writing look at the relationship between law and equality, cities and urban development, popular culture and everyday life. He teaches local government law, employment discrimination, and the often-misunderstood critical race theory. He studied with and advised governments around the world on questions of equality law, lectured at places like the Sorbonne in Paris on the relationship of law and popular culture, served as a commissioner for the San Francisco Housing Commission, and worked with cities on how to manage neighborhood change and volatile real estate markets. He writes about law and popular culture for lawyers, academics, and popular audiences. His latest book is Dress Codes: How the Laws of Fashion Made History, a legal history of the rules and laws that influence what we wear.
Law matters. We hope you’ll listen to new episodes that will drop on Thursdays every two weeks.
To learn more, go to https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-legal-podcast/.
40episodes
Episodes
Newest firstAll episodes
Countering Contemporary Criticism of America's Founding Principles
Yesterday01:04:01Tap to summarizeThe real crisis isn’t the Declaration—it’s what we’ve stopped teaching. Peter Berkowitz, Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, contends that universities have failed at liberal education—the cultivation of citizens prepared to exercise freedom and responsibility. He attributes the breakdown to politicized classrooms, overreliance on narrow “scientistic” approaches in the social sciences, and a professional culture that trains future scholars instead of educating future citizens—leaving graduates with little serious exposure to the Declaration, the Constitution, and the moral logic of self-government. Stephen Haber, Stanford Professor of Political Science, History, and Economics, presses the discussion toward causes and incentives, setting up a debate about who is responsible for the drift and what reforms could realistically restore civic learning. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters:[00:00:26 – 00:04:11] Chapter 1: Setting the stakes—The Declaration at 250 and today’s critiques Michael McConnell frames the episode around renewed skepticism of the Declaration’s natural-rights claims—from progressive critiques focused on slavery and domination to post-liberal arguments against “abstract” rights.[00:04:11 – 00:06:54] Chapter 2: Berkowitz’s opening—What the Declaration claims and why critics converge Peter Berkowitz restates the Declaration’s core logic (equality, unalienable rights, consent, and the right to alter/abolish destructive government) and argues that left/right critiques increasingly overlap in their indictment of universal rights.[00:06:54 – 00:17:47] Chapter 3: Universities and the erosion of liberal education Berkowitz contends civic understanding is collapsing because colleges no longer ensure a shared, rigorous education in founding principles, constitutional traditions, and the broader intellectual inheritance needed for citizenship.[00:17:47 – 00:31:00] Chapter 4: From “critical” to “generous” thinking—Mapping the modern critiques Berkowitz argues that criticism without charitable interpretation becomes a “rage to criticize,” then traces postmodern progressive and post-liberal arguments (including Deneen and Vermeule) that reject the Declaration’s rights framework and flirt with radical alternatives.[00:31:00 – 01:04:12] Chapter 5: Human rights, diplomacy, and reform—The Commission and a debate about university governance Berkowitz ties the Declaration to U.S. foreign policy via the UDHR and the Commission on Unalienable Rights, including its aims and controversies; Stephen Haber responds that boards, presidents, and provosts shape campus ideology and that governance-level changes could enable a revival of civic education. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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The Declaration In the Age of General Purpose AI
1w ago01:07:13Tap to summarize"The Declaration meets the machine age" In this episode of The Declaration at 250, Michael McConnell frames a question the Founders never confronted: if the Declaration grounds rights in human nature, what happens when machines can generate persuasive, human-like language at scale? Constitutional scholar Alexander Tsesis argues that the Declaration’s conception of rights is inherently human-centered—rooted in consciousness, moral agency, intentionality, and the capacity to participate in a constitutional republic—so AI systems are not and should not become First Amendment rights-holders. He warns that treating large language models as protected “speakers” would be a major break from the Declaration’s principles and could make ordinary democratic regulation—transparency requirements, labeling of synthetic content, safety rules, data practices, and restrictions on deceptive election deepfakes—far harder by forcing courts into strict scrutiny review. Stanford historian Anne Twitty broadens the lens by situating abolitionists’ use of the Declaration within wider 19th-century conflicts over speech and constitutional meaning, reminding listeners that rival traditions—including censorship and suppression—also shaped American practice. She also presses a key tension in Tsesis’s framework: abolitionists championed not only the right to speak, but the public’s right to hear, circulate, and access contested ideas (as seen in the abolitionist postal campaign and opposition to the congressional gag rule). That listener-centered strand, she suggests, could potentially be invoked by scholars arguing for some constitutional shelter for AI-generated communications—an argument Tsesis acknowledges but ultimately resists by emphasizing that the First Amendment’s core purpose is protecting human expression and self-government, not machine output. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters:[00:00:26] Chapter 1- Framing Question: Do constitutional rights grounded in “human nature” apply to AI? Host Michael McConnell introduces the episode’s core dilemma: the Declaration’s natural-rights logic underwrites later constitutional protections like free speech—so where does that leave generative AI? [00:01:18] Chapter 2 - Thesis: Why Tsesis says AI can’t be a First Amendment rights-holder Alexander Tsesis argues the Declaration and Constitution are human-centered: AI lacks consciousness, moral agency, and political personhood, so extending rights to LLMs would depart from founding principles and hinder regulation. [00:10:08] Chapter 3 - Regulatory Stakes: What happens if courts treat LLM outputs as protected “speech”? Tsesis warns that First Amendment coverage for AI could trigger strict scrutiny and undermine laws on transparency, labeling, safety, data practices, and election deepfakes—citing recent doctrine and cases like Reed v. Town of Gilbert. [00:52:35] Chapter 4 - Historical Challenge: Do abolitionists’ “right to hear” arguments support listener-centric AI rights? Historian Anne Twitty complicates the record: abolitionists elevated the Declaration, but censorship traditions were strong; she highlights abolitionist campaigns (postal campaign, gag rule) to argue listener rights might bolster pro-AI speech theories. [01:04:17] Chapter 5 - Tsesis Response: Listener rights matter—but is the First Amendment still speaker-centered? Tsesis agrees the right to receive information is important, yet maintains free speech is fundamentally about protecting human intention and self-expression, not conferring constitutional status on machine outputs. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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The Iran War and the Limits of Presidential Power
2w ago00:28:53Tap to summarizeStanford’s Allen Weiner examines how the U.S. war with Iran raises questions about the president’s power to wage war and negotiate peace. --- The American war with Iran began with ambitious goals, including preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and potentially bringing about regime change. But the conflict may well be leading to a very different outcome, according to Stanford Law School's Allen Weiner, a scholar of international and human rights law and former State Department lawyer. Just prior to the recent collapse of the tenuous cease fire, Weiner joined podcast host Professor Pam Karlan to discuss how the conflict is arguably strengthening Iran’s most repressive factions while putting economic and diplomatic pressure on the United States. Weiner traces how the conflict grew out of the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, asks whether the new agreement with Iran amounts to a weaker version of that accord, and considers how ceasefires and shifting legal rationales have allowed the administration to sidestep Congress and keep the War Powers clock from running out. Allen Weiner >>> Stanford Law School Page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters 00:00:00 Introduction 00:02:09 Back to the JCPOA—The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal 00:04:23 From "worst deal ever" to a weaker one 00:04:51 Two rounds of strikes 00:07:11 Regime change that wasn't 00:08:40 The Strait of Hormuz and the global economy 00:09:49 Emboldened by Venezuela 00:11:33 Israel in, NATO out 00:12:27 The new MOU 00:14:31 Israel left off the page 00:17:38 Free transit, for now 00:19:06 Treaty or political commitment? 00:21:36 The War Powers loophole 00:24:26 Can Congress actually enforce the War Powers Act? 00:28:12 Conclusion Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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Is the Declaration Our Law?
2w ago01:04:57Tap to summarize“Two competing originalist instincts” In this episode of The Declaration at 250, Michael McConnell introduces Randy Barnett, the Patrick Hotung Professor of Constitutional Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and Faculty Director of the Georgetown Center for the Constitution alongside Eugene Volokh, the Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford), and the Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus (and Distinguished Research Professor) at UCLA School of Law. Barnett and Volokh share respect for the Declaration’s importance but diverge on what that importance does in law. Barnett sees the Declaration as the “ground and foundation of future government,” supplying binding premises about “just powers” and limiting even broad state “police power” claims that risk subverting rights. Volokh counters that the Declaration resembles a political platform and persuasive rhetoric—valuable for context and values, but too general and historically contingent to function as enforceable law without tethering to more specific legal texts. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters [00:00:26] Chapter 1: Framing Question: Is the Declaration “law” if courts can’t directly enforce it? Host Michael McConnell opens by contrasting Justice Barrett and Justice Scalia’s view—Declaration as ideals, not law—with Randy Barnett’s claim that the Declaration functions as foundational law shaping constitutional meaning. [00:01:54] Chapter 2: Setting the Stage: Why Barnett and Volokh, and why this debate now? McConnell introduces Barnett and Volokh, highlighting their originalist and civil-libertarian influence and teeing up the central question: “Is the Declaration our law?” [00:06:11] Chapter 3: Barnett’s Case-in-Chief: How did Salmon P. Chase use the Declaration as law in anti-slavery litigation? Barnett argues the Declaration supplied a liberty baseline in 19th-century practice—especially in the Matilda and Van Zandt cases—supporting “clear statement” rules and strict construction against liberty-restricting interpretations. [00:37:38] Chapter 4: Volokh’s Challenge: What is the Declaration—and what isn’t it? Volokh contends the Declaration is best understood as a political platform/announcement with legal significance as an independence claim, but not as governing law; it can guide interpretation mainly when reinforced by constitutional provisions like the Ninth Amendment. [00:56:04] Chapter 5: Barnett’s Rebuttal: Can the Declaration shape doctrine without giving judges a blank check? Barnett responds that “law” is broader than judicially enforceable rules, arguing the Declaration legitimately informs burdens of justification and doctrines (due process meaning, presumptions of liberty vs. constitutionality) while remaining constrained by legal method and natural-rights theory. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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State Constitutions and the Declaration of Independence
3w ago01:04:25Tap to summarizeThis episode highlights an often-missed story: the Declaration of Independence didn’t just shape the U.S. Constitution—it directly shaped state constitutions, many of which echo its natural-rights language more explicitly than the federal charter. Arizona Supreme Court Justice Clint Bolick argues that reading state constitutional provisions through the Declaration can strengthen enforceable limits on government power. The conversation reframes the Declaration from anniversary rhetoric into a practical interpretive tool in living state constitutional law. Bolick traces a two-way influence between the Declaration and early state charters, pointing to founding-era texts like Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights as a roadmap for Jefferson’s phrasing—and noting that later state constitutions continued to incorporate Declaration principles such as equality, popular sovereignty, and inalienable rights. He then connects those ideas to modern doctrine, arguing that state courts can treat natural-rights provisions as meaningful constraints (or interpretive “prisms”) rather than mere preambles, with recent state supreme court decisions illustrating how the Declaration’s ideals can translate into concrete protections today. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: [00:00:26] Chapter 1 — McConnell’s framing: the “hidden” constitutional story in state charters The host introduces how state constitutions borrow explicitly from the Declaration and why that matters for modern rights protection. [00:05:59] Chapter 2 — Bolick’s thesis: an “enduring symbiosis” between the Declaration and state constitutions Bolick argues the Declaration’s influence on state constitutional text and interpretation is deeper and more direct than its influence on the U.S. Constitution. [00:10:46] Chapter 3 — Origins and transmission: Virginia’s 1776 rights language and state constitution “laboratories” Bolick explains the two-way borrowing between early state constitutions and the Declaration, including George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights. [00:27:57] Chapter 4 — From principles to doctrine: natural-rights clauses as enforceable limits (with cases) Bolick lays out how courts have used natural-rights provisions as substantive protections or interpretive tools, citing key state cases and modern disputes. [00:46:34] Chapter 5 — Ford’s recorded response + Bolick rebuttal: state power, natural rights, and the limits of the frame Ford praises state constitutionalism but complicates the natural-rights narrative; Bolick responds, emphasizing both self-government and enforceable individual rights. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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The Structural Declaration of Independence
4w ago00:50:19Tap to summarizeThis episode reframes the Declaration of Independence as more than soaring ideals about equality and natural rights. Former California Supreme Court Justice Mariano-Florentino “Tino” Cuéllar argues the text contains an underappreciated architecture of government: accountability to citizens, managing political conflict across regions, and establishing legitimate authority both domestically and in the international order. The result is a Declaration that reads like a nation-building document designed to make a new state workable after revolution. Responding to Cuéllar, Larry Kramer—former Stanford Law dean, a leading scholar of democratic constitutionalism, and now president of the London School of Economics—adds a grounding historical frame: in 1776, the Declaration was shaped as much by law as by philosophy. Kramer argues the grievances were understood as claims that Britain had violated the colonies’ constitutional rights under the British customary constitution, which helps explain why the Declaration’s “structural” ideas are often implicit rather than spelled out as a blueprint. Together, Cuéllar and Kramer show how the Declaration operates in two registers: a practical indictment of governmental failure and a foundational text later generations repeatedly reinterpret to justify (or resist) evolving structures of American governance. Their exchange highlights a central tension that persists—between universal promises and the administrative choices that determine how, and for whom, those promises are implemented. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: [00:00:26] Chapter 1 — Framing question: Is the Declaration also a “blueprint for government”? Host Michael McConnell sets up the episode’s core premise and introduces guests Mariano-Florentino “Tino” Cuéllar and Larry Kramer to explore the Declaration’s structural dimensions. [00:05:21] Chapter 2 — Cuéllar’s thesis: “Text vs. territory” and the Declaration as state-building Cuéllar argues the Declaration is not just a creed; it catalogs governance failures under George III and implies the need for a sovereign that can function at home and abroad. [00:06:04] Chapter 3 — The Freedom Train as a case study in ideals meeting administration (1947–48) Using the racially integrated Freedom Train—and its refusal to stop in segregated cities—Cuéllar spotlights the friction between universal principles and on-the-ground governance. [00:13:07] Chapter 4 — 1890–1950: expansion of the administrative state and contested equality Cuéllar walks through key moments (Du Bois/Niagara Movement, Wilson at Independence Hall, Becker vs. Coolidge, FDR’s “Second Bill of Rights,” Ho Chi Minh quoting Jefferson) to show how the Declaration structures recurring fights over equality, borders, and state capacity. [00:28:51] Chapter 5 — Kramer’s response: the Declaration’s legal-constitutional origins and how texts evolve Kramer argues the Declaration was fundamentally a legal brief grounded in the British customary constitution; its grievances alleged constitutional violations, and later generations repurpose founding texts to frame new disputes. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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Birthright Citizenship and the Future of the Fourteenth Amendment
Jul 600:33:17Tap to summarizeStanford’s Fred Smith examines the Supreme Court’s birthright citizenship decision, its historical roots in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the questions the Court leaves unresolved. --- The Fourteenth Amendment opens with a simple constitutional promise: that anyone born in the United States is a citizen. In a closely divided Supreme Court decision, that understanding of birthright citizenship is once again tested through competing readings of text, history, and precedent. In this episode of Stanford Legal, Professor Fred Smith, a leading scholar of the federal courts, joins Pam Karlan to examine the Court’s ruling in Trump v. Barbara and the history behind the Citizenship Clause. The discussion traces the Clause to Dred Scott v. Sandford, which denied citizenship to Black Americans, and to the Reconstruction-era effort to overturn it, as well as United States v. Wong Kim Ark, long understood to affirm birthright citizenship for those born on U.S. soil. The discussion highlights deeper disagreements over how that history should shape constitutional meaning today. Smith and Karlan explore tensions between originalist approaches, reliance on precedent, and questions about congressional authority over citizenship. At stake is not only the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the broader question of who the Constitution recognizes as part of the American political community—and who gets to decide. Links: Fred Smith >>> Stanford Law School Page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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Inside the Supreme Court’s Key 2026 Decisions
Jul 200:36:07Tap to summarizeJeff Fisher discusses a term marked by major rulings across executive power, voting, and civil rights, and what they signal about the Court’s trajectory. --- The Supreme Court has wrapped up a consequential term, issuing decisions that could shape executive power, constitutional rights, and the balance between the branches of government for years to come. Rulings on birthright citizenship, independent federal agencies, voting rights, transgender athletes, and Fourth Amendment digital privacy all landed within weeks of one another, offering a rare, wide-angle view of where the Court is headed. In this episode, Professor Jeff Fisher joins Pam Karlan to unpack the term's biggest rulings. Fisher and Karlan co-direct the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, and are among the nation's leading experts on Supreme Court litigation and constitutional law, regularly briefing and arguing cases before the Court, giving them a close vantage point on its work. The discussion traces how the Court is navigating open clashes with President Trump even as it advances long-standing goals of the conservative legal movement, and examines the Court's growing use of history and tradition as a tool of constitutional interpretation. Fisher and Karlan also discuss disagreements among the justices and consider how recent decisions may be emboldening the executive branch. Links: Jeff Fisher >>> Stanford Profile Opinions of the Court 2025 >>> US Supreme Court Page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:57 How to understand this Supreme Court term 00:03:12 A divided Court with rising tensions 00:04:35 Digital privacy and the Fourth Amendment 00:07:35 The Court and the democratic process 00:09:07 Race-conscious law and disparate impact 00:11:09 Election rules, fraud claims, and voting rights 00:14:56 Birthright citizenship and the limits of originalism 00:16:36 History, tradition, and judicial reasoning 00:18:39 Presidential power and independent agencies 00:23:08 The future of the unitary executive theory 00:25:31 Trump, the shadow docket, and executive authority 00:26:08 Immigration, presidential rhetoric, and Court deference 00:28:17 Presidential facts, tweets, and legal reality 00:30:48 Transgender rights and the law of school sports 00:32:23 Why context matters in Supreme Court decisions 00:35:47 Conclusion Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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The Declaration of Independence as Obligation
Jun 3000:43:44Tap to summarizeThis episode of The Declaration at 250 discussion spotlights a striking—and often overlooked—line in the Declaration of Independence: when despotism becomes systematic, “it is their right, it is their duty” to throw off such government. Martha Minow probes why the text escalates from permission to obligation, arguing that the “duty” language radically reframes political resistance as a moral demand, not merely a justified option. The episode asks what that duty requires, who must act, and what it means for citizens facing injustice today. Minow traces possible roots of this obligation in natural law and the “law of nations,” social contract ideas, and religious traditions that shaped the founders’ moral vocabulary—where obedience to rulers was often understood as conditional on legitimacy and higher law. She also raises the thorny question of who counted as “the people” at the founding (noting exclusions such as enslaved people and many Native persons), and how later movements—from abolition to global self-determination struggles—have invoked the Declaration’s language to justify resistance. Jenny Martinez extends the inquiry by emphasizing the Declaration’s closing mutual pledge—“our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor”—as a concrete act that binds a community and helps explain how the document generates enduring civic obligations, not only to oppose tyranny but to carry forward the promise of equality across generations. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: [00:00:26] Chapter 1 — The Declaration’s “duty” to resist tyranny (Series setup) Michael McConnell frames the episode around the Declaration’s claim of a duty—not just a right—to throw off despotism. [00:03:31] Chapter 2 — Minow’s close read: why “duty” changes everything Martha Minow zeroes in on the fourth sentence and explains why duty is not synonymous with right. [00:05:43] Chapter 3 — Where the duty might come from: Locke, social contract, religion Minow traces intellectual and religious sources, including Locke and Samuel Langdon’s 1775 sermon after Lexington and Concord. [00:08:56] Chapter 4 — Who is “the people,” and who is duty owed to? Minow questions who was included/excluded, then connects duty to universal law, human rights, and global self-determination movements. [00:26:41] Chapter 5 — Martinez: duties, limits on revolution, and the “mutual pledge” Jenny Martinez contrasts civic duty traditions and argues the Declaration’s lasting obligation is the mutual pledge to uphold its promises over time. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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The Case for a Public Share in AI
Jun 2500:25:54Tap to summarizeJeremy Bearer-Friend and Sarah Polcz discuss their proposal to require leading AI firms to pay taxes in equity, reshaping how the gains from AI are distributed --- Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping the economy, but two Stanford Law alumni argue that existing tax frameworks are failing to capture—or fairly distribute—the value it generates. Jeremy Bearer-Friend, JD '14, a professor at George Washington University Law School, and Sarah Polcz, JSM '12, JSD '20, a professor at UC Davis School of Law, join co-host Professor Richard Thompson Ford to discuss a proposal that would require leading AI companies to pay a portion of their taxes in equity rather than cash, with those shares placed into a public trust, and their work with U.S. Senate members to make this happen. The conversation explores a central question: If AI was built on vast amounts of human-generated text, images, and creative work, who is entitled to share in the wealth it produces? Bearer-Friend and Polcz connect their proposal to broader concerns about wealth concentration and whether the gains from AI will flow to a narrow class of tech executives and investors—or to the public at large. The episode also examines how an equity-based tax could work in practice, including questions of governance, political insulation, and the mechanics of a sovereign wealth fund, and what it would mean to give the public a direct stake in the companies shaping the future of artificial intelligence. Links: Jeremy Bearer-Friend >>> GW Law School page Sarah Polcz >>> UC Davis School of Law page “Sharing the Algorithm: The Tax Solution to Generative AI” >>> Columbia Journal of Tax Law page American AI Wealth Fund Bill >>> PDF “Everyone Wants to Tax A.I. The Big Disagreement: How?” >>> NY Times DealBook page “Don’t laugh off Bernie Sanders’ communist AI-heist attempt — young voters are falling for it” >>> New York Post page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X (00:00:00) A Tax Paid in Stock (00:02:14) IP, Inequality, and the AI Boom (00:05:56) Why the Public Deserves an Equity Stake (00:11:58) How the Tax Would Actually Work—Stock, Rates, and Governance (00:16:59) Sanders, Trump, and a Race to Co-opt the Idea (00:21:06) Objections, Safeguards, and the Road Ahead Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.
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