Boeing's Nosedive: The 737-MAX

Summary

Stuff You Should Know – Boeing's Nosedive: The 737-MAX

Podcast: Stuff You Should Know
Hosts: Josh Clark & Chuck Bryant
Date: May 5, 2026
Episode Theme:
A sobering look into the design failures, corporate decisions, and regulatory breakdowns that led to the Boeing 737-MAX disasters. Josh and Chuck chronicle how a once legendary engineering company lost its way, the plane crashes that shook the world, and why the repercussions are still being felt in passenger aviation.

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Main Theme & Purpose

This episode explores how Boeing, formerly synonymous with engineering excellence, became mired in scandal by prioritizing profits over safety during the development of the 737-MAX. Josh and Chuck explain how corporate culture shifts, design compromises, and regulatory oversights resulted in two major aviation disasters and ongoing issues. The hosts dive deeply into Boeing’s transformation, the technical flaws at the heart of the MAX’s failures, and the broader implications for air safety worldwide.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Boeing’s Cultural Shift and Corporate Priorities

• Boeing’s engineering legacy: Celebrated for innovation and safety for decades.
  • “They put engineering standards before profit and all of that just got wiped out in the course of a few years from about 2018-19.” (Chuck, 04:14)
• Acquisition of McDonnell Douglas (1997):
  • Marked the beginning of a focus on cost-cutting and shareholder value.
  • McDonnell Douglas' model: “Just kind of revamp it and update it... so much worse than designing a new plane from scratch. It just costs a lot less and it takes a lot less time.” (Chuck, 07:17)
• Relocation of Headquarters:
  • Moving HQ from Seattle to Chicago (for minor tax breaks) eroded collaboration between decision-makers and engineers.
  • “You had a company that had everything under one roof in Seattle and now... Seattle-based engineers working there, and you had the C suite in Chicago. And that's anytime that happens... it seemed like a great idea to have everything there in Seattle.” (Josh, 08:12)
• Leadership and Changing Values:
  • New CEOs (Philip Condit, Harry Stonecipher, Jim McNerney, Dennis Muilenburg) accelerated the “financialization” of Boeing.
  • CEO Harry Stonecipher: “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent. So that it is run like a business rather than a great engineering firm.” (Josh, 10:08)
• Engineering deprioritized:
  • Countdowns, speed demands, and information silos led to a chilling effect on safety reporting.

2. The 737-MAX: Rushed Design & Dangerous Compromises

• 737-MAX was a quick-fix answer to the Airbus A320neo:
  • To avoid “retraining pilots” (which would cost airlines money), Boeing made major modifications to an aging airframe and avoided a clean-sheet design (15:49).
• Bigger Engines, New Problems:
  • “They basically took the same plane and just put giant engines that the plane was never designed for. And it just knocked it out of balance... And you would say, why didn't they just move the wings? There's a good reason... the more changes you make, the more likely pilots... are going to need updated training.” (Chuck, 16:24)
  • Avoided changes led to “whack a mole” engineering — patch this, create a new problem elsewhere.

3. MCAS: The Software That Cost Lives

• MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System):
  • A completely new piece of software designed to correct the plane’s nose angle automatically due to design imbalances.
  • “It literally takes over controls of the plane... instead of saying let's redesign this or at least train pilots to rectify this on their own.” (Josh, 17:28)
• Lack of Redundancy & Secrecy:
  • Only one of two sensors was required to trigger MCAS. No redundancy.
  • “Only one of those sensors saying the plane's angle was wrong could trigger the MCAS. Like, there was no redundancy.” (Chuck, 19:36)
  • MCAS not mentioned in pilot manuals or official documentation due to lobbying—a fact hidden from airlines and pilots.
    • “They didn’t tell anyone about it... MCAS took over the controls from the pilot. Imagine that happening and you having no idea what's going on because you don't know the MCAS exists.” (Chuck, 21:53)
• FAA Complicity:
  • Boeing lobbied the FAA to not require pilot retraining or MCAS inclusion in manuals.
  • The FAA relied heavily on Boeing for certification.

4. Regulatory Failure and Conflict of Interest

• FAA Mandate Issues:
  • FAA is supposed to “promote aviation industry interests” and “ensure public safety”—often conflicting goals. (Josh, 24:18)
• Organizational Designation Authorization (ODA):
  • Boeing, like other manufacturers, was allowed to effectively oversee its own safety certifications.
  • “The FAA can say... you planemaker certify your own plane and tell us if we should certify it in turn.” (Chuck, 25:57)
• Regulatory Capture/Revolving Door:
  • FAA and Boeing share cozy ties; regulators often hired by the companies they oversee.
  • “There should be... a rule or a law that says, you know, choose your path. You can't go work for the FAA for 10 years and then go work for Boeing right after that with some plum job... it's just such an obvious conflict.” (Josh, 28:37)

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The Crashes: What Happened and Aftermath

5. The Disasters

Lion Air 610 (Indonesia, Oct 29, 2018)

• 13 minutes after takeoff: Crew reported difficulty controlling the plane.
• Crash into the Java Sea: All 189 onboard killed.
• Boeing’s reaction: “Pilot error”—not design flaw.

Ethiopian Airlines 302 (March 10, 2019)

• Similar scenario: MCAS repeatedly forced nose down, crew unable to override.
• Crash 6 minutes after takeoff: All 157 onboard killed.
• Pilots followed new Boeing "procedure," but it failed due to software issues.
  • “Even with this workaround that Boeing came up with, it still wasn't fixing the problem.” (Chuck, 35:41)

Worldwide Grounding

• All 737-MAXs grounded for 20 months—an unprecedented move, given “brand new planes dropped out of the sky.” (Chuck, 36:29)
• Probability calculation completely wrong:
  • “They said... risk of catastrophic failure is, quote, almost inconceivable... In just 2,130 flight hours, there were two catastrophic events!” (Josh & Chuck, 36:47)

6. Accountability?

• Congressional hearings: Boeing leaders blamed pilots; faced public outrage. (37:02)
  • “It's just so scummy... to blame people who were blameless in it.” (Chuck, 37:44)
• Fines and Penalties:
  • FAA fined Boeing $17 million (unrelated to crashes).
  • DOJ action: $2.5 billion to US government, $8.3 billion to airlines, $100 million to victims’ families (~$290,000/family).
    • “Boeing is dedicating $100 million to victims' families... like they weren't forced to. It also shows that all of these outlets were basically just copying the Boeing press release.” (Josh, 41:05)
• Criminal Charges:
  • Only one person (Mark Forkner, chief test pilot who misled about MCAS) indicted—found not guilty.

7. Aftermath and Continuing Issues

• Second wave of crises:

  • Alaska Airlines Blowout (2024): Door plug blew out at 16,000ft at Spirit Aerosystems’ factory due to missing bolts and careless assembly.
    • “They would jump up and down on airplane parts and like kick it into place to make the drill holes line up the way that they should... Boeing of yesteryear would have immediately sent [that] part back...” (Chuck, 44:26)

• Additional Mechanical Problems:

  • Loose bolts in rudder, faulty air pressure sensor.

• FAA's response:

  • Brief request to reinstate Boeing self-certification—retracted after incident.

• Whistleblowers:

  • 32 requested protection.
  • 2 high-profile deaths: 1 suicide (explicitly blamed Boeing in note).

• NTSB steps in:

  • Bypassing FAA, issuing public safety notices directly.

• Even Boeing's Starliner spacecraft failures (2024):

  • Astronauts stuck at ISS, SpaceX had to retrieve them.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “We're flying the friendly skies with our copilot, Jerry, and our other copilot, God.”
  (Chuck, 01:45)

• “There was a CEO that kind of kicked it all off. His name was Philip Condit... Rather than making their name as also a great engineering firm with innovation and a mind to safety, McDonnell Douglas is like, no, we’re just going to cut costs.”
  (Chuck, 06:48)

• “We need to get this plane out. We need to get it out fast. We need to cut every corner we possibly can to save time and money. Go.”
  (Chuck, 11:12)

• MCAS design secrecy:

  • “They didn’t tell anybody about the MCAS... Imagine [your plane] taking over and you have no idea what's going on because you don't know [it] exists.”
    (Chuck, 21:53)

• Industry-Regulator Conflict:

  • “It stuck out to me, Chuck, that the safety of the flying public isn't always in the interests of the aviation industry. It should 100% of the time be in the interests of the aviation industry. That's just my take. Hot take.”
    (Josh, 25:13)

• “There was no redundancy. So if one of those sensors was faulty and the other was fine, it didn’t matter.”
  (Chuck, 19:36)

• Blame-shifting:

  • “It's just so scummy, you know, to be that responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people...and then just to blame pilots who were blameless in it.”
    (Chuck, 37:44)

• “Every step of the way with the 737 Max, all of it followed that like psychopathic corporate logic where the shareholders’ return on investment is the most important thing. It is more important than morality, safety, practicality, sensibility, anything.”
  (Chuck, 49:18)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Boeing’s cultural shift & McDonnell Douglas merger: 06:48–10:08
• Rushed design of the 737-MAX: 15:49–18:30
• Introduction & implications of MCAS: 17:28–22:01
• FAA’s failure and regulatory capture: 24:18–29:30
• First MAX crash (Lion Air): 33:42–34:22
• Second MAX crash (Ethiopian Air): 35:41–36:48
• World-wide grounding & miscalculated risk: 36:29–37:02
• Blame shifting, Congressional hearings & fines: 37:02–41:05
• Alaska Airlines plug door failure & additional defects: 42:19–45:08
• Whistleblowers and tragic fallout: 46:11–47:27
• Wider Boeing troubles (Starliner): 48:34–49:18
• Financial impact: 49:18–50:23
• Are MAX planes still flying? 50:34–51:39
• Concluding thoughts on safety, software, and airline transparency: 51:39–52:28

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Final Thoughts & Reflections

Josh and Chuck urge listeners to consider how corporate priorities and weak regulation can endanger lives, even in industries where stakes are highest. The Boeing 737-MAX story stands as a warning: prioritizing profit over people can be catastrophic for both.

“There’s a lesson in there. No one will heed it, of course, but there is a lesson.”
(Josh, 50:23)

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Note

The entire episode remains in the hosts' signature style: wry, conversational, and deeply researched. They maintain a tone of incredulity and frustration at Boeing’s decisions, and their outrage is palpable but balanced with technical explanations anyone can follow.

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For listeners: This summary captures all the technical, regulatory, and human angles behind the Boeing 737-MAX crisis as explained by Josh and Chuck. If you travel by air, you’ll better understand what went wrong—and why it’s not just “pilot error.”

Transcript

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[Josh Clark]

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[Podcast Announcer]

Welcome to Stuff youf Should Know, a production of iHeartradio.

[Chuck Bryant]

Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh and there's Chuck. And we are just flying the friendly skies with our co pilot, Jerry, and our other co pilot, God. And this is stuff you should know.

[Josh Clark]

I thought it was dog.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. Yeah.

[Josh Clark]

Okay, well, before we get going, there is kind of an exciting thing we need to mention. And we're going to mention this. You know, you're probably getting sick of us talking about it, but stuff you should know is going on a cruise.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, a sea cruise.

[Josh Clark]

And not just like, so long, suckers, we're going on vacation.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right?

[Josh Clark]

It's like a stuff cruise with other, like, stuff they don't want you to know is going to be there. We're doing our live podcast on board and it's like, hey, Stuff, you should know listeners. Come. Come cruise with us.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, come cruise with us. I think that's the message that we're sending out right now. It's on Virgin Voyages, which is pretty swank. And it's October 2nd to the 7th. It's five day cruise from New York City to Bermuda and back. Even they bring you back to your car.

[Josh Clark]

I think that's kind of key. Yeah, it's an adults only thing and I think the name of it is the Big Apple to Bermuda Cruise. And yeah, it's gonna be a lot of fun. So, you know, like I said, we're doing our live podcast and we're gonna be doing some other fun events that they haven't told us about yet. The feeling it'll be like trivia and stuff like that. But Jerry is going and that's reason enough to sign up, I think.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, you can verify in person that Jerry.

[Josh Clark]

That's right. Might be able to rub some suntan lotion on on her back too.

[Chuck Bryant]

So where do people go to sign up for this sea cruise?

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, you know what I would do? I think we're going to have some like super specific information coming. But just get on your search engine and check out stuff at Sea Virgin Voyages and that'll direct you. I can't wait.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, I can't wait either. We'll see all of you in October on the high seas.

[Josh Clark]

That's right. This episode is not about ships actually. It's about a plane, which is technically a ship.

[Chuck Bryant]

It's an airship.

[Josh Clark]

An airship, yeah. Yeah, that's a good way to say it.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, that's how most people say it.

[Josh Clark]

I'm trying to watch what I say about this one because it's pretty touchy.

[Chuck Bryant]

It is touchy. But it's just such a shameful chapter in the history of what was long regarded one of the best engineering firms in the world, the Boeing Corporation. They made great airplanes. They were very innovative. They made very safe airplanes. They cared about the details.

[Podcast Announcer]

They.

[Chuck Bryant]

They put engineering standards before profit and all of that just got wiped out in the course of a few years from about 2018-19. All of it just went bloop when it came to light that they had flip flopped that a few years before and profits now came before standards.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, and you know, we'll talk about in more detail but you know, the end result as everybody knows at this point is two, two of their 737 Max planes crashed, fell out of the sky and, and killed a lot of people. Super sad. And it's very sort of anger inducing when you know the story behind it all. So we're going to detail that now starting, I guess we should say that the 737 Max airplane that we're talking about was A brand new fleet that was going to replace the old 737s and compete with their rival Airbus. The Airbus A320neo.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. And Airbus has long been Boeing's rival since Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas back in I think the 90s. And so it's just been Boeing, Airbus head to head to supply the world with their airplanes and the 737 Max. The reason that they were updating the 737s is one, like you said, these were old 737s that needed to be replaced. But also that Airbus A320neo, it was like a step up, like it was the same kind of body. Like I think a narrow body is what it's called, narrow body, midsize plane as the 737. So companies now had an option, they could be like, well, we're going to go with this Airbus instead of replacing the Boeing with Boeings. So Boeing said, good God, we've got to get out there and give them something that they're going to want besides this. A320 Neo.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, for sure. I think. Should we save talk of the actual incidents till later?

[Chuck Bryant]

I think just mentioning that they happened was enough for now.

[Josh Clark]

All right, well, what you're going to hear is going to infuriate you a little bit. It's also going to shine a bit of a light on some of the, which will also infuriate you just some of the systemic problems with the airline industry as a whole and how these planes are approved for being safe to fly in the sky. And the FAA is going to take some hits, deservedly. But we should probably start out by talking about Boeing. You know, you mentioned that they were, you know, dedicated to the top notch engineering for decades and decades. But starting in the 90s, that started to change. Right?

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. There was a CEO that kind of kicked it all off. His name was Philip condit. And in 1997 he said, we're going to acquire McDonnell Douglas. Like I said up to that point, McDonnell Douglas was also a neck, neck and neck competitor with Boeing. But rather than making their, their name as also like a great engineering firm with innovation and a mind to safety, McDonnell Douglas is like, no, we're just going to cut costs.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

Whereas Boeing, if they were going to design a new plane or if they were going to come up with a new plane, they would start from scratch and design a new plane and probably set all the industry standards for decades to follow. What McDonnell Douglas did was they would design a plane and then they would go back to it. Over decade and decade and decade after decade and just kind of revamp it and update it. That is essentially what you call kludgy. It can be done, obviously. Cause they were doing it. But it is so much worse than designing a new plane from scratch. It's just, it costs a lot less and it takes a lot less time.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. Because over those decades, over those 30 to 40 years, there have been so many innovations in flight that like you could build a really great airplane from the ground up if that's what you wanted to do.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right.

[Josh Clark]

We should mention that, all of that. Did you name that first CEO from 97?

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. Philip Condit.

[Josh Clark]

Okay, so he was the first guy. The other thing that he did, and this was a little bit later, this was I think four years after he was named CEO. He didn't split up Boeing like a breakup, but he split them up physically in that he moved their headquarters from their longtime home in Seattle to Chicago. And he did this for a lousy 3 million bucks a year. It was $60 million in state and local tax credit over a 20 year period. 3 million bucks a year for a company like this is like chicken scratch. So it was a bit of a head scratcher move because you had a company that had everything under one roof in Seattle and now you had these Seattle based engineers working there and you had the C suite in Chicago. And that's anytime that happens that, I mean, I know people can work remotely and stuff like that, but it seemed like a great idea to have everything there in Seattle.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. And plus up to that point with the executives and the decision makers working very closely with like the engineers and product division, those engineers knew the executives, they had a working relationship with them. So they felt comfortable saying like, I don't really think we should do that because it's going to make the plane fall out of the sky. And the executives would listen. This is like they didn't know these people anymore. It just got separated. And this transition really kind of became complete when a guy named Harry Stonecipher took over from Philip Condit In 2003, he became CEO. He used to be with General Electric, but he was most recently with McDonnell Douglas. And even though that Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas influenced Boeing's culture. Boeing's culture became that same cost cutting like focus, shareholder first. Yes, exactly. That kind of focus that became what Boeing adopted after guys like Kerry Stonecipher took over Boeing.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, he has a quote even he said when people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent. So that it is run like a business rather than a great engineering firm. And that's one of those quotes where I was like, bro, he just said that out loud to the press. No one wants to hear that. Yeah, well, I guess shareholders did, but everyone else, the public at large, wants safe planes that don't fall out of the sky.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, but he was putting a signal out, a bat signal of sorts, saying like, hey, investors, come invest in Boeing. We're going to make a bunch of money for you. And they started to. The next CEO was Jim McNerney, and he was the one who you can really put the most. Most of the blame for the design of the 737 Max. From him onward, essentially every single CEO had some sort of direct personal blame for what happened. But he was the one who was like, we need to get this plane out. We need to get it out fast. We need to cut every corner we possibly can to save time and money. Go.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. So he ran the company until 2015. So he oversaw sort of all of that planning and development, basically. And then after that, CEO, Man, I just hate saying that CEO over and over and over. I had bad taste in my mouth. The new guy's name was Dennis Muhlenberg, and he, you know, obviously inherited quite a mess after what we're about to talk about.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right. So like I said, like these guys were saying, like, come on, we gotta get going. Like, Airbus is already several steps ahead, and we need to get this thing out so people can start ordering before Airbus just sucks all of the market share out of us. I saw that they put countdown clocks for different deadlines. All throughout the office, in meeting rooms, conference rooms, there was constantly a clock counting down while you were at work. Engineers got the impression, and sometimes we're told directly, like, keep your mouth shut. The head of the project for the 737 Max, people didn't report directly to them anymore. They reported to their heads. And their heads may or may not have told that project manager about any problems that came up. So this whole rushed project also had, like, an aura of just keep your mouth shut. Do not do anything to delay this.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, for sure. And, you know, as we'll see later, there there were whistleblowers, but when it takes a. Like, somebody requesting whistleblower protection to come forward, especially with. I mean, in any corporation, but especially when it's something that's dealing with, like, public safety, that's not how it should be. You know, you should be able to. To say, hey, at your work. This is without fear of Being of reprisal, you know, like, we're not doing the right thing here.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right. And it used to be you didn't even need to whistleblower. You would go to the executives and be like, hey, this is a real problem. This is not safe. And they would listen to wasn't the case anymore.

[Josh Clark]

Should we take a break?

[Chuck Bryant]

Sure.

[Josh Clark]

All right, let's take a break and we'll come back with the design phase right after this.

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[Josh Clark]

All right, we're back. I know we talked a little bit at first about how they decided to sort of revamp this decades old fleet design wise, instead of starting from scratch with all this great new technology. But that's what they did. They took that 737 body, they made a lot of changes, they added bigger engines. And one of the things that was the result, and they knew this by 2012, basically, was that they had created a problem, a balance problem. Whereas at certain speeds, you could potentially go into a stall because the airplane's nose drifted upward.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, because they basically took the same plane and just put giant engines that the plane was never designed for. And it just knocked it out of balance. Right. And you would say, well, why didn't they just move the wings? There's a good reason they didn't move the wings. Because the more changes you make to an airplane, the more likely it is that all the pilots at all the different airlines that fly that plane are going to need updated training. Right. The FAA will require it. Airlines don't like that. That's an added cost to the plane you're selling them. So they did. They bent themselves into pretzels trying to avoid making actual big changes. They just tried. They were playing whack a mole with all the problems that came up with an eye toward not actually doing the one thing that would solve the problem, which is redesign the wings. So what they came up with instead was some software that would take over and make the. Make the nose go back level whenever it got out of a suitable angle of attack. It's called.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, it's. It's called the. And this is the real sort of. Well, I was going to say the real villain, but the real villains were the humans behind this decision. But we're talking about the Maneuvering Characteristics augmentation system, the mcas, and this thing, like you said, I don't know if it was clear, but it literally takes over controls of the plane and supposedly takes care of the issue for the pilot instead of saying like, hey, let's redesign this plane, or at least train these pilots to rectify this on their own with their hands on the. On the wheel.

[Chuck Bryant]

No.

[Josh Clark]

What's that thing called?

[Chuck Bryant]

The stick. I think they call it the stick.

[Josh Clark]

Is it the Stick in big planes, too, probably.

[Chuck Bryant]

I'm pretty sure just a larger stick. Yeah, the big stick on the trunk.

[Josh Clark]

The big stick. They said, we designed this whiz bang software that's going to do that for you. And when they went around to test flight mode, I think it was like 2016, the MCAS was still a pretty small part of this whole thing, but it was part of the aircraft.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. And then they started testing this new design and simulator. And I know at least once, I think in 2012, I think the head test pilot for Boeing took 10 seconds to override the MCAS and crashed. And they were like, ooh, okay, we need to keep working on this. So again, they're back to playing Whack a Mole. Like the bandaid that they put on the issue of the imbalance, which was the software now has its own bugs, so now they're fixing those, and then that would bring up more bugs and more bugs, and so they had to fix those and those and those. And this was where the design for the Boeing 737 Max really started to get out of hand.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, for sure. Because like I said, it was a pretty small part of the system at first. It had kind of that one function, I think, initially or was supposed to. But by the time you're playing Whack a mole, it keeps growing and growing, and you're like, well, then the software will solve this problem, and then the software should solve this problem. And all of a sudden, as it's interacting with these plane systems, it's a huge part of flying this plane.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. And they had to integrate it with the existing software. They couldn't redo the software or the flight controls, or else again, you have pilot training that you've just triggered. Right. So they were just basically hammering this thing into place as best they could. The way that it finally worked was there were two sensors on the nose that sense the angle of the plane. Right. And when the sensors sent information saying, hey, this plane's at way too steep of an angle, it could stall out if it goes any further in, if it goes any further up, the MCAS system literally, like you said, took over the flight controls and then leveled the plane back out. Right. There was a huge issue that they made it, they designed it, which still befuddles engineers, aerospace engineers today, so that only one of those sensors saying the plane's angle was wrong could trigger the MCAs. Like, there was no redundancy. So if one of those sensors was faulty and the other was fine, it didn't matter. The faulty one was going to tell the MCAS to level out, even if the plane's angle wasn't actually an issue.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. Like, the whole idea there is, if one sensor goes off, you want to have that other sensor that aligns with it and says, yeah, we're getting the same readings or whatever, which is. You know, it's that backup. It's that redundancy that you need. You need that matching data before that thing engages itself. So they said, you know what? We've done our calculations, and we think it's much simpler this way. And the risk of catastrophic failure is, quote, almost inconceivable. Yeah. I think they figured the probability was 1 per 223 trillion hours of flight. So they said, you know what? We don't need this redundancy. It's not necessary.

[Chuck Bryant]

Which is still. It's just insane. Like, that is a basic principle. Redundancy is a basic principle of any engineering. Right. And it just. I don't. I still couldn't find why they made that decision, why it was so much harder for that to have the sensors have to match. It's just nuts. But as we'll see, somebody clearly forgot to carry the one, because that. That calculation they came up with for that probability was not.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, correct.

[Chuck Bryant]

So there was another thing that they did. They didn't tell anybody about the MCAs.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, this is the one that really gets me.

[Chuck Bryant]

They created. This was brand new. No one had ever created something like the MCAS before. It wasn't like they took an existing software and just kind of redesigned it. They made new software to do a brand new thing that hadn't been done before, and then they didn't tell anyone about it. And again, just want to reiterate, the MCAS took over the controls from the pilot. If you were the pilot, you were no longer in control of the plane while the MCAS was bringing the nose back down to a more suitable angle of attack. Imagine that happening and you having no idea what's going on because you don't know the MCAS exists.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. And all of this is because they don't want to, again, make the plane less appealing to buyers, to airlines, because they're gonna have to invest a lot of money in, like, pilot retraining and even as simple things as, like, you know, flight manuals and stuff like that. Yeah, supposedly. I mean, it was reported at least that Boeing made a deal with Southwest Air that said, hey, if you buy enough planes from us and if you don't require your special training for the pilots. Like, save yourself some money. We'll give you a discount on these planes. And Boeing lobbied the faa, like, actively lobbied them to allow them not to make any mention of the MCAS in the manual. Like, we don't even want this in the flight manual. And the FAA said, sure, yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

They said, okay. Boeing told them that it was such a minor part of an already existing system, I think the existing airspeed sensor system, that it was not worth mentioning. And the faa, like you said, they're like, sure, that's fine. They also didn't even put an indicator light for it in there. That's how secret they kept this thing. So you would have no idea it was on. Right? So this was like, that was. You might be stunned that the FAA just went along with that. It also shows you that they didn't. They had no idea what the MCAS was. They didn't go and look and say, well, let us see if it's actually important or not. Tell us what this thing is. Later on, FAA officials, some of them would testify they didn't get the MCAs. They didn't understand what it was, and they really were encouraged not to ask too many questions. So they just said, sure, if you guys don't think that it's worth mentioning, we won't make you.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, for sure. And, you know, this is all, you know how I mentioned the beginning part of the systemic failures of just how things work. So we should talk a little bit about that as far as the FAA is concerned, because when they were formed in 1958, it was pretty clear right out of the gate that their. Their kind of co. Mandates could often be in conflict with one another, which was to promote the interest of the aviation industry and very important to promote the safety of the flying public. So they knew pretty quickly that, like, those, like I said, those don't always align. So Congress In, I think 1967 said, all right, maybe we should have a new agency that really guides the safety side. So they created the National Transportation Safety Board. And they're like, they'll keep everybody safe and recommend regulations to the FAA to enforce, but they can't demand that. The FAA has never, like, had to do the things that they're suggested to do.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right. It's just the NTSB is looking out for the safety, but the FAA doesn't have to enact it because, again, that might conflict with the interests of the aviation industry. And that stuck out to me, Chuck, that the safety of the flying public isn't always in the interests of the aviation industry. It should 100% of the time be in the interests of the aviation industry. Yeah, that's just my take. Hot take.

[Josh Clark]

But what ended up happening was the FAA said, all right, well, you know, we're good at the industry stuff, so why don't we just let Boeing, like, they know planes. Why don't we let them handle their own certification process? And it wasn't. I mean, that seems to be sort of standard practice. It wasn't like some big exception was made, right?

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, no. They have a name for it. Organizational designation authorization. The FAA can say, like you just said, you know, a lot about what we want and what we require. We're just going to let you go through and verify that all this stuff adheres to FAA requirements and guidelines, and then you come back and tell us if it does. You planemaker certify your own plane and tell us if we should certify it in turn. And that's exactly what it is. That's that process.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. They're like, hey, here's what you do. Just do it all. Then send me an email that just says, all good.

[Chuck Bryant]

Right. Write an email to the president, but, like, it's from me, and then I'll sign it.

[Josh Clark]

Right. So this is part of a bigger problem that actually has a name. It's called regulatory capture. And it's this idea that when people are working closely together, like the FAA works closely with the airline industry and Boeing, that they, you know, they know these people, and they end up, I don't want to necessarily say siding, but they end up more sympathetic to the industry side than the public that they're supposed to be protecting, because they don't work with the public at large every day. They work with these people every day.

[Chuck Bryant]

Exactly. That's the same reason why you should avoid ever agreeing to mediation instead of a lawsuit, because the mediators typically, even though they won't say they do, they will typically work for the people paying them. And the chances of your company that say you're. You're going into mediation with hiring them again are far greater than you ever hiring them. It's, it's, it's. It's not exactly the same thing, but it's. They have a working relationship that just can't be avoided. And that also is supported by another issue called the revolving door. Regulatory capture is very much supported by the revolving door and vice versa, which is you are a friendly regulator, and the company you're regulating later on is like, hey, we want to hire you. We think you've done a great job and we want you to come work for us for gobs of money. And it can go the other way, too. A friendly colleague can go become a regulator and, you know, you just kind of expect them to turn a blind eye when you need them to. That's just a huge problem. Especially when you're talking about huge, like, life and death stuff like designing and certifying airplanes or, you know, pharmaceutical makers and the fda, they're frequently talked about as regulatory capture and a revolving door.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, I mean, I'm just a dummy podcaster, so I don't know how any of this stuff works, but it seems to me like there should be like a rule or a law that says, you know, choose your path. Like, you can't go work for the FAA for 10 years and then go work for Boeing right after that with some plum job or some pharmaceutical company, and then you go work for the fda. Like, it's just such an obvious conflict, you know?

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. I don't remember if you and I recorded the episode on it or not. I feel like we did years back. I definitely wrote an article about this and people have proposed that over the years. I think three years is typically the average, which makes sense. Like, a lot of. A lot of people change at a company in three years. So that would probably actually do it, but it's just like, just added to the pile of problems that we have to solve to get things on track around here.

[Josh Clark]

I propose we take a sort of a quicker break here than we normally would because we've got the crashes coming up, and after that it's, you know, what do you think?

[Chuck Bryant]

I agree.

[Josh Clark]

Okay, I'm not quite sure what I was trying to say there, but we'll be right back and we'll talk about what happened with these planes right after this.

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[Chuck Bryant]

Okay, Chuck, so we're back. And we're gonna go back to March 2017, and I guess this month is when the FAA certified the 737 Max 8 to fly. A few months later, the Max 9 was certified to fly. And both of these planes, I think they were the first 737 maxs to hit the skies. And one thing you want to point out is when the FAA certifies a new plane to fly, they and the European, the EU Aviation authority, they're basically their stamps tell the rest of the world like, these planes are fine. You can buy them, you can fly them, you can put them into your airline fleet. Other countries have their own aviation authority. Sure. But they do not have the resources that like the Faa or the EU's aviation authority have. And so they're relied upon like their credibility is important worldwide. So this is why. One reason also, it was such a big deal that the FAA just completely fell down on the job.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, because they're supposed to be the gold standard worldwide, like you said. So on October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight, it was the 737 Max 8 crashed into the Java Sea very shortly after takeoff from Indonesia. And the flight crew communicated with air traffic control that basically they were having trouble with flight control, they were having trouble with their altitude. And then the plane just disappears from radar. And I think it was about 13 minutes later, it plunged into the Java sea at about 400 miles an hour and killed all 189 people on board.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, yeah. And all this was, I think, like you said, 13 minutes after the plane took off. So that angle of attack thing, we know enough now to know what was going on. At the time, no one had any idea what was going on. And so Boeing said, oh, there's this thing called the MCAS that we put in. Just here's some information about it, and if anything like this ever happens to you, here's the procedure to override it and you'll be all good. Just. It was still. It was pilot error, everybody. That's, that's what the problem was. That's what Boeing blamed it on. And that, that what made that crash even worse, Chuck, is that those airline pilots followed that procedure that Boeing had told the world about after the Lion Air flight a few months before, and it still didn't work because there was a software glitch with the mcas and it kept reactivating and reactivating and they couldn't override it, and that's when it crashed. So even with this workaround that Boeing came up with, it still wasn't fixing the problem. And after that second crash, it was quite clear that Boeing had screwed up royally and also that the FAA had let them do that and still certified these planes that were way too dangerous to carry human beings.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, they had to ground, I think, 30 of their 58 plane stock.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, fleet.

[Josh Clark]

Fleet, that's the word.

[Chuck Bryant]

The fleet with the sticks.

[Josh Clark]

That's right. I mean, it's clear I'm not an aviator, you guys. I'm sure that's not a surprise to anyone, but governing bodies really kind of came in quickly after that point. They launched investigations not just into Boeing, but also into the faa. And, you know, they did the thing you do, which you start issuing statements like that are really angry, and then there are press releases and there are denials, and then CEOs come and go, obviously lawsuits and at least one criminal charge would come and regulatory actions. But while this is going on, there's still, like, problems with this plane.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. And the reason they grounded all 737 Maxs everywhere in the world for 20 months. It was supposed to be a very short time, but it turned out to be 20 months is because these were brand new planes that dropped out of the sky. Remember that? One in 232 trillion chance of the malfunction.

[Josh Clark]

This is two.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. The Lion Air plane had 800 hours of flight time. The Ethiopian Air had just 1330 hours. So this happened two times in just 2130 flight hours.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

Boy, there's some, some Josh Clark math in there that we just edited out.

[Josh Clark]

Right. So in October 2019, this is a year after that Lion Air crash, the CEO who I mentioned earlier at the time, Dennis Muhlenberg, was called before Congress, which is what you do. You gotta take your lumps and go in there and get yelled at, basically. And the whole time he's insisting the plane is safe. And in that hearing, and I remember watching some of this stuff, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal said after that second crash, he met with Boeing reps in his office and they said what Josh Clark would say one day is that it was pilot error. Which, like, that's just complete fabrication.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. I mean, they. Yeah, it's just so scummy, you know, to be that responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. Terrible deaths. And then just to blame two people who were. Or four people, I guess, who were blameless in it. That's just. I just think that's terrible. And you might say, well, okay, what's wrong with Muhlenberg? He was the one who inherited the problem. He's to blame because he didn't ground that. The 737 Maxes. The FAA made Boeing do that. So he had the option to do this. He had the opportunity to, and he didn't.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, for sure. You know, obviously the faa, we've been pretty hard on here, and they were found responsible for good reason. There was a 2020 congressional report that said Boeing and the FAA jointly were responsible for these two plane crashes. And the FAA this whole time is insisting that it did the right thing. It's like we, you know, did everything like we were supposed to as far as certification goes. But it seems to be a systemic thing where no one stepped forward before this and said, you can't allow them to certify themselves because they may have been telling the truth when they said they follow procedure, but the procedure was wrong.

[Chuck Bryant]

Exactly. Yeah. So when that report came out, the shares of Boeing plummeted as far as fines go. And actual money that they had to shell out from this.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

The FAA fined Boeing $17 million in 202117 million with an M. Yeah. For using unapproved or non conforming parts or mislabeling the parts. Neither of these, those things had anything to do with the crashes. So Boeing was never fined for those two crashes by the faa.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. Was that just them trying to be like, hey, let's slap him with something so the public sees a headline?

[Chuck Bryant]

That's my interpretation. Yes. And that's the little pussycat bite that they came up with.

[Josh Clark]

Right.

[Chuck Bryant]

Is that a thing? Wow.

[Josh Clark]

Sure.

[Chuck Bryant]

The other thing is the FAA didn't start issuing penalties like that until the Justice Department filed suit against Boeing for defrauding the United States government by saying this thing is fine, you can go ahead and certify it. Faa. And there was actually a criminal misconduct facet to the whole thing as well. And I think Boeing negotiated a $2.5 billion payment or fine to United States to basically say like just here, make this go away, here's some money. They also had to pay $8.3 billion to the airlines and then man, the victims families all, I think 345 victims families, there was $100 million pot set aside for them as part of this negotiated agreement with the Justice Department. The thing that I saw though, when I was looking that up, Chuck, on a Google search or whatever, the reporting on it said that Boeing is dedicating $100 million to victims families almost across the board. All of the reports, like they weren't forced to. Yes. It's disgusting because it also shows that all of these outlets were basically just copying the Boeing press release.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, yeah, for sure. You did mention a criminal charge. There was one. There was one individual that faced criminal charges. It was a former lead technical pilot named Mark Forkner. And he is the guy who convinced the FAA that the MCAS was not something worthy of including in the flight manual. I think it was exposed later on in internal emails. He was frustrated about MCAS in the email and he said, quote, I basically lied to the faa, end quote. And he was found not guilty of defrauding federal regulators. And that was the only person to be brought up on criminal charges.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. After that the DOJ said, okay, we're closing this case. It's done. As you can imagine, the, the families of the victims were not at all happy with any of this.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

So the whole thing put to rest, everybody's moving on. This is. What was that, 20, 21, I think when that whole thing got settled.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

And then three years later, less than three years later, there was another catastrophic incident with another Boeing 737 Max.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. And I remember when this one happened, after all the other stuff, it was just like, what is. Because, I mean, I feel like there was this weird certain amount of national pride with Boeing even at one point. Like, I remember growing up hearing about, like Boeing, like this great company of engineers, like these brilliant people. And then by the time this happened in 2024, I'm not even in like a planehead. And I was like, what is happening with this, like, once great company? And that's when Alaska Airlines flight depressurized rapidly at 16,000ft because a door plug blew out and there was a hole in the side of the plane.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. A door plug is essentially a panel that covers an unused emergency exit. And that panel came off. Blew off. And just by total luck, or the grace of God, depending on your view of what's going on behind the universe, there was nobody seated right there.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

And the reason why this was lucky is because parts of the seats were sucked out. And there would be a good chance that a human sitting in one of those seats would have been sucked out at 16,000ft. It's mind boggling that nobody was killed or I think seriously injured even than that. It's just, it could have been so bad and lucky for Boeing it wasn't.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. Initial reports indicated that they couldn't find the bolts that were to hold that plug in place. And then apparently there were signs that they, maybe there were never bolts in place to begin with. And that a Boeing worker removed that door plug for some maintenance, routine maintenance, didn't put the bolts back in. At this point, the FAA is like, all right, this can't, you know, this is such a public thing. After the disaster of the two crashes, they grounded the planes again. They said, quote, this should never have happened and it cannot happen again. And when they did follow up investigations, I mean, it seemed kind of like a clown show going on at Spirit Aerosystems, like the factory where these things were being put together. One of their suppliers.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, this was not a good look. There were assemblers who were in charge of putting plane stuff together. They would jump up and down on airplane parts and like kick it into place to make the drill holes line up the way that they should. A part like that for something like an airplane, and the Boeing of yesteryear would have immediately been sent back and supplier would have been sweating that they were going to get dropped for somebody else. That's not the case. Or that certainly wasn't the case with their vendor, Spirit. There were other Problems that also came up with the Max too, that didn't even have anything to do with the MCAs, but were still both potentially catastrophic themselves.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, there was an air pressure sensor that seems pretty vital to me as a non pilot that would ensure that pilots had enough air to not lose consciousness, I guess, in the event of something bad.

[Chuck Bryant]

That should be important to you as a passenger too.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, it is. They also found loose bolts in the rudder system. And by this point, like it's. It's pretty obvious that the FAA was complicit in this whole sort of shoddy operation going down with the 737 Max. They were non compliant with FAA regulations. And if the FAA is saying they don't know about that, then that's. That's on them. Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

There was no argument or justification that FAA could put forward that exonerated them in even a little bit, you know.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. And here's the thing. Before that door plug blew out, just before that, the FAA had gone to Congress and said, hey, I think it's all good. Now can we go back to letting Boeing certify their own planes? And then after that door blowout or plug blowout, they withdrew that request.

[Chuck Bryant]

And this is the last CEO, Dave Calhoun. And the reason he was a problem or an issue as well is because he didn't change Boeing enough for this door plug incident to not happen. So there was. There were two high profile whistleblower deaths. 32 people came forward to seek whistleblower federal protection to complain against Boeing. Two of them died, and it turns out both of them died. Well, one died by suicide, another one died of mrsa. So I guess natural causes are disease. But the guy who died by suicide, of course there was a conspiracy theory that he was actually murdered. He had just given a deposition in Charleston when he was found dead of a gunshot wound in his truck in a Holiday Inn parking lot where he was staying after giving that deposition. And apparently there's all sorts of evidence, including CCTV or security camera footage that show that this was suicide. The point is that doesn't exonerate Boeing. In his suicide note, he actually named Boeing as a huge reason for this. Because they ruined his life. He said.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, he requested to be buried face down so they could, quote, kiss his ass.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah.

[Josh Clark]

So, yeah, it's very, very sad, obviously. So they are identifying all these issues with the 737 Max. The most scathing stuff obviously would come from the NTSB because they're separate from the aaa and they basically have taken to bypassing the FAA by issuing their own safety notices directly and not like going through them. And I think in June 2025, just last year, they issued a bulletin of a possible engine problem on the 737 Max.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, yeah. I feel like airlines should alert you. I know they're not going to, but I feel like they should give you a choice. Like this is a 737 Max.

[Josh Clark]

Well, you can see what plane it is like when you book the flight.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah. That they switch them sometimes too.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah. I'm gonna start looking though, man, after this.

[Chuck Bryant]

Oh, I do, I do. I don't think I've ever been on board a Max, but I feel like it's just a roll of the dice every time, you know?

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, I mean, yeah, it's something I'm paying a lot more attention to now, obviously.

[Chuck Bryant]

We also can't not mention another thing that happened after the Alaska Airline blowout that had nothing to do with their airline division or airplane division, but still was Boeing. And it was a terrible look, it was an aerospace thing. When the Starliner test flight to the ISS did not go very well.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, they, I mean there were a lot of failures there. We're not going to get into all of them, but it was a test flight carrying a couple of astronauts to the ISS and they ended up stuck there. I think it was supposed to be a little more than a week and it turned into nine months and SpaceX had to go get them.

[Chuck Bryant]

That's just not a good look, right?

[Josh Clark]

It's not.

[Chuck Bryant]

I mean, luckily Wilmore and Williams, the two astronauts, made it back to earth safely and the Starliner, uncrewed, remotely controlled, made it back to earth safely. But still it's just like your stock price goes down every time. And the reason I mention that is because every step of the way with the 737 Max, all of it followed that like psychopathic corporate logic where the shareholders return on investment is the most important thing. It is more important than morality, safety, practicality, sensibility, anything. Right. And so the whole like sad trombone like twist, I guess, is that the 737 Max cost Boeing investors $87 billion over the six years from 2018 to 2024. It didn't make them money, it cost them money in share price drops over and over and over again because one thing after another just kept going. And Airbus was eating Boeing's lunch all of these years too.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, it's, I mean there's a lesson in there. No one will heed it, of course, but there is a lesson yes, there is.

[Chuck Bryant]

Chuck, you got anything else?

[Josh Clark]

I got nothing else. I mean, they're still out there, right? The 737 Max?

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, they got recertified by the FAA. I think the last one was towed out of groundage. I don't know if that's the word or not, but you know what I'm saying. And it was declared ready for delivery to China on August 29, 2025. So there is a very good chance that you will fly on a 737 Max at some point in your life if you fly a lot.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah.

[Chuck Bryant]

Oh, and also, just real quick, they also have the Max 7 and the Max 9 are the newest ones, and they're having trouble getting those certified because they're having an issue that they can't figure out how to fix yet.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, software is a great thing. So I'm not bagging on the software industry, but, like, I have a car that has, like, a lot of newer cars are, like, very software based, as a lot of people know, and sometimes it'll just do something.

[Chuck Bryant]

Yeah, we had ours Brick once.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, it happens. I've seen it happen in my own car. And, like, that's not a plane with hundreds of passengers, you know.

[Chuck Bryant]

No, no. Thankfully, we were parked and couldn't get it back on. But, yeah, I can't imagine how terrifying that would be if it happened while you were driving. You know, we should also say talking about software, it was widely reported that Boeing had hired had outsourced their software coding to Indian companies to curry favor with India so they could sell more jets there. That's true. I think they were recent college graduates who were being paid $9 an hour who were entrusted with very important software stuff, but none of them worked on the MCAs, which was the thing that caused those two crashes, obviously. That's right. I think that's it for the 737 Max. I gotta dedicate this one to my dad because he's the one who gave me my interest in engineering because he was an engineer all these years.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, I knew that. That's great.

[Chuck Bryant]

Well, since Chuck said that was great, that I just dedicated this episode to my dad. As foretold in 2008. We just opened listener mail here in 2026.

[Josh Clark]

All right, this is from Alexa from Seattle. It's short and sweet. Hey, guys, just wanted to add to the topic of the cherry blossom trees. And I remember when we recorded this, I was like, I know there's some places that are known for their cherry blossoms that we're not going to mention. And luckily Alexa wrote in Seattle loves their cherry blossoms, guys. The quad at UW is probably the most popular spot for cherry blossom viewing, and it's always packed with people all over the city. You'll find cherry blossoms blooming and events themed around the cherry blossoms, including food items and anime conventions.

[Chuck Bryant]

Nice.

[Josh Clark]

Cherry blossoms bloom in the spring when we get random breaks from the bleak winter weather, and it's absolutely beautiful. And Alexa, I can confirm, I think my first two trips to Seattle were in spring and I got like the best weather and I think I saw cherry blossoms and I was like, what's the deal with this place being gloomy? Like, this place is incredible.

[Chuck Bryant]

I remember that too. I think we've done at least five, maybe six shows there over the years, and this past one in January was the first time it ever rained while I was in Seattle.

[Josh Clark]

Yeah, we got big time Seattled on this last trip. We did.

[Chuck Bryant]

We did. That was smart to choose a Seattle one because that's where Boeing's from. So that fits this one very nicely.

[Josh Clark]

Oh, fantastic.

[Chuck Bryant]

That was from Alexa. That's right, Alexa. Send email. Thanks, Alexa.

[Josh Clark]

Oh, my God.

[Chuck Bryant]

If you want to be like. If you want to be like Alexa and send us an email and have us thank you like you're a robot, we will do that. All you have to do is send your email off to stuffpodcastheartradio.com.

[Podcast Announcer]

Stuff youf Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts My Heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app. Apple Podcasts are wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

[Superhuman Podcast Advertiser]

Imagine an Olympics where doping is not only legal, but encouraged. It's the enhanced games. Some call it grotesque. Others say it's unleashing human potential. Either way, the podcast Superhuman documented it all, embedded in the games and with the athletes For a full year, within

[Josh Clark]

probably 10 days, I'd put on £10. I was having trouble stopping the muscle growth.

[Superhuman Podcast Advertiser]

Listen to Superhuman on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

[Podcast Advertiser]

What would you eat if you had to start over?

[Chuck Bryant]

Real simple. Poor man's poor woman's food.

[Josh Clark]

Black beans, chicken, rice, plantains.

[Podcast Advertiser]

On the podcast Eating While Broke, I sit down with celebrities, entrepreneurs and creators as they revisit the meals they once relied on and the moments that shaped their journey. Named Best Food podcast at the 2026 iHeart Podcast Awards, the full season is available to binge right now. Listen to Eating While Broke from the Black Effect Podcast Network on the iHeartRadio app Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcast.

[Podcast Announcer]

This is Saigon, the story of my family and of the country that shaped us.

[Josh Clark]

From iheart Podcasts. Saigon.

[Chuck Bryant]

You don't think I'm serious about a free Vietnam?

[Josh Clark]

One city, a divided country and the war that tore America apart.

[Chuck Bryant]

This is for Vietnam.

[Josh Clark]

They're pouring petrol all over here. Freedom for Vietnam.

[Chuck Bryant]

There's a fire coming to this country and it's going to burn out everything.

[Josh Clark]

Listen to Saigon on the island, iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

[Podcast Advertiser]

This is an iHeart podcast.

[Josh Clark]

Guaranteed Human.