Podcast
Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)
Hosted by Attorney RJ Dieken, Loki Esq Law, Montana · EN
Following what the Supreme Court is actually doing can be daunting. Reporting on the subject is often only done within the context of political narratives of the day -- and following the Court's decisions and reading every new case can be a non-starter. The purpose of this Podcast is to make it as easy as possible for members of the public to source information about what is happening at the Supreme Court. For that reason, we read every Opinion Syllabus without any commentary whatsoever. Further, there are no advertisements or sponsors. We call it "information sourcing," and we hope that the podcast is a useful resource for members of the public who want to understand the legal issues of the day, prospective law students who want to get to know legal language and understand good legal writing, and attorneys who can use the podcast to be better advocates for their clients.
*Note this podcast is for informational and educational purposes only.
32episodes
Episodes
Newest firstAll episodes
M & K Employee Solutions, Inc. v. Trustees of IAM Nat. Pension
5d ago00:09:03Tap to summarizeSend us Fan MailActuaries should probably use the best/most recent predictions about future stuff, and we should not try to tell them not to.Also lets keep track of how many times The Court says: "Stuff that's not in here is not in here for a reason, BONUS POINTS: when the excluded (or desired) terminology is in the same Congressional Act.Support the show
Transcribe →HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES
6d ago00:12:50Tap to summarizeSend us Fan Mail Held: The cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government”; Ha vana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in Havana Dock’s property interest. Pp. 8–16. (a) Title III generally makes any person who “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government . . . liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property.” §6082(a)(1)(A). This dispute turns on whether the relevant “property which was confiscated” must be Havana Docks’ property interest in the docks (the concession), or whether it could instead be the docks them selves. Support the show
Transcribe →MONTGOMERY v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
6d ago00:09:09Tap to summarizeSend us Fan MailA claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority Support the show
Transcribe →JULES v. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES (ARBITRATION, CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION)
6d ago00:13:30Tap to summarizeSend us Fan Mail A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending ac tion under §3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a result ing arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court. LokiEsq.LawRev. RJ Dieken, EsqSupport the show
Transcribe →FIRST CHOICE WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTERS v. DAVENPORT, A.G. OF NEW JERSEY (1A and donor records)
May 100:08:49Tap to summarizeSend us Fan Mail First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend ment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing. Support the show
Transcribe →Louisiana v. Callais (§2 of the Voting Rights Act)
May 100:12:36Tap to summarizeSend us Fan MailIn Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s congressional map (SB8), which created an additional majority-Black district, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its design without a sufficient justification. The Court clarified that while compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can qualify as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, §2 properly interpreted only requires proof of intentional discrimination—not mere disparate impact—and thus did not require Louisiana to add another majority-minority district. The Court revised the Thornburg v. Gingles framework to align with that interpretation, requiring plaintiffs to show race—not partisanship—drives voting patterns and to produce illustrative maps that satisfy all legitimate state districting goals without relying on race. Applying this updated framework, the Court found the earlier Robinson plaintiffs failed to establish a §2 violation, so Louisiana lacked a compelling interest to use race in drawing SB8, leading the Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling that the map violates the Fourteenth Amendment.Support the show
Transcribe →ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Apr 2600:11:35Tap to summarizeSend us Fan Mail Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is non jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable toll ing. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdic tional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdic tional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling Support the show
Transcribe →DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W. (PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP/TERRY STOP/VEHICLE)
Apr 2600:16:25Tap to summarizeSend us Fan MailTotality of the Circumstances is required in considering Probable Cause for a temporary stop. Probable Cause being defined as: "Articulable reasonable suspicion for the officers belief that 'criminal activity is afoot.'"Support the show
Transcribe →Hencely v. Fluor Corp (Wartime contractor immunity)
Apr 2500:05:50Tap to summarizeSend us Fan MailA U.S. Army specialist injured while stopping a Taliban suicide bomber at a base in Afghanistan sued military contractor Fluor Corporation for negligence after the attacker—an Afghan hired under the military’s “Afghan First” program—was allegedly poorly supervised. Lower courts dismissed the case, holding that state-law claims against contractors are preempted during wartime under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception. The Supreme Court rejected that view, ruling that the claims are not preempted because neither the Constitution nor federal statutes bar them, and the FTCA exception does not extend to contractors. Relying on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. was misplaced, the Court explained, because preemption applies only where a contractor follows specific government directives, not where it allegedly violates them. Since Fluor’s conduct was neither ordered nor authorized by the military—and resolving the case would not second-guess military decisions—there is no significant conflict with federal interests, and traditional state tort law may proceed.Support the show
Transcribe →Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
Apr 1800:09:28Tap to summarizeSend us Fan Mail Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal of ficer removal statute. Support the show
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