The Global Aftershocks of Trump’s Blunder in Iran

Summary

---

Podcast Summary

Podcast: Talking Feds
Episode Title: The Global Aftershocks of Trump’s Blunder in Iran
Host: Harry Litman
Guest: Jake Sullivan (Former National Security Advisor; current Kissinger Professor at Harvard Kennedy School)
Date: April 30, 2026

---

Episode Overview

This episode features a deep-dive conversation between Harry Litman and Jake Sullivan, focusing on the global consequences of President Trump’s recent actions in Iran—the so-called "war truce," the collapse of the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal), and the broader aftershocks on U.S. alliances, world order, and competing superpowers. Sullivan offers a uniquely informed perspective as chief architect of the original Iran deal and as a senior Biden administration official. The episode thoroughly explores American strategy, Iranian reactions, and ripple effects on China, Russia, energy markets, and U.S.-Israel relations.

---

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Current Iran Standoff and U.S. Strategy

[02:35—05:36]

• Sullivan finds Iran more predictable than the Trump administration: Iranians insist on maintaining nuclear enrichment, won’t negotiate under humiliation, and value “pride as much as substance.” Trump, by contrast, vacillates wildly—embracing ceasefires without negotiation but maintaining “impossible” demands.

• Jake Sullivan (on Iran's posture):

  "They are not going to negotiate when they feel that President Trump is just going out every day and saying, I got to bring these guys to heel. I need absolute surrender, I need them to give their dignity up... they care as much about pride as they care about substance. Full stop." (03:33—03:41)

• Trump’s unpredictability does not enhance U.S. leverage—Sullivan dismisses the "madman theory" as ineffective because Trump caves to adversaries (Putin, Xi, Iran) while antagonizing allies (e.g., Denmark, Japan).

• Jake Sullivan:

  "He has no idea what he is doing because he has no idea quite why he is doing it... Iran has proven it can shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which was previously open. Iran has held the world economy hostage, and Americans are paying more at the pump for it." (06:43—07:11)

2. The Predictability and Consequences of Iran’s Response

[08:01—10:19]

• Sullivan insists Iran’s potent response was entirely foreseeable—U.S. intelligence had warned that Iran could block the Strait and eliminating that capacity would be costly.

• Trump acted recklessly after perceived easy wins elsewhere (e.g., Venezuela) and ignored “consistent predictions” of escalation.

• Jake Sullivan:

  "It was predicted by the US Intelligence community... The idea of closing the Strait is no longer just an abstract idea. It's a proven capacity that Iran possesses." (08:44—09:49)

• The entire episode, Sullivan argues, leaves the U.S. worse off than before: exposed strategically, hurt economically, and facing a more confident regime in Iran.

3. The JCPOA’s Value and Its Sequel

[10:19—13:25]

• Sullivan recaps the JCPOA’s strengths: intensive inspections, clear limits on Iran’s capabilities, and international buy-in.
• Trump’s 2018 withdrawal, unsuccessful efforts to revive the deal under Biden, and Trump’s military-first approach have made a future deal harder.
• Jake Sullivan:

  "It was the strongest, tightest nuclear agreement ever produced... I believe it verifiably blocked Iran's path to a nuclear weapon." (11:58—12:05)

• At best, Sullivan sees the future as a return to a deal similar to the JCPOA—but under far worse circumstances for U.S. and global security.

4. The U.S.–Israel Alliance and Shifting Attitudes

[13:38—18:19]

• Host notes plummeting American support for Israel (now 60% unfavorable in polls).
• Sullivan argues that Israel’s current leaders conflate short-term military gains with improved long-term security, which “remains the case with respect to the war in Iran.”
• He does not advocate severing the U.S.–Israel alliance but calls for alignment with American interests, including halting weapons sales if the war is detrimental.
• Jake Sullivan:

  "The US should just operate according to our interests... and make decisions about the security relationship with Israel accordingly." (15:32—15:48)

• On U.S. leverage: actual influence is limited; nations are sovereign, and coercion has real limits, but the U.S. should firmly prioritize its own interests.
• Jake Sullivan:

  "Anyone who thinks you can just snap your fingers and make things happen, I don't think has ever sat in the seat and tried to do it." (16:58—17:08)

5. Aftershocks in the U.S.–China Rivalry

[19:07—24:43]

• Sullivan pinpoints three layers of risk regarding China:

  1. Depleted U.S. Munitions: The Iran war leaves the U.S. less able to deter or defend in a Taiwan crisis.
     • "We have expended so many munitions in this unnecessary war... that we are not now in a position to be able to effectively mount a campaign should it be necessary in the Taiwan Strait." (20:08—20:22)
  2. Undermined Alliances: Allies see America as “the disruptor,” making collaboration on China’s challenge harder.
  3. Lost Economic Leadership: The energy crisis drives countries away from Middle Eastern oil and U.S. clean energy—Trump’s policies cede “clean energy superpower” status to China.
     • "They're going to be looking to China... China's sitting back thinking we're going to be the beneficiary of this." (21:44—22:13)

• China’s patient, multi-domain pressure on Taiwan continues; U.S. distraction and “eroding deterrent” raise risks of Beijing seeking unification via means short of direct invasion.

6. Russia and the Fallout for Ukraine and NATO

[24:48—27:17]

• Putin directly benefits from:
  • Oil price spikes (more revenue for his war machine)
  • Reduced Western military support to Ukraine (as U.S. munitions are diverted)
    • "We can no longer send air defense missiles to Ukraine because we're using them all in the Middle East." (26:10—26:15)
  • Internal divisions in NATO, with Trump openly questioning the alliance’s future
  • Putin “almost can’t believe his luck”—Trump’s “musing about a fundamental change in America’s relationship with NATO” is a strategic windfall.
    • "This is like Putin's birthday... He cannot believe this." (26:43—26:50)

7. The Future of World Order

[27:21—30:10]

• Responding to historian Robert Kagan’s “Hobbesian” diagnosis of a divided, every-power-for-itself world, Sullivan agrees this is now the “most plausible” direction.
• But he stresses the situation is not “inevitable”—rebuilding alliances and forging new forms of cooperation is critical after Trump.
• Jake Sullivan:

  "It is the most plausible [outcome], but it is not inevitable... It's imperative for all of us to think creatively: What is a way on the back end of Trump to build something better going forward than what he has left us?" (28:41—30:10)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Iran’s lesson from the crisis:

  “We have taught Iran that a theoretical thing it could do—shut the Strait of Hormuz—it can actually do. And that... is only going to make this regime, which is an even harder line regime than... before.” (07:29—07:46)

• On the U.S.–Israel partnership:

  “The American president should be prepared to say no... [and] it doesn't make sense for us to continue sending weapons in this context.” (17:28—18:01)

• On the world order post-Trump:

  “We can't just go back to the way things were before. You've got to build something new going forward... It is imperative for all of us to think creatively.” (29:20—30:10)

---

Timestamps for Major Segments

• [02:35] Iran standoff – U.S. and Iranian posturing
• [05:36] "Madman theory"—Trump’s unpredictability analyzed
• [08:44] Intelligence forewarning and predictable Iranian response
• [10:58] JCPOA explained and assessed
• [13:38] U.S.–Israel relations and shifting U.S. support
• [19:07] China: Security and economic risks post-Iran war
• [24:48] Russia and the Ukraine war: Putin’s windfall
• [27:21] World order, alliances, and the “Hobbesian” diagnosis

---

Takeaways

• Trump's unpredictable, militaristic policy in Iran has produced negative global reverberations: emboldened adversaries, weakened alliances, energy shocks, and diminished U.S. leadership.
• Iran emerges more confident, Russia and China as strategic winners.
• The U.S.–Israel alliance endures but is under strain; U.S. influence over allies (and adversaries) is much more limited than commonly imagined.
• Repairing world order is possible—but will require creative new arrangements, not a return to “pre-Trump” norms.

---

Jake Sullivan closes on a note of careful optimism:

“It’s imperative for all of us to think creatively... What is a way on the back end of Trump to build something better going forward than what he has left us?” (30:02—30:10)

Transcript

[Bloomberg Advertiser]

Some follow the noise. Bloomberg follows the money. Because behind every headline is a bottom line, whether it's the funds fueling AI or crypto's trillion dollar swings. There's a money side to every story. And when you see the money side, you understand what others miss. Get the money side of the story. Subscribe [e-mail] starting a business can seem like a daunting task unless you have a partner like Shopify. They have the tools you need to start and grow your business. From designing a website to marketing to selling and beyond, Shopify can help with everything you need. There's a reason millions of companies like Mattel, Heinz and Allbirds continue to trust and use them. With Shopify on your side, turn your big business idea into Sign up for your $1 per month trial at shopify.com specialoffer.

[Harry Littman]

Welcome to Talking Feds One on one deep dive discussions with national figures about the most fascinating and consequential issues defining our culture and shaping our lives. I'm your host Harry Littman.

[Interviewer/Host]

I'm thrilled to be speaking with one of the most knowledgeable and experienced experts in foreign policy and national security in the country. Jake Sullivan has been in the room where it happens for much of his incandescent career. Sullivan served as Biden's National Security Advisor for all of Biden's term and back in the Obama administration he was one of the key negotiators of the JCPOA nuclear deal concluded in 2015, the deal that Trump ripped up. He is now the Kissinger professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School and along with his former colleague John Finer, co host the great new podcast Everyone. Check it out. The Long Game he has probably the most gold plated resume I've ever seen. Did I mention Rhodes Scholar and Supreme Court Clerk? But he somehow managed to remain a down to earth guy from Minnesota. Jake Sullivan, thank you so much for joining Talking Feds one on one and my apologies to you and our listeners for my froggy throat.

[Jake Sullivan]

Well Harry, I just hope you're feeling okay and thank you for that very kind introduction.

[Interviewer/Host]

I want to shoot straight to Iran. We're in this strange war truce in which US Strategy seems to be changing twice a week. What do you make of it overall and what clues, if any, do you think we can take from the way both sides seem to be posturing and sending mixed signals about their appetite for negotiation?

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, it's interesting. In some ways it is easier to

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

predict the Iranian side than than the Trump side.

[Jake Sullivan]

The Iranians have made it clear that they are not going to give up entirely their right to enrichment.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

They're not going to completely surrender their nuclear program. They're prepared to do a deal, but it has to be a compromise.

[Jake Sullivan]

And the Iranians have made clear that they are not going to negotiate when they feel that President Trump is just going out every day and saying, I

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

got to bring these guys to heel. I need absolute surrender. I need them to give their dignity up.

[Jake Sullivan]

Because fundamentally, one thing I learned from negotiating with them is they care as

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

much about the pride as they care about the substance. Full stop.

[Jake Sullivan]

Now, the Trump side is harder to predict because I think he doesn't really

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

want to go back to war. He grabbed at that ceasefire a couple of weeks ago when it was offered

[Jake Sullivan]

to him, and he extended it, even without having any kind of negotiations ongoing. And yet he continues to stick to a series of demands that I don't think he's going to achieve. And he continues to stick to the thesis that one day Iran's just going

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

to walk out and surrender if he

[Jake Sullivan]

just squeezes hard enough and long enough.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

And I think that's not true either.

[Jake Sullivan]

And so the result is, I think we're going to see a continuing standoff

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

between the US And Iran for some

[Jake Sullivan]

time to come until President Trump recognizes that unless he's basically willing to do a deal that looks a lot like the deal Obama did, we're likely to be stuck in this circumstance. And who pays the price for that? The American people pay the price for that, because it's just going to keep putting upward pressure on gas prices, it's going to keep putting downward pressure on economic growth. And at the end of the day, the economic pain will be felt increasingly

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

by just working people here in the United States.

[Interviewer/Host]

And I want to talk more about both the consequences and the prospects. But just a quick question about Trump. From what you said, I don't want to ask you to psychoanalyze Trump. That's an avocation I myself have long since abandoned. But he's been all over the map. He lurches here and there. He has bellicose rhetoric, and then, as you say, a desire for a ceasefire. My question is more general. It's whether, as some claim, there's some strategic upside in keeping everyone guessing about what the hell we want and what we're doing, or is it rather, as you see, it's sort of fundamental failure for world power of our perch to be so capricious?

[Jake Sullivan]

You know, Harry, I really did try

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

to keep an open mind to this proposition, the kind of madman theory of international affairs, that if you're unpredictable, you can keep your adversaries off balance. If you keep your adversaries off balance, you can gain leverage and therefore better outcomes for America. Here's my problem with that theory as put into practice by Trump. Number one, the countries to whom he seems to constantly cave are our competitors and adversaries, and the ones he kicks around are our allies.

[Jake Sullivan]

So who is he weakest with? Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and now the Iranians, where he's shown he's worried

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

about continuing to escalate.

[Jake Sullivan]

Who's he toughest with? The ones like the Danes over Greenland

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

or Japan and Korea over tariffs.

[Jake Sullivan]

So I don't buy that the madman theory is actually generating anything vis a

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

vis competitors and adversaries. That's point one, point two on Iran specifically.

[Jake Sullivan]

I think it is a complete sane washing by his defenders to say he's got a grandmaster plan, and it's just everyone else who is uncertain about what

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

he's going to do.

[Jake Sullivan]

He has no idea what he is doing because he has no idea quite

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

why he is doing it.

[Jake Sullivan]

And as a result, where are we right now? Where we are right now is Iran has proven it can shut down the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Strait of Hormuz, which was previously open.

[Jake Sullivan]

Iran has held the world economy hostage,

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

and Americans are paying more at the pump for it.

[Jake Sullivan]

And yet Iran still has missiles and

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

drones, still has highly enriched uranium, and

[Jake Sullivan]

the regime is still intact. So it is difficult for me to see how Donald Trump is actually gonna produce a better situation for the United

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

States of America on the back end

[Jake Sullivan]

of this than we had going in. And there are lots of ways to see in. We have destroyed our credibility with the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

rest of the world who are asking,

[Jake Sullivan]

why the hell did you do this? And we have taught Iran that a theoretical thing it could do, shut the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Strait of Hormuz, it can actually do.

[Jake Sullivan]

And that, in my view, is only

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

going to make this regime, which is an even harder line regime than the one that came before.

[Jake Sullivan]

It's just going to teach them a lesson about the future that is worse for America. So you got to bring receipts if you're going to make the madman theory,

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

and all the receipts are just tallying up to more costs for Americans strategically and economically.

[Interviewer/Host]

Yeah. You know, and it certainly seems to me, at least from the moment when they installed the son of the Supreme Leader, that any sort of regime change was out the window. Would you say it was predictable going in? I mean, it's been sort of maybe the noteworthy aspect on their end as even that while getting pummeled, they've been really insistent on maintaining leverage and they've been able to. Was that predictable, would you say, going in? And do you think, in fact that just about Iran, I certainly want to talk about China, Russia, but just about Iran, we've managed to make it more dangerous to the US and the world in the long run?

[Jake Sullivan]

Yeah, I do think it was predictable, Harry. And in fact it was predicted by the US Intelligence community who would have reported to the President, A, Iran does possess capabilities that can stop traffic through the Strait, and B, eliminating those capabilities

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

is super challenging and a real stretch without putting massive numbers of Americans at risk.

[Jake Sullivan]

And I think the reason President Trump rejected that analysis is because last year

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

in the 12 Day War, Ron didn't really respond that dramatically.

[Jake Sullivan]

And then he pulled off this high

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

risk Maduro raid at the beginning of

[Jake Sullivan]

this year and after that he thought, I don't have to listen to anyone. Military action is consequence free. I can do whatever I want and no one will do anything back to me. And despite the warnings and despite the consistent predictions that this could happen and would happen, President Trump waved it all aside because he basically thought he got to act with impunity in Iran.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

And they didn't have a vote.

[Jake Sullivan]

And they did have a vote, and this is the result. And what it means going forward is that the idea of closing the Strait is no longer just an abstract idea. It's a proven capacity that Iran possesses that it can re up at any point in the future. It knows that, the region knows that, the world knows that. And this, I think, puts the United States in a worse spot today than

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

we were in before this whole thing kicked off.

[Interviewer/Host]

Yeah, you and your podcast co host John Finer had a great piece in the New York Times saying he took the wrong lesson or he might have you predicted accurately that he would from that quick sortie with Venezuela you've mentioned a couple times. Best you think we're going to do is what you and others back more than 10 years ago were able to negotiate with the JCPOA. Can you just flesh that out a little what that was and why you think it's sort of right now our ceiling after these eight weeks or whatever it's been of war.

[Jake Sullivan]

Sure. So the Iran nuclear deal at the end of the day was quite straightforward.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

It was a nuclear agreement which said

[Jake Sullivan]

there is a limit on the capabilities that Iran can have so that it

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

cannot build a nuclear bomb.

[Jake Sullivan]

There are intensive inspections, not just of the defined nuclear sites. But of any facility in Iran that is suspected of housing nuclear activities, the international community, the iaea, the International Atomic Energy Agency, could go visit and make

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

sure was not being used in violation of the agreement.

[Jake Sullivan]

And this agreement, elements of it were in place forever. Other elements of it were in place for a set number of years, 10 or 15 or 25 years. And the notion behind it was we put this in place, we put a lot of time on the clock so that Iran can't get a bomb, and later we can renegotiate elements of it, just as we have with all kinds

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

of arms control agreements through US History.

[Jake Sullivan]

So it was the strongest, tightest nuclear

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

agreement that has ever been produced before. And I believe it verifiably blocked Iran's

[Jake Sullivan]

path to a nuclear weapon, but it didn't entirely eliminate Iran's right to enrich

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

uranium at very low levels. It's right as it's kind of described it.

[Jake Sullivan]

So Trump pulls out of it in 2018, Iran starts scaling up its enrichment program.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

In the years that followed, in the

[Jake Sullivan]

Biden years, we tried to get back into the jcpoa, but the Iranians basically

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

said, we did this with the Democratic president. A Republican pulled out. Why would we go back in?

[Jake Sullivan]

When President Trump came into office, he had a chance actually to go back to a deal, and he chose not to.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

He chose to use military force instead, hoping he could generate regime change or.

[Jake Sullivan]

I don't even know quite what he

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

was hoping to achieve.

[Interviewer/Host]

Maybe just a supposition if Biden then bad, it certainly seems to apply in other areas, right?

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Yeah, exactly.

[Jake Sullivan]

And so now they are looking at negotiating an agreement that basically has the exact same elements as the jcpoa, except

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

for following all of these costs.

[Jake Sullivan]

And that to me is honestly now

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

best case scenario, that we actually can

[Jake Sullivan]

negotiate something like that with an Iran

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

that does feel more empowered, does feel like it has resisted the United States,

[Jake Sullivan]

and has increasing levels of suspicion and concern about doing any deal with the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

United States of America.

[Jake Sullivan]

So we will see what comes out of these negotiations. But I basically see the end game of this looking a lot like that thing we did more than 10 years ago, without all of the pain and

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

strategic cost that has come as a

[Interviewer/Host]

result of this war and deaths. Okay, let's open the focus up a little, starting with Israel, which a lot of your recent writings, Jake, have focused on. But support for Israel among Americans is falling fast. 60% of Americans view Israel unfavorably. Now, in a, in a new Pew poll, 40 US senators voted against sending new weapons there. And you think that that was probably the right decision. So would you say that the US Is on track to weaken or even sever its historic alliance with Israel? And, and if I could load up another a compound question as the lawyers don't like, but just is there a way in which, even as it might have served Israel's shorter term interest more than ours going to war, that the longer term interests of Israel are undermined by this whole sortie in Iran?

[Jake Sullivan]

I think Israel, this particular prime minister

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

and this particular government of Israel have

[Jake Sullivan]

never been able to link operational tactical

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

gains on the battlefield or in a military context to long term strategic gains for Israel. They have simply been unable to convert one into the other. And that very much remains the case with respect to the war in Iran.

[Jake Sullivan]

Tactical gains of hitting a bunch of

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

military targets, reducing some of Iran's missile capabilities and other capabilities, but at the

[Jake Sullivan]

end of the day, strategically not creating

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

greater security for Israel, stability for the region. And certainly from the US perspective, I think our interest and Israel's interest diverge quite dramatically when it comes to this war in Iran.

[Jake Sullivan]

I don't believe we need to sever

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

the relationship between the US and Israel, and I don't think most people believe that either. What they believe is that the US should just operate according to our interests and our foreign policy and make decisions about the security relationship with Israel accordingly.

[Jake Sullivan]

And that I think is likely the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

direction of travel ahead.

[Interviewer/Host]

All right, you know, I had a more general question along these lines because you've been quite reflective, I think, in thinking that perhaps the Biden administration should have put more pressure on Israel as the Gaza war proceeded. Some of your criticism and others kind of suggests that all the, all the US has to do is just, you know, play the music and Israel will dance to the tune. Is it really right that the US and Israel power dynamic works that way? And how do we, and how assuredly do we influence what Israel does? As a general matter, Harry, it's a

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

very fair question because leverage is a complicated thing. And you can't just make other countries do things or make other countries not do things, or even if they're your friend or ally or if you have a huge amount of kind of coercive leverage over them as a competitor or adversary. Leverage has its limitations.

[Jake Sullivan]

And also how you translate conceptual leverage

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

into real world results is massively complicated. And anyone who thinks you can just snap your fingers and make things happen, I don't think has ever sat in the seat and tried to do it.

[Jake Sullivan]

But my view of this is that Israel's a sovereign nation.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

It's going to make its decisions. America's a sovereign nation. We have to make our decisions.

[Jake Sullivan]

And we should try to shape our

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

decisions in ways that point towards better outcomes.

[Jake Sullivan]

And just to give an example of

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

this in the immediate context, when the

[Jake Sullivan]

prime minister of Israel comes to the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

president of the United States and says we should together launch a regime change war in Iran built on flimsy assumptions, uncertain outcomes, and where the costs are going to be substantially borne by cost to American lives, cost at the gas pump, cost to American credibility, the American president should be prepared to say no.

[Jake Sullivan]

And then when it comes to sending more weapons to Israel in the midst of that war, because I believe the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

war is not in our interest, it doesn't make sense for us to continue sending weapons in this context.

[Jake Sullivan]

That, to me, is not about one

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

country dictating to another country or thinking they can just make another country act a certain way.

[Jake Sullivan]

It's about the United States of America

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

deciding what's in its interest and operating accordingly.

[Jake Sullivan]

Do I think ultimately that has some impact on Israel?

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Of course.

[Jake Sullivan]

But do I think it's as simple

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

as you were describing in the setup to your question?

[Interviewer/Host]

No.

[Michael Waldman]

I'm Michael Waldman, host of the Briefing Podcast. I'm a former White House speechwriter, a lawyer, and a constitutional scholar. And I'm president of the Brennan center for Justice. We work to repair and strengthen American democracy, from gerrymandering to abuse of presidential power, from Supreme Court reform to congressional corruption and more. What fun. You're going to hear new ideas in this podcast, and you're going to hear about the strategies and the legal and political fights that will shape the next phase of American politics. If you care about our democracy, the Briefing is a podcast for you, broadening

[Interviewer/Host]

the focus, yet still you've had some really interesting and insightful commentary about China and Russia. There's reason to think that the big switch by Trump is a sort of Putinesque reversal toward the 19th century of Big powers get to do what they want within their ambitious let's start with China. You're especially worried that this war is just the latest development that will lead to us falling behind China in concrete economic ways, but also in sort of world leadership. Can you tell us the risks that you're especially concerned about and what, if anything, the country should be doing to try to arrest China, that trend?

[Jake Sullivan]

I think that there are three layers

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

of risk vis a vis China.

[Jake Sullivan]

The first is kind of the simplest and most straightforward, which is there was

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

a Wall Street Journal article A couple

[Jake Sullivan]

of days ago laying out that we

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

have expended so many munitions in this unnecessary war of choice with Iran that we are not now in a position to be able to effectively mount a campaign, should it be necessary in the

[Jake Sullivan]

Taiwan Strait, that we have created a deterrence gap in Asia because of the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

expenditure of munitions in the Middle East. And that was foreseeable. And yet President Trump chose to take us down this road anyway.

[Jake Sullivan]

Second, our allies, the countries that we need to rely upon to work together

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

with to effectively deal with the China challenge economically and technologically, are looking at us launching this war and screwing their economies and saying, what the hell are you doing?

[Jake Sullivan]

And they are saying, why should we align ourselves with the United States when you effectively are now the disruptor in the world and China is at least pretending to be an agent of stability

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

and calm and so forth.

[Jake Sullivan]

This makes no sense. And I think it has weakened the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

American position to rally a coalition of

[Jake Sullivan]

countries to manage the long term challenge from China.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

And then the third thing I think

[Jake Sullivan]

this is really important is every one of these energy crises, and we are

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

now in the midst of a bona fide energy crisis, tends to produce a

[Jake Sullivan]

change in the international energy mix. And this one is likely to drive

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

a lot of countries around the world to want to diversify away from oil and gas from the Middle East.

[Jake Sullivan]

And where are they going to be looking? Well, they're not going to be looking to the US Because Donald Trump is basically abandoned the United States effort to

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

become a clean energy superpower. They're going to be looking to China.

[Jake Sullivan]

And we could have been competing on that. And we were competing on that with the inflation Reduction act and the massive

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

growth in the American clean energy industry,

[Jake Sullivan]

which is jobs, it's tech, it's competitiveness. And Trump has walked away from that. And so China's sitting back thinking we're going to be the beneficiary of this

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

economically and in terms of countries dependence

[Jake Sullivan]

on us, we're going to be the beneficiaries of this in a distracted America

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

that now has less military capacity to deter us in the Indo Pacific.

[Jake Sullivan]

And we're going to be the beneficiaries of this because the United States is once again fighting with its allies rather

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

than aligning with them.

[Jake Sullivan]

So from their perspective, they just have to sit back and follow the maxim. I think it was originally from Sun Tzu that says, if your enemy is

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

making a mistake, just don't interrupt him.

[Interviewer/Host]

China, at the same time as it repeatedly, week by week, asserts a right to just take over Taiwan, it stays its hand. Do you assume that the conventional wisdom there, or is the conventional wisdom literally the military deterrence, that the US Would storm in, what is the sort of trigger point there? Because you would think they might have long since made their move.

[Jake Sullivan]

I think there are two things going on here. One, I do think that China takes

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

very seriously the American deterrent capability, and that is a relevant factor in their thinking. And no doubt and eroding that is not positive for maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. But the second thing is that right

[Jake Sullivan]

now, China's leadership believes that its current strategy, which is not a D Day style landing on Taiwan, it is persistent, patient, relentless pressure, propaganda, economic pressure, information operations, cyber operations, that the military squeezed through exercises, that this is going to

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

ultimately get Taiwan to capitulate.

[Jake Sullivan]

That is their view. And they think right now that is working. And the more they can say to Taiwan, America can't come to your defense. They're bogged down in the Middle East.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

They're not paying attention to you.

[Jake Sullivan]

Or worse, if Donald Trump goes to Beijing and changes American policy on Taiwan and says basically something that China can grab onto and go to the people of Taiwan and say, see, the American president doesn't care about you at all. This, China believes, is only going to

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

accelerate their ability to absorb Taiwan without having to do the massive military operation.

[Jake Sullivan]

Now, they are planning and exercising and preparing to use force to do it, but they would prefer to do it without using force through this other strategy.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

And they're going to keep trying to

[Jake Sullivan]

do that for the foreseeable future. The big question is at what point do they decide that's not going to work?

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

We got to go for the use of force. And that's something we have to watch very closely.

[Interviewer/Host]

Got it. Okay. And in this sort of dizzying tour of the globe, but I really want to want to take advantage for all the talking listeners of having you. Let's move to Russia with a focus on Ukraine. The war feels like it's created another opportunity for Putin to profit from chaos, including in gasoline, profit from NATO divisions. How is Russia exploiting events in Iran and in particular, what has it all meant for the war in Ukraine?

[Jake Sullivan]

The single biggest immediate tactical advantage he's gotten out of this, you referred to it, is when the price of oil goes up, the way it's gone up and supply gets constricted. The way it's gotten constricted, Russia can

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

sell more of its oil for higher prices and feed all of that money into its war machine.

[Jake Sullivan]

And this has been a Complete gift to Putin economically. He was feeling the pressure, he was feeling the squeeze on his finances.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

And that has been substantially alleviated because of this war.

[Jake Sullivan]

And that's not going to stop. Even if, even if everything ended next week and there was some kind of deal and the strait opened, there's going to be a long tail on that. We're going to see consistent elevated prices,

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

all to the benefit of Vladimir Putin over the course of 2026.

[Jake Sullivan]

Second thing he's benefited from is we

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

can no longer send air defense missiles to Ukraine because we're using them all in the Middle East.

[Jake Sullivan]

And that means when he fires his

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

salvos at Ukrainian cities, there's less to defend those cities and more terror that he can rain down upon the Ukrainian people.

[Jake Sullivan]

And then the third, I mean, he

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

almost can't believe his luck on this one. And you referred to it as, well,

[Jake Sullivan]

President Trump openly fighting with his NATO allies and musing about a fundamental change

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

in America's relationship with NATO.

[Jake Sullivan]

This is like Putin's birthday

[Interviewer/Host]

nana from Moscow, whatever.

[Jake Sullivan]

Absolutely. He cannot believe this. And I think we all have to watch very closely.

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Once this war finally does come to an end, does Donald Trump turn around

[Jake Sullivan]

and say, you guys, you Europeans, you

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

weren't with me on Iran, so therefore I'm downgrading NATO straight up, not just rhetorically, but operationally. He could do that.

[Jake Sullivan]

And I know that, you know, Vladimir

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Putin is spending every day thinking, hey, how do we encourage him along to do that?

[Jake Sullivan]

And that could be one of the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

ultimate long term strategic consequences of this war.

[Interviewer/Host]

Wow. And having been apparently surprised by the pushback in the straits, he's now daily castigating NATO and saying they have to come in, but they had nothing to do with in the first place. Jake, it's so great to be with you. I want to end with a very sort of broad strokes question. I spoke recently with Bob Kagan, who thinks that Trump has basically finished off the peaceful world order the US created after World War II. And we're now in a much more dangerous world where everyone has to rearm to defend themselves rather than depending on the US as kind of global protectors. And strong countries dominate their parts of the world and compete for the border regions. A pretty Hobbesian world. I wonder, I'm sure you've read that piece. I wonder if you endorse his assessment. And just in general, is Trump, even apart from Iran, just making the world a more dangerous place going forward for the United States?

[Jake Sullivan]

I think that Bob Kagan's prediction of where the world is headed is the most plausible. It is the one that you probably be safest to bet on. And I say that without, you know,

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

with, with a great deal of regret that that is what is happening.

[Jake Sullivan]

It is the most plausible, but it is not inevitable. And my reaction to his piece was similar to my reaction to Mark Carney,

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

the Prime Minister of Canada's speech at Davos where he said that we're not in the middle of the transition. We've had a rupture in the international system. And he basically said to countries who

[Jake Sullivan]

are not the United States and not

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

China, we all have to work together because we basically have two adversaries of sorts in these two big powers we got to look out for ourselves.

[Jake Sullivan]

I disagreed with that to a modest extent as well. Only as far as this goes, it's not inevitable that there is a huge

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

amount of repair work to be done.

[Jake Sullivan]

And you can't just go back to

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

the way things were before. You got to build something new going forward.

[Jake Sullivan]

But that's something new. Where the American people want things to be are very different from where Donald

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

Trump wants them to be.

[Jake Sullivan]

And I hope that ultimately shines through. And we can restitch or not restitch, we can stitch new relationships with our

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

allies and partners that will allow us to work together in a cooperative way on things that matter to all of us and matter to the security and prosperity of the American people.

[Jake Sullivan]

I do not think we should throw

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

up our hands and say we're now just in a Hobbesian dog eat dog

[Jake Sullivan]

world, even though, again, that is the

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

direction of travel we're in right now. It is imperative for all of us to think creatively.

[Jake Sullivan]

What is a way on the back

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

end of Trump to build something better going forward than what he has left us for sure.

[Jake Sullivan]

But also that looks different but still

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

delivers a degree of prosperity and cooperation and does not descend into the kind of dark picture that Bob Kagan has very, very articulately painted.

[Interviewer/Host]

Jake Sullivan, such a privilege to all of our Talking Feds listeners to have you with us. I hope we can do it again. Best of luck with your great new podcast with John Finer, the Long Game, and talk to you later.

[Jake Sullivan]

Thank you so much, Harry. Love your podcast and I hope your

[Jake Sullivan (continued)]

listeners will come over and listen to ours as well. Thank you.

[Interviewer/Host]

As they should. Bye bye.

[Harry Littman]

Thank you for tuning in to One on One, a weekly conversation series from Talking Feds. If you like what you've heard, please tell a friend to subscribe to us on Apple Podcasts or wherever they get their podcasts and please take a moment to rate and review the show. You can also subscribe to us on YouTube, where we are posting full episodes and daily updates on top legal stories. Check us out on substack harry littman.substack.com where we're posting two or three bulletins a week breaking down the various threats to constitutional norms and the rule of law. And Talking Fez has joined forces with the Contrarian I'm a founding contributor to this new media venture committed to reviving the diversity of opinion that feels increasingly rare in today's news landscape, where legacy media seems to be tacking toward Trump for business reasons rather than editorial ones. Rest assured, we're still the same scrappy independent podcast you've come to know and trust just now linked up with an ambitious and vital project designed for this pivotal moment in our nation's legal and political discourse. Find out [e-mail] thanks for tuning in. And don't worry, as long as you need answers, the Feds Will Keep Talking Talking Feds is produced by Lou Cregan and Katie Upshaw, associate producer Becca Haveian, sound Engineering by Matt McArdle, Rosie, Dawn Griffin, David Lieberman, Hamsum Hadrenathan, Emma Maynard and Hallie Necker are our clients. Contributing writers and production assistants by Akshaj Turbailu. Our music, as ever, is by the amazing Philip Glass. Talking Feds is a production of Doledo llc. I'm Harry Littman. Talk to you later.

[Interviewer/Host]

Foreign.

[Mint Mobile Advertiser]

Reynolds here from Mint Mobile with a message for everyone paying big wireless way too much. Please, for the love of everything good in this world, stop with Mint. You can get premium wireless for just $15 a month. Of course, if you enjoy overpaying. No judgments. But that's weird. Okay, one judgment anyway. Give it a [e-mail] Switch upfront payment

of $45 for three month plan equivalent to $15 per month required Intro rate first three months only, then full price plan options available, taxes and fees extra. See full terms at mintmobile. Com.