B (3:24)

So in the tech Coup. You describe a global power ship, not through tanks or elections, but through code platforms and algorithms and argue that democracies didn't just fall behind in the digital age, they were outmaneuvered. So before we get into the free speech and sovereignty, can you briefly explain how did this happen and why? What makes it a coup instead of, say, just a disruption?

C (3:50)

Right. So I wanted to show that the growing power, power grab, but also outsourcing to tech companies with, you know, profit incentives is a threat to democracy and that it's a systemic problem. So for a lot of people, when they hear technology and democracy, they may think about disinformation, which is very important, or they may think of, you know, social media and foreign manipulation of the public debate and so on. Those are again, very important. But I see a much more systemic, wider problem that also includes infrastructure, that also includes cybersecurity, scanning for risk, really a sort of, you know, systemic way in which think about aspects of our lives, of our societies and try to imagine an area where tech companies are not powerful. You know, digitization often means privatization. And so what I want to show in the book, and this was before Trump got elected for the second time, is how tech companies, the CEOs, are increasingly in positions of decision making power on issues that are very consequential, whether it's on, you know, discrimination or whether it is on national security, or whether it is on who gets to participate economically. These are the governors of our time. And I think what's lacking is countervailing powers, independent checks and balances, you know, transparency and accountability. And that's why it's such a problem.

B (5:20)

I mean, I agree with you. You also write that the digital revolution has seen private companies increasingly take on functions normally assumed by states, leading to a concerning erosion of agency and accountability. And as you said, you wrote this before the Trump administration, before we saw the leaders of Silicon Valley sitting at the front of the inauguration, before we saw the integration of Silicon Valley AI products into the government and Doge. It feels to me like we've really seen an increase in this problem. But what do you see? Is there is anything different now or are we kind of just on the same path that we started?

C (6:02)

Well, I think it's all accelerating. And in many ways the role that President Trump is giving to tech CEOs is sort of the logical next step. If you look at the buildup of their growing power, the aspiration to not only disrupt markets, but also disrupt governments, disrupt states, disrupt democracy. And I just see a power hunger among These tech companies that of course wouldn't stop at borders, wouldn't stop at laws. That's sort of been the mantra from the beginning. But what is new now, and it's unfortunately very problematic for those of us who have aspirations of seeing democratic regulations around AI and other technologies, is that the US Is no longer participating. So where the rest of the world is concerned with safety risks of AI, wants to govern AI, the US Is not participating anymore. The Trump administration has a deregulatory agenda, has a very anti European agenda in which tech regulation is one of the key focal points. And when I wrote the tech coup, I was still hopeful that there would be forces in the US that we could count on, that there was a shared interest in seeing some aspects of our lives, of the public interest, of our national security, not disrupted. And it's been dramatic to see the extent to which the Trump administration has changed the potential of the US of being a part of that sort of global democratic coalition to also govern technologies. And so that's a dramatic shift and one that we have to reckon with in many ways, especially in Europe, but certainly also when it comes to tech and the need to have those countervailing

B (7:47)

powers in place, it feels to me like that might be something that is fundamentally different. Because, of course, the Obama administration also did a lot to bring tech into government, created new roles for tech, new links with Silicon Valley. We've seen several countries open embassies in Silicon Valley and have ambassadors to Silicon Valley, which is, I think, a reflection of that power. And, you know, even under the Obama administration as well, they exported a lot of these protectionist trade policies that protected big tech platforms that, you know, forced other countries to adopt Section 230 style protections against intermediary liability, et cetera.

C (8:36)

So

B (8:38)

the difference, it sounds like today, you're saying, is that it's accelerating, but it's also kind of more of the same. Help us understand how different is this? Because it seems like American tech companies have been dominating the economy and the information system in Europe for at least the past, what, 15 years.

C (8:59)

Oh, I absolutely agree. And I think we've all been naive about, you know, the, the harms and the, the excesses that we would see, you know, emerging as these companies just grew and grew and grew. So you're right that Obama really leaned social media companies, data analytics for his election. And it was very much combined with a promise of more democracy, that this was a way to empower people to give a voice to the unheard. And the companies at the time, even if they were powerful, were of course, less powerful than they are today. Since President Obama was in office, maybe thanks to him being in office, we've seen companies like Google growing seriously, but also Facebook, meta, Microsoft, all these big tech companies are now so much bigger and have so many more functions than they had at the time that their role in society is much more of a sort of foundational character than of a sectoral character or of even a product. You know, you can't even think about them as products anymore because they have so much data that they can then use for new services, training AI models, but also understanding things about society that are incomparable to what other entities have access to. And so the potential for abuse, for manipulation, for using that information with political agendas is now manifesting itself. And I do think that that's different. So in my book, I point out to the power that CEOs have. I mean, I vividly remember all these discussions when especially Americans were challenging the legitimacy of European regulations. And they said, oh, my gosh, who wants a minister of truth? No censorship, no intervention is sort of similar to what we hear Vice President Vance saying now that Europe is censoring. But of course, at the time already we knew that Mark Zuckerberg was essentially the minister of truth, that there is no neutrality in these technologies. There never was. Not politically, not economically. But what is new now is that the alliances are so much more explicit. So where the companies might have still pretended that they did not make choices, they wanted policy to stay away. That's why they took this hands off approach, because I think they, they were afraid to step into the political minefields of where the limits of free speech were and so on. Right now, they're explicitly aligning themselves with this administration, supporting the president, calling for his help when there are antitrust fines coming from Europe, when there are regulations coming from Europe, and they are explicitly saying, we are in the world to strengthen the United States of America. If you listen to someone like Alex Karp, the CEO of Palantir, highly controversial company, been preaching the dominance of the West. But of course, the west has been destroyed by this president and it has had no consequences for what Palantir does. If you look at Mark Zuckerberg, he has really come around to be much more conservative, much more aligned with Trump. Someone like Sam Altman as well, was asking for AI regulations, is now so happy that Trump administration is having a deregulatory agenda. So it's more explicit how politicized things are, where these companies stand and how blatant they are in supporting the U.S. even deploying people in the U.S. armed services.

B (12:26)

Right. I mean, it really is amazing just how politicized, because, of course, we've seen informal efforts by governments to influence the content moderation policies of platforms, you know, to get them to implement their terms of service through, you know, Internet referral units or during public health crises like Covid. But this seems to be particularly different. Right. We saw, for example, that X algorithms systematically amplified extremist and far, far right content during the German elections where far right parties were boosted disproportionately after the mass stabbing in the UK where we've seen Elon Musk personally intervene to amplify voices that he favors that aligns with President Trump, including manipulating not just X, but also his chatbot Grok, which, by the way, is now authorized for use in the US Government to push white genocide myths, pro Nazi talking points, et cetera. And, you know, we've seen Facebook permitting state propaganda and promoting, again, a lot of extremist content. We saw Google and Apple app stores give in to pressure from the administration to remove what are called ICE tracking apps, essentially, to be able to track, you know, where ICE agents are going to. So we've really seen, I think I have to agree with you, that it's kind of an escalation and more of some of these interventionists and explicitly politicized intervention. I think back to our first meeting. I think it was 2011, when, as you said, these platforms were fundamentally different. Human rights activists, democracy activists, were able to use them to help bypass state censorship of mainstream media, to reach the global media. And back then, we used to talk about digital sovereignty as a problematic concept being used by authoritarian states or states that want to control their information environment. I would say from a negative perspective, but now it seems that we're talking about digital sovereignty, and there's a lot more agreement and a lot more usage of that term and concept by democracies, by their European Union. What do you think about this idea of digital sovereignty? And are we talking about something different than we did before? Is it just, as you said, everything is so different now?

C (15:05)

Well, I think both. So, on the one hand, having state control in a authoritarian state has different consequences than having jurisdictional control in a democracy. So even if you could argue that they're both sovereignty meaning that the companies have to comply to the laws of the land, the consequences for people, I mean, human rights defenders first and foremost. But think about journalists or others who are critical of the powers that be, of course, what you may face as a result of expressing critical viewpoints towards the sitting government in an authoritarian state is fundamentally different than what you might face in any EU member state, because there also charter fundamental rights and so on. So consequences are different. But I think this was a reckoning that was long overdue. The idea that the global Internet would just sort of ignore political conflicts, nations, borders, the laws of the land was just, I think a vision that for a long time had support from the democracies in the world because they thought it could be a vehicle towards democratization. That indeed the empowerment of human rights defenders, critics, opposition leaders in authoritarian states through these tech platforms would be a net plus from a democracy point of view. But right now, speaking from a European perspective, it feels like a huge risk that we are so dependent on US technologies that through decisions by the executive, adoption of sanctions or the independent choices of the CEOs, Elon Musk taking a stand for the far right in the German elections and other elections is becoming a huge risk. So the US has changed and therefore the view of US technologies has changed. The alliance is at a greater tension than it's ever been. This has consequences for defense, but also for digital. And I think actually European responses are not even going far enough. So we hear talk about digital sovereignty, but it's hard to actually identify what is done differently on a day to day basis than what we saw maybe two years, five years, 10 years ago. And so I think we actually need much more dramatic investments, the use of procurement as a leverage. So looking at the criteria that would allow the rescinding of existing contracts, looking at new criteria for new contracts, because if you boil it down, Europeans, including European taxpayers, through their governments, are subsidizing the success of Silicon Valley, are feeding the monster that's attacking them at the same time. And that it doesn't add up, it doesn't make sense. And so it's really urgent that this sovereignty gets more meat on the bones. So more substance to it, rather than being a slogan, a motto, a strategic perspective, which it's great that there is alignment. I think everybody agrees we need a Euro stack, we need more strategic autonomy. But now let's make it work, make it actionable.

B (18:20)

Yes, I mean that makes me think about, for example, the UK procuring cloud services from, was it Microsoft or Amazon? Right. So part of the challenge, isn't it that these big tech platforms are so dominant, Right. They have such a corner on the market. And I think that as the, you know, AI revolution is underway, there's this idea that if you somehow regulate AI, you're going to impede innovation and competition. And yet it seems to me like we're not really talking about what are we innovating towards, what are we competing for? Because if China is our base model, is that going to lead us to the type of societies we want? But can Europe really realistically have an alternative given the market dominance throughout the tech stack, throughout the AI stack again, the infrastructural cloud, underwater sea cables, satellites, social media, search app stores, devices. I mean, where should Europe focus its efforts on digital sovereignty?

C (19:32)

Well, you mentioned the uk and I do have to just mention for the record that, that this UK government, despite being of progressive signature, is just a cheerleader for Big Tech. It's remarkable and it's been very revealing to see the amount of sucking up to Big Tech on the EU front. Look, I hear a lot of people concerned that this is going to be an uphill battle. And I agree it will be hard, but I will only evaluate something when it's been attempted and we haven't tried. So I think we should give it our best, see the urgency not just from an economic perspective, and I think that this is really important, but also from a self determination of individuals, sovereignty of states, national security. What does it mean if you don't have control over the entire stack of your communications channels? I mean, I was talking to people in civil society recently and just asking out loud like, okay, if you want to have some kind of campaign, be it against the genocide in Gaza, be it against Trump, be it for gay rights, what have you, and you would have to imagine mobilizing and reaching people without using social media. Where would you go? We really have to unlearn or reshuffle where we go. And I think looking at Ukraine actually gives me inspiration. Who would have thought that they would be the key innovative producers of drones, say five years ago? And we all know that it's for very sad reasons. We really would have wished that Russia had not invaded the country and that they would not have been forced to innovate in defense and warfare to simply defend their territory. But this is where we are. And so it shows that things that seem difficult, with a great sense of urgency can be solved. And unlike Ukraine, the EU is much more wealthy, has enormous foundations to build on, of industry, of investment, and also of European innovations and tech products. They have just never been prioritized, not by governments, not by citizens. But if I listen around me, everybody, everybody is talking about the need to be less dependent because people are Concerned, they see what can happen. They also see a US President who would have ever thought that would be possible, personally intervene in the businesses that are American, taking a stake, forcing a sale to a friend. I've often wondered what would responses of Republicans be if Democrats would have pulled this off? I mean, we would have heard accusations of communism all around, I'm sure. But this is now a Republican president personally intervening, taking stakes in companies, that just upsets the whole notion of what the private sector is, what the relationship with the government is, and also the assessment of what, what the impact of our dependence on US technologies is. In fact, dependence on US Tech was never really a topic. Now it's a huge issue.

B (22:40)

Yes, I agree. And I want to really hone in on the free speech aspect of this. Right, because I think we have seen an escalation of attacks on free speech in the United States, on media, the use of regulatory coercion and strong arming to get money from big media, as you've said, the business deals that the administration has done with tech companies, including subsidies, but as well as direct deals with the President. What are you worried about in terms of freedom of speech? As you see these deals taking place, as you see this effort to control speech history, the cutting off access to research, redoing Smithsonian's history, all of this in the US and yet there's this rhetoric by the US that Europe is not as free speech protective, that somehow, you know, laws against hate speech or the Digital Service act is akin to censorship. What's your response to that?

C (23:53)

Well, initially, let me just be clear. I think all the statements by this president and his supporters, whether it's the vice president or the CEOs of the tech companies that are claiming to be pro free speech while they're picking up students who are writing a critical op ed or they are pushing cable networks to push stand up comedians or what you call it, talk show hosts off the air. Everybody sees that the rhetoric around free speech of this administration and its supporters is a lie. And so I guess they need a scarecrow to pretend this is still true. And that scarecrow apparently is Europe. And look, they have the freedom to say that that's fine. We actually have freedom of speech. We have laws that are somewhat different from the United States. But I think there's no ground in all these accusations of censorship. Actually the Digital Services act doesn't say what can and cannot be said. It just puts obligations on the platforms to make sure illegal speech that's already illegal according to the law does not get spread and that in an extreme situations, like take the pandemic as an example, if it is concluded that disinformation has an impact, a substantial impact on public health, or if there's a systemic threat to democracy, for example, by foreign interference in elections, that platforms have to act. So I think what's good about the EU situation is that it's explicit, it's legal. The path to challenge these laws are clear. In the US a lot of curation of information is happening, a lot of intervention in speech is happening, but it's all political. It's not according to the law, it's implicit. It's through pressure and intimidation. This whole notion that the US is somehow the torch bearer of free speech doesn't hold up in Trump's America.

B (25:52)

And when we look to Europe and the Digital Services Act, I think what I see happening is not necessarily a robust defense. Right. There's a debate over whether Europe is going to enforce the dsa, the Digital Markets act, the EU AI Act. And as you pointed out, these are democratically enacted laws. How do you think that Europe should be responding? You said they're not doing enough in terms of actually putting their money where their mouth is and their procurement dollars. But what about with respect to how it's standing up for rule of law in Europe?

C (26:35)

Well, it's a big question hanging over Brussels and something that concerns people a lot. How rigorous is the enforcement of these laws going to end up being when the pressure grows? And we've seen concerning steps, you know, where Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has essentially censored, there is censorship in Europe, has censored a member of the European Commission and basically urged her not to talk about a competition case against Google, even though competition is in her portfolio. So what I gather is that this is obviously of significant strategic consideration that Commission President von der Leyen has made the Schef sache so something that she wants to decide about. But I think the ultimate decisions about the strictness of enforcement and what might or might not be negotiated with the US has not been made and that they're keeping some cards to their chest. But I think the fact that this is now an open question is bad. You need to have absolute clarity that laws that are adopted will be enforced. Otherwise the, the sort of credibility and the legitimacy of the laws that indeed have come about through the normal democratic process begins to corrode. And I think that that would be a threat to sovereignty as well. So we think about tech sovereignty in terms of building infrastructure, building a tech stack that's one aspect. But the other aspect of tech sovereignty is also to stay firm on the tech regulation that is on the books and that simply needs to be enforced, no matter who is pushing back against it.

B (28:14)

I think that is a very insightful point that I hope, you know, the, the Europeans hear, because it does feel like there is this split in what used to be the democracies of the world that would stand up for these fundamental human rights. And despite the market dominance, you know, there had been some movements in recent years to leverage competition authority to use the powers of antitrust intervention and pro competition policy. But then we've seen what I think many, including, you know, myself, would see as a lackluster set of remedies for Google's illegal monopoly on search. We don't know what's going to happen with ad tech yet, but we also saw Europe impose some pretty massive fines on Google. So it seems like, you know, the, the jury is still out on the competition front. Do you think that we need to be looking to antitrust and competition authorities, more so than kind of the political side of things at this point, to break up the power of these corporations?

C (29:20)

Well, the competition authorities are independent. What I would look to most is the enforcement of the Digital Services act, because it's very clear that the Trump administration takes most issue with that. And it's interesting, right, because there's also an AI act that we don't hear as much criticism about. There's really a fierce opposition to the Digital Services act, and it's probably because the platforms, the social media companies, are the vehicle to influence populations, to spread information or to have an impact on elections. The public debate, what have you, as we've seen with the infamous German example and X. So I think it's very striking it may change. With regards to the AI act, of course, we've heard strong words from the White House, but we've also seen American companies supporting the code of practice, you know, committing to it because they understand that their consumers are in Europe. And if you want to do business in Europe, you have to abide by the law, whether you're selling toys or selling AI. That's normal. So we'll have to see. But I hope that the European Commission is increasingly appreciating the urgency here, that there's no room for nostalgia. The transatlantic relation as we've known it is done. And I think a number of political leaders are still trying, look at what the UK is doing, to keep hammering on this special relationship, on history, not really accepting the bitter reality. I don't want to gloss over that. It's very, very hard. It's a dark moment in geopolitics, in the transatlantic relation. But I think the only way that populations can be prepared to do what it takes is also if their leaders accept the reality that Trump has created. This is not something Europe wanted, but it's a reality we're confronted with and now have to step up to draw the consequences and make radical choices the way that we've shored up investments in defense. The same kind of action, boldness is needed for digital sovereignty.

B (31:25)

Well, action and boldness is indeed needed for digital sovereignty and for true protection of free speech. I want to thank you, Richard, so much for coming on, talking about this. I want to thank you for your book the Tech how to Save Democracy from Silicon Valley and Despite the Dark Times, for shining a light on these topics and standing up for human rights, democracy, democracy and the sovereignty of other democracies. So with that, thank you so much for joining us. Thanks for being on Tech Tank. And until next time, thank you.

A (32:07)

Thank you for listening to TechTank, a series of roundtable discussions and interviews with technology experts and policymakers. For more conversations like this, subscribe to the podcast and sign up to receive the Tech Tank newsletter for more research and analysis from the center for Technology Innovation at Brookings.