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- [00:00]
Saeed Husseini
Foreign.
- [00:17]
William Shorkey
Welcome back to the AIAC Podcast. My name is William Shorkey and you are listening to this, which is Africa is a country's destination for analysis on current affairs both on the continent and elsewhere from a Pan African and Left perspective. This week we are featuring the Nigerian Scam as guest hosts once again. It's our final episode of the year and host Saeed Husseini and Emeka Ugu dive into the complex and often contentious relations between Nigeria and South Africa. Joined by Africa is a country's sharp critic and writer Kania McHali. Very timely episode. With a mix of humor, depth and analysis, the trio unpacks everything from xenophobia and identity politics to Afrobeats and Afcon rivalries. Along the way, they tackle how cultural exchanges, economic tensions and historical solidarities shape the interactions between these two continental heavyweights. Tune in for a lively and thought provoking exploration of what unites and divides these two powerhouses of the global South. Enjoy.
- [02:02]
Saeed Husseini
We are recording this episode at a moment in which Bola Tinubu, the beloved President of Nigeria, is currently on a bilateral visit to South Africa to catch up with his equally widely admired counterpart, Cyril Ramaphosa. Judging by the amorous visuals that have come out of the visit so far, an uninformed observer might be forgiven for assuming that the two nations as represented by their amiable leaders are best of friends, united by a historical bond of tender affection and brotherly love. On the other hand, if you know anything about these two countries, and especially if you've been on on Twitter of late, then you'll be aware that the diplomatic niceties at the official level are barely masking some fairly thorny citizen to citizen interactions between Nigeria and South Africa. A lot of the interaction arguably has fallen within the realm of harmless and mildly humorous online banter, but some of it has definitely spilled over into some fairly nasty real world incidents, including acts of deliberate sabotage and some fairly hostile clashes. The so called Bolt for Bolt battle between Lagos and Johannesburg and the fallout over a Miss South Africa contest where a contestant of Nigerian heritage appeared to be gaining ground are just a few of the more recent examples that come to mind. So in light of all of this, we thought to have a conversation today about Nigeria South Africa relations. What's going on between the two nations? What's driving the vitriol, and what would a normal relationship look like? To explore these questions and hopefully today find a permanent solution to the conundrum, we are joined by a very capable guest who is no stranger to readers of Africa as a Country, but is a first timer on the Nigerian scam. So very happy to have her. And I'm speaking of none other than the respected Africa as a country staff writer and critic, our friend and comrade, Kanye. Kanye, thank you for joining us today.
- [04:04]
Kanya McHali
Thank you for having me. I hope I can offer some sound contributions to this topic.
- [04:10]
Saeed Husseini
We'll try our best, all of us. So listen, I mean, maybe the place to start is, is with the most recent episodes, and I'm thinking particularly of the whole fallout around Miss South Africa contest, you know, involving someone called Chidima, additional from not mispronouncing her last name, you know, and a host of characters in, In South Africa. So I don't know, maybe you could walk us through a bit that, that incident, which I'm, I'm sure folks, you know, will be kind of familiar with, at least at the surface level, and then maybe give us your take on whether or not it's fair to say that Nigeria has, has won this round.
- [04:55]
Kanya McHali
Well, I guess I'll concede that win to, to you guys. You certainly came off. We did. So just to give some of our listeners some context. Chidima was part of a group of contestants who had enrolled in Miss South Africa. And for some odd reason, beauty pageants have a huge hold on our country. We take a great interest in them. And so when her profile came up on X specifically, there was outrage around whether she was South African enough to compete in the competition. And, you know, initially there was thought that perhaps this would die down, that it was just a couple of, you know, rage baiters looking for engagement. But it continued to spiral. And I think when she was announced as a finalist, it got especially bad. There was a video of her and her father and the rest of her family celebrating the fact that she was a finalist. And people were extraordinarily upset about it because her father was in traditional regalia. And, you know, people felt like it was an affront to, you know, have her compete in South Africa. And so it ended up sort of culminating in the Minister of Home affairs launching an investigation into her nationality. And it was alleged that her mother, who happens to be of Mozambican descent, committed identity fraud. And so what made this especially ugly was that there were lots of Africans who claimed to be doing this in the name of cracking down on corruption. But really, this was naked xenophobia. This was people responding to the fact that Chidima supposedly did not have a South African sounding name and surname and punishing her for that. And so she was forced to withdraw from the competition. Her safety was at risk, her family safety was at risk. And you know, I would characterize it as one of the darker moments in our recent history as a democracy. I think it was just a symbol of how bad things have gotten and how much xenophobia continues to fuel this anti African sentiment. And so, you know, Chidima thankfully got to compete for Nigeria in Miss Universe and was actually the runner up and was crowned, I think Miss Universe, I think Africa and Oceania if I'm not mistaken. So it was a win for her. But I often think, you know, at what cost did that win have to arrive? This is someone who was born and bred in South Africa, who, you know, hails from Soweto, one of the most infamous black townships in our country. You know, this is the only home she knew and yet she was made to feel like an outsider. And mind you, she's only 23. You know, this is a very young adult. So, you know, again, it was a really dark chapter in our recent history and I think it had really sort of demonstrated how out of control xenophobia has gotten in South Africa.
- [08:25]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, very interesting. Lots of elements of that I actually didn't know about before, including how young she is supposed makes sense like a lot of these pageants often like pretty young contestants. But I think it makes the whole thing a little, you know, less funny, to be honest. And yeah, I mean, I guess, you know, one thing that comes to mind as you narrate that episode is, is the question of citizenship in South Africa. And has it, has, has it always been this fraught? And I mean, of course we're talking about South Africa right now only because, you know, it's just how we've entered into the conversation. A lot of what you're describing actually could, could describe Nigeria as well. And we'll certainly come back to sort of explain some of that. But yeah, I mean. Right, yeah. But I wonder, like, okay, citizenship maybe is a little. Can go in maybe a lot of directions, but. But maybe nationality or something like, has it always been this fraud or is this a particularly low point? Just curious as to how you sort of think through the trajectory of, you know, this dynamic.
- [09:33]
Kanya McHali
Sure. So I'd say there's two parts to this answer. So citizenship or nationality. You know, the interesting part is that before the arrival of democracy in 1994, black South Africans were not considered South African. The apartheid government implemented this system whereby black people were considered residents of a so called homeland or what we called Bantustans. Right. So black South Africans were not considered natives of South Africa. In fact, they had to have permits to work in South Africa proper, if you can call it that. So this issue, you know, it's very illuminating because I think it demonstrates the extent to which the idea of nationality or citizenship has long been very tenuous in this country. And, you know, the people who were giving Chitima so much trouble would not have been considered South African not too long ago, you know, and so I think we are holding on to these apartheid constructs. I think so much of our understanding of South Africanness is fraught because, you know, I'd argue that I don't necessarily think we have a coherent national identity, you know, and even in the context of South Africa, there are certain ethnic groups who are subjected to these citizenship or nationality tests. Right? And I'll be specific here. So Vendor people in particular and Tonga people in particular, they are often outcasted and marginalized in South Africa. They are not considered South Africa, South African enough. You know, so. So much of this is driven by. By anti blackness. So much of it is driven by a perception that certain ethnic groups are supposedly more South African than others. And so I think to your other point, what's happened at the moment, you know, I think it is especially fraught because, you know, in 1994, we had the rise of rainbow nationalism or rainbowism, right? South Africa was considered the rainbow nation. And this was an attempt to construct a national identity. However, the critics of rainbow nationalism would argue that it kind of papered over the racial tensions that had been left post apartheid. And, you know, it was essentially the equivalent of placing a band aid on like a gaping wound. However, in the years that South Africa has deteriorated and we've, you know, experienced what, you know, some might categorize as de development, there has been been this resurgence of rainbow nationalism, but it has a desperate quality to it. It has a darker quality to. Has obviously been influenced by the rise of fascism globally. And so you have people clinging to this kind of nationalism. And it's a reactionary type of nationalism. It's a prickly kind of nationalism. And so I think it's kind of colored. The. It's only enhanced this type of xenophobia because people are clinging to this idea that we need to protect South Africa at all costs. That South African belongs to South Africans, yet if you look at our constitution, it states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it. You know, so we're at this moment where these global factors are shaping how South Africans engage with their identity or Their perception of what it means to be South African, which, funnily enough, we never really figured out what that was. So it's, it's just, again, it's just a demonstration of where we're at, not just as a country, but just as a global community. You know, things have become increasingly fascist and dark and scary now.
- [13:35]
Saeed Husseini
Fair enough. Also very relatable, unfortunately, like, especially when you think about Nigerians or Nigerian ethnic groups or nationalities that live on the borders, you know, physically, like the people, you know, Tuaregs in the north, northeast, or kind of the religious borders as well, or kind of identitarian borders like the Shia community. You know, it's very easy for the kind of Nigerian ness to be stripped, not to talk of, you know. Yeah, like migrants who of course, as usual, kind of become the scapegoats when there's economic downturns and such. So, yeah, it's. We often point the accusing finger, I guess. You know, Nigeria does. But, you know, a lot of this sounds extremely familiar. Let me hand over to Megh, who had some funny thoughts. Yeah.
- [14:39]
Emeka Ugu
So thank you again, Kanya, for that really detailed background, you know, and yeah, and I think, yes, that I also agree with, you know, Saeed, that, you know, they're often even doing it in its own localized context, you know, instances of similarities between xenophobia and our own brand of it, even though it's a bit more internal. So I think, yes, that while there are similarities, there are also some differences, I'd say. And this makes me think about, you know, how perhaps that what one instance of this difference might just be found in the ways that maybe Nigerians interrogate whiteness, you know, quite apart from the way that maybe black South Africans do. So even though you, you had, you know, in answering Tight's second question, you had begun to answer, you know, the question that, ah, that's. That's popping in my own head, you know, would you think, you know, that. That there's an economic nationality to see South African, you know, xenophobia. And you know, off the back of that, do you also consider that, you know, that there is an extent to which intra African migration is used to. To discipline South African workers? You know, because, I mean, I suspect that part of what explains xenophobia is the level of inequality in South Africa. I mean, there's a time that I kept track of those numbers, but not anymore. So I. But I also know that economically South Africa is at a better place than, you know, where Nigeria is. But I don't know if this question Makes any sense to you or something that you. You might want to. If it's something that you might want to attempt.
- [16:57]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, of course. So you're asking whether there's an economic component to the xenophobia in South Africa. Is that the first question that you posed?
- [17:12]
Emeka Ugu
Yes.
- [17:14]
Kanya McHali
I mean, certainly I'd actually argue that that is quite literally driving much of the resentment towards other African nationals. It's the perception that. And again, you see it all over the world. Right. It's not unique to South Africa. It's not unique to any country on the continent, but there's a perception that, you know, other African nationals are coming in and they're taking our jobs, even though there are no jobs to take. Right. Our unemployment rates are astronomically high. Right. So there's the sense of. Of. Of competition, the sense of, you know, other African nationals taking jobs that are already so poorly paying. And so I think that's a component to it. And I think it's a lot easier for South Africans to direct that resentment and anger to African nationals because they live not just in proximity with them, but amongst them. Right. This is usually in either urban areas, they see African nationals in and amongst them, whereas it would be a lot harder for a black South African to resent, let's say, a white European immigrant. They're not proximate to them. Exactly. And there's plenty of them. Right. And. And in our case, that person would usually, you know, be their boss or would usually occupy an economic status that would not enable black South Africans to kind of challenge that. So, you know, I think. Because something that kind of struck me, you know, just to go back to the Chidima scandal, was that I look at someone like Trevor Noah, for example. Trevor Noah is the child of a white Swiss father who came to South Africa during apartheid. Right. The fact that nobody found that weird was, you know, quite interesting and telling to me, at least. But, you know, she's the product of a white Swiss father and a black Hosa South African woman. And yet no one would ever even deny that Trevor Noah is South African. And they'd argue, well, you know, Trevor Noah grew up in Soweto. You know, he speaks African languages, or South African languages in this case. But who's to say that Chidima doesn't. Right. Chidima also grew up in Soweto, So I think race does play a part in it. And I think, you know, unfortunately, white, white South Africans, they occupy a kind of aspirational position in our country, at least economically. So from my perspective, at least, I think black South Africans are reluctant to sort of direct their ear towards them because there's an aspirational component to it. Those are the people whose lifestyles we want, you know, so we're not really going to attack them. We're going to attack the people we live amongst. And so, yeah, I don't think you can discuss xenophobia without looking at the economics of it all, without looking at the fact that post 94, things have barely changed. If anything, they've become increasingly worse. And in South Africa, there's just this nationwide decay. There's an account on X called Josie Voices Josie, and it examines just the decaying infrastructure, the fact that our roads have plenty of potholes, traffic lights are not working. You know, just in the span of 10 years, we've seen this rapid deterioration. So that definitely plays a part in things. And it makes it a lot easier for. For black South Africans to point the finger at other African nationals, as opposed to kind of looking at our economic system, our labor system, which still remains, you know, it still has, like, the vestiges and just the legacy of apartheid written all over it.
- [21:15]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, all right.
- [21:17]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah. So, but just before I hand you over to Saeed, you know, for any other question that you might have, I think there's a second component to my question which perhaps I didn't quite, you know, flesh out in a way that maybe you would have understood it. So my reading of South Africa from afar. Yeah. And I must, you know, insist that this is a reading that's from far. Is that post the rainbow? I think you made reference to it. So I'm trying to see if I'm using it right. The rainbow generation era. That's, you know, post 94, post end of apartheid. Is it the case that the. The way the South African economy is structured is not radically different? And I think that by this I'm trying to also gauge what the ANC had done after the end of apartheid once it gained power. Compared to a bit of how I understood South Africa to have worked during apartheid with regards to how black businesses were owned, you know, and I think that I read somewhere that it was the taxi business, you know, that black South Africans quite, you know, coming out of apartheid or even during apartheid had a hold of. That's where they kind of built their economic base. I don't know how different, you know, the economics of it is today, you know, as. So the question, my accent is South Africa grown beyond just taxis and taxes around forming the bedrock of, you know, the black South African economic base, you know, and perhaps that, you know, now we have, you know, just built up economic base that have branched into other sectors of the, the South African economy such that, you know, trying to, to wrestle the idea of, you know, how, how much xenophobia tribes in South Africa that migrants, you know, black migrants into South Africa, especially in parts of, of South Africa's, you know, places like Soweto, for instance, whether there's a conflict of them coming in and then, you know, sort of tussling for a share of that economic base in whatever sector, you know, so that. Is there a way in which the black South African worker who's probably not working in the mines is being punished or even working in the mines is being punished for this flocks of migrant workers? Because I also understand that, I mean that there are a lot of Zimbabwe, Zimbabweans rather, who move into South Africa. So there's that kind of cross migration or migration happening in and around even southern Africa.
- [24:46]
Kanya McHali
Right, right. Oh, I apologize. I think I forgot to answer the second part of your question, but I'll give it my best shots. So I think, you know, if you look at the, the economic system of apartheid, it was essentially based on the exploitation of cheap black labor, right? And so because the borders of apartheid South Africa were closed off to the rest of the continent, you found that black South Africans, and in the case of mining, black southern Africans, you know, from Zimbabwe or Zambia, Mozambique, were brought in to drive that particular industry. And so I think what's happened post 94 is that because the system has more or less remained unchanged, right? It's still based off of the exploitation of black labor. All the kind of the sort of intra African migration is done. You have a different set of workers who are just substituting workers who had already been there, you know what I mean? So I'm not necessarily sure whether this has been deliberately used to punish black South African workers. I think that unfortunately African migrants have kind of substituted in some respects the roles that black South Africans typically played within the economy. But I certainly will admit that I think the idea of black immigrants taking people's jobs, I think that is lauded over the black South African worker, most certainly. I think in many instances you will find, you know, middle class black South Africans, for example, on the one hand, they will participate in xenophobic attacks, you know, not necessarily the violence per se, but they will espouse xenophobic rhetoric. Yet on the other hand, they would prefer to hire an African national to, to do any kind of job because the perception is that, well, African nationals work harder, they're not demanding, they're not going to be part of the union. You know, so it goes back to the foundations of our economy. They're based off of exploitation of cheap black labor. So you will have somebody who's more than happy to point the finger at other African nationals, yet privately they prefer to hire them because that's quite literally how, you know, our economy was structured. You know, you exploit people as much as possible. So I don't necessarily think that the punishment is deliberate. I do think that it is lauded over black South Africans. And so resentment unfortunately is directed to African nationals as opposed to members of the ruling class, for example, or you know, black South Africans who have benefited perhaps from some of the measures that were put in place to implement economic redress. And I mean, I don't know if this is a point that might be relevant to either of you, but you know, for me I find it very interesting that, you know, sometimes I will see members of the black middle class, upper middle class, they will espouse xenophobic rhetoric. And I think it's actually just, it's a form of distraction really. You know, it's because they'd rather have the focus be on African immigrants as opposed to them, because they don't want to be the targets of a class war. Right. You know, distraction, it's a way for them to kind of not have any attention of potentially ill gotten bombs. And so I think that is very important to point out that a lot of the xenophobia is opportunistic. It's highly opportunistic and it's a form of distraction because really black South Africans, particularly poor and working class black South Africans could build solidarity with other African nationals because they share the same class struggle. But of course it serves the interests of the ruling class, it serves the interests of the aspirational middle classes. What have you to make xenophobia and African nationals the focus of, of all South Africa's troubles.
- [29:07]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, that's very interesting. Definitely like goes in the direction that, you know, I sort of hoped we'd go because I feel again, I mean, you know, I guess I'm becoming the similarities guy because I feel like there's a lot of this happening in Nigeria as well. I mean it's, it's maybe not as pointedly anti foreign or you know, anti African national because of our own kind of peculiar dynamics of being an ecowas and we share a lot of linguistic affinities with the people around the borders. So it's, it's sometimes kind of, well, people across the border.
- [29:46]
Emeka Ugu
So.
- [29:46]
Saeed Husseini
So it can then be kind of transformed into a sort of anti ethnic or inter ethnic conflict.
- [29:53]
Kanya McHali
Right.
- [29:54]
Saeed Husseini
I think an example of this is, is with, you know, when you get kind of middle class urban Nigerians talk about Fulani pastoralists in the countryside, you know, destroying farms. I mean, it's a very complicated conversation. But I think one of the elements is this notion that they're not even our Fulani, they're kind of like foreign Fulani. You know, it's, it's all. It's sort of so much worse and it's, you know, and then it's also, it also Max masks the class element where it's like, it's not the like middle class, aspirational middle class or ruling class people buying out large tracts of land and forcing, you know, people without land to compete for what's left outside of the fences. It's the people outside of the fences that are, you know, and those that are sort of migrating from the Sahel or elsewhere that are the source of the problem. So, you know, I really appreciate that point about how it kind of like it's, it's a nice escape valve for class conflict, you know, especially for the perspective of the middle class. Elements of the aspirational middle class. I mean. So at the same time, I guess I think, you know, now that we've introduced this question, the middle class, I think about the elements of the debate or banter or, or kind of recurring rivalry with Nigeria that happen mostly online. And I want. And I wonder, yeah, I wonder how you would kind of, you know, whether they're sort of definable contours in demographic terms. Are there folks who have certain kind of political affiliation or certain kind of like, you know, geographic location or something among South African middle class, you know, South African Twitter, Roti, that. That are more likely to be like a little less welcoming of Nigerians or, or is it, is it, is it more generalized? You know, is it, is it hard to pin down in, in that way? Because, because my theory is that like on the Nigerian side is that this is mainly a Lagos thing. I mean, America might correct me if I'm wrong, but you know, I don't think like, I don't know, like to, you know, to what extent Nigerians outside of Lagos, like really that worked up about this thing. So. Yeah, I wonder, I wonder if it has some kind of geography or certain kind of political, you know, like eff people it seems, seem a little more welcoming. But you know, if that's just on the surface.
- [32:26]
Emeka Ugu
So.
- [32:27]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah. How would you, you know, how would you kind of delineate the contest, if you can, of. Of the kind of like, Nigerian competition among South African aspirational classes?
- [32:42]
Kanya McHali
Yeah. So it's interesting and I, I hope I. I get an opportunity to ask you about that because I wasn't aware that a lot of this stuff was concentrated in Lagos, but hopefully I'll get a chance to. To touch on that later, or you guys can touch on that later. But I think, you know, in terms of any kind of regionality or political affiliation, I'd argue, and I could be wrong, that EFF people, and this is, you know, mainly just by virtue of the fact that Julius Malema does identify, you know, however dubiously, as a Pan Africanist, so likely to espouse, you know, xenophobic sentiments, at least publicly. Right. But I'd actually argue further that this is a generalized thing. And what makes it interesting is that you'll find people who aren't located in urban centers where you are likely to find more African immigrants by virtue of the fact that that's really where the jobs are. Like, you'll find certain people believing that African nationals are responsible for X, Y and Z. And I think it's because it's. This idea has just become so pervasive. And I think, you know, for example, if you're somebody who lives in a rural area and you have family members or friends who work in more urbanized areas and they tell you that the problems that are facing them, you're likely to believe them. Right. Even though you might not face those issues yourself or those supposed issues yourself, even though you don't live proximate to any African immigrants, you're likely to believe them just by virtue of what they're telling you. And I think, you know, a lot of the political parties, certainly within the last, I want to say, five years, six years, and especially in our, you know, most recent national election, you know, you saw them inject very xenophobic sentiments into their mandate. You know, so it has become quite an insidious sort of pervasive idea that resonates with South Africans, and political parties are pandering to that. And I mean, again, I'm. I'm reluctant to give any South African political party credit, but I'm just saying, you know, the EFF has been consistent in terms of condemning xenophobic attacks. They have been adamant on promoting calmer relations between South Africans and other African nationals. And so I wouldn't necessarily ascribe It. To any sort of political affiliation. And I'd argue that this idea of the African national, and unfortunately Nigerians in particular as a threat, as being responsible for whatever problems are being debated like that has become a countrywide thing.
- [35:46]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, no, fair enough. Although quite, you know. Yeah, I mean, quite. Quite unfortunate. Although, I mean, so I'm not trying to feed it, but, but, but look, I mean, I've heard this argument. I want to run. I want to run. Run by, you know, the group here that has some obvious limitations. But. But there's an element of it that. That. That was striking to me that says that, I mean, Nigerians are a peculiar kind of migrant in South Africa because they're coming from a highly liberalized economy where they're kind of like, they're trained to adapt to state failure and even to make money from state failure, you know, in the sense that, like, South Africans are like, oh, you know, our electricity system is. Is collapsing. But it means that, like, there'll be some hours out of the day when, like, you get a notification on your phone that says there won't be electricity. I mean, maybe. Maybe, you know, maybe I'm. And romanticizing it a little bit, but, you know, whereas in Nigeria, there'll be, like, weeks when there's no electricity. So people are like, they don't even really think about the national grid, or a lot of people don't really think about the grid is where you expect electricity. So it spawned this whole economic sector where people are, like, importing generators, people are servicing generators, people are buying spare parts for generators, people are installing solar, selling fake solar materials. You know, like, that whole thing is, like, born in the, you know, in the midst of the sort of the. The collapse of the electricity grid, the liberalization of electricity sector, this privatization of electricity distribution to very ineffectual companies, etc. So, I mean, the argument is that, like, isn't the competition a little unfair in a way? If, if we are moving down this sort of path of, like, an increasingly liberalized economy in South Africa, I hope we're not. But, you know, if that's the generalized direction of travel, then is it. Shouldn't we be a little empathetic for South Africans who are like, wait a minute, we're not ready to be, like, full. Ready to be full neoliberal subjects like these Nigerians are? You know, so, I mean. Yeah, am I. Am I being too empathetic there, you know, is there, you know, deep. Again, like I said, I think there. There are some quirks to the argument but there's an element of it that I like that, that was striking to me. And I wonder. Yeah, I wonder how you would respond to it.
- [38:34]
Kanya McHali
I think you're being a tad bit generous, but, yeah, I'd say there are merits to your argument. You know, I think, you know, there are African nationals who are accustomed to state failure, you know, and I think they're perhaps, you know, maybe even more importantly, they're accustomed to clampdowns on protests against state failure in a way that South Africans aren't. I think South Africans, our inclination is to protest. Our inclination is to attempt to kind of resolve issues through the means that brought apartheid down. And so that isn't working. Or at least we haven't necessarily built a coalition that can really challenge, you know, the ruling class and their role in the deterioration of our country. So I think, yeah, to an extent, it's almost as if, like, well, what has previously worked for us is not working. Our unions are compromised. So now you have a group of African nationals who are accustomed to these things and are able to kind of make do under these circumstances. So, I mean, sure, you can be a little pathetic. And, I mean, I just think it's a pity, really, that, yeah, people have to be this industrious, that they have to think this outside of the box. And I hate the fact that it's almost romanticized in a way, you know, and it's almost considered, like, I suppose it's. It's considered this really cute quirk, and it's considered something to be proud of, and it shouldn't really.
- [40:25]
Saeed Husseini
Entrepreneurship. Right.
- [40:26]
Kanya McHali
Like entrepreneurship, innovation, you know, and. And unfortunately, we're buying into it more and more. And I think, you know, South Africans have always been industrious. They've always been able to sort of make money off of terrible situations or find a way to make a living. Not a particularly good one off of, you know, terrible situations. However, I think we do have neighbors who are just more accustomed to doing it because they've been liberated longer than us. So, yeah, I do think there is to be said about. About what you're raising, but the tragedy is that, you know, we shouldn't have to be innovative about state failure.
- [41:14]
Saeed Husseini
Absolutely. Yeah. And so, in a way, maybe we do have something to learn from the way that South Africans want to respond to state failure, not by innovating around the failure, but by resisting it. I mean. So, okay, let me. So I'm playing the kind of, like, secret South African in the. In. In. In Nigeria at the moment. So let me Lean further. Exactly. That's. That was the whole point. But yeah, I mean, I'm going to lean even further into that with another argument also from WhatsApp. I should say I didn't acknowledge. The original one was from various WhatsApp groups. Marxist WhatsApp groups that I'm a part of in Nigeria. Yeah. So the second one is. It's describes the most successful South African brands in Nigeria and then the most successful Nigerian brands, South Africa and then says, you know, you decide who's. You decide who's winning. Are you ready? Have you seen this Em, by the way?
- [42:19]
Emeka Ugu
This is the one with religion, with.
- [42:23]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, I say, you just spoiled my punchline. But so the most successful South African brands, MTN group, totally ubiquitous America is probably joining in from an MTN connection where he's based. So. So am I shoprite. Totally ubiquitous as well in Nigeria increasingly. Although it looks slightly different in Nigeria than it does in South Africa. It's like. Right. I think it's like in Nigeria it's a little like, it's a little nicer or sort of like supposed to be a little bit more of a middle, upper middle class place.
- [42:54]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [42:57]
Saeed Husseini
Extensive fruit section, etc. Relatively multi choice, standard bank. I mean these are like everywhere in, in Nigeria. Okay. Protea hotels and then most successful Nigerian brands in South Africa, Redeemed Christian, Church of God, Christ Embassy, Living Faith. And. And what's the other one, the tv, Joshua's one.
- [43:29]
Emeka Ugu
America, you know, I can't remember.
- [43:33]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, yeah, but which was, which was big. It's gosh. Yeah. Like church of all nations. Yeah, so. So I don't know. I mean, like, just based on that, do we really have a leg to stand on as Nigerians in this conversation? I mean, America, maybe you want to save Nigeria, Kanya, if you want to save Nigeria, I'd even be particularly welcome to that. But yeah, I mean, you know, given what we described here, I mean. So I guess the question for Kalia is really like, is there any Nigerian influence in South Africa? Like is, you know, leaving aside the. The notion of competing for jobs or for like economic is like what, you know, where else is, you know, where else is Nigeria like excelling or even like seeming to be competitive in, in South Africa if, if at all, please, please be charitable.
- [44:32]
Kanya McHali
I'm trying to be. I feel like I'm a Nigerian agent based in South Africa given all this podcast is going. So, you know, interestingly enough, I would say over the last maybe 15 years I have seen a growing number of Africans take an interest in Afrobeats, which was not the case. So I would say that Nigerian music has occupied a place in South Africa that it never did before. You know, and perhaps we need to give credit to the Rands and the Naira's, you know, that song.
- [45:16]
Emeka Ugu
True.
- [45:19]
Kanya McHali
You know, they could learn some lessons from our musician. But I think you. And if I remember correctly, you know, I. We used to buy Nollywood DVDs. They were knockoffs, but we used to buy Nollywood and there used to be a channel called Africa Magic and.
- [45:42]
Saeed Husseini
Right.
- [45:43]
Kanya McHali
We would watch Nollywood films. So I wouldn't necessarily say that it was, you know, we didn't necessarily have like a Nigerian business that had like a sort of mainstream presence in South Africa. We still don't. And I think that's something that we. We should investigate. And I think Sora and Bola need to, you know, maybe unpack that a little. This relationship is not equally weighted. But I would say culturally, Nigeria has made inroads. And I mean, this might be a little controversial to say, but romantically, you know, Nigerian men have made significant inroads.
- [46:26]
Saeed Husseini
Which I hear can also be a problem at times.
- [46:29]
Kanya McHali
But hugely, I mean, there is significant resentment towards Nigerian men because the perception from some South African women is that Nigerian men know how to treat women. I mean, we're being very trichy, and I apologize for introducing such a frivolous topic, but I think it's relevant.
- [46:46]
Saeed Husseini
No, spot on. We should have started with this as well, I'm telling you.
- [46:51]
Kanya McHali
You know, but there's a perception that, you know, Nigerian men, especially Nigerian men of means, know how to treat women. You know, they will oftentimes try and empower their partners economically, so they will give them money to start a business, for example. And. And so you've seen a number of South African women, you know, say quite expressly that I prefer to date Nigerian men. And there's even a term for them. They're called jolofinas.
- [47:26]
Emeka Ugu
Okay. That's really very useful information.
- [47:36]
Saeed Husseini
Yes. Very comforting to hear in some respects.
- [47:41]
Emeka Ugu
I suspect this is coined out of Jolof.
- [47:44]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, right.
- [47:45]
Emeka Ugu
Oh, it gets more interesting, you know.
- [47:51]
Kanya McHali
So I think they've been romantic inroads. And, you know, there has been just musically, and I think that's. That's something that I think has been such a stark difference in terms of, you know, what used to be the case, which is that, you know, people would gravitate to black American cultural production and they would prefer to listen to hip hop, for example. And R and B. And they still do, but now you have Afrobeat, Afrobeats on a mainstream radio and you have South Africans singing the lyrics to Afrobeat songs, which wasn't the case, you know, a decade and a half ago. So, sure, I don't think that, you know, they're, you know, sure, they're not a significant number of Nigerian business in South Africa. And mind you, I don't even think South Africans really realize just how many South African businesses are littered throughout the continent. Like, I think South Africans would be taken aback by our economic presence and other parts of the continent. So it's an important point to raise because I feel, you know, there could be resentment towards us. You know, there could be a resentment towards the fact that, you know, multichoice is there, Shoprite is there, Standard bank is there, NTN is there. And again, it's like our role throughout the continent hasn't always been the most positive, but I guess, you know, is that something that you would reflect on or is that something that you would really ponder on when, you know, you're somebody who's economically disenfranchised and you have far more personal needs at play? You know, But I think it's a relevant point to, you know, aspiring black South African middle classes or members of the ruling class, you know, especially when they try and mimic or appropriate the grievances of, of black South African working classes.
- [49:47]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. Yeah. And it's promising. Promising in certain respects. I mean, aside from the romantic, but including the romantic. I think. You had one more question.
- [50:03]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, I had one more question. But, but then just listening to Kaya's, you know, response to your, your last question, it's. I'm tempted, I'm tempted to say that, you know, from listening to her, the impression I get is that while, you know, over the last few years, maybe a decade, you know, the South Africans have gravitated towards Afrobeats. Yeah. To link that up to, you know, the perception amongst, you know, you know, certain Africa, South African ladies, you know, the perception of Nigerian men. I, I don't. So there's a part of me that thinks that, you know, so, so there's the, of course, the gravitation towards the music. But is, is there something of the culture that comes, comes with that music that, you know, that, that, that, that, that people seem to be, that's repelling, you know, to, to cross section of South Africa maybe even.
- [51:17]
Saeed Husseini
Right.
- [51:19]
Emeka Ugu
You know, so is there a gender bias somewhere that emanates right from, you Know, South African interaction with. Because Africa, Afrobeats, you know, beyond the sound is, is kind of like lifestyle, you know.
- [51:35]
Kanya McHali
Right.
- [51:36]
Emeka Ugu
And it's a lifestyle that, that if, if. I mean this is not the place to get into it, but you know, it feeds off what, what we call yyah.
- [51:48]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah.
- [51:49]
Emeka Ugu
Okay.
- [51:51]
Saeed Husseini
So it's a strong Afrobeats crime nexus, for sure. Yeah. I mean it's not all it is. There's a lot more, more in there. It is now a lot more like global money in there.
- [52:02]
Kanya McHali
Right.
- [52:03]
Saeed Husseini
But in Nigeria proper. Yeah, there definitely is that.
- [52:07]
Emeka Ugu
No, even, even in South Africa, you know, because if you do some, if you conduct some kind of research. Right. You'd find that what you call the YYAHU format, you know, in its, in its current wave, you could trace that to the migration of certain of, of young, black, young male Nigerians into South Africa somewhere in the mid-90s, if I, if my, if I have my head correctly. And that's what they metamorphosed into some of this gang related crimes that, you know, Nigeria is often accused of or that, you know, that arguments that are used in support of, of South Africans and the phobia towards, you know, Nigerians.
- [53:03]
Saeed Husseini
And I would say again, not surprising that that was the way of migration that followed structural adjustment, you know.
- [53:09]
Kanya McHali
Yeah.
- [53:10]
Saeed Husseini
You know.
- [53:11]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, this was in the 90s, right? Yeah.
- [53:15]
Saeed Husseini
So people, people who like, had had to adapt and like figure out ways around stuff.
- [53:21]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, so. So that's what. Something that popped up in my head just listening to your, to your response. But my initial question, you know, so I mean, you might want to have a stab at it if time allows. But yes, I put it down as, as some sort of observation. But my question was, and this is something that I've always, you know, maybe not gotten around to, to investigate it. I mean, following South African politics for some years back, I'm doing a bit of reading around, you know, the generation, the rainbow generation, you know.
- [54:02]
Kanya McHali
Right.
- [54:03]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, I figured that, you know, the rift in the ANC at the time between Cyril Ramaphosa and what's the guy, the EFCC guy now.
- [54:19]
Kanya McHali
Julius Malema.
- [54:21]
Emeka Ugu
Malema, right. You know, kind of was packed in the crucible of ANC politics at the time.
- [54:30]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah.
- [54:31]
Emeka Ugu
When Malema was some kind of youth leader, you know. But going back into all of that, two things struck me about Ramaphosa, which I didn't think could, you know, pan out in the Nigerian context was that he was from the, is it called the Vendor tribe or. The Vendor tribe.
- [54:51]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, Vendor Vendor.
- [54:53]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah. All right.
- [54:54]
Saeed Husseini
That.
- [54:54]
Emeka Ugu
That is in. Largely in the minority. Yeah. And that also had cost him progression in, in the, in the rounds of AEC politics, you know, from before that. But more interestingly, and this is where, you know, you can find some similarities is, Is that as somebody from a minority ethnic group in, in Southern Africa or in South Africa, he had very strong links with the, the label labor union. So it was kind of weird to hear you say that, that labor unions were breaking down in, in what my reading would be under his own presidency. Because I reckon that up to a few years ago, the South Africa still could boast of, you know, really strong labor union. So the sense I get is that, you know, there would have been some sort of strengthening, even though I know that, you know, I think there's a part of. There's an interregnum somewhere where I think Ramos Fuza thought about it and said, okay, you know what? I'm teaching this whole labor union thing and I'm going full on out to make money.
- [56:13]
Saeed Husseini
So I see, I see you wading into part two of the episode. I think, you know, you may have to land in the interest of time here.
- [56:23]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, okay, but that's. I mean, I don't even know if I'm asking a question. It's just something I'm trying to please tease out here. You know, how, what's, what's up with that? You know, how do you have somebody with a labor background and then without having the situation where you, you know, the strength of the labor unions, you know, is beginning to dwindle?
- [56:45]
Kanya McHali
Oh, my word. I. I don't know if we have time to address.
- [56:49]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah.
- [56:51]
Kanya McHali
Betrayal of the unions, which really, you know, it predates his official involvement in party politics because, you know, post apartheid Soromaphosa. Did you know he was one of the chosen black industrialists? Right. He became one of the bigger heads of Black Economic Empowerment. And so he was involved in. In private business, made a significant amount of money. And I think, really, if you want to kind of, I guess a turning point in terms of his perception, or at least the soured relations that he has towards unions, was the Marikana massacre.
- [57:36]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah.
- [57:38]
Kanya McHali
Where he, you know, I have to say this for legal reasons, allegedly, you know, took a part in ordering, you know, the murder of those miners who were demanding a living wage. So I think Cyril's relationship with unions and mind you, I think if I'm. If I'm not mistaken, he. I think he was the general secretary of cosatu in the 80s, you know, this is not somebody who had a casual relationship with, you know, the People's Union at the time. And this was during the renaissance of the labor movement in, in the 1980s. And the way the labor movement essentially, in my view, at least accelerated the downfall of the apartheid government because they rendered apartheid ungovernable, as the late Oliver Tambo, who was the president of the anc, had encouraged South Africans to do so. I think Cyril, and to your point about him being part of a minority ethnic group in South Africa, I would certainly, you know, agree that, you know, him being bender has colored how people discuss him. His masculinity is often called into question. And again, that's a topic for another podcast episode in terms of how, you know, masculinity is perceived amongst ethnic groups. And I'm sure this probably applies throughout the continent, but, you know, that is certainly an element of the hatred that is geared towards him. But he did, at least in my mind, betray the labor movement. And he was an especially ambitious individual who clearly, you know, profited off of his association with the anc, became a billionaire and decided, you know, I want to be president, because it was on my bucket list. You know, I've never really gotten the sense that Cyril wants to lead South Africa, you know, wholeheartedly and passionately. It just seems as though it was something that he wanted to do just to say he did it. But in any case, there was a question you asked in terms of the sort of gender dynamic around Nigerian men, afrobeats, etc. I'd agree with you. I would say, you know, lifestyle, in particular, aspirational lifestyle that's become a big part of South African culture. Social media has played a huge part in it. We call it the soft life. And, you know, without going into gender, essentially. Yeah, soft life.
- [60:22]
Saeed Husseini
Like soft life, soft life.
- [60:24]
Emeka Ugu
Oh, okay. So, okay, okay.
- [60:27]
Kanya McHali
You know.
- [60:29]
Saeed Husseini
Oh, America knows the soft life, though. Don't worry.
- [60:34]
Kanya McHali
It. Look afterwards. No, yeah, I wish. I think that has certainly, you know, that certainly filtered into, you know, the perception of Nigerian men as being, you know, just capable economically of supporting a woman. And yeah, there's a lot of. Just a lot of gender sensualism that, yeah, just affects these conversations and oftentimes makes them deeply unpleasant. And I know, you know, just based off of social media that Nigeria is no stranger to the gender wars, you know, and South Africa is no stranger to the gender wars. I think really one area where there is commonality is just the rise of, like, anti feminist rhetoric on our respective exes. Like, you Often see, like, just. And a lot of it is driven by, you know, the evangelical right, you know, and the influence of religion in terms of shaping how people think of gender. And then, of course, you have the sort of red pill stuff going on globally. So, yeah, I mean, there is a tremendous amount of resentment that has. That is directed to Nigerian men as a consequence of that. And mind you, this is a very small subsection of like, you know, African. Nigerian nationals who live in South Africa. Not everybody lives that particular kind of lifestyle, you know, and even in South Africa, very few people live that particular kind of lifestyle. Yet it is so coveted. I'm not sure if that answers your question, but, yeah.
- [62:09]
Emeka Ugu
Oh, it does. I mean, it sheds. Sheds real light on.
- [62:14]
Saeed Husseini
On it. Thanks. Yeah. I mean, so, I mean, as a way to wrap up, I suppose it's clear that there are lots of shared pathologies, including the ones you just. You just narrated. Are there any. You know, and you've. You've been generous enough to also point to some, you know, some arenas where there's, you know, there is some slightly more hopeful interaction, Afrobeats being one of them, despite some of its problems.
- [62:45]
Emeka Ugu
But.
- [62:46]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, I wonder if this might be tricky, to be fair, but, you know, I wonder. I wonder if you could identify or kind of locate particular arenas where the relationship between the two countries is, like, normal, you know, or whether. Yeah. What that could look like. In phrasing this question, I was kind of, like, trying to figure out if I could. If I could figure out what, like, a normal relationship between countries would be, and I sort of struggled. But, you know, but, but. But you're the one in the hot seat, so. Yeah, I mean, how would you address that, you know, if you could.
- [63:26]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, I mean, it's. It's hard to. It's hard to figure out what a normal relationship between Nigeria and South Africa could look like, because even in terms of our southern African neighbors. Yeah, the more quote unquote, normal relationships are typically with neighbors with whom we have linguistic similarities, you know, which you mentioned before. Like, South Africa is less likely to. South Africans are less likely to be hostile towards people from Botswana.
- [64:08]
Saeed Husseini
Right.
- [64:08]
Kanya McHali
I mean, that's changed significantly, and the perception of. Of Basuto has changed significantly with the rise of illegal mining and the perception that Basuto men in particular are especially ruthless and violent. But again, that's a topic for another podcast. But I think it's easier for South Africans to have kinship with African countries with whom they share, you know, linguistic similarities, cultural similarities. But, you know, and maybe I'M naive for this, but, you know, during Afcon, you know, the semi final, that for me was arguably the most normal kind of back and forth that I've seen between Nigerians and South Africans in a long time. It was irreverent. There was an acknowledgement that, look, we're too 2 highly obnoxious. Highly. And we've had this, you know, comical rivalry in terms of Afcon that dates back, you know, to 1996. And the perception is that, you know, had Nigeria been competing in the 1996 AFCON, then, you know, South Africa wouldn't have won. And, yeah, that kind of stuff. And I suppose it's easy to be light hearted when it comes to something like soccer or football. You know, the jokes that emerged from that were hilarious. You know, I saw people, you know, Nigerians saying, you know, after this, we own Amapiano now.
- [65:44]
Saeed Husseini
It's called.
- [65:51]
Kanya McHali
I saw, you know, some Nigerians saying, you know, we. Nelson Mandela is ours now and we've renamed them to one Nelson. You know, those sort of things, they crack me up. And, and sure, like, they're not a road map to how relations can be, but I think acknowledging the fact that we're two nations with massive egos, we're two nations who, to some extent, we, outside of the rest of. Outside of ourselves, we're pretty caught up in our. In our own nonsense. We're pretty caught up in our own sort of struggles. We. We like to think that we represent the continent. So I think, you know, that could potentially be a road map to civil relations or at least less hostile relations. But again, this stuff is so complicated and I think, you know, what this conversation has done for me is just revealed to me that we have a lot in common. That a lot of these struggles, be it anti immigrant sentiments, they're not specific to South Africans, and putting them in context, pointing out the fact that, listen, this is not a problem that is exclusive to you. I suppose that could bold solidarity in some ways, but I think it's going to require a lot of work. And unfortunately, we do have, you know, members of the ruling class who are happy to exploit, you know, xenophobia and these tensions to gain ground, you know, and to distract from the fact that the real problem in South Africa is class, you know, you know, racialized class conflict, but it is class. And, and it's easy for these politicians to just. They don't want to. They don't want South Africans to look at that because it's scary. If they were to look at that, it's scary. And so I don't have an answer to your question. But, you know, when I see the more irreverent interactions between South Africans and Nigerians, that does give me a glimmer of hope. You know, when we're able to find each other, we're able to poke fun at our ridiculousness and, and outsized egos. Like, that's at least to me it makes me feel okay. This is a very sort of hokey and weird form of Pan Africanism, but it's a start.
- [68:22]
Saeed Husseini
No, I agree that. Yeah, yeah, no, mega. Take it away.
- [68:26]
Emeka Ugu
Yeah, I was just going to say that. I mean, historically, that we can find examples of. Of relationships that have been beneficial to. To both countries, you know, but that you don't have to go all the way back, I think, to the 70s.
- [68:45]
Kanya McHali
Right.
- [68:45]
Emeka Ugu
But this, of course, again, was a long radical lines, you know. Yeah. So that's. So that's, that's. That's one where. One place where I think, you know, alongside even music, you know, so when you talk about the relationship that people like Fella had, Miriam Makiba, what's this guy? Human? So Keller, you know, so those kinds, those kinds of collaborations, you know, is, is.
- [69:18]
Saeed Husseini
Is.
- [69:19]
Emeka Ugu
Is the sort that I think that might in future, if we work hard at it, you know, to deepen them.
- [69:24]
Kanya McHali
Yeah.
- [69:25]
Emeka Ugu
Are the sort of collaborations that might begin to change some of this. This narrative. Yeah, yeah.
- [69:33]
Kanya McHali
If I can just interject quickly, I think that's also relevant, you know, to, you know, relationships between the diaspora and the continent too, I think. Yeah. Not to romanticize history, but certainly, you know, in the 60s and the 70s, you saw attempts to build solidarity, you know, to build this black internationalist movement. And they were sincere. And people, you know, at least people from the diaspora came to the continent to try and see what was going on, you know. And so again, it's not to romanticize history. It's not to sort of, you know, pretend as if that can be entirely possible, although. But I think it is something to work towards, I guess. And I suppose it starts by developing just a more generous sort of approach to engaging with one another and deepening our curiosity about how our respective countries run. You know, I think South Africans, if they were to really have an understanding of some of the challenges that other African countries face, they'd realize, oh, wait a second, like, we have so much in common and, and state failure is not something that, you know, we have to accept or we have to innovate around. And so let's build strategies that can tackle this, you know, where we incorporate some of the things that African nationals have unfortunately had to do with some of the kind of protest measures that have been. That were intrinsic to the downfall of apartheid. Yeah, that's just me being whimsical.
- [71:10]
Saeed Husseini
No, and, and, and the warm feelings that you've managed to impart as a. As a result of that are very much appreciated. And, but, but, but actually, you know, a lot of what you're describing, you know, is. Is ongoing in some forums. Right. Not at the scale that we would like for sure, but, but it's, but it exists, you know, it hasn't, it hasn't totally of extinguished since the 60s and 70s. So.
- [71:39]
Kanya McHali
True.
- [71:40]
Saeed Husseini
You know, and, and I. Yeah, I mean, okay, podcasting has very obvious limitations, some of which you've very well summarized in some of your previous writing, but I think even for forums like this do there very little bit in contributing to that. And you know, you've done a lot for us today, today, helping us understand the South Africa situation as a part of that kind of, you know, move towards strength in solidarity between our two nations. So for that week, we have to say thank you once again, Kanye, thank you for making the time as well, you know, despite the difficulties in trying to schedule things this late in the year, etc. Etc. Really grateful to have you on and hope we can. Hope we can do it again, you know, to explore some of the threads that emerge, but, you know, weren't sufficiently tackled today. So. All that to say huge thank you. This was fun. Let's do it again.
- [72:43]
Kanya McHali
Yeah, absolutely. Thank you so much for having me and please invite me again. I know I've written some disparaging things about the podcast. This was great and know it would be lovely to pick up on some of the points that were raised because I certainly have questions for, for the both of you. So.
- [73:00]
Saeed Husseini
Yeah, sure. Well, yeah, when, when Cyril comes to Nigeria, then we'll do y.
- [73:44]
Emeka Ugu
That.