The AIAC Podcast: "Business as Usual?" — Algeria’s 2024 Election and Beyond

Date: September 19, 2024
Host: Will Shoki
Guest: Maher Mazahi (Contributing Editor, Africa Is A Country; Host, Africa Five Aside Podcast)

Episode Overview

In this episode, host Will Shoki explores the results and implications of Algeria's September 2024 presidential election with journalist Maher Mazahi. Together, they analyze the overwhelming re-election of incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, pervasive voter apathy and boycotting, the legacy of protest movements, the clientelist political system, Algeria’s economic and foreign policy context, and the continuing resonance of state-sponsored football. The conversation situates Algerian political malaise in a broader context of post-colonial governance, regional geopolitics, and the promises and perils of energy-driven economic stability.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The 2024 Presidential Election: Results & Context

[00:18]–[10:18]

• President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was re-elected for a second five-year term with 94.65% of the vote.
• Voter turnout was historically low at roughly 23% (lowest ever in Algeria)—a sign of mass electoral disengagement.
• Only three candidates were approved to run. Main challengers:
  • Abdullah Hassani Sharif (Islamist/Conservative; ~3%)
  • Yusuf Elsheesh (Socialist; ~2.1%)
• Opposition candidates, including the Socialists (FFS), were seen as either unknown or not truly independent options.
• The main form of protest for disaffected Algerians, especially youth, was an organized boycott of the vote.
• The context is informed by the legacy of the Hirak movement (2019–2021), which forced out long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Many activists are now in exile, imprisoned, or forced into silence.

“What I found fascinating actually, is that the Algerian people … found a way to protest and it's really protest by boycotting the elections.”
— Maher Mazahi [09:21]

2. The System: “Le Pouvoir,” Clientelism, and Real Constraints

[10:18]–[16:03]

• Algeria’s elections offer the appearance of choice, but the regime (led behind the scenes by the military and entrenched elites—“le pouvoir”) curates who can run.
• Both the opposition and ruling party are often part of a clientelist system where public employment and patronage are exchanged for loyalty.
• Mass abstention is thus both a practical and symbolic challenge to state legitimacy.

“It's kind of like somebody saying to you, okay, pick any fruit you want, but we're only going to put two fruits on this plate ... no, I want something else from that tree over there!”
— Maher Mazahi [08:08]

• Even when the electoral process is technically free of fraud, it fails to be democratic due to how the field is structured (“the cards are stacked”).

3. The FLN’s Enduring (and Ambiguous) Legacy

[16:03]–[21:53]

• While Tebboune ran as an independent, he and nearly all high-level political actors are products of the National Liberation Front (FLN), historically Algeria’s post-independence, anti-colonial party.
• FLN’s transition from liberation movement to governing force has generated “fatigue” and cynicism:
  • The party is still deeply embedded in the state apparatus, but its revolutionary prestige has faded.
  • The party is widely seen as old, tired, and out of ideas, and many believe its time has passed.

“People were singing and … shouting, you know, the FLN should be in the museum … many people believe actually that the 2019 protest broke out because the FLN were going to announce that Bouteflika was going to run for a fifth term.”
— Maher Mazahi [17:40]

• Policy differentiation between parties is minimal; all main political actors are committed to Algeria’s distinctive system of subsidies, social spending, and anti-colonial foreign policy.

4. Grievances and Divided Priorities

[21:53]–[29:31]

• Algerian society is united in its discontent, but the focus of grievances varies by group:
  • Journalists/intellectuals: Concerned about loss of civil liberties, media closures, jailing of dissenters.
  • Older generations: Value security and stability, influenced by memories of civil war and regional insecurity.
  • Working class/youth: Frustrated by unemployment, stagnant living standards; will trade legitimacy for real material improvement.
• Tebboune’s regime has increased unemployment benefits (notably for youth), invested in social programs, and leveraged the recent global energy crisis to boost foreign reserves.
• Sustained legitimacy is closely tied to economic performance:

“There’s a real sort of desire for political and economic stability … If that were to erode, then that might start to pose questions for the longevity of Tebboune’s political legitimacy.”
— Will Shoki [27:05]

5. The Regional and International Picture: Foreign Policy

[29:31]–[45:42]

Algeria’s Foreign Policy DNA

• Anti-colonial identity from the revolution persists in policy, particularly in support for Palestine and Western Sahara.
• Algeria’s doctrine is non-interference but strongly supports self-determination movements.

Main Regional Flashpoints

• Morocco:

  • Deep mistrust rooted in historical territorial disputes (Sand War 1963).
  • Borders closed since 1994; conflict over Western Sahara underpins frosty relations.
  • Economic and social toll from regional disunity.

• Mali and the Sahel:

  • Algeria involved as mediator in Tuareg rebellions.
  • Concerns over instability, influx of refugees, and terrorist threats.
  • Strategic interest in pipelines and energy infrastructure with Niger/Nigeria.

• Libya:

  • Algeria supports the internationally recognized government, skeptical of Haftar.
  • Approach complicated by rival foreign interventions (Russia, France, Turkey, Gulf states).

• Palestine:

  • Algeria is a vocal and active advocate for Palestine in international forums.

“People in Algeria … are not happy with a lot of domestic governance. But when it comes to foreign policy, I think people are pretty much completely behind the Algerian government's way of doing things.”
— Maher Mazahi [40:16]

Limitations

• Algeria’s ambitions to be a regional or pan-African leader are hampered by constitutional limits on military action outside borders, though some of those constraints are loosening.

6. Civil Society, Media, and the Promise (or Illusion) of Reform

[51:02]–[55:25]

• Widespread clampdowns on civil liberties and independent media have stifled dissent.
• Many hope for a normalization of civil society life post-Tebboune, possibly after his “stabilizing second term.”
• Hopes for improved civil liberties, increased social spending, improved international relations, and a sustainable energy transition (solar/green hydrogen aspirations, but water concerns remain).

“Journalism is practically dead in Algeria. What I would like to see is definitely more civil liberties open up, more freedom of expression.”
— Maher Mazahi [51:08]

• The future trajectory depends on maintaining economic stability (currently buoyed by gas exports), genuine political opening, and a peaceful transition of power.

7. Football, Identity, and the Political Economy of Sport

[45:42]–[50:06]

• The Algerian national team, a potent force in national identity, is in a period of transition.
  • Poor performance at 2023 AFCON led to a change in coach.
  • Club football has moved back toward a nostalgic, state-supported model, with national companies buying clubs and players as state employees—a return to “socialist” sport.

“How can I say this? It's satisfying a lot of people's nostalgia for the 1970s and 1980s when … players were just like employees of national enterprises … it's been interesting seeing sports sort of become more socialist in Algeria over the last few years…”
— Maher Mazahi [49:11]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Electoral Apathy:
  “The main form of protest … was really protest by boycotting the elections.”
  — Maher Mazahi [09:21]

• On Power and Political Choice:
  “It has to be something really exceptional, something completely out of the ordinary for you to flip the switch … to win an election against a candidate of le pouvoir.”
  — Maher Mazahi [13:49]

• On the FLN’s Erasure of Its Legacy:
  “People were singing … the FLN should be in the museum … that cuts deep.”
  — Maher Mazahi [17:40]

• On Divided Grievances:
  “You journalists care about freedom of expression … but [others] say, we need to be politically stable because all around us there are extreme geopolitical challenges.”
  — Maher Mazahi [22:41]

• On Stability and Fortune:
  “Taboun got really lucky … in the middle of his term … Russia invaded Ukraine … the price of oil and gas shot up.”
  — Maher Mazahi [28:18]

• On Foreign Policy Consensus:
  “When it comes to foreign policy, I think people are pretty much completely behind the Algerian government's way of doing things.”
  — Maher Mazahi [40:16]

• On Civil Society’s Future:
  “What I would like to see is definitely more civil liberties open up … Journalism is practically dead in Algeria.”
  — Maher Mazahi [51:08]

• On the Hope for Real Transition:
  “We need to switch out and hopefully he sets the scene for open, fair and free democratic elections in 2029.”
  — Maher Mazahi [55:20]

Timestamps for Major Segments

• 00:18–03:15: Intro, election overview
• 04:19–10:18: 2019 Hirak protests, election context, and the mechanics of state-curated elections
• 11:35–16:03: Limits of opposition, clientelism, and military determination of outcomes
• 16:03–21:53: The FLN’s evolution and legacy in political culture
• 22:19–29:31: Grievances, civil liberties, and economic conditions
• 29:31–45:42: Foreign policy — relations with Morocco, Libya, Mali, Palestine, and Algeria's broader international role
• 45:42–50:06: Football’s place in Algerian society and “re-socialization” of sports
• 51:02–55:25: Hopes for civil liberties, economic sustainability, and prospects for genuine reform

Final Reflections

The episode portrays a society in stasis: outwardly “business as usual,” yet brimming with latent desire for real change. Economic luck has for now staved off crisis, but the foundational legitimacy of the system continues to erode. The regime’s obsession with stability may be buying time, but only deeper democratization and rejuvenation of civil society can renew Algeria’s promise.

Guest Bio:
Maher Mazahi is a journalist based in Algiers, a contributing editor for Africa Is a Country, and host of the Africa Five Aside Podcast.

Recommended Follow-up:

• Africa Is a Country (website & podcast)
• Africa Five Aside Podcast

End of Summary