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- [00:18]
A
Welcome back to the AIAC Podcast. My name is William Shockey and you are listening to Africa's A Country's regular Destination for news and analysis and commentary on world events from an African and Left perspective. In this week's episode, we are talking about Algeria's recent election. In case you missed it, on 7 September, Algeria's incumbent president, Abdul Majid Thabon was re elected for a second five year presidential term with a whopping 94.65% of the vote. Tabun came into power in 2019, replacing Abdelaziz Butafikha, who ruled the country for 20 years and planned on running for a fifth term until widespread protests for radical change ended his rule. Initial data from Algeria's National Independence Authority for elections indicated that just 23% of the population voted for a candidate. They didn't have many options. Only three were approved by the regime and contested against Tabun. His main challengers were the conservative Abdelahi Hassani Sharif and the socialist Yusuf alshish, who received 3 and 2.1% of the vote, respectively. Tabun's campaign focused on political participation, particularly engaging with Algeria's youth, who make up a significant portion of the population and face high rates of poverty and unemployment. However, there was a general sense of apathy among younger Algerians who felt that their votes did not significantly impact the electoral process. This was the same feeling in 2019, where many young Algerians then also decided to boycott the election. Indeed, Tabun is still facing the legacy of 2019's Hirak movement, which continued up until 2021 until was ended by the COVID pandemic. And many activists from this generation have been forced into exile, some have been imprisoned, and numerous associations and media outlets have been shuttered to address these issues. Taboon has focused on the economy, has introduced a social welfare program and increased social spending more generally, taking advantage of a gas boom which has been made possible by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As Algeria has started supplying more of Europe's energy needs, his success will depend on his ability to manage economic stability, address the domestic discontent and manage other regional tensions. Tabun's foreign policy, for example, has been active in regional crises such as Palestine, Western Sahara, the Sahel and Libya. So joining us in the podcast to discuss this election and what it means for Algeria's future is Africa as a country. Contributing editor Maher Mazahi Here is my conversation with Maher Maher, thank you very much for coming onto the podcast now.
- [03:15]
B
It's my pleasure will nice to be the guest for once to have somebody else host.
- [03:22]
A
I'm sure you feel relieved of hosting duties and the pressures that come with it, but hopefully it's a pleasant time.
- [03:33]
B
Definitely will be. So I wanted you to come on.
- [03:37]
A
To talk about Algeria's recent election. So if listeners might have been paying attention. On September 7, 2024 Algeria's incumbent President Abdul Majid Taboon was surprisingly well, unsurprisingly I suppose I should say re elected for a second five year presidential term. And what was surprising was the fact that he won with 94.65% of the vote. So for people who might not have noticed that this has happened, could you just walk us through the selection? Who were the main contenders? What percentage of the vote did they get? What was voted turnout and how were the results received?
- [04:20]
B
Well, I don't want to drone on and on but I think really to start talking about all of the questions that you've asked, we sort of have to go back five years and the 2019 Hirak sort of anti government protests which ousted the previous president Abdelaziz. But Flecha who was in power for 20 years, he had suffered two strokes, was not speaking in publicly or not making any public appearances but was wanting to be a candidate for a fifth term. And that was sort of the straw that broke the camel's back and people went out into the streets and they had just had enough of this system, that's what they call it, you know the, the power, the system, the pouvoir, that's what we call it in Algeria, you know, where it's a kind of top down approach to governance. Usually it's because I mean in every single president in Algeria's history it's really been the military that sort of designated them and it's not a real true vibrant democracy that you'd have in other countries, even in other countries in Africa, much less across the world. So these protests there were you know, millions and millions of people on the street. People were very not, they weren't violent really, they were really careful with how they wanted to present themselves. Very optimistic, very, a lot of humor was used but they were very resilient and persistent and they lasted over a year and it was only really COVID 19 and the sanitary sort of health dangerous of continuing to protest that people that stop people from going out onto the streets anymore and they sort of responsibly decided to stay at home in quarantine. And so the, this president, the incumbent Abdul Majitabun, he was elected in the midst of these protests in December 2019, and the protests went from February 2019 until February, March 2020. And when he was elected, initially people were not happy because they. We were only given five candidates, five choices. There were, you know, more than 20 people that wanted to be candidates to the Algerian presidential elections, but we were only given, you know, five. And many of these five, you know, they were like ministers or former prime ministers of previous but regimes. Tabun himself was a former prime minister of the but regime, even if he was sort of seen at odds with but in his clan. And that's, I think, why the people that sort of designated him or put him in charge, they sort of thought it would be a good idea to run him again because he was seen as sort of like somebody that had bad things to say or that sort of clashed with the previous regime. But other people, like Ezdin Mehubi was the Minister of Culture. Everybody was. They weren't exactly like part. They weren't, you know, very close associates of. But they were not very far away either. And so people were angry. They wanted a more democratic vote. Only five candidates were approved by the Constitutional Council. And so there wasn't a huge voter turnout. There was the lowest in Algeria's history for the 2019 presidential elections, but it was still around, if I'm not mistaken, around 40%. But I remember there were protests immediately after he was elected and for the rest of the week and for the months that that followed. And so now know, five years later, we almost have an exact same playbook where there were many candidates but only three were approved. And it's kind of like somebody saying to you, like, okay, pick any fruit you want, but we're only going to put like two, two fruits in this plate. You have to pick it from this plate, you know, where it's like, okay, but you, you selected which fruits are going to go on the plate. Like, no, I want. I want something else from that tree over there, you know, and so what, what we've been. What I found fascinating actually, is that the Algerian people, by and large, they've. They found a way to protest and it's really protest by boycotting the elections. And we saw them do this not just with this most previous presidential elections, but also with a referendum on the constitution, because Taboo wanted to renew the constitution and also with legislative elections. So with those, we had, you know, between 20 and 30%, I believe most of. I believe it was like 24% for both of them. 22 and 24%. And these most. The. The presidential Elections that happened on September 7, we had a turnout of, I mean what they did, they were, they refused to even announce what the actual turnout was, but they told us how many people voted and you knew how many eligible voters there were and how many people voted and you had to do the math yourself. It ends up being around 23% voter turnout, which is again the lowest in Algerian history. And so what it really is is it's half of it, I think is people boycotting because they're not happy with the democratic electoral process. Half of it could also be people just not wanting to take time out of their Saturday. People that might have voted to Boon just been like, we already know what the result is anyways. And, and that's not healthy either. But what I would say actually is that the 90 or the 94, I think it's been revised down to 86 week later when the results were ratified. That actually isn't that big of a surprise in Algeria simply because the people that went out to vote went out to vote for the President. Our eyes were mostly on the voter turnout. If we had 60, 70% voting voter turnout and then we had 90, that would be a big problem. But I think the people that didn't want to vote for the president just boycotted the entire election and, and I think that's why you had such low voter turnout and such high score for Taboo.
- [10:18]
A
So is it a question of the main means of protests in this election was boycotting and of the available options limited to 3? None of those options were viable. I mean, I saw that even the Socialist Party candidate who is in the official opposition was approved to participate in the election. And at face value, this figure seems like someone who does have, let's say, counter hegemonic attitude and relationship to the government, calling for the release of political prisoners and liberalizing more civil liberties and things like that. Is it a matter of even of the options on the table? None of them are appealing and people decide felt like, you know, if you, if you weren't going to vote for the president, you really couldn't vote for anyone. Or was there a possibility that in an alternate universe, let's say if people did vote for one of the opposing candidates, that they could have mounted a serious challenge to, to Taboo.
- [11:35]
B
Good questions, actually. Yusuf Elsheesh. So what I would say is about the other two candidates you're talking about the Social Socialist Forces Front candidate, Yusuf Elshish. He was the problem with him and the problem with the other candidates, Abdul Ali Hasani Sharif, who is an Islamist candidate, sort of along the lines of a Muslim Brotherhood party in Algeria. But it's an Islamist party that's accepted, you know, it's like, accepted within the Algerian political landscape. They're not seen as too extreme or they're palatable, let's say, for, for the government. To be completely honest, I would say 90 to 95 of Algerians didn't know who these people were prior to the elections. The ffs, the Socialist Forces Front, is a credible political party. And this is the first time they've participated in elections since 1999, 25 years. So that, that in itself, because they've always boycotted and sort of decried, you know, unfair political processes. So the fact that they wanted to participate this time, I think that was a credit for Taboo and a credit that was like a win for them, you know. As for Abdul Ali Hassan Sharif, again, his, his party is a credible party. They have the most seats in the legislative elections, which were not fraudulent elections. But again, they had very low voter turnout. But the Islamists won the most seats. The MSP did. The problem is they won the most seats under another, another president of the party. And he, if he actually challenged Taboo, that might have been a little more interesting, but he was sort of forced to step down because he had criticized Taboo on several occasions. He was hit with a ban from leaving the country and he's faced some judicial harassment since then. So you see, the, the can, the, the parties themselves are credible, but the candidates nobody had heard of. Auschish is a senator, but most people, if they were going to know him, they would know him as a former journalist, think it was more a case of, okay, what he might, what he's saying is kind of interesting, but I don't trust that. I mean, the stacks are card. That the, the cards are stacked against him. You know, like, I don't trust that this is a truly democratic process. And that's the thing. Like, if you're going to go and let's say we're going to do a really deep and detailed, you know, investigation on if there was any fraud during the Algerian elections, there's a very good chance they might come back and you find out that there's been no fraud, actually. But what you fail to realize is that it's not democrat, it's still not democratic. I'll give you a, you know, a simple example. Algeria has more than, I think, 5, 500, 000 paramilitary people, like, you know, police and 500, 000 Jean d' Armes for Example, they're all gonna. It's. It's an unwritten rule that you have to go and vote if you're one of them. And usually, you know, it's like sort of like it's understood that you have to go and vote for the incumbent, you know, and if you have, you know, when you account military, when you count police, when you count all of that, you realize that you're now like a million to 2 million people. And that the total vote count was 5 million 5, 5 million 500, 000. You know, that's so those, you know, and then people, you know, people that work in unions, these are all, we call them like clients of the system. You know, they. They get big subsidies. They'll, you know, be supported in different ways. And so it's not. It's. It's always the person that's the incumbent. It's always the people The, The Provo candidate that always has a huge head start. It has to be something really exceptional, something completely out of the ordinary for you to sort of flip the switch and, and to. To. To win an election against a candidate of the pouvoir. And the only way we could sort of overcome any of this is if, let's say Taboo has a second and final term. Second. Yeah, second and final term, hopefully this time. And he steps down and all of a sudden, you know, like, there's a blank sort of. I think people are more interested in the next elections than these ones. There's a blank slate. And all of a sudden now you have, you know, three, four, five, six different people actually going for it. I think that that is something that could work, but it's up to the military to decide if they wanted to place somebody else or if they want to sort of open the valves and let democracy play its role.
- [16:03]
A
I think you're getting at something interesting that I think characterizes a lot of post colonial states. And there's a question of whether once Tabun does eventually step down, if his successor will be any different. Because both Tabun and Buteflikha are from the National Liberation Front, right, the liberation movement turned political party in Algeria. And I think the clientelistic political system that you're describing is present in a lot of states across the continent, indeed across the world. And so what you have is just a lot of party loyalty embedded in the state apparatus and people turnouts and vote for the incumbent because it's directly tied to their material interests. So could you talk maybe just a little bit about the FLN and it's kind of how it's received in Algerian society currently because it's interesting because the FLN has dominated, I think, a lot of political discussion recently because of course its anti colonial struggle was valiant at one Algerian independence, but it's now a party in power and its record in power hasn't been as inspiring as its.
- [17:31]
B
Record out of power. Yeah. So one quick rectification. Abdul Majidun actually ran as an independent both in 2018 and this time around. But it's not inaccurate to say that previously in his career he was a member of the FLN. Yes. You know, Algeria up until 1988 was a single party state and it wasn't until the 90s really and sort of the fall of the Berlin Wall and there was a, you know, you know, a movement all across the world really to get rid of these, you know, single party socialist states where we started to have something that resembles more of the multi party system that we have today. I think Algerians across the board, they'll draw a distinct line between the FLN of 1954 to 1962 to the, to the independent Algeria FLN and even I would say like maybe 1962 to 1988 when it was a single party state. And, and then, and then what's, and then now. And it's telling to me that Abdul Majid is an independent in 2019 and in 2024. I think I was at those protests in 2019 when people were singing and were, you know, shouting, you know, the FLN should be in the museum, you know, and that's something that, you know, again, because of the revolutionary history of the country, that cuts deep. You know, that's like something that's, it's, it's tough to say, but many people believe actually that the 2019 protest broke out because the FLN were going to announce that Butaflika was going to run for a fifth term despite him again being horribly sick and was not even at the rally. They actually had just a picture of him, you know, like almost like a painting, a portrait of him. And, and they were like acting as if he was there and they're talking to. It was absurd, absolutely ridiculously absurd. And, and that became like a lot of, I became very symbolic throughout the protest where people were saying, you know, like, we don't have a president, we have a, a cat, we have a frame, we have a painting, you know, so, so the FLN and the R now in present day Algeria are still the biggest political parties. They don't have the most seats Anymore. But they. When you talk about membership, when you talk about influence, you know, we talk about clientelistic political system. The FLN and its sort of partner, the R D, which many people believe was just an offshoot that was created to make it seem like Algeria is slightly more democratic, but it's the exact same thing. It was something some people believe, created by the establishment, which probably was. So they. They are the two biggest political parties, and I think people are. They have fatigue, they're sick of them. You know, where they. Yeah, they're just seen as, like, never as innovative, tired old. And I think it'd be interesting to see if the next president runs as an independent or as a candidate of the FLN or the. Or the R D. It should be said that both of those parties publicly endorsed Taboo and they held rallies for him, even though he was an independent candidate. And a third political party, Albina, did the exact same thing. And, and so it's also interesting that Algeria, I mean, they. There's no real difference in policy between, let's say, foreign policy, between the political parties. You're still going to have a pro Palestine, pro Western Sahara. You're still going to have a socialist system. No matter who it is, whether it's the Workers Party or the Socialist Party or the FLN or the R and D or. Or anything else, you're still. It's still going to be a social, you know, with a lot of social spending, a lot of subsidies. It's just how much. That's sort of what you're. That's sort of what your choice is. But there isn't really a big choice in terms of changing things around. It's not like you're going to vote for a party that's all of a sudden, you know, financially liberal or, or, you know, on the right side of the financial political spectrum, and they're all of a sudden gonna, you know, take away all of these state enterprises and privatize them. No, it's not in the DNA of Algerian society, in my opinion. And it's never really going to happen anyway. So that's another thing about, you know, Algerian elections, is that what sort of choice is there in the end, anyways? Okay.
- [21:53]
A
That'S interesting, because then it raises the question of if this was. If the resoundingly low voter turnout was a boycott of the political system, what are people's grievances? What's made them disgruntled? Why is there discontentment? What are the issues? People feel like the political system isn't able to Speak to them on no.
- [22:19]
B
Really? Good question. So I think it depends who you are in Algeria. So for somebody like me as a journalist, I really put a lot of value on, you know, like, civil liberties, freedom of expression, freedom of the press under taboo. We've had a huge regression in terms of civil liberties than under which already things were not great then. But we've had. We have more than 200 people, as you mentioned. You know, we call them political, we call them prisoners of opinion. People that will post something on Facebook or on Instagram, they'll get in trouble for having a political opinion. Some of them are even, you know, like, for example, some of them will insult the president and that, for example, even in law, you're not supposed to insult people in Algeria, you know, like, certain ways it could be seen as like defamation or something. And at times, if it's somebody with a high political level, you know, they can, that can count as jail time. So for me personally, like, I see the second biggest French newspaper, Liberty, shuddered because political pressure, the first biggest French speaking newspaper in severe debt because of political pressure. I see a very influential journalist in prison until now, like for writing articles or for saying the wrong things. I see a complete absence of the. There's no, absolutely no freedom of association outside in political spaces and public spaces anymore since COVID even for, you know, spontaneous ones, like, for example, to support the Palestinian cause, that would be completely shut down because they don't want it to morph into something else. So for me, as a journalist, these are my gripes. These are one of the reasons why I personally wouldn't go out there and vote. I speak to my uncle now who's, you know, like 70 years old, and he says, we don't care, you journalists, you guys, you guys care about freedom of expression. Like, you'll say things like, no, we are under extreme danger. He'll say, you know, Morocco just normalized its relations with Israel. You don't think that they, they have a very deep defense agreement now and they're going to be cooperating. That's like an enemy on our border. We have, you know, the Western Sahara conflict, which is. They're now openly in war against Morocco. We have Mali or the Indonesia, where, you know, there have been coup d' etats. And all of a sudden, you know, things are very, very heated in the north of Mali, where the Malian armies, you know, hitting what they claim are, you know, terrorists, rebels. But what Algeria and many Algerians see as more. They'll see them as rebels, yes, but not Necessarily terrorists. And they're all of a sudden fleeing north into the Algerian, you know, across the Algerian border. And that's all of a sudden, that's another, you know, like, it's a. It's another issue of a migration issue for Algeria, Libya. So many arms since 2010, 2011, 2012, have flooded into the entire Sahel, in the entire region because of Libya. So, like, I can almost understand too, when people say, like, all right, we're now we need to be politically stable because all around us there are extreme geopolitical challenges as well. So that's like another person's view on things, and that's a person that would vote Taboo, for example. So. And then there are other people, you know, like, you're apolitical person that's, you know, I can speak to cousins of cousins that live, you know, in the middle of Algeria. They don't live in the big cities on the Mediterranean struggling, you know, don't have one of them. I called and he said, I don't have work. Why would I go out and vote? So it's almost like a transactional thing, like, all right, if my living conditions were better, than I would go out and vote for you. But. And to be fair, like, that's, I guess what many votes are all over the world. But that's, that's also been a thing where it's like, all right, once my socioeconomic economic conditions improve, then I'll be more. I'll be more of an active member of, of of society. I'll take on my political duties if it were. So, yeah, Taboo has done some things for people like that as well, by the way. Algeria, I believe the only country. I believe the only country with an unemployment privileges or unemployment benefits now where you get a decent salary, I mean, it could be up to around 120, $130 a month if you fit the conditions between the ages of 19 and 40. And you had to prove that you've been looking for work and you couldn't find and so on and so forth. But more than 2 million people already benefited from the program. And Taboo said he's gonna increase the unemployment benefit. He's gonna create450,000 jobs for young people, and he's also going to double public sector salaries. So. So, yeah, I just tried to give you like, a few different profiles, you know, people in Algeria and why people would go out and vote and why they would. Wouldn't vote. But that should give you a clear idea of what's going on.
- [27:06]
A
I Think I think that's really helpful. What I'm understanding is that, you know, especially your last comment there, there's, there's a real sort of desire for political and economic stability and sort of the, the bargain and consensus at the moment is economic stability means general sort of political legitimacy. But if that were to erode, then that might start to pose questions for the longevity of Taboo's political legitimacy.
- [27:42]
B
Yeah, I mean, people don't believe it. I mean, it's not a coincidence that when a single party system sort of collapsed in Algeria, it was 1988, 1989, oil and gas prices were their lowest and there was a huge economic crisis and that led into, you know, massive protests onto the street. You know, the 5th of October 1988 is still a massacre where, you know, the army shot at its own people. And it's still something that's very traumatic for people in Algeria. And so that sort of brought about huge, dramatic political change, you know, so I think that's probably, you know, probably a law of real politic where it's like, you know, when the economy is not doing good, politicians are not doing good and vice versa, you know, when the economy is. But the thing with Algeria is that it's not usually like policy decisions by an individual candidate that's going to grow or, you know, shrink the economy. It's usually actually geopolitical factors. And Taboon got really lucky in that, you know, in the middle of his term the, there was obviously the Russia and Russia invaded Ukraine and when that happened, the price of oil and gas shot up. And not only that, all of a sudden Europe has to divest from all gas, natural gas imports that they're doing that they were bringing in from Russia and they had to look for alternative resources. And Algeria went from a 12 market share of natural gas exports to Europe to 19 market share. And so, and, and they plan on increasing that in the years to come as well. So that's the thing about Algeria too. It's like we weren't doing great. Like at the beginning of his term we were down to $40 billion in reserves, Foreign exchange reserves, which is really important in Algeria. Price of oil and gas was low at a trade deficit. And then in the middle of his term, really everything just sort of flipped. And now we're, we've doubled the foreign exchange reserves and you could see it, there's been a lot more social spending as well.
- [29:32]
A
So yeah, you, you spoke about Algerian foreign policy and there being sort of widespread consensus and you spoke about the many geopolitical questions that surround the country. Could you walk us through some of that? You spoke, you spoke about Algeria's relationship with Morocco. On the one hand, Algeria's relationship to the Sahal, on the other, its relationship to Libya and how that relates to things that are happening in the Sahel. And of course we can sort of talk about its rock solid support of Palestine and Western Sahara, which also relates to its relationship to Morocco. How is it that. So this is the question that, you know, everyone asks of, of a country like Algeria. It's a question similarly asked of a place like South Africa and other places. These foreign policy positions and maneuvers, to what extent are they, you know, obviously some of it is motivated by genuine self interest, by influence, building ambitions and kind of building Algeria's sort of political power and international stage. But some of it is also politically and ideologically driven, I imagine.
- [30:55]
B
Yeah, especially in a country like Algeria with, you know, its history, its foreign policy is completely guided. It's again, it's in, it's in its DNA. It's completely guided by the Algerian revolution. And so Algeria sees itself as an anti colonial state. It sees itself as an integral member of the Non Aligned Movement. And as a result, you know, like, for example, what they will say is our support of the Western Sahara has nothing to do with our, you know, believe it them or not, our bad feelings towards Morocco. We supported, for example, East Timor, East Timor's liberation against an ally simply because we completely have to believe in a, you know, an anti colonial philosophy. It's in our DNA. That's, that's what led us to our liberation. So we have to do that for other countries as well. But let's do a quick sort of tour of the horizon. So with Morocco it's, it's a weird one because Algerians and Moroccans are so similar. I mean, culturally, you know, we eat the same food, same religion. They want to like one another really. And when, if you, if you go to a place like France or the uk, you know, they're mixing in the same communities, they're intermarrying and it's, it's just, just, it's a tragedy of sorts. But the, the problem, I'll give you Algeria's perspective of why they don't trust Morocco. They don't trust Morocco because in 1963 the sand war breaks out and the Sandwar is basically Morocco laying claim to some of Algeria's western Algeria's desert, the western part of Algeria's Sahara desert. For Morocco, in their mind, it's like, no, Morocco Used to be this massive empire, this royal empire. And when we got colonized, you know, our lands were sort of splintered and given to everybody else. And when we helped you with your revolution, you know, some of your political leaders said we would consider, you know, the desert again and perhaps, you know, reallocate pieces of land one another. And that is true that, you know, some Algerian leaders did say that. And when they saw like one year on that Algeria was holding on to their lands, they invaded Algeria. And so Algeria sees Morocco as like, they view them with a lot of suspicion. They still suspect until this day that they have expansionist motives not just in Western Sahara, but perhaps even beyond. People forget that Morocco didn't recognize, you know, Mauritania and the Mauritanian borders until, you know, 1970. I believe it was 10 years, I believe after they, they declared independence. And so the, you know, this idea of the, the great Morocco, the Greater Morocco of, you know, pieces of Mauritania and Western Sahara and Northern Mali and Algeria as well, that's something that Algeria is very, very, you know, careful or like they always on their guard about. So that explains as well why they also really support the Western Sahara. For them, it's sort of seen as like if we give them an inch, they're going to try to take a mile. Whether you believe them or not, whether you believe that's realistic or not, that's, that's definitely some of the, the thinking behind Algeria's relationship with Morocco. But you know, even, even with, you know, the, the sand war, even with, you know, the 1975, the, what Moroccans would call the, the Green March, you know, as they sort of entered into the Western Sahara and then, you know, you know, cutting relations one after the other. You know, in 1988, the things had warmed. We, we talked about, you know, North Africa being an integrated region again, kind of like the East African block or ECOs. And it's just, it's one thing after another every single time, you know. So like 1988, everything seems like it's going to go great again. They agree on a referendum in the U. N. 1994. Morocco accuses Algeria of importing terrorism onto its onsets land. And Algeria at the time did have a lot of terrorism. They were in the middle of a civil war. Algeria is offended by that, you know, because Moroccans, they, they require a visa of any Algerian in Morocco. They, they expel a lot of Algerians that were in Morocco. So Algeria decides to shut the border, and the border has been shut since 1994, and if you ask economists in the region, they're going to tell you that, you know, 2% of the GDP of the region is affected every single year because of that border being shut between Algeria and Morocco. Because that should be an integrated region really, at least Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, perhaps Libya, perhaps Mauritania as well, Western Sahara and so on and so forth. So, yeah, that, that is a really big issue and I don't anticipate one that, that's one that Taboo could fix in his second term. Really. That seems to be one that, honestly, I don't even see a solution for it anymore. I don't, I don't know how it's going to be fixed. I don't know if it's ever going to be fixed. I hope it is. One day I would love to take, you know, a train from Casablanca to Tunis or to Tripoli. I think everybody wants that deep down, everybody all over the place. But it's a question of if the political calculus can, if they can fix the political calculus at the highest level with Mali. So with Mali, it's, it's again, it's another very long. People think it started in 2000, so on, but it's a very long issue when you, when you realize that, you know, the Tuaregs in the north have been sort of asking for concessions, have been asking for their own, not their own state necessarily, but for more and more rights really, since the 1960s and 1970s. And it sort of, you know, things came to a head in the 90s. They had a civil war in 2012. The Tuareg rebels, some of them, you know, by the way, later on, associated with Al Qaeda, some of them with isis. But they, they this. But there are also, like the Azawad movement, as a watt movement is a secular movement, and they're the ones that are really heading things there. And they go and they capture large parts of the north, north of Mali, claiming that they want their own state. And Algeria steps in as a mediator and they have these things called the Algeria accords in 2000, in 2015, the Algeria court's apologies. And this would basically bring the two factions together, give a little bit more autonomy to the north, but still keep them inside of Mali, integrate, you know, maybe their militias into the, the Malian army and so the FAMA and so on and so forth. Initially, everybody agreed to these terms, but they were never really implemented past, I think, 20. And eventually last January, SME Goita decided to withdraw. And he's been accusing Algeria of interference and so on and so forth. And so now they've been really on the off. They've brought on Wagner mercenaries. They've been attacking, you know, Kidal Gao and other, other cities and villages up in the north. And that's pushing again a lot of Tuaregs, a lot of people. And when I say Tuaregs, you know, these are people that have been separated by an artificial border. You know, like we have a Tinzawatine in Algeria, they have a Tinzawatin in Mali. These are people that are, you know, have never been bothered by, they live on both sides of the border anyways. These are nomads, you know, like in, it's in their blood kind of. So they don't, they don't recognize borders and so on. So it's really a. Algeria has to be implicated because the populations in the south of the country are implicated as well. So yeah, so it's, it's very complicated here. And again we're going to have to, there's going to have to be some high level diplomacy that happens to try and fix the situation in Mali because that is going to affect Algeria as well. These are things that are going okay, except for the fact that Algeria keeps expelling migrants, what they call sub Saharan migrants into the desert in Asia. But they've actually come to a bilateral agreement on that. I think Algeria, they might be paying the Nigerian government to take them in. But Nigeria is a key strategic piece for Algeria because there's a pipeline that might be coming up from Nigeria. That pipeline has been built throughout Nigeria. It's been built from Algeria and they just needed to go through Niger now and they could start exporting gas to Europe from there as well. And Algeria would hit touch some royalties on that and it could maybe even have some gas on that as well. So that, that's something that I think at the macro level Algeria season as being very strategic as well. And finally Libya, Libya, Algeria doesn't get along with Khalifa Haftar, who's a sort of warlord in the eastern part of the, the country they recognize, you know, the internationally recognized national government. But Haftar, I mean we have to say things as they are. Haftar has been, his influence has been growing over the years and he sort of almost is a de facto ruler of large parts of Libya. And so as a result, and the problem with Libya is the problem that you had in Syria and the problem that you have in many places, even in Mali now is that there are too many foreign interests. You know, you had Turkey, United Arab Emirates, you Have, you know, sometimes Russia, France and so on and so, and when everybody has, you know, a stake, that's when, you know, it's difficult to find some kind of solution that's good for the Libyan people. And so it's something that's been going, you know, it's been blowing hot and cold and on and off for a very long period of time. It's another thing that again, it's on the main agenda for Algerian's foreign policy, but it's something that Tabun has to try and find a way to be influential in finally. And sorry, I know I've been, I've been going on forever, but finally Algeria was largely elected, I mean, almost unanimously as a member of the, as a non temporary member of the Security Council. And since that they've been doing a great job really sort of fighting for the Palestinian cause, putting in resolutions almost non stop almost every week or every two weeks, trying to hold Israel to account, trying to get them to force, you know, the Security Council to force Israel to abide by, you know, ICJ rulings and so on and so forth. And that's again, one thing where I think Algeria, maybe you as South African can understand this. People in Algeria, I think the anc, the FLN may be similar in some ways, but they're not happy with a lot of domestic governance. But when it comes to foreign policy, I think people are pretty much completely behind the Algerian government's way of doing things. The only thing that I think people would be more happy with is if we were a little more not on the Palestinian issue, but maybe in the other regional issues, you know, Mali or Libya, I think if they were a little more intelligent, a little more, a little more guile, a little more, maybe a little more willingness to compromise not on your principles, but maybe, I don't know, sometimes it feels like if somebody does something that Algeria doesn't like, they'll withdraw an ambassador and okay, we're cutting relations. You know, they're a little too brash at times. But overall, I mean, on the principles, I think most Algerian people are behind Algeria's foreign policy.
- [41:18]
A
I think. Yeah, thank you for, for sketching that. I think it's a really informative picture on the way Algeria is approaching its foreign policy and the way it conceives of its role in the region. I suppose the, the next question I should ask is, are there, are there grander ambitions for not just regional stability and cohesion, but perhaps maybe even reviving the political ambitions, let's say, of the 20th century? Of projecting a kind of anti colonial imaginary of that particular place in the world? Or is that something that kind of motivates a lot of decisions that are taking place currently. But the, you know, the potential for, for revival of let's say Arab nationalism is, is pretty remote.
- [42:21]
B
Arab nationalism in particular is not like Algerians or Algeria would be particularly would be pursuing I don't think simply because, you know, like a lot of Arab countries are monarchies are. How can I explain this without being controversial. But basically I would say like, I would say economically motivated maybe less. I. Less. Less based on philosophy, less based on ideals and so on and so forth. Anyways, no, you ask a good question there. I think Algeria sees those two particular issues, you know, the Palestinian one and the Western Sahara one as a continuation sort of as what it was doing in the 1960s and 70s. But what sort of hamstrings or what sort of hampers, you know, Algeria is sort of trying to put things into overdrive and becoming sort of a global leader of you know, liberation or so on and so forth is that Algeria does have this policy of like non interference in other countries affairs, you know, where it's very much. It's not like for example, when things are happening in Syria you saw a lot. Or in Yemen, you know, you saw like a lot of Arab nations come together and be like hey, we need to you know, put together a force in Yemen and a coalition and to go and take care of this. And so. And Algeria was always like nah, we're not doing that in Libya. St. Libya is just next door. It's. We share a border. Algeria was always like no, we're not going to interfere at least militarily in other countries affairs. And this was actually in the Algerian constitution for more than 60 years that Algeria would never send its military outside of its borders for Algerians to die in other people's wars. And actually under Tabun's mandate, under Tabun's term they changed the constitution and now Algeria's military can be sent out of the Algerian borders. They say it's always been said that if it were ever to happen it's going to be like a specific mission or a specific, you know, like. Yeah, like something very short. Like for example, I think at one time, you know, Algeria's ambassador, Somali was under real threat or maybe it was a consulate, consulate in the north of Mali or something like that might have been targeted or something. So it would be like a rescue operation or something. But others see that as you know, like a signal of Intense from Algeria, I'd say, like, we're gonna start, you know, everybody's. Has everybody's influence. Everybody's. Nobody's shy of, you know, giving their influence or giving their opinion on our region. It's about time we start doing the opposite, you know, because like I said, in Mali, in Libya, there are so many foreign interests. And I think. I think even some Algerians would want Algeria to sort of spread out and say, and assert its own agenda into those countries while respecting their sovereignty. But, yeah, in terms of, like, if we talk about liberation, you know, anti colonialism, I think Algeria is really limited to those two issues, Palestine and the Western terror. And they almost always try to influence those two things through international bodies like the un.
- [45:42]
A
Thanks, Maher. I suppose now to. To come to probably the most important question, I suppose, arguably the most important question for you, AFCON 2025 and the Algerian national football team didn't have the best run at AFCON this year. What place does the national team have, I suppose, in Algerian politics and society? And what is your strategy for Afghanistan? You were the most miserable man in Abidjan during Afghan this year. So I'm keen to hear, almost a year since, have there been changes made to the national team structure and what's. How are you guys approaching qualification to afcon, and hopefully AFCON itself as well?
- [46:35]
B
Well, thank you for asking a football question. I'm sick of speaking. No, but since.
- [46:40]
A
Since I asked the football question, I think. I can't remember who said it, but there was an old football coach who.
- [46:48]
B
Said, of all the.
- [46:49]
A
Of all the unimportant things in life, football is the most important.
- [46:53]
B
Most important. Exactly. Since AFCON and Abidjo, since we were there in Cote d', Ivoire, Algeria's coach resigned. So he was the coach since 2018. So he was there for six years. And now we have a new coach, a Swiss Bosnian coach. His name is Vladimir Petkovich. And a lot of Algeria's influential players actually haven't been as influential under this new coach. Players like Red Mars has only played one match. Yusuf Bellelli hasn't been called up by this new coach. And so it seems like we're turning a new page. The problem with this coach is that his results have been mitigated. He's been scoring a lot of. We've been scoring a lot of goals. We've been conceding a lot of goals as well. That's the issue. But still, we're well on our way to qualifying. We've played two matches of qualifying. So Far Algeria has six points. We won both of our matches and it's going to be an interesting one because AFCON takes place in about a year and change in Morocco. And so it's going to be, yeah, a very interesting one in that I do think there's going to be, you know, tens of thousands of Algerians that head over. They can't cross the border directly. Obviously you're gonna have to take a layover in Tunisia or for those that have passports in Europe and then, and then head down to Morocco. But I do think we're going to have a sort of home field advantage unless you play against Morocco. But I guess everybody else, Algeria might be the best supported team and North African teams tend to do well in AFCONs that are hosted in North Africa. So I do believe that that has a real role to play. I mean the home field advantage. And I'm really, really looking forward to it. I hope you're going to be out there as well. But let's see if I can drag this back into politics. The one thing I would say about Algerian football and football in general right now is that, you know, because in 2010, 2011, we sort of professionalized the local league, meaning that teams were no longer sporting associations that are non profits that, you know, are eligible for subsidies from the Ministry of Sport and so on and so forth. No move that on. They were publicly traded on the stock market and they had to do things like provide health insurance for their players. We became professional. What's been really interesting is that two, three years ago, the league sort of folded and it was no longer professional anymore. And supporters themselves were out in the streets protesting for the government to force a national enterprise to, to buy their clubs. And that would sort of stabilize them financially. And so you have now, like all kinds of national enterprises, whether they be in oil and gas or electricity or whatever the case may be, they're all buying clubs. And it's, it's. How can I say this? It's, it's, it's satisfying a lot of people's nostalgia for the 1970s and 1980s when we had, when players were just like employees of national enterprises and their salaries were on a fixed grid. You know, if you work three years in the, the company, you make X amount. If you work five years, then you make X amount. And so, yeah, it's been interesting seeing sports sort of become more socialist in Algeria over the last few years, as again, the state's coffers have been sort of filling up with, with the money of oil and gas from abroad.
- [50:06]
A
I hope that long may that experiment continue. I think, yeah, lots of, lots of things to draw inspiration from, at least in that example, maybe as a final word, any kind of final reflections on what this era of Algerian politics means, represents, what should we be paying attention to and what will it, what will it take for the trajectory to be one of sort of progress and improvement? You know, of course, you know, maybe to put a crudely part of it does seem quite reliant on this economic cycle and the oil and gas boom that's been advantageous. Is that sustainable? Especially from a bigger picture standpoint, if you consider all of the ecological implications, what might be next?
- [51:02]
B
Yeah, it's a really good question. So, like me, what I would like to see, I'll put it, I'll put it that way. First of all, I would like to see civil liberties sort of open up again. We need, there's no point of having, you know, journalists in prison. Media, you know, complete. All media outlets and houses have sort of become PR outlets instead of actual media outlets. Journalism is practically dead in Algeria. So for me, I would like to see that. And many people believe that will happen. People believe that, you know, 2019, this is, this is a theory, for example, that my, the uncle I spoke about my scenes 2019 was, it was Algeria was destabilized, you know, and again, surrounded by, you know, geopolitical threats and so on and so forth. So we couldn't like go through an extended period of instability because that would have had severe repercussions on the country. So taboos brought in to stabilize the country for one to two terms. And once that happens, all right, then we're going to go back to normal. I don't know if that's the case, but what I would like to see is definitely more civil liberties open up freedom, more freedom of expression. I like the increase in social spending. Things like unemployment benefits, social housing has been, you know, really great under taboo. And I think he's going to increase the expenditure on that as well. I, I would like to find some kind of solution for the international problems with Morocco, with Libya, with Mali, definitely. And then, you know, please God, give us a solution in Palestine as well. Please, something that everybody would be happy with. That would be great, you know, if they could do that. That would take off a lot of burden on Algeria and foreign policy perspective. But again, that's not really up to just Algeria. That's, you know, an entire ecosystem that things need to all click the right way for that to happen. And so it's not fair to expect taboo to solve, you know, the Palestinian cuts in. In five years. But yeah, I think me personally, I would just like civil liberties to increase. Algeria says that it is transitioning out of oil and gas into more green energies. Things like solar in particular would be very interesting because of Algeria's vast Sahara. A lot of talk about green hydrogen. But apparently if, you know, if you read Africa as a country, you might know that that's not exactly a solution as well. Hello. Hello. Hello. Hello. Hey.
- [53:47]
A
I don't know what happened.
- [53:49]
B
It might have been my Internet. My bad. No worries, no worries.
- [53:52]
A
But we can. I can edit this all up. Your. Your final sentence was how it's not fair for Tabun to solve the.
- [54:01]
B
Yeah, okay. But yeah, and in terms of energy, I think Algeria is going to try to capitalize on this. This point in time where natural gas is in high demand. It does has indicated that it will move on to green energy. Things like solar, you know, in the desert in Algeria could be something that I think could benefit the country. If you read Africa as a country, you know that green hydrogen is coming to North Africa, although that could also be very problematic because of the amount of water it needs, really. And this is a very water stressed region of the world at the moment. So, yeah, I think overall, I think people would just be. People in my position would be happier with more civil liberties and then people, you know, that maybe are making a little less money, maybe more of the working class would be a little bit happier with, you know, increase in purchasing power, limiting inflation, continuing things like social programs and subsidies and so on, which is. All of that is, is doable. All of those things that I outlined is doable for him in the next five years. So yeah. And then most importantly, at the end, peaceful transition of power. We cannot have another president, especially him. I think he's going to be 83 years old. Cannot have another president try and try and go for a third term and violate the constitution again. We need to switch out and hopefully he sets the scene for open, fair and free democratic elections in 2020.
- [55:26]
A
Maher, thank you so much for coming to the program.
- [55:29]
B
Thanks for having me on. Will, it's been a pleasure. Read Africa as a country.
- [55:33]
A
Oh, man.
- [55:34]
B
Amen.
- [55:34]
A
Maybe next time we'll have your uncle on. You should tell him to read up because.
- [55:44]
B
He needs it. But it's good to speak to somebody like that because they always have an alternative view, even if you think it's completely wrong, but they'll always have an alternative view of how things are going and at least gives you, like a window into what other people are thinking in the country. So. So, yeah, always.
- [55:59]
A
Always good to keep one's ear on the ground. A reminder of who I've been speaking with. I've been chatting with Maher Mazahi, who is a journalist and the host of the Africa five Aside Podcast, which is about African football, its history, its politics, its culture. Do like, subscribe and follow Maher and the Africa five Aside Podcast. He's based in Algiers and he's also a contributing editor for Africa Is a Country. And you have been listening to the AIAC podcast. Also, follow us. Also, keep up to date with our latest episodes. You can find us wherever you listen to your podcasts and stay tuned for the next one. Goodbye.