C (4:31)

I don't know that I can conjure anything beyond the context that you.

B (4:38)

Because you brought the topic up. I just wondered how, you.

C (4:44)

Know, it just seemed like a natural progression of, of the conversation. You know, if we're talking about corruption. I mean it's, it's, it's. That conversation is like it's most probably a sub team of, you know, the bigger is Nigeria is calm or the origins of the scam conversation. You know, because the way we laid it out, we kind of looked at it both from corruption as perpetrated by corrupt government officials, politicians as well as, you know, the more contemporary Internet fraud scam, Yahoo, Yahoo phenomenon, you know, and it struck me as an incomplete conversation to the extent that we don't have, you know, a follow up, you know, with the conversation around. I mean, if this has become a scourge within the Nigerian polity or society, what's being done about it? So my own entry point into this conversation, it may not necessarily be about, you know, what conversations are ongoing within the left or outside of it. And to add, while these conversations might not be ongoing within the Nigerian left within the context that you have offered, I do know that it's an ongoing conversation, at least in small circles outside of the left. But for me personally, it's more like a way to discuss, you know, what government, you know, what even politicians themselves have done. You know. So, you know, I think about it, I think about, you know, the efcc, the Economic Financial Crimes Commission, the icpc, nfi, stuff like that. Policies around, you know, fighting of corruption. Yeah. That were fashioned to kind of fight corruption. Kind of put, put some lick cloth.

B (7:13)

On a pig or chapstick. Actually. The weather is very dry at the moment. Yeah. Something that in a way did not even necessarily make the pig look better, but just improved its health, you could say. Yeah. Oji, what do you think in terms of justification for the, for the topic? Do you agree with that? Is there anything you'd add?

D (7:38)

Yeah, to a large extent the maker has been Right. About what he said. But I, I also want to add that, you know, if we're looking at things from one direction, it's also good to look at it from the other direction. As you know, we've been looking at the corruption side and you know, what it has done to the country. People have been responsible and all, you know, so as materialists, historical materialists, people that look at dialectics front and back of things, you know, the up and down, trying to see, you know, the other side of things. And it's worth examining what we call anti corruption also put like a sort of X ray on it and see that, you know, like in class societies or in the, during the rule of these elites, how us, you know, they are, they are lip service to anti corruption. You know, how has it panned out in this class society? You know, so not to be like, I did a poor adding point to what you guys are talking about with the pig at lipstick and chapstick, but yeah, like, it's just like lip service all through if we're looking at empirical factors, you know, empirical things. Yeah. So yeah. Awesome.

B (8:51)

Okay. Right. Okay, nice. That makes sense. I mean, I guess we should get right into the meat of it, you know, I don't know, there's some kind of food and lips analogy that's lurking behind. I guess we're having this conversation at lunchtime. Right. But so I think the meat of it should be the contemporary. Should be the contemporary period. Right. Is raising a question about the anti corruption agencies that exist in Nigeria and how they emerged because, yeah, I think that's what will be most relevant to most people listening. But I think it might also be worth doing like a brief history of anti corruption in Nigeria prior to the current period, prior to the Fourth Republic where organizations like the EFCC and the ICPC emerged and we'll explain those acronyms in a moment. So, yeah, I mean, if we could, in a nutshell, I mean, this won't be easy to do, but let's try to, in two to three minutes, like offer your own summary of the history of anti corruption in Nigeria. How would you approach it.

C (10:19)

Prior to the Fourth Republic? Yes, I, I do think it's, I mean, it's almost impossible to say it doesn't have a history that predates the Fourth Republic. But I think whatever history it had, you know, wasn't quite institutionalized, you know, like it was in the Fourth Republic. And it was usually just left to the whimsical caprice of military regimes who rode on the wave of anti corruption into the anti corruption sentiments into power. And the clearest example that one can think of, you know, is the immediate past president of Nigeria, whose first stints as military head of state in the 80s, you know, kind of gives credence to this history that we talk about. But it was almost like it was just basically now who Intoxicated, corrupt, nine incorrupt people randomly, you know, there were little or no investigations, proof, and then it was, you know, done outside of, you know, the democratic norm. So that's my feeling, you know, it didn't become institutionalized, you know, until the port Republic. Why it then became institutionalized in the fourth Republic is another catalog, as most of us here know, that kind of took place under the civilian administration of who was under some kind of external pressure by, you know, the multilateral bodies to institutionalize this. So in a nutshell, that's what. That's what. Not properly. That's what gave birth to the creation of agencies like the icpc. Yes.

B (12:40)

Yeah, I think, like I said, we will spend more time talking about anti corruption after Obasanjo and what gave rise to it. But yes, I agree that the Buhari period was kind of paradigmatic of a certain kind of anti corruption wave that preceded the fourth Republic. O. Is there anything to add there about the kind of military version of anti corruption politics in Nigeria?

D (13:14)

No, nothing much to add. Only that Muritalatu Muritala Mohammed.

B (13:18)

Yeah.

D (13:19)

Was a bit, you know, high on the anti corruption thing and then there were numerous retirements, sacking of people.

B (13:28)

Yeah.

D (13:28)

You know. Yeah. So I think I just add moral into the mix, you know, and. Yeah, that's it.

B (13:34)

No, that's. That's crucial. I think. I. I think that the transition from Gawan, like, was a turning point in Nigerian history in a lot of ways. At the end of Gawan marked the end of that first oil boom. Right. Or the first oil boom was coming to an end, as we discussed in the cement armada conversation. And I think that during the oil boom, while the music was playing, people were sort of enjoying the spoils and there was less of an emphasis on efficiency of contracts and all that stuff. I think when the album ended, the focus on accounting for the funds generated this kind of public interest in anti corruption. Right. In kind of punishing the folks who had squandered the funds. And, you know, the. The rise of the populist military dictator Motala, whose vice president was of ashra, propelled that movement forward quite a bit. And, you know, he was then part of These tribunals or launching these tribunals, including the one on cement armada, and also pioneered the thing that Emeka has affirmed as well, which is where the head of state just unilaterally jails or fires certain people because they were associated with corruption. So it was kind of, yeah, as is the tradition in these John texts, a very top down approach and quite whimsical. So I think that's a decent way to portray anti corruption if we're forced to do so quickly prior to the Fourth Republic. I mean, maybe. One other aspect I will add is that there was a lot of popular support behind the desire to cleanse society of corruption. I think that with the inequalities generated by oil wealth, it became very obvious quickly in the 70s and 80s that a lot of the people who were gaining resources were doing so outside of the bounds of legality. Right. So it generated resentment obviously, because it's not only that wealth was concentrated, but it was that, you know, it was being attained through inflating contracts, kickbacks, all that stuff. So even though the military leaders didn't necessarily channel that popular anger in actual productive and institutionalized directions, I think it's just worth acknowledging that that anger did exist and you know, there was a sort of anti corruption movement emerging, even if it wasn't, you know, exactly organized around that framework head on, if that makes sense.

D (16:56)

Yeah, it does. You know, does at least gives us a background that it's not like nothing has been done, but we can clearly see that we're building towards what we have as the anti corruption framework now and seeing how it in a way was in a different era, but remains the same, if you guys understand what I'm saying.

B (17:21)

Yeah, Defs. No, so let's not talk about the current period and like anti corruption since the return to democracy. I mean, so America, you already started walking us down that path, talking about how when Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999 under the leadership of President Ubaso, a new wave of governmental initiatives to reduce corruption emerged. But this time they were centralized under the banner of two main federal institutions, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, if I've not gotten their names wrong. So you're saying that these emerged as conditions for, you know, Nigeria's engagement with international finance. Do you want to say more about that and why these conditions took this particular form?

C (18:30)

I mean, I think the short answer to that would be that within multilateral, international, multilateral circuits, corruption had become a big deal, especially with, you know, for developing countries, I think that there's quite extensive literature around that. So if we talk back a bit to the period that you mentioned under. Go on. And you know, furthermore, on the. Maybe not Muritala, but. And also maybe not even other Buhari in his first incarnation, but more precisely on the Babangida, you know, when we had to go through the structural adjustment program phase, you know, the conversation at the time, you know, when it became obvious by the 90s. Yeah, I think late 90s early noughties that, you know, some of the recommendations of IMF and the World bank, you know, with respect to, you know, austerity measures, structural adjustment programs had failed. Rather than take the blame for prescribing, you know, wrong treatment, corruption became the fall guy for why those policies didn't quite work. So that buzz, you know, was created around, you know, anti corruption at the time, which in turn meant that this prescription by the same international bodies became that part of the reason why this hasn't worked was because the African elite, you know, elites in the third world countries were irredeemably corrupt. And there was a need to check that. There was also a conversation around the scourge of money laundering and how because of the lack of institutional frameworks within developing countries, but most especially African countries, it was easy, it was not easy to trace, you know, the source of these funds that were finding their ways into safe havens in the metropole. You know, so that kind of, you know, pull and tug is what event led to these institutions, you know, recommending then again that, you know, we had to fix stuff on the home front, but with the particular instance of Nigeria, and this has gone around quite a bit at some point during Obiju's second tenure, that's Obasanjo's second tenure, he and his ministerial cabin, whatever they call them, felt the need to go to these Bretton woods organizations and seek debt relief. You know, and part of the conditions that they had to meet was the institutionalization of frameworks to curb, you know, wanton corruption. And, you know, so this is what led to what is today known as the EFCC act, the ICPC Act. You know, it's, you know, within a democratic, you know, setup. So it wasn't just left to the whims and caprice of whoever the head.

B (22:45)

Of, at least in theory. It wasn't supposed to be left to this.

C (22:49)

Yeah, I was going to say what became of that is anybody's guess, but. Well, yeah, I mean, in fear. Yeah. But even in practice, really, to be honest, if we're being Fair. The act itself gave investigative powers to the efcc. Whether the EFCC was provided with the financial muscle and, you know, all that it required to be able to, you know, and to execute its mandate, it's a different ball game. And how, you know, over time, the EFCC itself as an agency had become or became hijacked by, you know, political interest. You then becomes another conversation. But that's in a nutshell. It's like the background.

B (23:41)

No, nice. Thank you. That history is extremely helpful. You know, it covers a lot of the conversation we want to have, really. So now it's a question of unpacking it. I think the point you raised about the shifting of blame from the adjustment process itself and the failure of the economics of the adjustment process to African elite and some kind of notion that there's a congenital African problem with corruption was in a way a genius move, because it's undeniable. I think we'd all admit that there is corruption in Nigeria. I mean, am I. Am I shaking a table when I say that table's broken already? Yes, I think we can. We can accept that as. Right.

C (24:35)

Table we don't break.

B (24:37)

That's not breaking news. But at the same time, you know, the question is of what sort of, you know, to what end, who are the beneficiaries and who are the losers and what is the cause, etc. Like, these kinds of questions, I think were totally sidelined by the notion that this is somehow some kind of organic or traditionally African problem and that what is required is kind of externally imposed institutions to fix it. So I think that, yeah, that aspect of the history is quite interesting and it's worth highlighting. I think the thing I also want to highlight there is that the transition out of the oil boom period, where I think the model of development pursued by the Nigerian military was somewhat more Keynesian. Right. It was more oriented around some measure of redistribution, some measure of trying to stimulate domestic manufacturing and this sort of thing, some measure of import substitution towards the neoliberal. One also saw a transition in how we think and talk about corruption, that when we arrive at the present day, the presence of the state in any kind of process, in any kind of directly productive process or in any kind of process of managing resources, seems to always carry this label of corruption. So I feel that's one of the achievements of that IMF and World bank framing is that now it's moved from, you know, just a byproduct of state processes that in a way is inevitable without certain institutional constraints. To something that is inherent to the nature of the state in Africa in general. So I thought that was an interesting point that was kind of implied in what you were saying and definitely sets the tone for, you know, the anti corruption institutions that emerge in the Fourth Republic as well. Any further notes there?

D (27:20)

Yeah, just to kind of maybe add to it, like, these guys are shapers of policies and it shows you the kind of power that they wield on African countries and even, you know, countries from all over, all over the world that are subjected or that subject themselves to their diagnosis. You know, of course they also come with what they feel should be done and what ultimately benefits capital, you know, so tackling the root cause of class contradictions or class struggle will not be what they really want, because that then takes us to the root of the problem, you know. So why they essentially did that was just to kind of shift blame away from, you know, international capital and take us away from class struggle. And then we keep chasing shadows and not cool cutting the tree, the corruption tree from the root, you know, so that's why corruption manifests in different forms and, you know, patterns in the states and also looking at global framework, you know, when you have like tax havens, all these places where elites can keep and dock their money, you know. So, yeah, so that's one thing that I might add to that.

B (28:42)

I want to come back to the corruption tree because I think we need to figure out how to cut it down in this episode for all time and people. But before we take on that task. No, I think the question of now the emergence of these anti corruption institutions is an interesting one. I mean, so how would we assess so far the record of these anti corruption institutions? Have they served their mandate? Now, I asked that question in two senses. I mean, one is the mandate that they were given in the law that established them, which Emeka has referred to, you know, like institutionalize and rationalize the anti corruption process and remove it from the whims and caprices of individual leaders. I mean, how much of that has been achieved? I mean, yeah, obviously I think the listener will already be aware what the answer is, but if you can kind of elaborate on that, why that is, that would be helpful. But then the other sense is the purpose they were meant to serve for international finance and its domestic allies. You know, maybe the deeper purpose of these institutions be on the surface. Do you feel like they're serving that purpose? I don't know. Who wants to take a stab.

C (30:14)

Which is trying. They are trying.

B (30:21)

Okay.

C (30:22)

I mean, yeah, if The, I mean, if we're right and it's part of the reason why these organizations or these agencies were created was to curb corruption within, you know, the political, then the response to that would be, I think you might leave that to opinions. There are those who believe that they're just a waste, you know, of time and everyone's time, you know, but then there's those who believe that it's a process. And I think that the EFCC or even the ICPC itself is maybe a 20 year old institution if I'm not mistaken, and that perhaps the 20 years is not enough time for it to have learnt the ropes, you know, especially because its creation was basically just to pay lip service the recommendations of this multilateral Bretton woods organizations. And so not a lot of thoughts was put into it. I can't remember if I'm correct, but I think I've read somewhere where the pioneer, if you like, of the FCC gives an account of your challenges he had to face, you know, in order to even get funding for setting up. So this act was just passed, but you know, there's not a lot of money that was pumped into it. And then right over time when, when the need arose, Obasanjo has been alleged to have used it to hound political opponents in what was effectively one party state at the time, you know, right. To, to put all of, all those who were his detractors in line. And so I think that's where initially some of these organizations started from, you know, so on that front it's hard to argue that they have succeeded. But of course there are a bit, there's a bit of stats to throw around here again. So the question is how many, what's it called, complaints have EFCC gotten? You know, how many have been investigated in terms of percentage, how many have they prosecuted and how successful have these prosecutions? I'm now talking about high level corrupt cases, you know, cases that have to do with the Halibutin case of the early 2000s. I think, you know, state governors especially, you know, who during their tenures were covered by the immunity clause, but who after their tenures have been hard to prosecute. I doubt that you can get up to 12, I mean a dozen of those cases where you'd say the USCC has been able to jail 12 former governors, you know, who have been accused. And there's hardly any governor who's, you know, governed any states, you know, the subnational states in Nigeria now, who hasn't been accused of misappropriation of Funds. So on that count it's a bit of a challenge. But the remit goes beyond that. So it's actually economic and financial crime. So there are also those that have to do with the Yahoo Yahoo phenomenon. Like any Nigerian knows, you can hardly read any newspaper where in recent times you haven't heard that EFCC series with it, some hotel or hideout and arrested 10, 20, 30, 40 alleged Yahoo Yahoo boys.

B (35:17)

You know, awesome dormitory on campus.

C (35:19)

You know, some dormitory on campus you get, you know, so, so if, if you're going to assess them on that, on that score, the scorecard might just be that they are pulling their weight, you know.

B (35:33)

Right.

C (35:35)

They're getting these raids in. They are confiscating some of these funds that were acquired illegally, a large chunk of which they are now being accused of pocketing.

B (35:48)

Right, right, right, yeah, yeah.

C (35:51)

So I mean it's a difficult maybe because I don't want to categorically say that they haven't succeeded, you know.

B (36:04)

So, so yeah, that's interesting. I mean it sounds like America has been somewhat charitable and tried to assess these institutions on their technocrat, technocratic merits alone. Right? Say, okay, based on what they've, the standards they've set for themselves, how are they doing? And you know, he's suggesting that okay, maybe they're trying their best kind of thing. I mean, how would you respond? Will you assess them only from the technocratic. No, no, within the framework, you know, how well they are performing on the test they set for themselves?

D (36:42)

No.

B (36:42)

Or do you feel like there's a deeper question to answer?

D (36:45)

Yes.

B (36:45)

Corruption.

D (36:46)

Yes, yes, I will look at, I'll look at. Of course the principal guiding analysis tool is within this class structure. What have they been doing? You know. Yeah, they can, they can resolve or try or appear to look like they are resolving in intra elite squabbles, you know, but they come down hard on the so called Yahoo boys, you know, so it has just proven over time to be a tool for the elites to resolve their internal dealings and then just pay lip service to fighting corruption. You know, if you look at it, you've seen that they've not done well in bringing people to justice or these elites to justice. And then within the same political framework that we have, they just change their parties or pledge allegiance to the ruling party and they are forgiven. We've seen governors say if you come to our party, you know, you're forgiven, you know, and then what is the function of the EFCC in that context where the class power or the ruling class or the ruling party at that point in time is showing us without, you know, any form of doubt that these institutions are essentially important, you know, in effecting the rules that they've set out or their mandates or their set out goals. You know, so if we look at it from like the class perspective, we'll see that any tool that the elites come up with to regulate themselves almost come to failure because you then see the hypocrisy or the, the, the objective as not truly fighting corruption, but again using it as a tool to further their own interests and consolidating power. You know, so we then see corruption having, or that lady justice having, you know, a selective set of people to deal with. And it comes so harshly down on the poor people or the people at the lower rank of society than it does on the elites amongst themselves where you can have a plea Bargain still like 15 billion, and then do a plea bargain return like maybe 2 billion and have a net gain of, you know, 13 billion. But I'm just, I'm just, I'm, you know, I'm just saying already. Yeah, so I'm just saying that, I'm just saying that in this class society that we have, corruption actually is being rewarded because it's a sum total of a net gain for you to steal as much as you can so that when the FCC gets you, you can do the playback game thing and keep like 80% of what you stole and you know, got some air conditioned house arrest bullshit that they've come up with. You know, so in. It's like this quote that says ecology or environmentalism without class struggle is just gardening is the same way as, it's the same way as anti corruption without class struggle is just inter elite investigation or inter elite shaming. Let me just put it that way. So that's what I see it as. They failed horribly. And they've not only failed, but they've shown and delegitimized those institutions and make it make, made the people know that we can't trust them fully, you know.

B (40:16)

Yeah, I'm inclined to agree with that because I think that, okay, the, the story we were telling about the kind of populist military version of anti corruption and the democratic technocratic version of anti corruption is maybe a little more complicated. If we look at the very recent history of Nigeria that like, okay, if you see that Obasanjo launched the kind of technocratic phase of anti corruption where you know, he had this internationally recognized institutions with clear rules of engagement operating within the rule of law, doing Things like plea bargains, I mean, that Ouigi just talked about. We saw some attempts to reverse that with the emergence of the Buhari administration. Right. Because I think under the pdp, people started to get sick of the technocratic gloss of anti corruption that was targeting, in effect, poor people, but letting a lot of wealthier politicians off the hook because they just institution did not have the resources. Of course, the question that that begs is why not? I mean, who was restricting them of resources? Right. Or that, you know, they couldn't necessarily prosecute the cases fully or, you know, all manner of clearly politically instigated failures were bedeviling the institution. The institution. So people started getting quite fed up. And I think that was part of the motivation that brought added momentum to the Buhari campaign, the desire to bring back a populist military figure now in civilian garb to execute the anti corruption struggle and to take us back to the military version of the anti corruption struggle, where the state became less constrained by this rule of law and, you know, legal constraints, in effect, and then was empowered to just grab and smash. Basically. The outcome, as we've seen, is actually that we ended up in a lot of ways right back where we started. Like, a lot of the cases that were sort of landmark cases that were pursued under Buhari ended up achieving far less than they set out to. I mean, I think one governor ultimately was convicted, but, you know, like Ouiji has described, he's under house arrest.

C (42:54)

You.

B (42:54)

Know, hasn't forfeited very many resources at all. He's still very active in the political arena, really well respected. I mean, I'm thinking of Dari, the platoon state guy. I mean. Right, okay. And Yami. But you know, these, in these examples like these, these people were more or less offered as some kind of scapegoat, Right. And then when they, you know, kind of made amends within the ruling party, their cases have seemed to take on a much less harsh kind of trajectory and a much more pliant trajectory. So it seems to me like both the populist and technocratic approaches and then the blend of them that Buhari tried to pursue. So all three of those, like Oechide has said, I mean, don't seem to address the underlying problem, which is that when you have such dramatic inequalities and access to resources and no redistribution after the fact, then the balance of power will skew so heavily in favor of the people whose interest it is to preserve the existing system. So under those conditions, and particularly when that economy is then supercharged by A natural resource that the government monopolizes. It becomes very hard to actually make any sustained progress in cleaning up the way the state operates. And that's just focusing on the state, not even the private sector which yeah I mean has its own very interesting access to corruption anti corruption history. So Emeka, how would you respond to this given that you are trying to cut them some slack from a. From a purely technocratic angle.

C (44:54)

This, your English was heavy. I don't know that I was, I was trying to cut them some slack. You know what I, what I do know is that I'm not a very big fan. I think that, I mean I'm not. Let me choose my words carefully. I'm not very big on you know, this either the populist or technocratic, you know, you know, anti corruption crusade. I don't know any country that isn't, that doesn't have corrupt elements in the private sector or in the public sector. You know, perhaps the Nigeria differs as the brazen nature of it. What I have tried not to do is to throw out with regards to EFCC and maybe ICPC throw out the baby with a dark authority. So I have a friend who makes some very interesting arguments and his response is usually to those who say people like Ouji actually the FCC spends his time chasing after, you know, small fries, you know, the Yahoo Yahoo boys, low level corrupt government officials and whatnot. And you know, and his response would be I hope I'm getting him right. He would say if they don't do that how are they supposed to learn the ropes of their trade? You know and that's when you consider how you know, they've had to raise funding after its creation. You know, so just as leap service it was created to fulfill all righteousness but then it had had to function. And so part of even it's going after the Yahoo Yahoo boys is a way to raise the funds that he needs to do the job that it's required to do, you know, by the constitution. So but much more than that it's in prosecuting the Yahoo Yahoo boys who we also interface with whose modus on parandi courts across continents, you know, so that there's a bit of maybe not money laundering but if you can prosecute the Yahoo boys who swindle unsuspecting victims across the oceans and have to channel who then have to channel their funds using international finance circuits or wires into the country, it's only in doing that that they begin to understand or master, you know, the ways in which also corrupt politicians are able to do this. So one way to also think about this is in terms of, you know, some of the policies that, you know, have been created in the time since the EFCC has been. Some of the policies that we've, we've gotten in time since the EFCC has been created, you know, you, so you can think about the bvn, you can.

B (48:30)

Think about which is a number that every Nigerian with a bank account has.

C (48:34)

Yeah, yeah, with a bank account has. And no matter how many bank accounts you have, it's just one single bva.

B (48:45)

Yeah.

C (48:45)

You also think, think about the intelligence gathering aspects, you know, of the efcc, which used to go, which used to be housed under the efcc, but it's now in a body of its own there, you know, Nigerian Financial Intelligence.

B (49:02)

Nfiu.

C (49:04)

Nfiu. You then begin to think about things like, I mean, anybody who's lived in the west knows this, maybe either in the UK or in the US if you, if you engage in a transaction above 10,000, whether pounds or USD, it triggers, you know, some. So these mechanisms also exist here now. So it's not so much, I mean, coming from where we, you know, we're coming from there being incremental wins. So it's not so much in Nigeria now that you can indulge in fraud and get away with it. All right. Some mechanisms already exist, you know, so that, such that unless no one find you, you understand, and you can't see it. That's why EFCC can bust people, even in hotels, even in school dormitories and all of that. So these things can be traced up to GSM usage. All of those, you know, mechanisms have then been put in place. So I don't want to throw all of that away, you know, just because there has been a lack of political will to go after the really big fishes, you know. So, yeah, I kind of have lost track of the question. But I think my larger, yeah, my larger point is to say that it behooves on us to act or demand, you know, of our government or. I don't know how to say it. So we have to push. It's a struggle. We have to demand for these things, you know, and of course there are snags here and there. So someone like me would question why house the EFCC itself under the jurisdiction or the purview of the presidency? Alright, it then becomes the question and some of these are some of the things that you guys have raised the question of. So give an example of Dolly in Yami. And what's the other guy's name? Daria. Yeah, the people who believe that the reason why they were cut out was that by the time power change hands are moved from PDP to apc, these guys refused to move switch party. Okay. No, not soon enough. Yeah, so they did at the last minute and by that time, you know, had hit the fan, you know, so, so a counter example to that is I hope they don't come for me, but I'll call his name. The guy who is Senate president today, who was accused of, you know, even within EFCC moving millions, you know, but.

B (52:09)

Can'T you see how to some extent this might contradict the point you are making about learning? I mean. Okay, so I want to acknowledge what you're saying about the technical capacities of anti corruption institutions have indeed increased over the course of the last over 20 years of the Fourth Republic. And there have been some technical fixes that have strengthened their capacity to investigate. To the BVN that you've mentioned, the treasury single account, which is another World bank recommended thing that was implemented where all government receipts go into one account. Yeah. So it's easier to track certain things but I mean if you can track these things, but at the end of the day one person can make one phone call, then I mean to what extent does that matter? You know like which goes back to what you were saying about these things sitting on the, these institutions sitting under executives at the federal and state level, I mean particularly federal. If president can make a phone call and be like drop this case or.

D (53:23)

Whatever.

B (53:26)

Then why does it matter if these people suddenly learned how to use this new fancy software just makes chasing Yahoo boys.

C (53:37)

No. So no, no, it helps us. No, it just helps us to place the blame where it belongs. So it's not so much the EFCC itself as anti corruption agent, it's about the political parties and the politicians, you know, themselves. And so for me at the end of this conversation, I think it might boil down to is party politics, right. And whose interests are represented in terms of are we, is this the elite interest or is it the interest of you and I who would want to see people who have, you know, because let's not forget that EFCC as a body maybe not IICPC as so much, you know, its mandate is more preventive, you know, than on that note, I, I, that's why I've said, I started with saying that I don't want to throw away the baby with the bad water. Sometimes they do their jobs, they prosecute these guys, maybe not as much as, you know, as should be done, you know, giving the limits of what they can't do, you know, that's the word I was looking for constantly, you know, but when they do, you know, what do the AGs, you know, that are the generals of this, which is a more political post, what do they do, you know, do they push down? Let's take an ex, for example. The guy who is NSA today, who was from our first EFCC channel. When push came to shove, he was pushed out of the efcc. Right, right. When was it under Yaradua? I think was under Yaradwa. He was pushed out of the. And actually demoted. Right. You know, and that's because he had the balls. But it's ironic today that he's also a party guy, you know, who then calls the shots, you know, but these are some of the things. So I think the bigger question, the larger question here is about this, this moralistic view that we have towards corruption, which is something I try to read my, my right. Read myself of, you know, there's an element of corruption, you know, that thrives in society. Right. And, and that, yeah, parties need. Political parties need not to be. Need to accept as reality and then walk around it.

B (56:12)

You know, this is kind of where I wanted to go next. I mean, actually, so sorry to cut you off, but I think you might get a chance to finish the sentence when the question's posed. I mean, in effect, I wanted to ask, I guess we're now moving in the direction of what should Alephs do? Or what is the thing to pursue? So I guess the question is to what extent is corruption actually an impediment to development? I mean, because, you know, there's that school of thought that has it that it's not corruption in general, it's the type that you have, that there are types of corruption that actually build states, you know, so to speak, insofar as they might be redistributive or they might channel resources, even if in an extra institutional manner, towards certain industries or sectors that are productive. I mean, clearly that's not the kind we have. But it does raise questions about the moralism that seems to go into the desire to end corruption firstly before you do any other kind of governance. So, yeah, I wonder, I mean, how you guys address this question. I mean, Rebecca, I'll come right back to you, since you were going in this direction, like, is corruption necessarily an impediment to development?

C (57:45)

The answer to that question is, I mean, from my Own end is no, you know, there are ways to institutionalize corruption, you know, and like you said, make sure that, you know, you can, you can cash in on its redistributive power. And then there are things that already the norm in Nigeria. You then make sure it doesn't go beyond that. Right. We in the US as some of my friends, you know, often note, they don't understand why they go out, have dinner or go for a drink and then they have to tip, you know, and, and you have to tip at a certain percentage. Right. Some people will call on bribery, you know.

B (58:37)

Right.

C (58:37)

In Nigeria, you can't go after government contracts and not be willing to kick back 10%. Okay.

B (58:44)

Right.

C (58:45)

The question is, or you might, if.

B (58:48)

You arrive in the airport in Nigeria, you might have to tip some of the, some of the officials who stack your passport.

C (58:58)

The question is when the service is not commensurate with.

B (59:02)

Right.

C (59:02)

So somebody has given you a hell of a time but still expects you to tip them. You understand? You haven't done your job, but you want a reward for it, you understand? So if, if you're getting contracts and you're expected to give 10%, let's give you 10%.

B (59:16)

As far as 10% is standardized. Contracts are being delivered, right? Yeah. Sometimes you arrive and somebody says, okay, add five and then the, at the end you don't have enough money to execute the contract, etc.

C (59:32)

Thank you. I mean, so these are some of the things, these are some of the things that I, I think about, you know, and, and this, there's nowhere where you would have had this, what's it called? Corruption debate or conversation. Where is it in China? Is it in America? You know, America was built off the back of corruption, you know, fraud, if you like, you know, bootlegging, you know. Yeah. So I mean, that's basically you, you know how, and there's really, even so when you talk about capitalism, you know, and then people, you know, the left will say it's an offshoot of corruption, or rather when you talk about corruption, it's an offshoot of capitalism. But really it's, it's, these are the things that build, these are, I mean the models that we have inherited, maybe not the models that we want for, for the country, but you have to deal with society where it is, you know, and, and this is how these things operate. So if you're going to grab power, you say the left is looking to grab to will power, so fire power, and then wield it. You have to work within these frameworks and you have to understand, right, that this, this is how you win elections. You can't just come out. And so I mean, to answer your question, I don't think. I'm not a big fan of this anti corruption in the moralistic sense.

B (61:16)

Right.

C (61:16)

You know, so we need to understand what is systemic corruption and what's corruption, you know, that has some redistributive tendencies within it, you know, and then figure out what we, what we need to deal with rather than, you know, put everything under the same canopy and then have this moralistic sense of oh, these people are not corrupt. How do you build parties? How do, how do parties grow? How parties become political parties win election now patronage network and these things have. And that's what happens when really when, when they say political politicians switch parties. The reason why they switch parties and why they are accepted into other parties when they switch is because that loot that you have stolen from yourselves while you were governor, you can bring it into their own fold, at least at the state level where you stole it, and then feed it back into the system in order for them to win elections in the new parties.

B (62:22)

They don't come empty handed for sure. Yeah. Oji, how would you respond to this question? Removing the moralism. Does that mean, does it make you uncomfortable?

D (62:33)

No, it's not me again, it's not moralistic because you have to look at the laws by which things operate, you know, and where we are and our own level of development as a country, like what corruption can do or the effect or the damage corruption can do to a country that is not developed and has its morphed into a culture is potentially stagnating, you know, and never allows the country to get off the ground, you know, that some higher countries are developed and had world power and leverage corruption for themselves doesn't mean that we in Africa can take on a semblance of it and make anything positive of it. It's going to be detrimental. And this is what we are finding out because we've now kind of morphed it in our own way that has gotten the country, you know, entirely stagnating or even receding back into like the, you know, barbaric stage that it is in now. Because now if you look at the country that we are encouraging or entertaining, this level of like corruption or like institutionalizing it would then mean that we'll develop our own way of corruption. Resources that are meant to build like, what would I call it, institutions to checkmate these things would not be put to doing that, and then again, you already have a class that is not even looking into doing any form of that initial work, that redistributive work to start with for that final corruption. They are not there in any way, shape or form, you know.

B (64:20)

Yeah, okay, but, but OG what if you, what if you go about it like America does, where it's like, okay, you, you don't institutionalize any form of corruption, you just institutionalize certain forms. So you say that, look, kickbacks cannot exceed 10% and the project implementation has to reach this certain level before the kickback arrives, that kind of thing. I mean, would you, would you, I mean, okay, I'm aware it's hypothetical, but still, like, do you think that that kind of approach, in a sense more pragmatic or more, more sensitive to where we are developmentally, or do you feel like we should rather apply zero, zero tolerance?

D (65:06)

Yeah, I think, you know, as much as it's not 100 possible, I think a zero tolerance level should be, you know, adopted. Because if you say you should. Yeah, if you say you should.

B (65:20)

If.

D (65:20)

You say you should entertain some level, what is to stop person? We do 10% waiting stop from 15, waiting stop from 20. Capital go always they increase ego. It has that natural, natural inclinations to expand and gain more control, gain more control, expand and get more control. So what you keep getting is like this so called institutions become useless. They can't even function to keep that 10, 10 what it is. Because now what you have, we know that people that get contracts and all that, it's not even 10 anymore. What you now have, what you start having is like different ways of how they fashion out corruption such that it stagnates the country and no form of development would happen anymore. And what you just have is that corruption surfacing in different way. Oh, this guy stole 10 billion. Ah, that one's 200 billion. Oh, this one. So it just becomes like a firework of like numerous types of corruption while we are still dealing with, know the tolerable types or the ones that were supposed to, you know, deal with. That's why you see like some countries come up with very harsh laws. Let's just even know that when they catch you, they shoot you and then let's go from there. So we then arrive at a place where it is tolerable while we are building institutions that are against elite domination of those institutions, you know, or like a class system that doesn't allow it, then we can now deal with what is tolerable afterwards.

B (66:43)

So it sounds like you're saying even, even if we arrive at a place where we can institutionalize certain forms of extra legal exchanges or whatever to get there, we still need to establish first a sort of zero tolerance. Yeah.

D (67:00)

It must be done in the interest of the people. That maybe that's where I'm going to like. The people must be the forefront of things. What is their interest and you know. Right, yeah, that's, that's what I think.

C (67:12)

Can I, can I interject?

B (67:15)

Yeah, yeah.

C (67:16)

Two, two things. I hope it's not more than I'll give you.

B (67:21)

No, let it not be more because I'll give you an example.

C (67:25)

In, in China, for instance, right there, there's, it's not true that there's no corruption.

D (67:30)

I never said it wasn't corruption.

C (67:35)

Yeah, but hold on. And, and there are kickbacks. Okay. These kickbacks are not monetary in any sense. But public officials do favors for private sector henchmen and then they get kickbacks. They often get those kickbacks as gifts. Artworks, expensive artworks and all of that in the uk Right. Public sector officials do its ongoing favors for private. And they don't. The gratification is not instant. What usually happens is once that person who's done the favors, tenure ends. He's appointed into the board of one financial institution or one private, most blue chip company. Right. But for an example that's home grown, right. And where EFCC plays a role, for instance, is after the creation of efccc.

B (68:38)

What we found out was that it.

C (68:40)

Was increasingly difficult to launder money out of Nigeria. So people were stealing but they couldn't take out the money. And that's what in some quarters people will tell you, accounts for the GDP growth that Nigeria experienced, you know, between I think the second tenure of the OBJ era and you know, a large chunk of the good luck Jonathan era. What then happened was that because these guys couldn't take their monies out, they started to funnel it into other sectors of the economy, especially what you call it real estate. You understand? Now we're at a point where a lot of money, you know, fraudulent money sums that were acquired illegally have been funneled into the real estate and it's choking, you know. So what's the next stage? How do you then ensure that you can redistribute the monies that are tied down in unproductive sectors of the Nigerian economy into manufacturing? Now I think that's the conversation that we should be having around corruption and funds that have been acquired illegally. But to say that there's going to be, we're going to ever reach a point where there'll be zero tolerance for corruption, my brother, I think in my own opinion that that's totally utopian. It happens nowhere.

D (70:11)

Now what I'm saying is the stance, there's no utopia or anything anywhere, there must be a stance because what I said is it morphs into another form of corruption that we then go about chasing. So we've gone from oil to real estate, we're chasing goose up and down, we're chasing real estate now chasing this one. Now we're chasing. The stance must be this and then we walk towards what's practicable. Because if we already show a gesturing of allowing corruption that we failed from the onset and that's what, that's why we have what we have now. Or how did Oshibajo say that crap? I was saying there must be that stance first. We are materialists, we know where we are already, that there's okay going to be corruption. But it must be a culture of that stance being yes, it's not tolerable. We're not going to institutionalize any 10% anything, you know, or any allowing any corruption. But we know it's going to exist. But it should be a general knowledge that corruption is not something that is favored or looked upon. Yes, in China there's going to be kickbacks and all that. But look at without a form of stance that is not like allowing corruption, you know, that is when it can then when it's done with the people's interest, that's when you can have that real redistribution. Because when that money moves from one elite to the other, you still have who homelessness people. They've moved the money from oil, now they've moved it into real estate. They are making people multi dimensionally poor. That's why you have this multi dimensional poverty. Because the money keeps running from one sector to the other, making people poor in numerous facets of their life or lives, you know. So my own stance would be the country should not say that it is allowing any form of corruption, but if it happens off the mechanics of corruption, let it happen off the mechanics mechanics of corruption. But the stance of the country is that it won't tolerate it. That's where me I stand.

B (72:04)

I think that's an interesting debate and I mean it is one that in a sense is premised on a post revolutionary situation. Right. So in a way maybe we have to come back to reality for the final question because you know, here in reality in Nigeria, there hasn't been any revolutionary situation While still dealing with a situation where I think you could say that official corruption is somewhat endemic. And various attempts at anti corruption, even if they've marked some technocratic victories, have not been able to resolve some of the underlying political drivers of corruption, including the executive oversight of these institutions. And I think there's also a situation in the public arena where people are increasingly apathetic or cynical about anti corruption as a, as a policy, right to the point where people are like, look, I don't care, you know, I mean, I don't know if you folks have encountered this, but yeah, all the time where people are just like, look, you know, Buhari came and sort of demystified corruption or anti corruption in a way.

D (73:29)

They asked us to look at the body language.

B (73:33)

People see anti corruption as itself a corrupt practice, especially when some of these institutions cannot account for the funds that they seized. So in that context, you know, and that's, that's the contemporary context, what should the left's relationship to anti corruption be? I mean, do you think that the left can make some kind of argument that appeals to the public, framed in terms of addressing corruption? I mean, can that really quite delegitimized slogan somehow regain its force, its capacity to compel, if it's being wielded by the left? Do you think that's possible? Or might the left need to have a slightly different approach to engaging with the issue of corruption in terms of or in the context of electoral campaigns or policy, like non electoral movements? And I guess there's another contextual factor that's relevant to thinking about this question is that very often, given the dominant economic ideology of the moment, various policies the left would attempt to pursue, including nationalizing state enterprises or using the state for directly productive activities, either in industry or whatever, such activities would be delegitimized because they would be viewed as necessarily corrupt, since they're originating from the state. So within that context, what do you folks think about the Left's relationship to anti corruption? Is it something the left can actually successfully wield in our context, or should we really be looking elsewhere for ways to immobilize people and, you know, get a kind of progressive momentum going? Oji, maybe you have the initial word.

D (75:52)

I think it's just worth, you know, educating people on what their rights are, what, what each institution is supposed to do. This is what this institution is. This is what it's doing, you know, and doing it. Of course, if the left is going to come into political play or willed power, it has to work with what's on ground. This is where maybe I kind of intersect with what Emek has been saying. There's corruption here, party politics. If we are able to then gain power, we should work upwards and build something better than what's on ground. Because we, yeah, we have to start from where we are. There's nothing new that's going to come here. We have to start from where we are. If it's building a political party, you know, and mobilizing people, getting people on board, you know, but there has to be some certain principles that, you know, and how we do things and what we aim to do and a clear political process project that, look, this is our own direction, you know, and this is what we had to do at this point in time to get to where we are. You know, now that we're here, we're moving in this direction, you know, so doing that and being, you know, totally transparent and honest with the people would want get us that confidence back into, in the anti corruption, you know, struggle. Because anti corruption is anti corruption. So let's not allow some people take the world away from us. It is anti corruption, you know, so. And then once we do that, we can win that trust and beat back that cynical or push back that cynical cloud that's all over the country because the elites have delegitimized the anti corruption fight, you know, and then it feels like, you know, when you're, whenever you see anti corruption, you're just wasting your time, you know, so we are supposed to now come and add new meaning to that and new, new material meaning and of course cultural meaning to that, you know, which means fidelity to what we've said we're going to do when we get there. That's it.

B (77:48)

Right? Mega. Your final thoughts?

C (77:59)

I'm not a proponent of anti corruption is anti corruption and we need to reclaim anything. I deal with society where it is and the society that I have, the Nigerian society that I have engaged with or that I keep on engaging with tells me that a large number of Nigerians population aren't averse to corruption. To be honest. As far as I'm concerned, it's. Whenever there's corruption allegation, it's, it's. Then swing conversation usually delves into he's a thief, but he's my own thief and it was our fault to steal. All right, okay. And that, that gives you fillers as to whether Nigerian, you know, the average Nigerian is relative.

B (78:55)

Okay, okay. But, but, but, but that might not be entirely fair because of course there are people who, for instance supported Ptob in the last election from the point of view that he was even saintly when it came to issues of corruption. At least that's the perception. Just like people who supported Buhari, some of them, their rationale was that, oh no, finally we have somebody who could end corruption in Nigeria. So I mean, just throwing that bit in that I actually thought you would question the premise that Nigerians are becoming, becoming cynical about anti corruption. But yeah, maybe you, maybe you agree with that. So I just wanted to throw that piece in to complicate your response because I like to do that to you.

C (79:37)

But yeah, I welcome that, you know, and then people can tell you all sorts of things. You, you know, even though my response to that would be even though the polls are not anything to go by, you know, pre election polls, a large swath of people who were polled didn't know why they wanted to vote for anybody. They really. People who didn't even know who they wanted to vote for. If we're being, you know, yeah, sure, the majority. Yeah. So I don't. People say all sorts of things. You know, the interesting thing is that if you ask most of the people who chose who they voted for, if any of them had read manifestos of each of their own candidates, you get a resounding no. So people, it's almost a feel good thing. I'm not really keen on what people say, rather how they behave, you know, how they act. And like I said, it's my opinion I might be wrong, you know, but my own experience is that even though people, even for those who say that they were voting for Ipohari, for instance, because he was going to come and fight anti corruption, most of them were already entrenched within, you know, the political system and knew that there were benefits from supporting APC on whose back Buhari was riding because they would get political appointments here and there. And that's the kind of thing that we talk about. That's what, that's what, that's what I talk about when I mean corruption from whether people get appointments out, out of marriage, you know, whether it's, what's, what's it called? What's that word now when, when you put people nepotism, you know, I mean, so I mean the definition for corruption is really, really very broad, you know. And so if from the left point of view, if you're coming to meet a society, you know, that is basic because when you see corruption, well, not it's, it's essentially that the Nigerians, it's not just The Nigerian state, Nigerians themselves are corrupt. So you have to go back all the way to why we are the way we are. Nigerians. I don't know anybody, any set of people in the world that love to cut corners like the Nigerians. Whether it's for your child to get into the university. So let's not fool ourselves with this.

D (82:26)

And yeah, echoing what I said.

C (82:30)

That'S not the reality. So the truth of the matter is how do you wiggle round all of this? You know, as you know, in a manner that for left politics now how do you wiggle through all of this in a manner that allows you first and foremost my brothers to get power? Yeah, you know, because all this moralistic standing with that is not going to get you power. It's not even going to get you the resources to be able to execute an election. Alright, so how do you first and foremost we go through, you know, this really turning issue of corruption and anti corruption first of all to get power. Then when you've gotten power, you then now begin, you can now turn moralist and say okay, we will now find a way to curb corruption in such a way that it becomes redistributed. Okay, so we now want to hear your own ideas about anti corruption. But as for getting power, you're dealing with a Nigerian. Nigeria is rotting. We're not, it's not, let's not mix, let's not, let's not always blame leadership for all our problems. Problem of followers.

B (83:55)

It sounds like your, your pretty angry over there, which I understand. I mean you're coming from the everything don't cast perspective.

C (84:09)

Let'S not intellectualize everything, everything don't pass.

B (84:15)

Right, right. Right. So from that standpoint you're saying that the left should stay clear of anti corruption politics entirely. Perhaps.

C (84:26)

Take care of it, get power play. It's, it's a game. So you play it. When you play it, then you can then show that alternate. I mean, because what's, what's politics? Your job as a politician is to shape society. Right? But you're not going to ship society outside of power. You need power to shape society. So play the politics within the confines of what is all these words. I did forget that. Don't soil your hands too much. Right. So that the compromises that you might be required to make when you get power isn't that much. But when you then get power or assure us that vision of society that is radically different from the ones that you have been criticizing, you know, but, but telling us that, I mean, and this came back to. It's become. It's become vibes. Obino. They give shishi. How, you know who give shishi for politics. How. How are you going to win an election without giving shishi?

B (85:39)

Right, right, right, right, right, right. So, okay. No, I definitely get your points. I mean, of course. No, I think, yeah, you know, I think to counter the other extreme, which is the zero tolerance approach OAG has propounded.

D (85:58)

I mean, perhaps you, you guys are just, you guys are just getting me wrong, basically. Said what I said in a different fashion. I'm not saying we should not touch politics. Politics. I'm not saying he just. Anybody that listens to this playback is just. We'll say he said what I said. We have to do politics from where we are or where we are at, you know, and without doing that, we can't get to show the kind of society, society we want to build. We are people that are supposed to build something new. You know, I'm not just gonna, you hear my daughter talking in the background, you know, you can cut this out, you know, but I'm not just going to go out looking like I'm a utopian or whatever. Like we have to engage politics from where we are, you know, and make that change, you know, so you can, you might not put this in. You just cut it from where, you know. Yeah, my last. Into. Yeah, yeah. But what I said is exactly what I wouldn't say.

B (86:53)

Exactly.

D (86:53)

I think there's still some very interesting saying we should not touch politics.

B (86:57)

But even if there isn't, I mean, I think it's worth me introducing one here to say that surely the means just doesn't justify the end in every case. And I guess, you know, mega, you even alluded to that to some extent when you were like, well, I mean, there's certain compromises you can't make, right? So that needs to be stated. But I think it's still fair to say that surely the version of anti corruption that liberal or conservative politicians in Nigeria have been putting forward, which is this like discourse of zero tolerance and practice of partial tolerance, at least for allies, cannot stand, you know, and something else needs to replace it. So, I mean, I think, yeah, we might not have exactly found what that something else is today, but we definitely have got the conversation going which, like I said at the start, is one that's very much overdue. So we'll definitely come back to this theme, hopefully interview some people who've thought a lot about this in multiple contexts and can also give us some comparative insights to grapple with. But I think that's probably a good place to leave it just for now. So how does that sound for this? Oh, yeah. Yes. Bohemia.

C (88:51)

Guys, you don't fresh. So they chop a chop. English breakfast bacon. All this. Yeah. Your cheeks. Oh, yeah.