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- [00:00]
A
Sam.
- [00:45]
B
Today'S gist centers on the question of our quote unquote refinery or the new Dangote refinery which was dominating the airwaves for a few weeks but has somewhat lapsed in its trendiness, I suppose in the past couple of days in light of some of the other ongoing activities or distractions, however you want to call it, that have flooded the media, talking space, discourse sphere. But that shouldn't stop us from digging into the issue because as we reflected upon even in the previous episode, it's an issue that costs the heart of the political economy and concerns the cost of patrol, which of course is tied to so many other elements of economic life in Nigeria. The price of food, energy, almost everything. So I think it's time we talk about Dangote and yeah, and it's a big topic in various ways because the, the prehistory of Dangote conglomerate or empire probably extends from the pre colonial period to the present and we probably can't cover all of that today or shouldn't. But I think that this refinery question really gives us a pointy end from which we can explore the question of the relationship of the state and capital, the relationship of Dangote and the Nigerian state, and then more importantly the question of the livelihoods of Nigerians, how to manage in a country that produces crude oil, has one of the largest reserves of crude in Africa, but cannot seem to give cheap petrol products to its citizens. So I mean, that's by way of background, I think it's an important conversation. We've all thought it's an important conversation and we're, we're going to attempt in various ways to tackle it today. I suppose a place to start would be to say, I mean, where are we on the timeline of expectations in respect to the belief that opening of a private refinery in Nigeria owned by Dangote was going to improve the price, reduce the price really of petroleum products for the average Nigerian citizen. I mean, my understanding and folks looking for you to jump in here and correct if I'm wrong is that since the refinery was kind of commenced production, since it was supposed to have started producing, you know, refined products sometime earlier in the fall, I suppose that was September, that the price of petrol products Nigerians were buying at the pump was supposed to have dropped, but for various reasons that's not the case. There was also an expectation at some point in October the price will drop after I guess the production kicks in. And the domestic crude supply issue was a challenge earlier, was resolved. That also seems not to be the Case. So, I mean, I've kind of gone into it sideways. Maybe you guys can straighten me out. How would you make sense of just the basic elements of this story of Dangote's refinery that was supposed to improve the price of petroleum for Nigeria and the fact that it hasn't o. The. The. Your image, your. This looks like the pharaoh wants to open its mouth, so I'm going to go to you first.
- [05:12]
A
Well, the thing generally is, again, we have been taking on a trip of, you know, nothingness. These are.
- [05:22]
B
These are.
- [05:24]
A
This is the same model that's been employed when we look at cement. It's the same model that's employed when we look at electricity. The same model for different things, you know, that, you know, we put our hands on in Nigeria. And when we come sugar, all that is that there's a promise that things are going to get better only if we hand it over to the private sector. The private sector, you know, and what do we have is the disillusionment that it not only gets tougher, it's more expensive. And you keep seeing this extreme concentration of profits and wealth in the hand of these private guys that is now being glaringly facilitated by the ruling class, you know, and the government. So it's like they're just taking the bill for a ride. And every time, the people or the general populace have always gotten the short end of the stick all the time, you know, so this is now going from, oh, the government is stupid. They don't know what they are doing. So if you just step back and look at it historically, you see that it's the consistent model of operation that these guys have, you know, put in place. It's like an algorithm or it's like, you know, a code that the ruling class uses to please and steal from the people, take from public domain, put in the private hand, and then now charges a premium for what's, you know, for everybody instead of, you know, improving the mode of production, you know, and it means everything. Making sure it's tidy, it's transparent, we can see it. It works for the people. And then ones you want, one you want to sell, you sell it. No, they make it as opaque as hell so that it can steal. And every aspect of the ruling class machinery, be it the shipping, be it the people that have access directly to oil blocks, be it the government arm of it, it's all opaque so that stealing can go on. You know, that even explains from our own refineries that Akomat was down to this new dangote project where nobody can seem to tell you, you know, for real what the climate of the production and cost of things, you know, is going to be. You know, except for speculations here and there and even the. The main player, that is Mr. Himself. We just.
- [08:00]
B
Missed Mr. Allergy, Comrade Patriot.
- [08:06]
A
What we just hear is the. I know. Allow me to do this. This one, that one. You really don't get a full disclosure of what's going on, you know. So that's it. It's the people that end up losing at the end of the day. Yeah, that's how I see it.
- [08:21]
B
Yeah. So mega, your initial thoughts? So why, why is Dangote. Why is the price not reduced? Despite us having one of the biggest refineries, us having one of the biggest refineries in Africa, Our refinery is on stream finally. So why are we not buying. Why are we not using petrol to shower, putting petrol in our coffee? Why are we not pouring petrol on the road, you know, using it to clean our shoes when we have one of the biggest refineries in Africa and we have one of the biggest deposits of crude in Africa. Please, can you, can you explain this?
- [09:05]
C
That's very heavy.
- [09:06]
B
Why are we not brushing our teeth with petrol, man? That was what I expected by now.
- [09:13]
C
Why. But why would. The problem is you now. The problem is not done. It's not done with it or even the government, you know, it's a shame anyways. I don't know. For me, I think. How do you even go at it? It's just. I think part of the problem is that we have not had your constant steady supply. We haven't managed it in a long time, you know, I think since the 70s. So a lot of us grew up hearing about refineries and how they don't work. Terms like turnaround and dinner, these things form part of our vocabulary. You are then you. Over the years, I think, you know, because there's always. I don't. There's hardly any year that goes by in about. I mean since maybe the 70s, the primary last work, you know, had considerable capacity, you know, because not always that it's not working entirely anyways, all of that. But just to explain to you why Nigeria was always exporting crude and importing refined produce over 30 years we've had all sorts of versions of stories to explain this. I think that along lines some were there versions that said that as far as Nigeria can get its refineries working, it will be relatively cheap, you know. And then of course, you know that, you know, time doesn't wait. It's not static. While these conversations were ongoing, the price of fuel had you maybe not geometrically, but progressively increased over, over the years so that people were, you know, maybe stuck. I don't know if that's the case for you, but people are stuck in the time war, you know, and so in 2024, whereas the economics of oil doesn't even allow, you know, for that sort of illusion, there seem to be, I mean, a significant, I mean there.
- [11:38]
A
Are people who, I don't want to.
- [11:40]
C
Say illiterate, but who, you know, you wouldn't expect to understand why, you know, world wouldn't be proud. Price below a certain level. You know, then people just, and I don't know, it's funny to see that a lot of people thought, you know, ideally that, you know, once Dangote's refinery got, you know, on, on stream, you know, there'd be some kind of adjustment at the pumps. There's also the sense in which Dangote and those who sold that refinery and sell it not even just about pr, but even, you know, how much, you know, of help he got from the federal government, you know, most notably under Mfele, the former CBN governor. So people have this sense of that the refinery belong to them as well. Well, it was a Nigerian refinery.
- [12:44]
B
Yeah.
- [12:45]
C
And also, you know, because it was supposed to be on many levels, the first of its kind. Right. I think where, where people are now is that they're gradually moving past the denial stage. You know, so kind of waking up in your introduction, you see. Oh that with the start of production, you know, at Dangote refinery, it's been the case that, you know, fuel hasn't. The price has. People for fuel or petrol hasn't calmed down at the point. But it's actually the case like that it has, like it has gone up.
- [13:28]
B
Yeah.
- [13:29]
C
So that's. Yeah, yeah, that's my own, I guess think.
- [13:35]
B
Yeah, yeah. So I mean then the big question is why? Right. And I mean, I suppose for, to answer the question, it might be necessary for us to go back to history to some extent and you know, we've been alluding to it a little bit already, but I think to, to put it in concrete terms before, you know, I kind of hand back the mic, you know, what, what Nigerians are largely aware of, but I suppose maybe some non Nigerian, listen listeners might be just wrapping their heads around is that we as a country, the government has actually had for a long time, as Emeka said, since the 70s, public refineries that were Supposed to take the crude oil that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and other joint venture partners drill and refine that crude oil into fuel for cars and generators and various other petroleum products, such that the price could be set by the state, or at least largely influenced by the state, and the price of fuel could contribute to some kind of redistributive mechanism, or at least that, you know, Nigerians could basically garner some kind of benefit of citizenship through access to cheaper petroleum products, you know, which seemed fair in a country that produced crude oil. You know, so that's been the kind of expectation of a lot of Nigerians for a long time. But I mean, despite those refineries haven't produced minimally for some period of time, they were not meeting the demand, consumption rate of Nigerians and additional refined products had to be imported because the state was also not building or expanding the refineries. Despite claiming to be or budgeting for or allocating resources for that purpose. The refineries were still not increasing their capacity and the population was growing and the consumption patterns were increasing. And at the same time, smaller scale refining projects, especially those conducted by so called artisanal refiners, were being restricted, in some cases banned. I mean, a lot of those refining initiatives, oftentimes very informal, small scale, were considered illegal. So you had this kind of situation where the state was really not meeting the demand and it was small scale attempts at community level to do some refining was being blocked. So all that was left really to meet the demand were these import cartels managed centrally by the petroleum company, the state owned petroleum company, nnpc, that then subsequently got commercialized under the Buhari administration. So you have this kind of complex situation where despite producing crude and despite having refineries, a lot of the refined petroleum is imported by these cartels who are kind of in cahoots or in some kind of league with the state owned oil company to manage the price and also to create the conditions for companies to profit and the officials at the state owned company to continue to generate kickbacks. I've tried my best to summarize the situation, but I'm aware that I probably left a lot out and it's still fairly confusing. So I mean, I guess before we get to the arrival of the refinery itself or why people expected so much of it, does that largely capture the situation that Nigerians were confronted with prior to now? I know I've left out the question of the subsidy, but maybe there are other things that I've also left out that are crucial to highlight. What do you folks think?
- [18:07]
A
I think it's basically, I think it's.
- [18:09]
C
Basically just brewing that. I mean, because subsidy to a large extent is the reason why Nigerians expect that oil, petrol are the pump.
- [18:25]
B
Right.
- [18:26]
C
Cheap, right? Yeah. It's also one of the issues, or might be with the most central issue, you know, with all of this down with the greenhouse directly, those going at the energy, this whole web, almost as if the web of secrecy is that they are all engaged. That's nobody wanting to own up to the price. I mean, I think that many Nigerians still, I think maybe, you know, on the lookout for some adjustments that will.
- [19:15]
A
Come down the road.
- [19:18]
B
Yeah, yeah. Your thoughts?
- [19:22]
A
I just feel, you know, this is the hallmark of antagonistic relationship between leadership or the rulership and the people. Because why can't it be as straightforward as getting the data? This is how much we produce, this is how we are producing it and this is how much you guys will be getting it. But because of the interest, like there are a lot of interests that are trying to, you know, corner and dominate spaces along the pipeline of crude oil production such that you really can't then come out coherently to say, to give, you know, direct numbers. You're hearing this, you're hearing that, you're hearing this, you're hearing that it means the government or the pool in charge in this petroleum sector have it in their mind that they don't even have any allegiance to the people, you know, or the lands that they are taking these things from. You know, and on the surface, you even look at the environment where they get this crude oil from. You see how it is being treated not to talk of the people for that downstream. They are how much you want to get it. You know, this is. These are the places that you get this crude oil from directly. You know, so look at the, the pattern. The state has interacted with people that even tried to say, oh look, let's get more from our own product. You're taking. They just come. It's like a war between the ruler and people, rulers and people, you know. So what you're seeing on the bigger surface or the bigger picture is now this thing manifesting into the, the private players, the states of officials that are linked to the private players anyway. Yeah, it's not that they are ghosts. So everyone is just using their influence to corner as much as they can, which is leading to much more hardship on people, you know, so this, this is just, you know, the, the side effects that we have seen in terms of, you know, ridiculous price and Then if it means that state infrastructure has to be ignored and damn near damaged to serve, to allow private players coming and for them to gain wealth and all that, that's what they would do. They don't care about making it like being accountable to the people. You know, they divest from public schools, public libraries, all that we don't have. There's barely any public thing that works. You know, so if the model is privatization, private this, private that, then, you know, this is what you get. It's for profit. No one is investing their money to come and give you something cheap. No, they have to make their own court. And this is what we are seeing on the, on the people and the country that, you know, has a very low gdp, all that, you know, so it's going to put immense stress and strain on the people. That's what I. Yeah, yeah.
- [22:14]
C
So off the back of, you know, some of things that Koichi has highlighted, I think that's important to give some alternate kind of viewpoint, you know, as to why these things are, you know, so there are those who say, you know, that owing to the fact that the refineries in Nigeria, in Nigeria rather hasn't worked for a long time and that as said points out, the Nigerian government hasn't be able to on most occasions provide fuel on the scale that, you know, the country itself, the productive base of Nigerian economy, those consumers, work, require, you know, we've had to go and depend on imports, you know, but that whatever the case is, Nigeria's always for the most part have had to buy cheap fuel. And that has led to many things, you know, this being the dumping site of much, much very, very, very dirty fuel, some of which sometimes have been rejected outrightly, sometimes have been so bad, all sorts of stories around the subsidy regime. But there's also the part about corruption which Nigerians and politicians like to happen, you know, quite a bit, you know, so that's giving rise to all sorts of anomalies. Part of which is one is the fact that, you know, Nigeria hasn't managed to keep track of how much fuel it consumes in a day. So that's also something that's always in hot, you know, debate, you know, content. Sure. You know, at the heart of all of this is the almighty nmpc, which used to be sunk, I think a regulator of sorts. You. But I mean it's new lease of life, it's down more like a player in the market. So it's a competitor or one that is, has state backing, you know, and then these guys are Usually the guys who are in charge of subsidy payments, subsidies, you know, accounts or subsidies. So you know, the, if you like stories, you know, conspiracy theories. Not, they're not conspiracy theories anyways. But I mean some of them are, you know, is that it's essentially because of this relationship that you know, the NNPC might have with you know, international marketers, you know, in the light of the interactions that they need to have in order to ensure that, you know, Nigeria meets it's quota intent in, I mean that there's adequate amount of fuel always, you know, in the country, you know, for consumptions by Nigerians, you know, that, you know, essentially they build up a scam, what you essentially call the subsidy scam. And by and large it's the same interest that would see to it that you know, Nigerian refineries don't work because if Nigeria refineries work that they would be out of business essentially. But you know, so there are people, you know, who come from this whole. That there's interests looking to sabotage, you know, the Dangote refinery. In fact that, so even some of the pricing issues, you know, people. Now I try to explain it the way as. So this, those interests have won, you know, that's partly why, you know, they can't sell fuel at maybe 300.
- [26:33]
B
Yeah, well, yes. Why I'm not brushing my teeth with fuel right now. I mean, you know, that you're going where I wanted to go next actually. And I suppose that's, that's, that's, you know, that's the question that one, you know, one could pose that as a question. So for folks who are, who all they've been reading is the press releases from the Dangote refinery company or whatever their official name is, they might come at this discussion so far and say hey guys, you're missing the point, you know, and it's where you are just going now. They say, look, the NNPC and the importance of fuel, who the NNPC has been in leagues with, you know, who call themselves marketers, that crowd, that cartel has basically conspired to make life as difficult as possible for Dangote. On the one hand not supplying him crude oil, so he's having to import crude oil to refine and then on the other hand pricing the petrol that they buy from him so expensive that it then reflects poorly on Dangote. You know, so you could have a perspective of a pro Dangote and maybe naively pro Dangote perspective that explains the situation in that way. Why would that be a Limited view in your perspective or is it a limited view? Or can the story be summarized more or less that way? That Dangote, a patriotic nationalist, has built this refinery. Okay, sure, he also wants to make some money, but he's seen a market for selling Nigerians cheaper refined products. But then the vested interest in the NNPC and among the marketers are trying to, you know, stymie that initiative and you know, of course Nigerians suffer as a result. Is that the whole story here?
- [28:37]
C
Or.
- [28:40]
B
If not, why not? OG The Pharaoh has opened his mouth again.
- [28:45]
A
I think the contradiction is more internal than external because I feel like every player along the line internally, they're trying to pull their influences. So it's leading to the conflict amongst all these guys at the top level, which they talk, say if two elephants they fight now the grass, you know.
- [29:06]
C
So a lot of, a lot of.
- [29:07]
A
Players are in there. You know, there was a video out there by what the chapter make us check out the Pengason guide which ELA elaborated, you know, the stangote aspect, this workers aspect, there's inflation, currency deregulation aspect. There are a lot of factors that come together. But what the people are saying is, look, even if it's going to be a bit expensive, not this astronomical price come out, let's know the real numbers. Like for me, let's know the real numbers, let's know the production process, let us build, be transparent and then we are, you know, we have this trust, we know that, okay, we're getting the best deal out of whatever production process or this mode of production or this means that the government has decided to follow. Then we are at rest, that, okay, yeah, it's not so expensive, we're getting the best deal at this time, you know, but what you found consistently is look at the price of sugar, look at the price of cement. There are a lot of dirty and nasty deals on top level with all these commodities I've mentioned. And now it's back to crude oil. So the internal contradiction is that you have a government, regulatory agencies, people in power, private sector, that is at war with the people, thereby making everything worse on ground. It's not that they are, you know, doing the best that they can. No, everyone, everyone is trying to secure their own profits before putting the people first, which again, this resource, what they talk about it is national resource. You know, if that is factored into the equation, then whatever mode or means of production that the state employs is going to be reflective of the general sentiment of the people. But that that variable in that equation is lost. And that's why we keep on having this almost suicidal or even unbearable regime by you know, when it comes to access to social services and all that, you know, so it's always against the people that's. I think it's more internal than external.
- [31:27]
B
Okay, so you don't necessarily see Dangote as the victim here?
- [31:33]
A
Never ever. Not victim for sugar, now victim for cement.
- [31:41]
B
How about you?
- [31:47]
C
I really don't know. Yeah, I really don't know where that my sympathies are with or the cabal as he likes to say to find out who they are. You need to really go through some of these reports and stuff because he doesn't actually name them. But yeah, I think that for me it's first and foremost my allegiance is to my pocket, you know, and that there are some ways in which this pays off between down with another interested players be the marketers or international oil. The IOCs, the international oil companies or yeah, the regulators, you know, because I mean Dangote is basically fought everybody, you know, but I don't know. Yeah, but of course my sympathies. My sympathies don't. And I'm not, I'm not generally disposed to, you know, the benevolent patriot, you know, narrative, you know, because.
- [33:25]
A
Yeah, it's.
- [33:26]
C
True, he's put down quite, quite a huge chunk of money, you know, in building the refineries and there are benefits, you know, you know, the Nigerian to Nigeria as a country, you know, you know, with the, with the startup of his refinery and that this benefit will appear, you know, down, down the line. But I think that right now Nigeria is in. Is in a severe case of severe crisis of cost of living, you know, and that to. For the price of fuel to go you, you know, to go up that much. I think it's really hard to find anybody who. Well, it's not hard to find but you know, who would go against the economics of their own pocket? I don't know if that answers.
- [34:41]
B
Well, okay. The point you raised about the possibility that the refinery will accrue some benefits to Nigeria in the long run is maybe an interesting point. I mean, because you know, you've not taken a bid in making it about victim or perpetrator per se. But you know, even though you're clearly not sympathetic to Dangote's PR or his cause, but at the same time I think you're granting that there is a possibility there's an opening that having one very large refinery, I mean, I don't know what the real size of the refinery is, but they give us the impression that it's very large and that if it's fully in capacity, if it's operating of full capacity, it can meet most, if not all, supposedly can meet all the demand actually of Nigerian consumers and even have some for export. In theory, that would be good. But, you know, the question that strikes me immediately is, but how? Why hasn't that been the case with cement? Because he is the largest producer of cement in Africa. And, you know, not only does he export cement from Niger, he also produces cement in other African countries. And yet Nigerians are still buying cement at some of the highest costs on the African continent. So, yeah, I guess the question that strikes me hearing that perspective is what's the guarantee that at any point in history the producing these commodities locally will somehow redound to the benefit of the consumer? I mean, should we hope, really, I mean, is there a basis to hope that our pocketbooks will eventually benefit in some way from the new domestic production of this thing? Especially given the history with other commodities like cement, etc. You know, what's the argument there? I mean, give us a reason to hope, man.
- [36:48]
C
The thing about, you know, some of the facts or the figures, facts and figures behind, you know, Dangote Refinery suggest is that, okay, one has the capacity to meet the demands of the Nigerian economy in terms of its daily production and yes, indeed, some for export. One way is that one of the upsides to that is that we can then begin to have a fairly accurate idea of what we consume on a daily basis. As of right now, those numbers range from anything between 40, 30, 40 million to about 60, 70 million, depending on who you're asking and when you're asking million barrels. Liters, Liters. Liters, million liters per day, you know, so that there is there, there's that. Yeah. There's also the quality that he keeps talking about, you know, although he makes it a choice between quality and price, you know, and that's not where the Nigerian economy is at. But then there's the quality. It's one of the highest qualities that you can find, you know, and that, you know, this would translate to over time, you know, hopefully that one did there. But also say make, we make, we won't buy the product. We talk, say we know, cm, you know, you know, as you guys are aware, there's some. There's been some kind of partial scarcity since all this back and forth between NMPC and the regulators, nmpdr, pra, whatever it's called. And what's it called? Dangote Refinery. You know, some of the marketers too, you know, but that's also attributed to the fact that you know that NNPC also couldn't meet some of make some of the payments that you know, it's obligations, you know, towards some of the market. So that, so there's all that back on, you know. Then okay then of course then Dangoti says that if. So if we're buying, if we're buying up, if we're getting all of what, you know, Nigerian, what Nigeria consumes in on a daily basis from, from Dangote. There's the argument that that takes off 40% demand, you know, the demand for Forex. It relieves the Naira of some pressure, right.
- [39:51]
B
Because the importers need foreign exchange in order to buy the refined petroleum products from abroad. So if they no longer, yeah, yeah, if they're no longer buying petroleum, refined petroleum products from abroad because it's produced domestically, then all of a sudden the government has this foreign exchange because, because no one, it's, it's not going to those same people.
- [40:14]
C
Right, which, but which, but, but which that economics now is not for paper. B. You know, you know, that's, it's because some, some people have also asked, okay, Dangote has also been producing maybe not PMS petrol but some other products for some time now. You know, they may be six months at say half the full capacity of the refinery. You know, so if you're saying it to take 40 and it's producing at half its full capacity, why aren't we witnessing the 20%, you know. You know, because that, yeah, the story is always that this pressure, this pressure that it takes off, you know, demand for Forex would be evident, you know, with the price, you know, that the Naira will become stronger. So ideally you should be having exchange rates of between say maybe $1 to say maybe 1,300, 1200 naira. But that's not being the case. You know, it's even the case that you know, dollar is going in the opposite direction. So yeah, so there are claims that, you know, this is, some of, these are some of the benefits, you know, aside the usual is the highest employer of labor is giving us the state of the art something that you know, middle class Nigerians can boast about, you know, when they go on vacations and they have to familiarize with Africans from other parts. Well, I don't know. Anyways, I don't know why, you know, but I mean that's, that's the sense. That's the sense, you know, that I get in terms of what it. What it can do for us. I mean that's the much I think I've gotten from those who would like to parrot, you know, that as the reason why quality trumps.
- [42:27]
A
Price.
- [42:28]
B
Right, Right. But arguably these are fairly speculative and not exactly very direct possible benefits. If the cost for the average person is still much higher than they were paying two years ago, you know, under the subsidy regime, quote unquote, then just the fact that yes, it's made in Nigeria and in theory it's cleaner if. Which by the way is debated might not be satisfying enough, you know, for the average consumer or O. How do you feel? I mean are you. Do you feel that the made in Nigerian as of the petrol and the possibility that it's cleaner will make you feel a little better when you're. When you're around in Nigeria, when you're driving from Lagos to Jebu to go and spray some. Some Naira notes? Yeah.
- [43:31]
A
How.
- [43:31]
B
How do you feel about that?
- [43:39]
A
I think. Well, while government is social science nursing, it exposes us to the dynamics of human interaction and all that. If baseline is how does it affect people's lives materially and concretely to start to do before we go start to look other things. And since it's not panning out again, the promise was it was going to be cheaper. It was one of the promises is good production is.
- [44:08]
C
Yeah.
- [44:09]
A
They say. They say good day. They say good day say of course market price. This one now put his market price but you know, go be something. Okay. Maybe it will be. Sorry, let me. Expectation for sure it will be out of reach like this. It might be a bit higher.
- [44:25]
C
Yeah. I just want know so that we go know who we go home because.
- [44:39]
A
Okay, sorry it will be this expensive, you know. But now it's breaking people's back the common man. Nobody afford to power their generator Baba. Nobody do their bobbin salon Taylor everything. So what's now the benefit of the refinery if the one will be originally operating before is cheaper, you know. So inside of virtues that's what. That's what I keep hammering on. The thing being opaque. We don't really know what is going on asides the few press statements and the people that are interested, you know, coming to give their own side of the story, you know. So I feel that it's not enough for it to be cleaner and all, you know, it's that like that climate change thing where should people starve but you can breathe air and die. You know what you see? What was this? There's a crazy thing in there but, but the people have been offered the short end of the stick. And on top of that, you know, it's not, it's not reassuring that you know in your mind that you don't have a government that is bargaining for you. So that makes it almost feel like a lost case that okay, yeah the government really know even to send like that. So you know, so the people are just watching. They watch during sugar time, they watch during cement's time. They've watched for band A, band B electricity. They are watching. They know that certainly what is going to come at the end of this whole rigmarolling and financial acrobatics and all is that it will just settle down to a point where it's going to be so expensive you either can purchase it or start going back to firewood. What's it called? Wood shavings for your pots. You don't see them now. So even if I would serve God. So this is, these are the problems. I don't feel that just parachuting, development or this thing is enough. It must carry the whole country along such that you know, people don't lose out in its entirety. So this one they just partial development on bang bang bang. They disposes people of the land. We're not even going to go into how they built the finally out the land. Everything land use all. We're not going to go into that. Environmental impact. If you bring some environmentalists on and they tell you the negative impact of our refinery, you'll be amazed because I, I've been privileged to speak to some of them and it's nasty for legal state and the aquatic in that area. Yep.
- [47:17]
B
Oh that's, that's funny. I thought that, I thought the refinery would even make the air cleaner, the fuel cleaner, the oil cheaper.
- [47:26]
A
So shocking is, is nasty. It is nasty. I've had the privilege to speak to some people that I've gone to like reviews environmental. It's nasty, you know, so let's not standalone. That's not the goal. Not talk of the damage of the environment, local communities, fisher folks, boat makers, all that then now the thing that you're promising, you know, is not. Is out of reach. So where does that leave us? In limbo, you know, so it's always been the people versus this guy. And you know when, and, and another point is when people don't see any benefit of your so called massive investments and your big projects, they start to attack it. And that time Will come where? If he and all these government people are not careful, it would be that that refinery will become an emblem of suffering and disappointment. And when the people are pushed to the wall, the investment will not last. That's it, that's where it's going. They should just be careful, you know, I'll leave it at that.
- [48:38]
B
Yeah. Quite a stern warning from OG and you know, and potential network of environmental. Environmental radicals.
- [48:51]
A
You check the pipelines now? You check the pipelines. What do you mean? Why people, they bomb the pipelines. They know cc, they reflect, know cc. Like they don't feel that their process, their progress is flowing in those pipes. They don't feel that their well being is flowing in those pipes. So if the sum total of all your activities, economic activities, is becoming negative on my own life, then we'll call your attention one way or the other.
- [49:16]
B
Yeah, absolutely.
- [49:17]
A
You know, that's, that's it. You know, when they start saying things like that, they shouldn't say, we've not won. That's just all.
- [49:24]
B
So, I mean, you know, I want to say this one, I make it. But still intrigued to hear your take as well. Does that mean that there really was never any hope for large scale private sector investments in these areas of particular economic concern to Nigerians? Petroleum, sugar, cement, etc. To lead to better prices, better products, better services for the Nigerian masses? Or is this just peculiar to Dangote, as far as we know, just the way things have shaped out from the point of view of his particular style of investment and the source of capital that, that has produced it, you know. So in other words, I mean, is there pretty much no reason to hope then that having a large private refinery in the country would somehow redound to the benefit of the citizenry, you know? Yeah. Or do you still see some pathway through the, you know, through the murkiness of everything that somehow this will, this will eventually lead to some improvement in something? I mean, I know I've partially posed the question before, but in light of OG's reflections on the wider context of the environment and other matters, I wonder how you'd respond. Megan.
- [51:03]
C
That'S a tricky one.
- [51:08]
B
Yeah.
- [51:13]
C
It'S. I mean, the Dangote investment is, is laudable. You know, I'm not even gonna come here and cheat you about it. But. So let me just say this. I think the part of why this conversation is a bit controversial, you know, especially on the home front, is that it's usually being discussed devoid of what's happening, you know, globally within the oil market. So there are those who say that, you know, oil is going. The price of oil internationally will drop. Okay. So you, you then ask if there's. There's a way forward. You know. Yeah, there are a couple of things that can happen, you know, that Nigerians would, you know, opinions will sway in Dangote's favor in terms of the feeling, you know, general feeling, you know, of being. Of having, you know, dashed hope, you know, you know, so one of the things that can happen is that somehow the exchange rate for, you know, dollar, you know, goes down, which would mean that Nigeria is producing more, probably exporting more, or that, you know, the price of crude, you know, also dips in. So that those are, you know, some of the ways in which you Nigerians can feel the price of the. The point where I have known is that, you know, investment is what's our own reality. Because he's. Whatever the case, you know, whatever he's worked out for the federal government in this crude for Naira, for crude swap, he is now basically tasked with supplying at least half of what, I mean was estimated half of what, you know, the country consumes, which has been at the heart of the fight that he's had with other marketers because he had wanted, you know, he has the capacity to supply all of it. But that would also mean that we're instituting some kind of monopoly, you know, and this is something that the market has fought against. But yes, you know, depending on what happens, you know, in the world, you know, like the Iranians now, you know, retaliating, these things can move the price of crude one way or the other.
- [54:03]
B
Yeah, yeah, but that, but that would have affected. That would have had an impact on the price whether or not Dangote had done the investment.
- [54:11]
A
Right.
- [54:14]
B
Right.
- [54:14]
C
But before now, I think that the idea was that, you know, oil prices will be going, you know, down. So, I mean, that's why when you see market forces, you know, then determine the price. Yeah. So I guess that's a way in. In which that could have played, you know, played out to his. To his advantage, you know. But can you. What's the second part of your question now?
- [54:42]
B
No, I think you're getting to it. Really. It's kind of like, okay, you know, where's the hope? But then also, I mean. Yeah. What are we to make of the refinery in light of all these factors? I mean, you know, and I think you were sort of suggesting that, well, the fact that he has invested this amount is something laudable. I suppose it would be interesting to hear you maybe clarify why that's the case. I mean, if, if the thing is going to be a huge pollutant, it's not going to reduce the price, then, you know, what, what is, what is, you know, what should we celebrate about it really?
- [55:24]
C
I think the thing to celebrate about it is that, you know, it, he offers employment, both direct and indirect to a cross section of unemployed Nigerians. Not to negate, you know, what it means for climate change in terms of what it means for, you know, people who live in that vicinity in terms of pollution and all of, all of that. You know, there is, there is that worry. But these are some of the trade offs that you get, you know, for some of these, for if you like industrialization, you know. But one would always hope that these things in terms of economic value outweigh the effects, you know, that it has on people who live, you know, in and around, you know, that facility. Of course there was mention of how the place was acquired, you know, acquisition. I think even some of the guys, you know, because in the midst of all of this back and forth controversy, there was the realization that Dangote paid quite a tidy sum of money to acquire the land. And it would seem that those monies, they didn't even get to those who originally were displaced from, you know, the land.
- [57:22]
B
Oh my gosh, I can't, I can't believe that I'm scandalized again.
- [57:27]
C
I mean, but that's, I think that's, that's something that has to do with, with the state government and you know, the not, not dying. I mean, he's paid for it. Yeah. So those, those are, you know, I mean, there are probably. I'm not the best person to ask what, you know, the benefits are because for me it's, there's a part of me that holds him responsible for the price that I buy feel today because, yeah, because I mean, whilst, you know, it's true that the Nigerian president on his inaugural, for his inaugural speech announced that subsidy. Subsidy was gone, the actual fact of the matter is that it wasn't, it was never truly gone, you know, so sometime shortly after he made that announcement, you know, they went back to paying some kind of subsidy, which is why, which is responsible for why we had been able to buy fuel at a relatively moderate price price Even at about 600 naira, 700 naira per, per liter.
- [58:43]
B
Well, whether or not, whether or not it's moderate depends on how much you had in your hand when you went to the filling station. But I think, okay, we can say that we are buying it less than the global price.
- [58:56]
C
Yep, yep, yep, yep, yep. Yeah. Nine be the moderation way that they talk about. You know, I mean, I mean, so, you know, there's this argument about people, those who produce crude, you know, should be able to buy fuel for cheap, you know, and then examples are usually given, you know, especially within the Arab world. But if you go into the books, also Venezuela. Yeah, okay. Yeah. But the thing is, and I don't even know what the population for, you know, some of these countries are. But my usual hunt should be to say that the dynamics to all of this and the population also, you know, matter. Which is not to make a case against, you know, fuel subsidy. But the thing is that, yeah.
- [60:01]
B
If.
- [60:02]
C
You hear Dangote recently at forum, I think he granted an interview to maybe Bloomberg or one of his media outfits, you know, on the margins of United Nations General assembly thingy. He. You could hear him maybe for the first time, you know, publicly say that you speak up against, you know, subsidy. Yeah, he. So he's advocating that subsidy goes, you know, or should go, and that the time is right for it. Yeah, so he seems to be on the same page with the President, which explains why, you know, to some extent, you know, the price of.
- [60:50]
A
Of.
- [60:52]
C
Fuel is where it is. But the irony is that what Dangote Refinery has done in terms of PR and by way of price statements that it released at least in the last month or so is that they have found every avenue or every reason not to touch the price of. Of petrol. You know, they. Basically the work that they've done is to say it, we are not the reason why petrol is priced at close to. I mean, people are buying petrol for a thousand naira per liter now, you know, and so they are trying to make the claim that they are not the ones responsible for it. You know, but at the same time, I mean, I'm confused.
- [61:50]
B
I think you've just expressed honestly what we've all been feeling. And I think, you know, to Ueji's point, it's not by accident that we've been rendered confused because there's a very obvious lack of transparency. I mean, and the more you read the press releases, the more confused you get. Which also doesn't seem incidental. Which leads me to the final question I wanted to pose. And you know, maybe it can be a little more light hearted. It can be light and sweet Bonnie. Light and sweet.
- [62:26]
A
Bonnie. Crude.
- [62:27]
B
I mean, it's a question of conspiracy theories, which you already alluded to. Emeka. Earlier. I mean it. In light of the lack of transparency, in darkness of the lack of transparency, a lot of conspiracy theories have arisen to explain what the hell is going on. And some of them have actually been partially stoked by the conflictual parties. The seemingly conflictual parties. And some of the conspiracies seem to be true in some respects, as you also pointed to, Emeka. And I think this would be the time to clarify what we mean by true conspiracies. So, I mean, I wanted to give everyone a chance to say what their favorite conspiracy theory has been in the past few weeks as the media and citizens have tried to make sense of this situation with the Dangote refinery and the seemingly ever increasing price of petrol products. So one of the major ones, and this was pushed forward by Dangote himself actually, is that the reason why he was not being given crude oil or sufficient crude oil by the federal government, by the, by the National Petroleum Company, which is now commercialized, is that there were cabals in the petroleum company colluding with the president's family directly.
- [64:07]
A
Oh, I didn't hear that one.
- [64:09]
B
Oh, you didn't?
- [64:10]
A
I didn't.
- [64:12]
B
That's. That the president, the president were. Dangote didn't put it this way directly, but the media then chased it up and pointed out that the president's son, Alaji, or Mr. I don't know which title he uses, was on the board of a refining company in Malta, I believe.
- [64:34]
A
Oh, okay, okay, okay.
- [64:36]
B
Which was one of the companies supplying some of the major marketers who then were selling the petrol in Nigeria. So given that in effect some of the foreign owned refineries are actually partially Nigerian owned, then certain elements of Nigerian ruling classes, including the president's own family and people in the nnpc had a vested interest in trying to stymie the Dangote investment.
- [65:10]
A
Right.
- [65:12]
B
So it's like, you know, he was saying, well I shouldn't be, we shouldn't be surprised that I'm not getting the crude that I'm supposed to be getting that I was promised in the deal with the federal government because they're going to try to frustrate this to keep their importation business going. So that's one theory, you know, that we can explore. I'd be curious to hear your reactions to that. Another is that the collusion is happening on all sides. That the reason why Dangote is saying that the subsidy should be removed and why the Tinubu administration agreed and why the marketers seem to have agreed is that they all benefit from the price of petroleum products going up. They all benefit from there not being any official cap on the price because then they can price it however they like in various states across the country. And then market forces, quote, unquote, which means those same people get to determine, you know, based on their own demands, based on their own needs, rather than based on the needs of the consumers. You know, so if they are in a cash crunch or their child is graduating from university and needs a new house, or if they need a new private jet, then they can increase the price. Yes. I mean, of course, you know, expecting that consumers will react and move from one station to the other, and then maybe that will provide some kind of regulatory mechanism. But, you know, because the country is so divided and because information doesn't flow adequately, I think that conspiracy holds that the market forces collusion would still work in their favor to a very large extent, because you don't know what the next filling station or the next state or you don't know how the product is priced in those places, so you end up stuck buying it from. From which place is closest to you. And of course, if your fuel has run out, then you're also less likely to try to get fuel from the cheapest possible place. You're probably more likely to try to get it from the closest possible place. So, I mean, these are some of the various theories that have arisen. On the one hand, that, yes, again, Dangote is on his own just trying to be a domestic producer and being stymied by forces colluding in the presidency and the nnpc. On the other hand, that the collusion is much deeper and that in fact they're all kind of colluding. They all, by the way, also hold interests in the Dangote refinery, at least the nnpc and it's an investor in the Dangote refinery in a practical sense. So that's part of where that theory gets its empirical base. So, yeah, I mean, how do you guys respond to all this? Which, which of these theories or any others that you've come across is your favorite? Not to say that you support it or you believe in it, but that it entertains you the most or that it seems on the surface to be the most plausible? How do you respond? Megan, maybe you first. Since you've.
- [68:35]
A
Since.
- [68:37]
B
Yeah.
- [68:39]
C
Yeah. I mean, I'm not too conversant with that. I mean, I don't, I don't quite follow the second theory that you alluded to, the one about everybody being in Kahoot, which seems possible by the. By the way, perhaps even more plausible to the theory that I. More attuned to the one that I've heard times about, which is that there are powerful forces. I mean, I think D is the one who sows the seed, you know.
- [69:21]
B
No, he did. He had a press conference where he.
- [69:24]
A
Talked about and he brought a can of petrol to drink. Clean petrol. Water petrol.
- [69:32]
C
No, before that, sir, before that. Before that. So I mean when he says, when he alleges that there are people who are importing dirty fuel from Malta, you know, and that there's. That they have a refinery off Malta. That's how he puts it. Off Malta. And that some nmpc, you know, POP guys have shared within the company. The refinery. Not even a refinery. A blending plant. That's what he says.
- [70:09]
B
Right, sorry, A blending plant is the term.
- [70:12]
C
Right, yeah. Where they blend, you know, all sorts of things together and then bring it into the country. So he alludes to the fact that those are the kinds of fuels that have been on sale in the Nigerian market for some time and that was responsible for you having to change your oil filter, fuel pumps and all sorts of things prepared mechanically within your cars. Yeah, so what the president did, because he left it so open ended, you know, that they ran into town and began to dig up all sorts of documents to the effect that there was a company on which.
- [71:02]
A
Was on the board.
- [71:05]
C
Was on the board. I think even she was on the board. Yeah. But it turns out that such a company maybe didn't even exist or existed under some kind of other name but did something totally, you know, different. Yeah, so, so that's, so that's. So that's that. But you see, Dagger had already sold this scene so bad that, you know, his supporters, and there are many of them still, you know, even though some of them are now, now, you know, now come down to reality, you know, you find that most of them are because till tomorrow Dangote hasn't told anybody how much he sells petrol. You know, nobody knows how much. But, but there, there seems to be a bunch of, you know, story to all of this, you know, and it is that the Depot association of Depot Owners or Marketers, whatever the acronym is, Dark man, you know, these guys had written to the President sometime in July, you know, to say that Dagote refinery alongside the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Regulatory Authority in Kahutu Dangote refinery had been engaging in some sort of sharp practices that effectively meant that Dangote had a monopoly on the market. And specifically of the AGO market, which was the diesel market. That's the allegation that they were making, you know, at the time and asked that, you know, the president steps in and went into the matter to resolve it in line with the PIA act. Okay, so. And then they made some, you know, point I gave some other pointers, you know, so it was in the light of that Dumbotit and decided that he was going to fight back. Fighting back alleges that the NNPC in cahoots with some major oil traders, all this their subsidy crap, you know, have been bringing in substandard fuel into the country and that his own refinery was produced. So that's when he gave that press statement that he invited people, legislators from House of Assembly and House of Representatives, I think. So that had been simmering. So there was a cold war. And that cold war is what I think has translated into the price wars that we see why Dangote is not willing to touch the price. You know, so NNPC says this is what Dangote says or stores. Dangote says no, this isn't quite true. They sell it dollars, you know, and so as if also now giving the, planting the seed there that you know, that's why some people believe that, okay, since he's, he's. This is the price for the crude that he bought in dollars. What about the crude that Nigeria is giving to him, you know, for Naira, would that then be cheaper? You know, but we'll see, you know, so those are the kinds of, I mean it struck me as oh, a bit initially, a bit irritating. But you know, over time it's become a case for me to, you know, some course of entertainment for me when I hear people say that, you know, off the back of this insinuation that Dangote makes, you know, that the federal government is against him, all sorts of people are, you know, trying to sabotage his, his refinery when in actual fact the allegation is that he had engaged in very sharp practices. And you, you know, this association of depot marketers, you know, had to voice their cons, their concern, you know, so and, and then the Dangote goes, you know, public tries to cut public opinion, you know, gives press conferences here, their press release statements. On one end is vp, VP oil and gas for Dangote refineries making all sorts of claims, some of them false, you know, so it's, it's. Which is why I say it's difficult for me to actually sympathize with him because I know and these Are things that go on, you know, within the industry. The general public is ignorant, you know, and all that matters to them is that they put $20 billion down to build the refinery. In building that refinery he a wharf, you know, he reclaimed the land, you know, all sorts of milestones, you know, the gantry and take X amount of this as finest art for labs. But the reality is that most of these things are immaterial, you know. You know, they service the cost of the product, you know, which. Which is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. Control is what makes the Nigerian economy tick. As in maybe everywhere else in the world.
- [77:09]
B
Yeah, yeah. So you come in, I mean. Yeah. Taking the bait. He's giving us even more. Yeah. Food for thought.
- [77:21]
A
Well, I'll just kind of go more into that mentality that the average person that kind of listened to Dangote. The mentality they've been by for the mentality that they have such that, you know, they feel like dagote is fighting a bunch of vampires around him and then they announce a comrade. Yeah, exactly. Recovery that, you know, he has to come up, he has to come out on top of this. And I think they have to look at history to see these guys operational practices and see that even some of the commodities that they have in their house right now, they're not paying a fair price, you know, so they should look at that history and try to situate themselves historically to know that look. Yeah. Better off just treading with caution and trying to get more facts as they come to appraise the angle, the situation than just thinking that he's some sort of victim in all this, you know, so don't fall for the middle class aspirational mentality where you feel like you. He's fighting in a very tough business environment. No, just some interests pushing and pulling themselves. He has, you know, made the business. Business environment top for some people back in terms like his fellow cement players.
- [78:43]
B
Yeah.
- [78:44]
A
You know, and all that. So there's a lot of history on Dangote for us to just, you know, fall back and try to analyze the facts rather than go on public or private PR sentiments and make our decisions based on that. So, you know. Yeah, that's. That's a lot of, you know, theories out there. But I don't believe that he's a victim or anything like that.
- [79:08]
B
Yeah, yeah, fair enough. I suppose it's hard to really convince leftists that a billionaire monopolist is a.
- [79:18]
A
Victim fighting for his dear life.
- [79:22]
B
So. Yeah. So I'll pack up my victim arguments and go to another podcast and see who I can convince there. But anyway, I mean, I suppose as dissatisfying as that feels, we probably have to leave it there for today. And I think one of the things I take away from this is that as we've said we want to do already, a much more extensive conversation about Dangote Enterprises or conglomerate and its history and its relationship to a Nigerian state would be quite an interesting exploration to pursue. And I think we are touching in some ways the tip of the iceberg with this refinery issue. And it's the tip from the point of view of it being the only bit visible, but so much of it still remains under the surface. And even the visible point parts we're only seeing quite partially, as we've complained the whole time. So it's a very confusing story and I think we've made our own little attempt to make some sense of it. Hopefully it's made some sense to the listeners as well. But I say that to say it's unlikely to be the last time we engage this issue. And yeah, and when we do revisit it, you know, there will be, I think, a little more space for engaging with the long running historical elements that we alluded to in the beginning. So I suppose, yeah, that's, that's perhaps where I might leave it. Do you, do you, do you folks have any final thoughts?
- [81:05]
C
Yeah, my final thought is simple, is a simple one. Yeah, I mean, I don't, I don't, I don't know how. Perhaps it makes sense to some people, you know, to, in taking up debate for this, your victim card. And there are those who think that he is a victim here basically that anywhere else in the world where the world's richest man or Africa's richest man makes an investment of US$20 billion, he needs to be granted all the concessions that, that he want or needs or requires make it.
- [81:53]
B
I remind you a lot of that money is loans, some of it is public money, etc, So I mean, I know, I know, you know, I know you know this, but it's just worth.
- [82:04]
C
That's why it's a, is our refinery. Yeah, so, so if it works, works, you know, we're all better off, you know, for it, you know, and so, yeah, to, to, to a large extent what these guys are actually saying is that they're fine with Dangote nationalizing his risks and prioritizing the wealth, you know, so, so, so the, the narrative is that you perhaps, you know, he's a victim because for the first time in a long time, you know, in decades. He's being challenged, you know, top dollar for top dollar by players within, you know, a sector of the economy where he's, yes, maybe the biggest investor, but a new player is this. Why are they oppressing the new entrants? You know, kind of greeting that, you know, if you want, if you want to join, join on. You know, you're free to.
- [83:13]
B
Fair enough. Yeah. No, that's. That's a good explanation for the middle class sensibility, even though it's clear that it's not one you share. Yeah. What are your. What are your final thoughts? Any parting. Parting words, advice to Dangote supporters?
- [83:32]
A
Ah, no, I think Mr. Dangote or Alaji will be all right, whatever it is, you know, but it's the common man that should learn to assess these situations and follow, you know, go a bit back in history, look at how things are, follow the money, look at how, you know, things play out. And assess where you stand in the big picture and don't be carried away by, you know, elite PR or government pr. Assess where you stand. That's the only way you can make the right, you know, decision or come up with the right opinions on these issues.
- [84:09]
B
Folks, I think we should call it a day. Until next time.
- [84:20]
A
Sam.
- [84:46]
C
Sa.