B (3:12)

So, Faizy, thank you very much for coming onto the air.

A (3:15)

AC Podcast.

C (3:17)

Thanks for inviting me. It's a pleasure.

B (3:20)

Absolutely. I mean, it's interesting having the conversation.

A (3:23)

With you now because last week I.

B (3:25)

Spoke with Sungu Oyo, who is a Kenyan socialist who is running for president there, and we discussed Kenya's own Gen Z uprisings, which took place last year and this year. And was interesting to have that conversation against the backdrop of what was happening in Nepal. And so I wanted to start by asking you if you could maybe give us especially for our listeners who might not have been paying as much attention just given how overwhelming the news cycle is these days. I'm sure some people find it hard to keep up exactly. With developments around the world. But could you maybe talk about what happened over basically two days in Nepal when we saw an inspired movement of young people bring down an entire political establishment? In the international press, familiar terms are used to describe what happened in Kenya. It was described as a Gen Z kind of revolution and the same in Nepal. And the ostensible trigger for this was a social media ban. And the description goes that it then sort of expanded to take on a range of other demands. But could you maybe kind of set the scene for us and just walk us through what happened, what the media triggers were, but what might have been the wider context that produced the protests that we saw recently?

C (4:51)

Yes, well, the, as you say it was the trigger was, or the sort of pretext was the social media ban. So the Nepal government had announced the banning of 26 social media sites. So the, you know, the familiar ones, Facebook, Instagram, even WhatsApp. And that was the kind of trigger, I suppose. And that's how it's portrayed in the media. And I think that's, that's clear that it was the potential banning of these sites. They. So the government had given these, these corporations a week to be registered with the government. And, and of course, a lot of them, most of them didn't. And then they were about to institute the ban and they quickly reversed it, I mean, within days because of this, because of this uprising. I would call it, I wouldn't call it a, A revolution, but I would call it certainly an uprising. So, of course, one has to look at the context in which this is taking place. And I think it wasn't that. It was, I think Immediately, what most of the, even the mainstream press has said is that it wasn't just about the social media. Right. Of course, it was coming off the back of really decades of anger and resentment at the political elite, the mainstream political parties. And that goes for the three main ones, Nepali Congress, uml, which is the unified Marxist Leninist party, and the Maoists, the Communist Party of Nepal. And it was particularly, you know, in some ways directed against Oli, K.P. oli, who was the prime minister from, from the UML party, obviously, because he's the Prime Minister, but his reign, his kind of leadership style was extremely authoritarian. He, there had been years under his, you know, rule of cracking down on dissent, of, of corruption, of allowing, you know, really unbridled corruption to, to take place. Himself also you know, involved in, in corruption and I think the gap between rich and poor, you know, increasing in many ways. Nepal seeing its first billionaire, you know, just over a decade ago and life for the vast majority not really getting much better. I mean, of course Nepal is famously a remittance dependent country. It's one of the, you know, it's one of the top remittance receiving countries in terms of its gdp. But that has kept people, you know, surviving, but it hasn't really massively changed and you know, people's lives and, and what has been happening is, is people using those remittances for daily survival. Generally speaking, some have been able to buy land and so on, but you have this situation where the vast majority of the population is, is dependent on these remittances. And really there's a jobs crisis. So there isn't really, there hasn't really been an outlet for people, you know, or for people to think, okay, life is getting better and this is a way, you know, there is a, there is a better future. And I think all of that anger and resentment exploded in this way. And yes, amongst young people in the, in urban centers.

B (9:09)

And does that, does that explain, I mean, this sort of characterization that you've just given about the political economy of Nepal, does that go to explain why demographically this was Gen Z driven protest? I mean, in the piece that you wrote for Africa as a country, you highlight how Nepal witnessed the growth of the higher education sector and this has produced obviously graduates who aren't being absorbed into the job market. And so is it the case that there's now this sort of class of downwardly mobile young people who are starved of economic opportunities in the country and who have rising frustrations growing out of that and, and who look at political elite that is largely indifferent to their problems. And first, a description about this demographic and why it was this demographic that.

A (10:11)

Sort of came forward to lead this.

B (10:13)

Moment, but also then to ask why ban social media? What exactly did the government think it was going to achieve? I mean, you've described how. What I didn't know actually was that social media companies were given a week to register. But why was it such a short time frame? What were the reasons behind this sort of clampdown on social media companies? And I'm surprised that they thought they could seemingly get away with it.

C (10:43)

Yeah. First on the remittances and the sort of investment in education. I think this is an important element of, of, you know, of what's going on. I think what we say in the article is that, is that people are, you know, there, there is a kind of desperation, right, of a, of a way out of sort of the experience of, you know, of, of work and of working particularly in, in, in agriculture. So there are, you know, lots of families that don't want their children to go into farming necessarily and also young people not wanting to go into farming, you know, in terms of job prospects and, and livelihoods and so on. And therefore a huge investment in education and, and a lot of those remittances are going into, into education. So lots of young people from the rural areas coming to the cities. And that could be Kathmandu, but it could also be the district headquarters to study. And so you do have this, it's actually quite a young population Nepal and you do have a lot of educational institutions that are, are there to. Yeah, to, to educate this, you know, this huge section of society. And of course a much smaller minority will go abroad. But there is this kind of real sense that if we invest in education, our children will have better lives. And of course that's universal. It's not unique to Nepal and in some cases, you know, that's working. But there is a jobs crisis. There isn't enough employment to absorb this hugely educated section of society. And I think a lot of it does have to do with the decimation of, of industry and the, and not developing industry in terms of what's possible. Nepal, like many countries, went through a kind of a neoliberal, kind of a liberalization of the economy from the early ninet. And a lot of industry was sold off mainly to Indian businessmen, but was, you know, was privatized and wasn't allowed to really develop. I mean, you know, it had a quite a large and, you know, well developed garment sector, Jute Rubber, you know, other, other industries and, and more that could have been developed, but in part due to, you know, trade arrangements and, and, and a certain type of economic policy, they haven't developed this. And, and there really is a jobs crisis. And so, you know, something like. Well, in last year, in 2024, something like 870,000 people left the country for work. Most families have at least one migrant laborer that goes, you know, and in many cases directly from the village either to India or abroad. Not even, you know, to Kathmandu or not even to the, to the, to the cities. So it's a really, it's a really common phenomenon that people will go and work abroad for labor and obviously in some of the worst jobs under very bad conditions. So, you know, Nepal, the, the government has, has enabled this to happen. They, you know, under, under, there's, there's really not enough regulation about it. I mean, of course the government facilitates passports and so on, but in terms of, you know, middlemen that are facilitating this, you know, there needs to be a lot more regulation, of course, to ensure that it isn't, that they're not, you know, endangering themselves and, and the families and so on. But it's really been, you know, they, they facilitated this, this, this migration abroad, but they've not really facilitated, you know, the idea that you can stay in Nepal and, and work. There's not been a real concerted effort to, to make sure that there are jobs or that, you know, that people are sort of able to stay. And that's not to say, of course, things have changed in the last 20 or 30 years. There is, it's a, it's. It's really a service economy that's kind of the dominant sector in Nepal. And there have been, you know, small businesses, of course, and so on, but that's not really what the government has, has done, combined with a very basic welfare, very basic welfare provision. So I think there's been a lot of, I mean, from the government's part, I think they're quite, yeah, disconnected, I guess, from the, from the, from the vast majority of the population. And, and I think the, the ban on the, on the, on the social media sites is kind of, you know, an expression of, of this disconnect between what people are doing, what people want, the way they are kind of developing culture, the way they interact with the outside world and so on. So the idea that, that they, that they ban these, these companies, I mean, I think, I mean, I'm not, I'm not sure why they would have Given them. It's kind of unclear why they would have given them a week only perhaps to show their, you know, to show the, their, their muscle to, to say that, you know, we can do this as a, as a state. But, but it didn't work and it, in it and it, and it clearly backfired massively. And I think Oli himself was very, you know, is very self serving and you know, well as I say, authoritarian but also quite well, what's the word, you know, thinks a lot of himself in the sense he wasn't able to kind of, he was almost mocking the, the, even the, the, the people, the, the Gen Z activists who were going out and planning the protest, you know, online and so on that you know, they should think independently and they, they, you know, why are they bothering themselves with, with, with this kind of, you know, they should, they should concentrate on, you know, their studies and so on. Not really thinking that, you know, it's actually him that's going to be eating his words.

B (18:18)

I mean I, now I want to ask about, you know, Nepal's recent political history. You know, for an outside spectator looking at the political landscape in Nepal, seeing that Oli himself hails from the Communist Party of Nepal, the unified Marxist Leninist Communist Party, looking at the fact that the People's Socialist Party is part of the fourth Orli Cabinet and thinking about Nepal's recent political history and the, you mentioned the Maoist Communist Party that led the 10 year insurgency between 1996 and 2006 that eventually transitioned Nepal away from constitutional monarchy into republic. One would assume that given that there was this, you know, grassroots mobilization against monarchy that was precipitated by an uprising in 1990 against absolute monarchy and the fact that the sort of watchwords of this 10 year long insurgency was about ending inequalities based on class, on caste, on gender, ethnicity, one would think that having come to power in 2008 as the Maoists did, that they would, that they would have a mandate to fundamentally transform Nepali society and that they would pursue an economic program that would address all of the things that you spoke about, about building an industrial base, building self sustaining economy, et cetera. But instead what you've described is the history of many economies over the last decade which is being eviscerated by neoliberalism, austerity, liberalization, so on and so forth. And one part of me can see why this was the case. 2008 also happens to be when the financial crisis happened. And so one can think that the structural economic conditions weren't Very favorable. But could you kind of talk us through how we got here? How in spite of what was an inspired kind of bottom up movement against political authority in the 90s that carried over to the 2000s, that Nepal finds itself once again in this situation where people are having to rise up against a stranglehold of elites who remain still disconnected from the masses. And these are generations of people who are now in power but who would have been sort of carrying the same flag that Gen Z activists are doing so on the streets currently.

C (21:20)

Yeah, so I mean I, so What happened in 1990 was a, was a mass movement. I would call it a revolution. The the party less Panchayat system, the authoritarian Panchayat system was was abolished. You know, several hundred thousand people on the, on the streets to to. To get r. Again this was in the early 1990s, not unique to Nepal, a sort of ushering in of or restoration of democracy. But the Maoists as a party quickly realized in a few short years that in fact the promises made of a democratic transition were not making a massive difference to people's lives in concrete terms socially, politically, economically, in particular. And so they launched this, this, this people's war. And Maoism has, has a history really dating back to 1949. 1950 was when the first Communist party was established in Nepal off the back of, you know, comrades in in. In India. And, and and really had, they had been sort of organizing since even well before then, since, since the 30s. So and, and you're right, I mean they, they were the first party that actually went out to the rural areas and talked to people and introduced the notion of human rights and rights in general. And also a vehicle, an organization that you could join, that you could organize with, that you could actually fight with to, to demand these, these, these rights from, from a government that was really. And a series of governments under a democratic dispensation that were really. Yeah disconnected from from the mass of the population. And really politics was taking place in Kathmandu. I mean the, the, the, the rural areas or really anywhere outside Kathmandu wasn't really integrated politically. Although of course you know there were, there were, there was local government and so on and there was a measure of you know, resource transfer and so on. But really, you know, compared to what people were expecting in 1990 and what was really taking place there was a massive gap and the Maoists capitalized on that and they were very popular. So they fought this 10 year civil war and despite, you know, what again some of the mainstream media would would. Would have it that the population were caught between the army on the one hand and the Maoists on the other, and they're both the, you know, the same as each other is not true. It's, it's a very, you know, it's not really, it's not really, you know, taking into consideration what the Maoists were, were trying to do as a, as a project now. They, they failed to do that. A lot of it, I think has to do with Indian influence, I mean, at the state level. So obviously the Indians, the Indian government has their own Maoist movement on their, on their hands, is absolutely of course against it and, and wants to, you know, destroy it. And so when 911 happened, you know, you could see that the Nepal government used this rhetoric of, of the war on terror and, and terrorists on, on, you know, on, on their soil in, in, in the, in in expressed by the Maoists, you know, that they used the international community to get funding for weapons and so on to fight the Maoists and of course, help from the Indian government as well. Now militarily, they didn't win. It was, I would say it was a, it was, it was a standoff in a way. They didn't. Neither side really was able to. The army, very much heavily armed and equipped, much more so than the MA weren't really able to defeat them militarily. But on the other hand, I think the defeat came more politically where I think there were sections of the, of the Maoist leadership that wanted some way out through negotiations. And eventually they had a peace deal brokered by India signed in Delhi in 2006. And this was really, you know, one could say the beginning of the end or even arguably a few years before that when they entered into peace talks. But you know, essentially it was okay, a kind of strategic and theoretical, I think, I think sort of miscalculation, I guess, on the Maoist part that they needed to develop a capitalist economy really first and then you could have socialism in the future. And again, this is not unique to Nepal, but a section of, you know, the left that thinks, yeah, we need to develop a capitalist economy and therefore, you know, and we don't have a strong working class. The trade unions are weak, the, you know, political parties are weak, the mass of the population is not ready, etc. Etc. And for these reasons we need to compromise essentially. And so they were still the, the, the most popular party in 2008 when they had the constituent assembly elections. And that was when of course, they forced the, the king to abdicate and declare Nepal a republic. But I mean, There wasn't really, there wasn't any kind of mass movements anymore. There wasn't any kind of way for people to express, you know, popular, you know, desire or what they, what, what, what they wanted or what was, what was necessary. And slowly, I mean the Maoists had a, had a general strike in 2010, but really that was the last popular mobilization or last mass mobilization. I guess you could say it was mainly amongst the Mao within the Maoist party. But you know, I think particularly a young population was getting very disillusioned with politics in general, political parties in general, and the Maoists in particular because of the potential that they held and squandered and they, you know, being enmeshed in the, you know, the politicking in Kathmandu and so on, they became as corrupt, the leadership became as corrupt as the parties before them. So the Communist party, although it still holds some, you know, I think it's a very left wing population. I think people do vote for communist parties because they think that communist parties will are much more, you know, collective and concerned about the poor and so on. But people have been utterly betrayed, I think. And so there's real disillusionment. I genuinely think that people all over, I think there are different dynamics of course in rural areas and urban areas, but I think people in general are very distrustful. They don't know who to believe. Now post the Maoist experiment and certainly life hasn't got massively better despite working all hours. And so it's, I think it's difficult for the sort of an extra parliamentary left. And I, and there are, you know, left wing parties, many in fact left wing parties, probably too many left outside parliament. But I think there is that real challenge for those left parties. How do we connect with the population? We don't have party funds. How do we, you know, and you need money in order to organize and so on. And, and how do we, how do we turn that around where people are so disillusioned and distrustful. But I do think that the mainstream parties have a problem because after this, and I think it really is a new reality in that sense, people are not going to vote for the current status quo. This, current parties. I don't think they want to see any of these people in, in power again. The, the main sort of six or seven, eight leaders that have just been rotating, you know, positions for the last 30 years, 25 years.

B (31:00)

What do you think, what do you think about this moment is so decisive? Because you know, one thing that is surprising about Nepali politics is, is the extent to which ruling parties have proven remarkably resilient in, in the past. And you're saying now that you don't think they're going to be able to reassert control again, that we've entered a new political paradigm where the population is so thoroughly disillusioned with their track record and leadership. But on the other hand, there is also a vacuum and it feels, I wonder if you think that this vacuum, unless it's quickly filled in by the kinds of extra parliamentary movements and groups that you're describing, that it also paves the way for other formations who are cut from the same elite to kind of swoop in and assert the same kind of counter revolutionary rhetoric that sort of defangs and destabilizes transformative political moments that we've seen elsewhere. Right, to sort of talk in the register of order and stability and so on and so forth. Because, you know, I've already seen how reactions to the violence over the past weak and not against, not the, from the security forces against protesters, but from protesters themselves who've just burned down a couple of buildings. But I've seen already kind of like efforts for people to sort of distinguish, you know, to sort of distance themselves from expressions of violence. And you know, I, I'm not there, so I don't know whether there are efforts to discredit the protests by encouraging violence and who that's coming from, et cetera. But I'm just curious to hear what you think about this moment means that the political establishment has been so thoroughly discredited that they have no way back.

C (33:02)

It's complex, isn't it? Because there is a vacuum now. But on the other hand, the state has responded like any state would, which is to send in the army to restore order and to try and get back to normal, to normality as soon as possible. So the first thing that Sushila Ki did, the former Chief justice who's now being taken over to be interim prime minister, is to say we're going to, you know, repair the buildings and, and, and make sure we can prepare for elections. And that's fine. And they have to do that. But you know, there is this sense in which what is going to change, you know, who is going to run in for the elections scheduled for March? Are the elections going to happen? You know, all of those, all of those questions, I don't think, I mean, in one sense, I think these leaders are finished. It would be surprising if they did get anywhere near power again, given the humiliating resignation of, of Capioli and, and the, you know, in the, in the demonstrations you saw placards which had all of the faces of, of these, of these leaders. So you know, it, they were all kind of tarred with the same brush. But, but it's not that, you know, those political ties that the parties have built over decades will just simply disappear. Right? So there's still, and of course, you know, China may get involved, may intervene to try and unite the communist parties, perhaps, you know, that kind of thing. And then there could, and with new leaders there may, they may be able to, with A, with new leaders and B, without alternatives. And, and again there may be alternatives but people don't necessarily, they don't know who they are, they don't necessarily trust them and so on. Very difficult for there to be a kind of perhaps a radical shift, but certainly the space is there for alternative parties and leaders to emerge. And certainly I think a lot of people hope that there will be new parties. So the other point is I think we need to distinguish the Gen Z protesters and the people who were actually burning down the buildings. I don't think that they were the same people and it's kind of difficult to know who they were. Perhaps some linked to the RSP Russia party, which is the National Independence Party. But it's very difficult to know. I mean I don't think that it was, you know, the young women in school uniforms or the, or the, or necessarily, you know, the young men who were planning the protests were the same ones, you know, beating up the former Prime Minister and so on in their houses and burning down politicians houses and so on. So it's very difficult to know what kind of intervention there was. But it is interesting. I mean, no, we talk about Indian influence, but also the US is very powerful, China is very powerful. Capioli was famously known for being quite pro China and investment from China and so on. But one thing is clear is that the pri, the Prime Minister, the interim Prime Minister and three of the key ministers, so the Finance Minister, the Home Minister and the Energy Minister are all in various ways supported by the US and that's interesting because it sort of, it gives us some idea of, of kind of what's happening here. Perhaps a kind of correction to China's influence over the past, you know, 10, 15 years. And of course there will always be an Indian influence. And clearly India is watching this. This is not the first protest, a kind of a Gen Z or, or young person's uprising in the re in South Asia in the last, you know, a little while We've, we've seen Bangladesh last year, Sri Lanka two years ago. So certainly Delhi doesn't want this to happen on their soil. And it's more complicated and, and on a bigger scale in India. But the inequality is, is there, is AB there and, and obviously the social media is there and people see it. And this is why I think it, it, it struck such a, you know, nerve because people are constantly seeing this polit, you know, the sons and daughters of politicians flaunting their wealth, flaunting their lifestyles, and they're on the same, you know, Internet space. And it's absolutely, you know, it generates a kind of level of disgust and anger and resentment that, that this kind of corruption is taking place when the promises, you know, have, have just not been you know, borne out in any way, shape or form. And the fact that people are really suffering, you know, with the jobs crisis, with having to migrate for some of the worst forms of labor struggling in the, in the rural areas, you know, the earthquake that happened in 2015, and again, the promises of the constitution, you know, not living up to the reality then Covid, you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And again, a lot of this is, you know, you can see parallels with other countries. It's, it's. A lot of this is not Nepal, but of course Nepal has unique, unique conditions. But it's that, it's that real anger of, of the, of, of. And, and, and in particular a young population that sees no future or sees a very limited future given, given the investment that they've made and the, and the, and the work that they, you know, that they have to do. Yeah. So I think a lot of it has to do with this anger, but also the external politics influencing domestic politics.

B (40:07)

I want to touch on those two things. I mean, maybe I'll touch on the one and then we'll go to the other. But to first talk about what you've just described now, which is just the, the kind of onslaught on working people that has happened not only in Nepal, but worldwide over the last two, three decades. And the fact that the majority of the population is immiserated down and out, is frustrated, feels as if they have no opportunities. And then a dynamic that was very critical in fomenting the uprising this time around, as you said, is everyone goes on social media and they see the spawn of elites flaunting their wealth and this breeds for the anger and resentment until that itself explodes. I want to ask about the role played by the digital, which is something that now has an oversized influence on the way political mobilizations happen in the 21st century, which is to one sort of ask about, you know, what, what is the nature of social media consumption in Nepal? And do you see kind of new forms of politicization taking place on social media, absent, as you were saying earlier, traditional political vehicles of organizing? Has social media kind of stepped in as a substitute, or would it be overstating the role that it plays? And does kind of the use of social media itself sort of belie other kind of tensions or, or unevenness? Particularly thinking about the kind of rural, urban dynamic in Nepal, which I'm curious to hear a little bit more about, the character of these protests seem largely urban centric. And I wonder if that sort of mirrors social media use and consumption as well. And if not, kind of, how have people in rural Nepal been reacting to this moment? Are they in the conversation or are they still largely left out of it?

C (42:23)

Well, something like three quarters of the population has a mobile phone and just over half have access to the Internet. So it's quite, you know, quite a large section of the population does, you know, has access to these, to these spaces. You know, it is, it is, it has been an urban movement, of course, and not just in Kathmandu, but some of the other urban, urban centers. But, but I don't think that the rural population, or at least I haven't seen any evidence that they are feeling excluded on this question in the sense that they probably support what happened because it was, you know, giving the political elite a bloody nose, which they deserved, I think. And, you know, because they themselves had been suffering this, you know, the, the situation in, in the rural areas is essentially that most of the young men have left for work. You know, there is a phenomenon of the feminization of agriculture. Women are doing a lot more of what men were doing. They're managing the households. They're doing much of the agricultural work, and there's fewer people to do it. So you have new forms of, you know, bartering in terms of labor. Okay, we'll do collectively work on your land, and then, you know, next we'll work on ours and so on. And a lot of, a lot of agricultural work is just being left, so lots of land is just remaining fallow. There's reforestation in some, in some areas, so it's not happening. And, you know, that has all kinds of impacts. But, you know, there's a, there's a, an older population in Nepal in the rural areas, women and, and, and children. And that, that, that is essentially it so life is quite hard I would say in general. And so there is a lot of resentment. And again I think people still, the majority of the population lives in rural areas but they don't again feel like this is the way forward. Of course people don't want to leave. Most migrants don't want to leave. They want to stay in their own countries, they want to find jobs where they are. And so I think there is a real, real resentment that we've had, you know, 35 years of democracy, we've had 10 years of this new constitution and 10 and you know, 12 years of a republic and nothing. Life has changed. Yes, somewhat. But you know, even seasonal migration from the remittances, from seasonal migration doesn't make a massive difference in, in the finances of most families. And long term migration does make some difference but not, you know, it's not kind of life changing for the vast majority. And so I think there really is a kind of okay, good that, that the one, good that Ollie is gone. I, I don't think anyone is sort of missing his, his, his rule and two, that there is a space being opened. And you know, I think we haven't mentioned one thing which is the pro monarchy movement that has, that has kind of grown in the last few years and particularly since 2023. This will have undercut that to some extent. It will have undermined that to some extent. I mean it wasn't massive. But the idea that people are saying, you know, this is what we need is a return to the monarchy, I don't think is the way forward. And I don't think most people think it's the way forward. But I think this Gen Z movement will have, will have, will have undercut that which I think is a good thing. So I don't see, I mean of course there are different dynamics happening in, in urban versus versus rural areas, but this was a kind of a sort of a blow against the elite on behalf of, you know, everyone who is fed up with the, the status quo. And I think that's a good thing. And similarly I think the older generation in the rural, in the, in, well, everywhere but also in the urban areas, I don't, I mean it's a, it's a kind of youth led movement but I don't think it's just, you know, I don't think it's just oh, the youth are the future and they know what's, you know, they know they have a plan and it'll all be okay. I don't think that's the case, I mean the movement itself is leaderless. It's not, it's, there's no structure. And in that situation I think that's problematic. It could be problematic when it comes to transparency or democracy or coming up with a vehicle through which people can express what they want. So that's, that we'll have to see how that, how that plays out. But I don't think it's sort of this. On the one hand, it's not that people are apathetic and I think people are, have been politicized, as you say, by, by social media. But social media will never be a replacement of, of politics and of political parties. That is the system that we, you know, that we have at the moment under, under capitalist conditions and you do, and, and voting is important in that sense. But you know, I also think that, so we need, we need parties within parliament and the Gen Z movement has to figure out a way to, you know, make that happen or support a new force in parliament. But we also need extra parliamentary forces on the left in particular to try and make sure that we don't end up with a bigger pro monarchy movement or that we don't end up with any other right wing movement that can, that will only just, you know, ferment conflict and, and hatred and, and you know, all of that along, along all kinds of lines, whatever it might be, ethnicity and so on. So I, I, I think people have been politicized in the sense that they see the inequality and also they see, they see the poverty, they see, you know, life not getting better for the vast majority and that's a kind of politicization. But they're also deeply, as I say, deeply disillusioned with, with the current, what's on offer in terms of politics and political parties. So it's not that there isn't stuff going on and happening and, and people organizing outside of parliament, there is. But I think how do you, how do you put that together to have a mass, you know, popular vehicle in which people's desires and concerns are expressed? And how do you connect that then with, with parliament?

B (49:58)

Do you think there's anyone in Nepal, any formations that are exploring that question in inventive and productive ways and thinking about that as kind of maybe the medium term horizon which is heading into March 2026 when there will be this parliamentary contestation, but then beyond that, thinking about how to, as you saying, maintain extra parliamentary pressure on whoever occupies office. Thinking about the short term horizon as well, which is how do you, how does this movement Avoid the risks of co optation and demobilization that face any movement after peaks. One thing that you pointed out, which is the kind of archetypical form of organization these days, is that it's leaderless and structureless, et cetera. And do you think that makes the movement currently more vulnerable? Is that a strength? And I'm just curious to, just to hearing, you know, how you think it's. Yeah. How do you think this moment is going to kind of bridge those moments between kind of avoiding, on the one hand, short term demobilization, but then on the other hand trying to expand this political horizon that you're talking about? And is that some of that, is that some of that like, visible in the kinds of demands that are being made on the streets? As you've, as you've said a lot of, and as I've read, obviously a lot of the demands have spoken to big issues such as inequality, corruption, etc. Etc. But have there been instances where people have kind of advanced a kind of political vision? And if so, what has that been?

C (51:54)

I don't see any one political formation yet advancing a kind of national overall vision for what needs to happen. But I know that there are parties out there, I know that there are parties on the left that are out there, but I think there is a question of unity. I think not a single one of them, not one single one of them is able to sort of have a kind of national presence in order to say so they might have very good ideas. And I know that some of those smaller parties on the left are working with, for example, wider movements around, you know, against loan sharking and micro credit and, and things like that because, you know, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people are, are affected by, you know, usury and, and all of that and, and victims of really micro credit where they can't afford to pay back the loans that they have taken under the, some of these schemes. And they have been quite vocal. There was big marches since the last two or three years to the capital from rural areas, particularly from the, from the south, the southern plains, to demand that the government does something about this, that it stops, that regulates, stops the loan sharking, regulates the, the system of loans and so on. So some of these parties have been involved in those wider movements. So, but it's this, it's, it's. I don't doubt that it is challenging because it's hard when you're very small and you're, and there's lots of different parties that kind of question of how do you unite and on what basis do you unite? There isn't very much, I guess there isn't very much trust amongst the different left parties to, to get together. I mean the smaller ones, the, the extra parliamentary with the ones that aren't in, aren't in parliament to get people to believe you, to get people to trust that you do have some good ideas and that you can, that you can, you do have a vision. And at the same time also when you have lots of small parties, you don't have the, the funds as well to, to go out to campaign or to, to, to visit every district, every locality and so on. So I think the, the challenges are, are hard but not, not insurmountable. And I think one way to do it is through these, these, these mass campaigns. And one of them could be about corruption. But mustn't I think stop at corruption? Because it isn't just about corruption. Because in a way I think, you know, sometimes the people who talk about corruption and this includes the sort of liberal intelligentsia kind of mean or could mean that, okay, if you just replace some people with other people, it'll all be okay in, in this current setup or you know, you have the same parties in place and if you just get new leaders, everything will be okay. It, you know, it's not that easy. And so I think there are, there are moves towards, towards unity and there are already moves to, to strengthen some of these, you know, some of these wider movements. But I think in part it will be interesting to see who contests the elections and the extent to which the old guard, you know, are able to organize and reassert themselves. As I say, I, I doubt very much whether the same leaders will be able to get back into power. But the question is, I suppose whether the same parties will still be there and you know, even with new leaders really has the vision for Nepal changed. Because what, you know, what we really need is some genuine, for a start at least social democratic policies where you have, you know, strong welfare measures and the political will to really push them through for a stop. And then you can, you know, I mean, I, I'm all for, you know, really changing the, the, the, the current, the status quo and, and, and the economy and so on. But for as a start, I think, you know, there are plenty of anti corruption laws, there are plenty of anti corruption bodies in Nepal. They're just not implemented. And you know, the question of the constitution has been particularly, you know, difficult for Nepal in the last 30 years and in the last 10 years in particular because the promises that were made just didn't make it into the, you know, the 2007 Interim Constitution was more progressive than the 2015 Constitution that was just pushed through immediately after the earthquake because, you know, there was a sense in which, okay, people are reeling from this. We can just get, you know, get through a less progressive Constitution and, and, and that, and that worked. But people are, are, you know, the, the, the new state restructuring, the, the, the federalism that that came into play in 2015 has, has simply not. Which was supposed to, you know, people, you know, able to access resources easier given that there were more resources closer to you in the, in the districts and, and, and local government. That hasn't happened really in a, in a real sense. So I think again, you know, there are promises that just have not been kept and that was, that is always, it's been 10 years, but that is always ripe context for, for people for things like this to explode, for, for anger to explode in different ways regardless of the, of, of the trigger. So you know, yes, I think, you know, the new, the new government, they should, they have to investigate, you know, cases of corruption. There has to be more accountability. There has to be all this freedom of expression and all the demands that the Gen Z movement has, has put forward. But we really need desperate, desperate radical change now. And the question is who is going to, you know, what kind of leadership is, is going to take that up and it's a process. You know, I, I don't, I never have. I always have time for, for whatever is happening on the left to be developed and you know, it'll take as long as it takes. I guess. Of course they're not sitting on their laurels. They are. I'm sure there are people that are working day in and day out to try and unify and to try and perhaps even contest elections and to try and get a vision out there. But yeah, I guess we'll have to see, we'll have to see what happens. And, and, and you know, it's, it's at the same time not dismissing the Gen Z movement for being leaderless and structureless and so on. You know, that is just the way. Yeah, that is their context. But at the same time a kind of if the left can reach out and to, to this movement and the movement itself, also ensuring that it too has to be transparent and democratic and therefore needs structure and leaders, elected leaders, that there can be, I think an outcome that really breaks with the past.

B (60:18)

I want to ask, I mean, it's interesting I mean the Nepali landscape sounds so familiar despite I'm sure its unique characteristics to many post colonial contexts. But I'm, I'm interested in, in sort of the, the, the constitution of the extra parliamentary left right, which is, you know, who does it comprise and how does it distinguish itself from, you know, this, the official left that is represented in, in parliament, who are nominally left because they have words like communist and Marxist, Leninist and Maoist in their names, but who have sort of shown those leftist credentials while in power. How do they distinguish themselves? How do they sort of claim the mantle of quote unquote, being genuinely left and is part of why they perhaps are struggling to make inroads with the general population. The fact that, you know, left and right, the political spectrum that the, the kind of political coordinates which might, might have been legible, let's say in a 20th century context, simply don't resonate with young people today who, who kind of, you know, don't care whether you're left or don't care whether you're right, perhaps, but who wants to know whether they can trust you, whether when you say we are going to do xyz, you are actually going to follow through on those actions rather than simply kind of mobilizing a rhetoric which in many people's experience, lots of left wing parties have. But over the last three decades at least, the ones who are on their way out of power now, as in the case in Nepal, as in the case in many other contexts, have simply failed to live up to the promises that they've made to their people, whether in the context of anti colonial fights or national liberation fights or anti monarchy fights, whatever the case might be.

C (62:17)

I mean, it's a good question. It's very, I think it's quite challenging to follow the splits and mergers and so on, but there are about a dozen or more extra parliamentary left parties. Some of them are of course splits from the Maoists disagreeing with the, with the capitulation essentially with the, with the kind of entry into parliamentary politics also party that, that you know, want to do something, perhaps have a critique of Maoism and want to do something different there. So that may or may not call themselves communist in their name, but are um, very much kind of um, left wing parties that, you know, sometimes will have, you know, affiliations or, or associations with certain groups like Dalits or indigenous people or, or, or the like. But, but I think amongst at least a section of them there, there is um, a kind of, there is a desire and a recognition that things haven't gone the way they. They would have wanted that the Maoists really. It wasn't just that, you know, it wasn't just that they entered mainstream politics, but it was really a betrayal of. Of class struggle. It was a betrayal of revolutionary politics that they really want to try and do things differently. And in part, that includes connecting with the mass of the population on issues of concern to the mass of the population. So whether that is loan sharking or migration or gender or other things, it's. It's very important, I think, for a revolutionary left in, in whatever party. And I do hope that there are. That there are kind of moves towards unity, because I think part of the problem is that is that there is a lot of sectarianism that, that they are. That there are a lot of parties because they don't. They don't agree with each other on, you know, perhaps minor points. And I don't want to downplay that because, you know, to them they are, you know, otherwise they would organize together. They are important. But, you know, in this situation, which it's quite clear that there is a space now and that people have seen that it's possible to get rid of these leaders quite quickly, that there is an opportunity here and it, you know, it shouldn't be wasted because, you know, it's been 10 years since the last, you know, since the constitution and the Republic. It's been 15 years since the really the last kind of show of force of the Maoists in 2010. It's been, you know, 12 years since. Since. Since the declaration of the Republic. And people are absolutely fed up, you know, over all kinds of questions. So I think, I think it's. I think it's, you know, I think it's very important. I think. I think it really needs to be taken seriously what these parties are going to do and to. Not for these parties also to take seriously, you know, the question of trade unions, the question of, you know, the working class in addition to the peasantry, but, but really the working. What. What the working class can do. It's. It's power in terms of withdrawing its labor and so on and taking that kind of. Kind of Marxist politics really seriously and not thinking, okay, you know, we'll have socialism at some undetermined point in the future, and it doesn't really matter now. What we need now is to, you know, is to build capitalism. That very idea is outdated, I think, I hope is, because, you know, I think, you know, there have been various leaders, you know, in the press recently who have said oh, you know, those old ideas of, of private property and, or abolishing private property and, you know, dictatorship of the proletariat. So those ideas are outdated, but I would argue the opposite. I mean, I would argue that, that actually what we need is, is. Is. And what's possible in Nepal is, is a unity on the, on the extra parliamentary left that then is able to perhaps have some expression in parliament, which I think is absolutely necessary, but again, to do things differently, to recognize what went wrong in the Maoist movement, both practically but also theoretically and to revisit and to perhaps clarify theoretically and organizationally things that can be done differently. Because I think, I think people are thinking on this level, it's just a question of, you know, can we, can we unite some of these parties? Can we, you know, win people's trust? But again, I think, I think having now experienced this past two weeks, I think the space is there because it's open. Because, you know, really lots of different things can happen. And if the left doesn't fill the vacuum, I think the right of course will or the, the status quo will just reassert itself in forms. So I think the essential, and I think the conditions are ripe in which people are looking for, you know, something, something different and something that is, has some substance. Right? So it's not just kind of we just want social media and, you know, freedom of expression and, and, and that's it. No, we actually want something much more than that. We want it. We want a different kind of economy and we want, we want the ability for that economy and polity to deliver on the promises that have been in a real way.

B (69:05)

What does giving expression to that desire look like programmatically? What would it look programmatically for if, let's say, some unified left wing formation is able to either contest elections next year or organize itself sufficiently to exert serious extra parliamentary pressure. Because on the one hand, it is true, as you have said, said that the sort of go to stages theory of sort of, I don't know, socialist ideology where you go through a phase of capitalist development before revolution that has been kind of discredited and has sort of allowed and given license to socialist or social democratic parties in power to sort of keep in mind permanent abeyance the serious question of, you know, how do you transition beyond capitalism? But on the other hand, you know, we're not in a revolutionary situation and you know, you, and I'm curious to hear your reasons for why said that you would describe this moment as an uprising, but not a Revolution. And what that means then is as you've pointed out, that the kinds of economic interventions that are possible are largely social democratic ones, but those still take place under capitalist conditions and they take place under capitalist conditions that are extremely unfavorable for any party in power. It's stagnating, inequality is rising, we're facing ecological crisis, there's geopolitical instability around the world. And on the geopolitical question, I'm curious to hear what influence are outside powers jockeying for? When thinking about primarily China, India and the United States, where are the interests opposed? Where are they aligned? Sometimes I imagine there's some alignment between India and the United States and what kinds of tactical flexibilities might be required of the kinds of administration that we want. I don't know what that looks like, but I wonder if that means, you know, maybe ideally a position of non alignment, but maybe some kind of warmth with China or not, or. I really don't know. But I'm just curious to hearing, you know, basically if I can summarize the question, you know, if it does so happen on the off chance that there is an administration of the left that is sympathetic genuinely to the demands of the people, these are going to be very hard conditions to govern in. And I'm wondering what does that look like programmatically on the economy, on geopolitics, on social questions, etc.

C (71:56)

Well, it's a good, it's a sort of million dollar question in a way. I mean, why don't I call it a revolution? Only because what happened in 1990 and what happened in 2006 was a complete restructuring of the state. I mean in 1990 it was from the Panchayat to a democratic, you know, monarchy, a constitutional monarchy. And in 2006 it was the abolishment of the abolition of a 240 year old monarchy. So from a monarchy to a republic. So that it was a real complete change in the form of the state. Whereas this, this was a dismissal of the Prime Minister. And of course I don't say that it couldn't turn into a revolution or, or that it, you know, or that I hope it does, but eventually, but in that sense it was, yeah, the, the dismissal of, of government, not a change in the state form. Nepal has a, has a, has a real kind of objective difficulty which is that it has these two powers who are opposed to each other immediately on its borders. And it has Everest separating geographically separating Nepal, I mean, you know, the huge massive mountain range separating Nepal and China. But it has an open border on the south with India. And historically, ethnically, linguistically, it's been closer to India than, than to China. But China has of course used Nepal in, in various ways and currently has undertaking, undertaken lots of investment in, in Nepal and including with the Belt and Road Initiative which Nepal became part of in 2017. So it has a very, it plays a very, very deep, difficult balancing act. And I, and I don't underestimate that and I wouldn't underestimate the challenges that any government, including a left government, would have in, in that situation. So, and it, and it needs, you know, it's, it's again, it's historically, you know, least developed and so on. So it does need funds. But one thing, interestingly one thing that was that I remember very well in, in under the Maoist government in 2011, so three years into the Republic was when Babar Ambassarai, he was the finance minister and he had managed to actually collect taxes for the first time really on a, on a scale in which people had to pay the tax, you know, the rich had to pay the tax that they were owed, that they owed. And you know, you know, these many elite families, you know, being shocked that they had to pay their taxes for the first time ever, you know, but it was, the point there was that it was possible to generate a level of revenue internally in which you could then start a measure of redistribution. And I'm not saying that's enough. I'm not saying, you know, and actually as it happened, it wasn't spent in the way that it should have been. But, and I'm not saying all the money is there, but you can have a government and you'd have to have a very, very strong, ideologically committed government that was willing to do this kind of thing, really crack down on corruption, really have a progressive taxation system, really be committed to a redistribution of resources. Really able and willing and committed to redeveloping industry. If, if industry could have been developed in the early 1990s and 1980s and 70s, it could be developed now. I mean, there's no, there's no real reason particularly why Nepal can't have industry in many cases. It was a rice exporting country a few decades ago, it's now a rice importing country. And I mean that's another thing which is deeply related to its, to its question, the question of agriculture and the lack of labor in on that front. But you know, these things, it's possible to invest in mechanization, it's possible to redistribute Land. All of these things are not even necessarily, you know, communist. They are, you know, I mean, they are and they are, they are also just good social democratic policies. So I think, you know, and then again, in a way, this isn't unique to Nepal. I think lots of different countries, you know, if they could even just implement that, it would be a step forward. But, and then, and then, you know, finally but not least, I mean, this is just a list of things, but this really addressing the jobs crisis and of course the, the question of industry and agriculture is related to that. So how do you ensure that actually the vast majority of the population can find jobs at home? There's plenty to do, there's plenty of reconstruction, there's plenty of development work, roads, electrification, you know, there's no shortage of that. It's how you can, and vis a vis donors as well, how you can make sure that, okay, say to them, if you're going to give us money, it has to be no strings attached and it has to be on our terms and we have a plan. This is what it is. And you know, if you want to give to that, then we will accept it. But it will have to be, you know, what we do with it and that will be a redistribution of resources and it won't be along market lines. It will be, you know, but again, I would argue, you know, for nationalization in the UK context as well. You know, like it just if you invest in certain sectors, then you can make them work and very well. So I mean, in that sense, economically, you can start to address the geopolitical question. You know, I don't think neither India or Nepal, India or China would necessarily like this, but they may allow Nepal to get away with it to some extent if it has the support of the population. And that's why any government in power cannot lose its connection with the mass of the population. And, and one of the sort of interfaces of that is, is mass movements. Mass movements that are able to somehow represent the, the desires and the concerns of the mass of the population. And so the minute it loses that, then it becomes disconnected. Then it starts doing things, you know, that the population doesn't agree with and doesn't understand and, and disagree, you know. Yeah, disagrees with and, and generate that. That's what generates a resentment and an anger. It's not difficult to not be corrupt and, and to, you know, to, to, to implement at least some of these things. I'm not underestimating the challenges. I think it is challenging to, to, to deliver in a country with a, you know, with a terrain like Nepal's, you know, all of that kind of stuff. But, and, and again, the, the geopolitical influence, it's not easy. But, but you do have to have a very, very strong and as, and as I say, an ideologically committed government political force that stays connected with the, with the mass of the population that is willing to do this. And then it's possible you can, you can start to do something.

B (80:43)

Faizy, I think that's a, that's a great note for us to end on.

A (80:46)

Thank you very much.

C (80:48)

Pleasure. Thanks. Thanks a lot.

B (80:51)

Thank you very much to Faizy, to you, our listeners, for listening in. I've been discussing Nepal with Faizy Ishmael, who teaches at Goldsmith's, University of London.

A (81:00)

Her research interests include the politics of.

B (81:02)

Protests, labor, the climate crisis and anti imperialism. And she's also active in the British anti war and trade union movements. If you haven't read her piece, which frames some of our discussion, do check it out on africasacountry.com, subscribe to the podcast wherever you listen to your podcasts. And we'll be back next week with another conversation on current affairs from a Pan African and left perspective. My name is William Shoki. Until next time. Goodbye.