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A
I'm John Ostrower at earngee for the Air Current.
B
I'm Brett Snyder, author of Cranky Flyer.
C
I'm Brian Summers and I write the Airline Observer. You're listening to the Air show, the podcast where we talk about what happens in the business of the sky.
A
Can you guys believe this is our hundredth episode?
B
Is it wrong to say it feels like our thousandth episode? But listen, 100 is not a teeny tiny milestone. I think we can all agree.
C
Nope, it's not. Brett. Congratulations to all of us. A little self aggrandiz there, but that's okay. Here's to a hundred more.
B
I really wanted to celebrate by doing an outtake show, but I'm pretty sure nobody would ever listen again if they just heard me singing at you guys for 30 minutes, like throughout the episodes. It's probably not gonna work well, so I guess we have to do something different. John, you just published an extremely lengthy special report in the Air Current on the state of the US airline industry that reads a lot like what I've heard you call your grand unifying theory for the future of this business.
A
Indeed I did. I put an asterisk on that in the United States. But there are probably implications for the rest of the world over the long term. And yes, I thought this business needed a proper New Yorker length feature on the US Airlines, given, you know, broadly gesturing here, what we've been through since the pandemic, and given that Brian and I are both headed to Brazil later this week for the IATA agm, everything pointed to a good opportunity to step back and see where we are for the market that we call home.
C
Yeah, I'm looking forward to your discussion here, John. But first I have to tell you I am so excited for everyone's favorite boondoggle. I hope Airbus and Boeing still have their robust shrimp cocktail budget. We're going to Rio. I'm not sure that anything can top my experience last year when Ben Smith talked for like hours with me at one in the morning about Lopez and liveries in the hotel lobby. The man is an A geek to the core and I love it. But John, I know you don't want to talk about parties, Lopez or liveries today. Tell us what is on your mind with this New Yorker length opus.
A
This was a piece that I actually started working on in the summer of 2024, so almost two years ago now. And I kept accumulating reporting that supported the central thesis. US aviation, the world's original air travel marketplace, is rapidly going backwards.
C
Really, John, I Mean, are you serious? I'm not sure that I agree, but please make your case.
A
Well, sort of looking at the post pandemic period, I was sort of looking at different data points around how airlines were adapting to where we are right now. But I think it really kind of came together. When I was wandering through United's elevated in quotes 7879 in March at the company's media day in LA that Brett and I went to, I was really struck by how much of a throwback that airplane really is.
B
Yes, I was there with you, but how do you call state of the art flatbeds, Bluetooth 4K, OLED screens a throwback? Like maybe if we were stepping on an American A320 or something.
A
Hey man, those are good America west airplanes. You know them better than anybody, right?
B
I do. Okay.
A
Now look, not the tech of course, but the layout of the airplane. You have to walk past the wing and past door 3 of 4 on this 200 plus foot long airplane before you get to an economy seat. This is a premium behemoth. When United took its first 787nine from Boeing in 2014, there were 252 seats on that airplane, 202 of which were in coach. Its latest cabin Design only has 123 economy seats. Most of the real estate on this airplane is earmarked for premium seating. 35 premium plus recliners, 64 plush Polaris business class lie flat seats plus their new studio pods and yes, room for a guest and a caviar service.
B
Okay, so this is what a lot of airlines are doing though. We've seen them expanding premium seating. That's not really anything new.
C
I'll also remind you guys that this is a sub fleet. There are also going to be 787 nine deliveries that do not have this configuration.
A
Yeah, I mean it's okay. This is not going to be United's whole 787 fleet. This is definitely going to be a big subset of the fleet. And note, premium seating is not a new trend. But the density of premium seats outside of, I think, you know, the A35900ULR at Singapore and actually I think British Airways A51000 has a very, very premium lope.
B
Don't forget the MGM Grand Air 727.
A
Oh, of course you can. Absolutely, absolutely. Or while we're at it, the Sands A3 4500 or something. You know, remember the 747 SP?
B
Yeah, they're still around somewhere.
A
But look, why is this going backwards? It's not going to be the entire state of the industry. But I think when you look at the deployment of XLRs, you look at the deployment of 787 9s, you look at what Delta is doing around, its a 350 1000s that are coming. This is going back to an earlier age of aviation. I actually went back and found the original 111 seat Lopa from TWA's first delivery of a 707 by Boeing in 1959. That airplane was also mostly first class seats, almost very similar layout. Obviously no lie flats there, but it was an airplane designed for the people who could afford flying. In a regulated airline business that meant higher fares to cover the operating costs of new jet airplanes. That reverse that we're seeing here is going back up the cost curve. And what is fundamentally an undemocratization, whether you want to call it or not, or premiumization, as we've come to coin it, of this industry and ultimately the benefits of a half century of deregulation are dwindling. Costs are going up. Government's getting more involved again. And what that means is that they are fundamentally constrained about how they can grow.
C
John, you know that I fashion myself the world's foremost Lopa expert and I need to disagree with some of the things that you said there. I mean, you talk about US airlines going back 50 years or more than that on their cabin designs, but what I think is actually happening here is US Airlines are finally fixing mistakes that they made in the 1990s and early 2000s. We all remember that a lot of these carriers convinced themselves that this was a commodity business where the lowest cost won. Of course, a lot of these legacy carriers didn't have particularly low costs, but they tried to get them down as much as they could. But here's the thing that I've learned since then. US Airlines were very, very stupid then. They served a huge domestic market in the largest economy in the world, and yet they had way smaller premium cabins than many other carriers elsewhere. So this is something I spoke about last year with the CEO of WestJet, Alexis von Honsbruck. We love to say his name, friend of the pod. But you know that Alexis before He was at WestJet, which has small premium cabins, which was at the Lufthansa Group. And he reminded me that US carriers may have shrunk premium for a long time there. But you know who didn't? Lufthansa didn't. And BA. Didn't anyone been on a BA A380 recently? How many prima seats does that thing have zero?
B
It's a trick question.
C
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So world's best business class up there in first class, but okay, London is a special market. It deserves that. Although Frankfurt is a little less special and it has that airplane. But United has hubs in New York, big city, San Francisco, Tech hubs, a lot of other major cities. Delta has built hubs in major cities. You should be running tons of premium on those routes. Thank God these guys finally figured it out. But it sounds like you see this differently.
B
Hey, Brian, please don't say thank God because you're just going to get Scott Kirby's ego bigger again.
A
Oh, I really wanted to go back through the last hundred episodes and figure out how many times we actually said Scott Kirby to figure out how much is in the jar right now.
C
John, go on, tell me why I'm wrong.
A
I don't, I don't think you're wrong. You can't count out the Middle Eastern carriers in this discussion as well in terms of their ability to put premium products into the market that people fundamentally wanted to pay for. But at the same time, for the longest time, while the US and some European airlines were being like, these guys are able to pay for this because of how they're structured in terms of the verticalization of their industries domestically, in terms of like, look, the shareholder, right, it's the government in, in a lot of these places and it's just the way of they're competing. So yes, that there's a lot of catch up that's gone on here. But I think it's really important. I don't think you can look at premium in isolation. I think it's presented as an offensive strategy to take advantage of the changing taste of the traveler. Maybe a catch up offensive strategy, but definitely an offensive strategy. But I think that's fundamentally only part of the story here. I think more importantly, in the US it's equally a defensive reaction to answer the question of how do you solve, number one, rising costs on literally everything, and two, the inability for the US Air traffic system, most notably at hubs, to accommodate more flights on more airplanes.
B
I sort of agree on point 1. Yeah, airlines need people to pay more money to cover costs. We know this spirit, knew this. Everyone knows this premium is the best way to do that in today's world. It's easier to get people to pay more, to get more as opposed to just pay more for the basic product. But whether that continues to be the case forever, I'm not as convinced as some CEOs out there. It has made sense for a while now. So I get why they're thinking about it this way. And I understand what you're saying as well, Brian, about, you know, you have to play to the markets that you're in, which they have not been doing for a long time. But there will probably come a time when airlines wish they had more coach seating.
C
Again, I'm guessing a couple of things, Brett. I think they have enough coach seating. I understand we have some airplanes that have a lot of premium right now, but there's also the densification trend. So you look at these wide body airplanes, maybe it's not as comfortable as it once was. Actually it's definitely not as comfortable as it once was. But when you add a seat to every row, which is essentially what has happened, you still end up with a lot of coach seats. And then the second thing that is important is people about is premium going to last? Is it not going to last? But airlines have another weapon in their arsenal that they didn't have 20 years ago and that is technology, especially mobile. If you give people an offer to buy up to business class or premium economy at the last moment, even I think in a weaker economy, as long as it is discounted, you are going to see a lot more revenue from those seats than you did back in the day where you either gave them away to a frequent flyer or some poor agent got on the PA system at the gate and begged people to buy up for a fixed price.
B
Yeah, that's a good point. I see what you're saying. I think I was. Maybe I'm just getting hung up on some of these super premium aircraft, which is more of a subset. And I know we'll talk more about that. But in general, yes, United has 200 seats on an A321neo. That is a remarkable feat of engineering. And a snack bar and a snack.
A
But I think everything you're saying actually is supporting my overall thesis that fundamentally technology is an extraordinary enabler. But I think when you connect it to the loyalty question, the credit card question, which we'll talk about later, how this fits is that there is a common thread here that affects the state of the entire business to recognize that there is a fundamental limitation in how this industry can grow. And at the end of the day, what connects the end of spirit and what connects United wanting to merge with American? These are two massive, massive moments for this industry and they are inherently linked in my mind. They are both fundamentally trying to outrun the costs and constraints of this business. And the only way to do that is through inorganic strategy, which is either you get bought by another carrier or you buy another carrier to grow. Even if United gets all the airplanes it wants, there are big questions around its ability to fit them into its operation. And by the way, I say that for every other airline as well.
B
All right, but on your second point, John, I'm just not so sure about the capacity crunch because, you know, if you truly have a capacity crunch, you want more capacity. There are ways to do that, and airlines have found ways to do that. But also, some of this premium can go in the opposite direction for the super premium airplanes, you know, not the general aircraft we're talking about. But there are ways to grow. You don't think there are ways to grow?
A
Well, okay. I think the bottom line here is that the US Airlines collectively have run out of methods of growth and have hit a ceiling on expansion of their own. There are red lights flashing across a ton of operational fronts in this business. Last year, 58 million people went through TSA checkpoints. That was 7% more than before the pandemic. That's in context of U.S. carriers had scheduled 220,000 fewer flights last year than they did in 2019 and doesn't look right now like they're going to exceed that level in 2026. Overall, US airports last year saw on average a thousand fewer daily flights than before the pandemic. They may again get close in this year. But like the FAA administrator straight up told Congress earlier in the month, quote, our current system has reached its limits. There's a clear inability to get airplanes as fast as they need them. Delta is going to be waiting two more years for seat certification on their lie flat A321. So they're cramming in first class seats on those airplanes. There is a shortage of engines. There is the max 7 and max 10 delays. There are production delays left and right. Are they easing up? Yes, but fundamentally those constraints are through the entire industry. Layer that in with hub constraints at San Francisco, at Newark, at o'.
C
Hare.
A
And I think most importantly, the most troubling of all the trends I think that we've seen is going backwards on safety. I would happily fly any day of the week and feel safe doing it. But I think when you look at DCA and the LaGuardia accident more recently, those look to be an outgrowth of a system that is at capacity.
B
Well, I don't argue the point that the system is getting toward capacity on some metrics and that it's A crime, actually, that there has not been more attention paid to this by the government. But the airlines see what they have and then they adapt. You talk about up gauging, they're adding more seats. The airspace system is not more impacted. They're just adding bigger airplanes with more seats. That's changed a lot. You know, in some cases that reverses itself with these super premium niches that have fewer seats on board. But for the most part, it's more seats on board. And so the airlines are still finding ways to grow.
A
Yeah, no, absolutely. And I asked Scott Kirby this at Media Day. I think you're actually sitting in the room when I did. Effectively, what he said was, quote, I think there's a lot of evidence that there are a number of big airports that are at capacity. Quote, I think we can still grow, but the growth is likely going to be by gauge. So that's the number of flights, but on bigger airplanes. This is not breaking news here. I mean, we know that airplanes are getting bigger, but there is a whole lot of additional constraints that we're going to begin to hit, especially around airport infrastructure. Ability to actually accommodate those in layer in scarce pilots. I mean, we had a major pilot shortage earlier this decade, which was partially due to the. The fact that obviously there was a huge number of senior airline pilots that took early buyouts. They got pulled up through the regionals and the regionals were left without pilots. Everyone got a pay increase, which obviously drove up overall operating costs. But you layer that in with rising maintenance costs and the GTF and the durability issues on the leap and ultimately the downstream in terms of networks is that there's been a wholesale shift away from regionals that have taken place. And look, I think passengers hate them. That's well, well established. You know, when, when United did its next order in 2021, they were like, we're getting rid of 50 seat regional jets and they largely have and we're getting to CRJ 450s. They were really expensive. But like, this comes back to the idea of going in reverse. We want to guess how much bigger Delta's fleet was at the end of 2025 versus the end of 2019.
C
John, you taught me in the last episode not to play these guessing games.
B
I am going to say Delta doubled its fleet tripled. Its fleet tripled?
A
No, no, no. They were actually smaller. I found it really interesting that when they ended last year, they did so with fewer airplanes combined between mainline and regional, even as they took 240 new airplanes from 2020 to the end of 2025, they went from 442 regional aircraft down to 325, while mainline went from 898 to 989. Greater capacity. Yes, but that's a net loss of 26 airplanes. These constraints and alternate strategies for growth are show up everywhere.
C
John, let's take a break here and when we come back, we can talk a little bit more in depth about airports. Is there anything more frustrating than having a ton of points that are scattered in all the wrong places?
B
That's the worst. We've all been there. When you're just short of what you need to book an award you want, but you have plenty in other airline accounts.
C
Exactly. And then we all have to do travel math and see if we can find a way to get enough into that one account so we can actually hit confirm on booking.
B
That's why the ability to move points around. Using points, a plus grade company's exchange solution, is such a game changer. It's the bridge. It lets travelers move their points to where they need them when they need them.
C
It's a huge win for travelers when it works. But we've seen exchanges before that are treated like a check the box feature. They build the connection to a partner and then it just sits there.
B
Which is wild because when a member moves points, they're telling you they're ready to engage. If the program isn't paying attention in the moment, then it's just leaving revenue on the table.
C
That's why points work so well. It's an actively managed, fraud secure approach that's built to actually improve performance after the connection goes live.
B
Because at the end of the day, connecting partners is one thing.
C
Actually moving the needle, that's another.
B
Points exchange helps leading brands move beyond simple connectivity to drive real loyalty growth. Learn more@plusgrade.com.
C
We're back. Let's continue to talk about John's grand unifying theory for airlines might be going in reverse. And then, Brett, you and I can keep telling him why he's wrong. John, I love you. I think you're brilliant. I learned so much from you, but I still don't buy this. What I see is airlines evolving to meet the trends of this moment. Not going backwards. But there is a part of your theory that we have not talked in detail about, and that's airports. What do you have for us?
A
Well, look, I think they absolutely are evolving, but I think we need to understand the forces that are shaping that evolution. A hugely important and underappreciated part of this really Centers on the amount of catch up work that US airports have had to do over the last five to 10 years to modernize themselves. Look, all across the country we're getting awesome new terminals. I mean look at LaGuardia, probably America's best airport. Who would have said that a decade ago?
B
I think the rats who were displaced strongly disagree with your characterization, John.
A
Yeah, the rats per implainment ratio went down significantly at the party.
B
Yeah, I think so.
A
Okay, well yeah, long overdue there. But big picture, this is everywhere. San Diego to JFK and literally everywhere in between. But this comes with a real cost to airlines and that's paid for by carriers in the cost per implant. That's an average that's published and not an apples to apples comparison for short. So I just think that's important to note. But look, the trend is absolutely clear here as these rise. I went back through the 10Ks in 2025. United's went up 12%. Southwest went up 11%. Delta 13%. All attributed double digit increases in those landing fees and airport rents to redevelopment projects. And yes, in 2024, leading up to its first bankruptcy, Spirit's fees increased 10 and a half percent. All of those were outpacing capacity growth. Let's just take some select airports from across this country that I think really illustrate this. John Glenn Columbus International airport going from $7.87 per passenger in fiscal 2025 to more than $25 by the end of the decade. It's building a 1 million square foot 36 gate terminal. It's beautiful. By the way. Hollywood, Burbank, Brian's favorite airport.
C
Love that airport.
A
I know you do. I know you do. It's going from a dollar 86 in 2024 to over $22 in 2028. And look, there's a 950 million dollar terminal modernization happening in Omaha that's going to raise the CPE from $8.16 in 2024 to 2237 by 2030. It's 174% increase at Omaha. Let's just set this in proper context. These are LaGuardia numbers which is at 23.89 per the FAA as of last year. LAX is going to be doubling by the end of the decade to over $60 CPE. This is a real change in how airlines can operate. And also I think gets back to Scott Kirby's cost convergence question where these are getting pushed up. And so this is happening absolutely everywhere and it's going to change how we fly.
C
I can't Disagree with you here, John. These are good points. The airport cost thing is real. We talked about it on our last episode when you argued about how Miami's high cost per employment actually acts as a potential moat to protect American from low cost competition.
A
Yeah, ultra high and ultra low CPE are a huge advantage for American. Same for Delta. They actually enjoy the lowest CPE of any large airport in America, in Atlanta. And guess what? Number two, that's Charlotte.
C
Let's be clear a little bit about why, though. Because CPE is kind of a function like unit costs of how many departures you have. Right. The more departures you push through, the lower your cp. Those are very large airports.
B
Well, engage as well.
A
Absolutely. Totally a function of throughput. This is high volume at its finest, which is also the benefit of the hub structure. But at the same time, these are not airports that are doing huge modernization projects. There are updates, certainly, but at the end of the day, these are going to be big advantages to both of those carriers. No one's coming in there.
C
Okay, sort of big advantages. Brett, can you take us back 20 years when you were at US Airways, what was the customer satisfaction level at the Charlotte hub back in the day?
B
I was at America west, sir. I was not at US Airways.
C
You didn't work at U S Airways?
B
No, I interned there in college. But that was before the merger. No, I left before the Airways America west merger.
C
Well, I don't know too many passengers who like to connect in Charlotte. Let's be honest about that.
B
Especially if you have to go from like F to A or whatever it is. But it's cheap.
A
That's exactly it. And no one else can squeeze in there. But I think CPE is a really, really important indicator of where this is headed. Because I think fundamentally, if you get all the airplanes and you are able to deploy them, the airports you're deploying them to may have more capacity. But actually accessing that is going to be more expensive also. So it, it builds on itself in terms of, you know, those cost pressures from below in terms of how, you know, if you're a JetBlue or, you know, formerly a Spirit or Frontier, are able to adapt to that.
B
Yeah, sure. Because, you know, you need to know what kind of airline are you, and you need to behave appropriately. So if you are, as we had discussed, if you're in Miami, American is probably not so unhappy about the high cost because it knows that other airlines can't really make a go of it. But when you look at airlines that understand who they are Like Allegiant, for example, they grew more than 12% last year. This is an airline that actively runs away from high cpe. It finds markets where it can still grow quickly and not with a premium product because it knows who it is. So this is an airline that finds a way. It sees the opportunities that are there and it finds them. So how is this not disproving your, your thesis that there's no growth?
A
I think it's a fantastic point because I think it's really important to separate those carriers operating in large hub structures versus Allegiant. I think allegiant here really actually as on its own, is the exception that proves the rule. If you look at how they've grown, they're doing that in a way that fully recognizes the very real constraints that are stopping others from growing. They've got a premium offering. They're not putting in recliners or lounges or whatever, but they've successfully jump started consolidation with acquiring suncountry. So they're actually way ahead of everyone on that. I think gives them a boatload of new 737 NGS for scheduled charter and cargo operations. But this is a model that, that is flying right in the face of what is making it hard for the big guys or even the medium sized guys to grow. They're flying point to point to small airports that are not constrained. There is room for growth in this market. But as far as how the consolidated structures of American, Delta, United, Southwest, and you know, by extension, you know, JetBlue at Alaska are operating, there are very real constrained structures that they're operating in that are forcing them to evolve to what fundamentally is going to be another, ostensibly another round of consolidation to demonstrate that they can grow. And that's what we're seeing here.
B
But isn't that the point? Like some airports are full and demand keeps growing or it would if when fares start to level off, I guess. But. But so airlines will just find a way. I mean, at some point even Stewart or South Albany Airport will, will become attractive for New York. Right, because you just don't have another opportunity. And people want to grow and keep traveling. So there is opportunity. The government, to be clear, is going to eventually feel the pressure to build new infrastructure. It has to. It's actually incredible. It hasn't gotten to that point yet.
A
They're doing it right now, but they're not.
B
What are they doing? I mean we need more runways in some of these most constrained markets. It's not happening.
A
Yeah, that's my point.
B
At some point they're going to have to.
A
But this is the thing.
B
How is this not just a moment in time, how is this not going to eventually resolve?
A
I think it, I think it does resolve through rationalization and consolidation to some extent. Seattle is full, Newark is full. San Francisco is losing a big chunk of visual approach capacity. O' Hare is actively throttled. But fundamentally, I think that's a testament to this business overall. I, weirdly, I hear you guys talk about this and I feel like every point making supports the overall thesis that the type of evolution that we're seeing is due to all of these forces and we have to look at, at them in aggregate and how it is fundamentally defensive, not only offensive, like the resilience of this business is really extraordinary. I think fundamentally there's going to be big changes coming. And honestly, I'm not going to sit here and say I know exactly with 100% certainty that I know what those look like, but they are coming. We can also layer in here like that airlines are credit card companies with airplanes. But I think that's also the linchpin to this entire thing. They found another way to generate revenue to outrun these costs. Look, a premium strategy is the only way to survive the constraints of this business right now. United, Delta, Alaska, American, Southwest, Allegiant would not be profitable last year without those cards.
C
You don't know that, John, because if they didn't have the cards, the fares wouldn't be where they were.
A
But at the same time, you hear Kirby talk about the fact that you will destroy demand above a certain level as fares rise. What they've done is they've shifted the revenue burden to effectively making these individual carriers as extremely, extremely attractive from again, the importance of the networks, the international networks. This all flows in. Look, why is Alaska pushing internationally right now? Because they've got a credit card that ties in with being able to redeem to go to Rome and London and Seoul and Tokyo and Keflavic and all that.
B
Don't forget Wenatchee.
A
Don't knock Wenatchee.
B
Don't know enough about it to knock it.
A
Look, Delta made $8.2 billion last year on its Amex deal. It's staggering and it's exactly why everyone is rushing in that direction. Again, we pose this as an offensive move to capture customer preference, but it's inherently defensive and we're seeing it everywhere.
C
But John, that sounds like really good business strategy to me. If I may push back again, your theory is that US Airlines are going backwards rapidly. I Understand that as far as infrastructure, but in the commercial side, I just don't see it. This development of airlines selling miles to banks, this is genius. Like airlines, they literally made up a currency out of thin air. It has no, no other value and they sold it to banks. Super impressive.
A
It absolutely is. And it is them adapting to the environment that they're in. And part of the backwards is heading back towards premium right at the beginning of the jet age when revenues had to support higher costs. Look, I think this is, this is all explaining the same thing, which is that the constraints are forcing them in this direction because fundamentally, to return their cost of capital and to demonstrate growth, this is the method by which they have to do it. Look, Seattle is full. I said this already. But like there are gates that can, some can accommodate the 7879 but not the 787 10. And there's some gates that can accommodate a max 9 and not a max 10. So they're throwing in new airplanes in a very complicated puzzle. And again, again, Alaska is just one piece of this. We see this all over the place. I'm saying the overall system is massively constrained. And to grow and get enough wide body airplanes or narrow body airplanes that you need to demonstrate growth, the system that is designed to hold them, can't hold them. So you sum up the cost, the constraints, the pilots, whatever, this is the end state where we're heading and what's fundamentally driving this next big push in terms of showing either growth or market exit. And market exit is being acquired or growth is by buying American Airlines, for example.
C
I guess we should let it go there, John. We could argue about this topic for hours. Instead, I'll just read your article.
B
You've been listening to the Air Show. If you have suggestions or questions for us, or if you are in interested, interested in sponsoring the podcast, go to our website, theairshowpodcast.com to get in touch.
A
Leo Duran produced and edited this episode. Our theme music is by Joshua Mosher. Thanks for listening and we'll be back soon.
B
Did you call it avgeek? I think it's avgeek, sir.
C
It's not a real word. It's whatever you want it to be.
A
It's of geek.
B
That's how the British pronounce it, of geek.
Host: Shayr Media
Episode Title: Jon Says U.S. Airlines Are Going In Reverse
Date: June 5, 2026
Guests: Jon Ostrower (The Air Current), Brian Sumers (Airline Observer), Brett Snyder (Cranky Flyer)
In this milestone 100th episode of The Air Show, Jon Ostrower presents his “grand unifying theory” about the state—and possible regression—of the U.S. airline industry. Joined by Brian Sumers and Brett Snyder, the discussion dives deep into the notion that American carriers are, in Jon’s words, “rapidly going backwards.” The trio debates whether the current trend toward more premium seating, higher costs, and infrastructure constraints signal an “undemocratization” of air travel, or a logical evolution in response to today’s market forces.
“US aviation, the world’s original air travel marketplace, is rapidly going backwards.” (02:12)
Flight Volume & System Capacity (13:15-15:32):
“Last year, 58 million people went through TSA checkpoints...US airports last year saw on average a thousand fewer daily flights than before the pandemic...there’s a clear inability to get airplanes as fast as they need them.” (13:15-14:36)
Shift Away From Regionals (15:32-17:12):
Jon Ostrower (On state of industry):
“US aviation, the world’s original air travel marketplace, is rapidly going backwards.” (02:12)
Brian Sumers (On premium capacity):
“Thank God these guys finally figured it out." (07:33)
Jon Ostrower (On operational constraints):
“Our current system has reached its limits.” (13:54, quoting the FAA Administrator)
Brett Snyder (On Allegiant):
“This is an airline that actively runs away from high CPE. It finds markets where it can still grow quickly and not with a premium product because it knows who it is.” (24:48)
Jon Ostrower (On credit card revenue):
“The only way to survive the constraints of this business right now...would not be profitable last year without those cards.” (28:55)
Debating whether industry is evolving or regressing:
“What I see is airlines evolving to meet the trends of this moment. Not going backwards.” – Brian Sumers (19:56)
This episode dissects a pivotal moment for U.S. airlines, arguing over whether the move toward fewer flights, more premium seating, and higher airport and operational costs means the industry is “going in reverse” to a less democratic, more exclusive age. Jon Ostrower’s thesis, challenged by Brian Sumers and Brett Snyder, is that the industry’s current “premiumization” trend and reliance on non-airfare revenue streams are fundamentally symptoms of deeper, systemic constraints: operational bottlenecks, infrastructure costs, and hard growth limits. While some carriers like Allegiant can still prosper by avoiding congested big hubs, the legacy majors seem locked into a cycle of consolidation and defensive maneuvering.
For those seeking airline industry insight, this episode presents a thorough, spirited, and data-rich debate that explains the forces shaping the skies of 2026—and where they might take us next.