Hannibal's March on Rome

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Ancients – Episode on Hannibal's March on Rome

Overview In the episode titled "Hannibal's March on Rome," hosted by Tristan Hughes and featuring expert historian Dr. Louis Rawlings from Cardiff University, the discussion delves deep into one of the pivotal moments of the Second Punic War. The episode explores Hannibal Barca's strategic maneuvers, culminating in his bold attempt to march on Rome itself. This comprehensive analysis provides listeners with a nuanced understanding of Hannibal's strategies, the challenges he faced, and the enduring legacy of his campaign against the Roman Republic.

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1. Setting the Stage: Hannibal's Campaigns Prior to the March

Timestamp: [02:26]

Tristan Hughes introduces the episode by outlining Hannibal Barca's formidable campaign in Italy leading up to his decision to march on Rome. Hannibal, renowned for his audacious crossing of the Alps and victories in battles such as Trebia and Lake Trasimene, had been consistently threatening Rome for six years by 211 BC.

Key Points:

• Previous Victories: Hannibal's triumphs at Trebia and Lake Trasimene demonstrated his military prowess, causing significant Roman losses.
• Persistent Roman Resistance: Despite severe defeats, the Romans exhibited remarkable resilience, much like a mythical hydra, where defeating one force only led to the emergence of another.

Notable Quote: Dr. Louis Rawlings emphasizes the unexpected tenacity of the Romans:
"But Hannibal is a student of Pyrrhus and had studied Pyrrhus's failed campaigns against the Romans, and he knew that the Romans don't easily give up after a defeat." ([04:50])

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2. The Battle of Cannae: A Pyrrhic Victory

Timestamp: [05:22] – [11:57]

The discussion transitions to the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, often hailed as Hannibal's masterpiece. Here, Hannibal faced a significantly larger Roman force yet managed to encircle and decimate nearly 60,000 Roman soldiers.

Key Points:

• Tactical Brilliance: Hannibal's ability to surround a nearly double-sized Roman army on a flat plain showcased his strategic genius.
• Casualties: The Romans suffered catastrophic losses, with estimates of 50,000 to 60,000 killed within hours.
• Hannibal's Cost: Despite the victory, Hannibal's own forces incurred substantial losses, approximately 12% of his army, making it a Pyrrhic victory.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings compares Hannibal's loss ratio to typical ancient battles:
"A defeated army, statistically speaking, across, you know, if you're surveying the sort of losses of ancient armies. So his army is really quite heavily damaged by this victory." ([11:57])

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3. Strategic Alternatives Post-Cannae

Timestamp: [08:07] – [10:19]

Post-Cannae, Tristan and Dr. Rawlings explore why Hannibal did not immediately march on Rome despite his overwhelming victory.

Key Points:

• Hannibal's Decision-Making: Drawing parallels with Alexander the Great and Pyrrhus, it's evident Hannibal was cautious of overextending his forces.
• Logistical Challenges: The distance between Cannae and Rome (~150 km) posed significant logistical hurdles, especially for infantry-heavy armies.
• Defense of Infantry: The Roman infantry would be ill-prepared for a swift cavalry assault, making a direct attack on Rome risky and potentially futile.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings highlights the impracticality of Mahabal's proposal:
"Mahabal, ...claims that he could be on the capital, dining in Rome and feasting within three days. Now, is that realistic?" ([10:19])

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4. The Aftermath of Cannae: Capturing Allies

Timestamp: [14:20] – [22:39]

Following the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal sought to destabilize Roman alliances by releasing captured Roman allies and encouraging them to join his cause.

Key Points:

• Diplomatic Maneuvers: Hannibal released prisoners of war, urging cities like Tarentum and Campania to defect, positioning himself as a liberator rather than a conqueror.
• Mahabal's Advocacy: One of Hannibal's officers, Mahabal, advocated for marching on Rome, presenting a bold strategy that ultimately did not align with Hannibal's broader objectives.
• Roman Refusal to Negotiate: The Roman Senate, demonstrating resilience, refused to negotiate, choosing instead to double down on their war efforts.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings discusses the Roman Senate's stance:
"The Romans decide not to ransom those prisoners. And indeed any of the survivors of Cannae are to be sent to Sicily where they will serve out their campaigns until Hannibal is defeated." ([16:53])

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5. Internal Debates and the Decision Against Marching on Rome

Timestamp: [16:53] – [22:39]

The conversation delves into the internal dynamics of Hannibal's camp, highlighting debates among his officers regarding strategic directions.

Key Points:

• Mahabal's Proposal: Mahabal's suggestion to march on Rome was met with skepticism due to logistical and strategic concerns.
• Hannibal's Leadership: Despite the allure of attacking Rome, Hannibal prioritized repairing and replenishing his forces, understanding the prolonged nature of Roman resistance.
• Psychological Impact: The heavy casualties, even in victory, necessitated time to tend to the wounded and rebuild morale.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings critiques Mahabal's proposal:
"It’s a kind of common trope that the Romans always insert some kind of speech that tried to cut ..." PFENDING M Mahabal's historical authenticity remains uncertain." ([17:27])

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6. Expanding the Campaign: Focus on Allies and Strategic Cities

Timestamp: [22:39] – [41:50]

Post-Cannae, Hannibal shifted his focus to securing allies and capturing strategic cities to weaken Rome's position.

Key Points:

• Securing Samnium: Hannibal targeted the Samnites, old adversaries of Rome, successfully inducing several tribes to defect.
• Capua's Defection: The capture of Capua was a significant blow to Rome, depriving them of valuable resources and manpower.
• Challenges with Local Politics: Despite successes, Hannibal struggled with entrenched local rivalries. Cities like Nola remained staunchly Roman, and internal conflicts within regions often hindered his efforts to gain full control.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings explains the local dynamics:
"Even within communities, there's usually a pro Roman faction as well as a pro Carthaginian faction, ... it's a bit of a hard work." ([25:26])

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7. The Roman Counteroffensive and Hannibal's Defensive Struggles

Timestamp: [41:50] – [48:31]

As Hannibal worked to consolidate his gains, the Romans mounted a determined counteroffensive, targeting key regions and undermining Carthaginian efforts.

Key Points:

• Battle of Beneventum: Roman commander Pertinax Marcellus successfully thwarted Hannibal's subordinate Hanno's attempts to gather supplies, resulting in significant Carthaginian losses.
• Roman Military Adaptation: The Romans began employing unconventional forces, including volunteer slave armies led by commanders like Semponius Gracchus, to challenge Hannibal's advances.
• Continuous Engagements: Despite Hannibal's victories, the Romans remained active on multiple fronts, preventing Hannibal from gaining unassailable dominance.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings underscores the Roman strategy:
"The Romans are able to muster many field armies against Hannibal's invasion." ([37:29])

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8. The Decisive Move: Hannibal's Attempt to March on Rome

Timestamp: [50:01] – [55:31]

Faced with mounting Roman pressure and dwindling resources in Capua, Hannibal made the fateful decision to march on Rome as a last-ditch effort to force a political resolution.

Key Points:

• Diversionary Tactic: Hannibal hoped that threatening Rome directly would compel Roman forces opposing him to divert resources, easing the siege of Capua.
• Logistical Hurdles: The march faced significant challenges, including harsh terrain and well-prepared Roman defenses.
• Encounter at Porta Collina: Hannibal's forces reached the northeastern gate of Rome, but upon encountering fortified Roman legions led by Fulvius Flaccus, severe weather disrupted the engagement, leading Hannibal to retreat without capturing the city.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings reflects on Hannibal's gamble:
"This is his last throw of the dice. ... he avoids marching the sort of obvious route which is controlled by the Romans." ([53:25])

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9. Aftermath and Legacy of the March

Timestamp: [55:10] – [60:19]

The episode concludes by assessing the immediate and long-term impacts of Hannibal's failed march on Rome.

Key Points:

• Capua's Fall: Following Hannibal's retreat, Capua was besieged and fell, leading to severe Roman reprisals and the dissolution of its municipal structures.
• Stalemate Continues: Despite the dramatic attempt, the war persisted with alternating victories and defeats, ultimately leading to Rome's eventual triumph.
• Historical Narratives: The episode touches on how Roman historians may have downplayed Hannibal's successes to emphasize Roman resilience and superiority.

Notable Quote: Dr. Rawlings comments on the portrayal of events:
"It's a big moment for history writers of Rome because they're able to create this narrative that you're suggesting, this great humiliation of Hannibal." ([58:25])

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Conclusion

Tristan Hughes and Dr. Louis Rawlings provide a compelling analysis of Hannibal's strategic choices during the Second Punic War, particularly his bold yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt to march on Rome. The episode underscores the complexities of ancient warfare, the interplay of strategy and logistics, and the enduring legacy of Hannibal as a military genius who, despite his remarkable victories, could not secure a lasting victory against the resilient Roman Republic.

Listeners gain a nuanced perspective on how a single strategic decision can shape the course of history, offering insights into leadership, adaptability, and the relentless spirit of Rome.

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Notable Quotes Recap

1. On Roman Resilience:

   • "Hannibal is a student of Pyrrhus and had studied Pyrrhus's failed campaigns against the Romans, and he knew that the Romans don't easily give up after a defeat." ([04:50])

2. On Hannibal’s Pyrrhic Victory at Cannae:

   • "A defeated army, statistically speaking, across, you know, if you're surveying the sort of losses of ancient armies. So his army is really quite heavily damaged by this victory." ([11:57])

3. On the Impracticality of Marching on Rome:

   • "Mahabal, ...claims that he could be on the capital, dining in Rome and feasting within three days. Now, is that realistic?" ([10:19])

4. On Rome’s Strategic Defense:

   • "The Romans decide not to ransom those prisoners. And indeed any of the survivors of Cannae are to be sent to Sicily where they will serve out their campaigns until Hannibal is defeated." ([16:53])

5. On Local Political Challenges:

   • "Even within communities, there's usually a pro Roman faction as well as a pro Carthaginian faction, ... it's a bit of a hard work." ([25:26])

6. On Roman Military Adaptation:

   • "The Romans are able to muster many field armies against Hannibal's invasion." ([37:29])

7. On Hannibal’s Final Gamble:

   • "This is his last throw of the dice. ... he avoids marching the sort of obvious route which is controlled by the Romans." ([53:25])

8. On Historical Narratives:

   • "It's a big moment for history writers of Rome because they're able to create this narrative that you're suggesting, this great humiliation of Hannibal." ([58:25])

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Closing Remarks Tristan Hughes wraps up the episode by expressing gratitude towards Dr. Louis Rawlings for his insightful contributions. He encourages listeners to engage with the podcast through ratings and subscriptions, ensuring the continuation of such enriching historical discussions.

Final Note: The episode provides a balanced perspective, acknowledging both Hannibal's strategic brilliance and the formidable resilience of Rome, offering listeners a comprehensive understanding of one of ancient history's most legendary military campaigns.

Transcript

[Tristan Hughes]

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[Narrator]

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[Tristan Hughes]

Hey guys, I hope you're doing well. I'm currently at historyhit hq. I'm outside having a nice bit of a relax and to tell you all about today's Episode, it's about the famous Carthaginian commander, Hannibal Barker, with a particular focus on his march against the city of Rome itself at the height of his campaigns in Italy. Our guest today is Dr. Louis Rawlings from Cardiff University, an encyclopedia when it comes to the story of Hannibal Barke. It was fascinating just listening to him delve into the nitty gritty, important military details of this key event in Hannibal's life. I loved it and I hope you guys do too. It's 211 BC and Hannibal Barker has been fighting the Romans in Italy for the past six years. He has marched his army, including elephants, across the Alps. His most legendary achievement. He has defeated the Romans in three massive pitched battles that had resulted in tens of thousands of Romans dead. And yet the Romans kept fighting. Now Hannibal, far away from his Carthaginian homeland in North Africa, is in trouble. His forces continue to rampage across central and southern Italy, but the Romans act like a hydra. Hannibal defeats one Roman force, but then another one quickly takes its place. In 211 BC, Hannibal therefore decided to change strategy. He would march on the beating heart of his enemy. He would march on Rome. This is that story with our guest, Dr. Louis Rawlings. Louis. Louis Rawlings. Dr. Louis Rawlings. It is great to have you on the podcast today.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

It's great to be here, Tristan.

[Tristan Hughes]

And what a topic. We've done Pyrrhus most recently.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah.

[Tristan Hughes]

But with you, you are our Hannibal man, our Hannibal Barker man. And today we're talking about, I mean, his march on Rome. We usually think of Hannibal crossing the Alps or just traversing all around Italy, beating the Romans here, there and everywhere. You never really think about him actually marching on the city of Rome itself, but he did try it.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Indeed he did. And to get to the point where we can understand why he did it and when he did it, we need to kind of think about what happens in the years preceding that. So this is a story really of Hannibal's trying to sort of capitalise on his great victory at the Battle of cannae. So in 218, the Carthaginian General Hannibal, he's crossed the Alps. He started the war with the Romans. He's won three great victories over the following three years. So at the Battle of Trebia, he defeats Romans in the north in what's known as Cisalpine.

[Tristan Hughes]

That's the winter one, isn't it? With like the icy river and the snow and everything?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And then the following year, he's in Etruria and he takes on Flaminius and ambushes his army at the Battle of Lake Trasimene and more or less wipes that out. And then he advances down the coast to past Rome, swings past Rome, because there was a possibility, I guess, that after the Battle of Trasymene he could have marched on Rome, but his army was a bit worn out by the crossing of the Alps. Still, there was a severe winter in the year before that campaign of 217. And so he really needed to work on his troops health and rearm them. And so he goes into Picenum, which is on the Adriatic coast. And so he spends his time in Picenum and then heading south towards a supply depot at Cannae in Apulia in 216. And it's at Cannae, the Romans tried to challenge him and break him once and for all by raising this super huge army of eight legions and allies and bringing something in the region of 70,000 troops against Hannibal's army, which was probably around 50,000, 40 to 50,000, we're not entirely sure.

[Tristan Hughes]

And this is early August or July, 216 BC, and this is kind of lining up. Almost feels the best place for us to start our story today, ultimately culminating on his march in Rome. But this almost feels like this is the big battle, this is the climax, this is the tens of thousands of soldiers on either side. Hannibal versus the Romans in Italy, on the plains of Cannae.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah. And he pulls off this amazing magic trick of us essentially ambushing a Roman army in plain sight on a flat plain with nothing to be seen. Nevertheless, Hannibal manages to surround a Roman army that's nearly twice his size and in the space of an afternoon manages to kill. Well, the, the estimates are varied from the sources, but around about 50 to 60,000 Romans and allies are killed on this battlefield. So Hannibal kills as many men as he probably has in his own army in this battle, and only a few thousand Romans escape this bloody slaughter. There's a stat, amazing stat, that maybe 100 men in every sort of 10 minutes are killed in this battle, or possibly even a minute. So it's a tremendous amount. And in terms of the casualties, this is absolutely crushing for the Romans. So Hannibal at this battle defeats this huge Roman army, kills one of the consuls, kills loads of other ex consuls and 80 other senators in the, in the army as well, and inflicts this massive defeat. The question is, why does he not march on Rome right then, right there and then?

[Tristan Hughes]

Well, shall we explore that? So he's won this massive victory against the Romans. What is the aftermath. I mean, what does he expect should happen now he's won this great victory. Surely you must think, oh, the Romans must now capitulate. What's the thinking following his great success against Rome at Cannae?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah. And if he'd been Alexander the Great and he'd been challenging the Persians, three great victories and Alexander is king of the Persian Empire.

[Tristan Hughes]

He's King of Asia, Lord of the.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Absolutely. So you'd think that this tiny little Italian state. Well, no, it's a big Italian state, but nevertheless, Italy is a lot smaller than the Persian Empire. You think three crushing victories and the Romans would cave in. But Hannibal is a student of Pyrrhus and had studied Pyrrhus's failed campaigns against the Romans, and he knew that the Romans don't easily give up after a defeat. So Hannibal does in fact, eventually send negotiators to try the waters. But before he does that, of course, he is urged by one of his officers, certain Mahabal, who was a cavalry officer, to give Mahabal the cavalry contingent of Hannibal, which is a large force because Mahabal claims that he could be on the capital, dining in Rome and feasting within three days. Now, is that realistic? The distance between Rome and Cannae is around about 150km. So this is quite a distance for ancient armies, which on the whole can travel around about 10 miles a day. Hannibal's is perhaps slightly faster and tends to catch his enemies off, off foot. So maybe 12 to 15 miles a day at its when everything's going well. But an advance would at least take him a couple of weeks with his infantry. Of course, the cavalry can ride much faster, and it is possible that if they did ride day and night, they could have possibly got to Rome within three or four days. But what would they have found? Yes, what would they have found? Hannibal doesn't know. Doesn't. He doesn't know if the Romans have got any reserves in Rome. He's generally well informed about Roman affairs. He's got spies in Rome, so he suspects that there will be a defense. And of course, cavalry are not very good attacking cities by themselves, so I see that.

[Tristan Hughes]

Especially their walls.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Right, yeah. All they have to do is close the gates and what do the horses do, you know? So, in a way, this is kind of a grandiose claim by Mahabhar. And Hannibal decides not to risk his entire cavalry just sending him off and leaving his infantry isolated in the middle of nowhere. There are still Romans around. There's still, you know, 15, 20,000 Romans scattered across the landscape. What happens if they get back together? What happens if other forces join them as well? There are other legions poking around in various places, and garrisons. They could all be pulled together. So Hannibal also, in terms of even deciding to march with the whole army, would have to face a logistical challenge. It's August. The crops have been gathered in. Hannibal is potentially marching through hostile terrain and hostile territory. If he gets to Latium, which is south of Rome, all the Latin communities are probably going to remain robustly Roman. And so he's going to be walking essentially through a wasteland where his own forces won't be able to gather any crops. All the crops will be gathered into the. The various cities. So logistically, this is an impossibility as well. Final point as well is that Hannibal has fought this tremendous victory. His own force has suffered only 5,700 or thereabouts, but that is 12% of his entire army.

[Tristan Hughes]

Because we focus a lot on the Roman losses, and absolutely we should with the Bast of Cannae, because it's a disastrous Roman defeat. But it does come at a cost for Hannibal, doesn't it? Especially I'm getting that infantry line in the center that had to take all that weight of the Romans pushing forwards. They lose quite a lot of people doing that.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, I would say probably the Gauls in the center in particular may well have lost as much as 25% of their force. There were 20,000 of them there, but they seem to have lost, you know, 5,004, 5,000. So, you know, they've taken the heaviest losses. Psychologically, this army has been decimated. So though it's won. When we look at statistics of victorious versus losing casualties in ancient battles, generally victorious contingents lose something between 2 and 5%. The enemy who are defeated tend to lose around about 10% or more. Hannibal's army, although it's victorious, has essentially suffered the same sort of casualties. A defeated army, statistically speaking, across, you know, if you're surveying the sort of losses of ancient armies. So his army is really quite heavily damaged by this victory. And this is a kind of a Pyrrhic victory in a way, for Hannibal, and he needs to spend time tending to the wounded, looking out for the exhausted men, gathering more supplies, recuperating essentially. And this is in fact, what his council suggests to him. Only Mahabal speaks out with this grandiose offer of dining on the capital. The rest of the officers agree with Hannibal that actually they should be looking out for the troops at this point and restoring the wounded and restoring the army and that's going to take a week or two at least. So time is ticking. Hannibal is never going to get to Rome in time to actually besiege it, even if he was able to bring enough forces and logistics to the. To the table. So he decides not to go to Rome this year. What he does instead, I guess, is the interesting question. One of Hannibal's things that he does in the aftermath of all of his victories is to release Roman allied prisoners of war that he's captured after the battles. And he does this again at Cannae. He sends them home and he says, our war is with Rome. Our disagreement is with Rome, not you. We've come as liberators, and so we're letting you free. And you can go back to your home communities and tell them that Hannibal wants to be your friend. And so he sends off, you know, Tarentines and Campanians and all kinds of people, go back to their home cities where Hannibal is hoping that they will begin to persuade those cities to join Hannibal.

[Tristan Hughes]

Sorry, and a question to come in there, because you mentioned Tarantines and Campanians and the lot. So as Hannibal is now kind of making his way towards southern Italy, the Roman army that fought the Mercanae, those allied units, were they largely allies from the south of Italy where Hannibal had not yet reached, hence why Hannibal actually saying this to these allies. They're almost new Roman allies that he's encountering as he's come further south?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

I think to a large extent, they are, yes. They've been drawn from the central region, really, particularly for this campaign, and some of them are veterans from the north, but nevertheless, most of them are fairly new people from the various areas that Hannibal is now going to try and cause to defect. Now, Hannibal has Roman prisoners, so he makes an offer to the Romans. He sends Carthalo, one of his officers, as an ambassador to the Romans with an offer of opening negotiations for peace. You know, the Romans, you've lost. Demonstrably, you've lost this war. So please, you know, let's negotiate a peace. But also, we are quite happy to ransom all of your prisoners. There's debate in the Roman Senate, and the Roman Senate decides that it will actually double down. It's going to not negotiate with Hannibal while he's on Italian soil. The Romans are not going to accept the fact that they have been defeated, because when they look at things, you know, that the alliance system is still holding together. They still have troops in reserve. They have a very large population. And although they have lost a lot of people in the last three years, they still have plenty more where they came from, as it were. So the Romans decide not to ransom those prisoners. And indeed any of the survivors of Cannae are to be sent to Sicily where they will serve out their campaigns until Hannibal is defeated, essentially until Hannibal leaves Italy, the survivors of Cannae are not going to be demobilized, they're not going to be rotated off. Roman armies were levies. So soldiers every year may well have served for the year, but expected to be demobbed at the end, go back to their farms and maybe called up at a later time. Obviously, the Hannibalic war is a big period of crisis and we find that armies are kept in the field for years on end. But nevertheless, those who kind of serve a long term are able to return to their farms sooner or later. But not the men of Cannae. The survivors of Cannae, and that includes those prisoners. If Hannibal chooses to get rid of them in various ways, if they get back to Rome, they're going to be sent to Sicily and spend their time in kind of military exile.

[Tristan Hughes]

So those soldiers are kind of sent off, like, don't breathe a word of this kind of thing or stay away from the action. Shall we talk briefly about that famous Mahabal quote that he gives at this time? Because actually, you've said it there perfectly. Mahabal, although he's best known at the time, you know, the advocate for marching on Rome. And sometimes it's portrayed as like one of these what ifs in history. If Hannibal had actually marched in Rome, in actual fact, he was very much in the minority at this time. Post canine. You've listed all the reasons why actually it wasn't right for Hannibal to march on Rome at that time. However, Mahabal, in his words, I mean, what does he supposedly say to Hannibal?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Well, he says, hannibal, you know, how to win a victory, but not how to use one, which is an incredible statement. And of course, the Romans latch on this, you know, this is. This is very popular in Roman sort of rhetoric thereafter. You know, every schoolboy learns this, this faith, because this is clearly loaded with such prescience if it was uttered at the time or is a statement that was derived from entirely from hindsight. So we don't know whether Mahabal said this at the time. But nevertheless, what the Romans liked to do and what our pro Roman sources like to do is always try and take the gloss off of Hannibal's sort of victories. So another example of this is when Hannibal sends his brother Mago back to Carthage to announce the victory of Cannae and to request more troops to finish the job. And so the Carthaginian Senate is there and Mahabal pours out this great sack of golden rings that have been taken from all the fingers of senators and the cavalry class, the equestrians, the rich men in the army of Cannae that have been defingered.

[Narrator]

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[Tristan Hughes]

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[Oregon Lottery Representative]

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[Tristan Hughes]

There's that famous statue, isn't there, of Hannibal counting the rings of the senators that he's Killed at Cannae.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, exactly. And so these rings are poured out over the Senate floor and everyone's admiring this. But of course, there's inevitably, there's one Carthaginian who stands up. It's Hanno, arrival of Hannibal's father, traditional enemy of the bar kids, who stands up and says, oh, you know, why do you need reinforcements if you're so close to winning this war? Why haven't the Allies changed sides yet? You know? And so he basically poor scorn on this position, but he's in an absolute minority of one in this, you know, in this story. So it's a kind of common trope that the Romans always insert some kind of speech that tried to cut. Tries to take the gloss off Hannibal's achievements at that point. So we have to be careful with Mahabal's quote, whether it's really a Roman construct or a construct of a pro Roman source, whether Mahabal really said that. Having said that, and I just want to finish on that, Hannibal was a very clever commander because he promoted, and we see evidence of this in a number of debates in his own military council. He promotes free speech and he promotes alternative visions because if you can talk things through and argue things, then the decision making is going to be better if you're challenged than if you just have an autocratic kind of commander who just makes decisions without any consideration. So it is entirely possible that Mahabharata did offer this kind of view of the campaign strategy.

[Tristan Hughes]

So where does Hannibal then decide to go with his army? Where's his next focus? Where does he start campaigning next?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Immediately he has opportunities to go to Samnium. So the Samnites are old enemies of the Romans. They joined pyrrhus in the 270, 280s, 270 and samnium.

[Tristan Hughes]

That's kind of the highlands, central area, Apennine Mountains area.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Okay, yeah, yeah, absolutely. Hannibal goes to Samnium because he has this opportunity, I think, to peel off these resentful allies of the Romans, the Samnites, and he gets several of the major tribes to defect to him. And indeed, it seems from complaints the following year that the Samnites make to Hannibal that he actually acquires a lot of recruits from this army and that from this population. And so that enables him to bolster his army and increase the size of his army. So that's his immediate area of concern, is to bring the Samnites over, but then also he tries to descend again into the plains of Campania. He tried it the previous year when he devastated the Campanian plain. And, you know, to sow distrust and distress amongst Rome's allies. But this time he goes back properly, he tries to capture Naples and fails. It's a seaport, would be really useful for Carthagino.

[Tristan Hughes]

Yes. Campania said that that's Naples, Mount Vesuvius area today.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

So it's sort of the region south of Rome. South of Latium is the next region. South on the western coast is Campania. And so he fails at Naples, Neapolis, as it was called. But he does get Capua, which is the principal city of the Campanion plain. It's the most powerful city and its satellite communities as well. And the Capuans, after a bit of thinking about it, decide to join Hannibal. And this is a tremendous, tremendous achievement for Hannibal because it immediately deprives Rome of a large section of soldiers and resources in central Italy and kind of blocks the Romans off from going down the western side towards the south. Hannibal's achievements isn't entirely uniform, though. There are certain Campanian cities who stay with the Romans, Nola in particular, which is to the east of Mount Vesuvius. And this kind of controls the inland route south.

[Tristan Hughes]

This isn't there, so that Pompeii joins Hannibal, but it's in a kind of neighbour Nola does not, or something like that. So it's like it's rivalries of the towns which always seem to happen. One will join Hannibal, the other will stay with Rome. It's kind of almost. It's divided along those lines.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Absolutely. And this is one of Hannibal's big problems. Even though he's now going to pursue this policy of dragging allies away from the Romans, he always has to deal with local politics, local rivalries that have gone back centuries. You know, the Romans control these people and have stopped them fighting each other. Well, you take the Romans away and those old rifles are still bubbling up like rival football teams. You know, they hate each other, it's that kind of thing. So what Hannibal finds is great headache, that he only gets partial control of regions when he. When he moves into them. Some go over to Hannibal, but their local rivals tend to stay with the Romans. And even within communities, that kind of plays out as well. So within communities, there's usually a pro Roman faction as well as a pro Carthaginian faction, or a pro liberty faction, as it were, think that they can use the Carthaginians to further their ends. And so even within communities, he's able to exploit that to gain access to a number of communities, but his hold on those communities is Always a little bit tentative, because if the other side get the ascendancy, they may go back over to the Romans. We see this on a number of occasions, briefly on Nola. Hannibal makes several attempts through the war to capture Nola. It's quite a strategic position. It is really useful for transit through the plains. So controlling Nola kind of seals off the bottom of Campania or opens it up. And the Romans managed to retain control of it for the next. Well, for the entire war. But in the next three or four years, Hannibal keeps coming back to try and prize Nola away, but is always thwarted by one particular Roman commander, a guy called Marcellus, who gathers, initially gathers together a small force in 216 and garrisons the place. And then 215, he's got a legion there. And then in 214 again, he's there, always thwarting Hannibal's attempts to capture Nola. So Hannibal does spend a lot of time on particular strategic locations, but sometimes he's frustrated, sometimes he succeeds. So in the north of the Campanian plain. So after Capua has gone over, Hannibal spends some time trying to gather or capture cities in the north of the plain and sort of the access routes into Campania. One of those places is Casalinum, which initially rebuffs him. And it takes him the winter essentially and into 215 to capture Casalinum. Another place is Petalea, which is just down the road from there. He kind of advances on Petalea. It's gives up the first time, but the second time he comes with a bit more intent. And the Petalaeans over the winter had gone to the Romans and said, please, we need help. Cannonball's coming back. And the Romans, because they have lost so many tremendous numbers of troops and are stretched in all kinds of directions, have to say to the Petalians, you have to look to your own defense. So they sort of cut off any kind of support. And so the Petalians succumb to Hannibal at that point. But it's hard work. Hannibal hasn't got an automatic right to these cities. They have to be coaxed, they have to be threatened, and sometimes they have to be attacked in order for Hannibal to make gains in these areas. So Capua is an easy victory, an easy gain. But some of these other cities aren't. And this is the pattern that dogs Hannibal throughout the next few years, in fact, for the rest of the war, that Hannibal tries to acquire these allies for various good reasons. And we can talk about those in a second. But it's always tempered by these local considerations, these local politics, local inter communal rivalries and just sometimes loyalty to Rome just seems to persist. And sometimes the Romans have garrisons in these places that make them much harder for Hannibal to capture.

[Tristan Hughes]

It's also interesting at this moment how you know, the Romans are picking and choosing their battles almost or where they clash with the Romans following Cannae is this very clear switch of strategy where they will try to defend certain towns if they have a garrison, but with small forces and hold a strategic position. It is no more kind of war, hungry senators or consuls, those leading, deciding, I'm going to gather a new big army, we're going to meet Hannibal on the open field. Does it feel like they've learned their lesson and now it's just kind of small forces to try and hinder Hannibal wherever he can. Or I guess also realizing that Hannibal's strategy, it may have that flaw in it in that you're trying to wrestle away the allies, but the allies just hate each other anyway.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah. So it's quite interesting. Rome is obviously not in a very good position to fight Hannibal in 215, early 215, but nevertheless they put consular armies in the field. So armies of 20,000 men, two legions of Romans, about 10,000 men and two legions of allies or thereabouts. And they're putting these consular armies in to oppose Hannibal and to, to watch over him and to, and to bring him to battle if possible. So actually no, they don't lose their, they don't learn their lesson to a certain extent. They may not be so gung ho about it, but they're still trying to bring Hannibal to battle in a decent fight. And if we take the war as a whole and remember we've, we've, Hannibal's fought three great victories, he's actually fought four big battles, five big battles maybe en route and gain these three great victories between 216 and 203, the end of the war. Hannibal still nevertheless fights something in the region of 15 to 17 major pitched battles against Roman armies. So they're still going for them. And there's a really good reason for that. If they defeat Hannibal's army, the whole problem more or less goes away. You know, it only takes one decisive victory over Hannibal and war initially is won. And then it's a case of defeating the Carthaginians elsewhere. But Hannibal is also trying to carry on doing what he's been doing, which is to demonstrate that the Romans can't match him in the field. And if he can defeat Roman armies in the field because they come near him, he's going to go for them, you know, if the price is right. He's got problems. And his main problem is, of course, not actually manpower, because he now can start recruiting from these allies. We've seen the Samnites already sending him troops, and on a number of occasions we hear of him recruiting quite heavily in certain regions, particularly after defeats. So he can always replace his own army with Italians now, predominantly Italians. He's still got some Gauls as well, which he keeps throughout the war. He doesn't really need reinforcements from Africa, he doesn't need Carthaginian reinforcements, but he does receive reinforcement in 215. He receives about 15,000 men and 40 elephants.

[Tristan Hughes]

I was going to ask. He gets more elephants?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, exactly, because he's lost all of his elephants. He's probably got one left.

[Tristan Hughes]

When he goes through Capua, it's him on his last elephant that parade into the city. He's got one elephant left, but he's showing off the capture. You know, him taking over capoeira. But then, of course, he's replenished with elephants later. But it's quite a sight.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, it's quite a sight. Absolutely, yeah. So Hannibal does come back with elephants. They don't really get much of a narrative role. They do appear in a number of battle accounts, but the quality of our military narratives and battle accounts does decline. One of the reasons for that is the fact that Polybius, our better source, becomes very fragmentary. That just doesn't survive in very much detail anymore. And so we have to rely on Livy, who is militarily not so savvy and not so acute, but also is very pro Roman. So there's quite a lot of. You have to be sort of hedging his battle accounts a bit, because he always seems to give the Romans glory. He's always trying to take the lustre away from Hannibal's victories, even where it's clear that Hannibal's won them. So we have this kind of problem. But, yes, he's reinforced from Africa in 250 with money as well. And most of that force doesn't actually join Hannibal, but forms a second sort of army in the south. Hannibal's big problem is the Romans are like a hydra. As Pyrrhus's advisor once said, you can cut off one head, you can destroy one army, but two grow up in its place. The Romans have huge numbers of men, but they also have lots of commanders, and they turn out to be generally quite Able commanders, particularly after 260, when there's a little bit of vetting, I think, going on. Anybody who's a successful commander is rotated and given an extended command the following year. We see certain successful consuls getting consulship after consulship after consulship as well. People like Marcellus, consul, I think five times Fabius Maximus is consul. Similar sort of amount of times these guys are rewarded for success by basically having their commands renewed, either as consuls or as proconsuls, which is guys whose consular authority has basically been extended. And the Romans are able to muster many field armies against Hannibal's invasion. So I think in about 212, I think there are seven Roman field armies in Italy alone. And then there are armies abroad as.

[Tristan Hughes]

Well, in Spain and Sicily.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

In Spain, in Sardinia and Sicily, and actually by then in Greece. Because in 215, Hannibal makes an alliance with Philip of Macedon, which the Romans find out about, and that draws a legion to the Adriatic, Necrosi, Adriatic, to fight in Greece against the Macedonians. So Hannibal is always trying to, I think, to secure along the eastern coast ports, potentially for Philip to send aid and bring on his own King Philip V in Macedon. Got it? Yeah, absolutely. But that never happens. But nevertheless, he does try to kind of move on those places. So Hannibal's got this problem of having to deal with all these different Roman armies. And his own army is pretty much undefeatable as it becomes gradually clearer to the Romans. But his smaller armies that he has and he has in 215, he has three other armies in the field with him in Italy. Two of those are Carthaginian armies. So small forces detached from his own mainfield army, plus these reinforcements from Africa, form forces that are campaigning in Apulia, which is on the. On the eastern coast and southern coast of Italy, and in Bruttium, which is the far south, the kind of instep of the Italian high hill, if you can imagine the peninsula that way. So those two armies are operating in conjunction with local allies. So the Bruttians bring out an army of about 15,000 which joins one of those armies in campaigning in the south. And Hannibal's got his mainfield army and he's got one other army, which is a Campanian army, which doesn't join him, but operates independently. Very briefly, it attempts to capture the city of Kumai, another port along the coast, in 215, but is identified and intercepted and ambushed at Hamai by a guy called Semponius Gracchus. Now, Gracchus is a very Interesting character because his army he's made consul, but his army is volunteer slaves. The Romans are so hard pressed that they have actually started to recruit criminals and slaves who want. Who want to fight essentially. Who those slaves are is an interesting question. They are probably mostly gauns who have been captured in the in the early Campaigns of the 220s when the Romans were campaigning into South High Gaul. They are armed from the weapons captured at the Battle of Telamon in 225 and stored in a temple, the Capitoline temple. So these Gauls, these slaves who are mostly Gauls, are armed as Gauls and fighting for the Romans.

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[Tristan Hughes]

Battle of Telamon is another battle that happens just before Hannibal arrives in Italy, when the Romans are extending their control in northern Italy and the defeat a large army of Gauls. So that is the thing is that these Gauls enslaved, freed, are now being equipped with the army, potentially the arms and armour of their, maybe not relatives, but kind of their kin who have been defeated by the Romans more than a decade earlier. So yeah, the irony is not lost, I'm sure.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Absolutely. And Gracchus is able to use these troops and sort of blood them in this battle against the Campanians, which they successfully do. Even though the Campanians number around about 15 or 17,000 or thereabouts, they are attacked while they are encamped and not really ready to fight and basically disperse and suffer heavy casualties. These slave legions over the next three years do a really great service in operating independently potentially of other Roman armies as well. So Hannibal's having To deal with lots and lots. It's like whack a mole. There's lots and lots of armies out there who are operating. And he's always got to worry about the field armies that are actually allocated to either watching him or engaging, engaging him directly or interfering with his operations. But there are three or four or five armies out there doing other things. And what they're doing is trying to prevent Hannibal from consolidating his success in terms of turning allies to defect. So the great advantage of getting these allies for Hannibal, well, it's twofold. One is that he gets their resources, so he gets access to the, to the crops, the money, the territories, the bases, and the manpower, potentially, although he has to negotiate with each community and set up terms which tend to be more generous than the terms the Romans had previous. The Romans compelled allies when they were summoned to bring men. Hannibal has to kind of ask for volunteers. So he always has to kind of think about money and employing these as potentially as mercenaries rather than as subject troops that he integrates into, into his force. And that's the deal that he cuts with Capua. It's a deal he cuts with a whole range of other cities as well, that essentially they keep their own officers, or they can only serve if they are asked and they're willing to. They can't be compelled to. And sometimes Hannibal's not even allowed to put in garrisons in these towns without the consent of his allies. But nevertheless, it gives him manpower. It also takes that manpower and those resources and those bases away from the Romans. So it's, it's a twofold thing. The problem with cities, unlike Hannibal, who is able to move around the battlefield and Italy, foraging and seizing land and territory, well, seizing the crops and maintaining his army through plunder if he needs to, cities are static. They provide targets for Roman armies. So whenever Hannibal moves away from an ally that's changed sides, if the Romans can, they will come at that city sooner or later or that community sooner or later.

[Tristan Hughes]

So what then, with that brilliant described context of the situation as those years go on? So we get to, is it 212, 211 BC? And I think Campania is once again, it's kind of this melting pot. What is the situation then, that will ultimately lead to Hannibal making this decision to march on Rome?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Absolutely. Okay, so, yes, Roman pressure has been building in certain areas. So the Samnites get the brunt of it. In 215, 214, 213, they're beginning to fold Casalinum in The north is beginning to be pressured by the Romans. Roman armies come and eventually they capture Casalina, recapture it.

[Tristan Hughes]

It's the border. It's the border town, isn't it?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, it's that one that Hannibal, you know, it's strategic, it's very important. And Hannibal has a garrison of a couple of thousand men there. It's not a big town, but it's just on a nice fordable point of the river Volturnus. The Romans capture that at the end of 214 and that allows them then to start raiding Campania. So they're not staying necessarily, or they're going to their bases at Nola and other places along the coast. But they're also now beginning to put agricultural pressure because they're devastating that the land, preventing the sowing of crops that begin to put pressure on Capua in particular. And so Hannibal is spending his time dividing his time trying to get new allies and you know, exploit Lucania and Bruttium and places like that where he's got a lot of sympathy. He's also trying to Capture Tarentum. In 214. Some of those people that he'd let free at Cannae, some of the Terentians came back to him and said, the city is ripe for the plucking. Just come down. If you appear, the city will go over to you and will betray the city. Unfortunately, the Romans get wind of that and when Hannibal arrives outside Tarentum, the Roman garrison is on the alert and the city doesn't go over. So he's kind of frustrated for that. Yeah. So he spends his time partially trying to make new gains and he does make a number of new gains, but also partially going back to Campania to defend it from the Romans and also try and capture Nola, which is really irritating him I think. So eventually by 213, the Romans had got a grip on Campania in terms of being able to stage a full scale invasion in 212 proper with targeting of Capua and maybe a big siege to take the city out. And Hannibal is constantly trying to defend all these different cities and communities now from Roman armies, independently operating his own sub armies are not very good at dealing with Romans. So there were a couple of victories, but they do suffer big defeats as well. So his, his smaller armies are defeated on occasion and that that makes it very difficult for him to keep reliably folding sort of strategy, campaign strategy, because he can't quite rely on his own subordinate armies to be successful. In 212 the Romans come with two consular armies and also additional forces as well. They build up supplies at the mouth of the Volturnus, which is on the northern border of Campania. So there's a, there's a port there that they can use as a supply dam. Casalinum is also used as a staging post for the invasion. Nola is used. Naples, Cumae, all these cities along the coast to the south of Campania are also being used as supply bases as well. And so the Romans are bringing in lots of supplies for a big siege of Capua. They march on Capua in 212 and the Capuans know that they're coming. They know they're coming and they've asked for supplies to be gathered for them. They've asked Hannibal for supplies and he details one of his smaller armies under Hanno to collect supplies near Beneventum, which is a Roman colony and is hostile territory, but nevertheless is a good access point for Hannibal's control of Lucania and Apulia and all those sorts of areas to bring in supplies through, through that access point into the Campanian plain from the Apennines. The Campanians are supposed to come with their wagons to collect this stuff. Unfortunately, the Roman generals discover this and they attack Hanno's force as it's actually foraging and gathering forces and basically disperses it, defeats it, kills maybe 10 or 12,000 men. Wow. So it's a big defeat for Hannibal's sub army, which basically is more or less eliminated. If we trust Livy, Hanno pops up the following year with another army. Looks like it's fine, but nevertheless it seems to be a significant defeat. And also the Campanians who had come with their wagons were all captured. So Campanions know that the Romans are coming. They haven't been able to sow their seeds because the Romans have been through depredations, have been kind of preventing that, and so they know that hunger is going to come. So in 212 the Roman armies turn up outside Capua. The Capuans are not as well prepared for a siege as they want and they call on Hannibal to help. Hannibal comes and appears to fight a battle against the Romans, which he wins, but it's not a major victory and the Romans lift the siege. So it works. One Roman army heads to the coast, another army heads into the Apennine hills. Hannibal follows that army, but loses it. It's happy as Claudius army gives him the slip. But he does come across two other armies. Firstly, a slightly weird Roman volunteer army led by a centurion called Centennius, who seems to have 16,000 men with him, who Hannibal manages to surround on a hill and basically dispose of and defeat in battle. And we don't know how many of the 16,000, if that's a real figure, were killed, but apparently he had as many as two legions, Roman legions that he'd acquired, plus volunteers. So that's a big defeat. And then almost immediately afterwards he comes across Flaccus who had defeated his sub general at Beneventum and engages him at the battle of Herdonaea. And Hannibal there more or less annihilates the Roman forces there. So in the space of a few weeks, Hannibal kills in the region of 20 plus thousand Romans and allies in these two slightly unconnected engagement. Yeah.

[Tristan Hughes]

You mean is that Flaccus and Gracchus, are they they two different people?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Two different people. Oh yeah. So this is really, really interesting because this guy Fulvius Flaccus is Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus, who is the brother of the current consul who is besieging Capua, a guy called Quintus Fulvius Flaccus.

[Tristan Hughes]

Goodness, it's getting confusing now.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

I think this is the trouble, that's.

[Tristan Hughes]

Why I've not really been basically, Hannibal wins quite a few victories in quick succession here.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah. And that also is something that discourages the Romans to a certain extent, but nevertheless. And those survivors of Herdonia are given the Cannae treatment. In other words, they're told to go to Sicily and not come back until Hannibal's left Italy. So anyone to get away are dealt with in this way. And Flaccus is prosecuted, which must have been embarrassing for his brother. His brother and the other consul, Appius Claudius, come back to Capua though at the end of the year and besiege it properly. So Hannibal at this point, having gained these victories in the east of the peninsula, is finally able to get into Tarentum. Now we're not sure whether he gets into Tarentum in 213 or in 212, but he's able to capture this major city all but for the Citizel, which is a Roman garrison, holds out on and spoils his kind of the lustre of his objectives. But he now controls the major city of the of the southeast, Tarentum at this point. So he gains Tarentum, but probably at the expense of being able to defend Capua properly, because there are two different.

[Tristan Hughes]

Parts of the Italian peninsula there. Tarentum you say? Modern day Taranto, Naples, Neapolis. Well, Capua, that area, you know, hundreds of miles apart. And he's now got to get back. It's almost like he's, he's hasn't even completely taken Tarentum. The garrison is still there. But as you say that he now has that port, which is interesting. But now he's got to get back to Campania to deal with these Romans who've come back themselves to lay siege to Capua.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah. And because he's so far away, they've had time to completely surround the city with, with siege works. So they have contravallated, they've put a wall all the way around the city and they put gates and everything. You know, it's a proper, proper Roman siege. This is a massive investment. There are the two big Roman field armies there. So there's four legions in two camps. There's also a third army of, I think it's probably one legion under a guy called Nero who is to the south as well, who. So there are at least five legions in this area. The Romans in this year have 22 legions in the field. No, 25 legions in the field. You know, not all of them are in Italy, but around about 15 or so to 18 are in Italy. So Hannibal is now facing 100,000 Romans in the field at least, plus allies. So he can't be everywhere and he can't be doing everything. But finally he gets to Capua. Messengers come to him constantly asking for his support and he tries to replicate what he'd done the previous year, which is to drive the Romans off. The Romans are now well established. As Hannibal descends from the north east, the Roman forces deploy. At the same time, the Capuans try and break out. They've had the signal from Hannibal that this is the moment to act. And so they make a big sally against one of the, one of the camps, Roman camps. But the Romans are well defended. The Capuans are driven back and are unable to break through. The Carthaginians, a force of Spaniards and elephants breaks into one of the Romans camps and has a bit of a sort of runs around and causes mayhem, but is eventually surrounded and defeated. And finally Hannibal is unable to break the siege. So his next move is the wild gamble. Finally he decides to march on Rome.

[Tristan Hughes]

Well, so that is all the context of the march on Rome. It's a mass, but it's had a lot to talk about. But it's still important to cover that because that is ultimately what forces him. It's always he being forced to march on Rome now because it's to lure away those Romans who are besieging Capua or kind of take the scamboard.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Exactly. It's a diversionary tactic. If he can threaten Rome sufficiently, then maybe one of these armies leaves Capua. That gives him a chance to double back. He's always extremely good at double backing and giving armies, enemy armies a slip and maybe break the siege by dividing the forces. He knows probably that the two armies aren't going to leave. But at least if he can drag one of them away, then his position becomes better. But he knows time is running out for the Capuans. They've run out of food essentially and they are sending him desperate messages. And this is his last throw of the dice. So he, he avoids marching the sort of obvious route which is controlled by the Romans. He has to go along the edge of the Apennines, along the Liris Valley and heads comes at Rome essentially from the east rather than from the south. Fulvius Flaccus, the one who's not in disgrace, is able to take about 15,000 Romans from the besieging forces. Romans and allies force marches them into Rome. So they get there just before Hannibal does because they take the more direct route. And so when Hannibal makes a demonstration at the Porta Collina, which is the north eastern sort of gate, essentially he's.

[Tristan Hughes]

At the gates of Rome. He gets to the gates.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Yeah, he finally gets there and he descends and he makes a demonstration. He has a look, has a proper look to see if he can get into the city. The city is in mayhem. You know, there's panic everywhere. People are imagining there are some Carthaginian deserters. So there are some Numidians who have changed sides earlier. I think they may well have been a garrison that surrendered and then changed sides, deserted. But nevertheless they are being sent, you know, to help defend the streets of Rome. But they cause panic, you know, because of the Numidians. They look really distinct. So there's panic in the streets of Rome at this point. But because Flaccus is there, because there are two Roman legions who have been kept in reserve, Romans tend to raise legions in Rome. 2 Legions in Rome every year to protect the city and then the following year send those out on military operations. So it's like sort of bringing them, bringing them up to scratch a bit. So they've got two relatively raw legions, but we've got, we've got Flaccus's veterans as well coming in. And that's a sufficient enough force to deter Hannibal. So apparently there's supposed to be a battle fought between the two sides, we've only got Livy's narrative really for it. The two sides come together but then are driven apart by severe weather. And then the following day the same thing happens. And after that, Hannibal decides that he's not going to be able to take the city and so heads back through Samnium into Apulia, down to Lucania and then up or Lucania, then Apulia and then down to towards Tarentum to try and finish that off.

[Tristan Hughes]

And he will never march on Rome again.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

He will never march on Rome again.

[Tristan Hughes]

Because it's almost a bit of an anticlimactic episode, isn't it? Everyone's talking about his march on Rome, but actually you get there, Renaissance. I can't really take the city. He doesn't have siege equipment as well, I'm guessing. Or he doesn't have much of it.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Because he's moved very quickly.

[Tristan Hughes]

Because he's moved very quickly and then decides if I'm to beat the Romans, it is not by taking Rome, as I said, it's going back to his strategy that he's had since the beginning. It's taking away those allies. And in a funny way, for Hannibal's whole Italian war, it is cities like Capua and Tarentum that are more important than Rome itself.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Absolutely. I mean, if he could have captured Rome, obviously the war would have ended, you know, but it's too well defended, it's got big walls, it's a big population. You know, even if you just arm all the able bodied men in the city, you know, that would have made it very difficult for Hannibal to capture. These really big cities are tremendously difficult to take on. If Hannibal had tried to besiege the city, even if he'd had the equipment, you know, there are several Roman armies out there that could come and play havoc with his logistics and also, you know, address him directly. Big cities like Syracuse, like Capua, they need proper, serious numbers of troops to be in place for potentially years on end. And you know, with Capua, even when it was running out of supplies, it lasted quite a few months before eventually it gives in as it learns that Hannibal has head itself. So, yeah, it is a real anti climax. And you think, you know, whether Mahabal was right to kind of asked Hannibal to march directly because that gamble of trying to get to Rome and cause panic and just diplomatic pressure for the Romans to make peace at that point, when he had all the cards or potentially all the cards in his hand is difficult to kind of, you know, comprehend in a way. If we look at it. From what happens with the weight of hindsight in 211, it is a really unfortunate thing for Hannibal, really, that his only real attempt to march on Rome is at a point when he's forced to, and it's actually a really bad option for him. There are stories, of course, again, trying to take the gloss off Hannibal. There are these wonderful stories of Hannibal learning that the day that he arrives, the Romans are actually sending a force out to Spain to carry a war there, and they carry on doing that. They just send them off. That sounds entirely unlikely. An even stranger one is that he learns that the bit of land that he's actually encamped on is up for sale in Rome that day and is sold without any loss of the value of the property. So those kind of stories are there. You know, they show the sort of pluckiness of the Romans. Hannibal is transient here. They will endure him. Of course, he's all written with hindsight, but it's quite an interesting way of kind of undermining Hannibal at every moment.

[Tristan Hughes]

It is, isn't it? And even if strategically, it's not a massive moment in Hannibal's Italian war by kind of marching to Rome and back. I mean, psychologically, his decision not to besiege Rome or the idea, well, the vision of his army marching away from Rome, never to be seen again. Is it a turning point? Is it seen as a big moment in the war for the Romans, at least? I mean, how big a moment really, is it when Hannibal decides, actually, I'm not going to go to Rome or I'm going to leave Rome?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Well, it's a big moment for history writers of Rome because they're able to create this narrative that you're suggesting, this great humiliation of Hannibal. I don't think it really changes all that much on the ground. I mean, the loss of Capua clearly does. You know, that's a big loss.

[Tristan Hughes]

Would that fall very soon after?

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

So Hannibal march. When he marches away, within weeks, Capua has been defeated. The city is punished very severely. The ringleaders, the ones that survive, are sort of dealt with and the government is dissolved. The land becomes public, Roman land. Only people who had collaborated with the Romans prior to the siege were able to keep their property, that kind of thing. So it's really, really severely punished and ceases to be a municipal community essentially, for, for intents and purposes, an autonomous one that. That ends. So this is quite a big deal for the. For the cap. For the Capuans, the ringleaders who survived, the other ringleaders who knew they were going to be punished took poison, apparently, and it took them a day to die, according to Livy, who gleefully relates that. But in terms of the actual war, it's kind of still a grinding stalemate. There are wins and losses. You know, Hannibal was in the same year, you know, in the previous year, has already won these great victories and over the next few years continues to win victories against the Romans. He is pursued, but he's still holding his own. And there are still options out there for him as well. He's now got tarentum, which is a big, you know, plus in that if Philip can win against the Romans, maybe he can bring support. And the war in other parts of the Mediterranean is still going on. I know we don't touch on those at all. I try to keep them out, but Hannibal's got, you know, he's got his fingers in pies. Beyond Italy.

[Tristan Hughes]

Well, Louis, it's taking us several years to get through the story of Hannibal's war with Rome, the Second Punic War, but we're slowly getting through it. I felt like this would be a good chapter to do next between Cannae and his march on Rome and ultimately the end of that. But of course, there are still so many more years to do, isn't there? And as you've also hinted at, it's not just Italy. There is Spain. There will be Africa soon as well. So we've got all of that still to cover. But Louis, we should probably wrap up there for the time being. And it just goes to me to say thank you so much for taking the time to come back on the podcast.

[Dr. Louis Rawlings]

Thank you so much for inviting me. It's always a pleasure, Tristan.

[Tristan Hughes]

Well, there you go. There was the brilliant Dr. Louis Rawlings, returning to the Ancients podcast to continue the story of Hannibal Barker and his war against Rome, this time covering how he ultimately marched on the Capitol capital itself. I hope you enjoyed the episode. Let us know your thoughts. I always love getting Louis back on the show to talk more about Hannibal. He is one of the leading experts on Hannibal and is such a privilege to have him as a great contact of the Ancients podcast. Last things from me, Please follow the Ancients on Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. It really helps us. You'll be doing us a big favor. And if you'd be kind enough to leave us a rating as well, where we'd really appreciate that. And don't forget, you can also listen to us and all of Historyhit's podcasts ad free and watch hundreds of TV documentaries when you [e-mail] subscribe that's enough from me and I'll see you in the next episode. Hey Tinsley, why don't we use Ezcator to order food for staff lunches?

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[Tristan Hughes]

That's supposed to be simple.

[Narrator]

No, simple is Steven, Irma and Margie prefer lasagna and empanadas.

[Tristan Hughes]

Omg.

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