C (3:42)

Different.

B (3:42)

What this shutdown was ostensibly about, ostensibly about was the renewal of tax credits under the Affordable Care Act. Now, I'm going to go into some detail here because we need to be clear about what the unrealism of the demands. So the Affordable Care act, of course, was passed by President Obama. It went into effect in 2014, and among its provisions were a series of tax credits to subsidize the purchase of health insurance by people whose incomes were below a certain level. Those tax credits were in effect from 2014 to 2020. During the pandemic, President Biden made the tax credits temporarily more generous in 2021 and the next year, in 2022, he extended those more generous tax credits until 2025, he and the Democratic Congress of that time. The tax credits were written by President Biden to expire. And the reason they were written to expire well, is twofold. First, they were really expensive, and many, even in the President Biden's own party, didn't think that this level of expense, which was justified by the pandemic, should go on forever. And anyway, there are budget rules where if you had made the tax credits permanent, you would have needed a bigger voting majority to pass them into law than was needed when they were made temporary. So it was President Biden and the Democratic Congress of 2021 and 2022 that made them temporary in the first place. Now, had the Democrats won the election of 2024, I'm sure that President Kamala Harris would have tried to make the tax credits more permanent, either extend them for a long period of time or write them into law altogether. And if she had carried a Democratic House with her and enough Democratic senators, maybe she would have been successful, but probably not, because even unless she had a very liberal Senate, they probably would have flinched from the cost. So these tax credits were on their way out anyway. Now, all of that is a counter probably that is a counterfactual speculation because of course, the important point is she lost and it didn't happen. And there was no way they were going to be continued indefinitely by a President Trump administration. The votes just weren't there to do it. So when the Democrats made this big demonstration, they were engaged not in a real world, legislating exercise. The votes were never there to do what the Democrats wanted. There was no amount of shutdown that would ever change the votes and conjure them into being. The question for Democrats was how did they drive home the point that President Trump was not as keen on healthcare credits as they were? How did they message that? And the shutdown was their chosen way of messaging. Shutdowns come with a lot of pain. They do a lot of harm to the economy. In this case, they brought harm to people who depend on federal food aid relief. They brought harm to air travelers. They brought harm to many, many people. Government employees who expect their salary to be paid on time and military people, civilian people. They bring disruption. They are very painful events and they should not be accepted as regular parts of American life, although that's what they have been become. But the contest in a shutdown is to use this pain as a kind of teaching exercise. Normally, the party that initiates the shutdown fails, not only fails on getting what it wants. Everyone always fails. They never succeed in getting you what they want, but they also fail even to change the conversation. When Newt Gingrich shut down the government in 1994 and 95 under President President Clinton, he was trying to drive home a message of budget austerity, affecting even the Medicare program. Not only did he fail to get what he wanted from Medicare, but he actually made, he contributed to the fallen popularity of the Republican Congress, first elected in 1994 and helped to re elect Bill Clinton. When President Trump in 2018, 2019 shut down the government to try to Force funds for the border wall. Billions of dollars for a new border wall. He didn't get the money. But he also drove home the point that the Trump priorities were not the same as the priorities of the American voter, that he was not the voter for the average person that he had represented himself as in 2016. And again, that government shutdown was an important reason why President Trump lost reelection in 2020, along, of course, with the COVID nightmare. This time, Democrats had better success. Of course, they didn't get their tax credit extension. They were never going to. That was never a reasonable thing to expect or imagine or hope for. But what they did do was actually score political points against the Trump administration in a way that the Republican shutdowns of the past had never been able to do. They drove home the point that there is chaos because of Trump, not because of the Democrats, who actually were the people shut down the government. The chaos is because of Trump. The airline travel chaos is because of Trump. Trump wants to stop food stamps, and Trump is doing all of this because he wants to take away your health care credits. And he doesn't have any kind of health care plan of his own and neither does his party. That messaging was very successful by the standards of past shutdowns. Surveys showed that more Americans blamed the Republicans for the shutdown than Democrats. And surveys showed President Trump's standing declining steadily. It didn't help that while people were going without food stamps, while air travel was snarled, while government workers were going unpaid, Trump's top priority seemed to be this fantasy. He has a giant gilded ballroom next where the East Wing used to stand of the White House. And that his priority they drove home that his priorities were different from everyone else's. So it was as successful as such a jagged weapon can ever be. And it would not get more successful if it had gone on longer. All they would have done more harm. There is no reason to believe that it would have continued to subtract from President Trump's strength. It might well have gone into reverse at some point and subtracted from the Democrats strength. They scored their messaging win. They proved it within the elections of November 2025, where Democrats won so dramatically in New Jersey and Virginia and other places as well. And now it was time to pocket the winnings and leave the table. And that is what the Democratic leadership has done. There's going to be, it looks like some kind of deal, but many on the Democratic activist side are saying these people are sellots now when they say that the people who made the deal, they are sellots when they say that it's not because they really think that if this shutdown had continued longer that Democrats would have won on the tax credits point. That was never going to happen. And it's not because they even really think that they would have scored some other win. One of the big fantasy ideas that Democrats have, certain activist Democrats, is if the shutdown had gone on a little longer, President Trump would have been forced to tell his Republican senators, abolish the filibuster so that you can, we can pass a budget without the Democrats at all. And a lot of the activist Democrats want the filibuster abolished. But that probably wasn't going to happen either. My guess is what would have happened is President Trump would have counted on toss and shaking, would have done more damage, would have used the shutdown to inflict more pain on Democratic constituencies, especially this food stamps problem or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. It's no longer called food stamps, where he was infecting real pain on very vulnerable Americans and real pain on the federal, on the federal workforce. And in the end, Democrats were going to care about that pain more than he did. And he would have gambled, and the Republicans in Congress would have gambled that at some point, maybe some near point, public perceptions might flip and the harm that the shutdown was doing to Republicans and Trump in the polls would redound instead upon the Democrats, who. Who, after all, were the real authors of the shutdown. So it was a good moment to call it quits. But the people on the Democratic activist side, having seen it call it quits, now want to use the calling it quits as a weapon of power inside the Democratic Party, to push the party in a more confrontational, more radical path. More like these insurgent candidates like Mamdani in New York and others elsewhere, and against the traditional Democratic consensus, which will have the effect of making them more powerful while making the party less electable in most places. In the elections of 2026 and 2028, if there are free and fair elections in 26, 28, 28, which is a big if, we're worried about that. But if there are, that doesn't give the Democrats a pass to abandon the process, to abandon the work of being competitive for the votes in the center and the broad middle of American society, even if the elections are free and fair, they still have to compete and win. Assuming the elections are free and fair, they still have to compete and win. And that means coming forward with consensus candidates, candidates who look more like all of America and not just the activist wing, the Democratic activist wing, has deceived itself for now a decade that America wants a Bernie Sanders type government and America does not. And the more they foist that kind of approach on their own party, the more they do harm to their own party. And look, I'm not a Democrat. I don't have any stake in the Democratic Party as an institution. But at this juncture in history, if you're worried about Donald Trump, the Democratic Party is the instrument by which Donald Trump can be opposed, the only effective instrument. So a lot of us who aren't Democrats have an interest in the Democrats making wiser and better choices than that party has sometimes made. And making those wiser and better choices means not listening to people for whom the big prize is not winning elections and saving American democracy, but winning control of the Democratic Party and empowering themselves. And now my dialogue with Sarah Longwell. But first, a quick break. Sarah Longwell is a graduate of Kenyon College. She built a career As a Washington, D.C. communications expert on the Republican side, working first for others and then for herself. She became the first woman to become chair of the board of the Log Cabin Republicans, the premier gay rights group within the Republican Party. And in that position, she was active in an important factional fight in the 2016 election, where she led the resistance within the Log Cabin Republicans to an endorsement of Donald Trump. Time passed, the factional fight only worsened, and Sarah found herself in 2019 confronted with a majority of her colleagues who wanted to endorse the reelection of Donald Trump. And on that issue, she resigned from the Log Cabin Republicans and reinvented her life in a very brave way, signing up for a then new project called the Bulwark, where she became publisher and creating an army of Republican groups, Republicans Against Trump, many similar organizations. You've seen their content. And she has discovered a role as one of the leaders of a new kind of media campaign in the Republican world, standing up for traditional Republican ideas about the rule of law, limited government, free trade, while opposing the Trump presidency. And over that time, she has become a kind of central figure in the intellectual and community life of the small but proud group of anti Trump Republicans. So it's a special pleasure to welcome Sarah to the show today. Sarah, thank you for joining.

C (14:03)

Thanks, David. It's great to see you. Thanks for having me.

B (14:05)

Okay, so I want to ask you about a very specific thing that happened in the 2025 elections in Virginia and New Jersey, city of New York, and then a series of less headline elections, Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Georgia Public Service Commission. Now, we have some exit poll data on this and I'm going to preface, I'm going to take a minute. I know you have even deeper expertise on this to warn listeners if yours against exit poll data, that comes out immediately after an election. There are a lot of technical problems with early exit polls, but the core problem is this. Somebody approaches you with a clipboard after you voted, who's likely to linger and talk to them. Not someone with kids to pick up at daycare, not someone with a job demanding them. Someone with a little time on their hands and maybe a little extra willingness to share their views. Is that person like the people who are picking kids up at daycare are hastening to a job or just don't want to share their views with strangers. If the group willing to talk to exit pollsters is a different kind of group from the kind of people who don't want to talk to exit polls, well, there's your problem right there. Then you have the problem of making sure, well, how many, for example, we're going to be talking about this group. Women should be in the sample. Women are 52% of the adult population. But you don't know on voting day that women were 52% of the voting population. So you have to make a guess about how many women to include in your sample. And that goes for people over 65, people under 30, blacks, whites, Latinos, Asians, people with certain income levels. You have to start with an implicit model of what the electorate looked like, looks like, and which you don't know, and then build your sample accordingly. So with all of those caveats, something enormous seems to have happened with the votes of women and especially women under 30 on this voting day. And Sarah, you are here to explain what happened with all the caveats that we don't have exact as numbers that are as exact as some of the reporting suggests.

C (15:58)

Yeah, your caveats are real and good. But I think that even if there was a mission in some way with the exit polling, it would be difficult for it to erase what is still a seismic over performance of all of these Democratic candidates with women under 30. They all overperformed with men under 30 as well. But just to take the three key races that we focused on last Tuesday, which is the Virginia gubernatorial race, the New Jersey gubernatorial race, and then the New York City mayor plural race in Virginia, where it was Abigail Spanberger up against winsome Earl Sears, who was the the Republican. Abigail Spamberger was plus 17 with men under 30, but she was plus 64 with women under 30. And then it is this, it is similar in New Jersey. And this is another thing that's interesting about this, is that the results are so similar to, to each other that you do have to think, at least trend wise, they've got it right. And so in New Jersey, for men under 30, Cheryl was plus 17. But for women under 30, Cheryl was plus 62. That means that 81% of young women under 30, 81% voted for Mikey Sher. 82% of young women under 30 voted for Abigail Spanberger. And then you get to mom Donnie, where men under 30 went 65% for mum Donnie. And actually New York is the one place where men slightly went more for mum Donnie than in the other two races where women overall went more for Shell and Spanberger. But still women were. Women under 30 were 82% for Mumani. So those three races taken together, you have women under 30 where 81, 82% of them are voting for the Democratic candidate. That is a massive margin and really different from the gender breakdown, the gender split for their older cohorts. So among men and women who are, you know, 65 plus, the gender divide is almost non existent. But as you get younger, the gender divide opens up into a chasm. And I think Democrats are feeling pretty good about the fact that they still overperformed with men relative to how they did in 2024. But with women, it's just not even close. It's like a total ownership by the Democratic Party of this young cohort of women.

B (18:37)

Okay, before we go to the why, one more question about what? Do we have any information about Pennsylvania and Georgia?

C (18:43)

We don't. Or at least I don't, in part because those races. So here's the thing. In the other three races, the reason that you can get pretty good exit polling is because they had enormous turnout relative to a presidential year. These were really big races. And so, you know, the, the relative turnout compared to 2024, you know, in New Jersey, I believe they got about 77% of the way. There is a little more in Virginia. And so those are big numbers where you can draw pretty big conclusions from them. The turnout in these states where the races were not so big was nothing compared to what it is in a presidential year. And so it's tough to draw too many conclusions. And I will say one of the overarching things to understand, and I, I think that people do understand this more now. People get it. But, but just to put it all in context, if this is something that does sound new to you, you're like, man, why this explosive difference in these off year elections? Well, a large part of it is that there's a trade that's been going on over the last 10 or so years where a lot of college educated suburban voters who might have been Mitt Romney and John McCain voters have moved from the Republican Party into the Democratic Party. And that is good for Democrats in off year elections. The because those are highly engaged, highly likely voters and so they will vote in off year elections. Whereas Donald Trump got in the trade and Republicans got in the trade a lot more low propensity voters. And so one of the things that I do think people are still coming to terms with is for a long time for Democrats, the higher the turnout, the better Democrats did because they had these low propensity voters who didn't turn out in off years, weren't, didn't pay much attention to politics. But when it came time for a big national election, they would show up and say, I'm voting for the Democrat. Donald Trump has brought those people into the Republican Party to the point where in 2024, if there had been far more people voting, the likelihood of Donald Trump winning by a larger margin, which is just not how politics used to work. But that is the reality of the way that Donald Trump has, has reshaped the Republican Party party. Many more of these low propensity voters are now part of the Republican Party and many of them are men, which is another key piece of this story. Because women, like these Democratic voters are much more likely to be hyper engaged and to show up and be responsible about voting, including an off year elections or a lot of these younger men who have kind of been red pilled into the Republican Party, they are much more marginal voters. They are not the people you can rely on in an off year election to the same degree. And I so think, I think that's a big part of what we're seeing coming out of last Tuesday.

B (21:35)

I want to pin that and double back to it. But before we double back to it, and I really do want to double back to that point very much. But when you see this is a problem of relativity, when you see two groups drifting apart, the question is, is one, are they both moving, is one staying still and the other moving or vice versa? So as we see this increasing gap between the way women under 30 and men under 30 vote, who's changing more?

C (22:03)

I think, well, society, all of us, all around us, there are big changes taking place. I do think that it is women are changing more in the sense that over time, women have become more educated like they are. They tend to be statistically more have more higher education than their male counterparts. They are, like I said, more sort of hyper engaged in politics. Whereas men, I think, are a little more red pilled, a little more in the.

B (22:36)

What do you mean? Sort of explain what you mean by red.

C (22:38)

Yeah, so red pilled is sort of two things. One is a rejection of kind of democratic elite culture. So I think that men have been moving increasingly away.

B (22:48)

Red pill is a reference to the movie the Matrix.

C (22:51)

Yes. Sorry, I should. That's really. You got to go really far back to understand what red pilled, black pilled. But it's essentially the idea that you get. Well, actually, I don't even explain it in the context of the Matrix. I explain it in the context of politics, which is a rejection of woke DEI and democratic politics in general.

B (23:09)

In the Matrix, there's an offer of two pills, one which allows you to live in the world of comforting illusions, which is blue and one of which is red, which allows you to see the horrible truth. And so when Alex Jones wants you to know that aliens are real and killed JFK and Nancy Pelosi has been covering it up all this time because she's a face eating pedophile who lives in, who drinks blood that is called red peeling because as lunatic and crazy and false in every particular big and small as it is, the people who absorb that red pill believe it's true. The aliens did kill jfk and Nancy Pelosi has been covering it up. And men who are people, but especially men who subscribe to these crazy things you hear on the Internet, don't say I'm a lunatic, which is true, or I listen to, I trust and listen to lunatics and give them my money and buy their supplements. No, no, I've taken Morpheus's red pill and now I see the truth about the aliens killing jfk.

C (24:05)

That's, that's a way better explanation of like what the actual act of taking a red pill is in the world. It is more like men saying, man, I don't think that there's anything in what the Democrats are offering that resonates with me and I reject it actively. In fact, it makes me angry. And this I think goes to the central point of the why about younger men and women. They live in algorithmically different universes and that is pushing them to both not really understand each other, not be able to talk to each other. I also. There's a whole bunch of other things going on. Some of it is just Covid. Right. Like part of the red pill culture is about the idea that the way that elites approached Covid and demanded that they live inside and wear masks and that they were wrong about that and it destroyed people's lives. And so Democrats are to blame. And so you've got this sort of young man culture that is both angry at elites, angry at woke culture, and also in many ways hostile to women.

B (25:11)

Because to go back to your other comparison, the people over 65, mostly they're men and women living together. And especially with non national elections, they're talking to each other over breakfast like, you know, well, this candidate for governor wants to widen the highway. Well, gee, that means we can get to work faster. Yes, but it'll be more traffic on our road. Oh, I hadn't thought of that. But getting to work faster, that would be good. Okay, so let's vote for the candidate who's going to widen the road, not the one. And they converge because they're talking to each other, especially about those bread and butter issues that are so prominent in local elections. You want the bars downtown to stay open from 2 to 4, more revenue from merchants, a livelier street life, on the other hand, more mess, more risk of crime. The husband and wife over 65, they talk about those things. Whereas when you have young men and young women who not only don't live together but don't consume the same media, don't get the same algorithmic fees, as you say, they're not talking and therefore not converging.

C (26:04)

That is, that's 100% the case. And I just, I did this episode on the focus group podcast, which is the weekly podcast I do, where we listen to young. We listen to voters, but this week we to listen, listened to young voters. And I had sort of a Gen Z qualitative analyst on who was talking to me about what was going on with men and women. One of the things she said to me that makes a ton of sense is not only are young people growing up very native to screens, to social media, and to these algorithmic impulses that push them into completely different worlds. Because instead of saying, okay, men and women, they might gravitate towards different things, but there's also all this monoculture stuff that sort of brings them together that they like to do together or where they have similar points of reference and so they talk about it together, that much of that is disappearing, number one. And number two, Covid did a massive disruption for this younger generation that actually created for them an inability to even talk to each other in the normal ways, like flirting or figuring out how you just be together, like finding third spaces that aren't in school or in a job where men and women come together and hang out. And one of the things we did for this group is we listened to a young group of progressive women and it was interesting to hear them say, essentially, I don't really need men. They are off doing this stupid video game stuff and they're sort of emotionally immature or stunted in these ways. I get a great deal of my sort of nutrition, like, like emotional sustenance from other women. And so, like, I don't need men. And like, they're acting like big babies. And then you listen to the men who say, well, I want to get married, I want to have kids. Those are my priorities. And of course, them feeling like women don't feel the same way or reject them then caused them to sort of turn inward and find community in the. These broy podcasting spaces, gaming spaces, many places that actually could be either actively hostile to women or where just sort of a rejection of women to create that. That camaraderie becomes. And so like they're. They're getting actively pulled apart in this way that doesn't just have political consequences, but I feel like it's going to have lasting cultural consequences if we're. We kind of don't figure out what's happening with the kids.

B (28:28)

I'm interested by a word you haven't said. We were having this conversation about gender gaps, which began to show up in the 1980s. Before 1980, men and women voted almost exactly like each other and were defined by their group. So black men and black women, white men, white women, blue collar men, blue collar women, white collar men, white collar women. The sex divide was not an important divide before 1980. It begins to become an important division, important divide among. In. In the 1980s, but especially among the young. Over the 45 years where we've been talking about this, the word that is always invoked first is the word abortion.

C (29:01)

Abortion.

B (29:01)

And you have not said that word at all.

C (29:03)

Yeah, that is because I think that that matters. It's in there. And in fact, when we were listening to the young women in the groups, that was something they brought up pretty quickly, like they did. They brought. They are scared about the repeal of Roe v. Wade. They are in that age group where their friends are actively grappling with pregnancies, wanted unwanted reproductive health in general, thinking about ivf, like all of the things that kind of run the gamut there. That's the age where not only do you have to contend with it biologically, but and, and, and all of the scary things that come with it. But like everybody in your orbit is dealing with this stuff. So it certainly came up and mattered to them, but it was in with a bunch of other things too. They were much more likely. And this is where the algorithm and like algorithms are difficult. And actually this is where you get back to sort of the red pill, blue pill type situation is like, what does a person see? What world do they live in? And one of the big differences between people who are older and people who are younger is not just what types of media they consume, but how they consume it. So older people are what we would call news seekers. Right? Even people my age, People your age. We would watch the news like it was an, it was an act. We would go sit down with our cup of coffee in the morning, we'd watch the news or we'd pick up the newspaper, we'd read the news. And obviously that's been shifting for a while, but we still have a news seeker mentality. I'm going to get on, I'm going to look at what's going on in the news. Young people are news receivers almost exclusively. Like the algorithm just gives them their news, it washes over them. And so the algorithm is saying, oh, young women, I'm going to push more pro Palestinian stuff your way. I'm going to push more reproductive rights stuff your way. I'm going to push more affordability things your way, whatever it is. Young women are just living in a different information environment than the men that they're around. And so yes, it's abortion. I, I, I think that that really does matter. I just, I don't think it is. I think something bigger is happening than just reproductive rights.

B (31:16)

How much of this is just behavioral? So Mitt Romney faced a gender gap because many women disagreed with his views. Not just on personal autonomy, reproductive health, things like that, but also Mitt Romney, you were going to get lower taxes for fewer services. But I venture that if you'd asked the typical American middle aged woman said, if your daughter brought home a man like the young Mitt Romney, would you want to see her marry him? Oh, yeah, yeah, sure, yeah, he'd be a great husband, he'd be a great, I may not vote for him for president, but yeah, my daughter brought him home. Yeah. Okay, so Donald Trump, you'd call the cops, right? I mean, this, you get a restraining order like, and while I was about to say he's the biggest jerk in the world. Actually, you know what? Not. Not true any. Maybe he was in 2016, but he has been so far overtaken by bigger and bigger jerks who have been licensed by him. And we live in like the golden age of jerks. And so much of the world that we've seen since 2012 in the informational world is one in which the content produced for men, teaches, invites, validates the worst kind of behavior. And I wonder if that's kind of that women just say, I want no part of this.

C (32:31)

Well, this is what's so I actually don't quite know the answer to this, but I'm going to venture something because one of the things that's been so interesting to me as I've listened to focus groups now for eight years around Trump, I went back recently and looked at some of my 2018 focus groups among women. I'm talking about like 50 year old women, 60 year old women, and they have this sort of strong, weak frame they're grappling with. They also have, they have been dealing with Donald Trump in their lives for forever. Right? Like he was around, he was a playboy, he's on Page six. And then he was on the Apprentice, this carefully curated businessman. And I would say women, older women, they kind of had a, the locker room talk landed with them. Like they kind of understood that. And obviously there has been a disparity with women, but overall he does okay. Like the bottom hasn't completely dropped out with women. For younger women, it is not just Trump, but it is the forces Trump has unleashed on the young men around them. They have to deal with that. They have to listen. Imagine not just having Trump's sort of grab her by the stuff in the ether, but now Andrew Tate and Matt Walsh and the trad wives and all this stuff you see permeating the culture among young men. And you have the ability in ways that I think women many, many decades older than you might not have. Right. Because they were conditioned more to like deal with it. Young women are like, I don't need to deal with this. I don't. I mean the listening to the progressive women, they were just like, yeah, I'm not, I'm not like getting married, having kids is not, is not my number one priority. And if these guys are going to act like this, like, I don't have to hang with that.

B (34:14)

Well, you invite me to. I don't have to imagine it because I have, I have a daughter in the relevant dating pool and I hear her mother hears more obviously But I hear some and it does seem like I don't know what's going on in the entire universe. But in the universe of college educated, career minded young men, the behavior seems to be a lot worse than it was when I was in that group.

C (34:41)

Well, I think part of it is like how do you behave if your incentives are to come together? Right. If the cultural incentives are to find a way to men need women, women need men. We are finding ways to take the fact that like, you know, there's these real differences, but there's things that pull them together and make them want to cohabitate and live in the world together in a way where like those incentives are just sort of falling away. And it's the reason that part of the rise of the trad wife and like men talking about, you know, repealing the 19th amendment, you know, it comes from a sense of women are not as reliant on us anymore. More that freaks us out. And also I do think is genuinely displacing. Right. This idea of I don't know what my role in society is if women's role in society is this. And so I'm going to be angry about it. Like that is, I mean, and I don't want to overstate it. Like and, and the young woman that I was interviewing from Gen Z also was sort of careful to be like, and hey, look, we're still out here dating, we're still out here living our lives. But just in terms of big macro cultural forces, I do think the things that divide the sexes and the incentives have shifted quite a bit and are, are pushing people apart more than they're pushing them together.

B (36:03)

Yeah. Now I pinned something a little while ago and I want to come back to this about what is happening and maybe a way back into this thing we wanted to pin was to talk about what happened in New York City because Mamdani did do well with young men. I have my own private theory about that. But I'd be interested to know what is, is the difference here. And this goes back to the thing we want to talk about before is that women are voting for women because remember the places where we saw these huge gender gaps were female candidates. Although in Virginia was a female candidate against another female candidate, New Jersey female candidate against a male candidate. In New York the candidate was male. Is that why young men were more attracted to Mamdani? Or was it that Mamdani did come more from a very male oriented media subculture? And he also, he I'm going to try to put this as neutrally as I can, but he had engaged in and celebrated a lot of norm defying behavior.

C (36:56)

Yeah, I mean, I think that partly. It's tough to extrapolate. You can extrapolate a lot more about national politics out of New Jersey and Virginia than you can out of New York City. Like, New York City is really its own kind of beast with its own kind of like the people who voted for Cuomo. It's hard to know whether they're kind of like Trumpy Republicans all the way over to sort of normie Democrats to Jews who didn't like Madame. Like, it's actually a very difficult thing to tease apart or extrapolate from New York City what's going on in national politics. Just in terms of men versus women. The women under 30 margin was basically exactly the same as it was in the other two races, which was, it was 82%. Women under 30 went for Mamdani, but 65% of men under 30 went for Mamdani, which is higher than the other two races. And it was a very high turnout. Like, the thing is, is like how many, like, turnout is such an important part of trying to carve up how many people did what in an election. And just there's just a ton of New York Democrats. But I do think that Mudani appealed to men in part because he is a man, in part because he did more. He was very much in the sort of, yeah, male algorithmic ecosystem. But I do think some of it just has to do with, yeah, him being a guy. I, I, this is, this is a difficult thing to, to tease out in focus groups because people don't like admitting it. But I hear a pretty people do talk about the fact that they don't want to vote for women.

B (38:33)

Yeah, really, they do. They will say that they do.

C (38:36)

They're much, much more for president than, than for these local elections. And people will articulate this women too, where they'll say, you know, I'm happy to vote for a woman for Senate, whatever. But when it comes to, and a lot of it has to do with dealing with world leaders, but people often in focus groups and not just off, I mean, like almost dominantly, they put things in strong and weak framing. And one of the things they say about Donald Trump is that he's strong. And Kamala Harris seemed weak, but also Joe Biden seemed weak. And I think that there's something about Mumdani, young, handsome, lots of energy that leans, lends itself to the strong framing that does allow not, it's not Everyone. But does allow some men to just tag on in ways that they feel funny about voting for women. I think it does make up a little bit of margin.

B (39:30)

Do you think people are more willing to say in a focus group, I wouldn't vote for a woman than they were 15 years ago?

C (39:37)

I do, 100%. I mean, the thing is, I wasn't doing focus groups back then, but I gotta say, in my life, and I was a Republican, so it's not. I mean, I was around lots of people with, With Republican ideas. I never heard anybody say, I wouldn't vote for a woman. They might think it, sure. But honestly, people, especially for Republicans, there was always a sense of it would be great to have more women candidates, like, for such a long time. It was a. A real sense of we need to get more women in because that's how we're competitive. Women vote at these higher numbers. Everybody sort of knew that Donald Trump came along, and now both men and women are much more willing and a lot of them older, older to just say, I mean, I've had people, men. I remember it vividly, so it can't happen so much that it doesn't leave an impression. But he was like, well, what if they're on their period? Like, who knows what kind of decision they might make? You know? And so you do hear more of.

B (40:29)

That kind of stuff, I think with men voters of a certain age. There's also the Thatcher example. So the first female leader of a G7 country was someone who's unquestionably strong and on the right. And so I think that led a lot of people in the Republican world in the 80s and 90s to assume the first female president will probably be a Republican in the Thatcher model. Because that answer, that may answer the strong. I mean, no one would ever say.

C (40:53)

But yeah, that was always my thinking that the first female president would be a Republican. I think if Condoleezza Rice had run, and this is where I say people are like, well, no, America's never going to vote for a black woman. I'm convinced that if Condoleezza Rice had run, run also I'm convinced that if Michelle Obama had run this last time, but I do think, I think she would have won. I think that. That Republicans would have voted for her. I think that some Democrats would have voted for her. And. But, you know, there aren't a lot of women now in the Thatcher model like Donald Trump is. Actually, he's managed to. In a weird way. There are a lot of women, a lot of high profile women in the Republican Party. There's Marjorie Taylor Greene, there's Lisa Stefanik, there's Kristi Noem. You know, he's, he surrounds himself with lots of women, Pam Bondi. So he, in some ways, like, and people don't really write this story that much, but like he has lots of women in his orbit, maybe more than any president I can remember. The problem is, is that they're all deeply subservient to Donald Trump, right? They're all in his image. And so he likes that, he likes that there's these, all these women who are willing to kind of just subsume themselves into Donald Trump's image. Like even that was part of the problem for winsome Earl Sears, right? They're all these like MAGA weirdo candidates and none of them are in the Thatcher model at all, right? They don't, they sort of don't stand alone. And to the extent that Nikki Haley, she could never recover from the way in which she had allowed herself to be totally sort of humiliated over and over by Donald Trump and made to look a fool, like she actually was on the trajectory of that Thatcherite model. Somebody who was deeply invested in foreign policy or had high level of expertise in that. But nobody sees her as strong the way they don't see a lot of these women as strong because they're just Trump light. So everybody can see that they're this like simulacrum of Donald Trump.

B (42:51)

I want to go back now to something, a point again I bracketed a little while ago. Are we looking at sort of an education gap because women are so much more successful at gaining university and post university education than men. That, that's another reason that is going on here.

C (43:04)

Yeah, I mean the diploma divide is essential to understand. Like there's two things in politics and I wouldn't even put the gender divide as the top one. I would put the diploma divide at the top because I think it's driving a big part of the gender divide. And then it would be the political realignment that has happened with Donald Trump to the extent where, and again, meaning that there's been this trade, the trade of non college working class voters have moved to the Republican Party. The average voter in this country is a 50 year old white person without a college degree. But in places where there is a high concentration of, of college degrees, they tend to be more liberal. And most importantly, and this is what really matters for 2026, is that it is the off year elections where Democrats now have the advantage because they have more college educated Voters and many of them are like me. They are people who used to vote for Republicans and Republicans used to benefit from having people like me in the off year. In the off years we would show up. And so Republicans had the chance to do really well in off years. That is no longer true. This is the biggest flip in politics structurally, which is that in off years Democrats now have the opportunity to do better because they have more college educated voters. And I would hazard to take that a step further than, and say to your point, to bring it back, because young women and women in general are now much more likely to have a BA to be college educated and to be tapped in on these political issues in off years. They are now becoming enormous driving forces in who wins in off year elections. Which is why you're seeing these extremely enormous margins, right, because of the, in the makeup of who voted. Young women are making up quite a large percentage of who is turning out to vote. So they are going to become a key constituency. And that young men, much like non college working class voters, are people who maybe just turn out in big national elections and just pay attention to big national vibes, but aren't as keyed in on all this other stuff that young women seem to be very keyed in on.

B (45:28)

If you were to give each party some advice about how it can overcome its deficiencies, like in the most, not, not grand strategic advice, but just say, okay, if you're a Republican running for Senate or governor in 26 and you're worried about how you do with women, what should you do? And if you're a Democrat worried about how you're doing with men in 26, what should you do?

C (45:49)

Well, if you want to do better with women, you should reject Donald Trump. I mean, the extent to which Trump is driving a rejection of Trump, and that shouldn't be underestimated in these numbers either. Just the way that young men have gravitated more toward Donald Trump, young women are repelled by him. And so I think as, and this is a bigger question as we Trump's lame duckness really came into focus after these first off year elections. They are going to come further into focus after the 2026 elections where people will start saying, okay, who is going to be the Republican nominee in 2028? And I think that going into 26, the extent to which Trump is still though rejection of him is a driving force in Democratic politics. I think that that's the number one thing. Young women don't want to have anything to do with Donald Trump. If you were Gonna bring young men in. Like if you wanna do more with young men, go on all the podcasts. I mean this is what Trump did, this is what Vance is doing. Vance's job is basically to go on bro podcasts and keep the Trump agenda top of mind for them.

B (47:04)

Yeah, that's one of his vulnerabilities. Because when you say who succeeds Donald Trump, I bet it's pretty unlikely that J.D. vance ever said let's repeal the 19th amendment, the amendment that gives women the vote. But I bet there's a clip of him chuckling when somebody else said it.

C (47:16)

Yeah, well there's definitely clips of him talking about childless cat ladies being the biggest problem. Like his, he, that J.D. vance is a very good archetype of the kind of low level hostility to women and especially sort of memeification of the, of jokes about, about progressive women. And so like the intensity of the rejection of J.D. vance from young women will be hard and that will further accelerate that gender divide. Because I do think that Vance has something that a lot of young men, I know this for a fact, I listen to young men talk about. They like him, they find him to be a, a more intellectual version of Donald Trump, somebody slightly more serious and also somebody who is young like them. Just like Mamdani is a young man like them.

B (48:04)

Yeah. So you think that that works? That I mean he has, he's, he's awfully eggheady.

C (48:09)

I don't think it works the way Trump works. I think the reason that you see them cosplaying around the Trump 2028 is that they recognize this phenomenon that I have now discussed at length of Trump draws out low propensity voters in a way Republicans have never seen for their party. And they do not know if that continues to happen with J.D. vance because Donald Trump is such a unique figure. And if suddenly without Trump's general election ability to put up Saddam Hussein like numbers in a lot of rural areas and other places, if that's left to JD Vance and they can't get that. But these college educated suburban voters have now shifted to the Democrats. That spells long term trouble for Republicans.

B (48:51)

Last thought on this for what it means for the shape of local politics because one of the you have left behind. There's a big question mark about 2028. But what your suggestion is that if it's about propensity, that state government should become more and more. What is the word I'm looking for more and more aligned with the interests of younger women. I don't want to use the word liberal or progressive or because I'm not sure that that's exactly what's going on. But the way that those people who are today under 30 and very soon will be under 40 think is going to, it should drive more and more of the way local government behaves. Local, local government since the elections of 2010 has moved so far to the right. Republicans had a big year in 2010. There were the redistrictings and, and we've had very conservative local governments almost everywhere from 2010. And the effects of and with the consequence effects of the way state maps are drawn. So you get very, when you have a very conservative Wisconsin state legislature, you've got a very gerrymandered Wisconsin congressional delegation. Same thing in North Carolina. But if it becomes harder for Republicans to win in Wisconsin and North Carolina at the state level, then doesn't that how does that ramify through the whole federal political system?

C (50:01)

I mean look, I've always thought that the only way to get our politics to return to normal is for Republicans to endure sustained electoral defeats, which is not what's been happening. Right. It keeps kind of we keep having change elections swinging back and forth. Republicans have more confidence that they can continue in this trumpy direction and compete electorally. And I, part of me doesn't want to overemphasize sort of the demographic of young people growing up and then, you know, our politics staying the same because I think the Democrats thought that that would happen because of demographics and because of young people and that didn't happen. I do think what might happen long term is that more is that the parties start to become really gender divided that Republicans basically say I don't think we can compete which is what they're doing right now. They're saying I can't and won't even try to compete with young women. Instead we're going to focus on competing more with young men. And that includes margins of black men and Hispanic men that help us sort of recover those numbers. And because like I said, the average voter is a non college white voter over the of is like a 50 year old non college white voter. That's and there's a lot of them, they can still do really well, but they have to start losing in places like Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. And in fact, I'll tell you something else that worries me is that there's going to be a census in 2030 that I think is going to tilt things even further in favor of Republicans. Like, like it is getting very hard because these concentrations of young college educated women. They're not as concentrated in Ohio. They're not as concentrated in places where in Florida, in places where Democrats used to be competitive and no longer are. And so the Senate map is increasingly hostile to Democrats. And Democrats are going to have to figure out how to compete in places that they used to be able to compete in right when Heidi Heitkamp was around, or lots of people who would, who would, you know, they could compete in Iowa. And they're gonna have to do that again.

B (52:09)

Sarah, thank you so much for your time today. It's such a pleasure to talk to you always. I always learn from you.

C (52:13)

Oh, thanks for having me, David.

B (52:14)

Bye bye. Thanks so much to Sarah Longwell for joining me today on the David Frum Show. As I mentioned at the top, my book this week is a new novel, the Emergency, by my Atlantic colleague George Packer. Now, some of you who listen to or watch this podcast may remember a dialogue that George Packer and I shared together about his very incisive profile of JD Vance earlier this year. George Packer is the author of important works of non Fiction, a 2005 study of the war in Iraq, The Assassin's Gate, based on his really empathetic and very courageous war reporting from the Iraq front. He wrote in 2013 a stylistically original study of the Great Recession called the Unwinding, which mixed broad economic reporting with a series of very elegant and interior profiles of people, both famous and not, who had been caught up in the drama and tragedy of the events of the Great Recession. He is the author in 2019 of a biography of Richard Holbrooke, the great American diplomat called Our Man. But George, through his career, has been ambidextrous to fiction and non fiction. And this new novel of his, the Emergency, marks a return to his career as a writer of fiction. I read it in an earlier form. It made an enormous impression on me. It's one of those novels I found myself dreaming about. And as I thought about why it had made such an impact on me, it led me to a thought that George wants to invite, a thought. He contributed a recent article to the Atlantic about which is what is fiction for exactly. Now I am mostly a writer of nonfiction. I've tried my hand at fiction. It was not of the level of artistic excellence of George's work. When you write nonfiction, you're constantly trying to explain to people both how the world is and to prove that you have a right to talk about it. You have devices to substantiate your claims to credibility, facts and figures Quotes, public opinion, polling that you're trying to persuade people. Look, I'm going to tell you what the world is like, and here's how you can know that I am right about what the world. World is like, and this is why you should believe me with fiction. You jettison that apparatus when you're doing the work of fiction to say, say to the reader, I'm going to show you something. I believe it's true. You don't have to take my. You don't have to believe it. I'm. We're saying it's mostly made up or it's imagined. But I'm going to show you something, and you tell me if you agree that I have shown you a truth that you recognize, even though there are no facts and figures to back it up. And that, I think, is what George has done in the emergency. Here he conjures up a world that is like. And unlike our own, it is a world in which an old order has. Has collapsed, in which young people are imposing new structures of identity and conformity on the old, in which the old feel left out, and in which many people are turning to devices that substitute for reality, that offer them a more attractive experience than reality. So that sounds like a world we know, but in many respects it's not the world we know. It doesn't take place in the United States of America. It doesn't take place in any country that actually exists, takes place in a fictional fallen empire. It doesn't take place exactly in our time, the world of the emergency. Well, they do have cars, they have firearms, they have surgical suites. But it doesn't feel quite modern. It feels like the world of the 1970s or maybe the 1960s. It doesn't have an economy that works quite like ours. It doesn't have groups that conform to our idea of what the groups in society are. It's like and unlike. And it doesn't. One thing that is also very important is, although it is a world that doesn't exist, it's a world that doesn't have fantastic elements of magic or technology. There are no spaceships, and there are no wizards in warlocks, no magic spells, no incantations that things move. The laws of physics in George Packer's universe are exactly the same as the laws of physics in our universe. No abracadabras. And yet people. And the people are very like people, you know, and they operate and talk in ways that feel very familiar, even if they do so in a context that is. Well, that's the big Question mark is. In some ways the context is familiar. I mean, many of us have a feeling that we live in a world that is not the world we expected to live in. A world that is somehow a falling away from a better world that existed until quite recently. A world that disappoints many of our expectations and hopes, and a world in which we have to make the best of things that we thought we would never encounter in the first place. So in that sense it's strange, but it's not so strange. And in fact, one of the things that I think George is doing in this book is he is making our present day world more intelligible by making it more strange by abstracting. There's no Donald Trump, there's no Congress of the United States. There are no midterm elections. It's not even clear. There's no Internet in the novel. It's not even clear that this is a world in which the people involved are really speaking English. Although the novel is recorded in English, it's quite possible this is some other kind of language entirely which just happens to be reported to us in English. But it's a world in which we're going to feel that a lot of our fears and doubts are reflected in ways that make them easier to grasp and easier to understand, but with no claims made that this is how reality is. If you don't want to believe it, you don't have to. There are no opinion polls here, no surveys, no facts and figures. As I said, it is the kind of book that I found myself literally dreaming about. I woke up one night and I felt I had been living for that evening in the world of the emergency. A world in which sometimes it seems that we are living among fragments of a ruined society and that the challenge for each of us is to figure out how do we reconnect with people who have been estranged from us by the bruin of the old society and make something new that maybe won't be quite as good as what went before, maybe represents a degree of loss, but doesn't have to be as bad as it otherwise might be. It's a novel in many ways, of grief and disappearance and decline. But that kind of experience can also summon us to awareness of new possibilities, maybe not for everybody, but for ourselves, and new challenges to us to do right things under difficult circumstances rather than slide into the temptation to do wrong things. I highly recommend the book. I am so pleased to have been one of the early readers of it, and I think you will find it as moving and as disturbing as I did. That's it for the David Frahm show this week. Thank you so much for joining me. I hope you will consider subscribing to the Atlantic. That is the best way to support the work of this podcast and of all my colleagues. You can also subscribe to an alert for my particular articles. When they post, you will be the first to know. I hope you will share news of this podcast on whatever platforms you use to listen to or watch online content. Thank you for joining and I hope to see you again next week here on the David Frum Show. This episode of the David Frum show was produced by Nathaniel Fromm and edited by Andrea Valdez. It was engineered by Dave Grine. Our theme is by Andrew M. Edwards. Claudine Abayad is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio, and Andrea Valdez is our Managing Editor. I'm David Frum. Thank you for listening.