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Okay, only 10 more presents to wrap. You're almost at the finish line. But first, There the last one. Enjoy a Coca Cola for a pause that refreshes.

David Frum (16:35)

Margaret McMillan is one of the modern world's leading historians of war and peace. Many will know her from her best selling books about the beginning and the end of the First World War, the road to 1914 and Paris 1919. She has also written important histories of global conflict, of women in British India, and of the Nixon Mao relationship as well. Margaret MacMillan has divided her career between her native Canada and the United Kingdom, where she served among many distinguished roles as warden of St. Anthony's College at Oxford University. I'm very grateful and delighted to welcome her today to the David Frum Show. Thank you, Margaret.

Margaret MacMillan (17:12)

Well, thank you too.

David Frum (17:13)

Let me start by taking us all back on 101 International Relations. The lesson that we all thought we had learned from historians like you about the 20th century is that we tried to put together a stable peace in 1919 without the United States. Well, they didn't know it was going to be without the United States, but that's the way it turned out. And that project completely failed. Great Depression, Second World War. And the lesson that leaders of the world took from the Second World War is that stable peace depends on American presence. And that lesson, held for, by international relations standards, a reasonably long time. But it seems to be becoming unstuck now. In the Obama years, there was a phrase that went round about a post American world. And the idea there was that would be a post American world because India and China and others would get so big and powerful that they would overtake the United States. What no one ever seemed to contemplate was a return to your Paris 1919 situation and a post American world because America withdrew. Can you reflect on that experience, the comparisons then and now, and what lessons we ought to have learned and seem to be failing to learn?

Margaret MacMillan (18:19)

Well, I suppose what we should always remember is that any international order or any international system is only as good as the parties in it. And so unless you have the most powerful nations in the world willing to support a stable international order, you're in trouble. And I think where the League of Nations did have problems, I wouldn't agree with you. It was a complete failure. I think it did actually do some very good things. But where it was in trouble was that it didn't have the United States in it. And it also, for a long time, didn't have the Soviet Union, two very big powers indeed. And the Second World War, I think, brought a recognition that if you want to build an international organization and an international order, then you've got to get the good powers in, if you possibly can. And so the United States under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was very determined to get the United States in, to win over American public opinion, to get the United States into the United nations and all the Bretton woods organizations, but also to get the Soviet Union in. And I think that's what helped to make the Post World War II system work better, that there was a commitment by the big powers. And eventually, of course, Communist China came in as well.

David Frum (19:22)

We do seem to have in the present day, a kind of American abdication, an American withdrawal, not just from a role in the system, but also from the rules of the system. And right now we're poised on, apparently the verge of a United States war on Venezuela with no authorization by Congress, no partners, no allies, no real stated cause of the war, and no idea of what the United States hopes to achieve. It's just acting like a pirate state. And again, it may all fizzle out, but it looks like there's a kind of completely roleless, ruleless American war coming.

Margaret MacMillan (19:57)

I think you're expressing very much what I feel as well, that the United States is playing a role which we didn't expect it would play because it has, in fact, played a very significant role in keeping a world order. We don't have to agree with everything it's done and I wouldn't agree with everything it's done since 1945, but it's been key in keeping the world on an even keel. And I think what's been very important is that the United States and other powers have obeyed the rules. There are international treaties, international laws, international conventions. They've also followed the norms that nations behave in certain ways if they're responsible and don't behave in other ways. And we now see United States under this present administration, which really doesn't seem to care about any of that, that makes its own rules, breaks, breaks whatever norms and rules and ignores whatever values it doesn't like. And once you get a great power doing that, perhaps the key power in the international system, then others will follow along. We've already seen Russia beginning to abdicate any responsibility for the international order, beginning to break the rules, beginning to invade its neighbors. And we're now seeing a United States, which I don't think is planning to invade its neighbors anytime soon, but is certainly not upholding a system where everyone is expected to obey the rules. And I find this very dangerous indeed. And in the case of Venezuela, it's not at all clear what the United States wants to do. That's the other worrying thing. What is their purpose and what is their goal and what are their plans? Very unclear.

David Frum (21:19)

Yeah, well, that's just a caveat to the question. But not attacking their neighbors. Greenland isn't literally a neighbor of the United States, but there does seem to be a fairly developed plan to attack Greenland. I'm guessing that as experienced players of the board game Risk know that to secure North America, you need Venezuela, Greenland and Kamchatka. So that. That the pattern here is going to be a little disturbing if we find ourselves at war with Kamchatka. There are American troops in Greenland under NATO arrangement, but the United States wants more and more and more. And aggression against Greenland would be a very feasible project.

Margaret MacMillan (21:50)

I don't see the point of it myself, because the United States can get everything from Greenland that it wants. I mean, it's had a base there since the end of the Second World War. In fact, it used to have more bases, but it closed a couple of them down. It can get whatever minerals it wants from Greenland. The Danish government, I think, is very willing to work with the United States. The Greenlanders themselves, I think, have made it fairly clear in the last election that they don't want to become part of another empire. They would rather come out of the Danish empire and have their independence. But they certainly don't want to be part of an American empire. And what I find about a lot of the Trump administration's policies is I just don't get the point. I don't see what they're gaining from the actions they're taking. In fact, if anything, they're creating pushback, which is presumably not what they want.

David Frum (22:31)

Yeah, well, I think in Greenland, I think I do see a glimmer of what they want, as you say. I think the American presence in Greenland goes back before the Second World War. I didn't. It starts when, before the United states enters the Second World War, in 1941, with the consent of Greenland. Denmark was, of course, occupied by the Nazis. There was a government in exile in Greenland, and they welcomed the American presence in the same way that Iceland welcomed a British presence to keep the north northern sea lanes free from Nazi submarines. But I think the logic I do see is, yeah, you can mine in Greenland, but you're subject to Danish law and it's hard to bribe people in Denmark. Whereas if you. If Greenland were annexed, it could be, then mining in Greenland could be subject to American law. And as we see, America has a much looser approach to bribery officials. That seems to be a motive. But as you say otherwise, aside from the question of bribery, there's not a lot of point to it. I mean, Greenland is part of Denmark, and Denmark is a country where people can and do successfully do business.

Margaret MacMillan (23:26)

Well, I think the same thing's happening with Canada. I mean, the United States has always had access to Canadian resources. It's had a quiet neighbor on its northern border, and we've had our disagreements. But why do what the present administration is doing and alienate Canada unnecessarily? I don't see that this is benefiting the United States. What it is doing is creating a lot of mistrust out there in the world of the United States and its motives. And once you lose trust, I think it is very difficult to restore it.

David Frum (23:52)

I think the administration, this administration likes the idea of being able to do whatever it wants, regardless of other people. And in fact, that may be the real fun of it, that it's the. Regardless of whether it doesn't have to make sense, it just has to make the people running the policy feel empowered and dominant. Because in some ways, I think Trumpism, and this goes back to the points I wanted to ask you about at the beginning. Trumpism is a psychological coping mechanism for feelings of weakness that I talked before about the post American world concept that was circulating in the 2000 and tens and the idea then was China and India were going to get so big, America would seem reduced in comparison. And so Trumpism is about self assertion, but self assertion on a much smaller scale, which is, you know, we're giving up on Asia, we're giving up on Europe. We're going to have a Western hemisphere zone of influence stretching from Argentina to Greenland that will be dominated. It'll run much more like a 19th century zone of influence than like the American idea of a world order governed by rule rules. But it will be America's. And America will otherwise retreat. And the more boastfully America conducts itself, the less people will notice, I think Trump feels, and others around him hope the less people will notice that America is actually reducing its position in the world.

Margaret MacMillan (25:01)

Well, the Chinese will notice, won't they? And a number of others will notice. And I think you have a China which is spending more and more on defense, which is talking really more and more openly about how it sees a future role for China as a dominant power. It's certainly in East Asia, perhaps further afield field, and a China which is, at least as far as we can tell, beginning to surpass the United States in very key technological developments. And so the idea that the United States can sort of pull up the drawbridge, I mean, Even in the 19th century, that was becoming a rather old idea. And you know, the United States has always been protected by two big oceans, but we are living in a very globalized world with highly advanced weapons that can travel very, very fast in some cases. The idea that the United States can somehow put a motor around itself, I think simply doesn't work anymore. It hasn't worked actually for decades, since the end of the Second World War. And I think also the idea that the United States can have a zone of influence, I mean, this whole idea of zones of influence which seems to be revived now, I think is a formula for instability. Because what you get is always the points where the zones meet and you always get meddling in each other's zones. I mean, if the United States tries to dominate the whole of the Western Hemisphere, I would predict, and I think it wouldn't be a difficult prediction, that other powers, China, for example, which is always already making inroads into Latin America, already building ports, already winning friends and influencing people, will continue to do it. And there will be points at which the Chinese zone of influence in the Pacific, for example, clashes with the American zone of influence. And so the idea that you can have these neat little boxes and just ignore the rest of the world, it seems to me is unrealistic.

David Frum (26:35)

Well, a lot of it comes from too much looking at maps and not enough looking at economic realities. So the idea that Brazil is the largest country in South America, the most powerful, it's also a major agricultural exporter like the United States. Its economy isn't very complementary to the United States. It's more competitive. You know, if. If you're going to have a Western hemisphere behind high tariff walls. What does Brazil do for a living? I guess it can sell coffee to the United States. But who takes it soybeans? Who takes its beef? Who takes its other agricultural products? The Americans produce those. And the whole idea of a multilateral free trade system is you don't make your partners, your prisoners. In a multilateral system. Brazil can be a member of the American security alliance system while still selling its agricultural products to other people who need them, which will not be the United States.

Margaret MacMillan (27:21)

Yeah, no, I think Brazil is increasingly selling its products to. To Asia. And certainly the countries on the west coast of Latin America are dealing with Asia. I mean, I was in Chile fairly recently and met someone there who, who had a fruit farm, and she told me that most of her products go to China now because the Chinese have an enormous appetite with their population for the products of Latin America. And what. Also the danger of zones of influence, of course, is that the peoples within them don't always choose to be there and don't always like it. So not only do you have always the threats from outside, the tensions with the other zones of influence, but you also have a rested population who don't like the fact that they've ended up under your domination.

David Frum (28:00)

Well, that. That is such an important point. I'm very grateful to you for making it. Because for those who want to take pride in the American role in the world, Europe and Northwest Asia, Germany, Japan, those are good stories. The Latin American story is not a good story. And even its best chapters aren't that great. And its worst chapters are some of the darkest chapters in American history and pretty bad even by world standards. I mean, you mentioned Chile. I mean, you know, the Pinochet coup in 1973. It wasn't the doing of the United States, but it wasn't stopped by the United States. And the United States certainly had the power to stop it if it wanted to. And Argentina, possibly even worse, their dictatorship in the 70s, even worse than the Pinochet. I mean, certainly more crazy. I think the death toll was bigger in Argentina, in Argentina than in Chile. But Argentina has a bigger population. But there seemed to be a kind of sadism and cruelty and stupidity and insanity to the Argentine program. Whereas the Chilean was sort of more cold and ruthless and purposeful. Not to make that any kind of justification, but just. So those are bad chapters and a lot of them have to do with, as you say, Latin Americans saying, if this is going to be a zone of American empire, we want out. And the United States, well, then we will back the people who will lock you in by whatever means they need to lock you in.

Margaret MacMillan (29:13)

I think it's absolutely, it's a very grim prospect. And you know what will happen in Venezuela? Will Maduro goes? And if he goes, will someone even worse take over? I mean, there are a lot of very nasty people around him who presumably will have some control of the military or will there be chaos which won't benefit the very unfortunate people of Venezuela who've already been through so much torment and through so much poverty and so much unnecessary poverty. One of the richest countries in the Americas and it's been reduced to sort of a basket case by incompetent rulers. But I think what the American policies are doing is reawakening the Latin Americanism, the anti Americanism which is always there under the surface in Latin America and sending the gunboats. I mean, it's back to the pre World War I period or post World War I period where the Americans thought they could bring in Latin America under control by sending in the military. And it didn't work then and I don't think it will work now.

David Frum (30:11)

While you were in Chile, I was in Mexico last week and I spoke to a lot of people about the Maduro regime. Now the present government of Mexico under President Claudio Sheinbaum is very Castroid or emotionally. I mean, they run a fairly conservative domestic policy, but there's a lot of lip service to the glorious ideals of Castro Revolution abroad. And Mexico ships subsidized oil to, to Cuba to keep it afloat. So the government has, the leaders of the government have kind of a, an emotional connection to Venezuela. But most Mexicans have little love for the Maduro regime, which has sent 8 million or so refugees spilling all over the world. Many of the large group of Venezuelan refugees are in Colombia and there's a big number in Mexico as well as of course, the United States. But what they're terrified of is unilateral American action. They want some deference to the concept that the United States respects the other countries of Latin America. If you want to intervene, do so in a multilateral way. Get some buy in and Consent and reassure everyone that the goal is to restore the Venezuelan democracy that existed before Chavez and Maduro and not to appoint the next thug in line who will do business with Trump in a way, and avoid some of the provocations that Maduro has indulged in.

Margaret MacMillan (31:21)

Yeah, no, I agree with you completely. And I think we've seen in recent history regime change doesn't always go well. I think great powers often have this illusion that because they're so powerful, they can control everything. And it's a temptation and a snare, and you can't control events once they start to happen on the ground, and you don't always get the results you want. I mean, look at Afghanistan today. I mean, I don't think any American government would have wanted what's happened in Afghanistan, but that's what they've got now. They've got a Taliban government again.

David Frum (31:50)

Let's go back to the year 1919, which seems to be such a mystic turning point. I think one of the things that Americans don't remember enough about their history, everyone, I think, is taught in high school the story of the US Decision not to join the League of Nations. But I don't think enough people, because it's a little technical, understand what it meant in the United States in 1919, or actually a little later, 1921 and 23, decided to return to its high tariff policies that prevailed before the First World War. Europe was ravaged. Europe needed to export, Europe needed to earn dollars. And the United States said, no, we are withdrawing. And in a way, I won't go into here for complicated reasons. That isolation triggered both the artificial 1920s boom in the United States, but also the 1930s depression. And Americans remember the boon, and they think, oh, that that's our good policies. And they remember the 1930s depression, say, I guess something happened on Wall street, but we don't. It's very complicated. And they don't see that the two are linked together, but the people who lived through it understood that that must never be repeated. And so after the Second World War, the United States integrated itself with the. With the economies of Europe and Northwest Asia. And now it's 1919 again.

Margaret MacMillan (32:55)

Yeah, it's sort of beggar your neighbor, isn't it? And we've seen these tariff wars before, and this idea that somehow you can protect your own economy, well, there are times when protecting your economy and protecting infants industries works. I mean, it worked for the Asian Tigers. They protected domestic production for a time until their domestic industries were capable of competing. But in the end, what they did is lower the tariffs. And I think the idea that you can protect your economy by putting up tariffs, especially if you haven't got the basis to develop industries. I don't know. I mean, do you really think that Americans are going to go back to producing things in massive factories which are now being produced in Asia or elsewhere? I mean, is this the way the American economy is going to go? I don't see it myself. Yeah.

David Frum (33:44)

And tariffs on bananas and chocolate and coffee.

Margaret MacMillan (33:48)

Well, and the use of tariffs to do non economic things. The use of tariffs to force political change or the use of tariffs just to punish someone you don't like. I mean, Canada got another tariff slapped on when, when the Premier of Ontario did an advertisement with Ronald Reagan's making a speech that President Trump didn't like.

David Frum (34:07)

Yeah. Well, that sends a message to the world. And this is something we need to underscore, that one of the ways that the United States is going backwards is in those years from the end of the Second World War to Trump, there's there was a thing called the United States that was bigger and different from the president of the moment. And that in many, many areas of important areas of the relationship of the United States, relationships with the world didn't matter that much. Who was NATO went on being NATO. The US Japan arrangement went on being the. Sometimes it was a little bumpy or sometimes a little smoother. And sometimes there's some difference that some, sometimes Democrats were more comfortable with one country than another and the Republicans were more comfortable with one country than another. But basically you did not depend on the moods of the president. And that's also part of going backwards. I mean, it makes the United States feel more like a semi developed country that the moods of the president matter.

Margaret MacMillan (34:56)

So much or an absolute monarchy. I mean, I've always found it an irony that the United States had a revolution in the 18th century to get rid of a king and they've ended up, and long before this president, I mean, they've ended up with a president who has more powers than poor old George iii, who was king at the time in England, ever had. But I think what always gave the United States a lot of strength, I mean, it was by far the biggest economic power in the world after, after the Second World War. And it was the major military power. I mean, it had assets that the Soviet Union couldn't even begin to compete with. But what gave it a great deal of influence, I think, was the fact that people looked up to it. They thought the United States represented a Better kind of society, a better kind of politics, a hope for the world. I think also a lot of people had a belief that if the United States makes a mistake, as all nations do, it will correct itself, because that's what democracies can do. And so what the United States had. And I think there was a very wise. I think he was from one of the Scandinavian countries, a historian called Gerlunderstadt, and he said the Americans built an empire by invitation. And it was the invitation coming from the people who wanted to be part of it. I mean, the Western European countries wanted American leadership, they wanted American protection. And I think, and the Japanese did, too, a number of Asian countries. So this gave the United States tremendous power, far more than the Soviet Union ever had. I mean, the Soviet Union's empire was empire by sheer brute force. And as soon as people could get out, they did, whereas the United States had great moral authority as well as great power. And that, I see, is something that it really is losing now. And it seems to me, again, extraordinary that a power would throw away obvious advantages. And what I'm struck also is that a great power, and I've asked all my fellow historians, historians about this, and we can't think of other examples. A great power would throw away dependable allies and you get rid of the ones you can't count on. But getting rid of the dependable ones, like Denmark, like Canada, why would you do it? I mean, it doesn't gain you anything, really.

David Frum (36:52)

It's so imbecile that when you try to think, is there something deeper going on? As I said, the theory that I come to is this is a coping mechanism. It's a retreat under pressure. What is happening to the United States is retreat under pressure. It can't. That many in American life feel they can't compete with new rivals. China and India, they're retreating, but in order to conceal their retreat, especially from themselves, that they then are more boastful, more obnoxious, more aggressive. But as you say, where power meets power, the United States suddenly isn't there. I mean, if you're Vietnam or Indonesia, the United States was the most important factor in your life in 1995. Since 1995, there's been more and more competition, and that competition seems to be ending on Chinese terms. The United States is receding from those places, and indeed, now, after, you never know what these things last. But at least as of this speaking, Trump's latest mood swing has tariffs on Vietnam higher than the tariffs on China. So what's the message to Them.

Margaret MacMillan (37:53)

Well, I don't get it, because we know that Vietnam has a long and complicated history with. With China. I mean, it was part of the Chinese Empire for a thousand years and then broke free. And the Chinese have never been regarded in Vietnam as. I'm exaggerating, but they've usually been regarded as not a very benevolent power, something the Vietnamese want to steer clear of. And the Vietnamese, in spite of the Vietnam War. And this is, I think, quite extraordinary, really looked at the United States admired. The United States have traded with the United States, and yet the United States policies at the moment seem to be driving them towards China, which I suspect is not where the Vietnamese leadership or the Vietnamese people want to go. But it's a result of American policies. And the Americans are doing the same thing to South Korea. I mean, that raid on the factory with. When the technicians were rounded up and accused of being illegal immigrants, this was a factory being built by Hyundai, I think, wasn't it, that being built in the United States.

David Frum (38:46)

I forget which firm, but it was. More than 300 people, I believe, were detained and without warrants and under. Under inhospitable conditions. And.

Margaret MacMillan (38:54)

Yeah, and that did not go down well in South Korea. I mean, the South Korean press there covered it. Then the Japanese, again, I mean, I think, who have been firmly in the American camp, are now finding themselves sort of pushed at arm's length. So I don't. Again, I don't get it. I mean, I think your explanation, that perhaps it's a way of covering up a sense of unease may be part of the story. I just don't see what the United States is getting out of it.

David Frum (39:19)

Well, the new South Korean president made his first trip abroad to Tokyo. An unprecedented. He was like. Came to power in June, made his first foreign trip to Tokyo, unheard of. Every South Korean president since the coming of the democratic regime has made the first visit to Washington, as you know. Well, the Japan, South Korea relationship is fraught. South Korea was a Japanese colony for a long time and it was a very brutal occupation. And South Koreans look to the United States as their. As their protector, principally against North Korea and China, but not a little also against Japan. And now they're having to make the best deal they could because they. Again, the United States just seems gone.

Margaret MacMillan (39:57)

Yeah. And, well, you know, again, I speak as a Canadian. I mean, I think you're Canadian, too, and you've been in Canada recently. But, you know, the shock. I mean, it's just shock and disbelief, actually. What have we done to deserve this? And I was in Ottawa fairly recently and people there said everything has shifted. Things we took for granted has just changed. And I said, do you think it'll go back? And he said, one of the people I was talking to said, no, once things shift like this, they don't go back easily. And it doesn't help that we seem to have an American ambassador in Ottawa who behaves like a sort of a kindergarten teacher ticking us off the whole time and telling us to behave better.

David Frum (40:33)

Yes. Former congressman from Michigan. So somebody who should know better, you would think.

Margaret MacMillan (40:38)

Yeah, I know, I'm surprised because. But he did the same thing, I gather, in the Netherlands. So perhaps this is just a characteristic.

David Frum (40:45)

Or maybe they're chosen for obnoxiousness. Canada's had a very peculiar kind of national. I mean, it's vast terrain, not a big population, never been a major military power, although it certainly has a very distinguished chapter of military history in two world wars, but always in alliance with others. But Canada's always benefited from a security guarantee from the great power of the day. And so in the 19th century, one of the ways that I think a lot about the compare and contrast of Canadian and Mexican history, that even though Canada was also on the American border and even though it also is and was at intervals subject to depredations that the Americans always knew ultimately behind Canada in the 19th century stands great Britain, which is the dominant military power in the world, certainly the dominant naval power. So, you know, handle with care. And then Canada seamlessly transitioned from British protection to American protection. And it's like it's a shock to the national outlook that the British protection is long gone and the American protection has been withdrawn and they're now meeting their neighbor that is behaving to Canada the way it's behaved to many of its Latin American neighbors. And it's getting the same, building the same kind of feelings in Canada and pushing, I think, in my opinion, Canada some destructive ideas about being more self sufficient in industry, which are not feasible but which certainly are emotionally appealing.

Margaret MacMillan (42:06)

Yeah, no, there's a. It'll be interesting to see how far it goes. But I mean, certainly, I mean, I think what Canada is doing, something that perhaps it should have done before is it's upping its defense spending and it's thinking more about how it can find partners elsewhere. I mean, we've, you know, it's been very comfortable to be protected by great powers. You know, not always, but it has on the whole been comfortable. And I think we've got used to it. And I Think we got used to the idea that we didn't need to do much to defend ourselves because Britain or the United States would always be there. And now we really are having to think about where we fit in the world and how we deal with our situation in the world. And I think certainly our prime minister has been paying more attention to the Europeans and he's also been going to Asia. And I think this is something that perhaps is necessary, but it's going to be a very hard adjustment for Canada.

David Frum (42:53)

I was gonna ask you a question, drawing on your academic expertise. So you are both an historian and a teacher of international relations, two disciplines that normally are engaged in a constant speaking of clashing zones of interest. The historians always saying it's diff. The international relations people with their models and their generalities, and the historians saying, no, it's different. There's an academic game, I think, where of lumpers and splitters and international relations people are lumpers and historians are splitters. So drawing on both those clashing zones of expertise, do you think it's meaningful to ask the question, was is the United States an empire? And if it's a meaningful question, how would you answer it?

Margaret MacMillan (43:30)

It's always worth asking those sorts of questions. I mean, because we got used to the idea that empire was dead and gone, the winding up of the European empires after the Second World War, we thought, well, that's it, we won't have that again. We should have looked more closely at Russia or the Soviet Union as it was, because it remained an empire and it's still an empire today, in fact, fact one ethnicity ruling over a lot of other ethnicities who don't necessarily want to be there. But I think empire never really disappeared. We simply got informal empires, or we got, in the case of China, the Chinese moving into Tibet and absorbing or attempting to absorb Tibetan culture into Chinese culture. So I think empire has never really disappeared and we're seeing it back again with the vengeance.

David Frum (44:10)

You didn't answer. You didn't answer the question, though. What the was, is the United States Empire?

Margaret MacMillan (44:17)

Yes, I think it was. I mean, it behaved like an empire. I mean, well, look, I don't think empires are necessarily malevolent. I mean, the Roman Empire had both good and bad things about it. The people within the Roman Empire got stability and security, and people far more moved into the Roman Empire than moved out because of that. And so empires, the Austro Hungarian Empire, managed to provide stability for a lot of different ethnicities, religions, people. And so empires can bring a lot of peoples together. It depends how they're ruled. It depends whether, you know, in our day, we'd prefer that they have more democracy, but the United States has certainly ruled over other people who are not what Americans would consider Americans. I mean, the fact they never made Puerto Rico a state, I think indicates something of the American attitude that they don't really regard Puerto Ricans as being fully Americans in the sense that they define it. And the United States has behaved like. Like an empire in the Caribbean. It's behaved like an empire in Mexico. And that actually absorbed large bits of Mexico, conquering them and bringing in people. So I would say the United States has been an empire and in many ways still behaves like an empire. Not that Americans would probably agree with.

David Frum (45:26)

Me if it was or if it is, what would it mean for that empire to end? And how would we know?

Margaret MacMillan (45:32)

How do we know when empires end? When the peoples who are in the empire no longer want to be part of it and they leave or they rebel. And the British Empire was based partly on force, but also on consent from a lot of the people being ruled over because they saw no alternative. Once the British themselves, once Britain began to weaken, and once it began to become less willing to bear the costs of empire, because empires can be expensive, then the number of the peoples within the British Empire saw a chance to seize their independence. We did. Some Canadians, we were already moving to independence, and we achieved it fully, I would argue, in 1930. But Indian politicians, nationalists led by Gandhi, saw an opportunity during and after the Second World War and India became independent. So, you know, you decide the price of being in the empire is not worth it any longer. You're not getting anything out of it. You see a chance for independence, and you see the imperial power weakening. So will the United States begin to see parts wanting to break away? I don't know. The Hawaiian Islands were brought into the American empire, but they seem to be content as a state. But will the countries of Central America, the Caribbean, begin to push against the United States? Not at the moment. When the United States still is powerful in its own neighborhood.

David Frum (46:50)

Yeah, I think the United States will always remain powerful in its own neighborhood. I'm not sure how I would answer that question. I thought about it a lot and I don't. And I have a complicated answer and not a completely useful one. But what does seem to be happening is that the network, the lattice work of agreements on which American power was based Since World War II, those seem to be dissolving, and the American presence, which reaches its apogee in the 1990s and early 2000s, it seems to be in retreat and it's moving fast. And your point about the empire invitation? A lot of the British Empire in India grew because basically the British offered a better deal to people in India than the previous rulers had done, more security at lower cost. And local landed and mercantile elite said, you know, I like the British deal of security at cost better than I like the old, previous Muggle deal. Anyway, the Muggle deal is no longer available. They've cracked up, their power's gone. So if I want security, the British are offering a lot of security at a reasonable price. I'll take it. And then that lasted as long as it lasted. And then local elite said, you know what? We don't want the British here anymore. And then everyone discovered the British had always been there only because the Indians put up with them. And the moment the Indians decided not to put up with them, the British had to go. But I think there's something like that. The United States has offered these guarantees to everybody, and it's cost the US treasury, military spending, but it's benefited the American economy enormously. But Trump's theory is the American economy doesn't benefit. He's wrong, but he believes that. And so therefore, why should the treasury pay for the military costs, which are much less than the economic benefits? And so it all begins to shrink and wither, and everybody has to then make their own independent arrangements. And some people have no choice. Canada has no choice. Mexico may have a little bit more choice than it thinks. Although Mexico has to worry about American violence in a way that direct violence in a way that it suffered before and may suffer again.

Margaret MacMillan (48:41)

Yeah, I think a lot of Americans forget just how much of the southern United States was once Mexican. Mexicans don't forget it. But I think you're right. I think you get sort of people within empires. I mean, it's partly a confidence trick. I think that's what George Orwell said, that the people who rule it believe they have the right to rule. The people who are ruled accept that. But I think what also begins to change empires is when you get the notion of self determination and democracy and people within empires who have put up with rule because they've always put up with rule from different rulers, and that they've never had a say in who the rulers are, suddenly begin to think they should. And I think that also made a difference in countries like India, that the idea that the Indians themselves should choose their own rulers, which hadn't happened in the past and hadn't happened with the British now began to take root. And ideas can be, as we know, can be very, very powerful.

David Frum (49:32)

Well, if the American arrangement or whatever system is receding, some people will be sad. The allies in continental Europe will be sad. Canadians will certainly be sad. Some people will be relieved. I think many in South America will be relieved. But the many like in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, well, we just have to make our new deal with the new arrangement. That's the eternity of politics. And there seemed to be this moment when the United States offered us a world built by law, but they rejected law even for themselves. And they certainly can't give the benefit of law to us. And so we have to make our own new deal with our own new regional overlords, whoever they may be. China or India.

Margaret MacMillan (50:10)

Yeah. And it's very difficult to see how it will shape out. I mean, will the Chinese be a benevolent overlord? The record so far isn't. Isn't all that good. I mean, the way they've treated Xinjiang and the way they've treated Tibet and the way they're treating Hong Kong now doesn't give me much hope that the Chinese will allow different cultures and different, different areas to flourish and have a certain degree of autonomy. And what you had in a lot of the empires in the past is you did have various degrees of autonomy and then you did actually in some cases have protections for minorities. I mean, the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro Hungarian Empire, were actually very good on minorities. And the Ottomans treated Jews and Christians better than many states which were single religions. Empires are often better at treating minorities. Whether this will happen as we see a new world or perhaps an area dominated by China, the Russian treatment of its minorities is not very encouraging. And I do think what is worrying and is I think keeping some Europeans up at night is what's going to happen to Europe itself if the United States pulls out support for Europe. The Europeans are a long way, I think, from being able to replace American power. American weapons, American technology, they're moving in that direction, but it's going to take a while. And there they've got Russia right on their borders.

David Frum (51:34)

Well, on the day we are speaking, Monday, November 17, there are reports of a major act of sabotage inside Poland, presumably by Russian or Russian agents.

Margaret MacMillan (51:42)

I didn't, I hadn't heard that.

David Frum (51:44)

They blew. They blew up apparently an important train line with some kind of complicated device. And it's a very undeniable act of aggression against the NATO state. The Russians have carried out with more deniability attacks on defense installations in Europe before they've tried to commit assassinations of European defense executives. This seems to be a new level, and a lot of the permission seems to be because it's happening at a time when the Trump administration is preparing to withdraw American presence from Poland and Romania, where it's been forward deployed. So it's going to be. Yeah. We may discover that post American world is not just a topic for think tanks and seminars. It may be our reality, and it may be a lot less pleasant than the world it replaced. Margaret McMillan, thank you so much for making time for me today. I'm so grateful to you.

Margaret MacMillan (52:32)

Thank you. I'm not sure we've cheered ourselves up, but it's been a pleasure to talk to you.

David Frum (52:36)

Bye bye bye.

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David Frum (53:44)

Thanks so much to Margaret McMillan for joining me today on the David Frum Show. Now my Book of the week. As I mentioned at the top, the book is the Old Curiosity Shop by Charles Dickens. The Old Curiosity Shop is these days probably one of Dickens less well read books. It is kind of a mess and it's not very much to modern tastes. Many people who have not read the book will know it from a famously mean, spirited quip by Oscar Wilde. The central character of the Old Curiosity Shop is an angelic girl child named Little Nell. Little Nell heartbreakingly dies in the course of the novel and Oscar Wilde is supposed to have said the remark was recorded years after his death. It was not recorded in his lifetime, but it's from a pretty good source, a friend of his who wrote it in her memoirs. In 1930, Oscar Wilde was supposed to have said it would take a heart of stone to read the Death of Little Nell without laughing. Now, the death of Little Nell, in fact, sent all of England and many in America weeping. It was a tremendously moving scene, and I think if you read it today, you will still find it moving. But it is more sentimental than modern readers tend to like, and the whole novel has gone into kind of eclipse as a result of it. And yet it made a big impression on me. And I want to talk about it this week for a very particular reason. The Old Curiosity Shop. As I said, it's kind of a mess. It was originally published in serialized form in 1840. 41. It was published in book form in 1841. And it was an emotional response to a catastrophic event in the life of Charles Dickens. Charles Dickens lived with, in his large and growing household with, among other people, his wife's younger sister, Mary Hogarth, to whom he seems to have had a very intense romantic attachment. The relationship seems not to have been physically consummated, but it came darn close. Mary hogarth died age 17 in 1837, died with Dickens in the room. It was a heartbreaking event for him, deeply moved him, and its impact is felt in many, many of his books. There are characters based on Mary Hogarth throughout Dickens corpus, especially the early part of it. Little Nell is also based very much on. On Mary Hogarth and the Old Curiosity Shop, for all of its messiness and sentimentality, is Dickinson's attempt to reckon with early death. And what brings it back to my mind was a tragic event in our outer world. In the past week, dear friends of ours lost a child, a daughter, beautiful daughter at age 18, to an unexpected health catastrophe. I was on a visit to Mexico City. I got word of this catastrophic event. I was on a little bus going from one conference room to another conference room, and I stepped out of the bus, and there I was, sitting on Avenue de la Reforma, the big traffic artery in central Mexico City, on a park bench, just sobbing while pigeons stared at me as if, who is this crazy gringo who can't control himself on a park bench in the Paseo della Reforma? And it sent me back to the book to try to make sense of this kind of unexplained, unexplicable catastrophe. And one of the themes of the book, and what is actually my favorite scene, and this came very much to mind, is how death folds time in a curious way. The dead remain unchanged at who they were at the moment of death, while we, the living, carry on and There's a scene in the old curiosity shop, and if you'll indulge me, it's 300 words long, but I'd like to read it because it speaks to me, and it may speak to any of you who have had encounters with this kind of loss. Little Nell is on her wanderings and she comes into an old country churchyard and looks at the tombstones, and here's what she says. She was looking at a humble stone which told of a young man who had died at 23 years old 55 years ago, when she heard a faltering step approaching, and looking round, saw a feeble woman bent with the weight of years, who tottered to the foot of that same grave and asked her to read the writing on the stone. The old woman thanked her when she had done, saying that she had had the words by heart for many a long, long year, but could not see them now. Were you his mother? Said the child. I was his wife, my dear. She was the wife of a young man of 3 and 20. Ah, true, it was 55 years ago. You wonder to hear me say that, remarked the old woman, shaking her head. You're not the first older folks than you have wondered at the same thing before now. Yes, I was his wife. Death doesn't change us more than life, my dear. Do you come here often? Asked the child. I sit here very often in the summertime, she answered. I used to come here once to cry and mourn, but that was a weary, long while ago, thank God. I bless the daisies as they grow and take the home, said the old woman after a short silence. I like no flower so well as these and haven't for 55 years. It's a long time, and I'm getting very old. Then growing garrulous upon a theme which was new to one listener, though it were but a child, she told her how she had wept and moaned and prayed to die herself when this happened, and how when she first came to that place, a young creature strong in love and grief, she had hoped that her heart was breaking, as it seemed to be at that time passed by. And although she continued to be sad when she came here, still she could bear to come. And so went on until it was pain no longer, but a solemn pleasure and a duty she had learned to like. And now that five and 50 years were gone, she spoke of the dead man as if he had been her son or grandson, with a kind of pity for his youth growing out of her own old age and an exalting of his strength and manly beauty as compared with her own weakness and decay. And yet she spoke about him as her husband too, and thinking of herself in connection with him as she used to be and not as she was now, talked of their meeting in another world as if he were dead but yesterday and she, separated from her former self, were thinking of the happiness of the comely girl who seemed to have died with him. We remember Asanthe Foreman Barton in grief and love. Thanks so much for watching and listening to the David Reformed Show. See you next week. This episode of the David Frum show was produced by Nathaniel Fromm and edited by Andrea Valdes. It was engineered by Dave Grime. Our theme is by Andrew M. Edwards. Claudine Abed is the Executive Producer of Atlantic Audio and Andrea Valdez is our Managing Editor. I'm David Frum. Thank you for listening.

John Dick (60:35)

They say if you're the smartest person in the room, you're in the wrong room. My name is John Dick, and I'm never, ever in the wrong room. So I started a podcast to introduce you to some of the brilliant people I've encountered along the way. But we'll also keep it real. So we'll ask these incredibly successful people people to share some of their most embarrassing stories. Their dumbest mistakes. Mark and I talked about his inspiration and audacious goals for the business, how he's succeeding without spending a penny on marketing, and how he would fix our broken healthcare system if he had a magic wand. We also talked about how sports has changed since he walked away from the Mavs, what we're learning from our Gen Z kids, and why eggs are always better when dipped in ketchup. So I hope you'll enjoy the latest quadrennial conversation with Mark Cuban and me, the dumbest guy in the room.