Transcript
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Our packaging by 50% by 2030.
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This is how we create the beauty that moves the world. Recently we asked some people about sharing their New York Times accounts.
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My name is Dana.
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I am a subscriber to the New.
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York Times, but my husband isn't and it would be really nice to be able to share a recipe or an article or compete with him in wordle or connections.
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Thank you, Dana. We heard you introducing the New York Times Family Subscription one subscription, up to four separate logins for anyone in your life. Find out more@nytimes.com family hello and welcome to the David Frum Show. I'm David Frum, a staff writer at the Atlantic. My guest this week will be Sam Harris, and we'll discuss the turn in the politics of Silicon Valley away from some of the hopeful politics that prevailed in the past to a dark, authoritarian politics that determines the present. Sam will help me to understand why this happened and how and what it may mean for the politics of the rest of the country. In the book section, I'll be discussing a 1999 historical classic by Robert Proctor. But before getting to those subjects of the middle and the end of the show, I want to open with some preliminary thoughts about the recent malicious prosecution of James Comey by the Trump administration. Now, this podcast will release on the 1st of October, and by then we may be in a government shutdown. If that does happen, I will have some thoughts next week on what happened and why and what to do about it. But I don't want to speculate here about hypothetical contingencies when we have this glaring, shocking event from the recent past that needs to be discussed a little bit bit. And what I want to add to this conversation, because a lot has been said, some of it I've been on television and I've done some writing about it for the Atlantic. I want to put this story of this malicious prosecution into a larger institutional context, a global context. Now, what happened to James Comey is something that really could not happen in most other developed countries. I mean, imagine supposing you're, for example, the Chancellor of Germany and you decide you want to indict a political opponent. How would you go about doing it? Well, the short answer is you couldn't. And if you tried, you'd probably end up in handcuffs yourself, because the person who handles all the prosecutions in Germany, to whom every one of the hundreds of German federal prosecutors answers, is a director of public prosecutions. It's got a very complicated German title, but that's the basic idea. This person is typically a career civil servant. The current holder of the office is a man named Jens Rommel, no relation to the famous general, and he has devoted his lifetime to the service of the German courts and legal system. The German Public Prosecutor, Federal Prosecutor, is appointed by the President of the German State on the advice of the Minister of Justice, and then has to be confirmed by the German Bundesrat, the upper house of the German legislature. Now, the Chancellor has absolutely no role in this, and not only no rule, but typically the because Germany is governed by coalitions. The Chancellor and the Minister of Justice, who will nominate the Prosecutor, are from different political parties. Right now, the Chancellor is a Christian Democrat, but the Minister of Justice is a Social Democrat, and so is the President of the German State. So multi parties are involved in this. And the Bundesrad, which is produced by the 16 German states and whose membership constantly fluctuates as each state has its own elections on its own timetable, is a stew of many other parties. So whoever gets this job is going to have broad acceptance in German society. And the Chancellor has no role whatsoever and no influence on the actions of the Public prosecutor. Now, the Germans have a special pain point on the political abuse of criminal prosecutions. So their system is especially robust at cutting the head of government out of the process. But most advanced democracies do make the prosecutions quite far away from the head of government in Britain, in Canada, Italy and France. I don't know how all of these countries work, but in just about every case, there is little or no role for the Prime Minister or the head of government to influence the way the prosecution does its work. Now, I don't want to say that these systems are without flaw and without scandal. I mean, the Canadian example, which I know well, in 2019, there's a huge scandal in Canada because Prime Minister Justin Trudeau put pressure on his Minister of Justice to go easy on a company that had paid bribes in Libya to get contracts. This company was an important employer in Trudeau's province of Quebec and had important connections to Trudeau's Liberal Party. And he pressed the Minister of Justice to reduce the fine for the bribery scandal. But the Minister of Justice did say no, and the scandal did explode. And although Trudeau survived it, he was never quite the same after. And there's something a little different about a Prime Minister saying, look, can we go easy on this big employer that also is giving some money to my political party and the President's Saying to a prosecutor, that guy over there, I don't like him. I want you to put him in prison. Go do it. There is some difference there. And that latter thing, that can really only happen in the United States, not in peer democracies. And this unique American politicization of prosecution raises powerful questions about what course the United States will take in the post Trump era. If there is a post Trump era. Here's how things work in the United States. The prosecutors are appointed BY the president, U.S. attorneys, the federal prosecutors. There's a whole state system in the federal system. Federal prosecutors are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and they answer to the Attorney General, who's a member of the President's cabinet and often a political ally of the President. This situation would strike most people in most other developed countries as highly anomalous. When the system was created in the 18th century, it didn't seem so dangerous as it does now. In the early days of the American republic, the federal government had a very limited role in prosecuting crimes. And the US Attorneys were days travel away from the center of government in Washington. And the President wasn't there all the time. They were mostly operating on their own initiative. But as the federal government grew, as the federal criminal code grew, as federal prosecutions multiplied, abuses really did happen. And they happened thicker and faster in the 20th century. And they culminated with a big explosion of abuse that we know collectively as the Watergate scandal. During and after Watergate, really beginning with a New Deal, but especially after Watergate, the United States tried to come up with some workarounds to the problem of the influence of the President over the political system of prosecutions. There developed norms of professionalism and independence in the Department of Justice, norms that the U.S. attorneys, although appointed by the President, weren't supposed to answer to the President. Norms that the Attorney General should try to keep a distance away from individual prosecutions, and norms that the President himself should never talk to anybody about the individual prosecutions that he wanted. But these norms were just practices. They weren't written down in any kind of law. They were a habit. Like, for example, the habit that the FBI director should be about politics. This was very much a creation of the post Watergate world. After the end of the abuses under J. Edgar Hoover, and as there were revelations during Watergate, a new professionalism came to the FBI. Richard Nixon, in July of 1973, appointed a distinguished legal figure named Clarence Kelly to be head of the FBI. And Kelly served through the entire Ford administration. While he and Nixon were the same party and then through half of Carter's administration. Carter appointed a man named William Webster to succeed Clarence Colley. And Carter's choice served through the remainder of Carter's administration and almost all of Ronald Reagan's administration. It just wasn't done to replace the head of the FBI, because the head of the FBI was supposed to be independent. But this was just a practice, wasn't written down anywhere, and no one could make it stick. Donald Trump fired one FBI director at the beginning of his first term. That was James Comey. He replaced him with a man named Chris Wray. And then he fired Chris Wray at the beginning of Trump's second term because Trump wanted to have someone who would answer to him. And he installed Kash Patel as the current FBI director, a total personal loyalist, exactly the kind of person who would have been regarded as utterly unsuitable for the job anytime from the 1970s until the day before yesterday. And so it is with the US Attorneys. Again, US Attorneys were appointed by the president, but they weren't supposed to act in the name of the president, and they weren't supposed to take orders from the president. Yet when the U.S. attorney, who had jurisdiction over James Comey refused to prosecute because there was no case, and then appointed again, a complete personal loyalist with very thin professional qualities to do Trump's bidding. These are changes in the way the American system has worked, and the United States is discovering that it has very few restraints on these changes. The United States, as the federal government got more powerful, tried to find various ways to make important federal agencies more independent of the president. Commissions were set up, agencies that were. There would be some directors appointed by the president, some by Congress. But the Supreme Court has recently been on a rampage. Where to say, just know that you saw a case a little while ago where Trump wanted to fire a federal trade commissioner just because he wanted to replace the Federal Trade Commissioner, who was a Democrat, with a Republican. There had been a practice of a certain number of Democrats and a certain number of Republicans on the Federal Trade Commission, as is the case with the Federal Communications Commission and many other federal supervisory bodies. And Trump has said, no, I want. The president will appoint all of them. And the Supreme Court has said, well, there's really nothing to stop the president from doing that. Any deal that the presidents of the past have struck with Congress are there at the whim of the president and can be overridden at any time. Every executive function belongs to the president, and the president can fire anybody. Now, we're coming to a real crisis test of this Because Donald Trump wants to fire a Federal Reserve Board governor. Supreme Court has always carved out a special place of protection for the Federal Reserve. But Trump wants to fire one of the governors of the Federal Reserve. He has the power in law to do so for reasons of fault. If the Federal Reserve governor has done something wrong and the Trump administration has made allegations that this person had two mortgages instead of that, claimed both that a house was a principal residence. But it looks like the Federal Reserve governor in question, Lisa Cook, is probably completely innocent and obeyed every law. This obviously is going to end with Donald Trump doing as he so often does, is saying, the hell with it. I'll just tell the truth. I don't like her. She's not doing what I want. I want to fire her. I have a right to fire her. And that case will end up at the Supreme Court very soon. And the Supreme Court will rule whether the Federal Reserve joins all the other federal agencies in being subject to the whim of the president or not. But whatever they say about the Federal Reserve, they've made it clear that through the rest of the federal government, there is no restraint on the will and whim of the president over any aspect, including law enforcement. We are learning in the Trump years how much of the American system depends not just on the character of the president, but of the parties around him. That it just used to be thought that if a president sort of singled out people and said, punish that person, punish that person, that enough people in the system, both in his own, not only in the other party, but in the president's own party, would rise to stop him. We're seeing that's not happening. Trump wants a more absolute power in the hands of the president, and his own party is welcoming that. There are two considerations here. If that is your approach to power, it's hard to imagine that you will ever willingly lay down the power because you have built a machine that can be used by the other party against you if they ever get a chance. And it will simply be too dangerous ever to let any other Democratic president, any other president, get the powers that Trump is claiming for himself. I don't know how Trump is going to feel about a world in which, say, a President Newsom can give an order to the attorney general, put this person in prison, put that person in prison. At that point, it'll become a pretty existential matter to prevent a President Newsom from ever coming to power, or any other president by any other Democrat. But the Supreme Court is also creating a situation where it's becoming impossible for Americans to reform their legal system by acts of law. I mean, if the Supreme Court says we don't care what laws you pass a law creating the Federal Trade Commission, we don't care whether you write a law making the attorney general independent of the President. Our theory of the case is that everyone with any ability to enforce the law answers to the president, can be fired at any time by the president. Then we have a system of one man rule that lasts for four years or eight or nine longer, against which there is no institutional stopgap. The most important institution in American society, the Supreme Court is destroying the integrity of all the other institutions in American society. It's a very dangerous situation and it raises this most fundamental question to which I don't have an answer. And I invite you to think about it. If we ever do get to a post Trump era is the first job to reassert the institutions of the past and to do so in the face of the opposition of the Supreme Court that says you can't do it. Or is the first priority to use these changes institution that Trump has wrought to punish the people who did the things that Trump ordered them to do that are so improper. Are we going to be in a cycle of infinite payback or are we going to try to do institutional reform in the face of opposition from a Supreme Court that rejects the most necessary premise for institutional reform. Limits on the personal power of the President. I don't know what is the right thing to do. It's something I think about a lot. I ask everyone I get a chance. I ask this question, which would you do if it were you? I continue to think about this. I invite you to think about it too. And now my conversation with Sam Harris. But first a quick break.
