Charles Moore (2:53)

The side that loses.

David Frum (2:54)

And if we can maneuver the Democrats into being the side that shuts down the government, they must lose. And indeed, in 2025, it was the Democrats who failed to deliver the necessary votes to get over the hump of 60 votes in the Senate that would have kept the government open. So the Republican talking point that the Democrats did it is sort of true, but they made a miscalculation in understanding the pattern. It may be that the reason the Republicans lost the past three shutdowns, 95, 2013 and 2018 19, was that they initiated it. But as we see this shutdown unfold and the Democrats seem not to be losing, maybe what matters more is not who did it, but why. In 1995, the Newt Gingrich Republicans shut down the United States government to try to force cuts in Medicare on the Bill Clinton administration. In 2013, the new tea Party Republican majority in the House tried to shut down the government to force the Obama administration to roll back a lot of its subsidies to healthcare plans under the Affordable Care Act. So in both those first two cases that the shutdown was about was the Republicans were trying to cut funds to healthcare spending, the Democrats were resisting, and the Republicans initiated the shutdown and then lost. In 2018, 2019, the Republicans initiated the shutdown to try to force Democrats to give them more money for President Trump's border wall. And they didn't get it. They lost that fight, too. And they lost the fight because of the why that Americans did not agree with Donald Trump that it was urgent to spend billions upon billions of dollars to build a wall across the United States border. In this present shutdown fight, the Democrats may have initiated it, but unlike the Republicans in 95 and 2013, they initiated it to defend healthcare subsidies, not to take them away. And that may turn out to be the thing that matters. Not the who, but the why. We'll see the result. But I want to think a little bit about the strangeness of this particular battle. Donald Trump is trying to force the Democrats hand by using the shutdown as an opportunity to inflict pain on Democratic constituencies, stopping the flow of programs that benefit blue states, construction and other kinds of programs like that, and furloughing, and then firing large numbers of government workers who are regarded as Democratic constituencies. Much of the government, by the way, is staffed by people who probably vote Republican. Federal prisons.

Charles Moore (5:05)

The.

David Frum (5:06)

The guards there probably are Republican leaders. ICE seems to be Donald Trump's personal militia, so they presumably are voting for him. And the military votes in probably more or less the way the rest of America votes. It's, I'm sure, quite split down the middle. But many of the civilian functions are thought to be, or at least Donald Trump thinks them to be more Democrat than Republican. And if he can fire the workers at the cdc, that's a pain point for Democrats, that's a pain point for Democratic blue states, Maryland and Virginia. And by imposing pain, he can force the conclusion of the agreement on his terms. I mentioned at the start, I think I mentioned at the start that this is a uniquely American event. Government shutdowns don't happen in other countries. And the reason they don't is because most countries are parliamentary systems. The Parliament votes the supply, the money, the executive spends the supply. If the executive can't get a vote in Parliament to authorize the supply, then the executive falls. That's a loss of confidence. And the prime minister or the chancellor had loses power and there's an election or a shuffle of coalitions. At least now the United States cannot have these kinds of elections other than the statutory times. But in a way, what is going on in a government shutdown is exactly the kind of event that would, in another country, force an election. In a way, the legislature saying, the executive has lost our confidence. We won't vote supply, and we are withholding supply until the executive changes its ways. What it is, it's a kind of artificial election. It's an election in miniature. And as Democrats think about what their strategy is, thinking of this shutdown as something that would be an election if it were happening in Canada, Canada or Germany or Britain is a way for them to think about it. Because the reason they're withholding supply from the Trump administration is not just because of an argument about how generous healthcare subsidies should be. That's the ground the Democrats picked. But that's not what this fight is really about. This fight is about the rule of law. Because the background to it is any deal you strike with the Trump administration on spending, the Trump administration has said, we're not bound by it. We declare our intent. We assert our right to refuse to spend funds that Congress has appropriated. So even if there were a deal where Congress said, here's the funding deal, and the Trump administration said, right, that's the funding deal, the Trump administration could then walk out the door into the next room and say, that deal we agreed to five minutes ago, we're repudiating, we're holding things back. And meanwhile, Democrats are also saying, why would the parliament, the Congress vote supply to an executive that is breaking the law in all kinds of other ways, killing people on the high seas without the approval of Congress, detaining, arresting, deporting, imprisoning, torturing people without any kind of grant of power to do that. Not that there ever could be a grant of power literally to torture people and using the power of the presidency to identify specific people whom the President doesn't like as targets for selective criminal prosecution. Congress is forcing a kind of quasi election on this question. Now, there won't be a vote in the public, but there will be movement in the polls that will cause one side in Congress or the other to panic and to say, if there were an election, we would lose it. And the consciousness that if the election were today, you would lose has an effect on behavior. Not as legal as an outright election where you actually do lose power, but. But it concentrates the mind. And we'll be seeing over the coming days one party in Congress or the other realizing if the election were today, we would probably lose. And that will begin to affect their behavior one way or another. So if you think of this government shutdown actually as kind of American government functioning in a uniquely American way, but trying to address a universal problem, an executive that has lost the confidence of the legislature, you can better predict what is likely to happen and the consequences. This is a case where it's going to be very hard to arrive at the kind of deal that was patched up in the three most recent shutdowns in the past. It's going to be a deal that is going to have many more enforceable mechanisms because it's a deal with an executive that says, we're not bound by deals. How do you do business with people who say, whatever piece of paper we sign, we don't mean a word of it and you can't make us honor it.

Charles Moore (8:58)

And now my dialogue with Charles Moore. But first, a quick break.

David Frum (9:09)

Okay, so what if you could listen to all your books, docs, PDFs and articles? Well, you can. With the 11 reader app. You can turn anything into natural sounding voice like this one. So download 11 reader for free on your favorite app store today.

Charles Moore (9:35)

Charles Moore. Baron Moore of Etchingham has traced one of the most brilliant careers in British journalism. He joined the Daily Telegraph immediately upon graduating from Cambridge and Eton. He leapt to the Spectator, becoming editor in 1984, still in his 20s. The editorships of the Sunday Telegraph and then the Daily Telegraph followed in succession. Moore left daily newspapering in 2003 to commence work on the three volumes of his magisterial biography of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. It is as Mrs. Thatcher's great biographer that we speak to him today, almost exactly upon Thatcher's 100th birthday, October 13, 1925. A single volume abridgment of Moore's authorized biography was released by Penguin last month. Charles is a friend of mine of many years, a friendship whose perhaps most dramatic moment may be the day Charles took my wife, Danielle, fox hunting. Now, in prints and painting, fox hunting looks a stately and serene pastime. In real life, it's about as stately and serene as high jumping in an active sawmill. And that was a dramatic day. Charles, welcome to the program. It's so good to talk to you.

Charles Moore (10:40)

Thank you, David. And I got a little wind that you might mention this embarrassing incident with Danielle, so I'm wearing my hunt tie in her honor.

Charles Moore (10:49)

Thank you. So let's begin by refreshing people's memories about who Margaret Thatcher was and why her Prime Ministership was so important, not just in British history, but world history.

Charles Moore (11:01)

Well, Margaret Roberts, as she was, was born 100 years ago next week and born over a grocer shop in provincial England in Grantham, and would have been unthinkable at the time that anyone from that background would probably lead the Conservative Party and become Prime Minister, but doubly unthinkable that a woman would do so. And that was her most immediate and in some ways her most remarkable achievement, actually, was to do that and become Britain's first ever prime minister. But it turned out to be a wider set of achievements than that because Britain, rather, as it is today, was in a very low ebb when she became leader of the party. And indeed when she became prime minister, she became leader of 50 years ago and prime minister in 1979. And it was at a low ebb economically, very little hope around us, as is very much the case now, and a troubled international situation, as is very much the case now. And I think what mattered and matters still is the example of a particular type of leadership which is partly ideological, it is obviously partly to do with conservatism, but also a personal style of leadership and something that's quite unusual in British conservatism, which is, if you like, an evangelical approach to conservatism, that this is something which matters to the world and which can make the world not Just Britain, a better place. And there was no more important ally in that of course, than the United States. And it's a particular interest to Americans, but it is of real interest everywhere that there could be such a close relationship between a two term United States, a President and a three term British.

Charles Moore (12:44)

Prime Minister, just to remind people of the sequencing. Margaret Thatcher was elected before Ronald Reagan became President. And so in many ways she had in American politics the impact of a harbinger, a suggestion that something was possible, something might be coming. And in some ways she led the way both with things that worked and things that didn't work. Thatcher is maybe most famous in the British context for her privatizations of former state owned companies. There weren't such things in the United States, but the United States did move in the 1980s much more from a, for example, regime of the state constructing public housing to voucher programs like the program the Americans know as Section 8, that give people the, the means to buy their own housing rather than have the state build the housing for them.

Charles Moore (13:28)

Yes, your blessed country didn't really need privatization because it hadn't had nationalization to a large extent. So it was a revolutionary idea that she had, which then became exported. I think it was sort of specifically exported to about 50 countries in the world that the state could sell off a lot of the industries that it had taken control of. You're quite right, David, to say that she was a harbinger. She's younger than Reagan, but when they first met they were both in opposition and in adversity to some extent. She'd just become leader of her party. In April 1975 they met and she was only two months into her leadership and he actually held no office because he'd ceased to be the Governor of California and he was seeking, which he failed to win the Republican nomination for 1976. And they met in, in Parliament in Britain and hit it off immediately. And yes, she came into office 18 months before Reagan did so and I think this has never happened before in British or American history that a two term American President has had the same British Prime Minister throughout. It's an extraordinary piece of luck for us that that should be so and that they should already be friends. And friendship obviously is a stronger thing when made in adversity than when made in prosperity. And they did see eye to eye and she was the forerunner and she made some mistakes from which Reagan could learn and some successes from which Reagan could learn. Very important for her, of course, that he welcomed her as soon as he became President and When actually she was doing pretty badly. And a lot of people were saying the Thatcher experiment to do with monetarism, the control of inflation, the getting rid of exchange controls, all those sort of things, tackling the trade unions was. People were saying, oh, it's not working, it's terrible. And Reagan was very warm in his welcome to her when he didn't really have to be, actually, but he was in 1981, which was probably her worst year. And their alliance was a strong mixture of personal affection, shared belief, and a sense that this is their time, that things are happening in the world, both economically and in global power structures, where we're both needed and we need to be together.

Charles Moore (15:49)

I want to return to this point about nationalization and privatization, because these ideas are so old that their salience, I think, has drained from public remembrance to the point where this year the city of New York may well elect a mayor whose big idea is the government should own grocery stores, that the government should greatly increase its role in the ownership of housing. And you have to be now fairly old to remember the last time this was seriously tried. So one of the stories that I take from your book, in 1979, when Thatcher was elected, the British government owned the telephone companies, the gas companies. I'm going to forget what all else. The telephone company was a special disaster with waiting times for telephones in not weeks, but months.

David Frum (16:31)

I remember this from my own visits.

Charles Moore (16:32)

To Britain at the time. And you tell a funny story about this, but just what was involved in getting a telephone from the government in 1979? Would you like to take us down memory lane?

Charles Moore (16:41)

Yes, yes. I mean, first. First of all, of course, it was nobody's fault. There were only really landlines then. And you had to get them put in. And you had to get them in, put in in Britain by the. What was originally the post Office and then became a British telecom. And you had to join a queue, that beloved British institution. And I needed to tell, well, everyone really needs a telephone. But I particularly needed one because I was a journalist and we just got married and bought our house and they said six months it'll take to put in. All it requires is to put in a piece of wire and put in the telephone, and there you are. But they take six months. And as always happens when you have a sort of nationalized industry, which is supposed to be. Is done in the name of the people, what it actually privileges is that those who have power. Because I was able to jump this queue, because the editor of my national newspaper said this Young man must have a telephone. So he rings up the chairman and the chairman of the whole damn company of the nation in the nationalized industry has to personally decide that I get a telephone. It's just sort of absolutely inconceivable now. And I think it shows if you imagine how that ramifies how it affects how everybody else is able to do their business every day you'll see how massive the changes were and you'll be amazed at how much they were resisted.

Charles Moore (17:56)

Well, you mentioned exchange controls. Again, this is something that may be coming back and the United States, this one may be leading the way. But remind us of what those were and what they did and why you had to get rid of them.

Charles Moore (18:08)

Well, when I was a boy, it affected every individual, say that if you went abroad, you were only allowed to take 50 pounds out of the country going on holiday. And this was written in the back of your passport. If you exceeded this sub, you were in big trouble. So I mean, that's just at the relatively trivial tourist level. But you could not move money freely in and out of the country. And of course, one of the effects of this was to. And the idea was to protect the pound, but the effect was to prevent investment, global investment, and restrict what would otherwise be a much freer market. And again, Mrs. Thatcher lifted exchange controls almost immediately and against the orthodoxy of the day, and not without trepidation because Britain had suffered from devaluations in the past, but it did work and it was presaged other things, which was something which we call big bang in the City of London. The City of London, of course, is your Wall Street. And we had very restrictive practices there, which essentially meant that almost no non British people could trade in stocks and shares on the London Stock Exchange. And again, sort of unimaginable now. And that was all legislated for by Mrs. Thatcher in her second to her second term and began in 1986. And indeed again, troublesome ways. Some genuinely troublesome in some ways. And indeed in 1987 there was a very big stock market crash from which you all say suffered. But again, it would be unimaginable. You couldn't possibly run a great financial center of the world if you had anything like that today.

Charles Moore (19:44)

One of the themes of this history is that Thatcher's big had a number of big ideas, but her most salient and urgent idea was the cause of economic liberty, which was a very exciting and powerful idea in 1979 and one that now has gone into quite a recession. And one of the most ironic Counterpoints here is that the young people in Britain who hate Thatcher don't remember why they hate Thatcher, but if you press them, why is she such a figure of evil to you? The great indictment they will lay at her door is that she got rid of a lot of coal mining jobs, which is not exactly what happened. She allowed market forces to work in the coal mining industry, which was automating rapidly. And now, all these years later, a President of the United States is using state power to create coal mining jobs and to protect coal mining jobs and to protect this one antique industry from market competition and the very market forces that Thatcher unleashed. Thatcher did this in part because, as you remind us in the book, she was the first world leader to draw attention to the risks of global climate change caused by the burning of fossil fuels, especially coal.

Charles Moore (20:49)

Yes, that's correct, though the sequence isn't quite right. So she only really talked about climate change, which she did very strongly after she'd already beaten the coal miners union. But they were indeed related thoughts because she believed, among other things, about the coal industry that it needed to be on the way out. And indeed in competitive terms, it was on the way out with Britain because we could not produce coal at anything like the low prices of which were sort of even more subsidized or artificial, like those coming from communist Poland, for example, coal communists from communist Berlin. It is an extraordinary irony that it's all gone around this way and you can understand why to some extent, because there's always been the feeling, which was strongly expressed at the time in Britain, that manual workers were suffering because of Mrs. Thatcher's measures. And the coal mines would be a particular example of that. The problem that the critics never really sorted out was first of all, that they had been suffering for a very long time before Mrs. Thatcher came on the scene. What she was doing was trying to find a way, a future that went, went through all these problems rather than just moaning about them and spending more and more government money on them. So actually, for example, a Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, actually closed more pits and made redundant more miners than Margaret Thatcher did. It's one of those typical ironies of history. And the related problem was that if you have nationalized industries, you tend to have labor unions who exploit their monopoly role for political purposes. And this came to a very dramatic head in Britain with the miners strike because they'd already managed that in the 1970s and brought down a Conservative government by doing that. Mrs. Thatcher had been a minister in that Conservative government. She was not going to Let that happen again. It was a matter of, in the famous question, who governs Britain? And so she prepared very, very carefully over several years for what she feared would happen. And it did happen. And she lasted out the strike, which was nearly 12 months in the making. And so she had quite a strong sort of democratic thing on her side. And it remained a great sadness and a great scar that there was such a bitter conflict. But there's nobody saying, let's have the coal mines back. That you're telling me, David, and I've read is not quite the case in the United States. But I think modern societies still wrestle with this point about what happens to certain workers. And I suppose they're particularly white working class workers and they're particularly male workers when the world moves on in terms of who produces what. And the resentments are real, the difficulties are real, but the solutions put forward by the Thatcher critics were preposterous. She had the courage, and it is a political courage, to face that down and win so that you can go on to the next thing. And in her case, the next thing was a much more plural energy market with nuclear elements, increasing importance of gas, and as you've yourself said, the beginning of renewables.

Charles Moore (23:48)

Well, in a strange reversal of history, I'm not going to remember the figure on employment now, but in the first Trump term, about 50,000 people worked in the American coal industry. That's not just miners, but everybody. Bookkeepers, everybody, which was fewer at the time than worked as licensed yoga instructors in the United States. But I think Trump had both a cynical view that these were his people, his voters, and a romantic view that this is the kind of work that a man should do. He shouldn't be smiling behind a counter. He should be in the bowels of the earth, dangerously digging out an environmentally destructive rock so that it can be burned to power iron manufacturing and dreadnought building and other kinds of early 20th century industrial activity. And that was his idea of how it should be. And we have had this conversion where a lot of the contemporary right, both in Britain and the United States, seem to have a kind of aesthetic idea about how an economy should be organized. They have an idea of what work should look like and what work should not look like. And if the market delivers work that doesn't look the way they think it should work, not brawny enough, well, then the state should intervene to preserve these otherwise vanishing and uneconomic folkways.

Charles Moore (24:51)

Yes, I think there is a sort of odd romanticism about that. But though I don't share It, I have some sympathy with it because of the particular predicament of not very highly educated men in modern Western societies who in the 20th century were brought up to think of themselves as overwhelmingly valuable to their countries and then have the humiliating experience of not being so valuable. And of course, the value is validated by two world wars, of course. And indeed Mrs. Thatcher herself shared a lot of that belief. She felt in a womanly way, particularly strongly about the armed services. So she absolutely loved soldiers, sailors and airmen. And she. This was tremendously sort of close to what that sort of male reality of work. But what she, first of all, she understood economic reality. And secondly, she'd had these endless traumatic problems with labor unions because they were so politicized and their leaderships were so separated from their workers that they weren't actually, and they were very undemocratic, they weren't reflecting the wishes of the workers. So she wanted to, she liked the aspirations of these upper working class manufacturers and so on, manufacturing workers. But her big thing. And she said this slogan which helped win her the leadership, she said, we back the workers, not the shirkers. And the whole idea of these people who were constantly striking was. Seemed to her obviously economically damaging, obviously, but also immoral and shaming. And though in some ways Mrs. Thatcher was a very divisive person in her character, deliberately so, because she wished to have the argument in the industrial sphere, she actually brought in the end relative harmony. So when she became prime minister in 1979, in that year Britain lost more than 29 million working days to strikes. And in the year she left, 1990, we lost, I think, 1.6 million working days to strikes. So it was a totally transformed industrial and workplace landscape which was more harmonious, more productive. And of course that meant that broadly speaking, prosperity increased in a well distributed way.

Charles Moore (27:03)

Well, this is a way in which she was a global harbinger as well as just a British figure that when she left office, we seem to be entering an era in which there was a broad consensus across political parties from left to right about markets and democratic institutions and collective security. I'm not going to have the quote exactly, but you'll recall it better than me. But when shortly after she left, she was interviewed and asked what was her greatest achievement as Prime Minister? And she said, my successor, because we forced him to adapt our ideas into his thinking. And there for a long time it seemed like that tried ideas sought, maybe made a little more pillowy by social democratic governments in both the United Clinton, Blair. But these were basically operating the economy on thatchright and Reaganite terms for a long time that now seems to have come to an end, that there was a Thatcher era that. That terminated with the Great recession, perhaps about 2010. And we've moved then into the more statist era that we thought we had left behind forever in the 1970s.

Charles Moore (28:03)

I think we have, and I think this is partly to do with a misunderstanding of Satcherism. Though Mrs. Satcher strongly believed in free markets, she wasn't a libertarian and nor was she what's now called a globalist. It was important to her that the most famous book in favor of free markets is called the wealth of Nations. And nations meant a great deal to her. And she didn't think that the wealth of the. It's not called the wealth of the World, that book. It's called the wealth of Nations. And she believed strongly, she was not an economic nationalist in that sense, but she believed strongly in the need for independent nations to trade with one another. And she did not feel that this was a way of undermining their independence, but in fact of merely of increasing their reciprocity and their respect for one another's independence. And this was why she had such a fierce disagreement with the European Community, as it was then called later the European Union, though at the time she thought she could achieve that reciprocity through the single market, which she then came to regret because European single market. But she came to regret that because she felt it had been used for political reasons to create United States of Europe. But so what you always see in Mrs. Thatcher is a tension, not exactly contradiction, but a tension between the desire to open up the world with a desire to have accountable, parliamentary governed, independent nations. And we still see all that going on. And I think there's a big argument which didn't really happen so much in her time about, okay, well, so who do these nations actually belong to? And a resentment of a sort of global class which didn't really exist. We had our own existing hierarchies and elites, of course, but a sort of global class, which is sometimes described as Davos man, which didn't exist in, in her day to anything like the same extent. That's not all rubbish at all, those, those concerns, but it's been fanned by tremendously crazy conspiracy theories. And, you know, people are obsessed with George Soros or, or whatever, and, and all the sort of dark thoughts about what used to be called rootless cosmopolitans that are sometimes called just Jews. And, you know, there's sort of very unpleasant things that are now all over the Internet. Mrs. Thatcher did not have to contend with that.

Charles Moore (30:19)

And she is all over, all over important, all over many governments.

Charles Moore (30:22)

Well, indeed, indeed, indeed. And she didn't really have with that. So I think to understand any great leader, you have to understand, obviously they have a. Have to have a good eye to the future, but you have to understand what they were dealing with. And what she was dealing with was a Britain that jolly well didn't work at a time when other relatively comparable democracies were working better. So Germany, for example, was working much better at that time, and even France was working better at that time. And the United States was working better at that time, though there was comparable problems. And she had to. She wasn't totally a revolutionary, but she had to take us by the scruff of the neck and shake us. And it's that sort of leadership which is very important. And what we really lack now in Britain, it's a different type of problem in the United States, I think right now is we haven't for years now had a leadership that was capable of really attaining anything. We've had six prime ministers in 10 years or something like that, and almost nothing has been consistently done except the relentless expansion of spending and welfare in the state. And Mrs. Satcher had a model of leadership in which she used her sex. So basically she said men just talk and women do, and women understand economics because they have to deal with the horrors of household budgets in the area of inflation and so on. And she loved to say, the cocks may crow, but the hen lays the eggs, she being the hen. And this was a very powerful sense. And because she was very good at winning elections, because she seemed to, if not likable to many, she seemed necessary and her opponents seem weak. And so she won three times on the trot, ran the show for 11 and a half years, which is unprecedented in Britain in the era of universal suffrage. And so everybody, this is why it matters a lot now, that though she's from a very different world, you couldn't govern in her way nowadays. All these sort of things, she produced some of the problems we have to deal with. She was somebody who said what she wanted to do and did it. And that's what seems not to be possible.

Charles Moore (32:21)

Now, you mentioned at the beginning that in 1925 it would have seemed unthinkable for a woman to be leader of the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party is now in its fourth female leader in Britain. And why do you think it has not come to the United States? Because The United States, although there are women in many high offices, governor, senators, there have been two female nominees for president, both have lost. Hillary Clinton got a larger share of the popular, but the Donald Trump lost by the rules and Kamala Harris lost outright. Do you see a pattern here or is this just turn over the cards and there's a certain amount of randomness in the play of the cards.

Charles Moore (32:53)

There may be a bit of a pattern, David. It seems to me that it and Mrs. Thatcher proves this, that it's easier for a woman to rise in a party which doesn't have strong feminist views than one that does actually. Because what happens in a feminist party, say like the Labour Party in Britain, is that there's tremendously violent ideological contest about what that means. What sort of a woman have we got to have all these different schools of feminism that contests very violently? And with the Conservatives it was very simple. They all mostly had prejudices against a woman, but they were very vague prejudices, they weren't very political. They were just sort of old fashioned. And when a woman comes along who is nice to them and impressive and they believe brave because a lot of them had been in the Second World War and they admired courage and they thought she had it, they didn't really have an ideological objection and they think, well that's good. And then often they say she's a brave girl, give her a go. And so she understood how to turn the disadvantage of her sex into an advantage because it made her noticeable, unique, looking different, dressing different, sounding different, and the main figure in the room, always the one the cameras wanted to go for, the voice that would be heard as different. And one of the things I try to bring out in my book is always how much she thought about this. So she would think very carefully, very carefully about what she wore, what her jewelry was like, her hair, she changed her teeth, she changed her voice, she changed her clothes, all in order, some would say artificiality, but I would say it was in order not to get in the way of the message. It was to say subliminally, women can do this. And she didn't therefore want to talk about women's issues much because she wanted to conquer the issues that men care about. So she thought, what do men care about? Money, power and war. So that's what I, Margaret Thatcher, are going to master. I'm not going to talk about childcare all the time though. Actually she was interested in education, for example. Very interesting. And therefore she conquered, and therefore she didn't become a man in some sort of way, she's very much, very much a woman, including in all the caricatures of women, like being very capricious. And the handbag, which started off being a joke, became the symbol of her power. And indeed, her most famous nickname, the Iron lady, was given her by her enemies. It was given her by the Soviet paper because they said in the sexist way, how could a woman, you know, Bismarck was an Iron Chancellor of Germany. She thinks he's the Iron Lady. Ha ha ha. And she immediately grabbed that and said, well, look, I'm very happy to be called the Iron lady if that means that I'm defending the Western world against you lot. And so everything turns round, and I think it's actually harder. When I watched Hillary Clinton, I felt she always could never get over the point that she was somehow trying to expound her virtue rather than have rapport with voters. It was a sort of, I'm very good, and I'm very good partly because I'm a woman and you've got to respect that and support me. Whereas in a way, in an odd way, it's a sort of sense of entitlement. Whereas I felt with Mrs. Thatcher, though, she's a very moral person, actually. She was saying, let's get rid of all these men who've been telling you what to do all the time. Let me do it. And I understand what it's like in your hearth and home. And obviously it's sort of mythological in a way, but it worked.

Charles Moore (36:18)

You mentioned the Soviet nickname for her. One of Thatcher's decisive roles in world history was as both a warmaker and a peacemaker. She led Britain into a successful unilateral war to defend the Falklands Islands against an Argentine invasion. The Argentine defeat, by the way, overthrew one of the world's most gruesome dictatorships and ushered in an era of civilian rule in Argentina that has lasted more or less to this day. But she was also the first to make the big bet on Gorbachev and to persuade both President Reagan and then President H.W. bush to have confidence in Gorbachev as something real. Where would you rank that in the catalog for accomplishments?

Charles Moore (36:56)

I do rate that high. She and Reagan went against the trend when they were in opposition to question detente in the 1970s. They said that actually the Soviets were gaining from this process, and it wasn't peacemaking, it was gaining advantage. And they agreed on the installation of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe and fought off nuclear disarmers, and in her case, won resoundingly the election of 83. And he won resoundingly the election of 84. And this succeeded. And Mrs. Thatcher thought, right, we've shown strength, and it's from strength that we should negotiate. And she spotted Gorbachev, who was not then the Soviet leader, but was the likely one, this is in 1984, and invited him to her country house, Chekers. And they had this extraordinary meeting, which was very remarkable. And it went on and on and on and on and way over time. And they argued about everything like two students. And, you know, one says, capitalism's great. It makes you richer and freer. And the other one says, no, Communism is great. It's makes us all equal. And they were really shouting at one another. And this might have been thought to be a disaster, but actually it was extremely successful because it was the first frank exchange with the Soviet leader. And each listened to the other and enjoyed it. They enjoyed it. That's why it went on so long instead of the very stiff interactions that had happened before. And so an extraordinary week in her life after she had this conversation with Gorbachev that went on all day, she. She ran. She very excited, and she ran downstairs after he'd gone and said, oh, it's so late, and I. And I've got to have my hair done because tomorrow is China. And she went off to China to do the Anglo Hong Kong, Hong Kong agreement. And then she went to Hong Kong to sell that. And then she flew from Hong Kong to Honolulu to Washington, stopping in the middle of the night to insist, by the way, in Honolulu on seeing Pearl harbor, which of course went down very well with her American hosts, and then went to see President Reagan and to persuade him of two things. One was that there needed to be cooperation rather than unilateral movement on the Strategic Defense Initiative, what people call Star wars. And the other to interest him in the proposition of Gorbachev. And he took this from her in a way which he would not have taken, I think, from any other world leader, because he basically trusted her. And it was through her influence that he and his administration started very gingerly to get closer to the Soviet Union. And then the whole process began. And I'll just say one other thing about that. You might want to come back about how the Cold War ended. But just one other thing about that which is so interesting about the Reagan Thatcher relationship is because of trust, the amount of difference they could contain between them. And the key difference was this. It was absolutely the heart of all this. This is about nuclear weapons. Mrs. Thatcher profoundly believed in Nuclear weapons because she believed in the deterrent theory. So if they've got them and you've got them, nobody uses them. Reagan had a much more sort of idealistic, almost mystical idea that you could rid the world of nuclear weapons and that's what you should do. This terrified her because she thought that there would be huge disadvantage to Britain and Europe if suddenly all the missiles, which nearly happened at the Helsinki. Sorry, not Helsinki, at Reykjavik summit, that suddenly America and Soviet Union agreed to get rid of the whole lot. And where. Where are we left then? And she think, thought the whole of the world would destabilize. However, because the trust existed between the two of them, they were able to contain this disagreement because they had a shared aim. The shared aim being the spread of Western freedom through Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet empire. And they found in Gorbachev an interlocutor who was prepared to do enough of this for it to work. So I think it was very fascinating and sort of creative thing that such a major difference which was never fully resolved, was nevertheless contained. And they did win the Cold War. Now, the next question, of course, is what happens? And we see it today as a result of winning the Cold War. But anyway, I think what I say stands.

Charles Moore (41:02)

Well, the end of the Cold War is a chapter that. Whose importance and drama is lost because it was so peaceful. I often think one of the greatest injustices of politics is the lack of credit you get when things don't go wrong. When things do go wrong and you turn them around. Winston Churchill is a hero for turning around the situation in 1940. But if everything had been done properly in 1935, this would all be. I sometimes say, if somebody put a bag over Gavrilo Princip's head, or if they'd handled it better in 1914, this would be. The Balkan crisis of summer 1914 would be known by eight PhD students in international relations and nobody else.

David Frum (41:41)

Yes, George H.W.

Charles Moore (41:42)

Bush took the oath of office in January of 1989. If an angel had stopped him and said, what is your supreme challenge? What is the most important, the thing that will make your presidency a success if you accomplish it? And I believe he would have said, well, Soviet Union is coming apart, Soviet.

David Frum (41:59)

Empire is coming apart.

Charles Moore (41:59)

If we can arrange it so that none of the Soviet nuclear warheads go astray and none of the Soviet nuclear scientists go to work for some international terrorist, my work on this planet will be done. I mean, there are a lot of other things I want to do, but that is priority one. And that priority was accomplished so successfully that nobody even remembers how important it once was. I wrote an article about the Atlantic for this, and one of the things that when you go back to that time, you realize the United States had very elaborate controls, and Britain did, too, and France as well, for controls of nuclear material. These are free societies, and people could wander around wherever they wanted. The Soviets had no such controls because they policed the people. So you could just. You could leave your weapons behind chicken wire because no one was allowed to approach within 200 miles of where the weapons were. But once those systems of control of people broke down, the absence of protections for the weapons became a terrifying. And this was something that was a little after Reagan's time. But H.W. bush was his top priority, and it was done successfully. Thatcher had an important role there, too. And we had this moment in the 1990s where it looked like we had achieved the peaceful end of Communism, the peaceful reintegration of Europe, and we're on our way to a world of trade and peace that we can only be nostalgic for today because it looks gone.

Charles Moore (43:08)

Yes, this is quite true. And I think Mrs. Thatcher probably hasn't got quite enough credit, partly because she fell out with the others, including Bush, about the European Union, which she certainly made some mistakes there because she was very, very hostile to Germany in a sort of visceral way. But she loved the victory in the Cold War. But she was more alert than the rest of them to the dangers inherent in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent collapse of Soviet power. Nobody could have wanted a continuation of Soviet power less, but she did understand the danger of vacuum in Central Europe, and she did understand the danger of Russian resentment. And many accused her of putting too much faith in Gorbachev. And perhaps she did stay with him too long. But the reason she did that was because she could see what might happen if he wasn't in charge. And indeed, he was nearly overthrown, and effectively actually was overthrown really in 1991, and quite close. The old guard of the Soviet Communists came quite close to regaining power. They failed, but it was the end of Gorbachev, really. And then it was Yeltsin, and then there was chaos, and then it was Putin. And she was very conscious that Mr. Satch was good at risk. She had a good. And this was important thing in statesmanship. I think she had grand hopes for the future, but they were always qualified by how very nasty people can be, a sense of that, and how very nasty tyrannies are and how many risks occur in things that lurk, in things that look good. So she. She was, I would say, almost sort of visionary about that, about what happens when you have a power vacuum. So she was trying to warn against all of that. And this is one of the reasons she disliked European Union, because she was thinking about what lurked there. And that, of course, has come back with an absolute vengeance, with a vengeance, vengeance being the right phrase for what Putin does. So Putin sees the end of the Cold War as just an utter humiliation for the Soviet Union, by which he really means the Russian people. He's really the Soviet Union, for him is just the Russian people, I would guess, or the Russian world. And now he's trying to take it all back. And he sees a very weak Western alliance, which doesn't have the alertness of Reagan or actually, in his different way, Bush or Thatcher, to where the risk lies and how a balance of power should be asserted and how military force should be threatened when necessary and so on. And so it's a tremendously dangerous situation we have now have, of which the spearhead is Ukraine. But of course, it spreads much more widely. And the lack of understanding of these questions in Western statesmanship, and I'm afraid, I think in it very much, including President Trump on this, is really, really alarming. And I think about that a lot when I think about Reagan, Thatcher, Bush, and, to be fair, Helmut Cole, how hard they thought about these questions 35 years ago.

Charles Moore (46:09)

Let me. Well, on that note, let me end by asking you to take a somewhat longer view. When I was a student in law school, I was explained the theory of a law school exam, which is the answers never change, only the questions, Meaning they're just trying to elicit, do you know, a certain number of doctrines, and they create these crazy factual patterns that is just eliciting your knowledge of the basic doctrines you're supposed to master before you leave a law school. But I wonder if there's something about that in the world of politics as well, that there's some enduring answers about human liberty, the creative power of free people, the importance of achieving peace, but not by being trusting and credulous, but by being suspicious and well prepared. Yeah, but the questions of our time seem so, so very different from the questions then. And above all, this collapse in confidence in parties of the right. They've lost their belief, their understanding that politics is difficult, and you need to be well prepared. You need to know the details if you want to solve any of the problems. They've lost a lot of Their faith in markets and human freedom. And in some ways they often seem very alienated from their own country. They often act and think like self, like Leninist parties where we know we're the minority, so we have to seize power by means, even if illegitimate, and hold power at all costs with no confidence that people would ever freely choose us. And therefore we can't allow free choices.

Charles Moore (47:31)

Yes, I think there is a lot in that. And this is a very interesting case of Mrs. Thatcher because in many ways she did have similarities with some of the what are called populist concerns of the modern right. So she was very engaged, by the way, for example, on the question of immigration and the dangers that that contains and some of the cultural dangers as well as the mere number and so on. But here's a difference which perhaps goes to what you're saying. I think she was fundamentally a legitimist. She believed in the institutions of her country and she had no desire to dismantle them, except for the. What she wanted to get out of the way was a whole load of accumulated rubbish. Rather than bash up or ignore the institutions, strengthen the institutions would be of which of course Parliament would be probably the most important in the British system. And make sure that. And if I got a dollar for every time I'd heard her say not just liberty, but law based liberty, I would be a very rich man. Because she loved to say this constantly. And the other thing she always said was the old saw about time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted. And most of our politicians seem to spend absolutely no time in reconnaissance and waste a great deal of it.

Charles Moore (48:42)

But on that long view, what are the answers from Thatcher's time that need to be rediscovered in a world that doesn't remember her as much more than a cartoon when it remembers her at all in a world in which she's become a demon figure to people who are basking in a legacy she left behind? What are the enduring answers we need to take from her career?

Charles Moore (49:01)

Well, I think she did make a powerful case, an example for economic liberty under the law. And she understood that in terms of the trajectory of human life. So what we're talking about in economics, as the original Greek word suggests, is we're talking about the household, we're talking about each person. This is not some fundamentally something technical. And you have to look at it to understand why it matters to people. You have to look at it across the generation. So it's all to do with what will happen next, and not just for you, but for your children and your Grandchildren. And she had a very good, instinctive understanding about that. So she would think about things like she'd love to say, every earner, an owner, for example. You're building up human dignity and human society. Often accused of getting that all wrong. But that's a very important example, I think. And the other one is an idea about the exportability of liberty. It's not that everybody in the whole world has to be ruled in the same way, but here's a good thing. We in the west have Britain, United States, particularly the Anglosphere, but in general, in the west, we have this. Most people don't. Most people would be happier if they did. We're not supposed to go around killing people to persuade them of this, but we can help persuade them of this by our own example. And we can also help defend them when they are threatened by tyrannical power. And there are tyrannical powers in the world, and there will continue to be, and, my goodness, there are today. And then finally, I would say she also proved that this was not the preserve of men and this leadership was not the preserve of men. And therefore, these are at least three very important areas where you frequently won't agree with her. Sometimes you'll think she made terrible mistakes. But it's quite an exemplary story and it won't go away.

Charles Moore (50:55)

Let me end with a bit of a commercial placement for you. I haven't read the new abridged version, but I've pored over all the original three volumes. This is a life that bears every page. And although the books are very elegantly composed, they are full of sass and fun because Thatcher was, as you keep reminding us, there was a very fun, loving element to her and a very ardent element. Passionate often, especially in her earlier days, but all the way through. And she was in politics because of the things she believed, not because of the things she wanted to be. And you, you capture that and reveal that of this rich and extraordinary woman in what was then a man's world. Charles Moore, thank you so much for joining me today.

Charles Moore (51:35)

Well, thank you, David. You've been very kind. Thank.

David Frum (51:44)

You. I thank Charles Moore for joining me today.

Charles Moore (51:48)

This week's book, as I mentioned at the top, is the World of Yesterday.

David Frum (51:52)

By the Austro Hungarian writer Stefan Zweig. Now, this is a very famous book, and many of you may have already encountered it, but for those who have not, Stefan zweig, in the 20s and 30s of the last century, was one of the most famous writers in the world. He wrote in German. He was a native of Vienna, he was born into a prosperous Viennese Jewish family.

Charles Moore (52:11)

He served in a non combat role.

David Frum (52:13)

In the First World War. And through his life he espoused a politics of liberalism, internationalism and peace. He was a European more than belonging to any other country, more than he.

Charles Moore (52:24)

Was Jewish, more than he was Austrian.

David Frum (52:26)

At the end of his life, he was driven into exile by the Nazi threat in his state of Austria. He Left Austria in 1934, emigrated to England, then to the United States, and finally arrived in Brazil, a country he loved and about which he wrote a book in 1942. Sunk in despair, he wrote this recollection of the world of his early life, the World of Yesterday.

Charles Moore (52:47)

And then, after having typed the last.

David Frum (52:50)

Page with the assistance of his second wife, who also functioned as a secretary to him, the two of them took an overdose of drugs and committed suicide. He succumbed to a death of despair.

Charles Moore (53:02)

I read the World of Yesterday for.

David Frum (53:03)

The first time a long, long time ago. I recently returned to it for quite a selfish reason.

Charles Moore (53:08)

I've been working on a memoir of.

David Frum (53:09)

My own and I wanted to study.

Charles Moore (53:12)

The engineering of one of the great.

David Frum (53:13)

Masterpieces of the work of memoir. How did. How was it done? I learned a lot from the book. I learned, for example, how. That it's very important to tell stories in just a very, very few lines. Our lives are packed with incidents that are interesting to us but are not necessarily of interest to others. And Zweig ruthlessly excised from his book much that was personal, much that must have been tremendously important to him in his own life in order to focus on the part of the story that he knew that the readers of tomorrow would want to know about the World of Yesterday. He has a vivid image of the passing of that world. By one of the strange coincidence, he.

Charles Moore (53:51)

Happens to be at a railway stop.

David Frum (53:52)

When the train that carries the last Habsburg Emperor. Karl Son Karl the. With the Emperor at the end of the war, when that train went into exile, Zahi was at the Holy Crossing. His own train delayed, and he saw the Emperor head off into history, the end of the world of security that he had known and in which he had grown up. He is able to sum it up, the rise of fascism in a few telling details as well. And in those few telling details, he puts his finger on some of the enduring mysteries of the politics of fascism that we grapple with to this day. He notices how trucks will pull up in a village and men will jump out and with truncheons and other instruments of violence, attack people, jump back into the truck and drive off. And he noticed with horror, he observed with horror the incidents of violence. But he said, who had paid for the uniforms on these men? This is before the Nazis have taken over either the German or the Austrian state. Who paid for the uniforms? Who paid for the trucks? How did these men get so well drilled? How did they know to jump off the truck and. And jump back on again?

Charles Moore (54:53)

And those are in microcosm.

David Frum (54:55)

The questions that historians of fascism still grapple with was, what kind of movement was this? Who paid for it? What sources of social strength did it draw from? And Zweig is able to conjure all this up in a line or two. The theme in the book that haunted me most, though, as I rewrite it after an interval of so many years, was the theme of despair. And this is the theme that may be relevant to those of you who are listening to me talk about it, who are thinking about returning or visiting this book for the first time. Zweig had reasons for despair. The world he had grown up in was destroyed. The liberalism and democracy he believed in were destroyed. He lost his beautiful home in Salzburg. He lost the collection of autographed manuscripts that he cherished and into which he poured so much of the wealth he'd earned from his successful career. His books could no longer be published in his native country, either in Germany or in Austria, in his native language. And he had suffered so many personal losses, friends and families consumed by the violence and hatred of Nazism. And so in far off Brazil, he took his life and let his second wife take her life alongside him. But it occurred to me as I read this, you know, if Zweig had just held onto his faith a little bit longer, Nazism was doomed. And although he would never get back the world of yesterday, he could have played an important part in building the role of tomorrow. He would have returned to Austria. He could have returned to Austria and been acclaimed. He would have discovered his works again, published, his memories rediscovered. And the world that he tried to keep alive in memory would become a source of inspiration and strength to the new world, the new world of democracy and liberalism that was returning to the German lands whose language he spoke. And so maybe this is a little simple minded there. Maybe there's a lot more going on. Maybe I'm just not constituted by either my fate or my personality to understand the feelings that would animate a man like Stefan Zweig. But we all have to hold on, even when things seem despairing, because you never know that hope isn't just a few months away and that the glimmerings, and that in the deep dark you see there's already the glimmerings of the light of tomorrow, and that the world of yesterday can be a resource for the world of tomorrow. Don't despair. Don't quit. It's tempting, but I think Zweig would.

Charles Moore (57:04)

Have rejoiced to see the world that.

David Frum (57:06)

Was coming and would have had something to contribute to that world if he could have lived and allowed his wife to live just a few more months longer. Thank you for watching the David Frahm show today. I hope you will share and support the program. Share it on platforms like subscribe. As always, the best way to support the work of this program is by subscribing to the Atlantic. That is the way to support my.

Charles Moore (57:26)

Work and all of my colleagues. I hope you'll consider doing that.

David Frum (57:29)

See you next week.

Charles Moore (57:54)

This episode of the David Frum show was produced by Nathaniel Frum and edited by Andrea Valdes. It was engineered by Dave Grine. Our theme is by Andrew M. Edwards.

David Frum (58:05)

Claudine Abayad is the executive producer of.

Charles Moore (58:08)

Atlantic Audio and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor. I'm David Frum. Thank you for listening.

Alicia Wainwright (58:14)

Go beyond the lab in the new season of When Science Finds a Way, a podcast from Wellcome, a global charitable foundation supporting science to solve urgent health challenges. You'll join me, Alicia Wainwright, your host, for bold conversations about the scientific breakthroughs changing around the globe in this season. Each episode explores how science is not just in the lab, but alive in homes, supermarkets, hospitals, schools and communities. We'll hear from a Nigerian artist who's channeling his lived experience into creative ways to support mental health From Brazilian researchers who are using climate data to forecast and prevent disease outbreaks From European scientists developing new imaging technology that reveals disease in the body in unprecedented detail. We'll even explore a groundbreaking new study that's reimagining reproductive healthcare. These are all stories about how communities and researchers are working together to meet urgent health challenges with empathy and impact. Listen to When Science Finds a Way, a science podcast that tells the human story. Wherever you get your podcasts.