BONUS POD: Ari Talks Trump Tariffs, Fed, Bubble with Goldman Sachs' Lloyd Blankfein

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Beat with Ari Melber – BONUS POD: Ari Talks Trump Tariffs, Fed, Bubble with Goldman Sachs' Lloyd Blankfein

Date: March 6, 2026
Host: Ari Melber
Guest: Lloyd Blankfein (Former CEO, Goldman Sachs)
Episode Theme:
Ari Melber interviews Lloyd Blankfein, famed former CEO of Goldman Sachs, exploring Blankfein’s personal journey, philosophy on markets and risk, lessons from the 2008 financial crisis, his new memoir (“Streetwise”), and hot-button issues including inequality, CEO pay, the revolving door between Wall Street and government, and reaction to current economic and political news.

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1. Introduction & Setting the Stage

• Ari introduces Blankfein as a “defining figure of Wall Street’s success,” pivotal during and after the 2008 crash, and also a “lightning rod” for criticism of Wall Street excess (00:58).
• Melber presents a highlight reel of Blankfein’s career arc, from public housing in Brooklyn to Harvard to the top of Goldman Sachs.

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2. Understanding Markets and Risk (03:32-12:53)

How Do You Know Markets Are Functioning?

• Blankfein’s definition (03:41):
  “The market is the market. ... If the people who want to buy and the people who want to sell can be matched to a high degree – called liquidity – if the spreads are narrow ... that's a highly efficient market.”
• Efficient markets are those where participants can buy/sell at fair value easily (03:41–04:11).

Economic Health & The Wealth Gap

• Blankfein’s outlook (04:54):
  The “base case” is that the US macro economy is going well: low unemployment, moderating inflation, equity markets near highs, upcoming tech-driven productivity gains, stimulative policies.
• Caveat:
  “Wealth is being created, but that wealth is tending to attach itself to people who are already wealthy. ... The gap between the rich and the poor is widening even as overall wealth increases.” (06:27)

Memorable quote:

“The economy is generating wealth and going pretty well, but it also has to allocate that wealth in a way consistent with society’s values … That last part is one people are taking a lot of exception to, and that contributes to the polarization that we’re feeling now.” — Blankfein (06:38)

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3. On Probabilistic Thinking & Risk Management Culture (08:35-12:53)

• Ari describes Goldman's “institutionalized probabilistic thinking”—risk shaping over prediction and treating prediction as hazardous.

Blankfein (09:12):

• “We’re not in the ‘let’s guess the market right’ business. We’re in the contingency planning business.”

• “Very often, things that are very, very improbable happen more often than the probability would suggest. … This is a once in 80 year kind of an event, except it happens every four years. During my tenure at the firm, we had the crisis of the century every four or five years.” (10:28)

• On risk: “The risks they tend to underappreciate are the risks they don’t think of. … Most of these things are not anticipated. Our job is to try to anticipate it, and we know we won’t. ... Don’t tell me whether it’s a high or low probability. Tell me what could possibly happen....” (11:09)

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4. Personal Journey: From Public Housing to Harvard to Goldman (12:53-18:08)

• Blankfein recounts growing up in the Lynden Projects, East New York, Brooklyn (13:06).
  • “We were four generations … in a relatively small apartment.”
  • The experience provided motivation, not direct preparation:
    “I had no problem with that. I was very, very well motivated ... My work ethic came from being motivated to get into an out-of-town school.” (13:23-15:07)
• Anecdote: Attends a college fair, meets Harvard rep by chance, applies impulsively, gets in (15:17)
• Discusses feelings of being out of place or “an imposter” in elite circles:
  "I still felt like an imposter. ... In certain rooms, I still feel illegitimate; other people are the real grownups." (18:12-19:15)

Advice to others with ‘imposter syndrome’:

• “You can’t give your cards back. These are the cards you have; make the best of it. ... Sometimes I look at people who are so secure ... but maybe [insecurity] paid off in that it made me much more empathetic to other people.” (20:06-21:28)
• His background helps him understand economic bifurcation and who the economy is not working for. (21:28–21:52)

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5. The 2008 Financial Crisis & Goldman’s Response (22:15–29:29)

How Did Goldman Avoid Collapse?

• Blankfein describes a pivotal moment:
  • Noticed an abnormal 8% move in an asset at night, “ran to the telephone and start calling” (23:03-24:13).
  • Goldman's rigorous “mark-to-market” culture: pricing assets daily, not resisting reality.
    “If you mark it down again, it becomes easier to sell because you’re asking everyone for a lower price.” (25:04-27:04)
• Other firms’ denial about their asset values led to crossing the danger threshold.
• Goldman’s approach: “We ran our business tighter … We didn’t know whether to go up or down … but we were dealing in reality.” (27:29)

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6. Praise and Criticism: Being “the Face” of Wall Street (28:19-36:30)

• Goldman praised for prudent crisis management, but also became the symbol of Wall Street excess. (28:19-28:56)
• Criticisms from politicians (Sanders, Warren, Congress) about inequality and Goldman’s proximity to power.

Blankfein:

• “At that time, there was no value in going after firms that were either bankrupt or lost $50 billion. … We had done too well.” (29:08-29:19)
• If more banks had operated like Goldman, “you might not have had a banking crisis.” (31:20)
• On government hiring ex-Goldman staff (“revolving door”): “Our door really didn’t revolve. We didn’t hire people from government. Government hired people from us by and large…It’s part of the ethic of the firm … to want people to go into public service.” (34:01)

Notable exchange:

“I once said to a reporter who interviewed me for two hours ... ‘I can't, I’m late. I’m running off to do God’s work.’ ... He printed it as if it was some ecclesiastical statement ... I was joking.” — Blankfein (36:26-37:04)

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7. Inequality, CEO Pay & Should There Be a Wealth Cap? (37:09–42:07)

• CEO pay up 1,000% since the 1970s; worker pay only up ~26% (37:09)
• Is this a market failure?
  • “It’s not a market failure, but it may be a big problem. … People pay up for [talented leaders]. So that’s the market. Is it a problem? Yes.” (37:31-39:07)
• On capping personal wealth:
  • “I don’t want them to be capped ... The only thing you can do with that money at the end of the day is give it away. ... Our culture does a very good job of pressuring people appropriately [to philanthropy].” (40:08-42:07)
• Goldman partners are urged from the start to set up private foundations and balance professional success with public good. (42:07-43:03)
  • “You should have done other things” than just make money.

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8. Quickfire / Lightning Round: Views on Current Events (43:41-47:07)

• Supreme Court limiting presidential tariff powers:
  • “Good ... I believe in the Constitution, separation of powers.” (43:58)
• Presidential investigation of Fed officials:
  • “Bad, bad, bad, bad ... The protector of the dollar is the Fed. If you attack the Fed ... lenders may require higher rates.” (44:47)
• Paramount beating Netflix for Warner Brothers:
  • “That was the market clearing price … depends on synergies … I’m not close enough to give a competing opinion.” (45:36)
• Betting markets:
  • “They are both [good and dangerous]. … It’s good for hedging, but can also be dangerous for addictive personalities.” (46:24)

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9. Investing & Life Maxims (Lightning Round, continued) (47:14-52:24)

• First rule of investing:

  • “Stay within your capacity to lose money. Don’t go beyond it.” (47:23)

• Most underrated risk now:

  • “People investing in illiquid assets that can’t be easily sold.” (47:33)

• Stocks or bonds (long run):

  • “Always for me, over the long term, stocks.” (47:42)

• Past performance/Timing the market:

  • “Past performance does not indicate future results — always true.” (47:51)
  • “Time in the market beats timing the market … stay in, don’t get out.” (48:05)
  • “Buy the dip — usually true, if you have a long time horizon.” (48:13)

• Never outsource risk management:

  • “Never outsource your risk management and spend more time on it than you think you should.” (48:25)

• No guaranteed under/overvalued price:

  • “Value is in the eye of the beholder ... best indication is the price at which it clears at that moment.” (48:39)

• Big picture maxims:

  • “When it feels like you can party like it's 1999, you should... go back to risk management and spend more time on your balance sheet.” (50:24)

• Money & Motivation:

  • “The best thing about money is that you don't have to worry about money.” (51:03)
  • “The worst thing about money is that it robs you of your motivation.” (51:09)

• Best Advice:

  • “Don’t accept commitments just because they’re far off on your calendar. ... Eventually they’ll roll around and you’ll regret having agreed to them.” (51:15)

• On Success & Failure:

  • “Failure means I now have the opportunity to prove my resilience.” (52:03)
  • “Success means you have to have higher objectives.” (52:14)
  • “Reaching the summit means ... you better work harder to sustain your tenure at the summit.” (52:24)

• Reflecting on being nice to people:

  • “I wish I knew how senior and important I was going to be, because I would have been a lot nicer to people on the way up and I wouldn’t have had to spend so much time apologizing to them later.” (50:11)

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10. Notable Quotes (with Timestamps)

• On economic bifurcation:

  “The gap between the rich and the poor is widening even as overall wealth is increasing.” (06:27, Blankfein)

• On risk management:

  “We’re in the contingency planning business because we have to be prepared for what could go wrong.” (09:12, Blankfein)

• On imposter syndrome:

  “I still felt like an imposter. … In certain rooms, I still feel illegitimate; other people are the real grownups.” (18:12, Blankfein)

• On CEO pay and wealth distribution:

  “The economy in general has to do two things: create the wealth and distribute it according to values.” (37:31, Blankfein)

• On capping wealth:

  “The only thing you can do with that money at the end of the day is give it away. ... I’m glad [billionaires] are incentivized, even after they’ve made a fortune, to keep on going.” (40:08, Blankfein)

• On market highs:

  “Especially at the highs, when you’re feeling good and everybody’s popping champagne corks, you should go back and look at what’s going to go wrong.” (50:49, Blankfein)

• On failure:

  “Failure means I now have the opportunity to prove my resilience, which is the most important characteristic to have.” (52:03, Blankfein)

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11. Conclusion

• Lloyd Blankfein’s memoir, “Streetwise: Getting to and Through Goldman Sachs,” explores his journey, risks, and lessons.
• The interview navigates the nuance between Wall Street’s value and its systemic pitfalls, Blankfein’s measured optimism about the economy, the inevitability of unpredictability, and the imperative for leaders to remain both rigorous and humble.

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Summary prepared for listeners who want a deep but accessible overview of Ari Melber’s conversation with Lloyd Blankfein, capturing both substance and memorable moments.

Transcript

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[Lloyd Blankfein]

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[Ari Melber]

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[Ari Melber]

Welcome to the Summit Series with Ari Melbourne where we speak to leaders at the summit of their fields. Tonight's guest is a defining figure of Wall Street's success. One of the most consequential leaders during and after the 2008 crash. Longtime Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein. The CEO has been heralded and criticized. The New York Times reported he handled the financial crisis better than all the firm's rivals and had the longest run atop the firm in half a century. The paper also reported he became a lightning rod for objections to how Wall street operates.

[News Reporter]

Time for this morning's mover and shaker. And today it is Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein. Goldman is known on Wall street for escalating the pay. Blankfein is a supporter of setting industry standards.

[Ari Melber]

Blankfein was awarded a $68 million bonus, the most ever for a Wall Street CEO.

[News Reporter]

A dozen CEOs get ready to meet President Obama today to discuss the fiscal cliff. The Goldman Sachs chief has unveiled a business plan for American revival. He's been a lifer at Goldman Sachs, right? As you say he started in the 80s. He said that Goldman Sachs among a number of organizations failed to sound the alarm bells throughout the crisis.

[Ari Melber]

Boyd Blankfein, Newly minted billionaire Lloyd Blankfein

[News Reporter]

looks at himself as being a risk manager. Lloyd Blankfein is preparing to leave Goldman Sachs.

[Ari Melber]

We look at share price performance since he it's clear that while behind that of JP Morgan, it's significantly better than some of the other banks.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

After 40 years of running around the world and living in the macro markets, it's A little bit hard to. It's a little bit hard to drop it.

[Ari Melber]

Blank Fine is out with a new book, Streetwise Getting to and Through Goldman Sachs, recounting a journey from New York public housing to Harvard to the top of Wall street, where Blakefein became as big a household name as probably any banker can be even portrayed in the film Too Big to Fail.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Lloyd's a superstar. Goldman's the smartest shop on the block. And just because I used to be his boss, it doesn't mean he's gonna listen to me.

[Ari Melber]

The goddamn British bankruptcy administrator froze all

[Lloyd Blankfein]

of Lehman's customer accounts.

[Ari Melber]

You didn't square this with the British

[Lloyd Blankfein]

before you did it? Geithner on 5. People are freaking out. They can't get their money. Not investors. Science.

[Ari Melber]

Lloyd Blankfein joins the Summit series now. Welcome.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Good to see Ari. Who's that guy in a suit?

[Ari Melber]

You're more casual these days.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, I was pretty casual back then, too.

[Ari Melber]

That's memory lane. I want to get into all of it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Sure, sure, sure.

[Ari Melber]

But let's just start with fundamentals. You're the person to ask this. How do you tell that a market is functioning properly?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, the market is the market. And so if you can buy things and sell things, if the bid and spread, if the people who want to buy and the people who want to sell can be matched to a high degree called liquidity, if the spreads are narrow, in other words, where someone could sell, where someone could buy are fairly close together, that's a highly efficient market. So if you. There are people in the world who want to sell, people in the world who want to buy. If each one of them can accomplish their objective efficiently, that is at a tight spread, then that's an efficient market.

[Ari Melber]

In the news, we look at things and there's a lot of things you can ignore if you want. You can ignore sports, you can ignore fashion trends. A lot of people tune politics out. You can't tune out the market when it comes back and affects yourself or your job, even if you're not invested in it. And so I'm wondering if you could give us your smartest take for free. We're not buying it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

It'll be worth every penny you're not paying for.

[Ari Melber]

Exactly. That your clients and your firm's clients might have once benefited from. For someone who is not heavily invested in the market today, but is concerned about planning and they think about the risk of recession, full blown crash, or even bailouts, what is their likely outlook in the next couple of years?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, I'D say right now, the base case. The base. Look, I'm in the risk management business, so let me just say I'm always nervous, I'm always worried. I spend 99% of my time, you know, thinking about the 1% of things that could go wrong. I would say right now the base case is that the large economy, and I'll use the word macrolarge economy, is going pretty well and looks like it should continue going well. Why do I say that? Unemployment is relatively. Look, you pick up the paper every day or you watch TV every day and you can go, this is going wrong. And I'm upset by this number or that number. But basically, in the scheme of things, unemployment is pretty low. Inflation is higher than the Federal Reserve would like to see it, but we had 9% inflation. Now we have inflation, core inflation, in the high twos, we'd like to get it to two, but it's not that bad. Into a market that's got equity, markets are near the highs. Into a market that's going pretty well. The bbb, what some people call the big beautiful bill, some call it the bad bill, is coming, and that's going to be stimulative. We're having new technologies come in which should increase productivity. And also the spending by certain companies to invest in that new technology is kind of a stimulus in the market. Tax refunds are about to come. And the fact is that tax for a lot of people have been lowered, but withholding was high, so refunds are going to be higher. Those are all generally stimulative things coming into a good market. And so I would say one has a real good reason to be optimistic now. Now, before everybody gets, you know, crazy and say, you know, you're tone deaf, how could you say it's a good economy? An economic system has to do two things. It has to generate wealth. And that's really what I've been talking about. The economy is generating wealth and going pretty well, but it also has to allocate that wealth in a way consistent with society's values, let's say. And I would say that last part is one that people are taking a lot of exception to and that contributes to the polarization that we're feeling now in the country because wealth is being created. That created wealth is tending to attack, attach itself to the people who are already wealthy. Why? Because everything I said is increasing the value of assets. So if you already have assets, you're getting wealthier. If you don't have assets, you're not participating as Much. And so the gap between the rich and the poor is widening even as overall wealth is increasing, but it's attaching to a specific segment. And the segment that's denied, that is not feeling it and really is getting awfully upset when other people are saying the economy is doing really well.

[Ari Melber]

That's a big issue in our country right now.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

It's maybe the issue in our country too.

[Ari Melber]

And later I even have queued up some of the folks who criticize Wall street for that. So I want to get to that, but first I want to talk about your philosophy. There's something unusual about you having read the book and studied you, that you probably don't think about much because it's your usual reality. But so many people, they speak in absolutes, predictions. This is how things are, this is how they're going to be. We're going to do this and this is going to happen. We hear that in politics all the time. People love the politicians love to promise you what's going to happen. You're the opposite. And you've been trusted and respected for that. So I asked AI to kind of try to distill this. You want to know what AI said about your view?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Sure. As long as it's flattering. Yes.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, right. Blankfein and Goldman's advantage, I'm quoting, has been institutionalized probabilistic thinking, turning uncertainty into decision rules, incentives, and a culture that treats prediction as hazardous and risk shaping as the job. And in the book that's how you talk, maybe you realize, or more so than you realize about all matters. And it's striking because it seems to be a more precise way of adjudicating what could happen. And yet would you agree? It's rare. Can you tell us how you developed that, what that is?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I'm not sure what that meant. I'll just say that, look, we're in the business of intermediating. What does that mean? That means we stand between buyers and sellers. Companies want to do things and they want to get out of their risk. So we take over their risk. We get paid to take on their risks. Or we source people who want to buy things and they're not available, we sell it to them, and then we try to find the other side of transactions. And the end of it all is we end up with a big balance sheet. What do we mean, balance sheet? We have a lot of stuff and a lot of assets that we own. And so much so that there's hardly anything that can go wrong anywhere in the world where it doesn't affect us adversely. And so that's what I said. We're risk managers. We take on other people's risk. We finance people, which is risky for us because we give you money and then we have to go out and source the money ourselves, and we become risk managers. And so we're always attentive and we're always tuned to what we think is going to happen. And we try to position ourselves accordingly. We give advice so that our clients can position ourselves accordingly. But there's really two sides to it. One side is we try to predict the future. And that's what everybody does. A lot of people do. And everybody thinks that that's what we do. But what I always say also is very often we're not in the prediction, let's guess the market right. We're in the contingency planning business because we have to be prepared for what could go wrong. And sometimes, and very often, things that are very, very improbable happen more often than the probability would suggest. So you'll hear people talk, and this is a once in 80 year kind of an event, except it happens every four years. During my tenure at the firm, we had the crisis of the century every four or five years.

[Ari Melber]

So let me ask you this. What risk do even accomplished people tend to underappreciate?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, the risks they tend to underappreciate. The risks they don't think of. Because if you're thinking of a risk, the ones you can't see, the one that comes. We used to have an expression from around the corner where you can't see what's going on around the corner that happens. Take the thing. We can almost pick anything. The financial crisis, which by the way, essentially was different forms of a real estate crisis with different names. There was a mortgage crisis or a real estate crisis, but it centered around real estate. It started with subprime real estate. You know, real estate that was acquired by very poor credits, then better credits, then even great credits. And it went from real, you know, from mortgages to actual real estate and other kind of things that wasn't really anticipated. The crisis a few years before that happened, when there was a Russian default. Now it's very easy to imagine a Russian default because we're not friends with Russia anymore. But there was a period of time after the fall of communism where Russia was on such an upswing. No one would have contemplated that. I mean, we can go on and on. Most of these things are not anticipated. Our job is to try to anticipate it, and we know we won't. So we say we're really into contingency planning. We go around the table, sometimes literally go around the table, but usually we're all trying to think of, don't tell me whether it's a high probability or low probability. Tell me what could possibly happen even in your far fetched imagination and tell me what you're doing today, what kind of plan, what contingency planning are you doing so that if that happened, you'd go quickly and you'd solve it. And if you do that very, very well, you go faster than everybody else. And everybody did think you anticipated instead of just acted very quickly when the gun went off.

[Ari Melber]

Right. But you were ready. I want to do more on that. But the book starts with young Lloyd in public housing. East New York Brownsville, East New York, Brooklyn, Lynden.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Lynden Projects.

[Ari Melber]

So you're in the projects. What part of that prepared you for the world you were entering? Because in the book you talk about developing your sense of self, but also having a kind of an imposter feeling.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I would say the best thing and the first. I call the first chapter Advantages, which is kind of ironic because some people would think that would just advantage. You know, we lived in, you know, with my, you know, we were one two, we were four generations because my grandmother lived with us and my sister's baby lived with us and my parents in a relatively small apartment. But I would say there was not any direct preparation. But I got a lot out of that experience. What I got out of that was motivation. I think of different kinds of people. And when you read about people, children of famous people, wealthy people leading dissolute lives, being unhappy. I would say one of the pressures on people who seem on the surface to have everything is that they have to source their motivation and sometimes they can't find their motivation. I had no problem with that. I was very, very well motivated. My motivated. I didn't have a particular target in mind. I wanted to put myself in a position where I can get out of the project, where I can live, you know, go in a different place. I wanted to. I wanted to live in what I thought the suburbs was, which is, you know, you watch TV shows and some showing my age there. There was Father who Knows Best, and there was Leave it to Beaver and all these television shows.

[Ari Melber]

And that looked like a life that was different than your house.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I didn't know what it was. I hadn't seen it, but I thought it would be kind of a cool thing. To live in a real house as opposed to an apartment with grass in front and not like concrete and broken glass.

[Ari Melber]

That would be a step up to Lloyd Blankfein, get out of the apartment, you know.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

So for me, it took this. It was. I wanted to go to an out of town school. That was what. That, to me, was it. And so a lot of what I was doing, a lot of motivation, a lot of my work ethic came from being motivated to get into an out of town school.

[Ari Melber]

And Harvard's not in Brooklyn.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Harvard wasn't in Brooklyn. Now, that was a reach. I didn't know it was a brand name. I'd never seen it before I applied to it.

[Ari Melber]

But

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I went to a high school in a different neighborhood to their college night. There wasn't a college. Shockingly, there wasn't a college night at my high school, which was school that was on triple session. Means they emptied the school out and had three different groups go to the high school because it was overcrowded for the building. And there was a booth and it was manned. Different booths were for different schools. And there was a Harvard College booth. And whoever was sitting about it, I thought it was probably a young kid, but at that point it looked like an old guy to me. And he chatted with me and he handed me an application. And I filled out that application like you'd fill out a landing form when you were going through immigration or something. You asked a question and I answered it. And I realize now that these were essay questions, but I didn't deal with them as something that you go home and write and rewrite things 15 times. I answered it. And to the credit of Harvard and my eternal gratitude, they took me. By the way, I didn't get into every college, but I got into Harvard. I had very good math scores and not very good verbal scores. I don't ever think I read a book through cover to cover in high school since it suddenly became quite bookish. But anybody who knows me would consider me pretty verbal. Yet I didn't.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, but that developed. Now, do you remember the rap group Tribe Called Quest?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

No.

[Ari Melber]

They were.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Why don't you hum a few bars?

[Ari Melber]

Well, I got some for you.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Okay.

[Ari Melber]

Because reading your book, they have a couple songs. One they say back in the days on the boulevard of Linden we used to kick routines and the presence was fitting. They have another hit song where they say Lyndon Boulevard. Represent, represent. When the mic is in my hand I'm never hesitant.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, that was the big street Lynden Bull lived.

[Ari Melber]

So it's striking. That's in the culture. You had your road out, other people had their road out. But you were coming up in a place that was obviously diverse. And a lot of people, however much they love that neighborhood, knew that they were. They were not necessarily reaping the benefits of America.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I wish I had thought of it at the time, but I think I was pre wrap.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, but you were. They came later than you.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Yes, yes, yes.

[Ari Melber]

But, but, but that neighborhood, looking at that now, you feel like, wow, I made it out. And I would have not had that motivation had I started somewhere else.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I think that, you know, that's certainly right now, that's not to say, you know, there's always probabilities and statistics. I think, you know, I'd like to say that I'm representative of what anybody could accomplish if they're properly motivated. But you know something? If you're properly motivated, you still have to be lucky and you still have to get opportunities. And you still have to, you know, by random, sheer chance, run by that little booth at that high school that I wasn't even going to, and it has to work out, and somebody had to pick up my application, and somehow it thought, you know, this was a quirky kid, let me take a risk on him. So, you know, but you.

[Ari Melber]

And you kept pushing, which comes through in the book. So I'm gonna read from the book.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Sure.

[Ari Melber]

You say after law school and all of that. Right. Which is already a ways from where you started. You get to a good firm and then find out that they're basically pushing you over to a department out of your expertise. They're placing you last, and you write. Well, under the circumstances, I couldn't accept that job. I had some pride without delay. I got back on the phone, too, and you mentioned a different firm and try to go back to a different offer. And you write. Looking back on law school, I can see at that stage I was still holding myself back, not aiming for the law review or a clerkship or pursuing a more exciting specialty. Why was I underestimating my ability, underperforming my smarts? The truth is that coming from where I did, I still felt like an imposter. There was a chip on my shoulder, always looking for someone to knock it off. And in certain rooms, I felt, and still feel, and you're writing this book now, still feel illegitimate. Other people are the real grownups. Tell us about that. And for somebody watching who might feel like that, do you have a tip that comes out of that?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

You know, again, I'm not even sure that's such a bad thing in the. Look, it depends what you're going. Is that the formula for having the happiest life? Not necessarily.

[Ari Melber]

Probably not.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Probably not. I always, I joke and I say it in a different context. I've known people. Look, I've been around. I've been top of a very, you know, I went to great schools, big firm and everything. I met, I met everybody in the world. The mythology is gone, you know, the mystique. And I, you know, I met a lot of people who've done very well, including. And I used to say so. And so I envy that guy. That guy was probably elected most likely to succeed from kindergarten on, you know, that probably never had an insecure moment in his life. And by the way, I know people. I'm not going to name them. I could name them.

[Ari Melber]

You're talking about Thune or Diamond?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

No, I'm talking about people who are in. In the press now. Household names. And you look at them. But by the way, you also never. I don't know what happens when they go home and they cringe in the corner and their wife has to give them smelling salts. I don't know. Or their husband. I don't know. So you never know what somebody else. But I do know people who look like they've been most likely to see their entire lives. I wasn't that person. And at the end of the day, what's the best formula for hat? You know, I say this at times to my kids and other people. You know, you get, you know, this is one of those poker hands where you can't give the cards back that you don't like and get new cards. These are the cards you have. Make the best of it. I am the way. Not to quote Popeye, but I am what I am what I am. Boop boop. As they say in the cartoon bars. Bars, yes. And so that's what you have. But sometimes I look at people who are so secure and just was at the top of their class all along. Never had a down moment that wasn't me. And you know, maybe it's paid off in a lot of ways it made me much more empathetic to other people. You know, at the beginning of this conversation, we had a, you know, what's the economy? And most people who do what I do would tell you how great the economy is doing. But I'm really thinking about that. Who's the economy doing great for? And the bifurcation of outcomes for different parts of the. You know, for different categories.

[Ari Melber]

And you're saying partly because of the neighborhood you came from.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

It's because of where I identify with. You know, I was a CEO of a very big company. I get in a car in the backseat and a driver drives off. I go upstairs and I say, gee, you know, I wonder if it's cold in the car that I just left 2 1/2 hours ago. You know, I think of, you know, I think of other things because that's who I was.

[Ari Melber]

Well, you say you don't get to turn your cards back in. That's certainly the case when the market drops. And I want to take us just back in the moment because it could be easy to forget. History has this way of flattening things. We just put together briefly what it started to feel like during that crash. He has no idea how bad it is out there.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

He has no idea. He has no idea.

[News Reporter]

Bear Stearns today leading the tumble on Wall Street. The stock plunging 45%.

[Ari Melber]

Lehman Brothers is going bankrupt.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

The news from Wall street has shaken the American people's faith in our economy. Meltdown. The American financial system is rocked to its foundation. History in Dow plummets more than 777 points. Its biggest one day point drop. You know that Kramer was Harvard College, Harvard Law and Goldman Sachs, just like me.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, yeah.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

How do you like that too?

[Ari Melber]

How do you like that?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And we go to the same barber.

[Ari Melber]

What was the day you remember appreciating that the risk was rising? Because it was clearly before the crash, based on Goldman's way before the crash.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And one of the things, look, you know, I don't want you to think I'm overly humble. I think we did very well in it registering and we saw signs of it early. Why do we see signs of it early? We mark our balance sheet, we mark our assets. What does that mean? Everything we own every day we figure out what the price of that is worth and record that. And so we do that every day. And we're very, very, very, very rigorous about that. Not everybody was as rigorous as we were. And I will tell you, the first day I had an inclination that something was happening. I was sitting in a movie theater with my wife and doing what I always do when I was watching a movie theater in those days, I was going through my P and L, you know, what then was a BlackBerry in a backlight pretending to watch a movie. And one of the things that we had, one of the assets that we had that on a wild day would move hundredths of a percent Basis points, hundreds, tiny amount every day, and it had moved 8%. And I go, whoa, that's not supposed to happen. So I said, excuse me, gotta get some popcorn, ran to the telephone and start calling. What's going on?

[Mazda/Jeep Commercial Announcer]

That.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And that was.

[Ari Melber]

And let me just slow you down, because a lot of people imagine you got this giant bank at one point, 30,000 staff. They don't imagine.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Sorry, yeah, go on.

[Ari Melber]

They don't imagine that you are at whatever time at night going line by line and then noticing something that apparently had not yet been absorbed by the market.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, let me tell you, and this is not just me, this is, you know, people who run big companies. I don't know what you think people do, but when you're accountable and it's consequential, and all these people are depending upon you, and if anything goes wrong, they haul you in and your shareholders will want to kill you and everything, that's quite an incentive to stay on top of things. Now, not everybody does it the same way or the same thing. If we were manufacturing. Manufacturing jets, which we're not, I'd be walking through the factory. In our case, we're in the financial business, and I go over numbers all the time.

[Ari Melber]

So you look at that 8%, you get on the phone and you do it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I do that and I start making phone calls and I say, what's going on here? And there's no good answer to that at that point because this is like in a movie when you're watching a western and the horses in the corral are starting to whinny. You know, you know, and you know, you see a little cloud on the horizon. You in the audience know something big is going to happen, but the people on stage don't. I was. I had you started to know this is right now. I've had that feeling before, and it passed over. And so. But you react to it. And we started getting together and what's going on here? And a few more of those incidents start to happen. And we put out, you know, the word in the organization, and when I say that's not casual. We instructed people, let's get closer to home. So in other words, everybody has a lot of different parts of our firm in New York, in Japan, Singapore, China, everywhere else in different assets in stock market, bond markets, commodity markets. We trade everything and we trade everything all over the world. Do your business, stay close to your customers, but try to keep your risks closer to home. If you're being asked by your clients to take an extraordinary risk in Something, try to hedge it quickly so you get closer to, even closer to neutral as much as you can. And that's how we tried to run ourselves, still doing our business, still buying from people who wanted to sell, selling to people who wanted to buy. We would get extraordinarily risky at times in service of our clients, but we would very quickly try to bring it back to home. And that's the instruction that went out. And then we started to operate that way and it started to get worse and worse and build and build. And I would say the thing that helped us is that we were dealing in reality. We were marking to market, looking at the valuation of every day. Some people in our firm would argue and say, these securities, these mortgages, are worth more than you think. The people in the control department of the firm that do the P and ls, they're getting it wrong. This should be a higher price than they're ascribing. And we go to the trader or someone who had that position, you know something, maybe you're right. Go sell something and prove that you can get the price you think it's worth. And then they couldn't do it. So then we mark it down again. And if you mark it down again, it becomes easier to sell because you're asking everyone for a lower price.

[Ari Melber]

So in simple terms, you would call. Other people didn't want to be called. They just wanted to say, I got a good hand.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

We ran our business tighter. We marked ourselves to market. And because we did that, we didn't know where it would go to next. Half our firm wanted to buy more of whatever was going down, half the firm wanted to go short, sell more, and we didn't know whether to go up or down. But at this particular time, given what was happening in market illiquidity, and going back to your original question, the breakdown of efficiency in the market because the people who owned it couldn't sell it at the price it thought it was worth. And the people who wanted to buy it couldn't buy it at the lower price. The owners wanted more. The sellers, you know, and you couldn't get to that. And so we just. To me, that was the reality. And other people didn't do that and didn't have a reality.

[Ari Melber]

So you explore this in the book. Yes, there's two macro big stories here, two big narratives. One is the financial data and results that show you led a firm that handled this better than most other competitors came out ahead. That was good for anyone who'd invested in you. That's kind of your job landed with Warren Buffett money. That kind of outcome. And there was positives for that. And also became seen as what's wrong with Wall Street. And associated with a lot of the critiques.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And not just Wall street, us in particular. Let's not right.

[Ari Melber]

But you became the face of that as opposed to perhaps other firms that were so irresponsible they literally ceased to exist. They collapsed.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Yes.

[Ari Melber]

I'm going to show you. Go ahead. Sorry.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

No good. At that time there was no value in going after firms that were either bankrupt or lost $50 billion.

[Ari Melber]

They're gone.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

They're gone, they're gone.

[Ari Melber]

So let me show you.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

We had done too well.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah. Well, we want to show accurately both pieces of this. The first is the positive people, especially those close to the market. And Buffett himself saying not just Goldman, but Goldman under your leadership worked. Take a look.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

This is the part I like.

[Ari Melber]

Blankfein is an incredibly smart and very politic guy.

[News Reporter]

Blankfein has a charitable side. Records show the foundation he runs with his wife donated $11 million to Harvard.

[Ari Melber]

One of the most important people the financial firm specifically and the business world in general. The CEO and chairman of the Goldman Sachs Lloyd Blankfein.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Unequivocal and by praise of Lloyd, I

[Ari Melber]

think he did a terrific job in

[Lloyd Blankfein]

bringing the company through a crisis.

[Ari Melber]

So you have that associated with those results. And then you have a lot of other people who represent individuals who have been chosen for leadership and power their constituents. And they're saying some of this a

[Lloyd Blankfein]

dangerous and growing inequality and lack of upward mobility that has jeopardized middle class America's basic bargain. The Justice Department on Monday announced a $5 billion settlement with Goldman Sachs because

[News Reporter]

concentrated money and concentrated power are corrupting our democracy.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

The most powerful group of institutions in our country is engaged in fraudulent activity.

[News Reporter]

Goldman Sachs now has enough people in the White House to open a branch office.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, who's right?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Well, the world was like, listen, I will tell you. Let me summarize it for you. It was almost like in time bound. It started out as how did you do it? Magnificent. You hedged. And by the way, if every bank had done this, nobody would have. There wouldn't have been a bank crisis. We might have had a recession, but it wouldn't have been a banking crisis. It was a kind of worshipful how did you do it? And then it became how did you do it?

[Ari Melber]

Right.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And that's how.

[Ari Melber]

Your point one though is you say that the financial data would support the view that if more Banks operated like Goldman at the time. You wouldn't have had the level of bailouts.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Oh, yeah, wouldn't have the bailouts. You might not have had the intensity of a crisis. One of the things about this crisis, it was a. There were a lot of recessions, but this was a very big crisis, partly because it was also a banking crisis. At the end of the day, governments don't lend money to people. Central banks don't lend money to people. Banks lend money to people. If the government wants to give money to people, they don't call you up and lend it to you and they don't give you a mortgage. It's financial institutions that do that. The financial institutions were very distressed. And because of that, the transmission mechanisms, the way in which government support and government policy could get out into the general public was impaired. If you gave weak banks at that moment money, they'd hold onto the money to improve their balance sheet, to make themselves stronger, to recover. And it wouldn't get into the public. And that's why that's part of the

[Ari Melber]

catch 22 and that's part of the

[Lloyd Blankfein]

crisis was so dragged out.

[Ari Melber]

But when Sanders and Warren, we wouldn't

[Lloyd Blankfein]

have had a banking crisis if the banks had run themselves better.

[Ari Melber]

And when Sanders and Warren say this was a Goldman problem, you say it

[Lloyd Blankfein]

was singly on Goldman because frankly, we had done several reasons. We had, by the way, we didn't make money in those years, but we didn't lose money. And if you're looking, there was legislation that, that particular part that they wanted to pass and they were looking for symbols of it. You know, go get a mortgage from Goldman Sachs. Go, go to your Goldman Sachs local branch office and make a deposit. We were a wholesale bank. We did not have a relationship with the general public. It was Goldman Sachs, the illusion that was made. TheReElizabeth Warren is saying there you could have a whole government out of Goldman sa. The treasury secretary was from Goldman Sachs, the economic adviser. So there were a lot of Goldman Sachs people in government, by the way, both parties. Bob Rubin Democrat Hank Paulson Republican.

[Ari Melber]

It's remarkable you bring it up. We pulled the names. It's a very bipartisan thing.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

So not just America. Former prime minister, you know, the current prime minister of Canada, the former prime minister of London.

[Ari Melber]

Take a look. I think we have all of the government veterans primarily who've left Goldman Sachs and gone into government.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

You won't have all of them. It's very.

[Ari Melber]

Well, we won't have all of them, but we have many top Ones when you look at this, this is a point of pride or at some point it raises these questions that the public

[Lloyd Blankfein]

has about or go out of the country. The current prime minister of Canada.

[Ari Melber]

Is this a point of pride for the firm or does this at some point become an issue?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

It became, well, it's a source of pride and at some point it became an issue for other people. We tended to hire people. Look, the people in our firm do very well, make a lot of money but if all they want to do is maximize their income, they could go somewhere else and make money. There are hedge funds and boutiques and other places. People in our. We tend to hire people who are public service minded. They have their early career and they go into government. I know there will be people who always talk about revolving door. Our door really didn't revolve. We didn't hire people from government. Government hired people from us by and large. There's a few exceptions where people went into government and came back, but very few largely people get hired from us. And it's not so much that we. A little bit. It's part of the ethic of the firm and the culture of the firm to want people to go into public service after they've run their course at the firm. You're supposed to have other chapters in your life after you leave the firm. But by and large those are the kind of people that we tend to recruit. And that was always a source of pride and by the way it stayed a source of pride. But. But if you're looking, if there's a crisis, look, if you're going to be a samurai class or something, I'm just going to make a wild analogy here. And you're going to have a source of pride and be well compensated and do this because you defend the country and you don't do a good job at it. Everyone wants to get you. There was an economic crisis and if you're looking around, certainly the banks were. Could have done a better job. But I'm telling you why specifically Goldman Sachs when I think it was because it was because we didn't lose a lot of money at that point and because we were a mystery to people because again we're not a consumer firm, not a retail firm. And so we don't really had, we didn't have that relationship with them. And another name for consumers and retail are citizens and taxpayers.

[Ari Melber]

Sure.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

And you know, and I would say shame on us. A big mistake that we made was thinking that we did not have to let people know what we did. Our ethic was always to stay in the background and have our clients, we would advise companies and the companies were in front. We never explained, we never went on tv. At some point I went out there and I said something joking. I took it seriously. I once said to yeah, you write

[Ari Melber]

about it in the book that you said it was a quip and you're known for some quips about you're doing.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I said to a reporter who interviewed me for two hours and then was coming to interview other executives on Goldman Sachs for a feature they were writing. And as I was after, the day after he interviewed me, he's waiting in the anteroom to interview someone else. And I'm walking to the elevator, he sees me walk by and he says, just one more question, Lloyd. And I said, I can't, I'm late. I'm running off to do God's work. And I kept on going. And he printed it as if it was some ecclesiastical statement that I was representing, that I was, you know, it was silly.

[Ari Melber]

But you were joking. You weren't trying to make a statement about the religious value of it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

If I wasn't joking, that guy would be in even bigger trouble if I had that as close a relationship.

[Ari Melber]

Let me you mention inequality and this is much broader than the financial sector or banks. The CEO pay across the entire economy has risen by over 1,000% from the 70s and worker pay is up only about 26%, not keeping pace with inflation. Is that a market failure? Is that a problem?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I think it's not a market failure, but it may be a big problem because the market is the market. And I hate to sound religious, having just talked about an ecclesiastical statement about it, but you know, things are unique. You know, what's in, you know, these days. It wasn't always this, I was always a football fan, but it seems to me these days there's a general consensus that if you have a great quarterback, you have a chance of winning. And if you don't have a great quarterback, you don't. And so what's a franchise quarterback worth when the difference in success and failure is so commercially consequential to a team and look at how those are getting bid up. And I think the people who run these firms are very, very consequential. And the difference between getting someone who's very, very good with seven verys and very good with three verys could be the difference. You know, it be a huge difference. And so people are paying, you know, people pay up for that. So that's the market, is it a problem? Yes. Inequality and distribution. Again, as I said, the economy in general has to do two things. Create the wealth and distribute it according to values. And you look at that, and in good times where everybody's being elevated, there tends to be a relaxation of concern if somebody's getting elevated more. But at times when people are just getting by, it's infuriating to see if that people are getting spectacular multiples of it, even if that's what the market is compelling. So I think it is a political problem today and a social problem and. But one has to pay a lot of money for NFL quarterbacks, and people pay a lot of money for effective CEOs.

[Ari Melber]

Let me ask you philosophically, because it's very clear that you're bright. And all these other bright people say that you're bright. You have Harvard Law and you run this thing and now you're retired. Philosophically, is there a level of wealth that one person should hit their ceiling, whether it's a billion or 10 billion or 100 billion or an era where we hear we may have the first trillionaire? Is there some level that you see that as a philosophical matter that says it's a limit?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

People are different. There are people, look, the people who are killing themselves the most, I think the most competitive people in the moment today are these hyperscalers. What are hyperscalers? The metas of the world. The biggest companies in the world who are competing like crazy. Who's going to be the first to artificial intelligence? Who's going to be the social networks of that triumph? I'm glad these people are still competitive and still want to win and still want to make up. What do they do with their money at the end? What does Bill Gates do with his money?

[Ari Melber]

A lot of people give it away. You've given some away.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

That's the only thing you can do with the money. They're competitive. They make it. I don't want them to be capped. I do think that there's social pressure on everyone to be philanthropic. You get judged by that and at the end of the day, you're not going to change your lifestyle at levels way, way, way under what they're doing. But they're competitive about it. And the only thing you can do with that money at the end of the day is give it away. And that's what they're doing. The idea of a cap, it's a phony thing. You want to continue to incentivize the best people. In different cultures, there are different incentives you know, people work very hard in China and nobody makes that much money.

[Ari Melber]

But

[Lloyd Blankfein]

the currency that they're dealing with is fame, acclaim, status within the party. If you're a Nobel Laureate, your currency is whether you get a Nobel Prize or not. You don't get fame and acclaim, and you don't get a Nobel Prize. When you're wealthy and you create a business that generates jobs, generally you get hauled in front of Congress and have the hick kicked out of you. The only thing they get is the ability to endow large foundations and give away the money. I'm glad they're still incentivized, even after they made a fortune, to keep on going. I'm glad Elon Musk is somehow incentivized to keep on going, even though he's going to end up a trillionaire and he still keeps on going. I'm glad of that. You can't take it with you. Eventually, even he probably. I can't prove this, but even his life will be over at some point, and by then he will have undoubtedly given away his money. But the fact of the matter is, very few people in the world, and by the way, in every era, make an outsized contribution to the advancement of wealth creation and society. Again, there are different kinds of currencies, different kind of metrics for this, so I wouldn't put a cap on anything. But our culture also does a very good job of pressuring people appropriately, I think.

[Ari Melber]

You think the pressure on billionaires is

[Lloyd Blankfein]

good to give money away? Yeah, I think it is. Look, the first thing, the first conversation I had, and by the way everyone else did, when you make partner at Goldman Sachs, the first thing you meet with the partner who is like the minister of the interior of the firm. He's laid out some things that you should and shouldn't do in your partner. And one of the things that he ticked in is, we are now going to set up a private foundation for you, and we expect you to use it.

[Ari Melber]

To use it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Yeah. And we expect you to have a balanced life, including making contributions to your, you know, your society, your environment, your neighborhoods, away from the firm. And there was this old glib statement. It's a little bit dark to say to a young guy, but I remember he said it to me. He said, and it should be such that when they write your obituary, and if it's nine paragraphs long, no more than three of those paragraphs should be about your tenure at Goldman Sachs. In other words, you should have done other things.

[Ari Melber]

And you discuss that in the book and it speaks to the point we discussed earlier. You have people who are more well rounded rather than being of the same.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Look at the people whose pictures you put up on that screen. What is Hank Paulson took? I mean, I don't want to speak for him, but I think he took most of his wealth and put it into an environmental foundation. You know, he did that. All these guys went into public service. In other words, people in that financial crisis, when you see Elizabeth Warren there and Sanders there, they made it almost a pejorative that those people left their high paying jobs at the height of their powers and their career and went into public service and that somehow got turned into a pejorative. I'm incredibly proud of those people.

[Ari Melber]

Let me go to lightning round some news items.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Sure.

[Ari Melber]

And some fun.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Oh, fun. I'm short of fun.

[Ari Melber]

Deficit on the news. So this is lightning round. The Supreme Court limits the President's tariff powers. This is good, bad. And the market thinks what I think

[Lloyd Blankfein]

separating it into two pieces. It's good that there was a limitation because I believe in the Republic and separation. I believe in the Constitution, separation of powers. To me that's what that case was about is does the President see the executive have unlimited power? No. Certain things belong to the Congress and the third branch of judiciary decides that. That's good. The other substantive question, should we have tariffs? That's a different question. And should someone wield those tariffs? The right authority wield it, I think should under most circumstances, although it shouldn't be crazy and change every day and it should be somewhat predictable. But tariffs serve a useful purpose.

[Ari Melber]

The President has two Fed officials under investigation, widely reported to be baseless. This is appropriate use of power or

[Lloyd Blankfein]

bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad. Anytime the Federal Reserve, you know, we borrow money. Other people are our creditors.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

The way the US defaults to creditors is not by not paying. Because we print dollars. We can always pay back dollars. We have printing machines that pay back dollars. How does the US default? Potentially by inflating the currency so that the dollars we pay back on is worth as much. The protector of the dollar, people who keep the purchasing power, who keep inflation down, is the Fed. If you attack the Fed, the people who lend us money are either going to stop lending us money or else they're going to require a higher interest rate. So undermining the prestige and power of the Fed is just a bad thing.

[Ari Melber]

Paramount beats Netflix to get Warner Brothers. Did they get a good price and is it a good deal?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Those guys are close. I mean, I'M not afraid to answer a question, but that was the market clearing price and there was at least one other entity that was willing to pay just a smidgen lower. So at least two people who know a hell of a lot and are in that industry thought that was a good price. The good price depends on synergies and whether these companies, when they're pushed together, you can run them more efficiently. That one plus the cost of one and the cost of the other doesn't add up. The cost of two, less cost. And therefore it's a much more efficient organization and it will earn the increased price that they paid. And they believe that and their bankers believed it. And I'm not close enough to give a competing opinion.

[Ari Melber]

Betting markets are growing. They are a good thing. They're like the stock market or they're dangerous.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I think they're both. I think they're good because it allows people to hedge certain risks that are worth hedging because generally you want to do your business. And if you're afraid that this thing is going to happen and it stops you from doing your very socially constructive thing, you can hedge, put a bet on and hedge away that risk. But if it just becomes such a distraction and it becomes. And you're betting on things that are not socially useful, then it could be. It's like asking. There's a whole casino industry and it's a big industry. It's good entertainment for a lot of people, it's cheap entertainment. But for certain people it's not only distractive, it's really counterproductive and it destroys certain kind of addictive personalities in their lives.

[Ari Melber]

Yeah, no, you put that clearly. This is going to be hard for you now. The rest are in one sentence.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Oh my God. I've never said one sentence on anything.

[Ari Melber]

The first rule of investing is

[Lloyd Blankfein]

stay within your capacity to lose money. Don't go beyond it.

[Ari Melber]

The most underrated risk right now is

[Lloyd Blankfein]

people investing in illiquid. In illiquid assets and assets that can't be easily sold.

[Ari Melber]

Stocks or bonds.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Always for me, over the long term, stocks.

[Ari Melber]

Your response in a sentence to these, You've been very good.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Yes, thank you.

[Ari Melber]

To these maxims, past performance does not indicate future results.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Always true.

[Ari Melber]

Time in the market beats timing the market.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Impossible to predict when things that you think will happen will happen. So stay in, don't get out. It's hard to get back.

[Ari Melber]

Buy the dip.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Usually true. As long as you have a high time, a long time horizon.

[Ari Melber]

Never outsource your risk management.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Never outsource your risk management and spend more time on it than you think you should.

[Ari Melber]

There is no price that can guarantee something is under or overvalued.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Value is in the eye of the beholder and the best indication you have is the price at which it clears at that moment.

[Ari Melber]

What if the price is zero?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

If the price is zero, what you're pricing will not be allocated efficiently and chances are there'll be a lot of waste.

[Ari Melber]

That makes sense. It's not that anything can happen. It's that given enough time, everything will happen.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Right. And so therefore you should always believe that events that you think are low probability are a higher probability than you think.

[Ari Melber]

Too many people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

That's more sociology than market. That's more psychology than market.

[Ari Melber]

If you want to grow in an organization, you need the support of your subordinates, not their grudging cooperation.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

You will advance when the people under you are not just responding to you reluctantly and narrowly, but have thrown in with you and really want you to succeed. The people. And that's much more important than getting the support of the people above you. If you're good, the people above you will want to use you.

[Ari Melber]

You know who said that?

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Yes, a very wise philosopher.

[Ari Melber]

Yes, in your book. Finish this sentence back then. I wish I knew.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I wish I knew how senior and important I was going to be, because I would have been a lot nicer to people on the way up and I wouldn't have had to spend so much time apologizing to them later.

[Ari Melber]

Honest. When it feels like you can party like it's 1999, you should.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

You should go back to the question on risk management and spend more time going over what you have on your balance sheet to make sure you've audited everything and that you've narrowed down and been very conservative about your risks.

[Ari Melber]

So even at the high, that's the time to double check.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Especially at the highs, when you're feeling good and everybody's popping champagne corks, you should say, excuse me for one moment and go back and look at what's going to go wrong.

[Ari Melber]

The best thing about money is

[Lloyd Blankfein]

that you don't have to worry about money.

[Ari Melber]

The worst thing about money is that

[Lloyd Blankfein]

it robs you of your motivation.

[Ari Melber]

The best advice you've gotten.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

The best advice I've gotten is don't accept commitments just because they're far off on your calendar. Because eventually they'll roll around and you'll regret having agreed to do them.

[Ari Melber]

When people tell me something is impossible, I

[Lloyd Blankfein]

try to get help

[Ari Melber]

for fun. I like to.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

I like to read and I like to. I like to learn things that I don't know very much about.

[Ari Melber]

Final three Failure means.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Failure means I now have the opportunity to prove my resilience, which is the most important characteristic to have.

[Ari Melber]

Success means.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Success means that you have to have higher objectives.

[Ari Melber]

Reaching the summit means.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Reaching the summit means that it's easy to get used to and you better work harder to sustain your tenure at the summit.

[Ari Melber]

Lloyd Blankfein, thank you for your time. The book is Streetwise Getting to and through Goldman Sachs. Appreciate it.

[Lloyd Blankfein]

Thank you. Appreciate it very much.

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