Peruvian Bull (6:56)
Sure. So I first was turned on to WallStreetBets in 2019 actually. And I started monitoring the board and seeing what kind of stocks they were in. And I kind of like the informal, fun kind of retail investor shitposting approach to finance. It just made it much more dynamic and interesting. And in the fall of 20, I started seeing the chatter about GameStop and especially in December of that year because we saw some price action. It broke out above like $10, which was a huge line of resistance. And in the summer of that year, in August, Ryan Cohen had taken control of, had bought 12% of the shares, outstanding shares of GameStop, later building up to above 13%. And he had taken a position on the board. And so he was basically, you know, writing. Initially he was writing letters to the board asking them to make serious changes to GameStop, saying that the company was at risk of bankruptcy if they didn't make, you know, strategic moves soon. And then he finally just said, I'm going to take action. And he poured, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars into GameStop shares and bought a huge stake. And then he upped his stake over and over again and then started taking control of other board positions, getting more voting rights and eventually pushing out, you know, board members who are essentially not really doing their, their fiduciary duty, not doing their job. And so that was the initial catalyst for the games, one of the initial catalysts for the GameStop run because his purchase restricted the amount of, you know, shares to borrow. And then his, his moves on the board and ideas to rejuvenate this dying quote, unquote, brick and mortar were indicative of like a broader plan to reinvigorate the entire company and to, to turn it around basically to create this like, you know, David versus Goliath story and reimagine what GameStop should be. And if you're a hedge fund in 2019, 2020, it did make sense to short GameStop. GameStop was, you know, losing revenue for the last like 12 quarters. They were net income negative, they were EBITDA negative. Their average store was losing, you know, several hundred thousand dollars a quarter. It wasn't a good picture. And to add on to that, they had $400 million bond in March of 2021 that was coming due. So all these short hedge funds began to pile into short positions and convince other hedge funds to pile into short positions. And that created this kind of domino effect of the share price falling, revenues falling, pessimism building, short seller reports keep coming out, shitting on the company. And it was just this downward spiral of the stock continually falling. And then with Ryan Cohen coming in and buying a huge portion of the. That was the first indicator that something was afoot that could turn this thing around. And when we saw the initial spike in January of 2021, which again, the Gamestop apes, we don't believe that that was the actual squeeze. We believe that that was stopped because they turned off the buy button. But that initial move gave them enough momentum to start really working on the fundamentals of the business and start to reimagining things. And so they were able to kick that $400 million bond due in March of 2021 down to, like, June and late June into July. And so by delaying it by a couple months, they were able to raise capital that summer and then pay off the bond completely. And in the last few years, what they've done is they've been able to basically, you know, you could call it like, operationalize the company. They've. They've reduced SGA expense, they've reduced this, the amount of stores, the total store footprint. They've increased overall per square foot revenue. And so even though the company is a bit smaller than it was in 2021, they've mostly gotten rid of the bloat and they fired like, you know, hundreds. I think it's like 900 different administrator and manager positions. So they basically slimmed the company down by a significant amount to make it profitable. And in the last few quarters, it has been profitable on a free cash flow basis. But the problem that they face now is obviously, like, what's next? Like, this summer, they raised $4.6 billion of cash. They have no more liabilities on their balance sheet other than what's called a leasehold improvement, which is basically like a promise to upgrade some of their stores. So it's not really a bond. So they're basically debt free, have a ton of cash. But we've been in this cycle where the shorts are still trapped. And this is per a House Financial Services Committee report, the shorts never fully covered. In January of 20, they were able to kind of escape the noose by, you know, freezing the buy button and essentially kicking the can down the road with these, what we Call swaps and total return swap derivative positions that allowed them to push ftds into the future. And so the problem with the way the modern stock market works is everything, just like fiat banking, everything is on a fractional share basis or like a, you know, promissory basis. So when you go and buy a share from a broker, like let's say you go buy Apple shares, the broker will give you. They might show up in your account like immediately, right? But in reality those shares aren't there. They have to be delivered by the DTCC. Now the market maker has a T Plus 3 delivery window, so they can wait three days to give you the real share. But the thing is they can use what are called, you know, like good in kind or good faith redemptions to push that forward. So essentially what that means is like, okay, imagine you know, the, that Citadel sells you 100 Apple shares and then the DTCC goes to Citadel and you bought these through Vanguard. And DTCC tells okay, we need the 100 shares. And they're like, well, we don't have the hundred shares but we do have an option in Apple and that promises, promises us 100 shares. So that's as good as shares. So you should just use that to, to settle our obligations. So then they say, okay, we'll give you T plus, you know, 35. So we'll give you another 35 days to deliver the real shares. But because you have this kind of good in kind or almost like equivalent security, we'll just call it good. And we'll not tell the retail investor that they actually don't have a real share. And this game continues on every single stock in every single market basically all across the world, but especially in, in the US and the naked short positions that they built, you know, amount to trillions and trillions of dollars. But obviously these are isolated because this is a risky move, right? You're, you're selling shares you do not have. It's a risky move. And so the main, you know, targets of these, I guess you call them operations are me are like poorly performing companies, right? If it's a meme stock or if it's a, you know, dying retail company or some sort of like e commerce company that's gone off, you know, gone off the cliff and lost revenue. All these things can contribute to the company essentially getting on the short sellers like short list so to say, like, and that causes them to start shorting it aggressively. And from the research that they found, like Dr. Suzanne Trimbath, who is a PhD economist and she worked at the DCC, she put out in her book that retail investors are seven times more likely to receive a fail to deliver or basically what's called a phantom share, so a fake share than an institutional investor. And small cap and micro cap stocks have something like 20x on a volume weighted basis, the amount of naked shorts as a large cap. So basically these hedge funds and these market makers are saying, okay, we're not really going to take the risk with Apple or with Microsoft because these are the big boys, they have money, they could fight against us, right? And there's other institutions buying and those guys can see that we're not giving them real shares but retail, we don't really care what happens to retail. We can just give them phantom shares and they'll never actually call their shares into their actual broker. They're just going to leave them on loan, on margin accounts and that allows them to just put this fake share in your account and you think it's actually there. And this problem by the way, is not only isolated to GameStop, it's across the entire market. There were people writing about this in the early 2000s on some of the messaging boards. And we've also seen this happen in the treasury market, right? There's multiple treasury issuances where they've shorted more than 100% of the bonds. And this is just rehypothecation, right? They, they take the bond, they sell it to the market, then they want to short a bond so they borrow another bond and then they pledge that bond as collateral to somebody else. That person promises to sell it to somebody else. And it just kind of is like a daisy chain where everyone is thinks that they're holding this collateral. But when you go like open the doors and look at the DC's DTCC ledger, there's only one bond there and there's seven people who think that they borrowed it. And so that's, it's the same issue. And that, that endemic naked shorting that was revealed with GameStop because we saw, you know, we saw the short interest above 140% per FINRA data that weekend and even before that in the lead up we saw it at 220 and Ian Carroll even shared a screenshot with me that was at 330%. So no one really knows the true short interest of GameStop. But all these meme stock stocks were shorted into the ground. And it seems that these hedge funds were essentially coordinating to destroy companies. And there's even some tinfoil which could be believable that There are certain venture capital funds that were putting, you know, like management in key positions to drive the company down. So there was this very famous post called Bust Out Amazon and Bain Capital. And it was basically analyzing how Bain Capital and Amazon were working together to destroy retailers like Toys R Us or Bed Bath and Beyond or Blockbuster by installing. They would appoint like an Amazon VP of business development and the guy would just load the company with debt and do nothing about revenue. And then the company would go into bankruptcy and then these VC funds and the hedge funds could come in at the bankruptcy court and buy everything cheap. So it's really like a. A nasty, nasty system.