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Getting to Normal in the Two Sudans – Kate Almquist Knopf
00:26:25
Ten years after the conflict in Darfur began, Sudan and the newly-sovereign South Sudan are still experiencing terrible violence and efforts to ensure lasting peace in the region are falling short. What can the United States do differently to help...
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- [00:10]
A
Welcome to the Global Prosperity wonkast. I'm Lawrence MacDonald and my guest today is Kate Almquist Knopf. She is a visiting policy fellow here at the center for Global Development who works on US attitudes towards fragile states, including especially the top of the of our conversation today, getting to normal with the two Sudans, a forthcoming paper that she's written. Kate, welcome to the show.
- [00:34]
B
Thank you, Lawrence. Very happy to be here.
- [00:35]
A
Just before we started, I was looking at your bio here. You were the Assistant Administrator for Africa at USAID from 2007 to 2009 and the Sudan mission director from 2006, 2007. And I said, was that in Sudan? And you said, yes, indeed it was. It was in Khartoum. What was that like?
- [00:55]
B
Well, it was fascinating. It was a tremendous experience. It was when USAID reopened its mission in Sudan following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending conflict between north and South Sudan. And we established USAID established a mission in Khartoum relating to the Government of National Unity there, joint government between north and south and then with a, a major program presence in South Sudan, which was the largest development program for USAID at that time. And also unfortunately the largest humanitarian program in Africa and actually in the world for part of that time was in Darfur. So it was actually already a very large USAID program. And we put the formality of a mission presence together on the ground.
- [01:43]
A
What is that like to be heading a USAID mission in the capital of a country that I think it's fair to say most people who pay any attention at all to international affairs would consider it to be a pariah nation. They've been prosecuting a war that many people call genocide against the people to the west in Darfur. They've been fighting a decades long civil war against the people in the south that finally led to independence for the South. These are really bad guys. You're dealing with them every single day, right?
- [02:17]
B
You are dealing with them every single day in that setting. And there are many in the government that you look at across the the table from you or trying to negotiate humanitarian access or urge implementation of the peace agreement that somehow they've come to sign. But you wonder, do they really mean it in terms of bringing resolution here? It's challenging. But in order to get to peace, in order to see a negotiated solution work, you have to engage with both sides of the equation. You can't just talk to the side that you find sympathy with or that you can at least understand their cause and what their actions are about. And it does. It's personally challenging and also diplomatically challenging for countries to figure out how to do that. But I have to say I found the Sudanese people very, very friendly. As one might expect, the people in their government aren't necessarily representative of each other in this case. And they were keen to have the US aid mission there. They appreciated that we had come to try and help support peace in both north and south.
- [03:27]
A
I want to get to your excellent paper and the recommendations that you have for the United States both in terms of its goals and how it might achieve them. But first, I think some people who listen to this show probably have a vague kind of idea about Sudan. And we were talking before the show. Could you put it in context? You told me something astonishing about the size. I learned this and then I forget it and then I'm astonished again when I learn it the second time.
- [03:53]
B
So Sudan, when it was united as one country, is approximately the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. It was the largest land size country in Africa before the split of South Sudan. It still remains a very large territory combined. South Sudan is about the size of Texas for listeners in the United States. And.
- [04:19]
A
And it's smaller than Sudan proper.
- [04:21]
B
It is smaller than Sudan proper.
- [04:22]
A
And it's still the size of Texas.
- [04:24]
B
Oh, my gosh, it's still the size of Texas and maybe has a hundred kilometers or so of paved roads in that whole area of South Sudan.
- [04:32]
A
And the population, we're talking about north.
- [04:34]
B
And south together, together, about 43, 44 million.
- [04:37]
A
Now, how many were in the south after partition then?
- [04:41]
B
10 million in the south.
- [04:42]
A
10 million in the south. So one out of four Sudanese wound up in the south when it was seceded.
- [04:47]
B
Right. 34 million remain in the north in Sudan proper. About 8 million or so of those are in Darfur approximately.
- [04:55]
A
I'm going to come to the questions about the paper, but I'm going to ask. I'm going to throw you a curve ball here, a question I did not tell you I was going to ask. But it goes back to the. Just thinking about your experience of sitting opposite people who are credibly accused of genocide. What's driving these people? I mean, do you feel like you're dealing with evil? Do you feel like they have some greater vision of Pan Arabism? What makes them do what they do?
- [05:25]
B
You know, I can't say that I ever really figured it out. You do sit there and think you're in an alternate universe somehow, because the world just is very different through their eyes in terms of how they value human life, what they see in terms of their citizens, what they, what they think they're doing for or against them. And they can sit there and deny every fact and statistic and piece of evidence that you can present to say this is a problem, what's going on in this region of your country or that region of your country. And we have a hard time understanding each other.
- [06:03]
A
I think oftentimes I'm reminded, and maybe it's unfair, but I'm reminded of Hannah Arend's famous book titled the Banality of Evil, that when you're really face to face with evil people, it's pretty banal. Is that your feeling?
- [06:17]
B
You know, I've met President Bashir on more than one occasion. The US Government doesn't speak to him now since he's been indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But we did meet with him in the previous administration and leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to the signing of the first Darfur Peace Agreement. And you really can't fathom what runs through, through his head or through other senior leadership in the regime in Khartoum. But then there's just a human being across the table from you or in the room, and you carry on a conversation and you try and see where you can find some common ground in order to save people's lives.
- [06:57]
A
Okay, enough with the existential questions. We're going to take our first break. When we come back, I'd like to hear from you about the U.S. policy goals in this very complex and difficult situation in Sudan. This is the Global Prosperity Wonkast from the center for Global development, I'm Lawrence MacDonald. My guest today is Kate Almquiskanoph and we're discussing her new paper or forthcoming paper, Getting to normal with the two Sudans. Back in a bit. Welcome back to the Global Prosperity wonkast. I'm Lawrence MacDonald. My gate today, Kate Almquist, Knopf. We're talking about U.S. policy goals in Sudan. Kate, in the first page of your paper, you've got a list of bullet points there. And before, before the show, I was looking them over and I was saying, couldn't we please collapse these into two or three? And I was just looking through them. An end to violence in the so called two areas. An end to violence in Darfur, an end to intercommunal violence in South Sudan. It looks like what the US Wants is an end to the violence. Is that a fair enough summary of these points?
- [08:29]
B
That's correct. The official US Statement is that they want two Sudans, Sudan and South Sudan, that are politically stable, economically prosperous, and at peace with each other and with their neighbors. The unfortunate reality is that there are still multiple conflicts happening within Sudan, there is conflict within South Sudan, and there is still conflict between north and South. So getting a final resolution, a lasting resolution to all of those various vortexes of conflict is what the US is seeking.
- [09:05]
A
The US goals that you articulate at the beginning of the paper you say you have deduced from congressional testimony and public statements. Obviously, as a former US official, you have a lot of access and understand these goals. Well, can we just take these goals and say, yeah, they're the right goals and let's get on to the discussion of how to achieve them? Or is there something about the way the US perceives what it's trying to do in Sudan that you think needs to be more nuanced or perhaps more nuanced than my rather crude summary of what we're trying to do there?
- [09:37]
B
I do think, in general, there are the correct goals in terms of what US should aspire for Sudan and South Sudan and what the US could use its influence to help come about. I think, however, that we need to update our understanding of what's going on in each of these countries. We have to adjust to the reality that, in fact, now there are two separate countries. And that's only a reality since July of 2011, when the south became independent and after having voted in a referendum through a process of self determination that was supported by the international community and accepted by the government in Khartoum. And yet we still fundamentally approach Sudan and South Sudan as a North south conflict, and then secondarily, as the internal dynamics within each country bubble up and cry out for attention. Fundamentally, I think we need to approach Sudan as Sudan and South Sudan, South Sudan, and then be aware of the conflict potential that still exists between the two. But sort of a shift of north south focus to north north and south south focus, if that makes sense.
- [10:52]
A
This reminds me a little bit of the situation that some of our listeners might have faced. If you have, you know, two good friends who go through a really messy divorce and you spend years trying to sort of help them avoid the divorce and then to manage the divorce peacefully, and then it's like, over and done. But you still think of these two people as being somehow conscious. And what you're saying is, get over it. The divorce is done. Now, you know, you've got your relationship with Joe and your relationship with Judy, and let's get on with this new reality and stop thinking about the divorce. Is that a fair analogy?
- [11:24]
B
The divorce analogy is very pertinent here. And in fact, I use it, invoke it in the paper at one point as irreconcilable differences. Essentially, what the peace agreement provided for was an option for north and south to remain together, for unity to be attractive for voters in South Sudan, or if not, then to choose to separate. And they overwhelmingly chose to separate in nearly 99% of the voters in the.
- [11:54]
A
Referendum, all being in the South. Voters in the north didn't get to vote.
- [11:58]
B
All being in the South, Yes. The peace agreement gave voters in the south the chance to vote, to decide where they would reside. Conflict has persisted in Sudan and South Sudan since virtually independence of Sudan from British colonial rule in 1955. So there was a period of civil war between 1955-56 and 1972, a 10 year break, and then from 1983 to 2005, another period of war between north and South Sudan, with the south being horribly abused, over 4 million people displaced, more than 2 million people killed, a really high toll of human suffering for people in that conflict.
- [12:46]
A
We're going to take our second break. When we come back, we'll get to the third and final piece of your paper, which is recommendations for US Policy going forward. This is the Global Prosperity Wonkast from the center for Global Development. My guest today is Kate Almquist Knopf. I'm Lawrence MacDonald. We'll be back in a bit. Welcome back to the Global Prosperity Wonk Cast. Our topic today is Sudan and what the US Policy there should be in order to achieve a reduction in violence. My guest today is Kate Almquitz Knopf. Kate, in the part of your paper that you call time to pivot, you've got what looks like a four or a five point plan there. The first one is stop seeking to resolve Sudan, South Sudan crises and at the expense of internal crises. What does that mean?
- [14:00]
B
It means that we need to shift from prioritizing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan and the unresolved issues that still remain between them, which are significant. We haven't talked about them yet, but basically oil resides mostly in South Sudan. It has to be pumped through Sudan to port Sudan in order to be exported. It's the only outlet for it. The south cut off oil exports just over a year ago in a dispute with the north on oil pipeline transit fees. They've since resolved that specific dispute, but oil hasn't been turned back on because of other issues in terms of border security and some other outstanding matters there. We continue to focus principally on those kinds of north south issues and less on the conflicts that are happening inside Sudan. There is still conflict in Darfur, where more than 3.5 million people are still in need of humanitarian assistance and there's very little access to them. That conflict keeps morphing into different forms between rebel groups and the government, between Arab militia. There's now gold being found in parts of Darfur and even most recently, reports of Mali extremists coming out of Mali and now arriving in Darfur. So it's a very messy conflict zone. And secondly, and very concerning is the conflict that broke out in mid-2011 in these two states of Sudan that just sit just above on the border with South Sudan called Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, between a rebel group, they are called the SPLM north, which used to be part of the rebel group that's now the government of South Sudan and the government in khartoum, an astounding 900,000, almost a million people are in need of dire humanitarian assistance in this region.
- [16:02]
A
So that brings us to your second recommendation. Renew pressure for cessations of hostilities and unfettered humanitarian access. I mean, aren't we already doing what we can in terms of pressure? What would we do differently? What could we do more?
- [16:16]
B
You know, I think Sudan fatigue is easy to come by because conflict has been there for so long, whether between north and south or more in the last decade. We're more used to hearing about Darfur in the north. We're just about to approach the 10 year anniversary actually, of Darfur conflict coming up this year. And I think the US Government does speak out in some instances in certain ways. Certainly at the UN Security Council in New York, there's more pressure and calls for humanitarian access. The special envoy has been calling for it. But I think there's more that can be done in terms of putting pressure on Khartoum, both bilaterally and multilaterally. We've seen it work in the past, getting access to Darfur and changing the game that led to the comprehensive peace agreement and access in the south and even southern Kordofan, this area of renewed conflict.
- [17:15]
A
Khartoum, of course, being the capital of Sudan, the northern piece of this now divided country, and Juba being the capital of the south. And one of your recommendations is stop equivocating between Khartoum and Juba. So basically, we should make it more clear that Khartoum are the bad guys and that Juba, for all their many shortcomings as a new state is not systematically seeking to kill its own population. Is that the idea?
- [17:42]
B
That is the idea. It's hard to. It's easy to get some be simplistic sometimes about this. I think there's a tendency in diplomatic relations to say, yes, you're doing something bad, so is the other guy. So everybody is bad. And now let's all come to the table and work it out. There's bad and then there's really, really, really bad in certain cases. What's happening in South Sudan, there are troubling issues there in terms of intro, commercial communal conflict that makes it into the press. On occasion there are actions that the government is taking that exacerbate that and make the violence there worse. It is not the same as waging war against four and a half million of its own citizens as Khartoum is doing against its populations either in Darfur or these two states of southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
- [18:34]
A
So then another one of your recommendations to me is really startling. Send a U.S. ambassador back to Khartoum if one of them is really renegade road pariah state, systematically oppressing and killing and driving out of their homes millions of people and the other is a weak and new fragile state. I'm talking now about South Sudan, of course, that has some inter communal violent problems but is not systematically bad. Why would you want to reward the north by sending an ambassador to Khartoum?
- [19:10]
B
Well, first of all, I don't think that sending an ambassador is a reward. I think the United States has ambassadors around the world in many countries that we don't necessarily like or support their policies. We have them in countries that we do like and consider friends and allies. Having an ambassador allows us to conduct our relations at a level where we can convey to the highest levels of the host government what our concerns are, what our issues about. And it also allows us to have insight into the politics of that country and that society so that we can know where the reformers are and how to support them in a way that's constructive. Sudan is on the cusp, most observers believe, of some significant political transformation. It could go well or it could go really, really poorly. It will be for Sudanese to decide what comes next in terms of their political governance. I think the US would be well served to have senior representation there that can understand those forces, those dynamics, and figure out how best we can appropriately nudge those along and move away from these really horrendous practices and policies against its population and the violence.
- [20:25]
A
So what is this status quo we have a special envoy. Currently.
- [20:29]
B
Currently the United States has a special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. The US has an ambassador in South Sudan, so we have put an ambassador there immediately upon independence to help nurture that country along. And we have what we call a charge d' affaires in Khartoum as the senior U.S. diplomatic representative.
- [20:50]
A
And sending an ambassador would make a difference. The ambassador would have more access and more prestige than the charge.
- [20:58]
B
I think sending an ambassador, yes, an ambassador has more access than a charge. We have had ambassadors in the current. Sorry. We have had charges and the current one is, case in point, who have been ambassadors in other countries. So they are senior diplomatic officials and.
- [21:16]
A
Not about the individual involved. It's about the credentialing.
- [21:19]
B
It's not about the individual. So it's about the credentialing. It's also about the. On the one hand, it's a symbolic point to the Sudanese people and about our long term relations between countries, that the United States has interests in Sudan and with the people of Sudan that go beyond who the president of the country is or the current ruling party there. And secondly, it enables the mission there to do its job of engagement and outreach across the Sudanese political groups and society in a much more sustained and serious fashion that would then help our interests.
- [22:01]
A
This strikes me not knowing really anything about it, as potentially a politically risky move for the president, presumably a presidential decision, although we could say it's the State Department's decision, but the ambassadors are assigned by the president, nominated by the president. And I would guess, but maybe I'm wrong that a lot of the NGOs who were so outspoken on Darfur would be alarmed by this and would see this as an upgrading of the relationship with Khartoum. Is that the case or you know these people? Well, maybe I'm guessing wrong.
- [22:31]
B
I think there is space for thinking afresh about how we approach Sudan and how we approach South Sudan and what the role of a special envoy is visible. Having more senior diplomatic representation, such as through an ambassador in Khartoum, by those in the nongovernmental advocacy sector here in the United States, as well as members of Congress, would have to come on board with an ambassador because the president nominates and then Senate confirms ambassador posts. So that would be true here if that were going to come into being. I think it's important to note that my recommendation for an ambassador is part of a series of steps that I think the United States should take. Where we send certain signals to Khartoum about how we're going to engage for a longer term there. What our vision is, our interests are at the same time, we're not relenting on pressure, on cessation of hostilities, on humanitarian access. We are prioritizing, however, the need for political transformation at the center. The crux of all of these conflicts comes back to governance at the center in Khartoum. And so having an ambassador there helps us to understand that better. It supports the Sudanese people in moving to a system of a form of governance that works for all the parts of Sudan, not just for those privileged few around the regime and Khartoum.
- [24:00]
A
Well, Kate, thank you so much for joining me on the show. I always learn when I talk to you about Sudan. It's such a just really atrocious situation when you read about and think about the situation that people face there. And it can be a lesson in frustration for well intentioned outsiders as to the limits of what an outsider could do. So I admire you working on what can be such a tough issue for so many years. Thank you for coming to talk with me.
- [24:30]
B
Thank you for having me.
- [24:31]
A
This has been the Global Prosperity Wonkcast from the center for Global Development. My guest today is Kate Almquist Knopf, and we've been talking about her forthcoming paper on US Policy in Sudan. In the two Sudans Getting to Normal. You can find the Wonkcast online on itunes and on Stitcher, which is my favorite way to listen. Just search for wonkcast or CGD and subscribe to hear a new interview every week. Until next time, I'm Lawrence MacDonald. Thanks for listening.
- [25:26]
B
Sam Sa.