Episode Summary: “Getting to Normal in the Two Sudans” – Kate Almquist Knopf

Podcast: The CGD Podcast
Host: Center for Global Development (Lawrence MacDonald)
Date: March 5, 2013
Guest: Kate Almquist Knopf, Visiting Policy Fellow, CGD; former USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa

Episode Overview

In this episode, Lawrence MacDonald interviews Kate Almquist Knopf about U.S. policy in Sudan and South Sudan, based on her forthcoming CGD paper “Getting to Normal with the Two Sudans.” Their conversation explores the challenges of diplomacy with regimes accused of atrocities, the complex legacy of Sudan’s partition, and recommendations for recalibrating U.S. strategy to address persistent violence and promote stability in both countries.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. On-the-Ground Reflections from Sudan

• Reopening of USAID Mission: After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, USAID reestablished its mission in Khartoum to support the joint Government of National Unity.
• Humanitarian Scale: At the time, the USAID program in Sudan included the world’s largest humanitarian operation, particularly focused on Darfur.
• Diplomatic Challenges: Navigating relationships with government officials involved in the conflict was both “personally and diplomatically challenging.”
  • Quote: “There are many in the government that you look at across the table from you... but you wonder, do they really mean it in terms of bringing resolution here?” (02:16, Kate)

2. Understanding Sudan’s Size and Demographics

• Geographic Perspective:
  • United Sudan was the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi.
  • South Sudan alone is the size of Texas, with only ~100km of paved roads.
    • Quote: “South Sudan is about the size of Texas... maybe has a hundred kilometers or so of paved roads in that whole area.” (04:23, Kate)
• Population Split:
  • Combined: ~44 million.
  • Post-partition: ~34 million in Sudan, ~10 million in South Sudan (~8 million in Darfur).

3. Moral Complexity: Negotiating With Accused War Criminals

• The Banality of Evil: Comparing direct dealings with Sudanese leadership to Hannah Arendt’s concept.
  • Quote: “You do sit there and think you're in an alternate universe somehow, because the world just is very different through their eyes in terms of how they value human life...” (05:24, Kate)

4. U.S. Policy Goals: What Should Be Achieved?

Articulated Aims

• Stated by the US: “Politically stable, economically prosperous, and at peace with each other and with their neighbors.” (08:28, Kate)
• Persistent Violence:
  • Multiple ongoing conflicts within and between the countries.
  • Internal issues often overshadowed by North-South disputes.
• Need for a Shift in Perspective:
  • Treat Sudan and South Sudan as distinct countries, not solely through the lens of their separation.
    • Quote: “We need to update our understanding... We still fundamentally approach Sudan and South Sudan as a North South conflict... Fundamentally, I think we need to approach Sudan as Sudan and South Sudan as South Sudan...” (09:36, Kate)
  • Divorce Analogy:
    • Quote: “The divorce analogy is very pertinent here. And, in fact, I use it, invoke it in the paper at one point as irreconcilable differences.” (11:24, Kate)

5. Historical Context: A Legacy of Conflict

• 1955–1972: First civil war.
• 1983–2005: Second civil war, over 2 million killed, 4 million displaced.
• Secession (2011): 99% of southern voters chose separation.

Paper Recommendations: “Time to Pivot” (14:00–24:00)

1. Prioritize Internal Crises (14:00)

• Shift Focus:
  • Move from a fixation on Sudan-South Sudan negotiations to greater engagement with internal conflicts (Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile).
  • Oil Dispute: Ongoing instability over pipeline fees; issues remain unresolved, but internal violence demands more attention.

2. Renew Pressure for Ceasefires and Humanitarian Access (16:01)

• US Fatigue: “Sudan fatigue is easy to come by because conflict has been there for so long...” (16:16, Kate)
• What More Can Be Done?:
  • Stronger bilateral and multilateral pressure for humanitarian access and cessation of hostilities.
  • Past success: coordinated pressure helped access Darfur and enabled the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

3. Stop Equivocating Between Khartoum and Juba (17:15)

• Moral Distinctions:
  • Acknowledge that, although South Sudan is troubled, Khartoum’s systematic violence (e.g., Darfur, Southern Kordofan) is on an entirely different scale.
    • Quote: “There's bad and then there's really, really, really bad. What's happening in South Sudan...is not the same as waging war against four and a half million of its own citizens as Khartoum is doing...” (17:41, Kate)

4. Reconsider U.S. Diplomatic Representation (18:33)

• Send an Ambassador to Khartoum:
  • Rationale: Not a reward, but a tool for deeper engagement and intelligence.
    • Quote: “Having an ambassador allows us to conduct our relations at a level where we can convey to the highest levels...what our concerns are...it also allows us to have insight into the politics of that country...” (19:09, Kate)
  • Current Situation: U.S. Ambassador in Juba (South Sudan); only a charge d’affaires in Khartoum. An ambassador would allow more influence at higher levels.

5. Political Risks and Advocacy Concerns (22:00)

• Perception Issues:
  • Sending an ambassador could be politically risky—may be perceived as upgrading relations despite human rights abuses.
  • Congressional approval required.
  • Importance of pairing engagement with continued pressure on hostilities and humanitarian support.
    • Quote: “We are prioritizing, however, the need for political transformation at the center. The crux of all of these conflicts comes back to governance at the center in Khartoum.” (23:00, Kate)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Engaging with Accused Genocidaires:
  “You can't just talk to the side that you find sympathy with...it does. It's personally challenging and also diplomatically challenging for countries to figure out how to do that.” (02:16, Kate)

• On the U.S. Approach Post-Separation:
  “We need to approach Sudan as Sudan and South Sudan as South Sudan, and then be aware of the conflict potential that still exists between the two.” (09:36, Kate)

• On Sending an Ambassador:
  “Having an ambassador allows us to conduct our relations at a level where we can convey to the highest levels of the host government what our concerns are, what our issues are about.” (19:09, Kate)

• On the “Divorce Analogy”:
  “The divorce analogy is very pertinent here. And, in fact, I use it, invoke it in the paper at one point as irreconcilable differences.” (11:24, Kate)

• Summing Up Policy Goals:
  “The official U.S. Statement is that they want two Sudans...that are politically stable, economically prosperous, and at peace with each other and with their neighbors.” (08:28, Kate)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Background & USAID Experience: 00:55–03:27
• Sudan’s Geography & Demographics: 03:52–04:55
• Dealing with Sudanese Regime / Banality of Evil: 05:24–06:56
• US Policy Goals & Critique: 08:28–11:24
• Historical Perspective on Sudan’s Wars: 11:53–12:46
• Policy Recommendations (“Time to Pivot” section): 14:00–24:00
• Arguments for Sending an Ambassador: 18:33–23:00

Tone and Style

The conversation is factual, candid, and grounded in both personal experience and policy analysis. Kate Almquist Knopf brings a balanced perspective—both pragmatic and ethically aware—while Lawrence MacDonald presses for clarity and practical implications for U.S. policy makers.

Useful For:
Listeners seeking an informed, nuanced perspective on how U.S. policy could adapt to a new and complex phase in Sudan and South Sudan, with direct insights from a policy expert who has been on the ground.