What the U.S. and Israel Are Really Doing in Iran

Summary

The Chris Cuomo Project

Episode: What the U.S. and Israel Are Really Doing in Iran
Date: March 5, 2026
Host: Chris Cuomo
Guest: Jonathan Conricus (former IDF spokesperson, military analyst)

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Episode Overview

In this candid and wide-ranging episode, Chris Cuomo digs into the real dynamics behind the recent U.S. and Israeli operations targeting Iran. Cuomo is joined by Jonathan Conricus, a seasoned Israeli military analyst and ex-IDF spokesperson, to dissect the motivations, power structures, miscommunications, and strategic objectives shaping the conflict. The conversation also addresses regime change prospects, internal Iranian dynamics, and the fallout of a major civilian casualty—the bombing of a girls' school.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Who’s Driving the U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict?

• Is Israel leading the U.S. into war, or vice versa?
  • Cuomo presses Conricus on American political rhetoric, particularly remarks by President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio positioning the attack as U.S.-driven due to distrust of Iran’s intentions. (01:25–05:16)
  • Conricus asserts U.S. leadership:

    “This is a US led operation. This is Israel with the most skin in the game. … Unlike for the US which is thousands and thousands of miles away, this is much more an exercise in national security strength, deterrence and posturing from a US perspective.” (05:16–06:49)

2. Mixed Messaging and Political Spin

• Americans receive conflicting explanations about goals (regime change vs. deterrence), timing, and actors involved in the strikes.
  • Conricus reveals that Israelis focus on military realities rather than political statements:

    “It’s almost impossible to really create situational awareness based on statements in media because so many people say so many things… In situations of ambiguity and great dynamic change, what I look at is, what are the true things on the ground? … The physics were very clear. … The US was going to strike.” (11:39–13:56)

3. The Decision to Strike: Immediate Triggers and Intelligence

• Timing of the strike on Iran coordinated around rare intelligence about a high-level regime meeting, potentially attended by Ayatollah Khamenei.
  • The discovery and targeting of this meeting was a tactical opportunity, with debate over whether the Mossad or CIA provided final actionable intel.

    “Bottom line, I think we can say for sure that at least Israel struck that location, maybe Israel and the US together, and that set everything into motion. But that was just a tactical opportunity.” (15:11–18:38)

4. Status and Nature of Iran’s Regime

• The Iranian regime’s layered and redundant power structure makes toppling it complex.
  • IRGC’s central role:

    “You cannot… In order for the Iranian regime to be brought down, then people in the IRGC need to be presented with an offer that's too good to refuse.” (23:50–26:56)

  • Disunity among Iranian opposition, and arms are trickling in via Mossad/CIA, but grassroots regime change still faces immense hurdles.

5. Regime Change: Realistic or Rhetorical?

• Conricus views Israeli goals as broader than Washington’s stated aims, with Israel hoping for regime collapse, but leadership is careful not to say so explicitly.

  “Israel would definitely want and need the Iranian regime to be toppled … The accumulative effect [of recent targeting] is to weaken the regime.” (34:24–36:24)

  • There’s no IDF plan for a full-scale invasion; Israel will rely on strikes, special ops (Mossad), facilitating Iranian opposition, and standoff air power instead.

6. Civilian Casualties & Communications Failure

• The U.S. and Israel have not taken public responsibility for the bombing of an Iranian girls’ school, fueling widespread outrage.

  Cuomo: “If you make that bad a choice, right, and there's no good explanation… I would think that you need to own it.” (41:24–42:45) Conricus: “I think it's a communications mistake, definitely. … It is usually much better to own up to mistakes, be forthcoming, truthful, explain what happened…” (42:45–46:13)

  • Conricus calls out western media hypocrisy for selective outrage.

7. Regional Spillover & Iran’s Miscalculations

• Iran’s expectation of regional reprisal via proxies has backfired.

  “I think we've been overestimating the Iranians. … First and foremost, they are left without strategic backing and support. Russia is nowhere to be found, … So is China.” (49:05–52:09)

• Gulf states, typically passive, are engaging Iran militarily for the first time.

8. Duration and Prospects of the War

• Without Russian/Chinese support and with disrupted command structures, Iran cannot sustain a prolonged conflict.

  “The Iranians will run out of weapons, of fuel, of capabilities… They won't be able to manufacture new bombs, new missiles.” (52:32–54:53)

• Strait of Hormuz remains Iran’s last leverage, but U.S. operations are degrading their capacity to disrupt oil flows.

9. Israel as American Muscle

• Conricus frames Israel as the regional arm for American strategic goals:

  “It is by far the best outsourcing of military operations in modern history. … From an American perspective, it's the attack dog.” (60:58–62:48)

  • Conversely, Israel feels shortchanged diplomatically in areas like Gaza, Syria, and counter-proxy deals.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Jonathan Conricus on Power Dynamics:

  “As if the tail is wagging the dog. I find it ridiculous. … (Israel is) quite dependent on the US in terms of military supplies, in terms of veto in the UN Security Council and many other things.” (05:16–06:49)

• Cuomo, on American confusion:

  “President calls it war, like a hundred times, says it's gonna go on for weeks... And then the president saying, no, I forced Israel's hand, they didn't force mine. How do you process the mixed messaging?” (10:17–11:39)

• Conricus outlines regime resilience:

  “The way the Iranian regime has built and cemented its control … is that it has a lot of redundancies … it achieves a balance of power by dividing and conquering … You need to follow the money in Iran. … The IRGC is the heart of darkness here.” (23:50–27:15)

• On civilian casualties:

  Cuomo: “The silence is deafening. … What you ignore, you empower. … And especially dead kids are the metaphor… for a war crime.” (46:13–47:21)

• On Israel’s role:

  “It is the best marketing of American weapons systems since the second World War. Because Israel relies on American systems, it uses them exceedingly well and it wins and defeats all of its enemies, which are also the enemies of America.” (60:58–62:48)

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Timestamps for Major Segments

• Opening & Thesis Setup: 01:25–02:45
• Who’s Leading Whom? (US/Israel): 02:45–06:49
• Explaining Mixed Messaging: 10:17–13:56
• The Strike and Intel Sharing: 13:56–18:38
• Ayatollah’s Death – Evidence and Reactions: 20:32–22:20
• Iranian Regime Structure: 23:50–27:15
• Prospects for Regime Change: 28:58–36:24
• No IDF Ground Invasion Plans: 36:24–38:52
• School Bombing – The Communications Dilemma: 40:35–47:21
• Regional Escalation & Iran’s Miscalculations: 48:19–54:53
• Defining the War & Congressional Caution in the U.S.: 56:24–56:41
• Strait of Hormuz and Oil Leverage: 56:41–58:34
• Is Israel Using the U.S. or Vice Versa?: 58:34–64:52
• Outro Logistics & Personal Note: 65:03–66:57

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Takeaways for New Listeners

• The dynamics behind the Iran strike are more U.S.-driven than commonly framed, with Israel heavily reliant on American resources and support.
• Mixed public messaging in the U.S. is a function of both internal legal/political constraints and calculated strategic ambiguity.
• Israeli goals and American goals diverge, particularly regarding regime change, but Israel’s actions (by target selection) hint at a broader anti-regime objective.
• The complexity and redundancy of the Iranian regime make regime change—especially one driven by “the people”—extremely challenging.
• Civilian casualties and non-transparent communications damage Western credibility and fuel narratives about intentional harm.
• Iran’s proxies are proving less potent than expected; region-wide escalation has exposed Iran’s isolation.
• With no Russian or Chinese backing, and with command capabilities disrupted, the Iranian regime's sustainability is in question.
• Israel is framed as America’s “muscle” in the region, but feels it isn’t cashing in political/diplomatic returns commensurate with its risks.

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This episode delivers sharp insight into the real and perceived strategies driving the latest Middle East conflict, as seen by insiders from both American and Israeli perspectives. It’s essential listening for anyone wanting to move past headlines and partisan narratives to understand how the game’s being played, and who’s writing the rules.

Transcript

[A]

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[B]

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[A]

in this world, stop with Mint. You can get premium wireless for just $15 a month. Of course, if you enjoy overpaying. No judgments. But that's weird. Okay, one judgment anyway. Give it a try.

[B]

@mintmobile.com Switch upfront payment of $45 for 3 month plan equivalent to $15 per month. Required intro rate first 3 months only, then full price plan options available, taxes and fees extra. See full [e-mail] whose idea was it to go into Iran? Who went first? Who hit that school? Because the school was hit, the kids are dead. What is the power dynamic at play in these hostilities with Iran? Is Israel driving America or is America driving Israel in this situation? And what's motivating the President to do exactly what he said he wouldn't do? Once again, we are easily being distracted by shiny little objects used by people tripping algorithms. And we are missing why Iran matters, to whom it matters, and why, and what questions we need answered. Now, what I want to do for you right now is take you through this dialogue, dialogue with someone who owns the Israeli position. Why? Longtime member of the idf, longtime spokesperson for the idf. Okay. Longtime journalist, understands American politics and knows what's happening on the ground in Iran, why this started, what triggered it, and what it's about, at least for Israel, and what Israel's reaction is to what they're hearing from American politicians. All of this can come from a man who knows the situation very well for a very long time. His name is Jonathan Konricus, and here's the discussion. Jonathan, thank you for joining us. The President just said that. Oh, no, no, no. Israel didn't force my hand. I think I may have forced their hand because I was so convinced that Iran was going to strike first that I told Israel, we gotta do this now. These guys, I don't trust them. Have you heard anything like that before?

[A]

Well, I've heard lots of Israel haters telling me that Israel is dragging the US Into a war. And I've been asked a lot of questions about it. But I was also a bit surprised by Secretary of State Rubio's answer to a question which I found a bit odd and off the cuff and didn't really compute with other things that I've heard.

[B]

So Rubio said, just for the audience, the Rubio said, we became aware that Iran was gonna get hit, which obviously means by Israel, and that they would retaliate against us. So we hit them first because we were not gonna let them hit us first. Which is not only illogical, but a little unlikely.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Because Israel wouldn't say we're doing this no matter what. You think we're going to just do that, or is that your understanding?

[A]

Listen, the relationship, especially after two years of war where, and I say this with great sadness, Israel is left with very few friends and definitely not important ones, except for the US and except for President Trump, which, by the way, is evident when looking at the situation in Gaza. You know, just, just for people to, to get, you know, the big picture here. The situation in Gaza is now the way the political agreement is taking shape. It is far, far from satisfactory from an Israeli perspective. And it is happening so because that is how the President wants it to go. Board of peace, including two enemies of Israel, Turkey and Qatar. Turkey isn't an enemy yet per se, but very hostile towards Israel. And it's very far from our liking. Hamas isn't being disarmed and there are many other things that Israel is very unhappy. The bottom line is, however, that we can be unhappy. Israel unfortunately doesn't have a lot of other options. And we're just having, you know, to deal with the fact that this is the way forward, that or this is the roadmap that the President has delineated and that's what we're rolling with. So.

[B]

So the idea that you would just go rogue and go into Iran against the United States consent is far fetched to you?

[A]

Yeah, I mean, it's absurd because Israel isn't in that kind of position. Israel isn't in a military or diplomatic position of complete independence. Israel, as I think has been pretty evident, is quite dependent on the US in terms of military supplies, in terms of veto in the UN Security Council and many other things. So the whole thinking, you know, and this whole mindset that a lot of people seem to engage in, and they find it very interesting and, you know, lots of conspiracy theories, as if Israel is. As if the tail is wagging the dog. I find it ridiculous. This is a US led operation. This is Israel with the most skin in the game. It is our civilians that are here that are facing the consequences. It is our that is facing the consequences of the war. It's our soldiers, just like America, or airmen and armed personnel like the Americans. But we have skin in the game. We are invested here. This is our people, our children, our future, our home. Unlike for the US which is thousands and thousands of miles away. And this is much more of an exercise in national security strength, deterrence and posturing from a US Perspective. And I think people forget that they lose sight of what is at stake for Israel and what's at stake for the US and they think that Israel could be taking this lightly or that Israel is in the driving seat.

[B]

Why do you think Marco Rubio said it the way he did, Jonathan?

[A]

I actually don't know. And I was surprised because Marco Rubio is a very, very intelligent and very experienced politician. He knows he's been around the bl. He's, I think, acutely aware of the power of answering questions, etc. I'm surprised because it also doesn't make sense with other information that I've heard, for instance, Witkoff's interview on Fox where he clearly said, the Iranians made it very clear to us that they're not here to make any concessions and they're not going to negotiate. Not their enriched material, not their enrichment facilities, not their ballistic missile program and not Hezbollah and the other terrorists.

[B]

So how did you guys get it so wrong? How did America and Israel get the outcome of the initial bombing campaign to take out the nukes so wrong? The American president said, and he was not corrected by Prime Minister Netanyahu, we obliterated their nuclear program. How is something that was obliterated back in just months?

[A]

Yeah, I mean, if you look back at what I said in the weeks after Operation Midnight Hammer and Rising Lion, I said, I base what I'm saying on Israeli assessments, the Israeli Atomic Agency, Mossad, idf, and what we said was that we have dialed back the Iranian nuclear weapons program for a good amount of months in terms of hardware and an undefined amount of time when it comes to personnel and the know how and the ability to develop weapons, because Israel, in the opening salvo was able to eliminate 12 and then an additional one and two of the top nuclear scientists who were really the, the brain and the heart of the Iranian Manhattan Project. And I've never said, and Israel has never said that the nuclear program was obliterated. It was significantly downgraded, it was delayed. But we also acknowledged that there were a few hundred kilos of enriched material that was unaccounted for and that we hadn't gotten to all the hardened targets. And that was said. And of course, what the president said, you know, many times I find myself, I mean, of course, listen to him very closely. I think it's a mistake to take him verbatim on everything. And it's much more important to understand the essence of what he says and what he's the message that he's trying to get across. And, you know, there's been instances where there's a certain gap between the specifics that he says and what then becomes apparent. And from the beginning, in Israel, we've been saying the Iranian nuclear program has been delayed and significantly impacted by Israel, but still exists. And as long as the regime is there, they clearly will want to regain and reestablish and rebuild and surge forward.

[B]

How does Israel understand all the mixed messaging coming out of the United States now on what I'm sure was many, many weeks in planning and coordination that it seems that my leadership can't get its story straight. For you guys, it's easy. Iran is the enemy. And whenever we get a chance to go at him, we'll go at him. End of story. There is no confusion in Israel about what this is about in America. How do you guys process. President calls it war, like a hundred times, says it's gonna go on for weeks, says we're gonna lose more Americans. And just so you know, Americans do believe they have skin in the game. We've lost at least six service members. We don't really understand fully how this is gonna cost billions. It's exactly what Trump campaigned against. And now we're told it's not about regime change, which is odd also. Then what is it about? But how do you process him saying war? The Secretary of War saying it's not war. Other congressional defenders of the president saying it is not war. Marco Rubio saying, yeah, we found out Israel was gonna hit him, so we had to do something. That's why the timing was what it was. And then the president saying, no, I forced Israel's hand, they didn't force mine. How do you process the mixed messaging?

[A]

I think at the end of the day, what we do on our side, and it's easier for me because my perspective is more military than diplomatic, even though I'm heavily entrenched in all the communications and the messaging. But, you know, my compass throughout was looking at the military preparations. It was speaking with my IDF colleagues and through them, getting a sense of their American counterparts. And I made my assessments and what was going to happen based on the level of buildup of hardware, American hardware in the region, military capabilities, personnel, assets, and on the level of military cooperation and planning. And all of those signs, which are, you know, they're much more clearer and binary than statements and answers to questions by politicians, which is, you know, it's a. It's a world in. Of its own. The dynamics in an interview and things. Sometimes you want to say something and it comes out a little, little bit different. I'm sure you have experience with it. I definitely have experience with it. But at the end of the day, what I looked at was what's really happening in reality? And I think Israelis did basically the same thing because there's so much going on, there are so many people talking. There are so many people that have an important influence on the process and on understanding the current situation. It's almost impossible to really create situational awareness based on statements in media because so many people say so many things. And there's rivaling political objectives, personal objectives, short term, long term. There's messaging to a domestic audience, There is messaging international, there's messaging to the enemy. Right. There's so many things going on simultaneously. So in situations of ambiguity and great dynamic change, what I look at is, okay, what are the true things on the ground? Like, what are the physics? And the physics were very clear. The physics in terms of military buildup that all pointed in one direction that the US Was going to strike.

[B]

So the timing, they're building up. They're building up. You guys were talking, talking for weeks. Is it true that the timing was triggered by a meeting where many members of the regime came together in a total surprise to everybody, and you decided to jump on it? And if so, who detected the meeting and understood its context? Where'd that come from?

[A]

Yeah, so I believe that was the case. I believe that, you know, the US and Israel, specifically the US reached a certain point where things were in place and were waiting for the order to be given, basically for the political timing to be appropriate and suitable for the President and for him to give the order to the airmen and the crews, et cetera. Execute. I understand, and I believe that indeed, that once in a lifetime opportunity to take out the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, that was the trigger and that was what set everything into motion after everything else was already in place.

[B]

Who detected the meeting, and what was the context of the surprise of the discovery? And what's your understanding of why they had such a meeting?

[A]

I understand that they had this meeting because they wanted to brainstorm and prepare for what was going to happen after the second talk of negotiations. That's what I have heard. I have, at this stage, no way of confirming if that is really so. I'll tell you that I was very surprised that they did it. Extremely surprised, given the situation, given the buildup around them, given the rhetoric coming from Israel and from the US I was very surprised that the Iranians would do such a thing. I don't know at this stage. I've heard thoughts and ideas about it. I don't know if there was some kind of trick or ruse involved on behalf of Mossad at this stage, I can't speculate. But what I think is telling is that the first statement when Israelis were woken up, this was about 8am on Saturday. Israelis were woken up with what you have in the US when you have flash floods or Amber Alert, you get that screaming, very obnoxious, intrusive sound on your phone. So we have the same system here, but here it's used in order to inform people, you need to be ready to go to your shelter because there might be incoming missile fire. And that was triggered in the morning. And the first piece of official communication from anybody was Defense Minister Katz, who said, issued a statement that Israel has just struck Iran. And that, of course, that statement led for quite a while, for at least an hour or so. And it was reflected in media. It was said in Hebrew, but it was reflected all over the world in Farsi, Arabic, and of course English, that Israel alone had attacked. And only afterwards it became apparent after journalists started asking the Pentagon and reaching out for comment, is the US in on it? Is the US Attacking? Only afterwards it became clear that it was Israel and the US who were attacking together. It is still unclear. And I think this is an important point, whether this was a joint Israeli US strike on that compound or whether it was Israel only. I've heard conflicting reports regarding the intel that was like the golden nugget, and that led decision makers in Israel to understand that this meeting was indeed happening. I've heard what I understand is that it was Mossad intel based on various sources, human sources, and also cameras and other devices that they had in place. But I've seen more than one credible report that suggests that actually it was CIA that had the final straw that contributed to this being the golden opportunity that everybody was waiting for. Be that how it may, bottom line, I think we can say for sure that at least Israel struck that location, maybe Israel and the US together, and that set everything into motion. But that was just a tactical opportunity. I mean, based on, again, on what Witkoff said, it was clear in the US Administration that the Iranians were not going to negotiate at any satisfaction.

[B]

Well, that's what the President just said. The President just said that he became convinced and he made it sound like maybe even more than his own negotiators, that no no, no, this isn't working. These guys aren't gonna make a deal and they're gonna do something to us. So that's what the President's saying. That's so that's the narrative of the moment. Until that winds up becoming a bad move and then maybe the explanation will change. Support comes from Ethos E t h o s.com okay? Use it. Use my code. Why? Because life insurance matters. Because your responsibilities matter. And if you're young and healthy, you can get like $3 million in term coverage for like 30 bucks a month right now without seeing a doctor with just doing it online. Why? Because they're good at what they do and they know how to do it. That's why they have thousands of positive reviews. Yeah, well, I'm not young and super healthy and I got a pre existing condition. They have partners that work with your needs, your budget and your responsibilities. That's why I partner with them. Otherwise I would not. So I did the work. Ethos.com check them out. Check out their reviews online. Check out how they do it, Check out how much they've placed ethos.com cuomo and in as little as 10 minutes, you can get a free quote and up to $3 million in [e-mail] Cuomo all right? Use my name, tell them I sent you, things will go better. And of course, application times and rates are going to vary because everybody's experience is different and nothing is free. But if you want to do it right, efficiently, okay. Ethos.com ethos.com Cuomo what degree of confidence does Israel have that the Ayatollah is dead?

[A]

Very high. I would say almost absolute.

[B]

Have you guys shown evidence to the Israeli people that he's dead?

[A]

No, I haven't seen evidence of it, but I've heard unequivocal confirmation from various senior Israeli officials whom I know there hasn't been an on record one, but I mean, yeah, the Prime Minister has said it. Minister Katz has said it. Chief of Staff. They've actually said it on record. But in terms of, you know, seeing his body, seeing the ring and the other details, that of course will be interesting. Haven't seen it yet.

[B]

Iran hasn't said it.

[A]

Iran has said it.

[B]

They have said that Khamenei is dead.

[A]

Yes, they've announced it on their public tv. There was a very emotional public announcement by some broadcaster with lots of crying and tremendous sadness, which looks very genuine, by the way, on state TV that he was indeed dead. And of course, Lari Jani has Spoken about it. Pezesh Kyan has spoken about it. Many others have referenced it that, you know, they've spoken about what they call the murder, assassination, or the martyrdom of the Supreme Leader. So at this stage, you know, I would never trust Iranians with anything. But I do trust Israeli assessments and statements for the simple reason also that, you know, the track record is a pretty solid one. You know, when.

[B]

Right, I hear you. It's just curious that the President of the United States was supposedly given visual evidence that. That the Ayatollah is dead, and he didn't share it, which is unlike him. And then there was an immediate second layer here, as you well know, Jonathan, you understand our politics well. There's a lot of the MAGA base for President Trump that did not wanna see this. They're anti Israel, as you know. They believe AIPAC has this guiding hand. I have a joke I use every time I say this, which is, I work for aipac. I'm constantly listed. I don't know where the checks are. I can't even get any access to Gaza, you know, So I don't know what kind of working relationship I have with aipac, but it's not working for me. That much I know. But they are very against this. They are outspoken against the President. Between this and the Epstein files, he's got his hands full with the most rabid part of his base. But they immediately went to another argument, which is basically, fuck the Ayatollah. He's not who matters here. It's the irgc, it's the Quds Force. You can't just overthrow this regime. It's not one old man. It's not the mullahs, it's everything around them. Help us understand the organization and depth of the regime and what it means to you to get rid of the regime. What would that involve?

[A]

Yeah, so if they're saying that, that's surprising because that means that they've done some reading and actually have a clue about the dynamics in Iran. And it's pretty correct. So the way the Iranian regime has built and cemented its control over or its oppression over the Iranian people is that it has a lot of redundancies and it achieves a balance of power by dividing and conquering and separating between different security organizations, which is, of course, very wasteful and extremely redundant and not effective. But it ensures that there's not one unique center of gravity that if it falls immediately brings down the regime. The closest thing to it is indeed the revolutionary God, not so much the Quds Force. Quds Force is the expeditionary external operations. You could think of it as a CIA or a Mossad of the Iranians. They are the ones who do operations outside of Iran. They are the ones who have been building terror infrastructure networks, trying to kill or silence Iranian dissidents in Europe, Canada and the U.S. they're the ones who link with Venezuela and with others with Hezbollah, et cetera. So Quds is a bit outside of it. And the focal part of the irgc, the revolutionary God, is its internal weight. And what a lot of people, I think need to be aware of is that just like with so many other things in life, you need to follow the money, if you follow the money in Iran. And this, by the way, was also very apparent when the water crisis became more acute. The water crisis became acute. And I'll use that as an example, because when you start tracking and looking at, okay, who has been signing deals of infrastructure that had an effect on the water management in Iran, you'll find that the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard, had a lot of influence and had a lot of many, many sticks or, yeah, many sticks in the fire in that sense. And, and, and, and, or fingers in the pie perhaps is a better way of putting it. And, and they have a lot of involvement in national security and national infrastructure. The, the thing here that I think is very important is you cannot. In order for the Iranian regime to be brought down, then people in the IRGC need to be presented with an offer that's too good to refuse and something that can allow them continuity without fear of repercussions.

[B]

But how does that work in terms of Venezuela? Okay, my understanding is that the President was saying, I want it like Venezuela, I want it like Venezuela, but the regime is not like the Venezuelan regime. These are religious zealots. So who can you work with if they're all religious zealots?

[A]

So we in Israel, the only people that maybe would be palatable from an Israeli perspective would perhaps be the army. The army, which is a parallel organization to the irgc, less religious, less fundamentalist, less hardcore ideologic or with ideology. And they might be an organization that could take power, but their budget, training, personnel, etc, is far inferior to that of the irgc. And the way that the Iranian regime is built is again, redundancy, but very clear priority for the irgc. The IRGC has ground forces, local police forces, air force, navy, space, as I said, the Quds Force, which does external operations. And it's basically a complete military and industrial complex with a lot of hands into the national economy as well. One of the reasons why, you know, Iran is doing so poorly, despite the fact that they have the second or third largest oil and gas reserves in the world, is because of corruption. And the IRGC is the center, the heart of darkness here in terms of access to power because they are outside of the chain of command. They answer only to the supreme Leader. And they've had tremendous freedom to do whatever they wanted and, of course, to take care of their own.

[B]

So what's the likelihood that the Iranian people. So they have three main obstacles. One is they are largely not organized as an opposition because they would be killed and imprisoned if they were an outward opposition. They're not really armed because it's not an armed society, and they're very harsh on people who have weapons except for them. Then you have the second obstacle, which is they are not completely united. The regime has had decades to condition and disinform people so that there are sympathizers, there are extremists, there are rural factions that are not necessarily like the Persian articulate Western people that we see on TV in America all the time. So then they have that problem, which is they're not all together in a population of 90 million against the regime. And the third one is that if you get rid of the regime, there's no part of it that you can keep, apparently. So how realistic do you think it is that what we hear the American president saying, which is, here's your window. Go take over your country. How realistic is that, with no person on the ground to help them?

[A]

Yeah, you make very valid points. I'll address just the fact that I think weapons are being supplied into Iran by various organizations, CIA and Mossad specifically. That's not an official, you know, statement, and of course, it hasn't been said by Israel, but I would be very, very surprised if that wasn't happening. And the issue of not having weapons is indeed, that's a condition. You cannot overthrow a brutal, oppressive regime without having at least some weapons and without being able to confront them with firearms. So that's one.

[B]

But wouldn't that be like the Israeli citizens trying to take over the Israeli government, or the American citizens armed to the teeth the way Americans are? What is the chance that we could take on the American government unless the military was on the side of the insurgency? Right.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

So you can give them all the small arms you want. What difference will that make?

[A]

I think it will make a significant difference because the context of where the regime is, how extremely low its acceptance and popularity is how despised the regime is. And they've been exposed as ruthless and tremendously cruel. And you know, people have understood that, okay, there's only one way to actually improve our situation here, and it is the hard way. And you know, up until now they've been basically facing them barehanded, a few Molotov cocktails, etc. But they've been slaughtered with weapons. That can change and I think it will change. But I agree with you, it's going to be difficult. And of course what would hasten the process would be some high level rogue general in the IRGC who could have the power to shift things around in the organization or the army. Basij, the third security organization, which is basically kind of a police, riot police and main oppressive force mainly in the big cities, is also an important organization that has less firepower but lots of personnel. And they are the ones who have been doing a lot of the policing and oppression, running most of the notorious prisons that the regime has. And they're part of the, you know, the balance, the power balance as well. But I agree with you, I think it's extremely unlikely that there will be regime change that is induced by the people without any, or part of the security forces actually changing sides.

[B]

IDF has been, Bibi has been. IDF has been. I've been watching Prime Minister's interviews. He's been deferential to the U.S. he's keeping quiet, he's let the messaging stay on the American side. He's not taking any bait, at least not yet. Because the idea that the American objectives in this situation don't include regime change, I know why they don't have it in there. That's political dynamite for the MAGA base. If you say you wanna change the regime, everybody knows we're bad at that. Everybody knows it doesn't go well. They all remember the Arab Spring.

[A]

So you all remember Iraq and Afghanistan, of course.

[B]

So it's not even listed as one of the objectives. But I have heard Israeli commentators and former officials saying it's an absurd notion that you can take the nuclear capabilities off the board for Iran but leave the regime.

[A]

No, you can't.

[B]

That you can stop them from exporting terror but leave the regime. That that's an impossibility. So how do you process that? Or is it just, yeah, America doesn't want to take out the regime, but we will as Israel and we'll own that.

[A]

Yeah, and I think that's fair. And I think there is a certain gap or daylight between stated American goals and unstated or semi stated Israeli goals and aspirations which have not yet been defined as goals. And I would say yeah, Israel would definitely want and need the Iranian regime to be toppled because it is really the epicenter of most of the enemy activity that we face and really the gravest threat, current and future that we could face. So from an Israeli perspective, now is a tremendous opportunity and that is what Israel is looking for. If you listen carefully to what the IDF is saying, they're very careful not to speak about regime change. They haven't spoken about it at all. And as you said, Netanyahu alluded to it in the beginning in a few videos, but since the fighting has started, he hasn't really spoken about it. But again, if you look at the targeting, and again, I always look at real actions at the physics, because the physics lie far less than people with messaging. When you look at the type of targets that the IDF has attacked yesterday and today, they are regime targets. They are centers of gravity of the regime. They are the security apparatus that oppresses the Iranian people. It's the National Broadcasting Network, which was really an important tool in the oppression establishment. And it's the irgc, it is Basij, it is internal security and the judiciary, all of these. The accumulative effect is to weaken the regime. This doesn't have a lot to do with military, nothing to do with nuclear, nothing to do with ballistic missiles. This is regime weakening.

[B]

It is about time and about opportunity. Does the IDF have a plan

[A]

to

[B]

go onto the ground? Because if you wanna get rid of the regime, you are not going to do it remotely. I don't think I've done a little bit of research. There is no example of external regime change that was completely remote that has been successful in the modern era. Obviously the idf, Mossad is way more aware of that than even I would be. So don't you have to have that as part of your strategic planning that we're gonna have to go in if we wanna take out the regime?

[A]

I don't think that's in the cards. I don't think there's a plan for that. I don't think that there's a real plan to send troops idf. I'm sure that Mossad will be involved on the ground and they will conduct various activities. But in terms of idf, I would be very, very surprised if, if that came to be very high stakes. Very. I mean, just look at the distance and the amount of things that can go wrong on the way. Very substantial. And Israel, you know, our only ability to do Expeditionary missions. Far away from our borders is the Air Force and the Navy. We don't have that logistic capacity for, you know, airlifting, sending tanks and APCs and troops far away. We don't have that capacity. Only the US has strategic airlift. And I don't think that is at all in the plan. I would assume that the plan, even though it hasn't been formulated, relies much more on the Iranian people and actually giving them the tools, giving them air cover and perhaps weapons on the ground and facilitating it for them so that they can take control and get rid of the regime. That to me seems like the plan that exists Now. I agree with you that there are very few examples, if any, of regime change. Only through standoff fire. We can speak about Kosovo or Yugoslavia in the early 90s. Eventually that regime fell after an aerial bombing campaign. But it fell in elections.

[B]

Right, it fell in elections and there was so much weaponry and organized resistance in different factions on the ground, which is very different in terms of kinetic possibilities and potential than what we have in Iran. As far as I understand, the civilian based resistance support comes from Quince. Quince is a fruit. Okay? You don't know that because you're not me. But you know what else it is? Quince is a very cool designer line. Why? Fabrics, design, essentials, wear, feel, price point. Quince has the things that you're going to be wearing on a regular basis and they hold up despite being worn on a regular basis. Lightweight cashmere sweater, short sleeve Mongolian cashmere polo. Yeah, that's right. Short sleeve Mongolian cashmere polo. All right, that's cool. Linen bottoms and shorts, tees and 100% Pima cotton, European jersey linen. You know, all the things that really make up the ensemble that you want in your life. Quince does it directly with top factories. Cuts out the middlemen, makes it easy, makes it less expensive. The cashmere is 100% Mongolian. That's a good thing. I didn't know that Mongolia was a big cashmere place. But they're big with the worms. Apparently. The same stuff that luxury brands use. The Pima cotton long staple means it stays soft, doesn't pill.

[A]

Right?

[B]

That's the quality play. Everything is about quality, about lasting, about simplicity, about elegance and about affordability. Right now you can go to quince.com cuomo and you'll get free shipping and 365 day returns. I mean, how do you lose if you have a year to give it back if you don't like it and get a refund? That's A full year to build your wardrobe and love it. And you will now available in Canada to my brothers and sisters. So don't keep settling for clothes that don't last. Go to quince Q-U-I-N c e.com cuomo and you'll get free shipping and 365 day free returns. Quince.com cuomo. Okay, so then you have the last aspect, which is how it's being conducted. The biggest stick that they're swinging in this country right now in terms of why MAGA is pissed is the girls school. The first problem with the situation is that it happened and that the American military, the American political apparatus, the Israeli apparatus are silent. And that is making people feel, see, we knew they were doing this on purpose in Gaza. We knew that the American government was just as corrupt. They won't even own that it happened, which means they did it on purpose. Now I have to tell you, Jonathan, I actually give that some weight because if you make that bad a choice, right, and there's no good explanation, it wasn't intentional. We didn't want to kill kids per se, but it was one of the first targets. I would think that you need to own it. You need to own it because otherwise it looks even worse that if you don't say, yes, the school was hit, we hit it, we thought it was something else and it was a big mistake. But that hasn't been said by anybody. And now I'm looking at this Guardian piece that proves 10 different ways that it happened and that the kids are dead and nobody has admitted it. Do you think that's a mistake?

[A]

I think it's a communications mistake, definitely. I don't know who to pin it on because I don't know who actually struck. But from a comms point of view, I agree with you. It is usually much better to own up to mistakes, be forthcoming, truthful, explain what happened, what the mistakes were, and what led to an adverse result or a horrible result, in this case, apparently killing of school children and to take necessary precautions to prevent it from happening again and show that this is what you've done and own up to it. And the fact that it hasn't been done is indeed an issue. Of course, the, you know, the hypocrisy meter is off the scale because the same, you know, you speak about the Guardian, they hardly covered the mass protests by Iranians against the regime. They never did any investigative journalism into how were 30 or 40,000 Iranians killed by the regime. They haven't done investigative journalism into the torture at Evin prison or the multiple hundreds of cases of testimonies that are coming out of Iran of sexual violence and abuse as a form of torture by the regime in order to suppress or determine women from participating in the protest. I haven't seen any investigative journalism on it, but they're of course quick to focus on this because it's low hanging fruit, it's accessible, it's there, it's convenient, it serves a narrative which is very Guardian, which is anti Trump, anti Israeli. It fits, it ticks all the boxes. So I can understand that they do about it. Do they really care about Iranian school children? Obviously no. Did they report, you know, a year and a half ago, the Iranian regime, in order to stifle dissent, they poisoned school children, girl school children with gas. Not necessarily this school, but in various areas there's ample firsthand encounters and testimonials of parents and children, but specifically children who were murdered with gas by the Iranian regime because there was unrest in the region. And this was the way that the regime was forcing people to stop protesting and rising up about a year and a half ago. And that wasn't investigated by the Guardian, didn't see them expand any investigative journalistic efforts to it. So it's a very, you know, it's very partisan, it's very hypocritical. But having said that, nevertheless I agree with you that is, this is something that should, would rather, and I think it would have taken, you know, the, the sting out of it to quickly assess, bring the things forward in a transparent, professional way. This is what happened, this is the, these are the reasons why it happened. This is what we're going to do to prevent it from happening again. And now, ladies and gentlemen of the press and all the other hypocrites, we're moving on because we have a war to fight.

[B]

It's the expression in English. The silence is deafening. When you ignore something, what you ignore, you empower. Very often in politics and especially dead kids are the metaphor for certainly Americans and I'm sure Israelis and most warm blooded human beings for a war crime. What is wrong. Now obviously you'd have to show that it was an intentional targeting of that place. But I mean all of the targeting is pretty intentional. So what do you think the explanation is that you guys thought it was something else or the Americans thought it was something else, or that they're operating out of it? Although I gotta tell you, Jonathan, in American politics, the it's not just a hospital, they operate out of it. It's not just a synagogue, it's not just a school, does not fly. They don't care. Even though we did plenty of that as the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan, when we changed the rules of engagement, when they started attacking us from those places, there's very little political appetite for it right now. Maybe that's why they're not saying anything.

[A]

Maybe. My guess is it feels to me that it was American troops or American firepower and that it may have been a mistake or that it's something of a false flag operation done by the irgc. I wouldn't be able to, you know, put numbers to it. What I think is more likely, but these are the two main options. Don't think that this was intentional by, by the US Specifically because it's wrong, but also because it's so very counterproductive to, to have such a thing. So I agree with you. The bottom line here needs to be cleared, needs to be owned, explained so that we could move on if it. The longer it isn't, it becomes festering and, and more complex to, to disassemble afterwards.

[B]

How long does this last? And what is the chance of mission creep, regional warfare and having underestimated Iran's ability. While we've been talking, there's a report that the consulate, the American consulate in one of the Emirates is smoking. So there's no Iron Dome anywhere else except in Israel. So Saudi Arabia now, now somewhere in the Emirates, the consulate is smoking. What do you think of those two points? The duration, the degree of potential mission creep and underestimating the resilience and the assets of the Iranian regime here?

[A]

I'll say something that may surprise you. I think we've been overestimating the Iranians. I think the Iranians have been overestimating their own diplomatic capabilities and military capabilities. I think we have been overestimating their military capabilities. I think the Iranians have miscalculated significantly. First and foremost, they are left without strategic backing and support. Russia is nowhere to be found, found. So is China. They're not there for Iran and Iran is alone. And that's very important. When you think when we assess how long is this going to take and how much can the Iranian regime sustain, that's 1, 2. I think they've miscalculated badly with lashing out against the region and firing at six or seven sovereign states, one of them member of the EU and the others Arab Muslim states in the Middle east. That is backfiring. And for the first time ever we see these countries who do not have a history of fighting for themselves and actually taking meaningful action directly. We have these countries now engaging the Iranians. I think they're doing it because they see how weak Iran is and they understand that it's possible without paying a big military price. But also because they are offended and they've been assaulted by the Iranians, even though these countries have been very nice to Iran. So that's a third thing, their miscalculation here. Fourth, the whole regional enterprise of Hezbollah, Houthis and Iranian proxies in Iraq, it isn't delivering. And you know, for many years the working assumption was Iran is untouchable. Really like a mafia don. They're untouchable because their muscle on the street is Hezbollah, it's Iranian proxies in Syria, it's in Iraq, and sorry, in Yemen. And if you do anything against the Iranians, all hell will break loose. And they have very potent proxies all over and everything will just, you know, the whole Middle east will be up in smoke. If we put things into perspective, that is very far from where we are. And I think the Iranians have real, they should be very, very concerned strategically, very, very concerned because of the things that I said, no strategic support, miscalculations, overreach, and by lashing out against the region, there's a significant threat of backfire and their proxy network isn't working. And perhaps more importantly, last but not least, they rely on raw material from China in order to build and manufacture their ballistic missiles.

[B]

You make a good point that thus far, as far as we know, Russia and China have stayed out of this and they haven't really putting out anything into the ecosphere or the hellscape of social media, depending on how you decide to see it. So what does that inform you to in terms of duration here and what it will look like when it's over?

[A]

What that lends to is an assessment which is still, you know, preliminary and of course should be cautious. But they will run out. The Iranians will run out of weapons of fuel, of capabilities. They'll run out because they don't have a strategic backer. They won't be able to manufacture new bombs, new missiles. And their airspace is dominated by two foreign countries, the US and Israel. They are exposed and vulnerable. They won't be able to manufacture weapons. Most of their command and control is either severely disrupted or non existent. So sure, you know, the regime can issue orders to fight until the last man and not to give in. That could happen. But there's quite a lot of things that are building up and indicating that this isn't developing very well for the Iranians. And if I were an Iranian strategic planner, I would be extremely concerned because wherever I look, it's not as if help is coming and it's not as if I have a plan B. And the things that I've done so far are not developing as I thought that they would. I thought that I would fire at Gulf states and they would cave under pressure and that would be a leverage on the Americans and indirectly on the Israelis. But it's working out to be the opposite. I thought that I could rely on my proxies, but I can't. Hezbollah wobbled around for a day and a half, almost two, and then went in. But they went in very hesitantly and not with great gusto and conviction. And it's basically they're doing exactly what Israel wanted and giving Israel all the reason it needs. I don't say excuse or pretext, but every reason it needs in order to really pummel Hezbollah. So not looking too great. Which means that I don't think they can sustain the war for a long time. I wouldn't be able to tell you a number or an assessment, how many days, how many weeks. But it's not looking good for the Iranian regime.

[B]

Support comes from select quo. Look, if you have responsibilities, you got to take care of them. And the big one is the God forbid what happens if I'm not here for them. That's life insurance. Life insurance is scary. Why?

[A]

It means I'm going to die.

[B]

Okay. Why else? Once you decide to not be a child, well, it's expensive and it's complicated and I think they're scamming me. That's why selectquote.com matters. They've been doing it a long time, they do it well. And the brokers work for you. They work on salary. They don't get paid based on just what they sell you. Okay? And if you go to selectquote.com, you're gonna see why. They've placed billions for decades and so many thousands of people have given them good reviews. If you're young and healthy, you can get it done almost entirely online, maybe entirely online if you're not. They work with all kinds of partners that work with pre existing conditions. They figure out what you need and what you can afford so that you can have peace of mind. Life insurance is never going to be cheaper than it will be if you do it today. Get the right life insurance for you for less and Save more than [e-mail] Chris C. Save more than 50% on term life [e-mail] Chris C. Today to get started. Is there any question within Israeli politics and messaging that this is a war?

[A]

None whatsoever.

[B]

How do you explain the American dithering on that?

[A]

I think that's related to Congress and the legal issues of who has the authority, et cetera. But I mean, you know, it quacks like a duck, it walks like a duck, it's a duck, it's a war.

[B]

The Strait of Hormuz oil prices are moving up. That's understandable. Iran does have the ability for now to absolutely punish somebody for being in the strait. It's hard to stop that. How do you factor that in to the damage and the degree to which this can't go on that long because it is a major artery for oil supply to the region and obviously into Asia.

[A]

That is perhaps the last thing that the Iranians will have in order to apply leverage. While their naval capabilities have been significantly degraded mostly by the US they still have drones and they still have a certain amount of shore to sea missiles that could be important to fire at vessels in, in the region. Other than that, most of their military tools are gone. Like the naval tools are pretty much gone. And, and, and that's important. But they still retain some capabilities. Yes, that has bearing, that has influence. It influences China, it influences Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the uae, so of course Kuwait and Iraq as well. But it influences those countries and that is a leverage. And I think that's why the US Is focusing such a significant amount of military hardware and operations in subduing Iranian capabilities in the Hormuz Bandarabas, that area. But the way, again the way it's looking, the US will be able to subdue it and they'll be able to mitigate it.

[B]

What do you make of the last American preoccupation right now? From the right and left both have this misgiving that the President has decided to help Israel achieve its goals. And it doesn't end with Iran. There's Lebanon, there's Syria. Egypt has been quiet, but that, that's what this is going on, that starting with Gaza, for whatever reason, whatever reason you want to ascribe to it, the United States administration has been convinced to help Israel clear out its enemies. And it doesn't end with Iran.

[A]

I see it exactly the opposite. I see it as the US Looking at the globe as the global empire that the dominant global empire that the US Is looking at the globe seeing. Okay, what tools do we have in various areas we have a bunch of so called allies in Europe who are good for nothing. And I think what Secretary of War Hegseth was pretty accurate. You know, clutching their pearls and arming and awing about everything. So they're not going to be useful. They're barely up to defending themselves against the Russians. So not so reliable. The US wants to project strength and force and to be the dominant superpower in the world. Let's look at the Middle East, a lot of very rich countries with lots of tech but very little fighting power in history. And then there's this little rogue nation, the Jews, who actually have a very good batting average. And then the Americans say, well let's take these, this renegade nation and let's go to war with them. Let's have them do a lot of the heavy lifting. Let's have them engage in the region, use their creativity, use their ability to design and field weapons, use their ability to collect intel, use the fact that they are in the region, they have the most skin in the game and they are really, they are vested in success of wherever we will go. And I think that's, that's the lens through which I see.

[B]

So you think you're our muscle and we think we're your muscle.

[A]

I have no doubt that Israel is America's muscle in the region. It is by far the best outsourcing of military operations in modern history. It is the most cost effective outsourcing of national security by one state to another. It is the best marketing of American weapons systems since the second World War. Because Israel relies on American systems, it uses them exceedingly well and it wins and defeats all of its enemies, which are also the enemies of America. And most importantly, from an industrial point of view, it defeats the weapon systems that your enemies produce. Try to, if you were a salesman, VP sales for whatever company in Russia develops the S300 and S400. Good luck. After what Israel did in June 25 and what Israel did now, that's a non sellable system. If you have F35s or F15s on the other side of the equation, that's a lot of money. That's national security, that's jobs, that's influence. And Israel is the, from an American perspective, it's the attack dog. Now if you look at what Israel has gotten in the region, Israel's been short sold on quite a lot of things. Syria is a rogue state with a jihadist in charge which is doing a lot of very nasty things and getting basically a blank check from the American administration not to Israel's liking. There was supposed to be a security deal that was supposed to have diplomatic and political effects to it or characteristics.

[B]

It hasn't happened.

[A]

No, but it hasn't happened yet. Syria got everything that they needed from the us Sanctions were disintegrated investment and Syria is continued support from the us which probably isn't a bad thing. But Israel didn't get anything in that deal and it isn't conducive to Israeli security. The situation with Saudi Arabia, we spoke a lot before October 7th and since about the Abraham Accords. But now it appears pretty clear that, or at least before three days ago, that the Saudis are not interested. One of the reasons is that they got what they wanted from the US without having to make concessions for Israel. So these are two examples. Another example is the Houthis. The US went and did a deal directly with the Houthis without even consulting with Israel. That's not something that you do. If it's Israel in the driving seat and the US is the muscle, it's the other way around. The Houthis continue to fire missiles and drones at Israel. They stopped firing at American vessels and American interests. And that was the deal that the US made without Israel having a say and without Israel having influence. So these are three very important examples. And again, I spoke about Gaza. Gaza is okay. It's a decent deal on paper, but the way that it's being implemented is far from satisfactory from an Israeli security perspective. It basically ensures that we will have to fight Hamas in Gaza. Again, that isn't the way Israel would want it, but that is the way the US wants it. So whoever. When I look at the Middle East, I see Israel as the outsourced agent for the expansion, the strength, the projection of force and the deterrence of the US in the region and as an effect of that, also in the world.

[B]

Jonathan Conricus, I appreciate you and now I'm gonna put the arm on you if I find my way to Jordan and I'm trying to get across that Allenby Bridge.

[A]

I want to meet you at Allenby.

[B]

I want your phone number, cuz I want to text you and tell you what's happening. I'm. I was just telling my producers I hate talking about my logistics because I feel you jinx it. Even though I'm not superstitious, it just shows how stupid I am. But I have an Israeli producer who's gonna be with me from Jordan to get into there. She's an Israeli citizen and everything But I'm nervous. Not about the trip. I've done it several times. But it's always helpful, as you guys know, you know, your own people well, it's always helpful to have the ability to hand the phone over to a guy and say, just talk to this guy for a second.

[A]

I can assure you that you have my number and if needed, I'll come to Island B and talk to the relevant people to get you across.

[B]

I hope that I don't contact you until I'm in country and ask you to come and have something to eat with me.

[A]

But sure, more than happy to. No, listen, I'm serious. Whenever you. Whatever you need, whenever you need, you could. It's. It's even better if you keep me abreast of, you know, what's going, if you have a ticket, if you landed. So I can, you know, know and prepare and I can speak with people on my side of the border and, and for sure help and facilitate. But the more you tell me about where you are, the better I would know.

[B]

I'll take you all the way through. It should be that we take off Saturday, land there Sunday, and then, you know, go right from the airport to the bridge. So I'll let you know. I'll keep you in the loop. And I appreciate you, Jonathan. I've enjoyed our relationship through the worst of times, definitely.

[A]

So have I. And I appreciate you very much. All right, journalist that you are.

[B]

All right, Mr. Conricus, I'll talk to you soon. And thank you.

[A]

Yep, safe travels. See you.

[B]

Some interesting answers there about how this happened and what the different motivations are and what this is going to look like and the reality of taking out this regime and what happens next and what the thinking is to why this is happening now. Chris Cuomo here. Thank you so much for joining the Chris Cuomo Project. Thank you for checking out the different subscription models on YouTube. We did our first zoom with the top tier subscribers. The more of you who join, the more of those we will have and we will discuss the topics and they'll be a function of what you want discussed and how you want to use time with me, because that's the deal. And thank you for checking out the merch more of it is selling. That's very cool. I want you to wear your independence, especially, especially now as people need to be critical thinkers. You can't just be gobbling up dogma and vomiting it back because it's just that it's disgusting and right and left is killing us. You gotta get back to right and wrong, okay? And show you're a critical thinker. Show that you're different. Show that you're a free agent and not some party pack animal. So thank you very much for checking me out here on the Chris Cuomo Project twice every week. SiriusXM radio every weekday morning, 7 and 9 Eastern. And of course, News Nation every weekday night, 8p and midnight Eastern. The problems are real. We gotta think through it. We gotta ask the right questions. We gotta research what we can. Let's get after it.