Is This The End of the Iranian Regime?

Summary

The Commentary Magazine Podcast

Episode: "Is This The End of the Iranian Regime?"

Date: January 13, 2026

Host: John Podhoretz
Panelists: Abe Greenwald, Seth Mandel
Guest: Eli Lake (Commentary contributing editor & columnist at The Free Press)

---

Overview

This episode confronts the dramatic events unfolding in Iran, where the Islamic Republic appears to be facing the greatest threat to its regime in its 47-year history. The panel dissects whether these events represent the true endgame for the mullahs, discusses the nature and impact of the protests, the regime’s response, and deeply analyzes internal and external factors that could shape the outcome—especially the debate over U.S. and Israeli involvement. The conversation weaves history, strategy, psychology, and sharp critique into a gripping account of a potential turning point in geopolitics.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Severity and Nature of Iran’s Current Crisis

• Regime Violence and Social Upheaval
  • Reports indicate the state killed 2,000–12,000 protesters in 48 hours, using snipers and live fire (00:54).
  • Eli Lake highlights that while mass slaughter is hardly hopeful, it signals “an extraordinary crisis of legitimacy” (02:17).
  • Reference to the 1979 revolution and the “death cycle” of mass funerals turning into larger protests (03:00–04:39).

Quote:

“We are seeing...the regime's propagandists pointing to what was clearly, you know, a Potemkin rally in Tehran. But they have to try to say that because they are so loathed and despised...”
— Eli Lake (02:17)

---

2. Regime Fragility: The Erosion of Authority

• Loss of Legitimacy
  • The regime’s failure to enforce the hijab law, not for lack of will but capability, is emblematic of its erosion of authority (05:19).
  • Elite groups like the “bizarre” (merchant class) joining the protests is historically significant, as they were key in past revolutions (06:45–07:45).
• Calls for Change from Unexpected Quarters
  • Even hardliners like former President Ahmadinejad are advocating for referenda, underlining deep internal fractures (07:51–08:18).

Quote:

“It's not that the moderates got in the ear of Ayatollah Khamenei. It was because they could not enforce the hijab law. Literally, the morality police couldn't do it.”
— Eli Lake (05:35)

---

3. Totalitarianism, Fear, and the Myth of Invincibility

• Dynamics of Repression
  • The regime’s willingness to escalate violence reflects a belief in self-preservation at any cost (09:49–11:00).
  • Panel discusses historical precedents—Hungary 1956, Prague 1968, Tiananmen Square—and the possibility that fear may no longer be enough (11:16).

Quote:

“The key for these revolutions to work is when you have disobedience in the military, in the security services...For some people, it's not just a matter of conscience. It's a matter of, well, what are they going to do to me when this is over?”
— Eli Lake (11:39)

---

4. Potential for Military and Diplomatic Fractures

• Possible Military Defections

  • Some officers may be willing to defect. Eli Lake references conversations with figures in opposition confirming this possibility (11:39).
  • The panel discusses the regime's own recognition that those who lose power risk retribution by the people.

• Strategic Options for the West

  • The importance of creative diplomacy: offering safe havens for defecting elite figures and utilizing intelligence assets (13:50–16:05).
  • Skepticism about an exclusively internal revolution without exogenous (foreign) assistance (16:09).

---

5. Role of the U.S. and Israel: Ethics, Strategy, and Stakes

• Should America Intervene?
  • Podhoretz argues U.S. or Israeli intervention would likely be decisive (16:09–18:54).
  • Apprehension over U.S. involvement without a post-regime plan; historical failures and bureaucracy’s lack of “off-the-shelf” options are scrutinized (22:29).

Quote:

“If we, America, decide to get materially involved...That's the only way that we're going to get to the final stage. And that's the fight now under discussion.”
— John Podhoretz (16:09)

• Diplomatic Leverage Through Sanctions and Diaspora
  • Western countries hosting the families of Iranian elites could threaten deportation as leverage (26:01–29:02).

Quote:

“Ali Larajani, by the way, his daughter teaches at a nursing program at Emory University. Now, the message to Ali or Larajani can be very simple: Your daughter seems to have a very nice life in Atlanta. Would you like her to continue…?”
— Eli Lake (26:31)

---

6. Internal Collapse vs. External Pressure: Which Matters More?

• Socio-Economic Drivers
  • Explosive inflation and loss of status among the regime's foot soldiers (paramilitary Basijis) create desperation that might trump fear (31:31–32:32).
  • Panel underscores that totalitarian regimes do not typically collapse from mass demonstrations alone, challenging the hope for a “Tahrir Square” outcome in Iran (30:11–30:53).

---

7. Succession Crisis and the Khamenei Factor

• Khamenei's Health and Uncertain Future
  • The Supreme Leader’s age (turning 87) and unclear succession plan are immediate concerns (34:07–35:16).
  • A power vacuum or succession fight could further destabilize the regime (34:04–35:16).

---

8. Historical Context: Misreading the 1953 Coup and Western Guilt

• The Mossadegh Coup and Its Aftermath
  • Eli Lake unpacks the myth versus reality of the 1953 coup, challenging the dominant “America is at fault” narrative (44:46–53:23).
  • The Revolution of 1979 is reframed as the most reactionary event of the 20th century, an anti-modern, anti-American backlash with broad historical repercussions (53:23–56:04).

Quote:

“You have to understand the Iranian revolution as the most reactionary act of the 20th century, that it was a way of saying, no, stop. We do not want this. Women with the vote, equal rights...This must stop.”
— John Podhoretz (53:23)

---

9. American Political Debate: Action vs. Non-Intervention

• Internal U.S. Divisions
  • Some within the Trump administration advocate for negotiation, others for hard intervention. The left/right anti-interventionist horseshoe is exposed (38:47–41:10).
  • The panel debates the risks of “pushing too hard” in supporting the Iranian opposition (37:58–41:10).

---

10. Looking Ahead: Predictions and Tipping Points

• Lightning Round: What Will Trump Do? (64:12–68:29)

  • Panelists rate the likely scale of U.S. intervention on a 1–10 scale:
    • Eli Lake, Abe Greenwald, Seth Mandel: “6” — heavy cyber and visible support, but not direct armed removal.
    • John Podhoretz: “8” — possibly decisive U.S. action, akin to the operation in Venezuela.
  • Emphasis on the importance of visual, demonstrative action—something Trump can point to for political capital (41:25, 67:54).

• Potential New Foreign Policy Paradigm

  • If regime change succeeds without a regional war or occupation, panelists argue it will end America’s “Iraq syndrome” and redefine intervention debates for decades (74:43).

Quote:

“If Iran falls and you had same thing with Hezbollah and Lebanon, all this stuff. I mean, I basically think we're there, honestly...That's the end of Iraq syndrome, I think, once and for all.”
— Abe Greenwald (74:43)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments (with Timestamps)

• Eli Lake: “The Iranian foreign minister privately told [Brett McGurk]...the reason why the regime stays in power is because it is willing to kill its opposition.” (02:17)
• Eli Lake: “The regime that claims to be anointed by God is now denying Shia burial rites. That’s an own-legitimacy crisis.” (05:19)
• Abe Greenwald: “For Trump, his real objective is not even necessarily to push it over, but to just keep them off balance and stop them from regaining their footing enough for the protesters to continue.” (24:33)
• John Podhoretz: “The question of whether or not massive civil unrest can unseat a deeply rooted two-generation regime, world history tells us that has never happened.” (30:17)
• Eli Lake: “In the great book by Eric Hoffer, True Believer...What he talks about is the sudden loss of status for people who we might call middle class into extreme poverty. That’s usually the driver. We are seeing that in real time in Iran.” (31:31)

---

Timeline of Important Segments

• 00:54–05:19: Assessing regime violence, historic legitimacy crisis, role of funerals and social unrest.
• 06:45–09:49: The merchant class and revolutions, the role of the “bizarre.”
• 11:39–16:05: Military fissures, possibility of defection, creative diplomacy, U.S. and Israeli options.
• 16:09–24:33: US/Israeli intervention debate, scale of involvement, bureaucracy inertia.
• 26:01–29:02: Strategic use of sanctions and diaspora leverage.
• 30:11–32:32: The rarity of totalitarian regimes falling to mass protests; Iran on edge.
• 34:04–35:16: Khamenei succession crisis and regime vulnerability.
• 44:46–53:23: Historical context: 1953 coup, Mossadegh, myth-busting for policy clarity.
• 64:12–68:29: Lightning round on expected American moves—a scale from “do nothing” to “direct regime change.”
• 74:43: End of “Iraq Syndrome”—paradigm shift if Iran falls without catastrophic aftermath.

---

Language and Tone

The conversation is sharp, erudite, and at times sardonic. The hosts draw on deep historical knowledge, blending analysis with criticism of both foreign regimes and American policy inertia/naïveté. There is an undercurrent of urgency, skepticism, and at points, grim wit—matching the gravity and unclear outcomes of the present Iranian upheaval.

---

Conclusion

The panel agrees that Iran is closer than ever to regime collapse, with internal unrest, economic chaos, and global pressure converging. Yet they are acutely aware that history is not deterministic—success could hinge on deft U.S. and allied support as well as the regime’s own failures. Failure to grasp the opportunity, misreading history, or repeating past passivity could leave Iran’s people once again trapped under a brutal regime. The next moves by the Trump administration and international players may well define the geopolitics of the Middle East for a generation.

Transcript

[Eli Lake]

Hope for the best, expect the worst Some drink champagne Some die of thirst the way of knowing which way it's going Hope for the best Expect the worst, hope for the best.

[John Bodhoritz]

Welcome to the Commentary Magazine daily podcast. Today is Tuesday, January 13, 2026. I'm John Bodhoritz, the editor of Commentary magazine. With me, as always, executive editor Abe Greenwald. Hi, Abe.

[Seth Mandel]

Hi, John.

[John Bodhoritz]

Senior editor Seth Mandel. Hi, Seth.

[Abe Greenwald]

Hi, John.

[John Bodhoritz]

And joining us today, Commentary contributing editor and podcaster, columnist and all around factotum at the Free Press, Eli Lake. Hi, Eli.

[Eli Lake]

Great to be back. John. Thanks for having me.

[John Bodhoritz]

Eli. I think for 20 years now, or close to 20 years now, you have been writing about the Islamic Republic of IR and the political, geopolitical, sociological, religio fascist implications of this regime's existence. And here it is, I think, unambiguously in the most challenging position it has faced in its 47 years of existence. When you read these reports, which now range from I think, a minimum of 2,000 people killed by the regime in the last 48 hours to 12,000 killed, depending on your sources, but everybody agreeing that the regime is now open, basically opening fire on the protesters from sniper positions to whatever and in cities across the the country. Do you look at that and does this are, are you in a weird position of feeling like that's a sign of hope, or is the massacring a sign that the regime will somehow inevitably find its way back into quelling the resistance as it has so many times before in the last 20 years?

[Eli Lake]

Well, I mean, it's hard. You can say that the mass slaughter of demonstrators is any kind of sign of hope. But I think we can have two thoughts at the same time, which is that it's a sign that what something, by the way, that privately, Brett McGurk, who has been an envoy to the Iranians for both Republican and Democrat, including first term Trump, but also for Obama and Biden, he says that the Iranian foreign minister privately told him that the reason why the regime stays in power is because it is willing to kill its opposition. He recently put that on Twitter, which I mean, is of course true, but it's also extraordinary that the Iranians felt the arrogance that they were confident enough to say that to an American envoy. So this kind of shows that now they what we're seeing is the regime's propagandists are pointing to what was clearly, you know, I think a Potemkin rally in Tehran. But they have to try to say that because they are so loathed and despised, this is Something also to keep in mind in terms of the cycle, particularly to Iran. It's a point that Karim Sajapour made. It's a point that I make in the podcast that we are going to republish this week, part one and two on the making of modern Iran, that the 1979 revolution, we dated in 79 because that's when the Shah leaves and Khomeini returns. It starts in 1978, and it's a year of uprisings, violent protests, and then public funerals for the people who were slain in the uprisings, which then attract larger and larger crowds. And that right there is a. Is a death cycle that the regime is now risking. And I would not be surprised if something like that happened. The other thing to note is this is the Islamic Republic is.

[John Bodhoritz]

Wait, just to interrupt you for a second. So you're suggesting that in the wake of the massacrings that there might be funerals, the funerals themselves become flashpoints for continued in the Shia tradition. Protests. Yes, in the Shia tradition, obviously. Wouldn't the counter be that the regime knows that as well as you do, and therefore would prevent, even if it is a violation of Shia burial law, that they would somehow prevent these funerals from taking place? They can simply hold the bodies and prevent any mass gatherings until. Until everything pacifies, or am I missing a beat?

[Eli Lake]

Well, I mean, sure they could, but again, that would be further ideological discrediting of the regime itself. So a regime that is anointed by God to basically rule the country through a Shia religious interpretation is not allowing traditional Shia burial for Iranians. That presents its own kind of legitimation crisis. It's. Of course they can try to do that, but at that point, I mean, they've already lost legitimacy as a, you know, that they've already lost the kind of ability to say, hey, we are representing the word of God. And this is the. Because they were unable. I mean, this people got the story from a month or two ago about they're not enforcing the hijab law, which is the face covering. That was not because the moderates got in the ear of Ayatollah Khamenei. It was because they could not enforce the hijab law. Literally, the morality police couldn't do it. There were too many people just saying f you. So that's another thing to keep in mind, which is that they're. Each one of these things kind of builds upon something else. And so in that respect, it's been a long time coming. And the difference is that you Know, it's. We say it started with the currency crisis, with the bizarre this time. I mean, you could. Yes, it did.

[John Bodhoritz]

Who are the bizarre?

[Eli Lake]

Well, the bizarre is very important because that's the merchant class of the Iranian economy. And every major revolution has had their buy in, starting with the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, which starts because of excessive sugar tariffs. And some would argue even before that, the end of the 19th century, there was a tobacco deal that the Bizaris also did not agree with, and they started protesting. And it's always been the idea that they would marry up with the clerical class. And eventually there was a reckoning at the end of the 1905 process, around 1911. We don't have to get into the whole history of it, but the point is that they've played a major role, including in 1979. They were the last to sort of be there. They weren't really a big part of the women freedom life protests. The fact that they started it, the fact that the rest of the kind of country has.

[John Bodhoritz]

Those were the 22 protests you're talking about?

[Eli Lake]

Yeah.

[John Bodhoritz]

The 22 protests were about the morality police.

[Eli Lake]

Right.

[John Bodhoritz]

And they're.

[Eli Lake]

By the way, we can date this back to. And I mean, a lot of people say 2009 with the green revolution, which we saw Obama abandon when the regime stole the election in favor of Ahmadinejad. To get a sense, by the way, of how far things have gone in Iran, I would point out that Ahmadinejad is largely sidelined. But when he has made public comments, he has called for a referendum, which is what the opposition's calling.

He.

He has said, this is a corrupt regime, that we can no longer have reform. That's Ahmadinejad. Remember, he was the hardliner that the mullahs put in favor of the reform slate that won that election in 09. I dated back to 1999. The end of the reform experiment with. It was the end of the reform experiment. And it was also. There was a series of murders of intellectuals, but that was the first university uprisings that didn't really get anywhere, but it made it pretty clear that the regime itself would not reform. And so we've seen this recognition and this understanding coming slowly but surely. So I just point out that the slogans in the streets are either surprisingly, long live the Shah. So we're seeing how the. The son of the monarch that was ousted in 1979, that left in 79 because of the Islamic Revolution is coming back, and he is the one national figure that everybody knows that might be Able to sort of be a unifying presence. Fingers crossed. There. It's not a. There are a lot of ifs there. But I just want to point that out. The other one is just like death to the dictator every single time. Whether it's the drinking water crisis, every. It's not Logan. There's no fixing it at this point. It's just over for them. They lack that legitimacy.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, but there are two faces of the Islamic Republic, right? One is this religious, you know, dictatorial religious use of religion as a, you know, as a. As an absolutist. And the other is. It's just the classic totalitarian regime. So the Soviets didn't care about legitimacy. The Chinese don't really care about legitimacy. If you are, as Oral would say, the boot on the human face forever, you just put the boot down on the human face. So therefore we find ourselves in a position where it does. This is the big question, can this be done from the inside or. You're on mute, Eli.

[Eli Lake]

The answer to your question is yes and no. Stalin didn't care about public opinion. Khrushchev did. He gave a secret speech saying Stalin was excessive. More importantly, all these regimes care about public opinion. That's why they spend so much money on internal propaganda.

[John Bodhoritz]

I'm not saying they don't care. I'm saying that when push comes to shove, they bring the tanks out into the streets and mow people down by the thousands and then they go back inside, which is where we are.

[Eli Lake]

So here's where I.

[John Bodhoritz]

But Prague in 68.

[Eli Lake]

Sure.

[John Bodhoritz]

And Hungary in 56. And Tiananmen Square. And I mean, there never was a real uprising in, in. In Russia until 19. Until the failed coup. Right. In. In 19.

[Eli Lake]

Well, you could argue in 1989.

[John Bodhoritz]

Right. That's what I'm saying. But that was already the end of it. So I'm just saying that, that there is the. There is the situation in which the regime told Brett McGurk, the guy told Brett McGurk, we're willing to kill everybody and they know it. And now they're willing to kill everybody and everybody's going to know it. And so that's where step two comes in, which I think we should talk about.

[Eli Lake]

Well, okay, let me just say though, there are a couple of points to make here. One is each one of those mid level IRGC by CG people, they have a family, they have friends, they know people who at this point are affected. It is not so stratified a society that they are not affected by this. So that's the first thing. So there are a lot of calculations that we can't possibly know at this point. And the key for these revolutions to work is when you have disobedience in the military, in the security services. And that doesn't seem like a crazy point of view. In fact, you know, I mean, we. We'll have to see. But, you know, Pahlavi himself, Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, has said he has been in contact with military officers who've said that they are willing to defect to the side of the people. And so that's the first point that I'm not entirely sure that it's going to work, that there is. For some people, it's not just a matter of conscience. It's a matter of, well, what are they going to do to me when this is over? I, many years ago interviewed the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini. And at the time, I was very much taken by Gene Sharp and the theories of nonviolent civic resistance. And I asked him about this, and I almost wanted him to agree with me. And he said, that's never going to work because all of the mullahs understand, and this interview was in 2005, I should say all of the mullahs understand that as soon as they lose power, they are going to be murdered by the people because they've been so horrible. So that's probably an element there that they're fearing for their lives. But it's also an opportunity for some creative statecraft, some creative diplomacy where we can offer a soft landing for those who want to get out early. There have already been signs of fissures in the regime. The President Possian has said that he wants to distinguish between rioters and protesters. That is not a distinction that Supreme Leader or Ali Rallarajani, the national security advisor, or the head of the IRGC that they make. So that's already an interesting point, to just say that even in this regime of hardline goons, even some senior people like the president himself is saying that there is a distinction, that we need to do something to address these legitimate economic concerns. Maybe there's an opportunity to reach out to somebody like that, not to be part of a future Iran, but simply to say that you and your family can be safe when this inevitably happens. The biggest mistake that we could possibly make right now would be to begin any kind of negotiation with this regime. I cannot stress enough. I don't think Trump is going to necessarily do it. We know that he's used negotiations in the past as a ruse. I am hoping his comments in the last 24 hours were part of that as this idea of a ruse. Today is the big day. He gets briefed on his options, military and cyber, for how to make good on his promise to the Iranian people. I am hoping that there are lots of things that can be done short of bombing buildings, although there are certain kind of symbolic things that we can bomb that would be helpful. And I would go so far as to say, if it's true. I mean, listen, we know the Mossad hasn't incredibly massive presence in Iran and an effective one. I think it is slanderous that regime stooges are suggesting that the entire uprising is a result of the Mossad. We know that's not true because the opposition has predated the Mossad presence. And my understanding is that they. Those are two different lanes. But there are lots of things the Mossad can do to help advantage sharing intelligence, like the locations of these forces and so forth. And I would just say that I'm amazed, given the violence that began late last week, that we've still seen images that appear to be authentic from Iran that show that we still have massive crowds in the streets that are willing to do that. So I would not give up just yet. Even though they are willing to use extraordinary violence. And there are things that Trump can do to make that very uncomfortable for the regime. He knows the locations of supreme leaders, the Israelis, know where military commands are, commander of the internal security forces, the Basiji militia, and so forth.

[Seth Mandel]

John, you're on mute.

[John Bodhoritz]

Sorry, guys. So we need to split this up. So we've now talked about what's going on inside and the kinds of changes, the differences between this and previous revolts that the regime has put down with relative ease. I would say, despite the kinds of incredible optimism that were expressed during the times of previous uprisings that they did. This really might be it. This really might be the moment. Which is one of the reasons why I'm skeptical. Not that this isn't the moment, but that it can be done solely as part of an internal uprising in which, as you say, the military basically says, I'm sorry, we can't fire on our cousins and brothers and, you know, people in our mosque anymore. You're. We're just dropping our guns so that. That is something that doesn't really happen in strong totalitarian regimes. The military doesn't break. And so I don't. I think that's maybe a false hope, which is why we have to get back to the question of whether we, the United States. You're mentioning Israel as a kind of subterranean force in helping create the conditions under which the regime might collapse. And obviously, we know about its penetration of Iran in all kinds of ways. But it's pretty clear to me that the regime falls if we, America, decide to get materially involved in. That's the only way that we're going to get to the final stage. And that's the fight that is now under discussion. And I would say it is worth having a discussion. Like, I am very supportive of this idea, but we are talking about a regime of 90 million people. We are talking about a very complicated and very large country. Right. It's not, you know, it's not Kuwait. It's not little, you know, it's not a billion or two. You know, it's 90 million people, highly modernized in weird ways, all of that. You know, this is not like a. This is not like stripes. You know, it's not like you drive in, you drive out. It's like going into Wisconsin. Like, this is a serious gambit. We did an amateur. We did amazing work from the air and getting rid of the nuclear program. But we're talking about something else here. And it's always this question, which is, is the risk worth the reward, or are we getting ourselves in over our head if we're not willing to commit properly to doing this in the right way? Getting the mullahs out, letting the regime collapse. And what, what do we, what do we envision as the, as the day after, Can I add? Yeah, go ahead, John.

[Seth Mandel]

I think we should be specifically emphasizing this concern, given that it's this Trump administration, because it's not as if the president has had a regime change, policy or plan in place up until this point. There's this element of kind of winging it now in response to what's happening. And that is more reason for concern.

[John Bodhoritz]

You know, colder days, new Year, it's.

[Sponsor Voice]

Been a cold winter. This is the moment your winter wardrobe really has to deliver. And if you're craving a winter reset, start with pieces truly made to last season after season. And, you know, I'm going to tell you that you need to talk to Quince. Quince brings together premium materials, thoughtful design, and enduring quality so you stay warm, look sharp, and feel your best all season long. Not only do I have a Quint's puffer jacket, but after I had such a great experience with the puffer jacket, I got my son Isaac the same puffer jacket.

[John Bodhoritz]

Isn't that an amazing thing.

[Sponsor Voice]

Isn't that an endorsement? That's what I call an endorsement. So look, I've had the sweaters. I now have the puffer jacket.

[Eli Lake]

Get them.

[John Bodhoritz]

Trust me.

[Sponsor Voice]

Each piece made from premium materials by trusted factories that meet rigorous standards for craftsmanship and ethical production. And that outerwear really is especially impressive. Down jackets, wool coats, Italian leather outerwear that keep you warm when it's actually cold. Classic styles you'll love, that hold up year after year. So refresh that winter wardrobe with quints. Go to quints.com commentary for free shipping on your order and 365 day returns. Quint.com commentary now available in Canada, too. That's Q-U-I-N C E.com commentary As I'm.

[Eli Lake]

Talking to you, my dog Georgie, who's four, is sitting at my feet. I didn't want her in the first place. We got her for the kids. It was Covid. They felt bad. They felt they needed some entertainment from a dog.

[John Bodhoritz]

We got a dog and now she's kind of my dog.

[Eli Lake]

She comes to the office with me.

I walk her.

[John Bodhoritz]

I walk her at night. I walk her in the morning. She is a new love of my life.

[Eli Lake]

So here's a quick message from today's sponsor, the ASPCA Pet Health Insurance Program. These days we insure just about everything. Cars that lose value the second we drive them. Phones we trade in every two years. Trips we we haven't even taken yet. But our pets, who are truly irreplaceable, often go unprotected. With ASPCA Pet Health Insurance, you can get help with unexpected vet bills and make sure your dog or cat gets the care they need when they need it. And if you're looking out for them, there's a little extra something in it for you, too.

[John Bodhoritz]

Because when you enroll in an ASPCA.

[Eli Lake]

Pet health insurance plan, you could get a $25Amazon gift card. It's a little treat for you while you're doing something great for your pet. So to Explore coverage, visit aspcapetinsurance.com Commentary that's aspcapetinsurance.Com Commentary Eligibility restrictions apply. Visit aspcapetinsurance.COM AmazonTerms for more info. This is a paid advertisement. Insurance is underwritten by either Individual independent American Insurance Company or United States Fire Insurance Company and produced by PTZ Insurance Agency Ltd. The ASPCA is not an insurer and is not engaged in the business of insurance.

[John Bodhoritz]

You make an important point because we have a piece coming out in our February issue, which we close tomorrow by Elliot Abrams, which is about Venezuela. And I'm only using this as an, as an example. So he was, of course, the envoy, United States coordinator for the effort to get rid of the Maduro, Maduro regime in 2019 and 2020 for the first Trump administration. And what's very clear as he tells the story is that our intelligence agencies did not want to go into Venezuela, did not really want to even provide plans for what we could do to oust the regime beyond merely using sanctions. And they were opposed to it. They weren't for, they weren't being forward about it, all of that. And I think you can imagine that the same is very much true of the American bureau, the American foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracy. Now, for 20 odd years, they have been opposed to American action inside Iran or against the Iranian regime. In fact, they were advocates for the jcpoa. They don't like Trump's adventurism, all of that. So that Trump, when he said, I need to hear these plans next Tuesday, part of the reason he had to say that, I think even if it's part of a subterfuge, is I'm not sure those plans are really, like, off the shelf. Like, one of the easy ways that a bureaucracy can prevent something from happening is simply not providing a contingency plan. Like he goes and says, how are we going to overthrow the regime? And they're like, I don't know. We haven't, we've never really planned for that. That hasn't been our policy. And, you know, and it's so hard. And, you know, we're talking about committing forces that were so overstretched everywhere else. And look how we, all these people in Venezuela, we have all this, all these forces in the Atlantic, how are we supposed to get them over to the Indian Ocean to, you know, to put pressure on Iran? So he may not have options yet. That's the thing that he has.

[Abe Greenwald]

I mean, like, part of what doesn't worry me about the haphazard nature of it is that the situation with the regime seems to be like they, they are, they're teetering. And Trump has options to stop them from regaining their footing, which is different from going in and overthrowing a regime that is set, you know, concrete in power, which is that the protesters clearly have the regime on its back foot in a way that they haven't in some time. And we're seeing, you know, Eli, you mentioned the president saying, all right, well, we'll have some reforms and, you know, there's A difference between a protester and a rider and whatever. This is the sort of thing that started that made it look like, you know, Mubarak in Egypt was. Was over. Because, you know, the second you're not Bashar Al Assad and gassing the protesters is, you know, the second that you are, you know, on your back foot. So for Trump, I think it's really just like the regime, you know, is wobbling, and his real objective is not even necessarily to push it over, but to just keep them off balance and stop them from regaining their footing enough for the protesters to continue what they're doing, which is just to have the momentum, you know, to. And. And let the wave ride out.

[Eli Lake]

A couple points. In Egypt, the United States had the advantage of our military, had very close relations with the Egyptian military, and it was because the Egyptian military refused to disperse the crowds in Tahrir Square that ultimately forced Mubarak to resign. We don't have that kind of relationship, obviously, with the Iranian military or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, we have leverage. More importantly, our allies, which are in a tenuous position under the Trump years, let's be honest, also have leverage now. I've been disappointed by Canada, but Canada has been a haven for the children and extended families of many regime elites. That is an amazing source of leverage right now. The message needs to be sent. Sent. Ali Larajani, by the way, his daughter teaches at a nursing program at Emory University. Now, the message to Ali or Larajani can be very simple. Your daughter seems to have a very nice life in Atlanta. Would you like her to continue to have a nice life in Atlanta? Or maybe you can send her back to your country where there's 5 million percent inflation and everybody will hate her, and who knows how long she's going to last. That message can be sent a thousand times fold if somebody in the Trump administration can quietly coordinate it with Canada. United Kingdom, France is another place. There's all these Western countries where the elites have sent their families and their children not just to be educated. They basically live there now, saying, all right, you know, if you want your families to continue to live, if you care about your families, now's the time, step aside. You can join them and you can have a future, or we can kick them out, which is what we ought to start doing, and we ought to be very clear about that. So that's one source of leverage that we have that maybe is a little bit different, but we can try to use the same kind of coercive diplomacy with the security forces. The second thing I would point out is I think you're right. I don't think the intelligence community has any kind of transition plan or contingency for Iran or if they do, they're so buried that, you know, other people will block them from the President seeing them. But we know that Reza Pahlavi has addressed this issue with the Iranian diaspora for at least five years that I know of, probably more. We know that there are organizations like the National Union for Free Democratic Iran that has had many of these kinds of seminars with so much talent that has been forced to leave Iran. So there are people who are in a position who have studied this question. This is the kind of thing where even though Larry diamond is no fan at Stanford University, this is his specialty at Stanford.

[John Bodhoritz]

No fan of Trump's.

[Eli Lake]

I mean, yeah, yeah, he's no fan of Trump's, but you know, this is an opportunity to take out one of the worst regimes on the planet. This is the kind of thing that he, I mean I could see like Hoover teaming up with Pahlavi and getting a kind of, you know, the most talented people in the diaspora coming back, figuring out how to basically keep services running. And the only thing, the other thing I would just say about the willingness to kill, maybe they will not be moved by their conscience, but the inflationary freefall, the collapse of the Rial affects the Basiji too. It's not like the average.

[John Bodhoritz]

You're using terms people don't.

[Eli Lake]

Sorry. The base are the paramilitary that are often the front lines against the protesters. But it's only the very top level that lives in lavish luxury in Iran. Most of the grunts who have to do the hard work of suppressing the population are not living that much better.

[John Bodhoritz]

Right?

[Eli Lake]

They're living slightly better, but this economic contagion affects them too.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, again, the problem that you're facing in describing this is you are talking about the question of whether or not massive civil unrest can unseat a deeply rooted two generation regime that basically is semi totalitarian in nature. And I just think that world history tells us that has never happened. We have never seen a totalitarian regime collapse in that way under those conditions with the possible exception of the Soviet Union. But that was even a weirder story.

[Eli Lake]

Slobodan Milosevic 20002001 with the but he wasn't.

[John Bodhoritz]

But that he was, that was an authoritarian. That was not a totalitarian by that point did not have control of every state lever with no mediating institutions whatsoever in his way. So the que that then Brings back the question of what exogenous force? And you're describing some civil society exogenous forces. The question of whether or not a plan can be drawn up that will be, you know, inventive and clever about what to do once the regime is deposed. It is the deposition of the regime that I want to get to.

[Eli Lake]

Well, okay, but I just want to push back slightly, which is to say that we're not in a situation where the regime can certainly use fear. It always has, that if you, if you. If you. If you buck us, then it's curtains for you and your family. That. That's certainly true. But on the other hand, at a certain point, when your family is. Can't afford, you know, milk and chicken either, then those situations become desperate. In the great book by Eric Hoffer, True Believer, which is what happens. What are the conditions for mass revolutions? What he talks about is the sudden loss of status for people who wouldn't. We might call middle class into extreme poverty. That's usually the driver. We are seeing that in real time in Iran. And that doesn't just affect the bizarre merchants and the teachers and the oil workers, who I think are gonna be going on strike if they already haven't already. It's also affecting these security thugs.

[Sponsor Voice]

Right.

[Eli Lake]

And I'm just saying that that's something to keep in mind.

[John Bodhoritz]

Again, what you're then talking about is a new thing. So in other words, something that would. This would be a new kind of revolution, and maybe it'll happen. So I'm not. How do I know? Like, the world is a different place. We're not. It's not, you know, it's not bipolar. I don't mean bipolar like, you know, mental bipolar. I mean, it's. We're not a sort of Soviets versus us or the Chinese versus different thing. And we have the major X factor. And the major X factor is that two weeks ago, the United States went and extracted the president of Venezuela in a daring raid and pulled him out of a building and flew him out of the country. And Trump looks at Iran and coughs. And Khamenei is saying, can he come get me? Does he now talk about teeth? Like, the real threat of regime change and what you might call almost like it's like operation. It's like the game of operation. Like, we've now shown that Trump, you know, in the United States can take the funny bone out without, you know, hitting the sides and making it go like that. This is. This is something that has really not faced Iran or any other regime. You know, it's sort of like what, how Israel has redrawn the geopolitical map by doing things militarily that nobody thought that it was capable of or that anybody was capable of necessarily. That changes the dynamic. So the question is, are we.

[Eli Lake]

Let's add one more factor.

[John Bodhoritz]

Yeah.

[Eli Lake]

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not have a clear succession plan.

[John Bodhoritz]

Right.

[Eli Lake]

Former president who died in the helicopter crash three years ago was largely thought to be the one who had enough support within the inner circle to succeed him once he died. He'd like his son to be the next supreme leader, but my understanding is he's not very popular in part because everybody is looking around and saying, Khamenei, you've led us to ruin. Why would we trust the regime in the hands of your son? So if Khamenei strokes out or finally the cancer gets him or he is removed from power in some way, then that will create a succession crisis in Iran that would also lead to potential opportunities because at that point you would have the elites fighting each other for who gets to be the next leader.

[Abe Greenwald]

Because we should say he's, he'll be turning 87 soon. So there's no, there's, there is no long term future for Khamenei. This is like, this is a fairly immediate question considering his health.

[John Bodhoritz]

So let's go to immediacy because the thing that we're hearing or the things that are being said, you know, Mons, the, the, the Chancellor of Germany, others, it's like this is over. This is the end game. We are in the end game here. Not Khamenei may get cancer. And, you know, what are the, we're talking about the next six weeks or month or something like that. Israel was supposedly going to do a major strike on Hezbollah last week, determined not to do it because it did not want to complicate or create more complex conditions when the mothership might actually be, you know, might actually be at risk. And therefore, if the mothership can be taken down, taking that Hezbollah is obviously an entirely secondary thing since it's basically a subsidiary arm of the regime in Iran. If the regime in Iran goes away, you know, you can deal with Hezbollah at will almost after that. So Israel has already made geopolitical moves suggesting that it believes that it is. Things are very close to the edge if things happen. Not organic. I don't think that they think or even that we think or that the people that we trust inside the administration think that this is just going to happen. Tahrir Square like, although, Eli, as you say, Tahrir Square, we didn't do it, but we knew enough to know to give advice or counsel to the Egyptian military to say, you know what? It's not going to go good. Well for you, if you decide you want to fire on the protesters in, in Tahrir Square in Egypt, better stand down. Like, let this, let this play out, see where Mubarak is and see how he can save himself. We're not in that position here, but here we are going to have to take active steps if the regime is gonna collapse in the next week. We can have. And it feels like everybody thinks we're going to, doesn't it?

[Seth Mandel]

Well, but it does, because I think given what Trump has said, he has to now, it's almost kind of like the situation he got in Venezuela. I mean, I don't know what point he had. In his mind, he was determined to snatch Maduro if he couldn't get him out. But given that Trump has repeatedly said, if there's a bloodbath, we're going to do something. Now there is a bit of a bloodbath. Doesn't he have to do something?

[Eli Lake]

Which.

[Seth Mandel]

I have another question here, which is that if you Remember back in 2009, Barack Obama's cover story for not getting involved on the side of the protests in Iran was that the last thing that movement needs is to have the US Backing it. That will delegitimize the movement. We shouldn't have our fingerprints on it. He said that what he really wanted to do was rehabilitate the regime and bring it in, get a nuclear deal and bring it into the system of peaceful nations or whatever. Is there a. Could we push too hard somehow here? I mean, because I kind of feel. I mean, and this may be.

[John Bodhoritz]

That's a very important. Look, you're making an ultimately very important point. Apparently, we're hearing that there is a debate of this sort going on to some extent inside the administration with these camps that seem to now have hardened kind of into place, in which you do have a voice that is in opposition to the more activist, more militaristic approach of Trump in the JB JD Vance orbit, where Vance is talking about negotiating. And somebody, Witkoff, somebody says Witkoff, should go talk to the Iranians and all that. And there is about it this question of whether or not our involvement, which is essentially the isolationist view, both in the horseshoe of the far left and this isolationist right, which is our involvement, makes more problems than it. Than it solves. Like at Best it ends up complicating and confusing the matter and we don't know what we're doing and we screw it up and everything goes badly. And so let's not go do it in the first place. Clearly, Trump does not believe that of decisions he makes himself. If he makes the decision, then obviously it's the perfect decision and there was absolutely nothing wrong with it. In fact, if you say there's something wrong with it, he'd like to throw you in jail if you even say such a thing. So if he goes in this direction, that's not going to be a good place. But pushing too hard, what would pushing too hard look like? I mean, we've already done maximum pressure, right? So we're already like, we've already got, we've already done what the purpose of maximum pressure always was, given what's happened over the last month, which is, as Eli says, the real, the currency now has no international value. It is literally a dead currency, meaning that you cannot trade it for. You cannot go, you know, to the exchange window at the Dubai airport and get yourself, you know, some dollars for real there. It has no value. So that is the ultimate point of sanctions is to take, is to, is to take the economy down. So they're sitting there like that. So the only thing that's left for us to do is some form of military intervention. That's.

[Eli Lake]

Yeah, but no, yeah, no, there's, there's cyber things that we can do that would blind the command and control of the internal security forces.

[John Bodhoritz]

I mean, I consider that military intervention, but fair enough. A sliding scale of military intervention.

[Eli Lake]

Right.

[Abe Greenwald]

Also, I feel like that's less likely with Trump because I think I take Abe's point, which is that I also think that Trump has put himself out on a limb far enough that he would do something that you could see. And I think that's how Trump works. So the cyber stuff may happen, it may not happen, but I, I don't think that he would use that. Instead of, you know, something blowing up, it feels like Trump would want something that the public can see so that he can point to it and say, remember when I did this?

[Eli Lake]

Well, there's a lot of powerful things. I mean, listen, I would like to see a couple things blown up too, just to make it clear that, you know, we're here. But the most important thing might be to take over the state run broadcasting. We have the cyber capabilities to do that. Could you imagine if you saw a speech from Reza Pahlavi, hopefully like from Azerbaijan, about to Enter Iran saying, you know, I'm here, I have no, you know, we're going to have a transition to elections. If you defect now, you know, you'll be safe. All of those kinds of things are in the cards, you know, so I, but I want to get back to what you were saying before about Obama's calculation and can we do too much and can we potentially ruin it? This is informed by complete misreading of, of 1953 and the fall of Mohammad Mosadda, which you talked about on the podcast yesterday.

[John Bodhoritz]

So again, just very quickly, Iran in 1953 was governed by a semi democratically composed government led by somebody named Mohamed Mossadegh, who was taken down in a couple for which the United States has been blamed for, you know, since 1953, and for which Barack Obama, 40, 50 years after the fact, apologized to the Iranian people as part of his overture for the jcpoa. The story there is much more complicated action.

[Eli Lake]

I think it's worth getting into the complexity of that story.

[John Bodhoritz]

Get into the complexity.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so first of all, it's our.

[John Bodhoritz]

Original sin in Iran that has created why you want to bring it up, I think we need to explain is that the world of the foreign policy cognoscenti, you know, and when I was in my 20s, teens and 20s learning about this myself, this was one of the original sins of post war American foreign policy that we had backed authoritarians against Democrats in, particularly in Iran and in Guatemala and that that showed how bad our foreign policy was and you know, these progressives where there were progressive things and we did this and then everything went haywire and it eventually led to Vietnam and everything bad that could ever have possibly happened. So that's the, that is the sort of doctrine in which somebody like Barack Obama from college political science classes onward was bathed. That was the amniotic fluid of non conservative foreign policy thinking. So get into the complexity.

[Eli Lake]

Okay, so the reason why we are obsessed with Mosadda and why the left is so obsessed with Mossadegh is because of the worst timed memoir in the history of memoirs, which is that Kermit Roosevelt, who is the kind of mediocre grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, was sent by the CIA in 1953 after many efforts to negotiate with Mosaddegh and come up with a kind of equitable and by the way, like this is during the Eisenhower, the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. Both Truman and Eisenhower wanted there to be a fair deal between Iran and the United Kingdom on the ownership and the transition of the ownership of their oil fields. But it was worse than that because what Mosaddegh was doing by 1953 was his own kind of consolidation and illegitimate kind of. I wouldn't call it a coup, but it was certainly a power grab in that he had already shut down newspapers, he'd already banned kind of criticism of him. He'd already violated Iran's constitution by trying to sideline the role of the Shah, which is part of the constitution. He'd done a number of things that would. He also disbanded the Majlis, which is their parliament. So he was becoming himself a kind of dictator. So the best thing to sort of.

[John Bodhoritz]

All of this, again you allude to this, but just to be explicit, all of this was about the nationalization of Iran's oil, which had largely been in the hands of the British. Right, Though I think it was American oil companies or Dutch and American oil companies that were pulling the oil out of the ground from Iran.

[Eli Lake]

No, no, it was, it was the, it was what became British Petroleum.

[John Bodhoritz]

So it was bp. Okay, so, so the British had the kind of leases over the, over the oil fields and most of the, as was true all over the world was aggressively going at the idea that this is ours and we're going to nationalize it and you're gonna, you know, basically have to work.

[Eli Lake]

He was correct, by the way, that the original lease was, you know, it's.

[John Bodhoritz]

Just funny because we're talking about this now in relation to Venezuela. So that, right. All this is happening in these two different oil countries isn't entirely coincidental, but it is a little coincidental anyway. So most of them wanted to nationalize the oil and that created this crisis.

[Eli Lake]

But we should say, yeah, if he just wanted to nationalize the oil, the United States was perfectly willing to support him. They were, most of it came to the United States and as neutral third party arbitrators in this. And they largely sided with the, with the Iranians on this. It was all of the other things, it was dismantling the Majlis. It was, you know, cracking down on news. There's like arresting all these newspaper editors. And Mosadda himself had lost support from the coalition that made it possible for him to kind of govern in this period. So what you saw in the months leading up to the so called coup were a number of Iranian, even former allies and reformers. But most importantly, the clerics of Qom, which would of course be the font of the 79 Islamic Revolution, were begging the United States, right, the city of Qom, which is right here, right. Were begging the United States to get involved and restore a balance between the Shah and this out of control prime minister who has been self becoming you know, a dictator. Now initially, Shah Reza the first, the current Shah Reza Pahlavi's father was very unimpressive and he was almost willing to go along with Mosadda. He had already exited himself from Tehran. He was in his summer palace. There were rumors that he was leaving the country which was looking like the end of the Pahlavi dynasty. And it was the CIA that effectively persuaded him and Kermit Roosevelt to fire, which was in his constitutional right, Prime Minister for violating the Iranian constitution. He ends up doing that at first, Mossadegh says, has the guy who delivers the message arrested. Then there are massive street protests and demonstrations against Mosadda. Now the CIA has been effective at times and so forth. But that was not because of CIA and MI6 black propaganda. It was because Mossadegh had alienated almost every other constituency in Iran at the time. So he had sort of made his own bed and that was the role that the United States played. Yes, there were some other things that they did in terms of again black propaganda, but they didn't know the lay of the land well enough. So they basically did their black propaganda in anti mosadden newspapers anyway. So it wouldn't have mattered. But the point is that that was the extent of it. The situation was already in a kind of political crisis. And so I always felt that this was blown way out of proportion. Now what we should say then is that in this period after the 1950s and the early 1960s is an extraordinary example of admittedly Iran becomes incredibly authoritarian. And Pahlavi, you know, we see the Savak doing all kinds of nasty things.

[John Bodhoritz]

That's the secret police.

[Eli Lake]

That's the secret police. So that's on the negative side. But he introduces a series of modernization reforms that Mosadda himself was the early advocate for. And most notably what he does is he has a program to basically end the absentee land ownership of many Iranian elites, including the Shah's family itself, which relinquishes millions of acres of land and puts it in control of Iranian peasants, which. And then build schools in the world system that are no longer tied to the mosques, which is important. The literacy rate increases. This is a period of in some ways successful reform for Iran and liberal successful reform. Women get the right to vote. So there are all kinds of things. And who opposes that? Who opposes the reforms? What was known at the time as the white revolution, even though it wasn't A revolution. This is a few years later. It's a, it's a middle aged cleric named Ayatollah Ali Khomeini who would end up leading the Islamic revolution.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, you got to go back now to Kermit. You started this with Kermit Roosevelt's time memoir.

[Eli Lake]

So, so he writes his memory. Sorry, that memoir comes out, which should have been titled How I did the coup in Iran in 1953 by me, former CIA guy Kermit Roosevelt. That comes out in 1979. That comes out literally the same year as the Islamic revolution. So a book comes out which is by the CIA guys saying, hi, I did it the same year. We're trying to figure out what happened in Iran and why there was this huge revolution. So people think at the time, you have a lot of people, we all know their names. Elaine Chalino is on the plane. You know, we have all these people who are on the plane with Khomeini coming back from Paris. He pretends to be this democrat. He isn't. But if anybody who had studied Khomeini, one of the few ones was Bernard Lewis in the United States, who was at Princeton at this point, knew that Khomeini gets his start opposing giving the women the right to vote, opposing land reform, opposing having schools that are not teaching people only like religious tracks up to the eighth grade, and actually making sure they know how to read. So that's Khomeini. Khomeini is a reactionary and that's what his agenda was from the get go. He was a very talented speaker. He was able to sort of connect with a lot of people because it was true that there was a vast difference between how the Shah and his court lived versus everybody else. There was incredible poverty. But at the same time, Khomeini was always this force of reaction. He manages to trick the world into in 1979 in part because Kermit Roosevelt takes credit for Mosadda in 53.

[John Bodhoritz]

You've made a really important. So Khomeini as VS Naipaul famously put it in his book among the Believers, the first really serious portrait of the rising Islamic world. As a workers of journalism in the early 80s said this was the 19th century, opposing the 21st, that that the Shah's regime was a modernizing regime. And you have to understand the Iranian revolution as the most reactionary act of the 20th century, that it was a way of saying, no, stop. We do not want this. Women with the vote like equal rights for men and women, extremely educated and secularized middle class. This must stop. We must go back and retreat into Shia Islamic. Right. So what's interesting about this and where it resonates with the conversation we were having about America going too far is that the reason that Khomeini tricked everybody and the reason that this argument was seductive to Elaine Chalino, who was the correspondent for the New York Times at the time that, that Eli is referring to, and others, Richard Falk at Princeton, whose op ed about how we needed to trust Khomeini literally has been surfaced in the last couple of days and put on Twitter so people could read the psychosis that had afflicted the foreign policy establishment and you know, like serious thinkers at the time about this, is that it was fundamentally anti American. It was, we're bad. Khomeini opposes us because we're being nice to the Shah, because we're letting the Shah come into the United States to get medical treatment. And we shouldn't even do that. He should be allowed to, you know, rot with liver cancer at home instead of being at, you know, New York Hospital. And we should be taking revenge. And we're, we're the original evil anyway, because we deposed most of the day and all of that. And then they fell prey. They basically sat there, liberal public opinion, conventional foreign policy opinion, and, and backed and supported the creation of this unbelievably evil, barbaric regime that has been a massively destabilizing and negative force on the planet Earth for almost half a century. So where are we now? We have people inside the Trump administration who are opposing military action to depose this regime effectively. I believe on the emotional grounds that if we get involved, we're only gonna screw things up. Cause that's all we ever do. So who are they sounding like? Richard Falk, Elaine Chalino, everybody who said, well, one more.

[Eli Lake]

Michel Foucault, the father of postmodernism, is sent by an Italian newspaper to cover the revolution and has nothing but praise for Khomeini and the like. This pious movement that is no longer tricked by modern liberalism. It's the most insane stuff you could possibly read for this guy who is, by the way, a well known known, we should say pederast and gay man who loves bath houses in San Francisco is like, it's unbelievable. He's fashioning a rod effectively for his own back by saying, oh, no, no, this was going to be great. It's going to be true freedom that we couldn't understand in the west in that sort of thing makes the Islamic revolution for the like revolutionary left seem like it's part of their movement. Like he's like Che Guevara or the FLN in Algeria. And what the reality is is that he's a total reactionary. And the first thing he does is he tells women they have to be veiled, they can't vote. He does a series of things that are completely reactionary, but it still doesn't get the kind of coverage because there is this I told you so moment post Vietnam. And again, I'd say Kermit Roosevelt's ego and the failure of the CIA to say, no, you cannot publish this book. What are you thinking, you moron? That was enough to kind of fix our understanding of Iranian history so that we believe basically this falsehood.

I carry a lot of responsibility in my household. If something happened to me there real consequences like mortgage payments, tuition, everyday bills that don't just disappear. Thinking about that used to feel overwhelming. So taking steps to protect your family, that's the kind of thing that can really change your life for the better. That's why you should consider getting life insurance through Ethos. Ethos makes getting life insurance fast and easy, 100% online, you can get a quote in seconds, apply in minutes, and get same day coverage. There's no medical exam. You just answer a few simple health questions. You can get up to $3 million in coverage. Some policies are as low as $30 a month. As of March 2025, Business Insider named Ethos the number one no medical exam instant life insurance provider with 4.8 out of 5 stars on Trustpilot with over 3,000 reviews. So protect your family with life insurance from Ethos. Now by going to Ethos.

[John Bodhoritz]

In as.

[Eli Lake]

Little as 10 minutes, you can get your free quote and up to $3 million in [e-mail] commentary that's e t h o s.com commentary ethos.com commentary Application times and rates may vary.

[Sponsor Voice]

New year, new me. Cute, but how about New Year New Money? With Experian, you can actually take control of your finances. Check your FICO score, find ways to save and get matched with credit card offers, giving you time to power through those New Year's goals. You know you're going to crush start the year off right. Download the Experian app Based on FICO Score 8 model offers an approval not guaranteed. Eligibility requirements and terms apply subject to credit check, which may impact your credit scores. Offers not available in all states. See experian.com for details. Experian.

[John Bodhoritz]

So here we are with the question of American action right in 2026. And there is clearly a gut, weird, gut response that says America shouldn't act because it's, you know, it has a history of badness in its actions. And we also have this meme that has been going around. Various people have been doing this funny meme, right, which is look at in the wake of thousands of Iranians being mowed down by the regime. Here is the scene right now at Columbia University. And it's a picture of the Columbia campus with literally nobody on the green, you know, no tents, no protests, no signs, nothing. Harvard, the same. Everywhere the same. We literally have footage of mass massacres by a, an evil regime, the world's leading sponsor of terrorism for half a century. And no, no left wing compendium of people is saying boo about the fact that this is happening. No demonstrations, no nothing. So this says two things to me. Number one, going back to 2023, this was not spontaneous. This was a 20 year plan by Gutter to take out Israel and to, you know, defame Israel's reputation and the reputation of Jews in the United States and push us inside and indoors. Because nobody is telling these sheep, these cattle, these loathsome DSA pieces of garbage that it's time for them to go back into and say it's bad what's going on in Iran. Because of course they support Iran. The Middle Eastern Studies department at Columbia University supports Iran. Mahmoud Mamdani supports Iran. They believe that the Iranian Republic is a good thing, not a bad thing.

[Eli Lake]

No, no, it's worse than that. I mean, we had Hamid Debashi, who is a tenured professor at Columbia in the Middle East Studies department, literally retailing regime propaganda that this whole thing was ginned up by the Mossad and the CIA. And look at these crowds that were, you know, the Potemkin rallies in Tehran that they had on Monday.

[John Bodhoritz]

You know, you're referring to the fact that there was a supposed rally in Tehran on Monday of supporters of the regime opposing these evil, terrible protesters who were simply being, you know, who were in the pay of, you know, of Jews, basically, is what is what he said.

[Eli Lake]

Well, it's. What's worse is that it takes two seconds to think, if the, if the people really support the regime, why does the Internet been blacked out for nearly a week? And why are you doing all of this now? In light of the fact that we all saw the burning of the Qasem Soleimani statue and everything else before. So it's this utter mediocrity, this stooge is A tenured professor at an Ivy League university is a disgrace. And it's part of it.

[John Bodhoritz]

A department, that's the whole point. Part of a department and a discipline that has become the paid subsidy of the government of Qatar. They are simply agents of a foreign power hostile to the United States and world Jewry. And they have been functioning in this way now for two decades.

[Eli Lake]

Well, I would go a little bit further. I would say it's also Edward Said, who taught at Columbia, right, famously wrote a book in like 1980 who looked at the Islamic revolution in Iran. And his big takeaway was the Western media is portraying the Iranian revolution as a bunch of fanatics and maniacs. And boy, isn't that Islamophobic. Even though he didn't use Islamophobic, he used some postmodern, more complex language. But the point is that this was Said's response to this huge hinge in history. And they've been following in the footsteps of Said ever since. And that's, that's where we are.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, lightning round as we conclude then. So Donald Trump is going to have a meeting today. If he hasn't already decided, he has said, don't fire on the protesters or I'm going to do something. So on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being he does nothing and 10 being he nukes Tehran, I don't know what would 10 be? I don't know what that would be.

[Seth Mandel]

That he takes out common A.

[Abe Greenwald]

Well, 10 would be that he. 10 would be that he. Maduro's common A.

[Sponsor Voice]

Really?

[John Bodhoritz]

You think that's 10? Because I think that's more like 7.

[Eli Lake]

But.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, what do you expect in the next week? Where, what number do you think Trump is going to land on? Is he going to try to do this on the cheap? Is he going to commit to it? The way he's handled this so far is once he does it, he sends 150 planes. You know, he doesn't screw around. He went into Venezuela. It was a major operation involving, you know, massive deployment of military resources. Is he going to do a little thing? Is he going to empower the Israelis? Is he going to do it? I don't know. Again, 1. 1 to 10, 10 being not the removal. Okay, 10 is the Americans directly take credit for deposing the regime in Iran itself, the entire regime. And one is we do nothing. Pick a number where you think we'll.

[Eli Lake]

I think it'll be a six. We'll see. Like, I think the US Will turn out the lights in key ministries and effectively Blind elements so that they will be impossible to do command and control. This is the same, by the way. The Israelis are the ones who develop this capability. But that'll be, I think, something that's definitely going to happen, from what I've heard. But, you know, you can't tell with Trump what he's going to end up doing. And I think it's also possible that you could start seeing key security leaders or military figures disappearing, getting killed. I don't know that the United States has that capability, but certainly Mossad does. And I also think that we have to watch Pahlavi at this point. Will Pahlavi have a meeting with Trump and will Pavel? Pahlavi has to travel to at least like the border of Iran, and he has to begin kind of a next phase to. So I am here. I'm ready to lead a sort of transition to a democracy. So those are the things that I'm looking for.

[Abe Greenwald]

I think he's going to do something that lights something up. I think there's already going to be cyber stuff going on as and as. As in terms of taking credit for it. This is the only quibble I have with your, with the scale of that being 10, is that if the regime falls, he's going to take credit for it after the fact, which is, you know, I think he's going to say, you know, remember when I did this? But I also think I am expecting some kind of nod to a specific opposition figure, probably Palavi. I don't know if he's going to get an Oval Office meeting, but is this is the sort of thing that. That I would think Trump is probably pretty close to tweeting about on Truth Social, which is enough, you know, practically as good as a White House meeting for something like this. I think he's going to start getting more specific and start saying, you know, so and so could really do a much better job of this, and maybe it's time that we. That the people give him a chance or something like that. I think you'll hear that soon.

[Seth Mandel]

I agree with my, both my wise friends and colleagues here. I think a six on the overall scale, and I agree with Seth that it's going to be something visual, something that Trump views as spectacular. What I'd like to see is the US and or Israel take advantage of this moment to hit the ballistic missile program. Actually, I don't know if that'll happen, but if he's going to blow something up, that's a good thing to blow up.

[John Bodhoritz]

Okay, so I'm going to go with an 8. And I'm going to say that the one thing about the eight as opposed to the six, I think if it's a six or a five, the real question here is what, what are the knock ons if the regime is not totally taken out? Will there be a second strike? And will, is Israel at risk from remaining Iranian ballistic missiles? Because remember, an Iranian ballistic missile fired at Israel, that's, that's seven minutes. I think something like that, like there is no, there is no defense against an Iranian ballistic missile if it's launched, can't be taken down in time unless we're watching and can do it from the air while all this is going on. So there could be major consequences from the 8 or the 8 forestalls the major consequence because one of the things we've learned in the last couple years is there's always a lot of bluster about how Israel is going to fall and collapse and be cratered and destroyed. And there's a lot of paper tigering going on from the axis of Iranian evil or very, very, what you call impotent efforts at second striking or doing something in response. And maybe they're as hollow as you can possibly imagine. And they got other things to do other than just, oh, what the hell, we'll launch some ballistic missiles in Iraq. They're like trying desperately trying to get out of the country. They're not really going to bother with, you know, pulling the trigger there or something like that. But, but those are the. I think it's going to be bigger than you guys think. And I think either. But the thing I don't understand is where the consequences outside are going to be way larger or way smaller. I would probably lean toward the way smaller that they basically, it's like, well, we're, we're done. Like, that's it. You know, we got, we got nothing left in the, you know, we got no arrows left in the quiver. Or they do the Macbeth at the end of macbeth, which is, all right, I'm dead anyway, so I'm going to try to kill as many people as I can on my way out.

[Abe Greenwald]

But, well, I mean, you know, he's, I think part of that is that the, you know, Bibi came to D.C. recently and Trump basically told him it looks like the Lebanese have missed the deadline for disarming Hezbollah. Maybe you should go in and, you know, bomb Hezbollah's head off again or something like that. I think that that was an indication that, that what you'll see is the Israelis prepped and ready for whatever, you know, for whatever aftershocks may happen in the region, you know, whatever sort of last, you know, you know, death rattle type stuff might be going on. I think that's what they're preparing Israel for, and that's what Israel's role would be in this, is to, you know, make sure to be ready to pounce on and weaken anything that happens so that there aren't, you know, mobs running at U. S. Embassies or, you know, there's no Benghazi type thing. And there's also no, like, rekindled war that you could call, you know, a new war that, that he's able to say, we did this. It did not start a war. There were no, you know, basic things, basically, like what he did when he moved the embassy to Jerusalem. And then he said, see, there was no intifada, There was no fire in the streets.

[Eli Lake]

Can I. Can I add one more lightning ring question I think is relevant? And then we should go, but if this is successful or it doesn't lead to immediate catastrophe, what then happens to the sort of JD Vance block in both the influencer space? I mean, great timing, Megyn Kelly. And what happens to the broader kind of foreign policy elite establishment that has been telling us the same zombie mantra now for 20 years, that this regime's going nowhere and we have to cut a deal with them and so forth. Is there a moment where there's a discrediting kind of tipping point, or will people sort of say, no, bad things are coming and we're going to double down and so forth, will everybody just forget about it?

[Seth Mandel]

Vance gets on board retroactively and the podcasters go on saying this was all a ruse for Israel.

[John Bodhoritz]

I think that's probably right. I think the question of whether or not if this happens in tandem with Venezuela and if these don't turn into debacles over. Over time, in other words, like, if it doesn't look nine months from now, like, oh, my God, look, we did in Venezuela. We were so irresponsible. We did this and then we didn't have a plan and everything is a mess and all of that. I think we see a major shift, literally in the entire understanding of how foreign policy works on the planet for the rest of the century. That happens without a moment. There is no moment. It's more like all of the terms change over time and the people who were the expostulants of the prior view kind of dissipate and go and work at investment banks and stop speaking about this over time, and the podcasters continued just to attack Israel and go and get more and more and Jews in the United States and get more and more anti Semitic. And then they're existing in their own little bubble with their own audience. And yeah, Vance and others have to, because of the violence of their rhetoric, have to separate themselves, even if they don't really want to. Vance's notion that his future is built on using them as his sort of like, base of operations is no longer.

[Abe Greenwald]

Operative, which, which gets at a really important aspect of all these foreign policy things. If they, that have worked so far and if they continue to work on a large scale, which is, you know, they've basically cured the patient of Iraq syndrome, you know, it's, it's, it's going to become, if Iran goes the way we're talking about it going, it officially becomes impossible to throw Iraq in the faces of everybody who suggests some sort of foreign intervention. You know, you will, by then you will have had the strikes with, you know, no war and no American fatalities on Iran's nuclear program. You will have had the Venezuela stuff, the getting Maduro with no American casualties and no troops left on the ground. Besides, you know, those we assume are, you know, were there ahead of time or whatever, stuff like that. If Iran fall and you had same thing with Hezbollah and Lebanon, all this stuff. I mean, I basically think we're there, honestly. But Trump has done so many new things that have not resulted in that, that if something really huge happened like the fall of the Iranian regime without regional war and without, you know, an American occupation, that's the, that that's the end of, of Iraq syndrome, I think, you know, once and for all, which would be very.

[Eli Lake]

I would point out that after the Maduro operation, Megyn Kelly's guest was Aaron Mate of Gray Zone, which might as well be a PR agency for the Maduro regime. So that's not going to look great. I'm just saying doesn't look great now. I don't know how that's going to go. And I like, I often find myself if I know about the American. Right. I think Eliana made this point last week. Snatching a dictator, you know, that hates America in a flawless operation. Usually people on the right think that's pretty cool. So, you know, good luck to you.

[John Bodhoritz]

Eli Lake, always a pleasure. Stay tuned this week for the republication of Eli's Breaking History two part podcast on the making of modern Iran, which we heard a bit of in Chrysalis here. And you can get the full what is it that if something's in chrysalis in full bloom.

[Eli Lake]

Yeah. You'll get the butterfly.

[John Bodhoritz]

The butterfly. Right.

[Seth Mandel]

Okay.

[John Bodhoritz]

And we will be. We will be floating back into your ken tomorrow. So for Seth and Abe, I'm John Pothor. It's Keep the candle Burning, Sam.