Multipolar Disorder

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Commentary Magazine Podcast

Episode: Multipolar Disorder

Date: June 9, 2026
Host: Jon Podhoretz
Guests: Seth Mandel, Eliana Johnson, Jonathan Schanzer

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Brief Overview

In this episode, the Commentary team unpacks a “multipolar” and chaotic Middle East following an Israeli-Iranian military flare-up and the broader strategic implications for the United States and its allies. The discussion then pivots to the complex politics surrounding both the U.S. and Israeli responses, the maneuvering of Gulf States, the outsized influence of Qatar, and the continuing American debate over ends, means, and regime change. The last segment turns domestic, reviewing the controversy over Maine Democratic candidate Graham Platner’s attacks on fellow veterans and the campaign’s turmoil.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Chaotic Developments in the Middle East

Major Players: Iran, Israel, U.S., Hezbollah, Gulf States
Summary:

• Recent escalation: Iran fires ballistic missiles at Israel, which are intercepted. Israel responds with precision strikes in Iran.
• Reports (unconfirmed) circulate about the Iranian leadership suffering casualties, possibly decapitating the regime’s command.
• Trump initially urges Israeli restraint, then relents after discussions with Netanyahu. The U.S. continues negotiations with Iran while Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Notable Quote:

“We might have decapitated the Iranian, or Israel might have decapitated the Iranian regime. Again, Trump doesn’t want to fight. Israel fought, did good things. What message are we going to take from this? What the hell is going on?”
— Jon Podhoretz [02:00]

[03:11]–[08:57]

Jonathan Schanzer’s Analysis:

• Iran tries to expand the conflict to Lebanon, using Hezbollah.
• Israel targets meaningful locations in Iran, after weeks building a “target bank.”
• Trump’s initial instinct was to avoid escalation for the sake of negotiations; Netanyahu insists on military action, and Trump acquiesces.
• Key takeaway: Israel asserts that Iranian involvement in Lebanon will not be tolerated.
• Israel’s assertiveness gives the U.S. more leverage in negotiations, as Iran appears weakened and isolated.

Memorable/Quotable:

“The message to the Islamic Republic is what happens in Lebanon stays in Lebanon. Iran doesn’t get a vote.”
— Jonathan Schanzer [07:43]

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2. Evaluating the Prospects for a U.S.-Iran “Deal”

[08:59]–[13:00]

• Discussion on what leverage over Iran actually means in substance—what would a “good” deal look like? Skepticism dominates.
• Neither side truly believes there are conditions for a meaningful, enforceable agreement given Iran’s rogue status.

Seth Mandel:

“To me, it’s always appeared that there is no deal on the table and never will be that would be palatable to the situation.” [09:29]

Schanzer on U.S. Diplomacy:

• Economic pressure and Israeli attacks weaken Iran’s position.
• Israel’s military responses hand Trump “a victory” and more negotiating leverage.
• Concerns: Iran might reactivate Houthi proxies in Yemen, complicating matters in the Red Sea.

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3. U.S.-Israel Tensions & The MAGA Policy Divide

[14:00]–[23:05]

• J.D. Vance’s statement (echoed by Trump) that U.S. and Israeli interests may diverge is examined, with some suggesting this is performative or signals a “restrainer” faction wishing for public distance between the countries.
• The panel notes historically, such disagreements were handled quietly; now, there’s a political appetite for making them public, perhaps out of a desire to “show Israel who’s boss”—a stance the hosts view skeptically.

Notable Quote:

“‘There are cases in which the interests of Israel and the US diverge. We can achieve a long-term nuclear deal with Iran. Israel may not like it.’ ... If there is a good deal to be had, of course Israel would like it ... The issue is whether there can be a good deal because you’re talking about who your negotiating partner is.”
— Jon Podhoretz [18:08]

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4. The Strait of Hormuz and Energy Geopolitics

[23:05]–[63:34]

The Missed Anticipation of Hormuz Closure

• Debate over why U.S./Israel did not preemptively address the risk of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital for global oil exports.
• Trump’s gamble was that Iran wouldn’t dare, or that the regime would collapse first— a risky assumption.
• U.S. and Israeli planners should have known (and probably did) this was Iran’s ace in the hole.

On Regime Change vs. Making a Deal

• The consensus is that regime change in Iran should be the underlying U.S. objective, despite its political unpopularity in Washington post-Iraq/Afghanistan.
• Economic and military attrition, not boots on the ground, is viewed as the pathway.

Jonathan Schanzer:

“You can do regime change without putting boots on the ground and wasting blood and treasure and all that stuff. This would be the way to do it. Say it out loud.” [67:03]

The Erosion of the Strait’s Importance

• The panel highlights how Gulf States are fast-building alternative oil pipelines to bypass the Strait—a form of “reverse canal” system—reducing its strategic leverage for Iran in the near future.
• This is a striking example of supply chain adaptation and the power of market incentives.

Seth Mandel:

“The Strait of Hormuz will never be this valuable again.” [61:32]

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5. Foreign Influence & Qatari Money in the U.S.

[34:46]–[40:05]

• The discussion pivots to the financial and soft power influence of Gulf states (especially Qatar) on U.S. politics, business, and policy.
• Concerns about “state capture”—where massive foreign investment translates to subtle, pervasive influence across media, lobbying, and even campaign operations.

Jonathan Schanzer:

“Texas is just awash in Qatari dollars... What are we doing to actually get a handle on this? Are we bought? Are we a charity?” [38:54]

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6. Israeli Politics: War and the Coming Election

[40:05]–[44:47]

• Israel’s response to Iranian provocation is now political doctrine, as a result of previous conflicts where inaction proved costly.
• The intricacies of Israeli coalition politics make the November election difficult for outsiders to follow, but universal consensus inside Israel is that any major attack (like Iranian missiles) must be answered forcefully.
• Netanyahu’s right-flank opposition is using U.S. influence on Israeli military decisions as a campaign cudgel.

Seth Mandel:

“On that note...people like Yair Lapid saying, you know, elect us so that a country 6,000 miles away isn’t the one telling us what to do and how to defend ourselves.” [42:58]

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7. Domestic Segment: The Graham Platner Scandal

[67:46]–[78:23]

• Eliana Johnson details the unraveling of Maine Democratic candidate Graham Platner’s campaign following revelations of his online smears of decorated fellow veterans, his Nazi tattoo, and allegations of misogynistic behavior.
• Platner’s anti-military rhetoric (including wishing death on a fellow veteran) and poor vetting by left-wing operatives has become a broader scandal.
• The hosts remark on the absence of any “character defense” from Platner’s military peers, a stark silence in such controversies.
• Discussion includes the hostile takeover of local campaigns by national leftist operatives, alienating locals and mainstream voters.

Notable Quote:

“We haven’t heard defenses of Platner from zero military buddies. That strikes me as telling ... You would normally, wouldn’t you normally be able to come back with buddies you served with who were like, this guy is the guy I want with me when we’re under fire and we’re not seeing [that].”
— Seth Mandel [71:07]

Further Quote:

“These are the cast of characters behind the Platner campaign. They are the Democratic Socialists of America who have handpicked...all of the lunatics who are dragging the Democratic Party into the anti-Semitic ditch.”
— Eliana Johnson [77:01]

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Timestamps for Major Segments

• Middle East Escalation & Trump/Bibi Responses: [02:00]–[13:00]
• U.S.-Israel Tensions (J.D. Vance, MAGA Divide): [14:00]–[23:05]
• Iranian Leverage, Strait of Hormuz, and Regime Change: [23:05]–[67:13]
• Qatari Influence in U.S. Politics: [34:46]–[40:05]
• Israeli Coalition Politics & Doctrine: [40:05]–[44:47]
• Graham Platner Campaign Scandal: [67:46]–[78:23]

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Tone and Style

• Candid and Wry: The conversation regularly features biting humor and self-awareness, especially in critiquing both U.S. and Israeli political classes.
• Skeptical and Policy-Focused: All panelists express deep skepticism about the value and enforceability of a U.S.-Iran deal, and are notably hawkish about the goal of regime change in Iran.
• Insider-Yet-Accessible: While much of the discussion assumes policy familiarity (e.g., “target bank”, “pipeline bypass”), explanations are provided for big-picture developments.

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Memorable Quotes

1. On the Meaning of Leverage:
   “We don’t know what we have leverage for, exactly. Can you get into that a bit?”
   — Seth Mandel [09:20]

2. On Israel’s Message to Iran:
   “What happens in Lebanon stays in Lebanon. Iran doesn’t get a vote.”
   — Jonathan Schanzer [07:43]

3. On Regime Change:
   “This would be the way to do it. Say it out loud ... Just gotta say the quiet part out loud.”
   — Jonathan Schanzer [67:13]

4. On Campaign Decay:
   “We haven’t heard defenses of Platner from zero military buddies. That strikes me as telling.”
   — Seth Mandel [71:07]

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Takeaways

• The intersection of military action, diplomatic posturing, and domestic politics makes the U.S.-Iran-Israel dynamic exceedingly fluid.
• Despite public calls for “deals,” all parties (and especially these commentators) anticipate continuing instability—citing Iran’s unreliability and the need for uncompromising strategy.
• Foreign financial interference, notably from Qatar, is seen as a major, underappreciated problem in U.S. policy and culture.
• On Israel, responding to aggression is deeply embedded in both policy and political survival, regardless of whomever is in power.
• The Platner episode is a case study in the perils of ideological “outsider” candidacies and the nationalization of local politics.
• The hosts close with a sense of foreboding—but also with (unusual) optimism that shifting market forces are eroding the global leverage of malign actors.

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This episode offers a rich, behind-the-scenes look at the complex, multipolar challenges currently facing American and Israeli leaders, the hazards of short-term diplomacy, and the baggage of recent U.S. foreign policy history—all leavened with Commentary’s characteristic wit and candor.

Transcript

[A]

Hope for the best, expect the worst Some drinks champagne Some die at first

[B]

no way of knowing which way it's

[C]

going Hope for the best, expect the worst, hope for the best.

[B]

Welcome to the Commentary Magazine daily podcast. Today is Tuesday, June 9, 2026. I am Jon Bud Horiz, the editor of Commentary. Extending to our invitation, first time readers, first time subscribers. Go to commentary.org offer and you can subscribe to commentary, commentary.org and the commentary archives for $19.95 a year. That's $19.95 a year savings of 80%. We have had just an avalanche of orders since I began talking about this last week. Join the throng. It's exciting. You're never gonna get an offer like this again. Commentary.org/offer. And we are excited today to discuss our bipolar reaction to yesterday's news with senior editor Seth Mandel. Hi, Seth.

[D]

Hi, John.

[B]

Washington, Free Beacon editor Eliana Johnson. Hi, Eliana.

[E]

Hi, John.

[B]

And our contributing editor, Pooh Bah at the foundation for Defense of Democracies and expert on all things not bipolar, but multipolar when it comes to the Middle East, Jonathan Schanzer. Hi, Jon.

[C]

Hi, Jon.

[B]

So, Jonathan Schanzer, what the hell is going on? I'm just gonna mention three things. Iran flings ballistic missiles at Israel. Israel shoots him down 10 of them. TRUMP says, publicly, I'm telling Bibi not to retaliate. Israel retaliates with what appear to be phenomenally effective, very pinpoint targeted strikes on various locations in Iran, which we will talk about. Then Trump doesn't say anything. Then JD Vance says, I just don't think people understand how close we are to a deal. Trump says, we're so close. We're so close to a deal. Boy, what a deal it's going to be. It's going to be a great deal. Meanwhile, reports start coming out that maybe the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Vahedi, was killed in those strikes. And another report, which seems to be unsubstantiated, that the Iranian regime or the Iranian leadership has lost touch with the Ayatollah Moshtabah Khamenei, meaning implicitly that he too, might have been killed in these strikes. So we have a phenomenal deal coming up. We are just phenomenal. Meanwhile, we might have decapitated the Iranian or Israel might have decapitated the Iranian regime. Again, Trump doesn't want to fight. Israel fought, did good things. What message are we going to take from this? What the hell is going on?

[C]

Okay, so I mean, I think first order of business is the Islamic Republic has been trying to tie Lebanon to the ongoing negotiations about a possible deal relating to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the end of conflict. You may recall that the Lebanese government rejected this, the Israeli government rejected this. And then we began to have these ongoing discussions at the State Department, presided over by National Security advisor, slash Secretary of State, slash, I don't know, five other jobs, Marco Rubio. Um, and it was going, it still is going pretty well. And it, I think, was a positive that we were keeping the Iranians out of this. Now then you have this escalation by Hezbollah. They start firing what we, what we call FPV drones, these first person view drones, some that are attached to fiber optic cable, which means that the Israelis can't jam them, can't, can't deny them. And so they started actually doing some real damage to IDF soldiers, Killing soldiers, killing civilians, you know, doing damage. And, and the rockets too. Right. So the Israelis, after a while, they

[A]

just had enough and they start really taking it to Hezbollah. They attack Hezbollah in their stronghold of Dahia in the southern suburbs of Beirut, hit some sort of command and control center and maybe some other important assets.

[C]

That's where the Iranians say, no, we told you that Lebanon was part of our ceasefire deal. And so we're angry and we're now going to try to exert some influence and pressure on Israel for this attack. And that's when they fire the missiles. Now, the Israelis immediately, you know, are, you know, they, they put refueling tankers in the air. That was like, I mean, that happened within minutes of the strikes. In other words, they were preparing for an attack. Then Donald Trump gets, I guess, first on the phone with Barack Ravid, who I still don't understand how this guy from Axios continues to get access to the President. It, it, it boggles my mind. But nevertheless, he, his message immediately was, Donald Trump says, you know, Bibi has to stand down. I don't know exactly what happens there, but, you know, and then Trump, by the way, goes out and says it publicly that Israel is not allowed to attack. There is a conversation that ensues between Bibi and Trump. I don't know exactly what happens there, but apparently Bibi prevails and is authorized, or at least Trump agrees to the idea of a limited strike. 15 different targets. And as you noted, John, there could

[A]

be some serious damage done to the,

[C]

whatever's left of the rump regime in the Islamic Republic.

[A]

They hit targets in Isfahan and in Kharg island and in Tehran. And you know, I will just say here, the Israelis had a couple of months to prepare their target bank, meaning these were going to be meaningful targets.

[C]

And we don't know everything that got hit. But, you know, I'm going to assume that everyone had meaning and everyone was painful to the regime. And I'm hoping that Vahidi and Mojtaba, you know, Mojitaba may no longer be a cardboard effigy, but could just be toast, which would be, I think, good news. But so the message is, and, oh, and then just to finish off the episode, the Israelis attack, the Iranians say, we're done. Our, our, our response to Israeli aggression in air quotes is over. And then the Israelis, promptly afterwards, begin striking Lebanon again, which they have done over the last 24 hours against targets across Lebanon, hitting Hezbollah. If you ask me if I'm giving grades out from this episode, Trump, I gotta say, initially probably failed. I would probably give him an F for his initial response. I give him now a B plus for coming around. But, you know, he had to. I'm not giving him full credit for this because he was a reluctant participant and he didn't understand that by telling Israel to stand down, it was essentially telling the entire region that, hey, I want a deal more than I want your security. I, I want to deal more than I want to stop Iran from projecting power all over the region and terrorizing the Middle East. Bibi prevails, launches these attacks. They're effective. And the key takeaway, which I got to say, I'm pretty happy, I mean, so Bibi gets like an A plus for this. The message to the Islamic Republic is what happens in Lebanon stays in Lebanon. Iran doesn't get a vote. And right now the Islamic Republic appears to be chastened. They're not responding to Israeli strikes. In other words, it looks like for now, that the Israelis have carved out

[A]

a space, so they continue to take it to Hezbollah even as Trump continues to negotiate with the Islamic Republic. I think this is giving Trump leverage. I think the more that the Islamic Republic, I mean, as their leaders get whacked, as the economy continues to just contract because of our economic campaign and as Israel takes it to those proxies, Iran just looks weak across the board. I like where we are,

[B]

Seth.

[D]

I mean, that's very upbeat, Jonathan. I appreciate that. I don't know how to follow that, cuz I try to be upbeat, but that's, that's reversing. I don't want to reverse roles just for the sake of reversing. Roles. So, but I mean, what, what is the thing that gets me is this the idea of this deal.

[C]

Right.

[D]

J.D. vance is really excited about a deal and we're talking about leverage, having leverage over the Iranians.

[E]

What.

[D]

To me, it's always appeared that there is no deal on the table and never will be that would be palatable to the situation, which is that the United States is the world's superpower and Iran is a rogue state that needs to be dealt with and set aside and go sit in the corner, you know, with a, with a cone shaped hat on. So what kind of. To me, it's always seemed there's no deal that would recognize that imbalance that both sides would agree to. So my, my, the, my remaining nerves on this are that I'm not sure what we have leverage for exactly. Like in. Can, can you get into that a bit?

[E]

We're.

[D]

If we're building leverage, what is it? What kind of deal could possibly not make us slap our foreheads at the end of this?

[C]

Well, that is, Look, I mean, I think you're right to point this out, and I think that is an important question that we don't know how to answer because that is pretty much all in the head of Donald Trump and maybe J.D. vance and I guess Marco Rubio and certainly Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner and a handful of others. The question is, do we continue this pressure campaign, economic pressure primarily, although augmented now with, you know, maybe occasional Israeli strikes and maybe some covert action that helps the people of Iran begin to rise up or at least to organize again? Are we trying to bring down the regime? Are we trying to just get them to capitulate on all of the things that we want them to capitulate on, or are we doing JCPOA 2.0? And I do think that there is a legitimate question out there that we can't answer at the moment. I mean, we could be heading down the road for another agreement. And an agreement with the Islamic Republic is not worth the paper that it's printed on, if there's even paper involved. Right. It could just be some sort of like, we all declare and everything's okay and nobody signs anything.

[D]

In which case Israel might have, might have struck their paper factories, from what I understand.

[C]

Right, right, yeah. Delivering a debilitating blow to their defense industrial paper base. But yeah, I mean, you know, I think the big question of diplomacy and whether there's even, you know, I mean, is it futile and should we be doing this or should we just be trying to Deliver that death knell to the Islamic Republic. And here again, I just gotta, I've gotta reinforce this.

[A]

The Israelis continue to give America leverage. And after last week and the apparent spat between Bibi and Trump and all the talk, I mean, all the reporters that I talked to yesterday were everybody sort of spun up on this idea that Bibi snubbed Trump, that Bibi, like, you know, it was like a backhanded slap at the president. And look at the tension. I gotta say, there may have been tension for a few minutes, but what the Israelis did is they handed Trump a victory. They gave him more leverage right now to weaken the regime when the regime

[C]

is in worse shape. This is a good thing for the United States as we're trying to open up the Strait of Hormuz. I gotta say again, like, you know, from a, at least from where we are now, I'm very pleased. Now, I, I take your point that down the road we could be very unhappy again. And I'm not telling you that everything's going to be awesome with these negotiations. But what I will tell you is when we look at this round of fighting, this one day round, I think Israel emerged looking really strong and it has freedom of action around the region. And the United States has benefited from this. I will say if there's any one concern, it's that the Houthis may be reactivating out of Yemen. And I don't like that. That would be the Islamic Republic saying, okay, well, we're not going to do this anymore. We learned how dumb that was. So now we're going to fight to the last Arab again and we're going to, you know, activate our Yemeni useful idiots, which, you know, I do think that that could be what's going on here and that that could create new problems for us in the Red Sea. But not yet. Not yet.

[B]

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[E]

But nonetheless, yeah, I think there are two aspects to what he said. First, if the interests of Israel and the US Diverge, well, in whose estimation do they diverge? There are a lot of different points of view on that. There's no objective perspective on that. And then if they do diverge, where are those divergences hashed out or discussed? Are they hashed out in public before the American people, or are they hashed out in private? I mean, John, you and I have many friends who have worked in administrations who have had heated disagreements with the Israelis that have been hashed out in back rooms. But I think we all know that with close allies with whom we fight wars alongside, you know, this goes back decades, centuries. We know about the frictions between presidents and prime ministers, between military generals in the US and the UK These things are typically hashed out behind closed doors. We try not to advertise them. And I think there is a faction of the right, what we're really talking about here, that wants to publicize these things and have a public break between the US And Israel and in the. What really is a historically close alliance and historically close alliance that this war made. You know, we've never fought a war with Israel like the one that we just did. So to me, it's really a question of where these discussions are had because of course, we're going to have divergences of opinion with the Israelis, who are a difficult people. You know, we, the Jews, the Israelis, we're a difficult people with, with lots of different opinions. So I think those are, you know, to me, the, the big questions here.

[C]

Can I just add one other wrinkle to all of this? I mean, there's the J.D. vance statement. There was actually the statement by Donald Trump himself saying, you know, I call the shots. And, you know, and, and it was a clear assertion of, you know, the American dominant position, which again, to John's point, I don't think anybody. Questions. Right.

[E]

And can I just say, when you're, when you're saying some, something like that, you're saying it from a point of weakness. And of course, it happened at a point when Bibi then went and did something Trump didn't want, you know, or

[C]

maybe he didn't want, and then he was, he was convinced to. But right thing. And Eliana, I'd love to get your, your take on this and obviously Seth and John, but, you know, there was that report that came out, I guess it was yesterday or maybe it was on Sunday that the US Intelligence community assesses that the Israelis are now snooping on.

[E]

Yeah, we talked about it yesterday.

[C]

Yeah, and, and this is part of that bigger picture. Right. These are deliberate leaks designed to further weaken and inject tension into the US

[E]

Israel and I think to underscore the point that, oh, the interests diverge, they're not allies, they're adversaries and so on.

[B]

Well, okay, so where we are now is that effectively there's never been a ceasefire, but there was a systematic idea that there weren't going to be active exchanges, country to country, direct active exchanges. There would be little hints of things, and pretty much Iran was going to, if it was going to be active, it was going to go use little drones. It was going to go across the Gulf and not toward Israel. It engaged one of the two actual adversaries in this fight and it got its hat handed to it. First of all, the missile strikes were unsuccessful, did no damage, and in response, a lot of damage was done. So in the battle of June 7th, the Iranians lost the battle of June 7th. Now maybe on June 8th, maybe on June 10th, they'll do it again and a missile will get through or something like that. But we have clear evidence that this two month ceasefire, right, which was from or month ceasefire, I can't even remember what dates, anything, month ceasefire ended with the Iranians losing. Like losing losing the let's go active again. So it not only gives Trump leverage, I think it suggests that yet again where we are in the United States is that we are negotiating with ourselves. It's clear that we can probably act as we did through the first phases of this war with impunity. It's just a question of what it is that we're willing to do and whether we have not the will, but whether or not the general idea of restraining ourselves at the secondary and tertiary target level to things that aren't necessarily military, but would even more ravage the economy and even more throw them on their back foot and maybe even more threatening whatever possibility they have of fantasizing that they can reconstitute both their missile construction program and their nuclear program, that we can do that simply by flicking a switch. All what we don't know is how our, our level of munitions and we don't know what inside the administration people are saying about what it would mean to hit oil installations, to hit the export, you know, places on Kharg island and to hit dual use infrastructure inside Iran that would make life difficult for the Iranian people and that we still seem to be operating on the idea that we want to make it possible for the post Iranian, the post Iran Iranians to get back to living whatever we think is normal life for them. And it's like the Rubicon has to be crossed where Trump says to himself, there's nothing to preserve, there's nothing to save, there's nothing that's worth our saving. We need to show the world that we started this war and we're going to win it and we need to take the steps necessary to win it. And we sort of know what those are and we're choosing not to do it. It's not because we're afraid of Iran. We're not afraid of Iran, we're afraid of us. And that's a very weird place to be, it seems to me.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, it is weird. Although, I mean, I have to say a couple of thoughts in response. One is, I still think that if Trump is patient, and we all know that is his greatest attribute, but if he's patient, I think there is a world in which the Iranian economy collapses in not a lot of time. And what I mean by that is in a few weeks, a few months, which is not a lot of time, relatively speaking. I think the problem up until now is that everybody keeps demanding like, well, we're a superpower and we should just win this thing, and it should happen with bunch of big booms and explosions and we bomb them, and then they somehow raised the white flag. I think this will be a process, not an event. I think that you're going to see the unraveling of the Islamic Republic economically, already, militarily, it's severely degraded. Politically, I think, you know, it's in really bad shape. And now with the top leaders maybe, again, having been taken off the board, you know, we're going to still see further deterioration, and, and that, that this could be, I mean, this could be Trump's finest hour. I mean, it could be actually stretched into multiple hours. But it's not a bad way to end this thing without expending additional munitions and without having to put American troops in harm's way. Just keep, you know, just, you know, run the course here. The, the other thing that I, I, this is just sort of an update on the munitions thing. I know we talked about it last week. My understanding is that it's not the offensive munitions that are the problem. It's, it's about, you know, when you have thousands of drones and missiles that are hitting the surrounding Gulf states, that's the concern, because they're finite.

[A]

Right.

[C]

And there's just only so much of that we're willing to continue to deploy. That, I think, is actually the greatest problem for the US Right now. As, you know, we call ourselves the arsenal of democracies, which is interesting, because we're actually not defending democracies here.

[A]

We're defending, you know, autocratic dictatorships across the Gulf. But they're important for us because they provide oil and we need to keep them safe. But I think that is really the primary concern. But so if you can keep the fighting to a minimum and just continue to SAP the economic, political, and military power of the Islamic Republic by not doing much, it's sort of like the more they struggle, the more they, they lose power and that should be, I think. I mean, and I know Trump doesn't love to articulate plans. He doesn't like to put it out there like here's the Trump Doctrine or the Trump policy. But I think de facto, that's what this is. He just doesn't want to say it.

[B]

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[C]

Do we have to?

[D]

Do we have to? How much do we have to Listen to the Gulf states for, like, we've talked about what Israel has to do and the patience Trump has to have. But how much influence over the course of events do the Saudis have and others, you know, in the Gulf? I mean, we saw last time, we saw how the Saudis in Kuwait said, if you're not really going to defend us, then you can't continue this war. And so is it, is it even really about Trump and Bibi, or is it about mbs? Like, he's the guy that goes unnamed in so many conversations here. But should we worry about having our hands tied by the Gulf states? Should we worry about their lack of nerve and their getting tired of this and maybe the, you know, the, the Arab street poking its head out and saying, what are we doing here? That' sort of thing.

[C]

I don't know if I'm worried about the Arab street, but I, I will say, and I, I think you put your finger on this. Look, Trump is listening to a lot of different people right now. He's got, you know, this sort of the isolationists, you know, in, in one ear, and he's got the, you know, the interventionists in the other. He's got the Israelis in one ear, and he's got the Gulf states in the other. I think the Gulf states are the ones that, like, I mean, I think they're vacillating. I think they continue to lose their nerve. I think Trump is trying to figure out, you know, look, he's thinking about legacy, but he's thinking about his presidential library. He's thinking about a bunch of different things right now. And I think the Golfies are important players for him. And if they're nervous, and they are nervous, they were born nervous, they are a skittish bunch and they don't have a policy. They're trying to survive knowing that they're weak. And so they continue to sort of flit about without any clear guidance for the president. Now, I do wonder, after yesterday where they're like, oh, you know what? You just stood up for the region. You're not allowing Iran to project power all over the Levant and beyond. So, hey, good work. Keep it up. And this could be like the one or two days where they're happy, but in another couple of days, I would not be surprised if MBS is like, you know what? I don't like this anymore. You need to end the war. And I don't care what the terms are. And I think that's what Trump is. Those are the kind of mixed signals that he's getting from here, from there, by the way. It does, you know, don't even get us started on Europe. He's getting a lot of voices telling him, shut it down.

[B]

Okay. But, you know, this is where we have to talk about the most uncomfortable aspect of what's going on here, which is what are the incentives to continue or to end the war that aren't just that Trump doesn't want to wreak more devastation on Iran and look bad and look mean or whatever it is that is going on there that has stayed his hand or the fear of oil prices or whatever. But are there things going on with this administration which has been behaving in ways towards certain nations in a way that not since the early 20th century or something like that, as an American administration or American politicians been so conscious of representing the business interests of other players as they seem to be now, and the economic interests of the President's family and of the families of some of his cabinet members and negotiators. And that's where, that's where we start getting uncomfortable that there are exogenous factors that have nothing to do with policy, nothing to do with whether or not the Saudis are worried that they are being put in a bad strategic position, but that the gutteris have been spending a lot of money getting a lot of people on their side and that they are calling in their chits and saying do what you can to make sure that this goes the less hawkish way right now. And I don't know how better to say this, that Trump decided to start this war on February 28th. And some of the people who welcomed the war because they would rather not have an Iran than have an Iran got the idea that it wasn't gonna end with Iran, with the IRGC and the Iranian regime disappearing, and that now they would like some kind of a sue for peace moment and that they are talking to their purchased assets in the United States to get that done. Am I being unfair? I don't know how not to raise these questions.

[C]

You have to raise them. And I do think that the foreign influence problem writ large is one that we need to wrestle with. I don't know if you guys saw, we put out a report at FDD last week about how much money the Qataris have spent in the United States over the last 15 years. It turns out, and this is low end estimate, that the Qataris have dropped something like 403, $3 billion in US right across a range of, of, of

[B]

different industries over two, over two decades. Right.

[C]

Over two decades.

[B]

Was that the time frame?

[C]

Yeah, yeah. Most of it was in the last 10 years. You could go back a little bit further, but the lion share was, was, was 10 years. And the, the money spans. I mean, you know, it's defense tech and biotech and real estate, but it also includes, you know, White House correspondence, dinner parties, and the Congressional baseball game and keeping the metro open during the Stanley cup playoffs here in Washington.

[B]

And the plane.

[C]

And the plane. Right. And on and on it goes. It's naked influence buying. Right. And by the way, that number, if you actually hear Trump, if you hear the Qataris, they will tell you, and

[A]

we just couldn't substantiate it with the receipts, but they will say it's $1.2 trillion.

[C]

And so, look, I mean, yes, there's

[A]

a problem with individuals growing wealthy off

[C]

of, you know, investments from, you know,

[A]

from, from Gulf states, but there's also

[C]

just this broader problem.

[A]

I mean, Texas is just awash in Qatari dollars, South Carolina, Florida. And then you ask yourself, you know, will Lindsey Graham, you know, lock horns with the Qataris?

[C]

I don't know. Right.

[A]

These are problems that extend well beyond the Trump administration. John, I think you're right to raise that. You know, the Trump, you know, family stands to gain. I would say that at least there we see some healthy tension where Trump's saying, you know what? I know what the Qataris want, but I have a legacy to think about as President of the United States. I'm more concerned right now about the, like, the bigger picture. $400 billion, let alone $1.2 trillion, is a lot of scratch. What are we doing to actually get a handle on this? Are we bought? Are we a charity? I mean, I don't know if we understand exactly the full extent to which these foreign actors have, you know, tried to engage and maybe are successfully engaging in what we could only call state capture, where our hands are tied because of the amount of money that they have sunk into this country.

[B]

Well, why don't we ask now the political question I was discussing last night at the fifth anniversary of the really wonderful journal Sapir, edited by Bret Stephens, produced by the Maimonides Fund, which I really heartily recommend to everybody to read, to subscribe to. It is a magazine of Jewish ideas about the Jewish future that has a very unusual organization quarterly, because it organizes itself around a single topic like Aspiration. The new issue they have coming out is about how to fix America from a Jewish perspective. Anyway, so there were a bunch of people in the room And a lot of people at the table. And the question was politically, what does this mean? What is going on right now? What does this mean for the coming Israeli elections, which are in four months? And it is one of the most interesting and impossible to follow political stories because people in the United States don't understand the nature of the unbelievably byzantine Israeli electorate, party system, party structure and the way in which a government is cobbled together to get 61 out of 120 seats in the Knesset to get a prime minister installed and then up and running. And I think part of the question which goes to also American interests here is that Abibi not only had to strike because it is now Israeli policy never to not respond, never to fail to respond to aggression, having failed to respond to aggression in 1991 when Saddam Hussein hit Israel with Scuds and George H.W. bush insisted that Israel not respond because we would the United States was taking care of Saddam and that they should just stand down, which then gave them the idea that they could force, over the course of the next couple of years and then followed by the Clinton administration, kind of force Israel into some kind of a deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. So Israel will respond when it is aggressed against, period. And that is like a kind of universal policy inside Israel. There is no there. The, you know, if you ask do, do we need to respond if Iran fires nuclear missiles, that fires missiles at us, the 95% of Israelis would say yes.

[D]

So it's a BB's. Bibi's opposition has been using this against him. In fact, running to his I, I, I it's weird to call from to his right, but in a general, the simplistic sense, running to his right. On the, on that note, and saying people like Yair Lapid saying, you know, elect us so that a country 6,000 miles away isn't the one telling us what to do and how to defend ourselves.

[C]

Right, yeah.

[E]

Sorry. Can I just ask a quick question about a potential deal? Yeah, you want to kick me back on it? Okay.

[B]

No, no, go ahead, John.

[E]

I quick question about a potential deal. Let's say we reach a deal theoretically under which the Iranians open the Strait of Hormuz. What is to stop them from just closing it again? And how are you thinking through that? I guess I'm just thinking about the risks from them emerging from this understanding that they have the leverage to close it without us demonstrating that we can open it by force. And I guess the second scenario I'm thinking through is should we open it? Even if we open it by force, how big an operation is that? And even if we do that, you know, would that deter them again from simply closing it again? And would we be willing to go back and open it again? Should they do it again? I guess I'm, you know, is a deal under which they just agree to open it a satisfactory deal?

[C]

I think it's satisfactory for Donald Trump because it would alleviate some of the financial pressures and the political pressures that he's feeling right now, heading into July 4th, heading into summer months of travel, heading into, I mean, you know, heading into the midterms, I mean, obviously. So all of those things, I think would be welcomed by him. The question about a large scale, sort of can opener approach to the Strait of Hormuz, I think it would be painful. I think you'd see the deployment of troops, which Donald Trump is loath to do. Right. He doesn't want boots on the ground. This is part of his big thing about not getting into long what people have been calling forever wars and losing hundreds or thousands of troops in battles in far flung places. That does not resonate with the American people. Still doesn't. And by the way, I'm sort of okay with that. I think that's baked, that's baked into the calculus right now. But I do think that, let's just say the regime does agree to open the strait under some sort of diplomatic agreement. My guess is that the US has to start planning for another closure at some point. And there, I think what you probably have is the deployment of different military assets, whether they be bases or underwater drones or other things that I don't know how to predict. But in other words, we have contingencies and plans in place for when this happens again and we can respond immediately. So my guess is we probably have a more permanent deployment, not just for the protection of oil assets deep in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, but probably more along the coast with our allies to make sure that if we see movement, if we see aggression, if we see deployment by the Islamic Republic, it can be countered in real time. That's, I think, my best guess right now about how to prevent this in the future. But, Eliana, there is nothing that prevents the Islamic Republic from from deploying a handful of idiots with shoulder fired weapons to take out an oil tanker a

[A]

month after a deal is struck. Spooking insurance and reinsurance companies, spooking all these countries that don't want to risk losing their investments in the oil that they've purchased. And so everybody stands down again and the strait is locked.

[D]

Can I ask a silly sounding question along those exact lines? The other day when Israel struck back, one of the targets was, this was the early Monday morning. One of the targets was a, a drone warehouse, storage facility, something of like in Iran, why don't we blow up all their drones? I know this is like, I know that sounds like a cartoon, but if, if we, the US And Israel have the coordinates and own the skies over Iran and know where this stuff is, why, why wait for a perceived violation of a ceasefire or a crossing of a specific red line? Wouldn't it be good if Iran just didn't have its drones? I mean, is that, is that as silly as it might sound?

[B]

Well, no, it's absolutely not silly. That's why the ceasefire is so inexplicable. That's why Trump's fetishization of the term ceasefire is so inexplicable. He wants there to be a deal. It is his line. And JD Vance mimicking their line, that Iran wants a deal. Iran would like to end this war and Iran really wants a deal. And he is trying to do what he can to facilitate the deal making by taking the pressure off Iran in the way you're talking about with our aggression, to make it clear that we're negotiating in good faith to end this thing.

[C]

Okay, okay, but let me. The counter to that is this. And by the way, I mean, I do think that what you're saying is logical and makes perfect sense and two things. One is there are some targets that I think that, that, you know, the US can hit or the Israelis can hit, and there's some that cannot. Right. These missile cities that are embedded deep inside a mountain, that have thousands of drones, they are impenetrable. What I've heard is that, you know, the Israelis and possibly the United States expended a large amount of munitions trying to penetrate these reinforced, you know, edifices, I guess, and they couldn't, it was just they, they were not able to do the damage that they wanted to. So there are probably hundreds or thousands or, you know, I don't even know, maybe even a 10,000 of these missiles and drones that cannot be touched. At least right now they have to be pulled out in order to be, to get hit or you need boots on the ground. The other thing, and again, this gets back to the munitions problem that I've been, you know, I've been, you know, I really have been trying to get a better grasp of this, but it's not that we can't afford to drop munitions on these things if we see them. And when we identify an opportunity, it's there will be a response and the response will be all over the Gulf. And then we are forced to protect our allies and their oil assets. The Israelis are forced to expend additional ballistic missile interceptors and all of this. I think, look, I'm not saying that we are running on fumes, but I would say that it is always smart to keep more in the tank, not knowing what could be around the corner.

[A]

And I do think that explains some of the tensions here. It may not be, and I do think that there's probably, to John's point, there's sort of a fixation with this idea of getting a deal and that may be driving a lot of this. But I do think that one of the pressures that Trump is feeling is, you know, from, I don't know if it's the comptroller of the Pentagon or it's some guy, the bean counter, that's sitting there looking at the munitions and saying, eh, you know, I don't know about this, like, maybe don't keep expending Thads and Patriots and you know, and all these other expensive and exquisite munitions because, hey, you know, there's the Taiwan thing we talked about and there could be escalation with the Russians on the edge of Europe. And by the way, we don't know if the Iranians are going to, you know, pull out new surprises. And there's other stuff that we're thinking about. I don't know, Cuba. We just need more in the tank. So, you know, take it easy there, potus.

[E]

John, can you talk me out of the view that emerging from this confrontation, war with Iran, understanding that they can open and close the Strait of Hormuz at a moment's notice is extremely bad.

[A]

It's bad.

[C]

But look, they always could. I mean, and I don't think you,

[E]

you think that at the front of this they knew how easily they could do this.

[C]

Yeah, they did.

[E]

Why didn't they do it?

[C]

Well, I mean, like, I think they, they found themselves in such bad shape after that initial wave, that 40 day, you know, pounding that they took. This was their way out. It was asymmetric and it was basically holding the entire world hostage to try to get the war to end because they could not imagine sustaining more of a beating from the United States and Israel. They were getting absolutely shellacked and eviscerated. Right. So they do this. It's their out. Right. It was their weapon of the week that they did this. But if you like, I mean, talk to anybody at the Pentagon, talk to anybody at the Kiria in Israel, and you ask them about the war games that are played. When we talk about, you know, battles with Iran, skirmishes with Iran, full on wars with Iran, it's always the same thing. It either begins with the straight of Hormuz or it ends there. It's been a constant theme. Anybody that studied the possibility of conflict, this is their leverage. This is how they get everyone by the throat all around the world. And you can see it, they've done it. And so they understand that this is. But it's going to come at a cost, right? They are getting more and more isolated, they're getting weaker. And again, this is why I just keep saying, like, let them keep struggling. The more they struggle, the more the noose tightens for them. That knot continues to get tighter for them. They have, I think, less room to maneuver right now. And also, just don't forget, the Arab states now know who they're dealing with. And they have a lot of money that they can deploy to try to undermine this regime for years to come. You got the Europeans as weak and as just flaccid as they've been. I think they understand what's going on. They're losing money, their economies are suffering. They're canceling flights because they don't have jet fuel. They're unhappy. There will be retribution if the Islamic Republic survives. If it survives. Okay, let's go there.

[B]

Let's go there. So I think what we're learning here is that, remember what wasn't the policy of this war, regime change. That was not the policy of this war. This entire war and the way it's been conducted makes no sense. If Trump and Bibi. But Trump most plainly did not actually think that what happened on February 28 and what was going to happen in the week subsequent to February 28th was not going to lead to regime change. I think we see the weakness in the war planning strategy that in fact, what Trump thought was, they're a house of cards. I'm going to knock those cards over. I will do it with the bombing and Israel, and we will do it with the decapitation of the regime. And they will say, uncle, which either constitutes regime change, which he had hinted about. In other words, the entire goals, aims, framework, ideology of the Islamic Republic would be supplanted by the fact that we had put them in a box and they cried uncle and said, we know we can't ever do this anymore, or that the events of December and January in Iran would lead to a popular uprising and take down the regime. And that all of this and the reason that they didn't, that the war planners understand that in a situation which you don't factor something like that in, Hormuz will inevitably be used as a weapon by the Iranians. So since that didn't deter Trump from making the decision to go, he thought they would never get there. He thought either they would never get there or. And this is also an important point, because it gets to the whole geopolitical thing that you're talking about, or that the entire world would say, you can't do this, and the Europeans would send ships over and others would participate in an international effort to keep the Strait of Hormuz open because it's more important to them in a weird way than it is to us. And he did not anticipate, or we did not anticipate, just how either weak they are or how little they would be willing to participate in any effort that the United States made to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. And so playing the game of not saying you're going for regime change ended up being the net loser geopolitically, that either he should have said it and made it clear to the Iranian people that it was coming and let them prepare to do some street action or whatever, or use the Kurds as Israel wanted them to, to tie up the army to create other kinds of pressures on the regime or whatever. But I think he got seduced by what happened with Delsey Rodriguez in Venezuela and that he got seduced by the idea that all of this could be resolved without us having to put a single boot on the ground, unlike any other event in the history of the world that involved defeating another nation in an active shooting war.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I think a few things, you know, hindsight, 20 20, the whole thing, I think there were mistakes. Big mistake. Number one, don't pick a fight with Europe on the evil of a war with Iran. Right. Like, if you actually want them to come and help, then maybe don't start talking about just, you know, conquering Greenland and pissing off all of Europe. That was not the good like that. That was not the prelude to an alliance that would come to your rescue if we found ourselves in hot water. I mean, I think that's number one. Number two, how did we not fix the Strait of Hormuz problem up front? Incidentally, I don't know if you saw, but the French and the Brits are saying that they've now volunteered to clear the mines from the Strait of Hormuz after the war is over. Like, great. Thanks a lot, fellas. Way to be there, Will. We need you.

[A]

Right, but. Okay, like, we did not anticipate. I don't know who did not anticipate the Strait of Hormuz thing, but again, every war game would have told you, get in there up front and clear it out and make sure that it stays open. We didn't do it. I don't know why. And then, yeah, I think to your last point, regime change still must be the only thing that we go for here.

[C]

It's not.

[A]

It shouldn't be a deal. It shouldn't be some sort of clever formulation that probably won't stand the test of time or a transition of leaders in either country. Not.

[D]

Are you suggesting that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not the answer to this?

[C]

I think he's suggesting that because apparently he was. And that he bailed.

[B]

Yeah.

[E]

I actually thought there was a pretty telling exchange in the 60 Minutes interview between Major Garrett and Bibi, where Garrett pressed Bibi about whether the Israelis had anticipated the closure of the Strait, which I had been on this podcast saying. I just didn't believe that the Americans and the Israelis hadn't anticipated this, much, as you were just saying. And Bibi's answer read to me like he had not really anticipated that. I thought he essentially conceded that in that 15 minutes interview. I thought that was the most newsworthy take.

[B]

But I think that's just to get to my quick point here. I think they thought the regime was going to fall and that this secondary move wouldn't happen because they wouldn't have time to do it before they basically crumbled, kind of imploded.

[E]

Yeah, well, that was a pretty telling moment.

[C]

Yeah. Here's the alternative to that, though. It could have been that the Israelis said, hey, you know what? Straight of or moves. Gotta. Gotta take care of it. It's gonna be a problem. American war planners say, yeah, you know, we'll get to it. Don't worry about it. And then the Israelis are, like, looking on afterwards, going like, you know. And, you know, Bibi can't say, well, we told them and they didn't do it. Right. I mean, for anybody. I mean, the Israelis have studied the Iran problem. I know the Pentagon has, too. Again, I find this whole thing just to be really curious. I don't really understand how we left that off the war planning priority list. I feel like somebody at some point later on is Going to have to explain this. It'll be a fascinating article that pins it on one guy that just was like, oh, I was supposed to do that. My bad.

[D]

If is there. I wrote a post the other day that was fairly sunny, I thought, and I found it very. And I feel that way, honestly, which is that the mar. The way that the world works is the markets probably won't let this happen again.

[C]

Right.

[D]

I mean, I've sort of come around to the idea watching the alternatives being proposed and built. You know, the Saudis have. Won't have the east west pipeline and they're talking about putting a second one alongside it. You know, the UAE left OPEC for a reason and all these things, talking about overland routes and whatever. It seems to me that the Gulf states, purely out of self interest, will not that the Strait of Hormuz will never be this valuable again.

[C]

Yeah. Is that true? Can I just tell you, it will not and it already isn't. We're already seeing. Because people need to make money. Right. So you have, you have oil that's being diverted already from the Gulf to the other side of Saudi Arabia. You have, you know, you've got pipelines that are in the works that are being expedited. This will not happen again. Now, it may not be all 20% salvaged if this happens again, but maybe it's 10% of the world's oil, maybe it's 8% of the world's oil that gets blocked up in here enough to

[D]

keep the markets from freaking out and giving people time to work around it.

[C]

And so the Kuwaitis are going to be looking to send money over land to Europe. The Iraqis may send oil through Turkey. Right. And you're going to see more and more of this. And it's a good thing. It's going to actually, it's going to rob the Islamic Republic if it's a round of its leverage. But in general, you don't want these choke points. You don't want. Especially when you've got bad actors presiding over them, you're going to need alternatives. So Rich Goldberg at FDD was. I was just hearing him talk about this the other day. He's really, like, sharp on energy and he's been talking about all the different plans that are in place. And yeah, in another year or two, the Strait of Hormuz is not going to be the thing that it is right now. And that is a good thing. This is capitalism at work. And, you know, I welcome it.

[B]

It's how canals got made.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

Literally, I Mean, the reason that the 19th century in early to have featured the building of canals was when you don't have a waterway that's open to provide free transport, you literally make one happen through, you know, innovative construction. Like the Suez and Panama canals were major industrial events in the history of the world because they. They allowed transit from places that were unreachable to another place that was unreachable. We're talking here about an almost reverse canal system in which overland and underland systems are going to make the Strait of Hormuz obsolete. That this has at least given the world the understanding that you can't. That it's been playing foolishly with the idea that this very easily choked off piece of oceanic real estate could be allowed to remain sort of unmolested until it got challenged. That said, what we have here, I think, and this sort of concludes this conversation, is this is a time of testing for Trump in the sense of his ultimate seriousness, which is he is hewing to the line that there is a deal to be made, that they have an interlocutor who wants to make a deal, that they want the war to end and that they're dotting I's and crossing T's. I don't think any of us believes this in the sense that I don't think we see any evidence that there is an interlocutor or that if there is, that that person really represents the regime. It may be kind of like a weird shyster who has arisen as a kind of false negotiator to play this role, but either they'll strike a deal, in which case it won't be a real deal, and then it'll all fall apart anyway. Does he have the sang froid to do what Jonathan is talking about, which is he doesn't want to go back to kinetic war, but he can pursue a very, very, very savage policy of economic murder of the regime that will. But it's slow choking. It's like you got your hands around the neck and you're choking them slowly and slowly and slowly and slowly and slow and slowly. And they're screaming, yelling, and they're throwing. They're flailing their arms out and that at the end of that, what is the purpose of that doing that? Regime change.

[A]

Correct.

[B]

We're talking about the regime imploding and something.

[C]

It could be just simply capitulation. That could be the alternative. But I gotta say, you're right. The optimal outcome here is regime change. Just gotta say the quiet part out loud. We just don't say that in Washington. It's because. Such a dirty term, right? We just don't say it because, gosh, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, we're not supposed to say those things. But just because the. I mean, we. And I've written about this for you, John, I mean, the idea that it failed before because we had a bad model and we put trillions of dollars and thousands of troops, you know, in harm's way doesn't mean we have to do the same thing again. You can do regime change without putting boots on the ground and wasting blood and treasure and all that stuff. This would be the way to do it. Say it out loud. Say it out loud.

[B]

Jonathan Chanzer, as ever, thank you for your insights and your wisdom and the fact that you are sounding uncharacteristically cheerful for now.

[C]

Get back to me in a week. I'll let you know.

[B]

Seth, of course, writing cheerful posts. Eliana, cheerful as ever. Eliana, you have anything for us? Just to go out on a slightly comic. Do you have anything for us on Graham Platner? I think you've been doing some fun work at the Free Beacon on Graham Platner.

[E]

I do. Our lead story this morning is on Graham Platner's smearing of the lone survivor, Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell, describing his story of survival. His three fellow SEALs were killed in Afghanistan on their mission called Operation Red Wings, where they were in Afghanistan in 2007 on a mission to kill a Taliban leader. The mission was, of course, made into a movie by Universal Pictures based on a memoir by Marcus Luttrell. Platner, in a Reddit post, described it as a bs, although he used the full word glory story accused Luttrell of colluding with the Navy to portray it in a positive light. I have to say I don't really think it was portrayed in a positive light. It was a failed mission, of course, and Luttrell survived after his three fellow SEALs died because he was taken in by a Pashtun and narrowly escaped the Taliban. And he accused Luttrell of lying and promoting war porn and making up aspects of the story. But I think it's pretty clear that Platner, after he returned home, routinely smeared his fellow combat veterans and is a deeply damaged, embittered man who has mistreated his fellow combat veterans and many women. So that's in our lead story this morning alongside, you know, stories about the operatives, the incompetent operatives who promoted him and failed to turn all of this up in their vetting of him These socialist operatives, Daniel Moraf and Leanne Fan, who sat with the Wall Street Journal over the weekend and said they paid a lot of money to affirm to vet him. And lo and behold, for all this money, they did not turn up much of his comments in these Reddit posts over the past decade and a half, nor did they turn up his Nazi tattoo.

[B]

Well, this follows as you sort of allude to the attack on.

[E]

Of course, the primary is today. Yes.

[B]

Yeah. The attack on Chris Kyle, who was the center figure in the American Sniper. American Sniper and who was murdered stateside

[E]

by someone with PTSD when he went to a shooting range with him. And I think perhaps the most disgraceful attack was his attack on his fellow veteran, Teddy Daniel, who exposed himself to enemy fire to try to divert the enemy and save the lives of his fellow soldiers. And Platner said he deserved to die.

[B]

I mean, so that three, that's three heroes whom he has trashed.

[D]

I feel, I feel like, and I mean, maybe Eliade, you have the more on this, but I feel like we haven't heard defenses of Platner from zero military buddies. That strikes me as telling. Does that strike you as, as, like in a story like this, you would normally, wouldn't you normally be able to come back with buddies you served with who were like, this guy is the guy I want with me when we're under fire and we're not seeing, you

[E]

know, an open question to me is it's true on both sides. We have not heard, and it's sort of reminiscent of the John Kerry campaign in 2004. We have not heard members who, you know, Seal, sorry, Marines who served with him speaking up in his defense, which is really what you'd want to hear. Nor have we heard folks who served alongside him saying he was really terrible. You know, that, that sort of speaks for itself. I think his words speak for themselves. But, but that is a mystery to me.

[B]

Well, yes, the primary is today, and

[E]

with Janet Mills still on the ballot,

[B]

I mean, he's obviously going to win. It would be interesting to see whether Mills has an unexpectedly strong showing in defeat. I mean, she is going to lose, but it could be very suggestive of what goes on in November if a substantial number of Democrats turn out to the polls to vote against him.

[E]

Just to cast protest votes. Yeah. And show they're not, they're not going along with this. And you know, one thing it's worth just mentioning briefly is a former Platner campaign aide by the name of Genevieve McDonald wrote an op ed in the Washington Post yesterday. It was published last night. It's probably in the hard copy paper today saying that she resigned from the campaign because she felt continuously misled by Platner about his past, about the extent of the damaging information out there about him, about his Nazi tattoo, and felt that he and the aides behind the campaign, this Moraf, Morris Katz, who of course was the force behind the Mamdani campaign and Leanne Fan, who were Bernie Sanders aides, were totally dishonest with her. And she felt the duty to speak up about it. And so her piece is in the Washington Post today. Encourage people to read that. I think it's quite revealing. And she's encouraging Maine voters to cast protest ballots. She herself is a Mainer, a resident of Maine and plans to do that

[D]

and was elected official in Maine.

[E]

He's a school board member, I think.

[D]

But didn't she have. I thought she had some kind of other estate legislative or something, but yeah, whatever.

[B]

It's, you know, obviously campaign aids. Campaigns are very heated, emotional places to work and people, you know, get boxed out or they quit because they're angry at how they're treated and then they go off and they drop dirty dimes on their rivals. You know, in. In game playing, this seems to be a slightly different story. She was actually the first, before the Totenkopf tattoo. She was the first person to say, this guy is making me very uncomfortable. Not personally, but just in general. That was six, seven weeks ago, as I recall. She gave an interview to the. I think to the Wall Street Journal. I can't remember to whom.

[E]

Well, she spoke off the record to the Wall Street Journal, and then she went on the record with the New York Times. And that was about his treatment of women.

[C]

Right.

[E]

And she resigned around the tattoo. So she resigned further back than that. And now she's written this op ed to say she felt misled for a long period of time about the extent of the information that is dribbling out about him. And the other thing that I think is revealing about the way this campaign is being run is that Morris Katz, another one of these campaign aides, threatened her and said he would ruin her when he discovered that she had spoken to the Wall Street Journal off the record about his treatment of women, and instructed her to record her phone call with reporters, lying to them about what she knew about his treatment of women, and then to send him the phone call proving that she had lied to these reporters about what she knew.

[D]

It sounds like also the, the campaign was. It was a sort of hostile takeover by the National Democratic Mercenary Operative Collective. You know, in a way, like Genevieve, as you said, she's a Mainer. So she had this, I think she says in the op edge something. She was the captain of a lobster boat or something like that. You know, it's like, okay, you love the oyster man. Well, I, I was captain of a lobster boat. So, like, we're not, you know, this is main speaking to Mainers about Maine here. But Morris Katz isn't Mainers speaking to Mainers about Maine. Right. These guys are like

[B]

New York City. Yes. Memories Cast represents the New York City vacationers and Jewish kids who go to camp in Japanese kids who go to camp in Maine.

[E]

Nor are the other duo, Moraf and Leanne Fan. And I really do want to direct people to the Wall Street Journal video interview of Mora Fan Fan who are an Ivy League educated duo, Socialist duo who worked on the Sanders campaign in Pennsylvania. And Moraf was the campaign manager of Summer Lee, the squad member who voted against, unlike October 8, the House resolution expressing support for Israel and then made headlines when she went out to campaign for Abdul El Sayed in Michigan and said the enemy is the, quote, upper class. So these are the cast of characters behind the Platner campaign. They are the Democratic socialists of America who have handpicked, you know, the squad members and Zoran Mamdani and all of the lunatics who are dragging the Democratic Party into the anti Semitic ditch.

[D]

And what's their group called? It's like fight group, Fight Club, Fight something.

[E]

Fight Agency is Fight Agency. Yeah, it's Morris Katz's campaign agency.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

All right, well, we'll be back tomorrow.

[E]

On that happy note.

[B]

On that happy note, we're also a fight agency here, but unlike Morris Katz, we're non profit. So for Eliana and Seth, I'm John Podhoretski, Cattle Bureau.