The ‘Clean’ Technology That’s Poisoning People

Summary

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The ‘Clean’ Technology That’s Poisoning People

The Daily – The New York Times
Date: December 2, 2025
Host: Rachel Abrams
Guest: Peter Goodman

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Overview:

This episode investigates the dark side of recycled lead batteries, considered a win for clean technology and the circular economy. The New York Times reporter Peter Goodman discusses a joint investigation exposing dangerous lead recycling practices in Nigeria, their severe health impacts, and how American companies, knowingly or unknowingly, benefit from this supply chain.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why Investigate Lead Battery Recycling?

• Origin of the Story ([01:29]–[04:10])

  • Rachel Abrams introduces Peter Goodman as an expert in global supply chains.
  • The topic arose after The Examination (an investigative newsroom specializing in public health) contacted Goodman. Will Fitzgibbon, their lead expert who had reported on lead pollution in Africa, suggested testing people and soil for lead contamination.
  • Goodman’s task: Trace the supply chain from Nigerian recycling plants to U.S. battery manufacturers.

  Quote:

  “I knew zero about recycled batteries and that's rounding up.”
  — Peter Goodman ([01:54])

2. The Horrific Reality in Nigeria

• Field Investigation in Ogijo, Nigeria ([04:34]–[06:30])

  • Nigeria has become a major exporter of recycled lead due to limited domestic U.S. supply and stricter regulations.
  • Goodman and Fitzgibbon observed shocking scenes: families coughing, children with symptoms consistent with lead poisoning, schools right beside polluting factories.

  Quote:

  “I was just blown away and really horrified by what I was seeing up close. And it gave me a real sense of this story's really important.”
  — Peter Goodman ([06:19])

3. The Battery Recycling Process: U.S. vs. Nigeria

• A Tale of Two Systems ([06:50]–[10:52])

  • Proper U.S. recycling is sophisticated and expensive, involving automation and strict emission controls.
  • In Nigeria: Batteries are smashed open by hand, often shirtless and unprotected men, acid is dumped in waterways, furnaces operate with no emission controls, and whole communities are blanketed in toxic lead dust.

  Quotes:

  “You don't need a PhD in environmental science...to understand that it’s not a good idea to have...no gloves, to not have a shirt on, to be taking a machete, slamming it into an old battery with acid spewing out.”
  — Peter Goodman ([08:51])

  “I talked to a man who said, ‘Yeah, my walls are black.'...the impacts of this are just so obvious and so palpable that it was impossible to not be moved by this.”
  — Peter Goodman ([10:39])

4. Following the Lead: Unmasking the Supply Chain

• Tracing the Export Path ([11:00]–[15:55])

  • Trade data showed the lead shipped to the Port of Baltimore by commodity trader Trafigura, but the final end-user was unclear.
  • Goodman used trade shows, LinkedIn outreach, and in-person investigations at the port to discover that East Penn, the U.S.'s second-largest battery maker, was purchasing Nigerian lead.

  Quotes:

  “Most people ignored me. Some sent me to the communications people who then ignored me.”
  — Peter Goodman ([12:23])

  "It's not a household name...but it's there and we're participants. They're making batteries under the hoods of millions of cars that are out there on the road."
  — Peter Goodman ([14:39])

5. Seeking Accountability: Confronting East Penn

• Challenges in Getting Answers ([17:20]–[20:55])

  • East Penn ignored attempts at contact until Goodman orchestrated a face-to-face opportunity at an industry event.
  • East Penn’s CEO, Chris Pruitt, claimed Goodman's reporting spurred him to reconsider due diligence. East Penn subsequently stopped buying Nigerian lead.

  Quotes:

  “He said that our reporting had caused him to do a lot more thinking than he'd previously done about the origins of the lead.”
  — Peter Goodman ([19:36])

  “Was I too trusting? I'll take that shot.”
  — Chris Pruitt (East Penn CEO), relayed by Goodman ([20:52])

6. Due Diligence – or Just an Illusion?

• The Flaws in Oversight ([21:24]–[23:48])

  • Trafigura touts audits, but actual oversight is thin and ineffectual. Auditors don’t visit battery breaking yards, recommendations are not enforced, and the process seems performative.

  Quote:

  “This is not a process that can end up in derailing a deal...it is informed by a desire to reach a conclusion at which the deal carries on. And that's the problem.”
  — Peter Goodman ([22:56])

7. Devastating Health Effects Documented

• Testing the Community: ([24:06]–[25:36])

  • Independent blood and soil tests found 70% of residents near the smelters had dangerous blood-lead levels—children at particular risk for irreversible brain damage.
  • Soil near a Nigerian school was found to have 1,900 parts per million of lead—vastly higher than the “disaster” threshold of 95 ppm that triggered a federal emergency in California.

  Quotes:

  “Roughly seven out of 10...had levels of lead in their blood deemed dangerous by various medical authorities.”
  — Peter Goodman ([24:54])

  “We tested a school in Ogijo, where we found 1,900 parts per million.”
  — Peter Goodman ([25:33])

  “You're talking about irreversible brain damage, especially for children. You're talking about respiratory problems, relentless headaches, exhaustion, just a lack of function.”
  — Peter Goodman ([25:41])

8. Official Response – Real Reform or Cosmetic Change?

• Action from the Nigerian Government? ([26:09]–[28:00])

  • After test results were shared, five smelters were closed—only to quickly reopen with vague promises of improvement.
  • Tangible changes: more frequent distribution of safety goggles and gloves. Real change (emission controls, technological upgrades) would require millions, and no enforceable documents exist to compel such changes.

  Quote:

  “It's going to cost millions of dollars. This is not something that's going to be fixed with a bunch of gloves and goggles.”
  — Peter Goodman ([28:00])

9. The Global Marketplace: Why Change May Be Elusive

• Structural Incentives for Exploitation ([28:16]–[31:49])

  • The underlying incentive structures that favor cheap, poorly regulated supply remain unchanged.
  • As attention increases in one location, business usually shifts to another country with weaker enforcement.
  • Even if all players did the right thing, the added cost per battery would be only a few dollars at most; but the current global system values these savings over community health.

  Quote:

  “The verdict of the global marketplace on the question of what's it worth to poison entire villages in Nigeria is not that much.”
  — Peter Goodman ([31:44])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Goodman's admission of naiveté:
  “I knew zero about recycled batteries and that's rounding up.” ([01:54])
• The haunting description of pollution:
  “I talked to a man who said, ‘Yeah, my walls are black.’” ([10:39])
• On investigative journalism’s frustration:
  “Most people ignored me. Some sent me to the communications people who then ignored me.” ([12:23])
• Supply chain denial:
  “There’s so much sort of plausible deniability built in that any given participant can say, plausibly, oh, I thought somebody else was looking out.” ([20:57])
• Global accountability:
  “...the incentives that created this situation that we've been reporting on have not changed.” ([28:40])
• Price of community poisoning:
  “The verdict of the global marketplace on the question of what's it worth to poison entire villages in Nigeria is not that much.” ([31:44])

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Important Timestamps

• 01:28: How Peter Goodman started the investigation
• 05:11: Describing Ogijo and the smelter “True Metals”
• 08:45–10:52: Comparing U.S. and Nigerian battery recycling practices
• 13:36: Identifying East Penn as a key U.S. buyer
• 17:20–19:33: Confronting East Penn and CEO Chris Pruitt’s response
• 24:06–25:36: Blood/soil testing results—health impact in Nigeria
• 26:09: Nigerian government’s response post-investigation
• 28:40–31:49: Systemic obstacles to genuine reform

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Conclusion

This episode peels back the veneer of sustainability in the global car battery industry, revealing a supply chain tainted by severe environmental and public health harms in Nigeria. Despite public commitments to safety and social standards, U.S. companies have benefited from these practices, with real reform still looking elusive. The investigation suggests that the added cost of humane, safe recycling would be negligible, yet the market continues to reward the cheapest, most hazardous options.

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Transcript

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[Rachel Abrams]

From the new York Times, I'm Rachel Abrams and this is the Daily. In the contentious fight over how to address climate change in the United States, recycled lead is a feel good story. It can be processed with techniques that keep workers safe and reused in batteries that power millions of vehicles around the world. But a new Times investigation reveals how this environmental initiative comes at a major human cost. Today, Peter Goodman explains the dirty business of a supposedly clean technology. It's Tuesday, december 2nd. Peter, welcome to the show.

[Peter Goodman]

Thanks for having me.

[Rachel Abrams]

You are one of our foremost experts on the global economy and you just came out with this really eye opening investigation on recycled batteries and lead poisoning, which I will bet is not something that most people know a lot about. So I'm very curious to know two things. One, how did you even get on this investigation? And number two, how, how much did you, Peter, know about recycled batteries when you first started?

[Peter Goodman]

I knew zero about recycled batteries and that's rounding up.

[Rachel Abrams]

Okay.

[Peter Goodman]

So I got a call from a guy at the examination, which is this relatively new independent investigative newsroom that specializes in global public health. And they have this really terrific reporter, a guy I'd never met, though I'd heard about him, Will Fitzgibbon. He had done a fair bit of work already in Africa. He was a lead expert. He dug into the lead recycling industry. And this is the industry that supplies a lot of the car batteries that we find under the hoods of cars in the U.S. we're talking new cars, used cars, places like Autozone, Home Depot, Walmart, and a lot of the lead that we're using to make car batteries in the US Is, is coming from outside of the US because we've run out of supply domestically. So the industry's gone out looking around the world for new sources of lead. And one of the places it's now looking quite aggressively is Nigeria. Will had already spent a fair bit of time looking into what this business actually looks like on the ground. He'd already figured out that the process of recycling lead was being done in a way that Was really quite horrific to see up close. It was really harmful to people. And he'd had this terrific idea, which was that we would actually go and test people. We would find people willing to volunteer for blood tests and quantify just exactly how much lead was reaching people's bloodstreams. And we'd also test soil to look into the tainting of the food supply. And so I got enlisted to try to take a run at figuring out who was buying it, how the terms of trade were going down, all the logistics along the way. They wanted me because I've been writing versions of complex supply chain stories now for 25 plus years around the world. And I didn't know anything about this particular industry, But I did have some inkling about shipping logistics. And I was certainly intrigued to try to make the connection between this public health catastrophe in West Africa and the auto industry in the United States.

[Rachel Abrams]

That connection sounds incredibly challenging to make.

[Peter Goodman]

Yeah, it's enormously challenging, Especially because we're talking about a trade that's secret. I mean, the participants have no interest in talking to anybody about this stuff. There's limited publicly available data. And so I found myself taken on what, quite honestly was the most difficult reporting assignment of my career.

[Rachel Abrams]

Where did you actually start the reporting journey?

[Peter Goodman]

So Will had already done a lot of this legwork. He'd already had sources in Nigeria. He understood where these factories were. And then I went there with Will to nail down the real life consequences for the people living in villages right next to these plants, and also to go talk to people in Lagos who could tell us about the Nigeria supply chain, part of it, before this lead gets put into shipping containers and sent across the water for ports around the world.

[Rachel Abrams]

So where exactly did you go and what did you see there?

[Peter Goodman]

So I went to a place called Ogi Joe, which is just north of Lagos, which is a sprawling, you know, enormous metropolitan area. And Okijo is sort of combination of an industrial and rural, where there are a bunch of smelters, including the one that we wound up focusing on called True Metals. And we picked it not only because it's really bad in terms of the pollution that it puts out, but also because it only deals in lead. And these are large factories where people are feeding this lead into these giant furnaces that send smoke wafting throughout the area, including in these villages that are right next to the factories. So I spent a lot of time just sitting with families, talking to them about the struggle of living next door to these plants. People were coughing, people were complaining of all Sorts of ailments that are linked in the literature to lead poisoning, you know, indigestion and various gastrointestinal distress, unrelenting headaches. And I saw children in schools that were literally next to these factories. So I was just blown away and really horrified by what I was seeing up close. And it gave me a real sense of this story's really important.

[Rachel Abrams]

So what you're seeing in this town is all these signs of pollution that is coming from this lead battery recycling process. Before we get any further in the story, I just want to have you explain how and why a battery gets recycled and the correct way, and then what you saw in Nigeria and how that was different.

[Peter Goodman]

Sure. So, you know, it's important to note that virtually every car on the road has a lead battery under there somewhere, even electric vehicles. And if we didn't have lead batteries, we'd notice real fast. And it happens to be one of the most recyclable elements on earth. And the auto industry has really leaned into that in promoting itself as the exemplar of the circular economy. They do recycle most of these old batteries and have very sophisticated plants that recycle. They have, you know, automated processes that break apart the old batteries and extract the lead safely. They dispose of the acid that's in there. They have emissions controls that prevent lead dust and smoke from spewing out into communities. All that stuff costs millions of dollars. And so as regulations have gotten stricter in places like the United States, we've had smelters move. So that's eliminated local supply. At the same time, demand has increased because population's growing. We got more people driving around in cars. And so battery manufacturers have had to go around the world to go find more lead. And what I saw in Nigeria was something very different than what you would see if you managed to get invited into a lead recycling plant in North America. I saw first of all, people in so called breaking yards. These are the places where they get the spent batteries. They're brought by these people known as pickers, who come in by rickshaw, bicycle, motorbike, truck, and they bring these old batteries into these yards. And then men, often shirtless, with no protective gear whatsoever, use machetes to break apart the plastic case, just hammering at them. Yeah.

[Rachel Abrams]

And this is what would have been done by machines in the United States in a tightly controlled environment.

[Peter Goodman]

Correct.

[Rachel Abrams]

This sounds incredibly dangerous.

[Peter Goodman]

Incredibly dangerous. You can just sense it. Like you don't need Some sort of PhD in environmental science to understand that it's not A good idea to have no safety goggles, to have no gloves, to not have a shirt on, to be taking a machete, slamming it into an old battery with acid spewing out in every direction. The smaller operations, they take the acid and they actually dump it into waterways. It's just horrifying, right? So that's just the battery breaking operations. Then there's the furnaces. This is where most of the pollution comes from. The furnaces are these giant facilities that take the old lead taken out of spent batteries and they melt it down, they cook it at incredibly high temperatures into this molten liquid that's poured into molds that then form these ingots that can then be, you know, moved around, trucked to battery manufacturers that make new batteries. And if you saw a plant, a furnace in the US you'd see equipment used to vacuum up dust. You'd see machinery that prevents smoke from getting out into the communities. You'd see all sorts of automated systems to prevent workers from poisoning themselves by touching things with their bare hands. What I saw in Nigeria was just open air. I mean, you could see the smoke with your bare eyes just getting out between the sheets of corrugated metal that are the roofs of these factories. You could smell it. I was invited into people's homes. I talked to a man who said, yeah, my walls are black. And you could see it just the smoke is so intense and the impacts of this are just so obvious and so palpable that it was impossible to not be moved by this.

[Rachel Abrams]

So it sounds like these places are operating with very little regulation. How did you end up tracing what happens to the lead that they produce?

[Peter Goodman]

Well, we had trade data. You know, Will, at the examination, built a terrific database that had all the publicly available information. So typically, a trading company will identify sources of recycled lead around the world. They'll buy it, they'll ship it to an endpoint in the United States, typically the Port of Baltimore. And then the story ended. So my job was to figure out, well, then what happens?

[Rachel Abrams]

So how did you do that?

[Peter Goodman]

So I quickly figured out there's no expert to call. There's nobody who did a dissertation on this. There's no book, there's no YouTube documentaries to watch for tips. There isn't even, you know, Reddit to go get dubious, you know, tips. I was just.

[Rachel Abrams]

There's Reddit for everything.

[Peter Goodman]

Yeah, it was just a black box. And I started to reach out to people who worked for these trading companies. The one I was most focused on was this company called Trafigura.

[Rachel Abrams]

And to Be clear, Trafigura is basically a middleman here, correct?

[Peter Goodman]

Yeah. Trafigura's job is to buy and sell commodities. They're the ones who are most expert in what's available, what's the price. And so we had transactions we could see in the database where traffickers buying lead from these smelters we're focusing on in Nigeria and shipping it to the Port of Baltimore. But I had no idea who was buying it at that point. And so I did a bunch of different things. I signed up to go to trade shows, hoping I would run into people who would help tell me the story. I spent a lot of time on LinkedIn, just mass messaging anybody who had worked at Trafigura. And that was pretty lonely and felt fairly futile. Most people ignored me. Some sent me to the communications people who then ignored me. And then eventually a handful of people started helping me in a really critical way. And they started to name the same likely purchaser over and over again. They named East Penn, which is the second largest battery manufacturer in the United States. It's this family owned business. They're not publicly traded, they're very quiet and they don't like to deal with the press and they certainly didn't want to deal with me. So at this point, I know, and I put that in quotation marks I know on deep backgrounds. Right. With no names attached and no documents that East Penn is buying lead from trading companies that are bringing it into the Port of Baltimore. But I can't prove it.

[Rachel Abrams]

You can't report it yet?

[Peter Goodman]

I can't report it.

[Rachel Abrams]

You have good reporting, but it's not reportable yet.

[Peter Goodman]

It's certainly not going to be a satisfying, significant part of the story. Based on that sourcing, I needed something stronger. So I went to the Port of Baltimore. I actually spent a whole day there with a really excellent photographer who had probably the most unexciting day of her life. It was kind of a fairly futile day. We actually chartered a little fishing boat and we just like tooled around the harbor in Baltimore and we were able to see the dock where some of these shipments come in. We saw a trucking yard where they unload it from the water. And we got a sense of the geography, but there was no vessel bringing in lead on this particular day. But I did learn something. And because of that reporting, because of what I learned at the truck yard, I reached out to this logistics company where a guy who ran the yard did very reluctantly and somewhat elliptically confirm that they handled lead incoming from West Africa purchased by Trafigura, and they sent some of it out to Pennsylvania, to East Penn. But we still really needed to talk to East Penn about all this because, you know, let's remember this is the second largest battery manufacturer in the United States. It's not a household name, it's not a company most of us ever think about, but it's there and we're participants. They're making batteries under the hoods of millions of cars that are out there on the road. They're the ones actually profiting off of this and depending upon in Nigeria. So I wanted to understand what sorts of due diligence they were undertaking to ensure that this lead they were buying from Nigeria was in compliance with their social and environmental standard. So I'd had calls out to East Penn and they were just blowing me off. They weren't responding to my calls. I wasn't getting responses to my emails, just no response. And it became clear to me that I was going to have to figure out how to confront East Penn.

[Rachel Abrams]

We'll be right back.

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[Rachel Abrams]

Peter I spent many years as a reporter so I can absolutely relate to this idea that you have questions, you have to get in front of the people you're writing about, give them an opportunity to respond and you are getting nowhere trying to go in through the front door, which is what sounds like it was happening to you with East Penn. So I imagine you had to get creative about how to actually give them an opportunity to comment.

[Peter Goodman]

I had to make a spectacle of myself.

[Rachel Abrams]

Excellent.

[Peter Goodman]

This is actually how it happened. So the big break was in San Antonio, where the Battery Council International has this gathering. It's this big golf resort, and there are people from battery companies and lead recycling and companies that make equipment used. And they're all golfing and drinking and dining and having a good time. And the second I identify what story I'm working on, they either don't know anything about it, because most people, when I would tell them the story, they say, nigeria. No way. We're not buying lead from Nigeria. That's just not even. How could they even have lead?

[Rachel Abrams]

Wow.

[Vanguard Narrator]

Okay.

[Rachel Abrams]

They didn't even know.

[Peter Goodman]

And then the handful of people who did know were like. The last thing I want to do is talk about this subject with someone from the New York Times. And I figured out that the head of. Of East Penn, the then CEO of East Penn, this guy Chris Pruitt, is getting this distinguished service award from the Battery Council International. And I'm planning to go because it's gonna be my only shot. At this point, I've got calls out to their various marketing people. I've just gotten nowhere. So I know Chris Pruitt's there. I really wanna talk to him. The communications guy says, this is supposed to be honoring him, and if you're there asking these uncomfortable questions, that'll really be awkward. Now the reporter in me is like, well, I don't really care. I work for the reader I have. But I thought, well, if I'm not gonna get anywhere anyway, and I'm just gonna make a spectacle of myself, there's no upside to that.

[Rachel Abrams]

You won't ambush him.

[Peter Goodman]

I won't ambush him. But out of that, I'll get some basis for a more productive engagement and maybe go visit him in Pennsylvania. I do finally hear from an outside PR firm for East Penn, and I start to engage with them. Eventually, I was able to persuade Chris Pruitt and other executives at East Penn to talk to us.

[Rachel Abrams]

And what did he actually say to you?

[Peter Goodman]

Well, he said that our reporting had caused him to do a lot more thinking than he'd previously done about the origins of the lead, and that previously he had talked to trading companies like Trafigura and had said, I need this particular purity. And, oh, by the way, of course you're guaranteeing that this is not causing social or environmental problems. Oh, no, of course not. The trading company Would say, we have audit processes. All this is good. Okay, then. Just as long as you can deliver the quantity and the purity that we need at the guaranteed price. All good. And since our reporting, he'd actually dug into his own supply chain, had become concerned about the process of due diligence the trading companies were doing, and as he put it out of the utmost of caution, decided that he didn't want to buy any more lead from Nigeria. So I did ask him at one point about moral culpability. And I said, well, given that we now know that Trafigura's due diligence leaves a lot to be desired, and we could see with our own eyes and what was playing out in these villages next to these smelters. Where do you fit in terms of the moral culpability for this? And he said, look, was I too trusting? I'll take that shot.

[Rachel Abrams]

What did you make of that?

[Peter Goodman]

I thought that summed up the reality of complicated supply chains. There's so much sort of plausible deniability built in that any given participant can say, plausibly, oh, I thought somebody else was looking out.

[Rachel Abrams]

Well, to that point, though, this is East Penn acknowledging that what's happening on the ground is not okay. Right? Like, it's not up to their standards as an American company.

[Peter Goodman]

Right.

[Rachel Abrams]

But what about Trafigura? Like, have they made any kind of pledge to change or modify their behavior?

[Peter Goodman]

So Trafigura gave us this kind of general statement, but they say that they have an audit process that ensures that they're complying with their official social and environmental standards. And we actually talked to a consultant who does the audits for Trafigura in Lagos who pushed back on the idea that it's just like, performative, superficial. He said, I really go. And I look, first question I had is, okay, do you go to the battery breaking yards? No, no, I just go to the smelter. Okay. So right off the bat, you don't know anything about the raw materials that are coming in or the impacts for the people who are working in those places or where the acid's going, is it going in the stream? You know, none of that. Right. So then even at the smelter, I said, well, what do you do? He said, well, I look very carefully. But the consultant said, I give them a real list of problems that I identify. But the way this goes, and I confirmed this with people who've worked at Trafigura is the auditor will say, okay, you know, it really would be good if you handed out safety Goggles on a regular basis. It really would be good if you put in a system to control the lead dust. It would be great if you put in battery breaking equipment. And the smelter will say, okay, thank you very much for your suggestion. We will certainly hand out safety goggles. And then Trafigura says, great, your audit's done. Now let's talk about the volume of the next deal. I mean, this is not a process that can end up in derailing a deal. This is a process that is informed by a desire to reach a conclusion at which the deal carries on. And that's the problem. So there is due diligence, there are.

[Rachel Abrams]

Inspections, there are recommendations.

[Peter Goodman]

There are recommendations, there's an action plan. But there's no compulsion to do the right thing or the business doesn't happen. And meanwhile, the person who's buying it on the other side of the ocean, in this case Chris Pruitt and East Penn, doesn't know any of that and is certainly not getting on a plane to go to Nigeria to make sure. Trafficker is really engaging in a rigorous audit process.

[Rachel Abrams]

So at this point, it sounds like you know the answer to the part of the investigation that you were responsible for from that initial phone call you got about this partnership.

[Peter Goodman]

Right.

[Rachel Abrams]

What about the other question? The question about what kind of medical harm was being caused to the people in these towns in Nigeria by this lead poisoning.

[Peter Goodman]

So this is where the examination did an extraordinary amount of legwork. So Will had commissioned this team of independent scientists in Nigeria who found 70 volunteers. And we're talking about 14 children, 16 people who worked at these lead smelters. And these were people who lived very close to these smelters. You know, imagine a village, and in the very center of the village, you know, churches right up against the walls of these factories, schools right up against the walls of these factories. So life is playing out all around. And we tested 70 people, volunteers, right in the vicinity. And roughly seven out of 10 of them had levels of lead in their blood deemed dangerous by various medical authorities.

[Rachel Abrams]

Wow.

[Peter Goodman]

So one of the things that we were focused on was this comparison with the worst lead disaster at a battery manufacturer in Southern California more than a decade ago, which was a federal emergency. I mean, the feds went in, they shut the place down, they tested people, they took over, they're still managing this. And there was a soil test conducted at a preschool there that found 95 parts of the per million lead. Let me give you that number again. 95 parts per million. We tested a school in Ogijo, where we found 1,900 parts per million.

[Rachel Abrams]

My God.

[Peter Goodman]

Yeah.

[Rachel Abrams]

At that level of contamination, what kind of health effects would you expect immediately?

[Peter Goodman]

Well, first of all, you're talking about irreversible brain damage, especially for children. You're talking about respiratory problems, relentless headaches, exhaustion, just a lack of function. And that's the lead. Right. And then there's just the reality. If you're living in a place where there's smoke and terrible fumes all the time and people are coughing, it's just a living nightmare.

[Rachel Abrams]

So what happened after you did all this testing?

[Peter Goodman]

After we did the testing, our research partner shared some of this data with the Nigerian government, the environmental authorities, and within just a few days, the five worst smelters in Ogijo were shut down. The heads of these companies were summoned up to Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, to have a conversation around how they could supposedly make some improvements. And then they were given permission to restart.

[Rachel Abrams]

So it sounds like the Nigerian government took pretty swift action.

[Peter Goodman]

Well, you know, it's complicated. So the Nigerian government has been receiving reports of these health problems going back at least to 2018. And they got what they described to me as promises to make all of these improvements at these plants. Plants. But when somebody showed me a copy of the actual protocol that these factories had to sign, this supposedly enforceable document, it didn't have any of the details of these promises that they claim they got. And it specifically had a two to three year timeline for a very vague promise to improve technology at the plants. So it seems pretty clear that whatever was said in the room with the heads of these smelters, there is no enforceable document that compels these companies to do anything differently anytime soon. And when I was back on the ground talking to workers at these smelters, what they said is, oh, yeah, now they're giving us safety goggles. They didn't used to do that. Oh, they used to give us gloves once a week. Now they're giving them to us twice a week.

[Rachel Abrams]

And presumably it's fair to say that the Nigerian government knows that it probably should be doing a lot more than just handing out gloves and goggles if it wants to protect people, given the high levels of lead that is showing up in these test results. Right.

[Peter Goodman]

I mean, what has to happen at these plants is they have to put in serious emission controls and it's going to cost millions of dollars. If they put in battery braking equipment, that's going to cost millions of dollars. This is not something that's going to be fixed with a bunch of gloves and goggles.

[Rachel Abrams]

I do just wonder, though, given your experience covering global supply chains, knowing what the incentives are for the various actors here, knowing how hard it is to reform an ENT, how confident are you that in five years or 10 years or however long, somebody will be able to purchase a car in the United States and feel confident that the battery in that car was made in a safe and humane way?

[Peter Goodman]

I think there are serious reasons to doubt that that positive outcome will happen for the simple reason that the incentives that created this situation that we've been reporting on have not changed. And those incentives are, you have large brands like East Penn that actually make lots of batteries under other brands. So it's not as if, you know, a consumer can go off to the, to the battery store and say, don't give me one of those East Penn batteries.

[Rachel Abrams]

Right?

[Peter Goodman]

There are lots of others that they make for other brands. We also know that Nigeria is hardly alone as being a country where there are large numbers of people who are desperate enough just to figure out how to get dinner on the table tonight that they will accept horrific pollution. I mean, not that the people in the communities want the pollution, they're horrified by the pollution. But in terms of the situation for the policymakers, for the environmental regulators, they would like the plants cleaned up, but they're also cognizant that if they push too hard, this industry will shift somewhere else where some other government will cut a deal with the companies that need lead and other minerals. That's how this business tends to go. I mean, my history of looking at supply chain cases now, going back decades, is that when you get a public revelation, when you find out that, say, a fashion brand learns that they've been relying on a supplier that's been playing so dangerously that people have died in a fire or in the collapse of a building or rivers or drinking waters being poisoned, I mean, what tends to happen is the supply chain gets even more complex. Pieces shift somewhere else.

[Rachel Abrams]

Companies change their names under the guise of safety, perhaps. Right. Like there's consumer pressure. And then they say, we're going to make these reforms. Then the end result is what you're talking about.

[Peter Goodman]

Correct.

[Rachel Abrams]

Let's just say for the sake of argument, though, that in this case, in terms of battery recycling, that every player involved wants to do this the right way. They want to make a safe battery and make it in an environmentally friendly way. What would the increase in cost of that battery to the end buyer actually look like?

[Peter Goodman]

Well, it's a hypothetical. It's one that we wrestled with in reporting this story, and we concluded that there's no satisfying answer because no battery is going to be made exclusively with lead from one country or another. It all basically ends up getting blended together. But the best we could figure out is you're talking about pennies on the dollar. Assuming that every participant in the chain passes on their extra costs to the next player. You're talking about a single digit dollar number to the consumer. At the end of the day, in the US that's our best guess. There's a lot of assumptions into that, but certainly not a large amount of money. And I think that it's fair to say that the verdict of the global marketplace on the question of what's it worth to poison entire villages in Nigeria is not that much.

[Rachel Abrams]

Peter, thank you so much.

[Peter Goodman]

Thanks so much for having me, Rachel.

[Rachel Abrams]

In the days following publication of the joint Times investigation, Nigerian officials once again closed down several smelters in the Ogijo region. Officials also promised new investigations from the federal government and said they would conduct additional blood testing of local residents. We'll be right back.

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[Rachel Abrams]

Brother a New York Times subscription.

[Peter Goodman]

We exchange articles and so having read the same article, we can discuss it. She sent me a year long subscription so I have access to all the games. The New York Times contributes to our quality time together.

[Rachel Abrams]

It enriches our relationship.

[Peter Goodman]

It was such a cool and thoughtful gift. We're reading the same stuff, we're making the same food. We're on the same page.

[Rachel Abrams]

Learn more about giving a New York Times subscription as a [e-mail] gift.

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[Rachel Abrams]

What else you need to know today. On Monday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met for hours with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris. The meeting was part of a blitz to shore up support from European allies in the midst of negotiations over a U S led plan to end the war with Russia. While Macron reiterated Europe's commitment to Ukraine, the United States has put increasing pressure on Zelenskyy to agree to a deal, even as Russia has signaled its opposition to some of the plan's proposals. And the Transportation Security Administration announced that beginning February 1st, travelers without a real ID compliant form of identification will have to pay a $45 fee to fly. Passengers can prepay the fee up to 10 days before they come to the airport. Many travelers have already begun flying with passports and other documents considered compliant with the program. The TSA did not immediately reveal how to pay the new fee and other details about the program. Today's episode was produced by Diana Wynne, Anna Foley and Rochelle Bonga. It was edited by Chris Haxel and Michael Benoit, contains music by Dan Powell and was engineered by Alyssa Moxley. Special thanks to Will FitzGibbon and Finbar O'Reilly. That's it for the Daily I'm Rachel Abrams. See you tomorrow.

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Support for this podcast comes from Vanguard. Since 1975, Vanguard has operated with a clear purpose to take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly and to give them the best chance to for investment success. Learn more about what that means for 50 million [e-mail] mission all investing is subject to risk. Vanguard Marketing Corporation Distributor.