What is so-called 'Jihadi cool'?

Summary

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Podcast Summary: The Documentary Podcast (BBC World Service)

Episode Title: What is so-called 'Jihadi cool'?
Air Date: August 2, 2026
Host: Krasi Ivanova Twig
Contributors: Mariam Sousi (Jihadist Media Monitoring Team), Mina Alamy (Jihadist Media Expert)

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Episode Overview

This episode explores how supporters of the Islamic State (IS) exploit mainstream social media platforms, particularly Instagram and TikTok, to propagate and normalize jihadist ideology—what's been dubbed "Jihadi cool". The discussion focuses on the evolution of pro-jihadist online presence, the increasingly subtle and sophisticated tactics used for evasion and recruitment, and how these behaviors are reshaping extremist outreach to younger, unsuspecting audiences.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Social Media Rabbit Hole: Mainstreaming Extremism

• Social media algorithms easily guide users toward pro-IS content, blurring the line between everyday influencer behavior and extremist messaging. (04:10–04:45)
• IS supporters mimic mainstream influencer trends, making their content appealing and normalizing the presence of extremism.
• Personalities are central, and the content often appears innocuous on the surface.

Quote (Mariam Sousi, 05:00):

"Official Islamic State propaganda... dissemination of the group’s weekly newspaper attack claims... content that is not official—users documenting their daily routine, but at the same time they’re using hashtags, emojis... signaling affiliation."

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Obfuscation and Evasion Tactics

• Supporters use "the art of disguise" to avoid moderation: innocent cover images mask extremist materials (02:21–02:29).
• Common tactics:
  • Obscured or coded hashtags and language (e.g., inserting English letters into Arabic words)
  • Emojis (such as black flag, hearts, juice carton for “Jews”) to signal affiliation or mask identities (05:00, 14:59)
  • Use of platform features, like Instagram’s carousels, to hide propaganda as users swipe through images (13:33–13:52)
  • Mimicking mainstream accounts, adopting popular memes to blend in (13:52–14:27)

Quote (Mina Alamy, 02:21):

"The front page will be an image of nature or something very innocuous, but when you click on it, it’s a manual for bomb making."

Quote (Mariam Sousi, 14:59):

"Love hearts are used to actually mask individuals associated with IS such as the former IS leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi or prominent well-known IS attackers."

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The Rise of 'Jihadi Cool': Gender, Youth, and Trendiness

• Instagram and TikTok see a shift in representation with more visible female supporters, often not in traditional niqab but "trendy niqab," presenting as influencers (07:18–08:20).
  • Female and male IS supporters mix more openly, breaking traditional gender norms.
  • “Coolness” and rebelliousness are foregrounded—images of women on skateboards, brandishing guns, or participating in group activities.
• Young men are depicted in gym wear, flexing for the camera, signaling readiness for jihad under the guise of mainstream self-improvement content.

Quote (Mina Alamy, 07:18):

"There is very strict segregation between male and female users [elsewhere]. But... many female supporters, not in strict all black niqab, but trendy niqab, projecting this coolness, really trying to resonate with young audiences..."

Quote (Krasi Ivanova Twig, 09:12):

"It seems that what they're doing is saying it’s cool to be a jihadist... and it's okay normalizing this, being part of this society."

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The Recruitment Pipeline: From Likes to Encrypted Channels

• The goal is not just visibility and normalization but active recruitment.
• Engagement metrics (likes, shares) are high for posts featuring notorious IS figures (15:22–16:05).
• Once interest is detected, recruiters attempt to move conversations to encrypted apps like Telegram for further radicalization or operational instruction (18:00).

Quote (Mina Alamy, 18:00):

"The idea really is then to identify potential recruits... and then these recruiters will try to move the conversation to more encrypted apps..."

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Amplification and Platform Dynamics

• Social media recommendations and algorithms inadvertently bolster the reach of jihadist content (26:26).
• The “whack-a-mole” game: As accounts are suspended, new ones quickly reappear, often with numerical handles tallying the number of bans (12:10–12:35, 26:26–27:22).

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Engagement with Real-World Events

• IS media exploits ongoing world events (e.g., Gaza–Israel conflict) and general grievances to incite violent action, with real attacks linked to online radicalization (19:08–21:33).
• Lone-wolf attackers—often youth—are glorified and cited in propaganda as examples for others to emulate.

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Platform Responses & Limitations

• Meta and TikTok issued statements emphasizing their anti-terror policies, claiming millions of content removals and proactive detection (23:04–25:18).
• The investigative team observed that, despite these claims, many flagged accounts remained live.

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Legal Risks and Countermeasures

• Authorities and counterterrorism agencies highlight the legal consequences for youth engaging in extremist content online (25:52–26:26).
• UK counterterrorism police launch awareness campaigns directly on platforms.

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The Bigger Challenge: Culture, Technology, and Accessibility

• Jihadist narratives leverage the “addictive” design of social media; humorous or AI-generated memes featuring IS themes are used to normalize extremist messages (27:22–27:49).
• Long-term concern: Extremist content blends so seamlessly with mainstream trends that young users may not recognize it for what it is.

Quote (Mina Alamy, 27:58):

"For [IS supporters] the Internet is a crucial medium... They want to be there... and be able to compete [among] where millions of people are getting their news, entertainment, political views..."

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 01:21–02:16: Introduction to social media sleuthing; overview of IS content online
• 03:33–05:53: Mariam Sousi’s research method, discovering pro-IS accounts
• 07:05–08:20: Discussion on female presence and influencer style in jihadist networks
• 13:25–14:59: Obfuscation tactics: carousels, hashtags, emojis, coded language
• 15:22–16:58: Measuring engagement; AI-generated and meme content; mainstream hashtags
• 18:00–19:08: Recruitment pipeline; transition to encrypted apps
• 19:08–20:42: Move toward “do-it-yourself jihad”; incitement linked to global events
• 21:02–22:55: Case studies of youth radicalization, online-offline connection
• 23:04–25:18: Platform policies and responses
• 25:29–27:22: Youth awareness, algorithmic exposure, account reemergence
• 27:22–28:41: The challenge of normalization through humor and memes

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Memorable Quotes

• Mina Alamy (09:34): "The west present jihadists as backward, but this is a different presentation... It looks actually cool and edgy."
• Mariam Sousi (25:29): "It's worrying because you have jihadist content that is mingling with mainstream content... particularly young ones may not be aware that they are watching or engaging in extremist material because it's presented in a softer, humorous manner."
• Mina Alamy (19:08): "There definitely seems to be a move away from direct operational instructions... pushing as much material as they can and constant incitement... glorifying the role specifically of young people who live in the West."
• Krasi Ivanova Twig (10:11): "It seems extremely subtle and it's playing perhaps on the appeal of this sense of belonging..."

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Conclusion

This episode of The Documentary Podcast provides a nuanced look at "jihadi cool"—a disturbing social media phenomenon where extremist supporters blend seamlessly with youthful influencer culture. With ever-more sophisticated evasion, coded language, and a strategic harnessing of platform algorithms, the IS propaganda machine pursues reach and relevance among younger, global digital audiences. Platform crackdowns, while robust, are caught in a perpetual cycle of suppression and circumvention. Ultimately, the move toward normalization and subtle radicalization, rather than overt incitement, represents a formidable challenge to counter-extremism efforts in the social media age.

Transcript

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[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

We all do it. You you Open Instagram or TikTok and before you know it you have wasted hours watching cats or other people's lives,

[Mariam Sousi]

documenting their daily routines, whether it's eating out in a cafe or in a public place.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

But some influencer content comes with a catch, a subtle nod to something darker.

[Mariam Sousi]

It's those indications where they used a pro IAS hashtag, a particular is nasheed, and that signals to others on the platform that they are part of the IS group.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

These aren't isolated cases. It appears to be a network of supporters shaping a social media trend of their own.

[Mina Alamy]

A move away from direct operational instructions to do it yourself jihad, where they are outsourcing, pushing as much material as they can and constant incitement, constant messaging

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

to avoid detection by the platforms. They've learned the art of disguise.

[Mina Alamy]

There's obfuscation. The front page will be an image of nature or something very innocuous, but when you click on it, it's a manual for bomb making.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Once they are unmasked, the game of Whack a Mole begins.

[Mariam Sousi]

It's cat and mouse relationship where these platforms are chasing these accounts, trying to suspend them, but then they re emerge.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

This is a recruitment drive for the Islamic State group, trying to exploit platform features designed for maximum reach. We explore the obfuscation tactics, the continuous cycle of removal and re emergence and where it could lead. Welcome to the documentary from the BBC World Service. I'm Krasi Ivanova Twig. And this is the global jigsaw from BBC Monitoring, where we look at the world through the lens of its media, exploring the narratives, the propaganda and the disinformation.

[Mariam Sousi]

Western countries are not the international community.

[Mina Alamy]

That era has finished.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

In August 2024, a 19 year old Austrian man was arrested for planning a terror attack on a Taylor Swift concert in Vienn. The police said he was radicalized online as a teenager and swore allegiance to is. Mariam Sousi from our jihadist media monitoring team decided to check out how easy it would be to find posts by sympathizers of the Islamic State group on social media platforms.

[Mariam Sousi]

The research that I conducted over a period of several months looked at Jihadi's content on Instagram and TikTok, the dominant narrative and the tactics. I used Arabic and English hashtags that are basically familiar within the IS ecosystem online. That enabled me to pick up on official Islamic State propaganda and that would lead me to users who are actually hosting such content. And TikTok and Instagram's algorithms would suggest other similar accounts.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

And this is how a journey down the rabbit hole might begin.

[Mariam Sousi]

I looked at around 50 to 100 accounts on Instagram and TikTok. It's evident from the start there are hundreds if not thousands of pro Islamic State accounts. And I would just follow them and then more similar content would appear.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

What is the content that they're pushing out?

[Mariam Sousi]

Official Islamic State propaganda. Whether it's dissemination of the group's weekly newspaper attack claims, you also have content that is not official users documenting their daily routine, but at the same time they're using hashtags, they're using emojis that are familiar within the IS ecosystem, such as the black flag emoji or raising the index finger or the ninja emoji to signal affiliation with the group.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Are these IS supporters acting on their own initiative or has there been a steer from the group?

[Mariam Sousi]

It's difficult to say whether there is kind of coordination between Islamic State official accounts and supporter accounts. What we can see is the repackaging, I guess, or the amplification of official IAS material. However, Islamic State supporters use a lot of obfuscation techniques to hide and mask its content.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

We'll come back to those techniques in more detail. Needless to say, those users are careful not to reveal too much about themselves. So what do we know about them?

[Mariam Sousi]

Many users take deliberate efforts to remain under the radar. However, some do give signals of their age. On TikTok, I did come across some accounts where users were of young age and they were showing their faces. They used the black flag emoji to kind of COVID parts of their face. And that user was probably say under the age of 15.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

The jihadist supporters are presenting in a way that looks as if complying with the platform rules. But their presence here is distinctive from the jihadist material our team has been observing for years, such as the prominence of female supporters.

[Mariam Sousi]

There was a more female user presence on Instagram compared to other platforms. The gender norms and interactions on Instagram were more, more loose and relaxed. Men and women mixed. They often appeared to follow and interact with each other on Instagram and I guess they took on a more non traditional role, more active, where they were documenting their daily routines, whether it's eating out in a cafe or in a public place.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Our top jihadist media expert, Mina Alamy too has been watching jihadist behaviour on all sorts of platforms for many years. Here's her take on the prominence of women on the hugely popular apps.

[Mina Alamy]

A major difference between what we have been seeing on Telegram, Facebook and Rocket Chat. There is very strict segregation between male and female users. There is a clear and consistent messaging from the male supporters of is that women should not be online full stop, they should not be showing themselves. But when we started looking at TikTok and Instagram, there were many female supporters, not in strict all black niqab, but trendy niqab, projecting this coolness, but also really trying to resonate with young audiences. So this is not just women's places behind closed doors, cooking and cleaning and raise the next generation. But actually they can also be cool online. We see them on skateboards, brandishing guns, driving in the desert. And yes, some of them just present themselves as Muslim women or Islamists. But we can definitely see from various symbolism that yes, they are signaling that we are part of that circle.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

So these people, some of them, as you say, they're trying to stay under the radar and you can't tell much about them with others. The women you described who are describing their daily routines, it fits into this influenza style presence where the personality is very important. You can't keep that under the radars. Do you have those openly there?

[Mariam Sousi]

Yes, there was quite a few actually who were presenting what we call it is jihadi, call this Instagram influencer. And so while you would see the daily routines or them posing or driving or drinking coffee, whatever, again it's those indications where they used a pro is hashtag, a particular is nasheed. And that all signals to others on the platform that they are part of the is group, whether it's making hand gestures resembling firearms or physically engaging in strenuous activities to show that they're preparing themselves for future jihad.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

It seems that what they're doing is saying it's cool to be jihadist. And it's cool and it's okay normalizing this, being part of this society. But what's the message?

[Mariam Sousi]

I think it's more about how Islamic State can be presented now to a much younger audience. It's emotional, engaging material.

[Mina Alamy]

I think it's more kind of ideological recruitment. It's also a form of defiance and rebellion. The west present jihadistar backward, but this is a different presentation of female who are embracing and flaunting their hardline Islamist identity, if you like. And it doesn't look backward, it looks actually cool and edgy.

[Mariam Sousi]

And I think what is supporter accounts females as well is saying actually you can be part of this as well. Now it's more trendy. It's a younger audience where women can be part of this online group.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

It seems extremely subtle and it's playing perhaps on the appeal of this sense of belonging. We can belong wink wink, we know what we are about. Rather than pushing an extreme message to attack Western targets.

[Mina Alamy]

A lot of the jihadist messaging has been about the sense of belonging. And it is this wink, wink. We all know that we are part of this camp, if you like. And I think they have to shift to these more subtle and softer tactics if they want their message to resonate. I mean, if they have this ultra extreme, hard line, strict message online, this is not appealing to these young people. I think there is a definitely a trend on Instagram and TikTok that we have not been seeing on other platforms.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

You mean the trend of women taking part?

[Mina Alamy]

Women, but also even young men. So we're seeing a lot of young men flexing their muscles literally in gyms or on the streets, doing an acrobatic as well as tough guy look with their gym clothes, flaunting his muscles and all his moves. But you have the Ayas nasheed. So again, it is a wink, wink the jihadists always talk about. Even if we're not at war, then it is a phase of preparation. You train your body, you train on weapons. You have to be fit, you have to be ready. So even though these videos are not directly presented as this is part of our preparation, it is the context. If you're familiar with that narrative and with these spaces, you understand that the

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

platforms surely try to close these accounts, right? Or do they manage to stay under the radar.

[Mariam Sousi]

From my observations on Instagram and TikTok, both platforms were actively removing accounts. So if I came across an account and I would follow and then I would go back to check the content, I would actually find that account has been suspended. But it's the next day I would find a similar account has reappeared. And I think it's definitely a continuous cycle of removal and reemergence.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Whack a mole.

[Mina Alamy]

Yes, whack a mole indeed. And the challenge for platforms, from what we're seeing is that they're getting better at masking the content as the moderation gets tighter. These accounts are also adapting. They learn from that and say, okay, so next time we won't have the title of the IAS message or the Nasheed, we won't have that hashtag that refers to it.

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[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

This is the documentary from the BBC World Service. Let's get the obfuscation techniques under the magnifying glass on Instagram.

[Mariam Sousi]

This can be hashtags, stories or reels to exploit Instagram's Carousel feature that allows users to post several images into a single post and then users can swipe to access the different images of the Al Naba newspaper.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Al Naba is the Islamic State group's main publication.

[Mariam Sousi]

The front first image would be plain black and white, just referencing the name Al Nabba, the issue number and a release date in Arabic, but you would not actually see the publication until you scroll through it. Another account dedicated just to posting official Islamic State attack claims was mimicking a pan Arab news channel. It would use breaking news alerts in Arabic and then they would have the attack claim. Another tactic they would use is they insert English language letters into Arabic keywords or they would have a space between the letters. There was one account that was predominantly posting Islamic State memes and it Was referencing the Bondi beach attack in Sydney and one follower asked what had happened. In response, this account used a juice carton emoji and replied an attack on the Jews.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

That's Jews as in Jewish people.

[Mariam Sousi]

Yes.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

And that was a reference to Jews carton emoji.

[Mariam Sousi]

Yes.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

So those familiar emojis we all use are being repurposed and funneled into the obfuscation machine. Is supporting accounts drowning jihadist messages in love hearts.

[Mariam Sousi]

Love hearts are used to actually mask individuals associated with is such as the former IS leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi or prominent well known IS attackers as well. This was really predominant on TikTok to hide the image or change the meaning is they were adding either heart emojis or bows or flowers.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

What's the aim of all this?

[Mariam Sousi]

I would say it's the engagement that they're getting from these posts. One video featuring image of Mohammed Elwazi or Jihadi John from his school years attracted around 25,000 likes. It was saved more than 3,000 times and it was shared over 2,000 times by users. I guess they don't have large numbers of followers, but I think it's the amount of likes and interactions what they're looking for.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Mohammed Emwazi was a British IS member, notorious for taking part in beheading videos and responsible for the death of Syrian civilians, American journalists and British aid workers. And yet his image attracted tens of thousands of likes on the popular platforms.

[Mina Alamy]

We definitely haven't seen the same comparable level of engagement with pro IS posts on platforms like Facebook or Telegram, but similar posts on Instagram. They got thousands of likes, interactions or views pushing material and content to people who are not actively seeking that content.

[Mariam Sousi]

A lot of the users actually when referring to Islamic State use coded language. They use the term carrot state. They also have other references such as ice cream or pizza to reference the Islamic State and I guess is a tactic that they use to evade automated moderation systems. And I think what they're doing there is making the most of the wider trend of AI slot content, images of fruits and vegetables, talking or saying silly things. They're trying to tag along on that social media trend.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

This is different from the usual sources of jihadist material our team has been monitoring for years, which have severe limitations when it comes to reach.

[Mina Alamy]

On the encrypted app Telegram, where jihadists are mostly active, if I put a search word, it will only show me content that is posted by the people that I'm following, even if I use a hashtag. Whereas on Instagram and TikTok you put a hashtag, it can reach millions of people on the platform. And what these supporters are doing, they're not only using jihadist hashtags, they're exploiting popular mainstream hashtags because they want to reach unsuspecting audiences. You have these jihadist media operatives on the same platforms where you have some young people spend many hours of their day on these platforms.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

If jihadists are aiming for likes and shares as part of their recruitment drive, how do they turn the social media engagement into full blown radicalization?

[Mina Alamy]

The idea really is then to identify potential recruits who might be attracted to this or might be kind of curious clicking on this propaganda. And then these recruiters will try to move the conversation to more encrypted apps where they can communicate directly with these potential recruits. And once you click on the comments section, you will see a link taking you to Telegram or any other encrypted chat app. Or in many cases they will just simply put out manuals. Of course there's obfuscation. The front page will be an image of nature or something very innocuous. But when you click on it, it's a manual for bomb making or on how to use a weapon, how to stab a person in a fatal way. It could be kind of operational instructions that are posted on these platforms.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

You are listening to the global jigsaw from BBC monitoring. All of this suggests that jihadists are now using mainstream platforms and tools that to adapt their outreach tactics. And that also means adapting their methods

[Mina Alamy]

from the messaging by these groups. There definitely seems to be a move away from direct operational instructions or recruitment to do it yourself jihad, where they are outsourcing, pushing as much material as they can and constant incitement, constant messaging, glorifying the role specifically of young people who live in the West. There is always a message from Al Qaeda, from Ayah, saying to young people in the west that you are in a unique position to take action to what they say to avenge fellow Muslims. They're tapping into genuine Muslim anger, frustration, helplessness over, let's say, the suffering of Palestinians. They're saying violent action is one way how you can help Palestinians. The incitement is there, the narrative is already there. And here's also the instructions, the manuals. If you wanted to carry out lone wolf attacks, this is the shift.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

You don't really need to be a member to be useful to the cause. Jihadists are prepared to let go of the top down control structure to create ad hoc havoc.

[Mina Alamy]

And that's why of course, these platforms are crucial for Them they want to be where these young people are. They don't want to be in confined echo chambers. Is has pushed this argument that you don't need to be an operational member. All you need is in your heart believe in this cause and that as is in its words said, it makes you one of us.

[Platform Representative]

The guilty plea and sentencing of an 18 year old.

[Mina Alamy]

The suspect was motivated by an allegiance to ISIS. Teenager tried as an adult gets nearly 20 years. Safar in court saying he planned to join the Islamic State.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Worried he'd become fixated on ISIS, the parents sought help when he was 13. Now he's pleaded guilty to publishing violent ISIS videos on Instagram and email.

[Mina Alamy]

We can bring you more now on the sentencing of a teenager for encouraging terrorism.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

The number of teenagers arrested on terrorism charges is growing. So the stats would suggest that there is uptake of this kind of message among the young people. Would you say this is because they have found a way to reach these young people?

[Mina Alamy]

There was a rise in antisemitic attacks against Jewish targets in Western Europe. And in many of these cases, young teenagers were involved in these, according to authorities and media reports. Some of these people said, we don't really have any direct affiliation with this group that has recruited us, but it's all done online. In 2024 there was the case of I think a 15 year old in Switzerland who attacked a Jewish man. And he said that I took action based on the latest IS message online and is actually then paid tribute to that teenager. And after the Bondi beach attacks is said we inspired the attackers, is taunted governments in the west globally and they said, you will not be able to shut down our messages. You won't be able to end our influence. As long as digital communications exist, as long as the Internet exists, our message and influence will exist. Close an account or 5 or 10 or 100, we will still re emerge. It issued the same message after the New Orleans attack in January 2025. They took that as an example of is inspiration online.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

We asked TikTok and Meta what they're doing to prevent distribution of jihadist propaganda on their platforms. We voiced up their responses.

[Platform Representative]

Meta has one of the most comprehensive policies in the industry targeting terrorist organizations, hate groups and large scale criminal organizations. We do not allow organizations or individuals that proclaim a violent mission or are engaged in violence to have a presence on our platforms. We do not allow content that praises, supports or represents individuals or groups engaging in terrorist activity or organized hate. The Islamic State group is designated as a terrorist organization and is banned from our platforms. We do not allow the group or its supporters to maintain a presence, meaning we work to remove their accounts and remove content that glorifies, supports or represents them whenever we become aware of it. In the first half of this year, we took action on over 19 million pieces of terrorism content from Facebook and Instagram and nearly 2 million pieces of organized hate content.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

While Instagram has outlined the steps it's taking to address this issue, a number of accounts previously reported by our team remained active on the platform at the time of mixing this program on the 23rd of July, the company said their review of the flagged accounts is ongoing.

[TikTok Representative]

We have removed the content and banned the accounts involved for violating our policies. TikTok does not allow violent extremists, hateful organisations or individuals on the platform, nor content that promotes or supports them. We use a combination of technology and specialist moderation teams to enforce our rules with 99.6% of content removed under our violent and hateful organizations policy between January and March 2026, detected proactively before it was reported. We regularly train our safety professionals to help them better detect hateful behaviour, symbols, terms and offensive stereotypes, and to help them identify and protect counter speech. Once we remove these networks, we continue to track them and can quickly disrupt their attempts to re establish their presence on TikTok.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

For people like Mariam and Mina, it's not hard to spot jihadist footprints on mainstream platforms, but it's not so easy for the young people who inhabit these spaces.

[Mariam Sousi]

It's worrying because you have jihadist content that is mingling with mainstream content. Islamic State supporters are exploiting TikTok sounds, Western music, viral social media trends where users, and particularly young ones, may not be aware that they are watching or engaging in extremist material because it's presented in a softer, humorous manner as well.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

This danger is not lost on the UK counterterrorism police. They launched a campaign aimed at teenagers to showcase the potentially serious legal consequences of sharing extremist content online. Here's the message they posted on Instagram.

[Mariam Sousi]

I just got all my device taken

[Platform Representative]

away by the police.

[Mariam Sousi]

My mum couldn't believe it. I might get a criminal record and not be able to go to college. I only shared a link. I just thought it was funny. But it was terrorist content and that is not a game, it's real life.

[Mina Alamy]

One thing I'll add is a really concerning feature of Instagram and TikTok is the algorithms that recommend users for you to follow automatically. These platforms push more jihadist accounts and of course the Platform doesn't do that knowingly. It's more of a snowballing approach. You're constantly being offered more of these accounts and more of this content. That's an area that these platforms need to be aware of. All these platforms, they do suspend these jihadist accounts when it's very obvious. And they do complain all the time about their accounts being suspended. And sometimes when they re emerge, they say, this is my, I don't know, 50th account. Sometimes the handle itself has a number that represents the number of times that they've come back on the platform. So they do curse the people who run these platforms, but at the same time, they re emerge with defiance, with

[Mariam Sousi]

the addictive nature of social media, particularly TikTok as well. If you're constantly scrolling through, I would say, soft jihadist content that is humorous, whether it's an AI generated image of an IS fighter dancing to a techno nasheed. They've kind of altered and made up

[Mina Alamy]

a very high profile is nasheed or chant mixed with techno music, which we wouldn't really see on any other platforms. And that's a key difference compared to the other platforms.

[Mariam Sousi]

It becomes funny and acceptable and normalized over time. You're just scrolling through and I guess it kind of makes the user kind of more addicted to such content.

[Mina Alamy]

Is is always reminding supporters, almost shaming them, you're not fighting, you're not on the battlefront, you're not engaged in physical jihad. The least you can do is support the group online. It's a battle of wills. You have these dedicated, ideologically motivated individuals for whom the Internet is a crucial medium, crucial way to reach their target audiences. And they won't let go of it. In the same spaces where their narratives can compete with where millions of people are getting their news, entertainment, political views and positions. They want to be there and be able to kind of compete.

[Krasi Ivanova Twig]

Thank you to Mina Al Lami and Mariam Sousi for keeping a watchful eye on the challenges posed by jihadist supporters on mainstream social media for users and platforms alike. This is the documentary from the BBC World Service. This episode of the Global Jigsaw was produced by Krysta Satouri, Elchin Suleymanov and me, Krasi Vanovatvik. The sound engineer was John Boland. If you like this episode, check out our podcast feed for more jihadism related stories. And if you want to find out more about BBC monitoring, you can do so by visiting our website monitoring.BBC.co.uk Bye for now.