Podcast Summary: How the World Sees America, With Adam Tooze

The Ezra Klein Show – January 30, 2026

Overview:

Ezra Klein hosts historian Adam Tooze for an in-depth discussion on how America's position in the global order is changing, set against the backdrop of the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos. The conversation explores the collapse of the old world order, America’s shifting self-conception and projection of power, the role of China, and whether a new order is being born—or if we are simply living through an era of monsters.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Davos 2026: A Global Reckoning

• The Mood at Davos: Both Klein and Tooze emphasize how this year’s World Economic Forum marked a clear recognition that the era of American global hegemony is over.
  • Tooze describes witnessing the Trump administration’s unfiltered global showcase:

    “It was truly shocking… this was the first real global showcase of the Trump administration on the global stage, really doing its thing uninhibitedly… It just left you. There was no way out after that.” (04:15–06:24)

• Mark Carney’s Speech: Carney, Canada’s Prime Minister, explicitly declared the world is not in transition, but rupture.
  • Tooze highlights how this moment diverges from past, more seamless transitions:

    “Folks, it’s been more like an earthquake… The transition, if you think of the tectonic plates of the world economy, has jarred. And that is what we now have to reckon with… more to do with… the culture of international community.” (07:33–09:19)

2. The End of the “Old Order”—Biden, Trump, and Competing Visions of Power

• Biden as Atlantic Interlude: Tooze sees the Biden years as a last-ditch restoration of US-led liberal order, with a nostalgic belief in America’s exceptional leadership.
  • “It was a MAGA; it was a make America great again, but just nice and positive and liberal and all of that.” (12:24–12:32)
• Trump’s Approach: Differentiated from classic nationalism, characterized more by blunt patriotism and seeing America as beset by external losses from globalization.
  • “He’s not really even a proper nationalist. He doesn’t even really believe it… They also have this extraordinary narrative of the United States as the loser… And all of those things were kind of a threat to the containment of American power and American wealth.” (13:48–15:08)
• Conceptions of Power: Trump’s team focuses on material displays—“big, powerful artifacts,” investment coming in, and overt signs of dominance.
  • “Big, powerful artifacts seem to be an important part of their understanding of what power is… These people aren’t bringing industrial factories.” (16:47–17:39)

3. China’s Role: From Specter to Central Actor

• China at Davos: Chinese leaders stick to a globalist, multilateralist script, presenting themselves as champions of dialogue and cooperation.
  • “If anyone still speaks pure Davos, it’s the Chinese… At Davos, China advocates a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. We are committed to building bridges, not walls.” (19:16–21:02)
• Impact on Europe: Chinese electric vehicles threaten the core of Europe’s economy, while alignment with Russia on Ukraine acts as a wedge between Europe and the US.
  • “The Chinese EV invasion is killing the Germans… And Beijing’s alignment with Putin over Ukraine is the wedge...” (21:34–22:42)
• China as the Silent Engine: China’s capacity for rapid industrial transformation—building rail, homes, and green energy at unprecedented scales—has shaped the global context.
  • “They built more concrete in three years than the United States in the 20th century… all in 30 years, essentially.” (40:07–41:54)
  • On green energy: “China by the early 2000s was in a position to roll out enough solar… to get the world onto a climate stabilization track… The Chinese have created the industrial capacity to actually get a key component… for the entire planet.” (41:54–42:30)

4. America’s Sclerosis vs. China’s Dynamism

• Perceptions of Decline and Inequality: Both the US’s internal division and the perception of Chinese rapid progress have shaped American political psychology.
  • Klein: “Our society was becoming sclerotic. And yet you could see this incredible rapidity, like cities coming up in China, what felt like overnight.” (28:01–29:12)
  • Tooze: “American politics in its deep fabric is so static, so afraid of change… Whereas Chinese government... continuously reinvents what the party is and how it governs...” (30:30–31:45)
• Limits of American Innovation: While the US excels in finance and technology, its physical infrastructure and governance have become sluggish; China, by contrast, orchestrates mass physical transformation.
  • “What could you point to in America that resulted from the Obama stimulus? You’d have to be an expert to know. In China it’s a railway system unlike any in the world…” (39:26–39:58)

5. Competing Approaches to Energy and Industrial Policy

• Climate and Power: A central theme is how energy policy embodies the new rivalry—Trump prioritizes hydrocarbons, Biden sought green tech, while China outpaces both in green transition.
  • “One of the things… we can all agree power is based on is energy. But for the Trump administration, it is petrofuels… For China, which is nevertheless doing a lot of hydrocarbons, but it is in the future... the fight is going to be energy.” (44:33–45:22)
• Failure of Western Politics: Tooze notes Western inability to capitalize globally on China’s green capacity.
  • “The fundamental failure of Western politics… is to say, no, thank you very much, we’d like to argue about this, that and the other… We cannot right now organize the global politics necessary to fund that, to roll it out.” (41:54–42:30)

6. Is There a New World Order Emerging?

• Multipolarity, Not Hegemony: Tooze disputes that the world is moving towards a classic, stable new order, arguing that we may be moving into an era of overlapping, messy attempts at order rather than a singular regime.
  • “I’m dying on the hill that we’re not even in an interregnum… We have one example of the transition from a British centered model to the US model. Why do we assume that something follows?” (58:00–58:26)
• Desire for Predictability vs. Chaotic Reality: Klein and Tooze discuss the urge among global elites (from Carney to Chinese officials) to seek predictable rules—but with Trump’s unpredictability and increasing global complexity, such order is elusive.
  • “Germans are really addicted to this order thinking. There’s even a school of German economics called ordoliberalism… If you’re looking for order, you’ll never see it. But if you’re looking for ordering attempts, actions, the pragmatic approach… it’s all around us already.” (61:03–61:40)

7. How China and America See Each Other

• America’s View of China: Often casts China as an authoritarian, job-stealing, industrial competitor.
• China’s View of America: Both admires and fears American power, sees the US as conspiratorial, but also pragmatic and at times baffling.
  • “Deeply convinced that America has its finger in every pie, deeply convinced of the most conspiratorial views of the Ukraine war… On the other hand, bemused.” (54:07–55:18)
  • Tooze notes the Trump administration, paradoxically, has proven more practical and deal-oriented in dealings with China than Biden’s more ideologically coherent—if hawkish—approach.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the collapse of the old order:
  “This was the first real global showcase of the Trump administration on the global stage, really doing its thing uninhibitedly... It was truly sobering.” —Adam Tooze (04:15)

• On Biden’s restorationism:
  “It was a MAGA; it was a make America great again, but just nice and positive and liberal and all of that.” —Ezra Klein (12:24)

• On China’s scale:
  “They built more concrete in three years than the United States in the 20th century… Every house… all in 30 years, essentially.” —Adam Tooze (40:07)

• On energy and climate:
  “China by the early 2000s was in a position to roll out enough solar… to actually get the world onto a climate stabilization track… this is the central question.” —Adam Tooze (41:54)

• On multipolarity and the myth of stability:
  “If you’re looking for order, you’ll never see it. But if you’re looking for ordering attempts... it’s all around us already.” —Adam Tooze (61:03)

• On watching China’s rise:
  “We’re in the position of people watching the pyramids being built, not afterwards.” —Adam Tooze (38:45)

Timestamps for Major Segments

| Timestamp | Topic | |---------------|-----------| | 01:02–03:50 | Introduction, Gramsci quote, the “time of monsters” | | 04:15–06:24 | Davos as a moment of global dismay with US leadership | | 07:33–09:19 | The meaning of Carney's "rupture," end of old order | | 10:37–12:32 | The Biden administration as an Atlanticist restoration | | 13:22–15:08 | Trump’s approach to power, nationalism, and globalization | | 16:47–18:59 | Trump admin’s conception of material power vs. Biden camp | | 19:09–21:02 | China’s role at Davos, contrasting messaging | | 21:34–22:42 | Europe, China, and the Ukraine wedge | | 28:01–29:12 | America’s internal sclerosis vs. China’s speed | | 39:26–41:54 | China's industrial transformation and green policy | | 44:33–45:22 | Energy as the new ground for power competition | | 58:00–61:40 | Is a new world order emerging? Multipolarity, not order | | 62:10–63:21 | Danger of seeing the future as American vs. Chinese order |

Book Recommendations by Adam Tooze (63:25)

1. Lu Xun, Diary of a Madman – Modern Chinese novella exploring social delirium.
2. Jonathan Chatwin, The Southern Tour – On Deng Xiaoping’s pivotal trip, China’s opening ('92).
3. Ryan Ruby, Context Collapse – Long-form poem on poetry’s history and its collapse in modern culture.

Conclusion

This episode surveys a historical turning point: the collapse of the Atlantic, rules-based order and the messy birth of something new—but undefined. The scale and dynamism of China's transformation are recognized as both awe-inspiring and analytically confounding, while Western politics is portrayed as trapped between nostalgia and risk aversion. Tooze and Klein agree: the future won’t mirror the past. Instead, expect a world of improvisational, overlapping orderings—a time of monsters, but also of profound, ambiguous possibility.