Ezra Klein (7:45)

Thanks very much for having me, Ezra.

Yuval Levin (7:46)

So we're a solid few weeks into the second Trump administration. Tell me how you're interpreting what we've seen so far.

Ezra Klein (7:54)

Well, let me give you a kind of middle aged answer to this question. I'm 47. I've been in Washington since I was 18, with a little break for graduate school. I've seen presidential terms since George W. Bush's first. And one thing you learn over that time is that the first few weeks of a new administration are really surreal. They're very different from the rest of the time because the administration controls the agenda. And that isn't really the case most of the time, but in the first few weeks they've made plans and you don't know those plans. Generally they do, and they're rolling them out in a certain pace at a certain way, and it just feels like they are in command of the world. So I think that it's natural in that period to think, wow, these people are really in control. The opposition is totally on the ground, on their backs. They don't know how to respond to this. That's always what it feels like. That happened with Bush, it happened with Obama, it's happened with Trump, it even happened with Biden, if we can remember, four years ago. And it doesn't take very long for that to break. The opposition is back and organized pretty quickly. That takes a couple of weeks maybe. And the world comes back at you too. And the rest of the time, presidents spend a lot of their energy just responding to the world and what it throws at them, and they're judged by how they do that. That's definitely going on here. And so it's very hard still to judge what we're looking at. I think a lot of people have come in with a very strong prejudice that this time the Trump team is much more competent. They have a much better idea of not only what they want to do, but how. And a lot of what we've seen is actually a lot like what the first terms, first few weeks felt like. There's a lot of ambition, there's a lot of action, there's more than there was the first time. But there's also a kind of inclination to chaos that I think is actually intentional. That's part of what they're trying to do. And it didn't really work all that well the first time. And I'm not sure it's working all that well this time. So I have a mixed impression. I think it's just too early to say.

Yuval Levin (10:16)

Say more about your sense that there is a real effort to show energy, to show competence. Trump people are all over the media right now saying, see, we Told you we had it in hand this time, and we really did.

Ezra Klein (10:32)

Yeah. They certainly want to convey that. I think there was a sense that things the first time really started out rough. They actually had had a transition effort, you know, run by Chris Christie, that produced some concrete plans, and all of it was literally thrown away in a huff at Chris Christie, basically. And they started out on day one with just not all that much prepared. That is different this time. This time they've come in with a lot prepared. You know, eos that have been worked out for a while and that have been thought through and lawyered and all of that. That is a little different than last time. And they do have experience. Some of the people they've brought in, you know, were in the administration last time. And therefore they know where the meeting's happening. They know where the bathroom is. That's different. It makes a difference. But I think that we are also seeing the same kind of inclination to chaos and maladministration that we saw last time in some very important ways. They've had a really hard time talking about the government in the first person, seeing themselves as the people governing. They're still approaching government as something they act on rather than act through. And so I think a good example of that is the freeze on federal grants that we've just seen come and go pretty quickly. That felt a lot like the travel ban from the first time. And in fact, as soon as it happened, I went online and said, when was the travel ban? And so the travel ban was a week after the inauguration. It was January 27th of 2017. The freeze on federal funding was also a week after the inauguration was January 27, exactly eight years later. And they had a lot in common. They were both bold kind of steps that tried to do something big all at once, and they were not thought through in practical administrative terms. What's this going to look like on the ground? And it's because they're thinking about presidential power as a concrete reality and the people affected as an abstraction, when it's actually the other way around. Here's how this would have happened in the Bush years. And I don't suggest that George W. Bush was the model of governance in every way, but I worked there, and this is how it would have happened. You would have had a meeting at Ombuds, where you bring in the chiefs of staff or senior political appointees from the various cabinet departments, lay out for them what's in this memo, what is it gonna mean for you, and then take hard questions and some Stupid questions so you can work through what is this really gonna produce that we're not thinking about? And somebody in the back of that room would have raised his hand and said, well, so are we shutting down the Medicaid payment portal? And somebody at OMB would have said, well, no, we're saying this doesn't affect payments to individuals. And the guy would have said, well, those payments actually go to hospitals. Am I supposed to shut them down? And it would have been a conversation. They would have said, no, we're not touching Medicaid. Instead, what happened was they just did this. And the guy who runs the Medicaid payment portal in Baltimore shut it down. And there was a banner on the website that says, we're shutting it down because OMB told us to. That kind of practical chaos. OMB exists to avoid that. And they're clearly not working to avoid it.

Yuval Levin (13:54)

Well, this goes to this question of how they view the government that they now run. You said a minute ago that they don't look at it as the first person. They look at it as something they act upon. I would go a little further than that. They look at it as the enemy. They look at it as the thing they have to conquer. And if you go through a lot of what they are trying to do, most notably the OMB freeze memo, which is also written in a very hostile tone to the government and to the bureaucracy. But you look at the fork in the road email sent out, mirroring an earlier email Elon Musk sent to, I believe it was Twitter employees then. What they are trying to do is to effectuate a very, very large change in who is in the federal government, because they believe the federal government is full of people who hate them and will not carry out their plans. And their theory of what to do about it, seeming built on how Elon Musk treated Twitter when he took it over, is to try to do a buyout, try to make people miserable, try to create a lot of chaos and just drive everyone out and assume that a lot of those people are doing jobs that don't need to be done. They're waste. And you can keep running Twitter at a much smaller staff and maybe you can do the same thing for the federal government. But also you're creating vacanc that you can then fill with your people. They're giving loyalty tests to people. They're asking people they're trying to hire. When was your MAGA awakening moment? This isn't just acting upon the government. This is sort of viewing it as the opposition is the government they run, and this is a set of strategies to either cow it or take it over. You're somebody who thinks a lot about public administration. How are you seeing that side of it?

Ezra Klein (15:36)

They do come in with a sense that the bureaucracy is hostile to them and has to be fought, but they also come in with a sense that chaos can serve their purposes. And I think these are two different assumptions and that the second one is profoundly mistaken. So the buyout is a very, very interesting experiment. A lot of these folks do just want to do their jobs, but there are some among them who really are very hostile to the administration's intentions. The question is, how do you deal with that? How do you make your way through it? Now, look, in the long term, there's certainly an argument for driving some churn in federal employment, for driving some turnover, for bringing in some new blood. I can see that. But in the medium term, and politics is a medium term business, in the medium term, this is gonna bring chaos. So think, for example, about what they're doing to their new political appointees. You have all these people who are just now getting confirmed by the Senate, they're coming into these departments, some of them are quite new to these place, some of them maybe have been there before. And they're coming in as, I don't know what, a tenth, a fifth of their workforce is going through a long term resignation process. And those people have not been chosen on the basis of any sense of which jobs are most important, which people are doing the best work, what government functions are most essential, what actually has to be done by law, none of that. This is all happening on the basis of who finds it attractive to not work until September while getting paid and then take another job. That means they're going to come in with chaos. And the way they're approaching it is rooted, I think, in a Silicon Valley argument that says creative destruction is how you learn. Break things and then see how they fall and you can build something new. And the civil service just isn't going to work that way. That's not really how this system can learn.

Yuval Levin (17:37)

There's also a theory of who the federal employees are. And I think implicitly here they're imagining the federal employees are highly political. So you might imagine somebody who's in the civil service, but they work at the Department of Energy and they care very deeply about climate change or they're not needed. A view Elon Musk has had at different companies and similarly at Twitter, was that there was just a lot of people doing jobs that didn't need to be done. But of course, Twitter broke a lot and is even now technically, in many ways, very degraded. Some things work very well. Other things don't work at all. I don't know that that theory matches much of the federal workforce. So to give a concrete example, a lot of people who work for the government are doctors. They are, among other things, VA doctors. Now, if a bunch of VA doctors, primary care VA doctors, who have no political role in the federal government at all, decide, you know what? These people don't value me, this is annoying. I could do nothing until September and then get a job delivering primary care that is more lucrative elsewhere. Now, all of a sudden, you've knocked out, let's call it, 15% of the VA health system's primary care workforce. Is that good for the Trump administration? Their perspective, do they have a view on how to replace those people with people they feel are more ideologically compatible or better or more excellent quickly? Or are you just causing long wait times at the VA that people are going to be mad at you about? And maybe no one thing is that politically important. But mirrored across all the different things federal government does, I'm not sure that works out. I'm not sure they thought about VA primary care doctors taking the buyout at all.

Ezra Klein (19:33)

Yeah, there's 3 million people who work for the federal government, and I think a lot of people's sense of who the kind of modal federal employee is is probably off. I mean, I would say now people probably think it's somebody who lives in Washington and works from home and shuffles paper. And that's not actually a very common type in federal employment. Most federal employees don't live in or near D.C. and there are real functions to perform here. It's also worth remembering that the federal workforce is about as big now as it was 50 years ago. The government has a lot more contractors than it did then. It's taken on a lot of things, but it hasn't really grown the federal workforce much, which means that in those really essential functions that only government employees could do, the federal workforce is actually stretched pretty thin in some important places. We shouldn't underestimate how much we've assigned to our government and how much would be left undone if there weren't people doing it. If you saw a lot of attrition in the fda, the effects of that would be pretty serious. It's actually quite important that the agencies that keep us safe and healthy operate and do their basic work. This is the basic challenge of administration in a system, as big as we're talking about is that there are a lot of effects on the ground that it's possible to think through if you involve the different parts of the system in coming up with the reform. But it's very hard to think through if you're just sitting in a room and coming up with it on your own or just throwing it out there, because it's something that worked at Twitter.

Yuval Levin (21:07)

And you don't have very much experience in the government, as Musk and his crew do not.

Ezra Klein (21:12)

It runs deeper than that because the federal workforce is constrained by a challenge that isn't really present in the private sector, which is that there are salary caps that prevent you from paying the most qualified people the kinds of pay they could get in the private sector. Which means that places like not just the va, but the fda, nih, all the Commerce Department sub agencies, those places are full of people who spend their day sitting across the table from private sector people that they're regulating or working with and thinking, I have the same skill set as this guy, but he's got a much nicer house. Why am I working at the FDA rather than at Pfizer? And now there's an answer to that question. And a lot of people in those jobs really enjoy them. They like them and they have real significance and authority and that matters to people. But in the federal government, those are the people who are marginally attached to their job who are constantly thinking, you know, I gotta pay for my kids college in a few years, shouldn't I be working at a much higher paying contractor job or private sector job? So that when you make an offer like this buyout offer, it's those people who are thinking, maybe I don't really want to do this job. Whereas the people who are thinking, I can't get another job, I got to stick with this one, I'll do whatever they want. Those are probably your lower performing employees, or at least your less valuable employees. So that you're creating a situation where the people who are going to be hardest to replace are the people who are most likely to leave.

Yuval Levin (22:49)

This goes to something that I think has been paradoxical about the beginning of Trump's second term. As you said, they've had a lot more time to plan, and they did spend a lot more time planning. Things like the various policy efforts, including most famously Project 2025, do reflect a lot of people in think tanks and allied organizations coming up with theories of what you might do. One thing though, that is really clear is that they do not want to do the hard work of legislating on these questions. So, as you mentioned, there's a lot that is complex about the way we have constructed civil service rules, and it could use pretty profound reform. And you might imagine Donald Trump and Elon Musk and some of these people coming in and trying to use a political capital they've built to pass a pretty broad set of civil service reforms that allow for much more aggressive management of the civil service by the executive. You can justify that publicly in terms of promoting excellence and flexibility and agility and making sure the work of the American people gets done, even if what you actually want to do with it, at least partly, is use this new power to get rid of the woke deep state. But they didn't do any of that. So they actually don't have all the power they might need to do that. And they have a very, very narrow margin in the House and there's a filibuster in the Senate. And so it'd be very hard for them to do something big legislatively. But that movement to executive authority, which looks very strong and overwhelming, it seems to me in some ways to be an admission of weakness or at least of insufficient planning. They definitely did not walk out of the door with a well formed public message and legislative proposal that would allow them to remake the federal bureaucracy from the ground up. Instead, you have this slapdash buyout effort and yelling at people and freezing money that you then rescind. And they're also activating functionally a maximum of opposition, including, from what I can tell, inside the federal bureaucracy were a lot of people who were kind of planning to leave, now feel offended, and the more ideological among them are digging in their heels.

Ezra Klein (25:12)

I think the key to that point is in the sense that they're trying to look strong, but not doing it in a way that actually is strong. They face a very challenging fact. As much as they want to act as though they've just won a massive election victory and they now dominate everything, they've actually won a very narrow election victory. And their majorities in Congress, especially in the House, are very, very narrow. The House majority is the narrowest majority we've seen since there have been 50 states. And that means they can't get much through Congress on their own. And the administration is operating so far without really any sense that they need to get anything through Congress except the one big reconciliation bill that'll take care of taxes and spending for the year. They're not thinking in terms of how to advance their agenda as A legislative agenda. The secret to strong executive authority has a lot to do with stability. The kind of sense of security that an effective administration can provide depends on knowing where you're headed and moving there incrementally in a way that allows you to achieve big things without making people scared of what you're up to. I think the logic of administrative power that we're seeing operating here so far is just about the opposite of that. It's the sense that you show strength by coming in and tearing everything down and starting everything over and doing big things right away at the start, so that there's a kind of shock and awe that leaves people thinking, wow, these people are really assertive. And that has happened. I think people do have that sense. And obviously there are some advantages you gain by conveying that sense. You do scare people into doing what you want. Some, and you do give the impression that you're strong. But ultimately, it's very hard to make durable change in that way. Part of the reason, I do think is exactly as you say, that durable change actually requires legislation. In our system, anything that isn't legislated isn't durable. But part of it is also just the sense that doing everything right away, everything at the start, and creating this sense of disjunction, of a break, actually doesn't give people the impression that things are under control. It gives people the impression that things are out of control.

Jonathan Swan (28:02)

I'm Jonathan Swan. I'm a White House reporter for the New York Times. I have a pretty unsentimental view of what we do. Our job as reporters is to dig out information that powerful people don't want published, to take you into rooms that you would not otherwise have access to, to understand how some of the big decisions shaping our country are being made. And then painstakingly to go back and check with sources, check with public documents, make sure the information is correct. This is not something you can outsource to AI. There's no robot that can go and talk to someone who was in the Situation Room and find out what was really said in order to get actually original information that's not public, that requires human sources. We actually need journalists to do that. So, as you may have gathered from this long riff, I'm asking you to consider subscribing to the New York Times. Independent journalism is important, and without you, we simply can't do it.

Yuval Levin (29:04)

In the Office of Management and Budget memo that froze the spending that later got rescinded, they give a number of justifications for what they're doing. But one of them struck me as interesting from a perspective of political theory, of how our political system is supposed to work. The memo reads, career and political appointees in the executive branch have a duty to align federal spending and action with the will of the American people as expressed through presidential priorities. What do you think of that?

Ezra Klein (29:35)

Well, a lot depends on exactly what they mean by presidential priorities here. So the OMB memo is about federal grants and loans. And the thing about grants and loans is they're not specified. Their recipients are not specified in law. They are an amount of money that is designated for a specific purpose. And then the executive branch is charged with deciding among applicants who should receive them. And in making those decisions, there is a large amount of discretion afforded to the executive branch. Those grants do represent the President's priorities. And, you know, in a sense, they could have done what this memo wants to do without the pause. They could have just told all the agencies, review all the grants you're giving. And if there are places where they clearly violate one of these new executive orders or something else on this list we give you, you're empowered to stop that now and provide the grant to another recipient or open it back up for competition. They could have done that without a pause and therefore without the chaos. I think the decision to stop it all is a way of asserting a kind of authority over all federal spending and saying, congress says how much we should spend, but the President says on what? And that's a fight. They want to have a fight over impoundment, where they want to suggest that the President basically has the authority to take Congress's legislative authorizations for spending as just a kind of beginning. And fundamentally, this is an executive decision. There is a kind of presidentialism here that is, I think, rooted in ultimately in a kind of progressive presidentialism, a Woodrow Wilson argument, that the President speaks for the country, only the President speaks for the entire country, and therefore presidential actions are more legitimate than congressional actions and, as you say, represent the will of the public. I think they're wrong about this. I think they're ultimately going to fail in court on that front, but they are trying to make that assertion.

Yuval Levin (31:45)

You know, I found myself thinking back to how many conversations I had over the Obama era, particularly, but not only with Tea Party and Freedom Caucus types in the House. And they would tell me that they were constitutional conservatives and that their real problem with Obama, with liberalism, going back, as you just mentioned, to Woodrow Wilson, was that it's given too much power to the President, that it has diminished the constitutionally mandated centrality of Congress. That. And now I'm watching some of these same people, certainly many people among the House Republicans, cheer on these moves from Donald Trump. I'm watching the head Republican appropriator say he thinks impoundment is a totally reasonable thing, where the president sort of holds the money and decides whether or not he's going to spend it. And I find it truly impossible to reconcile their support of this presidency with those views, which I at least took as sincere at the time they were being expressed. You were always much closer to this than I was to these people, to these arguments. You've written a book about the Constitution recently. How do you think about what you're seeing from people who, I think, in other contexts you've seen express themselves as constitutional conservatives very concerned with executive overreach?

Ezra Klein (33:12)

I think there's always a certain amount of where you sit, determining where you stand. When people talk about politics and everybody does this on, sure, I do it, too, where. When the people you like are powerful in Congress, but not in the White House, you talk a lot about the importance of Congress. We're going to see Democrats do this over the next two years, for example, and when it's the other way around, you talk the other way around. But there's also an actual principled difference about the nature of the Constitution between a lot of Republicans and a lot of Democrats. And I think what we've seen over the last 15 years is a kind of uneasy combination of both of these things. To my mind, this is the way to worry about the Trump administration. A lot of what they want to do in terms of the political valence of federal public policy are things that I agree with. A lot of what they want to do in terms of driving us away from DEI and towards a more kind of colorblind federal policy, I think is great and very important. What they're doing on education policy so far, I think is very good. I'm going to agree with them about a lot of things. I'm a conservative, but the approach to the structure of the system worries me a lot. I worry about constitutionalism more than about public policy in this moment. And I think ultimately constitutionalism is more important than public policy. And the two biggest worries that I have about the constitutional system, not just now, but in general, first of all, are the weakness of Congress. I think a lot of our other problems come from that fact. And secondly is the overbearing and arbitrary character of the administrative state. And so far, it seems to me that both of those problems are going to get worse in the next four years and not better. Certainly the weakness of Congress, where a lot of Republican members now just want to surrender their power to a president they now like. And so they talk in terms of. I heard a member of the House say to another during the debate over the vote on the speaker at the beginning of this Congress, saying, well, President Trump should have the speaker that he wants. That is not how our Constitution works. And Congress should have a sense of its own authority and its own dignity that is distinct from the president. And on the other hand, I think this rushing in with arbitrary power and assertions of authority at the beginning of a new administration suggests that even though I may like the policy direction that the administrative agencies are going to take in this administration, they're going to continue to act in an arbitrary and overbearing way that creates enormous problems for our system of government.

Yuval Levin (35:45)

You've written that our usual approach to the separation of powers leaves us imagining that there is a fungible commodity called power that the different branches of our government exercise. So the question is, who has more or less of it? So it's definitely what I see Trump doing right now. He is arrogating more power to the executive. It's also something I've watched, I think, at a smaller level, but nevertheless, Democratic presidents do. The argument you make is that that's the wrong way to look at it. So what's the right way?

Ezra Klein (36:16)

Yeah, the separation of powers is not just a division of power into three, so that it's a little safer because it's divided. Power is channeled through three different kinds of institutions. The first one, the primary one, is a legislature. And the reason it's primary is that the legislature is representative of the American public. The president is elected, but the president was not thought of as a representative figure. That office is one person in a vast country. One person can't really represent that vast country. That has to be done by a plural institution like Congress. And Congress has a specific kind of work. It frames out, it builds out frameworks of law that are then going to direct the work of administration in the future. The president administers. And the idea of administration is almost lost to us now. We think of what the president does basically as saying, this is what should happen, and then things happen. But actually, the most important part of the president's job is the making of those things happen. It is the working of the arms of government, of the various tools and implements, to actually turn will into action. And the courts have a different job than both of those. They review past actions and determine whether they were in line with the legal frameworks that Congress had created or with the Constitution. These are very different ways of using power. They're not just power divided into three. And the different ways matter enormously. The interactions between them are really what create the dynamics of our system of government. I think our presidents, now, this has certainly been true of Donald Trump in his first term and now, but it's also true of the rest of our modern presidents, have a conception of their job that's very legislative. They think their job is to produce those frameworks, to do it through administrative action. And essentially, when Congress can't act, the president will. Right. Barack Obama actually said that basically in those words. But every modern president has acted as though he believes that. I think that's profoundly wrong and creates huge problems for our system. But among the problems it creates is that the other branches respond to this by also not doing their jobs. None of this is how our system is meant to work. And I think at the center of why this has happened is actually the failure of Congress to take ownership of the direction of the system.

Yuval Levin (38:48)

But is how our system is meant to work a relevant concept, given how different our system has evolved to be? I think it is fair to say that the fundamental institutions of American political life now are not the branches, but the parties. And the reason the president acts the way you mention him acting is not that he's the head of the executive branch. It's that he's the head of the party that controls the executive branch. And so he sets the priorities and the direction. And as much as we might want to lionize the structure of our government, believing it could ever work in the way it was intended to work, when we have these political parties that have fundamentally remade the structure such that the branches are subordinate to the parties is a kind of folly.

Ezra Klein (39:47)

Well, I think the reason to look to how the Constitution is intended to work is not to lionize the past, but to address exactly the problems we have now. The most stark fact about the American party system in the 21st century is that it's failing. Both parties are failing. Neither one has been able to form a durable majority coalition in 30 years. And that has left our politics intensely divided, bitterly polarized, very dysfunctional. And the question we have to ask ourselves is, what can we do about this? I think it's worth our looking to the Constitution because there are answers there to what we can do about it, not because that was some kind of sacred moment at the end of the 18th century. And they knew all this stuff we don't know. I don't think that's right. We know a lot of things they didn't know. We are better than they were in a lot of ways. But they did create a system that is distinctly capable of compelling narrow coalitions to broaden. The logic of the American Constitution is that only majority rule is legitimate, but majorities are very dangerous to minorities. And that means that we want a system that forces majorities to grow and broaden before they are empowered. This is what's frustrating about our system. Right. You win an election, you still can't do anything. And the reason for that is that the system wants you to first broaden your coalition before you're really able to act. We really resist that now. We don't wanna do it. We live in a 50, 50 moment. And you win 50% plus one, you treat it as this massive, you know, Donald Trump just won 49.8% of the vote in a presidential election. Kamala Harris got 48.3% of the vote. And the Trump folks wanna say, we won, we won big. We get to act. Now, the Constitution says no, you have to deal with the people you defeated in the election. And they won their seats in Congress, they won control of various state governments. They are still here, and you have to deal with them. To think about our system only through the lens of the parties is to reject that logic. Now, that's one way to do democracy, Right? That's how the parliamentary systems work. Those are legitimate democratic systems. But I think our system is better for us. Exactly. Because it doesn't allow us to work that way and ultimately prefers to produce legitimate public action over producing efficient public action. It forces us to build coalitions that include more people. I think that's what we're missing now.

Yuval Levin (42:27)

One way I take Trump is as a reaction to a feeling of governmental sclerosis. Right? When he wins, when he says, I alone can fix it, he is not just saying that he is the only answer, but he is saying that he is an answer to this thing that you have become disappointed in. I was looking at Tom Emmer, the Republican whip, his reaction to some of Trump's early moves here. And again, you can imagine a political system where Republicans in Congress are furious at the amount of authority Trump is pulling into his own domain. But he says, you're gonna see things like this and your first reaction is gonna be, well, this isn't the way it's been done. You need to understand, he. He being Trump, was elected to shake up the status quo. And I do think when, when I try to take the arguments here at their most generous, what I see is an argument that the system has become unresponsive. And so this, there is this tension between the wisdom of the slowdown and the coalition building that you describe. And I don't know what I think I observed now over a number of presidencies with Trump in some ways being the most extreme response to it, which is as people become more and more frustrated by their inability to build those coalitions, they begin to turn to people who pose a much more fundamental challenge to the system itself and simply refuse to respect its boundaries, its limits. And the trade being offered is bring me in and yes, I'll break the system, but then I will make it respond to you.

Ezra Klein (44:13)

I think the question that I'm left with from that description is responsive to what? To whom? Our problem right now is not that there is this American majority out there that's trying to get its will into action and the system is resisting it. Our problem is that there isn't an American majority out there. The elections of the last 30 years have produced 50, 50 results over and over. If you look at American political life at almost any moment in our history, you would find a majority coalition holding a very, very complicated kind of coalition together and struggling to keep it hanging together. And you find a minority party struggling to build and broaden its coalition and become a majority. Both those parties are engaged in coalition building, which is how our system is intended to work. In the last 30 years, and there's really only been one other period like this at the end of the 19th century, which lasted about 20 years, we've had two minority parties at the same time. This is a 50, 50 moment. And the challenge is there isn't a clear majority. Will, what we need from our system is not help empowering the majority. What we need from our system is help informing a broader majority. I think we've arrived at this place because we've moved too far from the original intentions of the American constitutional system, which is meant to operate with Congress at its center, building coalitions, negotiating across party lines. So that frustration with this moment should not lead us to abandon that system, but to recover that system. We've had a two party system for a long time, at least since 1824, in some ways since 1800, so that the system has actually worked as a two party constitutional system almost from the beginning. What it's failing to do now is facilitate bargaining and deal making across those lines. There's not an easy way to do it, but I think to do it would require, first of all, recognizing that that's what we're not doing. The diagnosis makes a big difference, because if the problem is just we're not passing big bills, then you want Congress to be more efficient. So you want to get rid of the filibuster. You want to strengthen party leaders, strengthen party discipline. If you think the problem is we're not facilitating bargaining across party lines, then you love the filibuster, as I do. It's the only reason we've had any bipartisan legislation in the last 15 years. You don't want to strengthen party leaders. You want to strengthen committees. You want to decentralize the budget process. The difference over which way we should go is very, very important for figuring out how to resolve the kind of frustration we have now, because I don't think presidentialism is going to resolve it. I agree that it is a response to that frustration, but it is a response that isn't going to work. And a better response would begin from a reacquaintance with the logic of our Constitution.

Yuval Levin (47:06)

You know, many more Republican members of the House than I do, you know, many Republican members of the Senate. One of the things that always I find strange about the people I know in both parties who serve in these offices is that on the one hand, you really do need to nurse a healthy ego and a healthy sense of your own potential consequence in American life and history to seek these offices and succeed in them. It's very, very hard to do it from a place of deep modesty. And on the other hand, these people get to these offices, and then they don't seem that interested in wielding the power they might have. Again, I am struck by how much Republicans in the House don't seem to want much authority in this presidency. They seem to understand their role as blocking and tackling for Donald Trump, not being empowered by him and having somebody who will sign their bills. Why?

Ezra Klein (48:15)

Yeah, this is a great question, and I really agree with the way that you put the problem. I think that you have to begin from the fact that you began with, which is these are ambitious people. Members of Congress are ambitious, smart men and women. I know they can look like clowns from a distance, and a few of them are clowns, maybe, but they're pretty impressive people, and they're going to do what it takes to succeed. The question is, what does it take to succeed? What is the definition of success that they're operating with? I think a lot of that is a function of the kinds of incentives that the political system sets up for them. And in this moment, a lot of the definition of success involves having a prominent place in our political theater, which is a very, very fragmented, partisan theater, and looking like you are doing a great job of speaking for the team. So every member wants to be seen as the person who really says that thing that the left doesn't want to hear if you're a Republican member. They define success by social media following by their prominence in the cable news outlets that matter to their older voters. They don't define their success as much by legislative work. By what can you bring home? In a funny way, the media environment they operate in has been both nationalized and fragmented. You're not trying to look good on the national news so much as to look good on to the particular social media influencer that your most devoted primary voters follow. And that's created a set of incentives that is distant from legislative work. And it's left a lot of members with a sense that investing themselves in their committee work is a waste of time. And so members who are ambitious are channeling their ambition in a direction that seems like it can lead to success. And I think that does create a variety of kind of deformations of legislative work that from the vantage point of our system of government makes these members seem to be doing very strange things. Foreign.

Samantha Shea (50:52)

Hi, it's Samantha Shea from Wirecutter, the product recommendation service from the New York Times. We all know those people who are simply impossible to shop for. At Wirecutter, we have a huge collection of gift guides to help you find the perfect present. We test everything we recommend, from an ice cream subscription to a back massager to a trio of succulents. We believe there's a perfect gift for everyone, and Wirecutter can help you find it. Check out all our gift guides@nytimes.com giftguides this time of year, a good hoodie is absolutely essential, and the American Giant Classic Full Zip hoodie is made to last a lifetime. With timeless style, heavyweight fleece, and durable details. You can depend on it for years to come. Snag the hoodie that will bring you comfort for life. The American giant classic full zip and save. 20% off your first order at american-giant.com when you use code classic24 at checkout, that's 20% off your first order at American-giant.com, code classic24.

Yuval Levin (51:57)

I wonder how true you think this idea is. I think that at least Donald Trump is somewhat afraid of Congress And I think he's afraid of Congress because he is somebody who performs the presidency first and foremost, performs kingship in a way, first and foremost. And so executive orders look great. Threatening tariffs against Columbia, that's very potent and powerful. But Congress is a morass, particularly when you have very narrow majorities. His biggest defeats in his first term were there, I mean, very famously losing on Obamacare appeal again and again, finally, in that very dramatic moment When Justice John McCain shuffles onto the floor and gives the thumbs down. And there's, I think, also a paradox for modern presidents working with Congress. And Biden, who actually did get some quite big bills done and a number of bipartisan bills done, I think understood this quite well, which is that the more central the president is to a bargaining effort or to a legislative effort, the less likely that effort is to be bipartisan. So Francis Lee, the political scientist, has done work showing this to be true, but I think it's also intuitive. The more a bill is going to make Joe Biden seem like a powerful, heroic figure, the less likely Republicans are to support it. The more a bill is going to make Donald Trump seem like the greatest president ever, the less likely Democrats are to support it. So a lot of what Biden did that was effective in getting things passed in Congress was actually being quite quiet. Some of this might have been age, but whether it was all age or it was also strategy, it ended up being adaptive. He didn't put himself at the center of things. And so things like the chips and science bill got done, the infrastructure bill got done. I mean, he wasn't out there in an aggressive way making things about himself. In the second term, Barack Obama tried something very similar, having noticed this dynamic in his first. And for Trump, this is lethal. This is actually in tension with the way I think he thinks his presidency is supposed to look. The process you're describing that could get him a bipartisan tax bill is a process where he is not out there seeming like he is in control of the tax bill and yelling at anybody and dominating anybody who won't vote for it. There is a genuine tension between, I think the desire to be seen in the moment as strong and the desire to go and actually work successfully with Congress.

Ezra Klein (54:32)

I think that's a great insight. And I think people are really understating the possibility that Republicans just won't be able to pass a reconciliation bill in this Congress. They just simply won't be able to patch it together. They have a three vote majority in the House, so what are they going to do? About tax reform? What are they going to do about renewing the expiring elements of the 2017 tax bill? It's entirely possible that ultimately the only way to do that will be through some bipartisan bill. But they're proceeding now as if that's not even a possibility. It gets back to the question we took up earlier about just what it means to be strong as a president. And this is actually a very long standing problem for American presidents. In the very first presidential administration, when George Washington was president, Alexander Hamilton started out just writing legislation, and he wrote these big bills on how to arrange the American economy. And the response that he got before things really broke down between him and James Madison was Madison saying, if you let us work this out, we're going to end up in a similar place, but we'll own it. And people aren't going to feel like they're voting on Alexander Hamilton's bill. Let Congress do this. Halder didn't agree, and it created enormous problems for him and ultimately had a very bad effect on his own political future. And ever since then, there's been this irony that the president is often strongest when he sets the basic parameters and says, look, if the bill doesn't do this, then I'll veto it, but otherwise Congress works it out. And I think our modern presidents in particular have so internalized this kind of deformed sense of their role that they don't see that ultimately their success depends on legislative action. They think they can be remembered for being great presidents for their administrative actions, and it's just not true. Who are the modern presidents we think highly of? It's FDR and the New Deal. What was the New Deal? The New Deal was legislation. What was the Great Society? Great Society was not a set of administrative actions. It was big bills that the President shepherded through. He certainly gave them a lot of direction, but there was a lot of negotiation that was not about him in that process. Ronald Reagan's tax bill was not just Ronald Reagan's tax bill. And a lot of Democrats voted for that bill because they were involved in negotiating it, and they got some things they wanted in it. And at the end of the day, we call it Ronald Reagan's tax bill anyway, because we remember our presidents for the legislative achievements that their leadership makes possible. And often that leadership is a kind of careful direction from a distance.

Yuval Levin (57:24)

There is a theory here, I think, among Trump's allies about what would make him successful in Congress. And maybe it goes a little bit to your point about vetoes earlier, but it's that he never loses. And so it's known that Elon Musk might fund primary challenges against members of Congress who vote against Trump's Cabinet appointees. You're hearing similar things from other allies of RFK Jr. Now, right? If any Republican votes against RFK Jr. Even though RFK Jr. Is not maybe still a Republican, but certainly wasn't a year ago, that they will face incredible ire, there's a view that what they should do is terrify Congress into Republicans in Congress, in this case into obeying Trump. And I really wonder how well this has been thought through because Trump makes some bad decisions. And there is other wisdom that comes from other parts of the political system. And this idea that you're going to cow the rest of the party, which I think you could do. I think Trump is so strong in the party you really could do it. I mean, maybe you get your budget reconciliation bill by just forcing it through over all these people, but then you have opened up all the vulnerabilities that maybe all these members of Congress are trying to protect you from. I'm not sure it is a good idea for Donald Trump to have RFK Jr. As HHS secretary. If bird flu jumps into human to human transmission, I'm not sure it is a good idea, given the fiscal situation the country is in, to have an unpaid for tax bill. My old colleague Matt Iglesias has been making this point that in many ways Joe Manchin probably saved Democrats from a much worse situation, that he was taking inflation very seriously much earlier than they were and them spending trillions more dollars would probably have looked significantly worse, not significantly better. And that there was actually information coming from where Joe Manchin representing a very different constituency than most Democrats did from what he was saying. And I'm not a fan of every view Joe Manchin has, but I do think there's validity to this view that you get information from the negotiations with Congress and the people representing different constituencies who are up in different elections are telling you things you actually need to hear. And I'm watching the Trump administration build a system to make sure it doesn't hear any of that.

Ezra Klein (59:52)

I think this gets at actually a very deep point about the lesson to be learned from Trump's first time around. I think the people around President Trump and Trump himself have come to the conclusion that what didn't work last time had to do with Trump being restrained. That where they failed was because they had kind of traditional Republicans in various places and their sense that they walked away with was when he was restrained, he didn't succeed. And if he could just be himself, he would do a lot better. I think that's exactly the wrong lesson to draw from the successes and failures of Trump's first time around, and that where he actually did well was where he pressed those traditional kind of Republicans, and they pressed him. And you ended up in a place where some of his distinctly populist approach was able to influence their more traditional conservative approach. And the result landed in a place that worked. I think that's what the tax bill looks like. That's what some of his foreign policy moves look like. But their sense is we just have to have a purer Trumpism. And so this time around, the insistence on loyalty, on being part of the team, is really intense. You see that in their hiring, you see that in their senior appointments. They're really placing an enormous premium, not on having the experience to run this department, but on never saying no to Donald Trump. I think they're gonna pay a heavy price for that, because nobody's always right, and certainly Donald Trump's not always right. The sense that if I step up and say, I don't know, this one's not a good idea, that I'm gonna be treated like a traitor and ultimately I'll be out of here, is very bad for decision making in any institution, in any situation, but it's certainly very bad in a presidential administration. So, for example, let's think again about the effects of the order to suspend all federal grants. Think about that guy who runs that Medicaid portal, and he's sitting there thinking, does this mean I should shut down Medicaid payments? That can't be right. That guy should call somebody and say, is this what it means? I don't think that's a good idea. But if that guy thinks, well, they're just going to call me a wimp, they're going to call me a squish and fire me, then he's not going to do it. And you've lost the ability to administer well by hearing from people on the ground. I think that's going to repeat itself over and over in an administration that doesn't value hearing from outsiders. And again, the assertion of strength creates weakness. And the sense that what's required to succeed is pushing people around isn't really how any good decision making can work. It certainly isn't how our system can work. And I think it's going to create a lot of problems.

Yuval Levin (62:47)

You've written that American constitutionalism requires a distinctly Republican virtue and cannot do without it, what does that mean?

Ezra Klein (62:57)

Republicanism is a very hard term for us to define. Now. A lot of what it used to mean has been taken over by other terms like democracy and liberalism. But the element of Republicanism that's distinct to it is the element of ownership. How do we take ownership of a set of problems rather than who's going to show up and fix this problem for me? And a citizenship that thinks that way is going to think about the kinds of leaders it selects in terms of the sorts of offices we're asking them to fill. And that means that we think about whether we should elect this person based on some judgment of whether this person can do this particular job. That means we need to know the Constitution a little bit. We need to know what the job is. We need to know what we expect of them. I think Americans have generally been fairly good at this, but that it is a skill, a knack we've tended to lose. For the reason you pointed to earlier, which is we just think as partisans now. We think, is this guy on my team or not? Rather than can this person really be president or not or a senator or not?

Yuval Levin (63:59)

How much is the virtue dimension of this meaningful? And I ask this obviously about Donald Trump because he is a person of a distinctive character. You've written there's no getting around the disgrace involved in bringing Donald Trump back to the White House. And I think there have been two understandings of him on this margin. One is that it is unfortunate that Donald Trump often acts the way he does and speaks the way he does, ways that we would not be happy with if they were coming from a colleague or a family member. I think over time, another view of him has come to dominate, that this is actually a kind of virtue, a throwback to older, more masculine virtues, that he's strong, that he's willing to be in conflict, that he never gives up, that he won't be muzzled. Right. That he'll say things that even other people think are offensive. And as that has come to be the dominant view of him, and as his success has been quite undeniable, you've seen much of his party begin to adopt his character, even when it's an awkward fit. I mean, this goes back to people like Ted Cruz who begin to sound more like Donald Trump. But J.D. vance is a person who sounded very different a decade ago. A lot of the people around him begin to try on parts of his character for size. Now, I think people are looking for that in who they're going to appoint to different Parts of the administrative state. How do you think about virtue and character here in not necessarily the grand moral order of things, though I care about that. But in the success of presidencies, yeah.

Ezra Klein (65:36)

I think it's absolutely central. Character is destiny. I think there's no getting away from character. And the basic reason, especially in the president, the basic reason, is that every presidential administration ends up having the personality and character of the president. There is a way in which the Bush administration just had George Bush's personality. The Obama administration had the kind of feel of Barack Obama at every level. And it's very hard to avoid that. That was certainly true of the Trump administration the first time around. The chaos, the impulsivity, the kind of gruffness was everywhere. It wasn't just him. And it will be again, because there's no getting around that. The presidency is a one person branch of government. And that means that ultimately the character of the president matters enormously. The character of Congress is a kind of average of 535people. The character of the president is one person's character. And that means that we need in our presidents the kind of character that we want from the executive branch. This isn't an ideological thing. There are conservative and progressive ways to have the right character to be our president. But it is really a matter of character. And so to my mind, look, there are a lot of things that the Trump administration did the first time and will do this time that I agree with as a matter of policy. But the fundamental problem of character cannot be gotten over. It is not ignorable. And I think that it therefore is a permanent problem with Donald Trump being president. There's no way around it.

Yuval Levin (67:11)

I think that insight also goes to decision making. When I think back to, say, the Obama administration, Barack Obama is a person who likes to make decisions through lengthy intellectual argument, hearing from both sides, a lot of evidence brought to bear. And so the administration begins to take on the character at sort of all levels. You learn how to appeal to the principal, even if you're not in meetings with them all that often. You see the people above you who have learned that you're mimicking them. You're trying to make arguments that are going to appeal to them. So the Obama administration, over time develops this very intellectualized dynamic. It creates in some ways both an affection for and then a backlash to technocracy. Donald Trump is a very different thing that follows him. Biden is very coalitional. It's become a big critique of his administration. I think it's accurate that particularly on domestic Policy. They just didn't want anybody in their coalition to be upset. And so things were unfocused, not that well communicated. Hard choices weren't always made. But they did keep a pretty big tent in the Democratic Party, ranging from Bernie Sanders on one end to Joe Manchin on the other. Largely together with Donald Trump, the way he makes decisions, the way people appeal to him, is being out on television showing you can mix it up and be in the fight by showing that you're dominant. I think that is going to permeate, because the people who will get selected for aren't just of a certain character, but they adopt a certain approach to winning arguments and winning power. And it's the approach that Trump himself responds to, and that is a little bit erratic. It is about the person often much more than the point. People in his own administration team don't know where he'll fall on issues constantly and are surprised where he ends up. And so it has a lot to do with who can sort of win him over. And he responds to things that are much more transactional. And there's a culture of any organization, culture of any corporation. And the culture, I think, ultimately reflects the way the person in charge of it makes their decisions. And even if you think Trump himself has a sort of guttural, mystical instinct that has served him very well, and a lot of people I know do think that, I think that's a strong claim to make about everybody who will serve under him.

Ezra Klein (69:33)

I think this actually also gets to the character of presidential strength in an important way. And it was a problem for Biden and for Trump. A president is strong internally within the executive branch when the second tier political appointee knows what the president would do if he were in his job. The president doesn't want to think about what the undersecretary for blah, blah, blah, and the Department of Labor is thinking about that day. But that person needs to have a sense that if the president were in this room, I basically know what he would say. And if you don't have that sense, it's very, very hard to make those small decisions that are essential to the big things working. I think both Trump and Biden had enormous trouble helping those people know what they would say. It wasn't that hard in the Obama years. It wasn't that hard in the Bush years. If you're sitting in some secondary office at hhs. I had this experience myself in the Bush years. You kind of know if the president was here, he would go this way, not that way. And nobody thinks that way explicitly, but it's how you actually do your job. I think in the Biden administration, it was hard to know because the president didn't really express clear priorities about anything. It was very hard to know what mattered to him and where he would fall. And I think because he was so coalitional, nobody in those lower tiers could really have a clear sense of, like, well, this really matters to the president. He would do this and not that. The problem with Trump was that he could go either way on anything at any time. And even if he's stated a clear position, he could say the opposite the next day. And there's this kind of paralyzing fear of making a choice that then gets you tweeted about and getting on the wrong side of the president because you just have no idea where he's going to be. This was an enormous problem. People throughout the government were much more afraid of getting on the wrong side of him than they were eager to advance his priorities. That is an enormous problem for effective presidential leadership. And I think that, as a practical matter, it made both Trump and Biden very weak presidents, probably the weakest presidents in the modern era, both of them, because it was very hard for them to exert authority in a concerted, focused way that was durable.

Yuval Levin (71:48)

You're a very measured person. This conversation, in a way that I think is helpful for this moment, has had a very measured tone. I would not say in the hours I've spent out of this recording room, I've been feeling all that measured. And for all that we're talking about the ways that bad process or poor character or unclear incentives can hobble decision making across the administration. There is a play being made here. Chaos and control. They're going to try to push things very hard at the Supreme Court, and we don't really know what they're going to try to do. But some of the things we've seen, I think, have been very concerning. The January 6th pardons, including of people who are violent on January 6th. The removal of security from people like Mike Pompeo and John Bolton and Anthony Fauci, which I think is really profoundly grotesque, given that Donald Trump himself almost died by an assassin's bullet, making it more likelier that people you don't like will die from an assassin's bullet is really quite a way to impose punishment and consequences. What would make you unmeasured as they're trying. I believe they're trying to really change the system of government here. What would, if you saw it, really frighten you? Make you think this is not just the normal surrealism of an early administration, but actually the emergence of something we've seen in other countries, which is some kind of breakthrough to another equilibrium?

Ezra Klein (73:15)

Yeah, it's a very important question. And my biggest fear is the administration deciding not to abide by court orders. What they're doing so far is legitimate, whether you agree with it or not, it's operating within the system. And then a court said no, and they pulled it back, and they're going to try again, and they'll push and pull. And that's how our system works. It's fine that it makes people uneasy, and a lot of what they're pushing makes people uneasy for substantive ideological reasons. And that's how politics works. But when the boundaries of the system itself are under threat. And again, this is why it's important to think in constitutional terms. It's not about the politics, but it's about the constitutional structure that keeps things in order. I think the biggest threat there are a number of ways that that could be threatened. The denial of an election result, for example, was a very important way in which that was threatened. And I think what happened after the 2020 election should have rendered Donald Trump ineligible for reelection and should have made voters not want to reelect them. And that's not what the American public thought. That worries me. But if the administration openly defies a court order, then I think we are in a different situation.

Yuval Levin (74:33)

Do you take it as an intellectual current that you have to be in conversation with or in conflict with in conservatism? So, JD Vance is a very, very smart person. I don't think anybody can deny that he's had a very profound conversion, I guess we'll call it, in recent years. And a couple years ago, he was on podcast saying that he would advise Donald Trump to say, as has been said before, the Chief justice has made his ruling. Now let him enforce it. Now, again, it's not clear they'll do that, but Vance is one of many on the right who seem to have moved into a view that the only way to save the Republic is to take it back over. I take this, I guess, seriously as an intellectual argument. I think if you read the Claremont Review, if you're attuned to sort of currents in the New Right, that this is an intellectual argument that is trying to challenge other visions of how our country should work, that things have gone so far that they have gotten so distant from correctly reflecting the common man or who is put in this story as a common man, that Extraordinary and emergency measures are warranted. That Donald Trump, for all his faults, is a kind of spirit summoned by the age when something out of the ordinary is demanded if we are to save what this republic once was. I'm sure you see this around you. I'm sure you see it in young people on the right. I'm curious how you have absorbed it as a. As an intellectual competitor to the things that you and others in your coalition have been saying for a long time that they now seem to many of these people to be too soft for the age we actually live in.

Ezra Klein (76:16)

Yeah, it's certainly alive and out there, but I would say that there's often a tendency on all sides of our politics to attribute so much strength and success to the other side that it justifies breaking the system, that that's the only possible response. That's been a relatively common refrain on the left, too. And there are a lot of people on the left who talk about throwing away the Constitution. Some of them are law professors at Harvard and Yale and who just talk openly about the need to abandon our constitutional system and the illegitimacy of it. There are certainly voices like that now on the right. I actually would not put J.D. vance in that category. I don't think that's right. And I should say I have a lot of respect and regard for J.D. vance. I think he's a serious person in our politics who we should take seriously. But there are such things.

Yuval Levin (77:08)

What did you think then when he said that he would advise Donald Trump to defy a Supreme Court order? I mean, that is a thing he said.

Ezra Klein (77:17)

I mean, it's not exactly what he said, but it doesn't matter. I mean, I would say that reference to that apocryphal Andrew Jackson line points in a very bad direction. I disagree with it. There are a lot of things that he's argued that I don't agree with. But I don't think that you should put J.D. vance in the category of people who want to throw away the American Constitution. That's not my sense. I could be wrong, but it's not my sense. There certainly are some people on the right, including younger people as well as older people, who make the argument that we are already in a post constitutional moment and that therefore it doesn't make sense for us to stick to the constraints of the Constitution if the other side's not going to do it. I think they're wrong about the other side. They're overstating the strength of the left. They're overstating the aggressiveness of the left. They're overstating the success of the left. The left is weak, too, and failing too, and can't seem to win a durable majority either. And therefore I also don't think they're right in their prescription. These, to my mind, do not seem like serious arguments, but they need to be answered because they are out there. It's a reason why it's necessary now to remind people of the argument for the American system. It's an argument that begins from the premise that we're not always going to agree in our country, and we need a system that allows us to act together even when we don't all think alike, and that that system is what our Constitution provides. And throwing away this system is extremely dangerous to the fundamental rights that we all think are most important. That's an argument that I have to make to younger people now. I think it's always important to make that argument, but it's certainly under assault in a way that's different from at least what I experienced on the right 15 and 20 years ago.

Yuval Levin (79:01)

I think that's a good place to end, always. Our final question, what are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

Ezra Klein (79:07)

So three books these days I think about this in terms of how to think more clearly about the situation we're in. So one book that comes to mind for me is a book called the Rhetorical Presidency, written by a political scientist named Jeffrey tulis back in 1987. It's a book that I've just kept coming back to in recent years and really offers a very profound way to understand the evolution of the presidency. A second book is about Congress. It's a book by Philip Wallach, a colleague of mine at the American Enterprise Institute, published just a couple years ago. It's called why Congress and is really a wonderful argument about the reasons for the centrality of the national legislature in our national politics. I think it's a book that every member and staffer should read, but that a lot of Americans should read just to understand the logic of why Article 1 is Article 1 in the American Constitution. A third book that comes to mind is a recent book just published at the end of last year by Christine Rosen called the Extinction of Experience, which is really about the ways in which modern technology has changed the basics of everyday human experience, the kinds of things that. But when you first encounter them, they seem like familiar cliches of our time. But when you think them through and see them in some historical context, and Christine Rosen is a historian, you really see how and why our culture has taken some of the peculiar turns that it's taken and why modern life can be so confusing and bizarre. I think together these three books are just a way to think about this moment with a little bit of perspective, which can certainly help in a time that it seems like it's out of control.

Yuval Levin (80:48)

Yuval11 thank you very much.

Ezra Klein (80:50)

Thanks so much, Ezra.

Yuval Levin (81:10)

This episode of the Ezra Klein show is produced by Elias isquith and Jack McCordick, fact checking by Michelle Harris, mixing by Isaac Jones with Afim Shapiro and Amin Sahota. Our supervising editor is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Roland Hu and Kristin Lin. We have original Music by Pat McCusker, Audience Strategy by Christina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie Rose Strasser.

Samantha Shea (81:50)

Work Management Platforms Ugh, red tape, endless adoption time. IT bottlenecks. And after all that, nobody really uses them. But what if you didn't hate your work platform? What if you actually loved it? Monday.com work management platform is different. You can make any changes you want and adapt it to your needs in an instant. No IT middlemen, no admin overlords. Less roadblocks, more highways. Add to that the beautiful dashboards that give you a real time broad view of all your work and what do you get? Easy peasy adoption. Because people actually want to use it. Monday.com, the first work platform you'll love to use.